We present a model where a society elects a parliament by voting for candidates belonging to two parties. The electoral rule determines the seats distribution between the two parties. We analyze two electoral rules, multidistrict majority and single-district proportional. In this framework, the policy outcome is simply a function of the number of seats parties take in the election. We prove that in both systems there is a unique pure strategy perfect equilibrium outcome. Finally, we compare the outcomes in the two systems.

Iannantuoni, G., De Sinopoli, F., Ferraris, L. (2008). Electing a Parliament [Working paper del dipartimento].

Electing a Parliament

IANNANTUONI, GIOVANNA;Ferraris, L.
2008

Abstract

We present a model where a society elects a parliament by voting for candidates belonging to two parties. The electoral rule determines the seats distribution between the two parties. We analyze two electoral rules, multidistrict majority and single-district proportional. In this framework, the policy outcome is simply a function of the number of seats parties take in the election. We prove that in both systems there is a unique pure strategy perfect equilibrium outcome. Finally, we compare the outcomes in the two systems.
Working paper del dipartimento
No
Scientifica
Majority election; Proportional election; Perfect equilibria
English
Working Paper Dipartimento di Economia Politica, Università di Milano Bicocca;150
Iannantuoni, G., De Sinopoli, F., Ferraris, L. (2008). Electing a Parliament [Working paper del dipartimento].
Iannantuoni, G; De Sinopoli, F; Ferraris, L
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/10281/23187
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