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Preface

Borders, Sovereignty, Rights is the title of the first publication of THE BORDER CROSSING SEMINAR (BCS), a joint program between the University of Milano-Bicocca and the University of Notre Dame, initiated in 2012 and directed by Eileen Hunt Botting and myself.

This text collects the papers presented in Milan during the first meeting of Summer Conference and School BCS, held at the University of Milano-Bicocca from 20th to 27th June 2012.

The aim of THE BORDER CROSSING SEMINAR is at developing a fruitful cultural exchange between European countries and the United States of America.

Considering the results of this experience from a both scientific and interpersonal viewpoint, we can say that the initiative was a successful story, which we hope can be continued in the years.

We want therefore to thank all scholars for their excellent lectures and the tutoring of students as well as the participants in BA, MA, PhD. studies, who attended the BCS with passion and interest. In particular, we want to express our gratitude to Giorgia Serughetti, who acted as a responsible for the scientific secretary of the Seminar, for her impeccable and committed work. We want also to thank Lindsay Dun, Courtney Biscan and Caitlin Glimco, who - beside their attendance to the BCS - helped other students, non-native English speakers, to improve the linguistic quality of their papers, in a spirit of mutual co-operation.

The Seminar would not have been possible without the financial and institutional support of many American and Italian colleagues. In particular, we thank Jim McAdams and Anthony Monta of the Nanovic Institute for European Studies at the University of Notre Dame; Michael Desch, the Chair of the Department of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame; Joshua Kaplan, the Director of Undergraduate Studies in the Department of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame; the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies; the Institute for Scholarship in the Liberal Arts at the University of Notre Dame; J. Nicholas Entrikin, Vice President and Associate Provost of Internationalization at the University of Notre Dame; Neil Delaney and the Glynn Family Honors Program at the University of Notre Dame; the Undergraduate Research Opportunity Program at the University of Notre Dame for their generous support of the inaugural Border
Crossing Seminar.

We also thank Giorgio Grossi and Carla Facchini, former director and present director of the Department of Sociology and Social Research of the University of Milano-Bicocca, for the support given to the organization of the BCS; Elena dell’Agnese for the international conference “Bordersapes III”; Michele Cometa, Director of the PhD in Cultural Studies at the University of Palermo.

In particular, I’m grateful to the US – Italy Fulbright Commission for the support of my scholarship as distinguished chair, which gave the opportunity to initiate the collaboration with the University of Notre Dame and to establish the BCS.

The Border Crossing Seminar was also related to the project of national interest on “Political Imagination and Borders. Citizens and Strangers,” supported by the Ministry of Education, Research, and University (PRIN 2009), and the Bicocca Departmental Research Centre, Public Reasoning and Global Society in Action (PRAGSIA).

The BCS is only at the beginning but very promising because it has the aim to cross borders and to increase a productive inter-cultural dialogue against any prejudice and violence. A global democracy can be built starting also from these experiences.

Marina Calloni
Introduction

When Professor Marina Calloni of the University of Milano-Bicocca visited the University of Notre Dame in 2011 as a distinguished Fulbright faculty fellow in the Nanovic Institute for European Studies and the Department of Political Science, she instantly began to form networks of friends and colleagues who worked across traditional disciplinary bounds in striving to understand common areas of scholarly interest. Crossing borders was a normal academic activity for her—not for the mere thrills of travel and trespass, but for the more serious sake of fostering relationships across those borders we erect, often to the detriment of building lines of communication and new pathways to shared knowledge, between our disciplines. Although her project of crossing borders in scholarly life has serious implications for what John Stuart Mill called the transformation of “dead dogma” into “living truth” through full, frequent, and fearless discussion, it is also fun for the same reasons it is serious. (Mill, 1863: 66) Human relationships, whether they grow in a seminar, a university, or a national or international community, give us the joy that inspires us to join that Millian public dialogue of learning.

