In nonatomic games, anonymity must be assumed in order to prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. This can be formalized by making payoffs dependent either on the players' distribution on the action set or on the strategy mean. An extension of Rath's (1992) proof to the case of limited anonymity is proposed: the behavior of the population as a whole, is shown sufficient to get equilibrium existence in pure strategies.
Rocco, L. (2002). Anonymity in Nonatomic Games [Working paper del dipartimento].
Anonymity in Nonatomic Games
ROCCO, LORENZO
2002
Abstract
In nonatomic games, anonymity must be assumed in order to prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. This can be formalized by making payoffs dependent either on the players' distribution on the action set or on the strategy mean. An extension of Rath's (1992) proof to the case of limited anonymity is proposed: the behavior of the population as a whole, is shown sufficient to get equilibrium existence in pure strategies.
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