We are continuously exposed to various and complex emotional stimuli. These stimuli, gathered and processed in our mind, give rise to our subjective emotional experiences. From a psychological point of view, the observation and study of how subjective emotional experiences emerge have been the subject of extensive debates. Nevertheless, throughout the course of research, all the major theories of emotions have started from two fundamental components: mind and body. The relative weight of these two components has then varied depending on the specific theoretical framework. Contemporary constructionist and embodied theories have brought the fundamental importance of the body back to attention. These theories suggest that the body is a crucial element in the emergence of emotions, both in terms of its role as basic psychological primitives and its active involvement at the neural level in the experience of emotions. This doctoral dissertation includes four studies investigating the relationship between body-emotion within a constructionist and embodied perspective. We sought to integrate these two theoretical models by documenting (1) whether and to what extent brain regions somatotopically organised are actively involved in the subjective emotion experiences (Study 1) and (2) whether this involvement has a causal relationship, thus highlighting the bi-directional interaction (Study 2). Study 1 investigated the contribution of sensorimotor experiences in generating subjective feelings of emotion using fMRI during an emotion recall task. Results showed that recalling emotional episodes activated parts of the sensorimotor system, thus favouring an embodied-constructionist experience of emotions. Study 2 showed that the somatosensory primary system (S1) also has a causal role in the feeling of emotions. Using tACS on S1 at different frequencies while participants rated emotional images, we have found that modulation of S1 influenced subjective ratings as a function of the frequency applied. Moreover, starting from the idea that emotions are a combination of basic psychological primitives, we tried to investigate what happens to the experience of emotions when one of their constituent elements is missing. In Study 3, we sought to investigate the role of sensory experience in conceptualising bodily felt emotions, examining the role of vision in constructing emotions when the sensory disruption is located at the level of the Peripheral Nervous System (i.e., bottom-up level). Using an Italian semantic model (WEISS-2), we found that all participants’ reports correlated with the model predictions. Interestingly, blind individuals’ responses more strongly correlated with the model, suggesting that language might be one of the possible compensative mechanisms for the lack of visual feedback in constructing bodily felt emotions. Finally, in Study 4, we observed whether the body facilitates recognising emotions in children with Benign Rolandic Epilepsy (BRE) with emotion recognition impairments. We used BRE as a model to explore a possible benefit of the body in emotion recognition when the impairment is located at the Central Nervous System level (i.e., top-down level). Preliminary results revealed that BRE children have a selective impairment in recognising emotions conveyed by faces but perform similarly to healthy participants when the whole body conveys emotion, potentially informing about the important role of the body in conveying emotions. Overall, the studies' results converge on the conclusion that the body and its feelings are one of the basic psychological primitive crucial in experiencing emotions. The cues from our bodily sensations and how the body is represented in our brain are essential to how emotions emerge, are perceived, recognised, and communicated.

Nella quotidiano, siamo continuamente esposti a stimoli emotivi vari e complessi. Questi stimoli, raccolti ed elaborati nella nostra mente, danno origine alle nostre esperienze emotive soggettive. Da un punto di vista psicologico, l'osservazione e lo studio di come emergono queste esperienze emotive sono stati oggetto di ampi dibattiti. Tuttavia, nel corso della ricerca, tutte le principali teorie sulle emozioni sono partite da due componenti fondamentali: la mente e il corpo. Il peso relativo di queste due componenti è poi variato a seconda del quadro teorico specifico. Teorie moderne costruttiviste e embodied hanno riportato l’attenzione sull’importanza del corpo nei processi emotivi, suggerendo che il corpo è un elemento cruciale nell'emergere delle emozioni, sia per il suo ruolo di “primitivo psicologico di base” sia per il suo coinvolgimento attivo a livello neurale. Questa tesi di dottorato comprende quattro studi che indagano la relazione tra corpo-emozioni all'interno di una prospettiva costruttivista ed embodied. Abbiamo cercato di integrare questi due modelli documentando (1) se e in che misura le regioni cerebrali somatotopicamente organizzate sono attivamente coinvolte nell'esperienza emotiva (Studio 1) e (2) se questo coinvolgimento mostra una relazione causale e bidirezionale (Studio 2). Lo studio 1 ha indagato il contributo delle esperienze sensomotorie nella generazione di esperienze emotive utilizzando la fMRI durante un compito di richiamo emotivo. I risultati mostrano che la rievocazione di episodi emotivi attiva parti del sistema sensomotorio, favorendo così un'esperienza incarnata-costruttivista delle emozioni. Lo studio 2 ha dimostrato che il sistema somatosensoriale primario (S1) ha un ruolo causale nell’esperienza emotiva. Utilizzando la tACS su S1 a diverse frequenze, mentre i partecipanti valutavano stimoli emotivi, abbiamo scoperto che la modulazione di S1 influenza le valutazioni soggettive in funzione della frequenza applicata. Inoltre, partendo dall'idea che le emozioni sono una combinazione primitivi di base, abbiamo cercato di indagare cosa succede all'esperienza emotiva quando manca uno dei loro elementi costitutivi. Nello Studio 3 abbiamo cercato di indagare il ruolo dell'esperienza sensoriale nella concettualizzazione delle emozioni percepite corporalmente, esaminando il ruolo della visione nella costruzione delle emozioni quando l'interruzione sensoriale è localizzata a livello del Sistema Nervoso Periferico (a livello bottom-up). Utilizzando un modello semantico italiano (WEISS-2), abbiamo riscontrato che tutti i resoconti dei partecipanti erano correlati alle previsioni del modello. In particolare le risposte dei non vedenti (congeniti) erano maggiormente correlate al modello, suggerendo che il linguaggio potrebbe essere uno dei possibili meccanismi compensatori per la mancanza di feedback visivo nella costruzione di emozioni incarnate. Infine, nello studio 4, abbiamo osservato se il corpo può facilitare il riconoscimento delle emozioni (ER) nei bambini affetti da Epilessia Rolandica Benigna (BRE) con difficoltà di ER. Abbiamo utilizzato la BRE come modello per esplorare un possibile beneficio del corpo nel ER quando la compromissione è localizzata a livello del Sistema Nervoso Centrale (a livello top-down). I risultati preliminari hanno rivelato che i bambini BRE hanno un'alterazione selettiva nel riconoscimento delle emozioni trasmesse dai volti, ma hanno prestazioni simili a quelle dei partecipanti sani quando è l'intero corpo a trasmettere le emozioni. Nel complesso, i risultati degli studi convergono sulla conclusione che il corpo e le sue sensazioni sono uno dei primitivi psicologici di base per sentire le emozioni. Gli spunti provenienti dalle nostre sensazioni corporee e il modo in cui il corpo viene rappresentato nel nostro cervello sono essenziali per il modo in cui le emozioni emergono, vengono percepite, riconosciute e comunicate.

