In this paper we propose a model in which there are ideological and strategic voters who vote under poportional rule. We prove that the behavior of ideological voters matters, in that it a¤ects the outcome. We also show how a subset of strategic voters changes his voting be- havior to balance the ideological players? votes. However, they can only partially adjust. Strategic voters will vote accordingly to this cutpoint outcome: any strategic voter on its right votes for the right- most party and any strategic voter on its left votes for the leftmost party

Iannantuoni, G., De Sinopoli, F. (2009). On the expect of ideology in proportional representation systems [Working paper del dipartimento].

On the expect of ideology in proportional representation systems

IANNANTUONI, GIOVANNA;
2009

Abstract

In this paper we propose a model in which there are ideological and strategic voters who vote under poportional rule. We prove that the behavior of ideological voters matters, in that it a¤ects the outcome. We also show how a subset of strategic voters changes his voting be- havior to balance the ideological players? votes. However, they can only partially adjust. Strategic voters will vote accordingly to this cutpoint outcome: any strategic voter on its right votes for the right- most party and any strategic voter on its left votes for the leftmost party
Working paper del dipartimento
Proportional Election; Strategic Voting; Ideological Voting
English
apr-2009
Iannantuoni, G., De Sinopoli, F. (2009). On the expect of ideology in proportional representation systems [Working paper del dipartimento].
open
File in questo prodotto:
File Dimensione Formato  
On_the_expect_of_ideology_in_proportional_representation_systems.pdf

accesso aperto

Tipologia di allegato: Other attachments
Dimensione 247.58 kB
Formato Adobe PDF
247.58 kB Adobe PDF Visualizza/Apri

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/10281/23191
Citazioni
  • Scopus ND
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? ND
Social impact