The principle that it is better to let some guilty individuals be set free than to mistakenly convict an innocent person is generally shared by legal scholars, judges and lawmakers of modern societies. The paper shows why this common trait of criminal procedure is also efficient. It extends the standard Polinsky and Shavell (2007) model of deterrence and shows that when the costs of convictions are positive, and guilty individuals are more likely to be convicted than innocent individuals it is always efficient to minimize the number of wrongful convictions, while a more than minimal amount of wrongful acquittals may be optimal

Rizzolli, M., Saraceno, M. (2009). Better that X guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer [Working paper del dipartimento].

Better that X guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer

RIZZOLLI, MATTEO;SARACENO, MARGHERITA
2009

Abstract

The principle that it is better to let some guilty individuals be set free than to mistakenly convict an innocent person is generally shared by legal scholars, judges and lawmakers of modern societies. The paper shows why this common trait of criminal procedure is also efficient. It extends the standard Polinsky and Shavell (2007) model of deterrence and shows that when the costs of convictions are positive, and guilty individuals are more likely to be convicted than innocent individuals it is always efficient to minimize the number of wrongful convictions, while a more than minimal amount of wrongful acquittals may be optimal
Working paper del dipartimento
Type I errors; Type II errors; evidence; optimal underdeterrence; Blackstone Pareto distribution; optimal screening
English
lug-2009
Rizzolli, M., Saraceno, M. (2009). Better that X guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer [Working paper del dipartimento].
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/10281/23172
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