My dissertation is about collateral debt contracts and the choice of specializing productive assets, from a theoretical perspective. Financially constrained firms pledge their productive assets as collateral in order to enhance their access to credit. However, firms may find it difficult to finance projects when their collateralized productive assets are too specialized since their liquidation value is low (as a matter of fact redeployability of those assets to alternative uses is scarce) even when their projects have large expected returns. In this context, my dissertation aims to answer the following research questions: how does the choice of asset specialization affect financial contracts? Which are the implications of different degree of asset specificity for the amount of credit and product market competition? This dissertation is at a cross road between industrial organization and corporate finance and uses a novel approach where the choice of asset specialization and the liquidation value of a productive asset are analyzed together. Asset specialization increases firms' project returns, but decreases the liquidation value of productive assets. When firms are credit constrained this implies a higher cost of debt. By examining this specialization trade-off, I am able to prove the following results: in the secondary market the resale value of a productive asset is determined by its degree of asset specificity, redeployability costs and the presence of firms willing to acquire the it; financially constrained firms invest less in asset specialization compared to self-financing firms; market structure and the degree of asset specialization may be influenced by financial choices; when asset specificity affects product market differentiation, the specialization trade-off implies that financially constrained firms invest less in product differentiation, and, as a consequence, face tougher competition compared to non-financially constrained firms. The dissertation is organized as follows: in the first chapter I survey the literature on the link between product market competition, corporate finance and collateral debt contracts. In the second chapter I study the link between firms' choice of asset specificity and the secondary market for productive assets, taking the market structure as given. In the third chapter I study the link between collateral debt contract and product market competition when the initial investment in asset specificity affects the degree of product differentiation in the economy.
(2018). Essays on Corporate Finance and Industrial Organization. (Tesi di dottorato, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, 2018).
Essays on Corporate Finance and Industrial Organization
BOCCALETTI, SIMONE
2018
Abstract
My dissertation is about collateral debt contracts and the choice of specializing productive assets, from a theoretical perspective. Financially constrained firms pledge their productive assets as collateral in order to enhance their access to credit. However, firms may find it difficult to finance projects when their collateralized productive assets are too specialized since their liquidation value is low (as a matter of fact redeployability of those assets to alternative uses is scarce) even when their projects have large expected returns. In this context, my dissertation aims to answer the following research questions: how does the choice of asset specialization affect financial contracts? Which are the implications of different degree of asset specificity for the amount of credit and product market competition? This dissertation is at a cross road between industrial organization and corporate finance and uses a novel approach where the choice of asset specialization and the liquidation value of a productive asset are analyzed together. Asset specialization increases firms' project returns, but decreases the liquidation value of productive assets. When firms are credit constrained this implies a higher cost of debt. By examining this specialization trade-off, I am able to prove the following results: in the secondary market the resale value of a productive asset is determined by its degree of asset specificity, redeployability costs and the presence of firms willing to acquire the it; financially constrained firms invest less in asset specialization compared to self-financing firms; market structure and the degree of asset specialization may be influenced by financial choices; when asset specificity affects product market differentiation, the specialization trade-off implies that financially constrained firms invest less in product differentiation, and, as a consequence, face tougher competition compared to non-financially constrained firms. The dissertation is organized as follows: in the first chapter I survey the literature on the link between product market competition, corporate finance and collateral debt contracts. In the second chapter I study the link between firms' choice of asset specificity and the secondary market for productive assets, taking the market structure as given. In the third chapter I study the link between collateral debt contract and product market competition when the initial investment in asset specificity affects the degree of product differentiation in the economy.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.