(2024). FEELING TOUCHED BY EMOTIONS: A constructionist and embodied perspective on the experience of emotion. (Tesi di dottorato, Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca, 2024).

FEELING TOUCHED BY EMOTIONS: A constructionist and embodied perspective on the experience of emotion

GIRAUD, MICHELLE
2024

Abstract

We are continuously exposed to various and complex emotional stimuli. These stimuli, gathered and processed in our mind, give rise to our subjective emotional experiences. From a psychological point of view, the observation and study of how subjective emotional experiences emerge have been the subject of extensive debates. Nevertheless, throughout the course of research, all the major theories of emotions have started from two fundamental components: mind and body. The relative weight of these two components has then varied depending on the specific theoretical framework. Contemporary constructionist and embodied theories have brought the fundamental importance of the body back to attention. These theories suggest that the body is a crucial element in the emergence of emotions, both in terms of its role as basic psychological primitives and its active involvement at the neural level in the experience of emotions. This doctoral dissertation includes four studies investigating the relationship between body-emotion within a constructionist and embodied perspective. We sought to integrate these two theoretical models by documenting (1) whether and to what extent brain regions somatotopically organised are actively involved in the subjective emotion experiences (Study 1) and (2) whether this involvement has a causal relationship, thus highlighting the bi-directional interaction (Study 2). Study 1 investigated the contribution of sensorimotor experiences in generating subjective feelings of emotion using fMRI during an emotion recall task. Results showed that recalling emotional episodes activated parts of the sensorimotor system, thus favouring an embodied-constructionist experience of emotions. Study 2 showed that the somatosensory primary system (S1) also has a causal role in the feeling of emotions. Using tACS on S1 at different frequencies while participants rated emotional images, we have found that modulation of S1 influenced subjective ratings as a function of the frequency applied. Moreover, starting from the idea that emotions are a combination of basic psychological primitives, we tried to investigate what happens to the experience of emotions when one of their constituent elements is missing. In Study 3, we sought to investigate the role of sensory experience in conceptualising bodily felt emotions, examining the role of vision in constructing emotions when the sensory disruption is located at the level of the Peripheral Nervous System (i.e., bottom-up level). Using an Italian semantic model (WEISS-2), we found that all participants’ reports correlated with the model predictions. Interestingly, blind individuals’ responses more strongly correlated with the model, suggesting that language might be one of the possible compensative mechanisms for the lack of visual feedback in constructing bodily felt emotions. Finally, in Study 4, we observed whether the body facilitates recognising emotions in children with Benign Rolandic Epilepsy (BRE) with emotion recognition impairments. We used BRE as a model to explore a possible benefit of the body in emotion recognition when the impairment is located at the Central Nervous System level (i.e., top-down level). Preliminary results revealed that BRE children have a selective impairment in recognising emotions conveyed by faces but perform similarly to healthy participants when the whole body conveys emotion, potentially informing about the important role of the body in conveying emotions. Overall, the studies' results converge on the conclusion that the body and its feelings are one of the basic psychological primitive crucial in experiencing emotions. The cues from our bodily sensations and how the body is represented in our brain are essential to how emotions emerge, are perceived, recognised, and communicated.
NAVA, ELENA
Emozioni incarnete; costruttivismo; teorie embodied; aree sensomotorie; fMRI tACS
embodied emotions; constructionist view; embodied theories; sensorimotor areas; fMRI tACS
M-PSI/02 - PSICOBIOLOGIA E PSICOLOGIA FISIOLOGICA
English
13-mag-2024
36
2022/2023
embargoed_20270513
(2024). FEELING TOUCHED BY EMOTIONS: A constructionist and embodied perspective on the experience of emotion. (Tesi di dottorato, Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca, 2024).
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/10281/478659
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