Consider a collection of m indivisible objects to be allocated to n agents, where m≥n. Each agent falls in one of two distinct categories: either he (a) has a complete ordinal ranking over the set of individual objects, or (b) has a set of "plausible" benchmark von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) utility functions in whose positive span his "true" utility is known to lie. An allocation is undominated if there does not exist a preference-compatible profile of vNM utilities at which it is Pareto dominated by another feasible allocation. Given an undominated allocation, we use the tools of linear duality theory to construct a profile of vNM utilities at which it is ex-ante welfare maximizing. A finite set of preference-compatible vNM utility profiles is exhibited such that every undominated allocation is ex-ante welfare maximizing with respect to at least one of them. Given an arbitrary allocation, we provide an interpretation of the constructed vNM utilities as subgradients of a function which measures worst-case domination. © 2011 Elsevier B.V.
Athanasoglou, S. (2011). Efficiency under a combination of ordinal and cardinal information on preferences. JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS, 47(2), 180-185.
|Citazione:||Athanasoglou, S. (2011). Efficiency under a combination of ordinal and cardinal information on preferences. JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS, 47(2), 180-185.|
|Tipo:||Articolo in rivista - Articolo scientifico|
|Carattere della pubblicazione:||Scientifica|
|Presenza di un coautore afferente ad Istituzioni straniere:||No|
|Titolo:||Efficiency under a combination of ordinal and cardinal information on preferences|
|Data di pubblicazione:||2011|
|Rivista:||JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS|
|Digital Object Identifier (DOI):||http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2011.02.001|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||01 - Articolo su rivista|