ient outcomes. Our paper reverses this view: properly designed monetary policies may take advantage of predetermined nominal wages to discipline monopolistic wage setters. This, in turn, requires accepting a non-zero in- flation rate. Discretionary monetary policy is e¤ective when wage setters are non atomistic. In?ation targeting has real e¤ects irrespective of the degree of labor market centralization.

Di Bartolomeo, G., Tirelli, P., Acocella, A. (2008). Trend inflation as a workers disciplining device in a general equilibrium model [Working paper del dipartimento].

Trend inflation as a workers disciplining device in a general equilibrium model

TIRELLI, PATRIZIO;
2008

Abstract

ient outcomes. Our paper reverses this view: properly designed monetary policies may take advantage of predetermined nominal wages to discipline monopolistic wage setters. This, in turn, requires accepting a non-zero in- flation rate. Discretionary monetary policy is e¤ective when wage setters are non atomistic. In?ation targeting has real e¤ects irrespective of the degree of labor market centralization.
Working paper del dipartimento
inflation bias; discretionary monetary policy; non-zero inflation targeting; unemployment; strategic wage setters
English
2008
Di Bartolomeo, G., Tirelli, P., Acocella, A. (2008). Trend inflation as a workers disciplining device in a general equilibrium model [Working paper del dipartimento].
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/10281/23181
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