To facilitate delistings of stock companies after an acquisition, national legislations in Europe give firms who own a large fraction of the targets' equity capital the right to acquire the remaining outstanding shares. Squeeze-out offers has been used extensively in Germany. We provide a cost-benefit analysis of the current squeeze-out procedures in Germany, using a brand-new database of squeeze-outs with unique data, and offer new insights on this procedure taking into account both the minority investors' point of view and firms' strategies

Croci, E., Nowak, E., Ehrardt, O. (2009). Minority squeeze-out regulation in Germany: efficiency, fairness, and economic consequences [Working paper].

Minority squeeze-out regulation in Germany: efficiency, fairness, and economic consequences

CROCI, ETTORE;
2009-06

Abstract

To facilitate delistings of stock companies after an acquisition, national legislations in Europe give firms who own a large fraction of the targets' equity capital the right to acquire the remaining outstanding shares. Squeeze-out offers has been used extensively in Germany. We provide a cost-benefit analysis of the current squeeze-out procedures in Germany, using a brand-new database of squeeze-outs with unique data, and offer new insights on this procedure taking into account both the minority investors' point of view and firms' strategies
Working paper
squeeze-outs, Germany
English
Croci, E., Nowak, E., Ehrardt, O. (2009). Minority squeeze-out regulation in Germany: efficiency, fairness, and economic consequences [Working paper].
Croci, E; Nowak, E; Ehrardt, O
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/10281/10372
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