The adoption of cloud technologies is steadily increasing. In such systems, applications can benefit from nearly infinite virtual resources on a pay-per-use basis. However, being the cloud massively multi-tenant and characterized by highly variable workloads the development of more and more effective provisioning policies assumes paramount importance. Boosted by the success of the cloud, the application of Game Theory models and methodologies has also become popular, since they have been demonstrated to suit perfectly to cloud social, economic, and strategic structures. This paper aims to study, model and efficiently solve the cost minimization problem associated with the service provisioning of SaaS virtual machines in multiple IaaSs. We propose a game-theoretic approach for the runtime management of resources from multiple IaaS providers to be allocated to multiple competing SaaSs, along with a cost model including revenues and penalties for requests execution failures. A distributed algorithm for identifying Generalized Nash Equilibria has been developed and analysed in detail. The effectiveness of our approach has been assessed by performing a wide set of analyses under multiple workload conditions. Results show that our algorithm is scalable and provides significant cost savings with respect to alternative methods (80 percent on average). Furthermore, increasing the number of IaaS providers SaaSs can achieve 9-15 percent cost savings from the workload distribution on multiple IaaSs.

Ardagna, D., Ciavotta, M., Passacantando, M. (2017). Generalized Nash Equilibria for the Service Provisioning Problem in Multi-Cloud Systems. IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SERVICES COMPUTING, 10(3), 381-395 [10.1109/TSC.2015.2477836].

Generalized Nash Equilibria for the Service Provisioning Problem in Multi-Cloud Systems

Ciavotta, M;Passacantando, M
2017

Abstract

The adoption of cloud technologies is steadily increasing. In such systems, applications can benefit from nearly infinite virtual resources on a pay-per-use basis. However, being the cloud massively multi-tenant and characterized by highly variable workloads the development of more and more effective provisioning policies assumes paramount importance. Boosted by the success of the cloud, the application of Game Theory models and methodologies has also become popular, since they have been demonstrated to suit perfectly to cloud social, economic, and strategic structures. This paper aims to study, model and efficiently solve the cost minimization problem associated with the service provisioning of SaaS virtual machines in multiple IaaSs. We propose a game-theoretic approach for the runtime management of resources from multiple IaaS providers to be allocated to multiple competing SaaSs, along with a cost model including revenues and penalties for requests execution failures. A distributed algorithm for identifying Generalized Nash Equilibria has been developed and analysed in detail. The effectiveness of our approach has been assessed by performing a wide set of analyses under multiple workload conditions. Results show that our algorithm is scalable and provides significant cost savings with respect to alternative methods (80 percent on average). Furthermore, increasing the number of IaaS providers SaaSs can achieve 9-15 percent cost savings from the workload distribution on multiple IaaSs.
Articolo in rivista - Articolo scientifico
Cloud computing; game theory; generalized Nash equilibrium;
English
2017
10
3
381
395
partially_open
Ardagna, D., Ciavotta, M., Passacantando, M. (2017). Generalized Nash Equilibria for the Service Provisioning Problem in Multi-Cloud Systems. IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SERVICES COMPUTING, 10(3), 381-395 [10.1109/TSC.2015.2477836].
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/10281/185553
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