The principle of equality is certainly one of the most frequently debated legal concepts. Speculations on its meaning and the value to place on it have even led people to doubt its legal usefulness: for some it seems an empty and misleading idea that should be abandoned. People have tried to answer the difficulty of giving the principle in question its own content through the anti-discrimination law: differences were thus viewed as a deviance compared to a standard of “normality” resulting from the sedimentation of cultural paradigms, which have historically conditioned Western law. Anti-discrimination protection, however, as it has been developed from European law, threatens to turn into a boomerang to the detriment of those it seeks to protect. This approach to the principle of equality, in fact, turns out not to be very effective (as, for example, with controversial affirmative action such as “quote rosa” to promote women’s political representation), if not downright counterproductive for those who are cut off by the rigid classifications on which anti-discrimination law is based and are likely to remain without any protection (such as intersexual and transgender people, who overturn the traditional dichotomous categories of sex and gender). We therefore need to reflect once more on how to understand and implement equality, realizing that, after all, the anti-discrimination paradigm could be abandoned in favour of an interpretation in terms of non-subordination of the principle of equality, no longer tied to the categorization of differences but based on the more inclusive notion of valuing human dignity in practice, seen as the equal right of all to the affirmation and protection of their own identity, also and precisely by virtue of the differences that make each person an individual different from all others. Equality, in this sense, would not deny the differences (requiring them to adapt to the standard of normality) but would allow their legal assessment, combining the formal and substantive dimension of this principle in a complementary way. This understanding appears essential in order to attempt to meet the increasingly complex challenges of composite social realities, with the mixture of different cultural and religious traditions, and where individuals more and more rarely have clearly determined distinct and separate identities, but are characterized, on the contrary, by the coexistence of a plurality of different and heterogeneous cultural and personal traits.

Tra i concetti giuridici più dibattuti, sin quasi all’abuso, c’è certamente il principio di eguaglianza. Le speculazioni sul significato e sul valore da attribuirgli hanno fatto persino dubitare della sua utilità giuridica: per alcuni si tratterebbe di un’idea vuota e fuorviante da abbandonare. Alla difficoltà di consegnare un contenuto proprio al principio in parola si è cercato di dare una risposta attraverso lo strumento del diritto antidiscriminatorio: le differenze sono state così rimarcate come devianza rispetto ad uno standard di “normalità” frutto della sedimentazione dei paradigmi culturali, storicamente caratterizzanti il diritto occidentale. La tutela antidiscriminatoria, però, per come è venuta sviluppandosi a partire dal diritto europeo, rischia di trasformarsi in un boomerang a svantaggio proprio di coloro che vorrebbe proteggere. Questa declinazione del principio di eguaglianza, infatti, risulta essere poco efficace (si pensi alle controverse azioni positive come le “quote rosa” per favorire la rappresentanza politica femminile), se non addirittura controproducente per coloro che sono tagliati fuori dalle rigide classificazioni su cui il diritto antidiscriminatorio si fonda e che rischiano di rimanere privi di alcuna tutela (si pensi alle persone intersessuali e transgender che scombinano le tradizionali categorie dicotomiche di sesso e genere). Pertanto, è necessario tornare a riflettere sul modo di intendere e agire l’eguaglianza, rendendosi conto che tutto sommato il paradigma antidiscriminatorio potrebbe essere abbandonato in favore di una lettura in chiave di antisubordinazione del principio di eguaglianza, non più legata alla categorizzazione delle differenze ma fondata sulla nozione più inclusiva di dignità umana da valutarsi in concreto, configurandosi come l’eguale diritto di tutti all’affermazione e tutela della propria identità, anche e proprio in forza delle differenze che fanno di ciascuna persona un individuo diverso da tutti gli altri. L’eguaglianza, in questo senso, non negherebbe più le differenze (richiedendone l’omologazione allo standard di normalità) ma consentirebbe la loro valorizzazione giuridica, coniugando in modo complementare la dimensione formale e sostanziale di tale principio. Questa rilettura appare irrinunciabile per tentare di rispondere alle sfide sempre più complesse di realtà sociali composite, nella commistione di tradizioni culturali e religiose differenti, e laddove gli individui sempre più raramente hanno identità univocamente determinate, distinte e separate, caratterizzandosi al contrario per la coesistenza di una pluralità di tratti culturali e personali vari ed eterogenei.

(2015). Diffidando dell'eguaglianza. Gli effetti collaterali del diritto antidiscriminatorio. (Tesi di dottorato, Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca, 2015).

Diffidando dell'eguaglianza. Gli effetti collaterali del diritto antidiscriminatorio

GIACOMELLI, LUCA
2015

Abstract

The principle of equality is certainly one of the most frequently debated legal concepts. Speculations on its meaning and the value to place on it have even led people to doubt its legal usefulness: for some it seems an empty and misleading idea that should be abandoned. People have tried to answer the difficulty of giving the principle in question its own content through the anti-discrimination law: differences were thus viewed as a deviance compared to a standard of “normality” resulting from the sedimentation of cultural paradigms, which have historically conditioned Western law. Anti-discrimination protection, however, as it has been developed from European law, threatens to turn into a boomerang to the detriment of those it seeks to protect. This approach to the principle of equality, in fact, turns out not to be very effective (as, for example, with controversial affirmative action such as “quote rosa” to promote women’s political representation), if not downright counterproductive for those who are cut off by the rigid classifications on which anti-discrimination law is based and are likely to remain without any protection (such as intersexual and transgender people, who overturn the traditional dichotomous categories of sex and gender). We therefore need to reflect once more on how to understand and implement equality, realizing that, after all, the anti-discrimination paradigm could be abandoned in favour of an interpretation in terms of non-subordination of the principle of equality, no longer tied to the categorization of differences but based on the more inclusive notion of valuing human dignity in practice, seen as the equal right of all to the affirmation and protection of their own identity, also and precisely by virtue of the differences that make each person an individual different from all others. Equality, in this sense, would not deny the differences (requiring them to adapt to the standard of normality) but would allow their legal assessment, combining the formal and substantive dimension of this principle in a complementary way. This understanding appears essential in order to attempt to meet the increasingly complex challenges of composite social realities, with the mixture of different cultural and religious traditions, and where individuals more and more rarely have clearly determined distinct and separate identities, but are characterized, on the contrary, by the coexistence of a plurality of different and heterogeneous cultural and personal traits.
LAMARQUE, ELISABETTA
Principio di eguaglianza, diritto antidiscriminatorio, critica, diritto comparato, common law, azioni positive, discriminazione, dignità
IUS/21 - DIRITTO PUBBLICO COMPARATO
Italian
27-mar-2015
Scuola di Dottorato in Scienze Giuridiche
SCUOLA DI DOTTORATO IN SCIENZE GIURIDICHE - 71R
27
2013/2014
open
(2015). Diffidando dell'eguaglianza. Gli effetti collaterali del diritto antidiscriminatorio. (Tesi di dottorato, Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca, 2015).
File in questo prodotto:
File Dimensione Formato  
phd_unimib_760886 .pdf

Accesso Aperto

Descrizione: Tesi dottorato
Tipologia di allegato: Doctoral thesis
Dimensione 1.65 MB
Formato Adobe PDF
1.65 MB Adobe PDF Visualizza/Apri

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/10281/79234
Citazioni
  • Scopus ND
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? ND
Social impact