It was Calloni’s idea to bring to life this philosophy of border crossing in the ethical and intellectual form of the Border Crossing Seminar (BCS). The seminar is an annual, weeklong interdisciplinary and international conference and summer school for graduate students and faculty in political theory, political philosophy, and the social sciences. The themes of the BCS center around questions of global justice, including the issues of cosmopolitanism, inter-cultural dialogue, and human rights. Held during June in Milan for the first time in 2012, the BCS is co-organized by the political philosopher Calloni and me, a political theorist at the University of Notre Dame. Walking tours of Milan’s cultural and urban spaces, and conversations with local people, are part of the experiential learning component of the seminar. The seminar features lectures by expert faculty from the University of Milano-Bicocca, the University of Notre Dame, and other universities from around the globe, in fields such as political theory, political philosophy, anthropology, sociology, geography, and political science. Each year, the students and faculty will publish their work in an annual e-book with the imprint of the University of Milano-Bicocca.
This first iteration of the BCS e-book explores the relationship of borders, sovereignty, and rights at individual, cultural, national and international levels, with a special focus on contemporary Europe. Several essays call into question the assumption of the fixed quality of national borders, through the study of migration across Mediterranean states or the complex history of redrawing national borders, particularly around Italy. Other essays explore the ethics of inter-cultural dialogue, through participant observation or personal interviews, among communities of young male footballers in Belfast or among women grappling with the meaning of feminism in Milan. Yet others theorize the reconstruction of sovereignty, at individual and national levels, after the rise of the United Nations, the European Union, and their many international legal covenants and instruments which seek to protect human rights both regionally and worldwide.

We believe the inaugural BCS e-book offers a rich international sampling of contemporary scholarly thinking on global justice issues. Our primary objective in editing the volume has been to encourage the next generation of political theorists—no matter what formal discipline they happen to occupy—to be daring and original in their work, and to risk the critical engagement of their ideas via the global electronic public sphere. For as the paradigmatic border-crosser John Stuart Mill reminds us in On Liberty, it is only through such public trespass, intellectual travel, and creative redrawing of relationships that we can begin to move toward the truth which all thinkers seek in the first place: “only through diversity of opinion is there, in the existing state of human intellect, a chance of fair play to all sides of the truth.” (Mill, 1863: 93)

Eileen Hunt Botting

References

I.
Global Democracy, Cross-Cultural Education and Development
Chapter 1.

Marina Calloni

The Borders of Cosmopolitanism: the Case of Asylum Seekers

Ambivalences in the notion of cosmopolitanism

The word cosmopolitanism derives from the Greek *kosmopolitês*, which means a “citizen of the world”. Cosmopolitanism refers thus to both the idea of a borderless entity and the possibility for a citizen to overcome the restricted determination of his/her political belonging, so that he/she can become a fellow not only of a community or a State but of the entire *cosmos*.

The debate on cosmopolitanism has ancient roots (Heater, 1996) and it is one of the most longstanding debates in the history of thought and public discourse. It was the core of the criticism of the Cynic stream (and in particular of Diogenes of Sinope) against the Greek polis as well as of the opposition of Stoicism (and in particular of Seneca) against the corruption of the Roman Empire. In both cases, a reference to the normative idea of cosmopolitanism was a clear critique against existing political systems, in which borders were the symbols of crisis because of internal dysfunctions towards the citizens and external exclusion towards the “foreigners”. The dialectic of cosmopolitanism shows also the “frontiers of justice”, and limitations towards the development of human capabilities. Over centuries the rise of debates on cosmopolitanism have always signed the immanent crisis of a political system and the claim for a more inclusive form of government.

The fortune of the debate on cosmopolitanism can be found in its intrinsic semantic ambivalence: it implies the reference to a borderless entity (*cosmos*) as well as to a human being defined by his or her belonging as a citizen (*politê*). Namely, borders define each individual and entity, which determine his or her identity. The question is weather a personal identity can be understood as flexible and changeable beyond the boundaries that produced it and at what extent.

an individual has the right to overcome freely political borders, which have connoted his/her citizenship.

In the last years, due to the new geo-political order, the crisis of the sovereignty of nation states in the global market, and the increasing mobility of human beings, a worldwide debate on cosmopolitanism has introduced new analytic perspectives and arguments into the debate. This is because of enlarging political processes, which tend to coexist with local tendencies (Beck & Sznaider, 2006). A traditional idea of cosmopolitanism is thus challenged in a global age.

