In this paper we show that in a simple spatial model where the government is chosen under strict proportional rule, if the outcome function is a linear combination of parties' positions, with coefficient equal to their shares of votes, essentially only a two-party equilibrium exists. The two parties taking a positive number of votes are the two extremist ones. Applications of this result include an extension of the well-known Alesina and Rosenthal model of divided government as well as a modified version of Besley and Coate's model of representative democracy. © Springer-Verlag 2007.
In this paper we show that in a simple spatial model where the government is chosen under strict proportional rule, if the outcome function is a linear combination of parties' positions, with coefficient equal to their share of votes, essentially only a two-party equilibrium exists. The two parties taking a positive number of votes are the two extremist ones. Applications of this result include an extension of the well-known Alesina and Rosenthal model of divided government as well as a modified version of Besley and Coate's model of representative democracy.
De Sinopoli, F., & Iannantuoni, G. (2007). A spatial voting model where proportional rule leads to two-party equilibria. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY, 35(2), 267-286.
Citazione: | De Sinopoli, F., & Iannantuoni, G. (2007). A spatial voting model where proportional rule leads to two-party equilibria. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY, 35(2), 267-286. |
Tipo: | Articolo in rivista - Articolo scientifico |
Carattere della pubblicazione: | Scientifica |
Titolo: | A spatial voting model where proportional rule leads to two-party equilibria |
Autori: | De Sinopoli, F; Iannantuoni, G |
Autori: | |
Data di pubblicazione: | 2007 |
Lingua: | English |
Rivista: | INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY |
Digital Object Identifier (DOI): | http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00182-006-0056-z |
Appare nelle tipologie: | 01 - Articolo su rivista |