The view that takes laws of nature to be essentially nothing more than descriptions of facts is still rather popular. The present article, on the contrary, defends the claim that the only real motivation for defending a descriptive view of laws—the quest for ontological parsimony—entails too high a price to pay in philosophical terms. It is argued that nomic primitivism, namely the alternative option that takes laws to be primitive fundamental entities in our ontology, is decisively more appealing, since it is the crucial role assigned to laws that makes a scientific theory of natural phenomena a system rather than a list. Finally, the implications that nomic primitivism might have for the issue of the status of the wave function in that particular formulation of quantum mechanics known as Bohmian mechanics are considered.

Laudisa, F. (2015). Laws Are Not Descriptions. INTERNATIONAL STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE, 29(3), 251-270 [10.1080/02698595.2015.1179038].

Laws Are Not Descriptions

Laudisa, F
2015

Abstract

The view that takes laws of nature to be essentially nothing more than descriptions of facts is still rather popular. The present article, on the contrary, defends the claim that the only real motivation for defending a descriptive view of laws—the quest for ontological parsimony—entails too high a price to pay in philosophical terms. It is argued that nomic primitivism, namely the alternative option that takes laws to be primitive fundamental entities in our ontology, is decisively more appealing, since it is the crucial role assigned to laws that makes a scientific theory of natural phenomena a system rather than a list. Finally, the implications that nomic primitivism might have for the issue of the status of the wave function in that particular formulation of quantum mechanics known as Bohmian mechanics are considered.
Articolo in rivista - Articolo scientifico
Laws of nature, Humean supervenience, quantum mechanics, Bohmian mechanics
English
2015
29
3
251
270
none
Laudisa, F. (2015). Laws Are Not Descriptions. INTERNATIONAL STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE, 29(3), 251-270 [10.1080/02698595.2015.1179038].
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/10281/127555
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