The present debate on cosmopolitanism seems to be a perpetual question, based on the opposition between universalists and realists (Braidotti, Hanafin & Blaagaard, 2012). The supporters of a universalist perspective argue that cosmopolitanism can prospect a borderless democracy or better forms of cosmopolitanism immanent to democratic institutions because of the process of cosmopolitization. Realists argue that a universalistic standpoint is a pure ideology, which denies the effectuality of violence perpetrated by nation states. They criticize the normative assumptions of cosmopolitanism as being utopian and difficult to be realized because of the impossibility to have a government without borders and a politics without representatives elected within territorial boundaries. A final agreement has never been found between these two polarities.

However, despite criticism and ambiguities, since the beginning of the new millennium the debate on cosmopolitanism has been revitalized and has increased over recent years, assuming a new global valence, when borders are demolished next to the construction of new political barriers. Kant’s theory of the perpetual peace has been reinterpreted as the right to inclusion and movement of the “stranger” against a benevolent notion of hospitality (Bohman & Lutz-Bachmann, 1997). Cosmopolitanism has become thus a persistent process of overcoming continuously delimiting borders and at the same time a constant necessity to re-negotiate boundaries in the dialectic of inclusion and exclusion in the realm of citizenship.

One of the main questions, which has been raised in recent debates, is whether and how it is possible to conceive and to practice cosmopolitanism in a global age. Trying to overcome simplistic objections against a too idealistic and utopian notion of a borderless community (which is a contradiction in itself) an idea of immanent cosmopolitanism (Held, 2010) as related to human dignity has been developed.

In a paper, Archibugi and Held (2011) argue that cosmopolitanism has to
be meant as an expanding democratic process from top down as well as bottom up, where universal values (morality) are joint to the respect of legitimate differences (culture) in the continuous negotiation of political boundaries and legal constraints at the both domestic and intentional levels.

The pragmatic and performative concept of cosmopolitanism, however, needs to have a substantive principle, on which the normative validity of fundamental freedoms and human rights can be bases, beyond political borders. This principle has been found in the cross-border idea of human dignity.

In some recent interventions, Jürgen Habermas (2012) and Seyla Benhabib (2011) have stressed the existing relationship between cosmopolitanism, human rights and human dignity, beyond political belonging. The authors argue that an immanent notion of cosmopolitanism is intrinsic to democratic and deliberative processes in the constitution of both individual autonomy and the public opinion. In this case, human rights – based on cosmopolitan norms and universal principles - can acquire a concrete meaning in political domains, transcending political borders and the contexts of the daily life. A communitarian identity – i.e. the belonging to a particular political/cultural entity – can thus coexist with an intrinsically universal perspective in the continuous negotiation of geo-political borders, which determines the ambivalence of citizenship.

**Ambivalences of cosmopolitanism: the condition of asylum seekers**

The present debate on cosmopolitanism is also due to the manifold effects of globalization. The increasing mobility of people has determined new cultural encounters and a “global ethics,” as Appiah has stressed in his book on *Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers* (Appiah 2006: XIII) However, cosmopolitanism is both a continuous renegotiation of borders determined by geo-political barriers and a legal/moral practice that is embedded in international norms and universal rights. However, the reality of cosmopolitanism is a continuous demonstration of the neglect of principles on which it is based.

One of the most evident examples of this negative dialectic is shown by the case of the asylum seekers, whose international rights seem to be often denied by progressive legislative delimitations promoted by interested nation-States, which tend to refuse the recognition of the status of refugee. Next to international humanitarian conventions on the protection of people, who are persecuted in their own country of origin and therefore are forced to leave, there is a resi-
The Borders of Cosmopolitanism: the Case of Asylum Seekers

stance of nation-states to admit them in their sovereign territories. In a global age, the condition of asylum seekers is drastically changed in respect to the past, also because of a combination of economic and forced migrants in the so-called mixed fluxes.

The figure of the banished person due to political reasons and the right to offer hospitality to a foreign in sacred space when persecuted, are of ancient origin, while the legal recognition of the refugee at the international level dates back to the second half of 20th century.

