This work is intended to be a first step in analyzing optimal harvesting policies under the assumption of uncertainty about the time of extinction. In general, we find the expected result that a higher hazard rate results in more vigorous harvesting. When we allow the hazard rate to depend only on time, it is shown that changing beliefs about the survival rates of the resource may account for the nonmonotonic behavior which is often observed.

Stefani, S., Salchenberger, L. (1991). Economic planning and uncertainty in renewable resources. In R. Hamalainen, H. Ehtamo (a cura di), Dynamic Games in Economic Analysis (pp. 102-111). Heidelberg/Berlin : Springer [10.1007/BFb0006233].

Economic planning and uncertainty in renewable resources

STEFANI, SILVANA;
1991

Abstract

This work is intended to be a first step in analyzing optimal harvesting policies under the assumption of uncertainty about the time of extinction. In general, we find the expected result that a higher hazard rate results in more vigorous harvesting. When we allow the hazard rate to depend only on time, it is shown that changing beliefs about the survival rates of the resource may account for the nonmonotonic behavior which is often observed.
Capitolo o saggio
Renewables, optimal control, planning
English
Dynamic Games in Economic Analysis
978-3-540-53785-4
Stefani, S., Salchenberger, L. (1991). Economic planning and uncertainty in renewable resources. In R. Hamalainen, H. Ehtamo (a cura di), Dynamic Games in Economic Analysis (pp. 102-111). Heidelberg/Berlin : Springer [10.1007/BFb0006233].
Stefani, S; Salchenberger, L
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/10281/10412
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