We study the problem of dissolving a partnership when agents have unequal endowments. Agents bid on the price of the entire partnership. The highest bidder is awarded the partnership and buys out her partners' shares at a per-unit price that is a function of the two highest bids. We show that there exists no price-setting mechanism satisfying certain mild regularity properties that is ex-post efficient, for any common prior of valuations. This result sharply contrasts the equal-endowment case in which efficient dissolution of the sort we are examining is possible through a simple k-double auction, as suggested by Cramton et al. (1987). © 2010 Elsevier B.V
Athanasoglou, S., Brams, S., & Sethuraman, J. (2010). A note on the inefficiency of bidding over the price of a share. MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES, 60(3), 191-195.
Citazione: | Athanasoglou, S., Brams, S., & Sethuraman, J. (2010). A note on the inefficiency of bidding over the price of a share. MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES, 60(3), 191-195. |
Tipo: | Articolo in rivista - Articolo scientifico |
Carattere della pubblicazione: | Scientifica |
Presenza di un coautore afferente ad Istituzioni straniere: | Si |
Titolo: | A note on the inefficiency of bidding over the price of a share |
Autori: | Athanasoglou, S; Brams, S; Sethuraman, J |
Autori: | |
Data di pubblicazione: | 2010 |
Lingua: | English |
Rivista: | MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES |
Digital Object Identifier (DOI): | http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2010.08.003 |
Appare nelle tipologie: | 01 - Articolo su rivista |