The problem of the refugees became evident after World War II when the displacement of people, minorities and survivors to the Holocaust over the European territory showed to urgency to promote new legislations and policies at the international level. On the basis of Article 14 of the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, which asserts that: “Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution,” a *Convention recognizing the status of refugees* was signed by the UN member states on 28 July 1951 in Geneva. Article 1.1. defines as a refugee on the basis of a:

> “Well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.” (UN, 1951)

Because this provision was restricted to the consequences of War World II, in 1967 a *Protocol* removed geographical and temporal restrictions from the Convention, so that the refugee rights as well as their protection became universal thanks also to the institution of the *United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees* (UNHCR). Since then this kind of right has been recognized in all liberal national constitutions and super-national entities (Article 18 of the *Charter for Fundamental Rights of the European Union*). However, the subscription of the Convention by all UN member states expresses the paradox of a political cosmopolitanism that is universal and cross-border. The agreement was signed by paretic sovereign entities, in which each of them recognizes the right to offer hospitality to a citizen victimized and violated by a peer-state. Namely, the Convention implicitly
recognises that each state can be both a persecutor and protector.

The negative dialectic of a nation-state consists thus in the affirmation of cosmopolitan rights together with the admission of their possible rejection. Indeed, nation-states are the major abusers of human rights. This dynamic connotes also humanitarian interventions: a part of humanity aids another part of humanity, which has been violated by other human beings. The UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (New York, 9th December 1948) delineates this complexity (Calloni 2006).

International conventions, which stress a cosmopolitan perspective related to the legal status of the refugee, show thus also the crisis of both universal human rights and the local rights of citizenship.

In 1951, in the same year of the subscription of the Geneva Convention, Hannah Arendt wrote in her book on The Origin of Totalitarianism that statelessness is the “most symptomatic group in contemporary politics”, who “once they had left their homeland they remained homeless, once they had left their state they became stateless.” And she adds:

“No paradox of contemporary politics is filled with a more poignant irony than the discrepancy between the efforts of well-meaning idealists who stubbornly insist on regarding as ‘inalienable’ those human rights, which are enjoyed only by citizens of the most prosperous and civilized countries, and the situation of the rightless themselves. Their situation has deteriorated just as stubbornly, until the internment camp - prior to the second World War the exception rather than the rule for the stateless - has become the routine solution for the problem of domicile of the ‘displaced persons.” (Arendt 1985: 279)

The lack of recognition of their status by other states comports further forms of violence.

Although a nation state forces a citizen to leave his/her country, another nation state does not always give him/her the opportunity to became a “new citizen”. Indeed, the recognition of the status of refugee is not automatic. In the global age refugee rights are becoming more and more restrictive depending from domestic legislations. Cases of repelled asylum seekers are increasing, showing the ambivalences of cosmopolitan norms when reinterpreted by nation-states. The forms of permission of residence that nation-states attribute
to a person who is claiming asylum are becoming more differentiated.

Due to the EU *Dublin Regulation* (2003), aimed to determine rapidly the member state responsible for an asylum claim, an asylum seeker has to present his/her instance in the first European country he/she enters. A territorial Commission has then to consider each case.

In Italy, there are four possible answers:

1. Recognition of the status of refugee and a permission of residence for 5 years, which can be renewed until the acquisition of citizenship.

2. Subsidiary protection for people whose life can be in danger if he/she will return to his/her country and lasts 3 years.

3. Humanitarian protection, which recognises that in the country of origin there are events - political tumults, crisis, environmental disasters, etc. - which makes impossible a return and lasts 1 year.

4. Denial, which foresees the immediate expulsion of the asylum seeker or his/her detention in administrative places, called *Centers for Identification and Expulsion*, before the return to the last country he/she was coming from.

The differentiation in the logic of permission shows a discretional power of the nation-state in the evaluation of the asylum seekers’ claims in the protection of its sovereign borders. This increasing control is also due to the transformation of the typology of asylum seekers in the global age, who come from different countries than in the past. During the Cold War, asylum seekers came mainly from socialist countries, from South American states under military dictatorships, or from Vietnam. After 1989 this scenario has changed and asylum seekers in Europe come mainly from Sub-Saharan and North Africa after the Arab upspring or from Asian countries under authoritarian regimes. Refugees come to Europe through the sea and borders in mixed flows together with economic migrants, so that often nation-states do not recognize any longer their intrinsic difference. Because of the increasing number and typology of asylum seekers, the recognition of the status of refugee has thus become more difficult, depending from local authorities and commissions.

