Most of the voting models limit their analysis to the investigation of symmetric equilibria where "similar" voters make "similar" voting decisions. In this paper we examine the validity of this restriction in a model with costly plurality voting. We first show that in any pure strategy equilibrium every two individuals who have the same preferences and participate in elections, would vote for the same candidate. However, this result does not hold for mixed strategies equilibria.
Most of the voting models limit their analysis to the investigation of symmetric equilibria where similar voters make similar voting decisions. In this paper we examine the validity of this restriction in a model with costly plurality voting. We first show that in any pure strategy equilibrium every two individuals who have the same preferences and participate in elections, would vote for the same candidate. However, this result does not hold for mixed strategies equilibria.
De Sinopoli, F., & Iannantuoni, G. (2007). Asymmetric equilibria in a model with costly voting. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY, 9(1), 29-40 [10.1111/j.1467-9779.2007.00296.x].
Asymmetric equilibria in a model with costly voting
IANNANTUONI, GIOVANNA
2007
Abstract
Most of the voting models limit their analysis to the investigation of symmetric equilibria where "similar" voters make "similar" voting decisions. In this paper we examine the validity of this restriction in a model with costly plurality voting. We first show that in any pure strategy equilibrium every two individuals who have the same preferences and participate in elections, would vote for the same candidate. However, this result does not hold for mixed strategies equilibria.
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
