We develop a model of simultaneous and sequential voting in a committee where members do not share their private information and do not have the same preferences. When objective functions differ, an optimal order in the sequential game can be found, leading to a unique socially optimal equilibrium. Our result rationalizes the presence of biased (i.e., partisan) voters in small committees as a way of reaching social optimality.
Balduzzi, P. (2005). Optimal use of scarce information: When partisan voters are socially useful [Working paper del dipartimento].
Optimal use of scarce information: When partisan voters are socially useful
BALDUZZI, PAOLO
2005
Abstract
We develop a model of simultaneous and sequential voting in a committee where members do not share their private information and do not have the same preferences. When objective functions differ, an optimal order in the sequential game can be found, leading to a unique socially optimal equilibrium. Our result rationalizes the presence of biased (i.e., partisan) voters in small committees as a way of reaching social optimality.
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