This precarious situation makes these non-citizens more vulnerable and subjected to different forms of labor exploitation, while they are still traumatized due to the violence they had suffered, often tortured, leaving their country and having been subjected to the brutality of traffickers in human beings. The misrecognition of fundamental rights becomes functional to new global powers in an increasing humanity of non-citizens, who are economically exploited, wi-
thout any political status, and deprived of any social guarantee. They became in
Western cities a “non-guest non-citizen”, marginalized and subjected.

In this case, cosmopolitanism shows its intrinsic borders. It still needs to be
politically and internationally applied crossing borders, as the normative and
substantive notion of human dignity immanently indicates, against any realistic
evidence.

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Chapter 2.

Eileen Hunt Botting
A Modest Freedom:
Women’s Human Right to Sport among Muslim Peoples

Since most Islamic nations have signed onto the United Nations’ Convention on Rights of the Child, the Muslim world accepts universal primary education (UPE) and physical education as fundamental human rights in principle. A policy question emerges for Islamic governments, however: may core subjects in UPE, such as physical education, be taught in a way that is sensitive to their religion’s gender norms—particularly the Islamic ideal of feminine modesty in public spaces? Human Rights Watch (HRW) has recently criticized Saudi Arabia for preventing girls and women’s exercise of the human rights to physical education and sport. It was not until the 2012 London Olympics that Saudi Arabia officially sponsored female athletes in international competition, under its national flag. There are few opportunities for Saudi girls and women to participate in organized, competitive sports at the local or national level. Most problematically, the government has not established a nation-wide system of physical education for girls. Women have limited access to health clubs, and most only exercise in private, at home, and with the permission of their male guardians. Many women find exercise inconvenient, or never learned to enjoy its benefits while girls. This public policy has thus contributed to a national problem with obesity (Murphy, 2012).

HRW reasonably points out that Saudi Arabia is an outlier on this issue in the Muslim world. The Arab Charter, which Saudi Arabia has signed, requires that its members “take all the necessary measures to guarantee, particularly to young persons, the right to pursue a sporting activity.” Article 3.3 of the charter allows for “positive discrimination” in favor of women in accordance with Sharia law. As the HRW report cogently argues, this clause could justify Saudi Arabia’s disproportionate expenditure of public funds in favor of improving girls’ access to physical education and women’s health in general (Human Rights Watch, 2013).

Despite its good intentions, the HRW report is unethical in how it rhetorically frames the issue from an outsider’s Western secular perspective. The title of the report - In the Steps of the Devil - pits the idea of universal human rights
against the Saudis’ religious values. The phrase “in the steps of the devil” comes from a Saudi religious scholar’s statement against female physical education. The author of the HRW report probably intended the title to be ironic, at least from a human rights perspective. Out of context, however, the title could be read as HRW’s irreverent use of Islamic values to criticize Saudi Arabia’s strict interpretation of Sharia law. This rhetorical reinforcement of the “us versus them” mentality may preach effectively to the secular Western choir. Yet it shows a decided lack of cultural sensitivity to the Saudis themselves, including the nation’s Muslim female athletes. As we know from their participation in sports around the globe, Muslim women often seek to creatively balance their religious commitment to modesty with their enjoyment of public games (Human Rights Watch, 2013: 32)

The HRW report indeed notes the creative activism of some Saudi women, who have launched a national campaign called *Let her get fat*. The campaign raises consciousness of the public health implications of the current policies against female physical education and participation in competitive sports. The ironic implication of their slogan is no doubt clear to Saudi men - if you want women to look good, let them play sports.1

The *Let her get fat* campaign resonates with the deliberate irony of many of Mary Wollstonecraft’s consequentialist arguments for women’s rights. She concluded her 1792 treatise *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman* with a sarcastic suggestion for British men to buy a load of whips from Russia. Thus armed, husbands could better tame their wives when women proved themselves unworthy of rights and freedom. Just as the Saudi activists don’t want women to get fat, Wollstonecraft didn’t want women to be whipped. In both cases, cultural and religious insiders argue for the benefits of women’s rights for men, but in an ironic sense that underscores the value of rights to women *qua* humans. The *Let her get fat* campaign reminds Saudis of the intrinsic value of exercise for girls and women: they ought to play sports for their own well-being, not to look good for men. Likewise, Wollstonecraft’s call for “whips” spurs men and women alike to ponder how the struggle for human equality would not end with the legal recognition of human rights. It would be a deeply psychological process that demanded the sexes to perceive and reject their master-slave relationship.

