Our experiment is made by three treatments. The first one reproduces the classical public good game. The second environment represents a perfect competition market where the contribution of a representative player to the private good gives a positive rent if and only if it is not lower than the highest contribution of the other players in the group. In the third treatment we consider a winner-take-all market where we have only a winner per group. The aim is to test whether the level of cooperation is minimum under the hypothesis of perfect competition.
Ponzano, F., Ottone, S. (2007). Cooperation without Punishment [Working paper del dipartimento].
Cooperation without Punishment
OTTONE, STEFANIA
2007
Abstract
Our experiment is made by three treatments. The first one reproduces the classical public good game. The second environment represents a perfect competition market where the contribution of a representative player to the private good gives a positive rent if and only if it is not lower than the highest contribution of the other players in the group. In the third treatment we consider a winner-take-all market where we have only a winner per group. The aim is to test whether the level of cooperation is minimum under the hypothesis of perfect competition.
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