In this paper we show that in a simple spatial model where the government is chosen under strict proportional rule, if the outcome function is a linear combination of parties' positions, with coefficient equal to their shares of votes, essentially only a two-party equilibrium exists. The two parties taking a positive number of votes are the two extremist ones. Applications of this result include an extension of the well-known Alesina and Rosenthal model of divided government as well as a modified version of Besley and Coate's model of representative democracy. © Springer-Verlag 2007.

In this paper we show that in a simple spatial model where the government is chosen under strict proportional rule, if the outcome function is a linear combination of parties' positions, with coefficient equal to their share of votes, essentially only a two-party equilibrium exists. The two parties taking a positive number of votes are the two extremist ones. Applications of this result include an extension of the well-known Alesina and Rosenthal model of divided government as well as a modified version of Besley and Coate's model of representative democracy.

De Sinopoli, F., & Iannantuoni, G. (2007). A spatial voting model where proportional rule leads to two-party equilibria. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY, 35(2), 267-286 [10.1007/s00182-006-0056-z].

A spatial voting model where proportional rule leads to two-party equilibria

IANNANTUONI, GIOVANNA
2007

Abstract

In this paper we show that in a simple spatial model where the government is chosen under strict proportional rule, if the outcome function is a linear combination of parties' positions, with coefficient equal to their shares of votes, essentially only a two-party equilibrium exists. The two parties taking a positive number of votes are the two extremist ones. Applications of this result include an extension of the well-known Alesina and Rosenthal model of divided government as well as a modified version of Besley and Coate's model of representative democracy. © Springer-Verlag 2007.
Articolo in rivista - Articolo scientifico
Scientifica
In this paper we show that in a simple spatial model where the government is chosen under strict proportional rule, if the outcome function is a linear combination of parties' positions, with coefficient equal to their share of votes, essentially only a two-party equilibrium exists. The two parties taking a positive number of votes are the two extremist ones. Applications of this result include an extension of the well-known Alesina and Rosenthal model of divided government as well as a modified version of Besley and Coate's model of representative democracy.
Nash equilibria; Proportional rule; Voting;
voting, proportional rule, Nash equilibria
English
267
286
De Sinopoli, F., & Iannantuoni, G. (2007). A spatial voting model where proportional rule leads to two-party equilibria. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY, 35(2), 267-286 [10.1007/s00182-006-0056-z].
De Sinopoli, F; Iannantuoni, G
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/10281/10320
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