1 Although a few Muslim cultures revere overweight women as beautiful, such as the nation of Mauritania in West Africa, Saudi Arabian culture is not defined by this particular feminine aesthetic. Thus, the irony of the *Let her Get Fat* campaign would not be lost on the Saudi audience. See Sharon LaFraniere, 2007.
Women do not only need rights, they need men to give up the desire to whip them into submission.

As laid out in chapter twelve of her *Rights of Woman*, the Wollstonecraftian model of UPE, complete with religious instruction, is arguably suited for many Muslim peoples today. Wollstonecraft’s capacious metaphysical worldview shares with Islam a foundational commitment to the moral and mental equality of the sexes in the eyes of God. Moreover, she envisioned UPE and female physical education as promoting women’s dignity and modesty. Modesty, rightfully understood, was not a “sexual virtue” for Wollstonecraft. It was a human virtue of sober self-judgment, moderately situated between the vices of excessive humility and misguided self-esteem (Wollstonecraft, 1989, 5: 191). If practiced by men and women alike, modesty would help reduce the treatment of women as sexual objects in society. Although Islamic nations focus on legislating feminine modesty in public spaces, not prescribing a universal virtue of modesty, they share with Wollstonecraft a concern with realizing a moral, not a sexualized, kind of modesty for women as creatures of God.

From even a recent historical perspective, Islamic governments’ concern with protecting female modesty in sports should not seem odd or “backward” to either secular or religious Westerners. In the United States, public and private schoolgirls wore elaborate gym suits - often with modesty skirts and pantaloons - during physical education and competitive sports until the 1970s (Campbell Warner, 2006). Female athletes at Catholic schools, such as the NCAA basketball champions of Immaculata College from 1972 to 1974, continued to wear such modest uniforms even when their secular opponents liberalized their clothing standards. The ability of the Immaculata teams to consistently beat opponents despite their different uniforms demonstrates that modesty need not be an obstacle to competitive athletic performance.

Speaking from a cultural outsider’s perspective, the HRW report could have more productively begun by adopting a stance of tolerance toward Saudi religious and gender norms, as modeled by John Stuart Mill in his 1859 treatise *On Liberty*. Mill’s liberal utilitarian approach could have enabled more creative and culturally sensitive policy analysis, as a path toward instigation of the Saudi government’s critical reflection on how it implements Sharia law in the case of physical education. A Millian observer could welcome the diversity of practices of sport across human cultures, as long as there was reasonable assurance that individuals freely chose them. Muslim girls may wish to play sports in more
modest clothing or headscarves, or only compete in sex-segregated conditions.

With such a Millian perspective of tolerance, FIFA (Fédération Internationale de Football Association) has pushed for the designation of headscarves that are safe for competitive wear by Muslim female soccer players around the world. Although the King of Jordan has decried the proposal as a kind of anti-Islamic headscarf ban, FIFA would seek only to standardize the rules for identifying a range of safe headscarves (Dunbar, 2012a, 2012b). Such broad-minded, fair, safety-oriented, yet culturally sensitive regulation paves the way for the mainstreaming of Muslim women’s athletic competition in the world’s most popular sport. As long as the regulation accommodates a variety of options for religiously and medically agreeable hijabs, and allows the usual leeway for individual and local interpretation of the rules, it would be a fair application of Mill’s harm principle. As set forth in On Liberty, this “one very simple principle” defines wrong in terms of “interfering with the liberty of action” of any individual except when such interference would “prevent harm to others.” Such prevention of harm to others includes ensuring the “self-protection” of individuals (and society) from harm done by bad agents (Mill, 1977, 5: 279).

Applying the harm principle, a Millian human rights analyst would support intercultural accommodation of religious practices so long as the policy did not handicap anyone involuntarily. A Muslim female athlete may choose to wear a regulation hijab, even though she risks overheating during a game in hot weather. Her choice of this potential handicap to her athletic performance does not require a similar practice for a teammate or opponent.

