Constitutional structures shape politicians’ behaviour and hence policy outcomes through the different incentives schemes that they generate. In this paper we analyse these mechanisms in parliamentary and presidential systems. The comparison is carried out by analysing how the two systems may select the efficient policy in the presence of asymmetric information. Presidential and parliamentary systems differ in that the policy proposed by the executive in the parliamentary system is confidence-dependent and observable. The main findings suggest that the parliament responds better to the incentive scheme in the presidential system due to the lower uncertainty faced by legislators over their term limit. However, the parliamentary system generates a more efficient behaviour of the executive due to selection and disciplining effects.

Cella, M., Iannantuoni, G., Manzoni, E. (2017). Do the Right Thing: Incentives for Policy Selection in Presidential and Parliamentary Systems. ECONOMICA, 84(335), 430-453 [10.1111/ecca.12236].

Do the Right Thing: Incentives for Policy Selection in Presidential and Parliamentary Systems

CELLA, MICHELA
Primo
;
IANNANTUONI, GIOVANNA
Secondo
;
MANZONI, ELENA
Ultimo
2017

Abstract

Constitutional structures shape politicians’ behaviour and hence policy outcomes through the different incentives schemes that they generate. In this paper we analyse these mechanisms in parliamentary and presidential systems. The comparison is carried out by analysing how the two systems may select the efficient policy in the presence of asymmetric information. Presidential and parliamentary systems differ in that the policy proposed by the executive in the parliamentary system is confidence-dependent and observable. The main findings suggest that the parliament responds better to the incentive scheme in the presidential system due to the lower uncertainty faced by legislators over their term limit. However, the parliamentary system generates a more efficient behaviour of the executive due to selection and disciplining effects.
Articolo in rivista - Articolo scientifico
comparative institutions, presidential system, parliamentary system, efficency
English
2017
84
335
430
453
partially_open
Cella, M., Iannantuoni, G., Manzoni, E. (2017). Do the Right Thing: Incentives for Policy Selection in Presidential and Parliamentary Systems. ECONOMICA, 84(335), 430-453 [10.1111/ecca.12236].
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/10281/152529
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