We reconsider the issues of fiscal policy interdependence in a monetary union, challenging the view that non co-ordination is always preferable. Moreover, we show that an expenditure bias occurs irrespective of the fiscal regime in place. We argue that a contractualist approach à la Walsh should be extended to the conduct of fiscal policy, setting explicit public expenditure targets.

Tirelli, P., Catenaro, M. (1999). Reconsidering The Pros and Cons of Fiscal Policy Coordination in a Monetary Union: Should We Set Public Expenditure Targets? [Working paper del dipartimento].

Reconsidering The Pros and Cons of Fiscal Policy Coordination in a Monetary Union: Should We Set Public Expenditure Targets?

TIRELLI, PATRIZIO;
1999

Abstract

We reconsider the issues of fiscal policy interdependence in a monetary union, challenging the view that non co-ordination is always preferable. Moreover, we show that an expenditure bias occurs irrespective of the fiscal regime in place. We argue that a contractualist approach à la Walsh should be extended to the conduct of fiscal policy, setting explicit public expenditure targets.
Working paper del dipartimento
Scientifica
EMU; Fiscal Leadership; ECB; Fiscal Co-ordination; Inflation Targets;
English
Tirelli, P., Catenaro, M. (1999). Reconsidering The Pros and Cons of Fiscal Policy Coordination in a Monetary Union: Should We Set Public Expenditure Targets? [Working paper del dipartimento].
Tirelli, P; Catenaro, M
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/10281/22940
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