The FIFA medical advisors have cited overheating during hot weather as one possible reason for regulation of headscarves. This concern may show a kind of Western European and secular bias in their analysis. People play sports in a variety of clothing in different climates, and judge for themselves when they need to stop exercise to prevent dehydration or overheating. From an intercultural perspective of tolerance, FIFA’s concern with preventing head and neck injuries seems like more reasonable grounds for international regulation of athletic headscarves. Applied to the headscarf issue in sport, Mill’s harm principle could be used to emphasize the risk of entangling and tripping for others, both teammates and opponents alike, if uniforms are not regulated with interpersonal safety in mind. A fair and cosmopolitan outcome might be establishing size and draping limits for hijabs. Such limits could respect the modesty of Muslim female athletes yet pose less risk for the dangerous pulling or unraveling of
their uniforms during competition, for themselves and others.

Intercultural tolerance is also important within national-level debates on female physical education in Muslim communities. Education and religion scholars have intensively studied British West Midland schools with many Muslim students. They found that Muslim parents are more likely to keep their daughters in sports and other physical activities, in both primary and secondary school, if teachers consult with them on matters of female modesty. This study also related how British Muslim elementary students are the loudest proponents of their right to participate in exercise and sports. By encouraging girls and boys in the Muslim faith to speak up about their desire to play games, and how they wish to play them, teachers in multicultural schools can promote a culture of cosmopolitan tolerance in education (Dagkas, 2011: 223-239).

Unlike Wollstonecraft, Mill did not specify that physical education should be coeducational. His more general defense of the human right of girls to physical education is thus more adaptable to religious traditions such as Islam wherein feminine modesty is traditionally ensured through sex segregation. Since he thought a diversity of school types—private, public, religious, and secular—could fulfill a national mandate for UPE, his philosophy of education is also suited for multicultural societies such as Britain with large Muslim populations and many Muslim girls who wish to play sports. Finally, Mill’s cautious approach to reform of other people’s cultures — through the steps of tolerance, education, observation, and instigation — allows for human rights advocates to build effective yet sensitive cases for reform where it is urgently needed, such as Saudi Arabia’s systematic and unnecessary neglect of female physical education.

Wollstonecraft and Mill argue that UPE - including physical education - ought to empower girls to feel self-sovereignty. Education is a fundamental right of the individual to the self-directed and distinctive perfection of his or her capabilities. This education toward virtuous self-development would lead the sexes to overturn the vicious gender norms that have rendered them unequal in society.

By applying their theories of physical education to the modesty concerns of Muslim female athletes, I have shown that neither Wollstonecraft nor Mill’s moral philosophies require that girls and women sacrifice their capability for cultural or religious affiliation in favor of their capabilities for other kinds of freedom. Virtuous gender reform, in other words, may be friendly to religious faith, and unexpectedly rich in outcomes. Transcending gender and cultural
prejudice through participation in individual and team sports also gives females in orthodox religions a chance to challenge, from within, the pernicious influence of adaptive preferences in their mindsets. A modest freedom may be within reach of Muslim female athletes, as women represented every Islamic nation at the 2012 Olympics for the first time in modern international competition (Murphy, 2012). Their spirited participation should remind us all of the twin, ancient ethical purposes of sport: intercultural understanding, and doing one’s personal best.

**References**


Chapter 3.

Giovanna Borradori

Photographs of Atrocity as Democratic Iterations. Reflections on the Arab Spring

The circulation of photographs of atrocities, especially atrocities perpetrated in the name of politics, has been a key strategy of modern humanitarian action. From the campaign launched at the end of the nineteenth century to stop King Leopold of Belgium from continuing to brutalize his personal colony, the Congo, to the most recent campaign against torture at the American detention center of Abu Ghraib, in Iraq, visual documentation of extreme suffering seems to have literally forged our moral sensibility concerning human rights. Most recently, the political power of such photographs reached a new zenith on the occasion of one of the most powerful public uprisings in modern history: the so called “Arab Spring” was literally set on fire by the viral dissemination of images documenting the self-immolation of twenty-six years old Mohamed Bouazizi, a Tunisian street vendor. What, I want to ask, makes photographs so powerful? Why are they so massively trusted in the age of Twitter, Facebook, and Photoshop, a time in which the falsification of images is in everyone’s reach? And last but not least, what constitutes atrocity?

