This commentary focuses on Machery's eliminativist claim, that concept ought to be eliminated from the theoretical vocabulary of psychology because it fails to denote a natural kind. I argue for the more traditional view that concepts are a functional kind, which provides the simplest account of the empirical evidence discussed by Machery. Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010.

Lalumera, E. (2010). Concepts are a functional kind. BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES, 33(2-3), 217-218 [10.1017/S0140525X10000403].

Concepts are a functional kind

LALUMERA, ELISABETTA
2010

Abstract

This commentary focuses on Machery's eliminativist claim, that concept ought to be eliminated from the theoretical vocabulary of psychology because it fails to denote a natural kind. I argue for the more traditional view that concepts are a functional kind, which provides the simplest account of the empirical evidence discussed by Machery. Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010.
Articolo in rivista - Articolo scientifico
concepts, categorization, natural kind, philosophy, eliminativism
English
2010
33
2-3
217
218
none
Lalumera, E. (2010). Concepts are a functional kind. BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES, 33(2-3), 217-218 [10.1017/S0140525X10000403].
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/10281/10697
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