My take is that atrocity photographs and other images of extreme suffering, whether still or moving, projected on TV or disseminated in the blogosphere, are crucial to both the formation and development of humanitarian consciousness. More specifically, I wish to claim that exposure to visual documentation of abuse forges our moral sensibility concerning human rights by way of a negative dialectics. Reversing Walter Benjamin’s dictum that “there is no document of civilization which is not at the same time a document of barbarism,” Susie Linfield claims that “every image of barbarism – of immiseration, humiliation, terror, extermination – embraces its opposite, though sometimes unknowingly. Every image of suffering says not only, ‘This is so,’ but also, by implication, ‘This must not be’; not only, ‘This goes on,’ but also, by implication: ‘This must stop.’ Documents of suffering are documents of protest: they show us what happens when we unmake the world.” (Linfield, 2010: 33)

I agree with Linfield and wish to push her claim further. Photographs of atrocity are so powerful because they awaken our moral consciousness. But this
is so because what we see in an image of extreme suffering is not whatever is literally represented, but rather what we cannot accept, what we cannot integrate in those background moral assumptions that allow us to form a sense of universal responsibility toward human rights. This explains why so many photos of atrocity do not actually represent visible human pain but are nevertheless considered icons of unspeakable abuse.

In commenting on the issue of collective guilt and responsibility in the context of the Historikerstreit, the debate raised by a number of German historians’ attempt to provide revisionary accounts of the Holocaust, Jürgen Habermas remarked that, no matter how subjective one’s perspective may appear, or how distant one’s personal memory of the facts may be proved to be, the moral point of departure is still the same: “the images of the unloading ramp at Auschwitz.” (Habermas, 1989: 229)

In perhaps the most iconic photograph of the unloading ramp, Birkenau’s (Auschwitz II) so-called “gate of death” looms in the background with a Christian cross standing tall on its pediment. The arched entrance to the camp stares at the viewer as an empty mouth into which three intersecting railroads ominously converge. The sky is white and so is the ground covered with snow. No prisoners or trains can be seen, but the terrifying emptiness of the desolate landscape speaks loudly of one the key moments of the Holocaust, which repeated itself over and over again for many murderous years: the selection of the prisoners on the three railroad unloading ramps. It was on these very ramps that SS doctors determined who was qualified for labor and who had to be killed immediately, which amounted to an average 75% of the prisoners.

Habermas refers to the image of the unloading ramp at Auschwitz to ground his notion of responsibility for the memory of that horror, a memory that transcends the boundaries of the self-sovereign subject and even the facts of her actual experience. From my perspective, Habermas’s choice of a photograph to substantiate his claim about collective and historical responsibility speaks of the peculiar dialectical nature of photographs of atrocity whose power lies not so much in their representation of objective reality but rather in their ability to engage humanitarian consciousness.

In the interpretation that I wish to suggest, photographs of atrocity do not simply “represent” acts of cruelty, but “perform” a moral imperative: they do not simply state reality as it is, but constitute acts of protest, by saying that it should not be so and must be stopped. In the same way that the statement “I
now pronounce you man and wife” does not simply describe an event but enacts it, photographs of atrocity do not simply describe a state of affairs, which can be manipulated and falsified, but enact a response of moral indignation. If I am right, the truth about photographs of atrocity is not to be found in their adherence to the facts on the ground, but rather in the moral disclosure they produce by dialectically engaging the dominant constructs of oppression and dehumanization that govern our ability to recognize atrocity at all. For atrocity is precisely the display of such constructs.

Fast-forward the clock from the darkest days of the Holocaust to December 17, 2010, from Germany to Tunisia. The Arab Spring was literally set on fire by the images of the self-immolation of twenty-six years old Mohamed Bouazizi, a street vendor protesting protest against the confiscation of his wares and the harassment and humiliation by a municipal official. The visual iterations of a man on fire, by circulation on the Internet and branding in public demonstrations, have performatively worked out the appeal made by the Arab street to its autocratic leaders. In my reading, this image of self-immolation has had constitutive role in the formation of a new humanitarian consciousness both in the Arab countries involved in the upheaval and in the global civil society that has responded to their plight.

The images of Bouazizi’s self-immolation were captured by the cell phones of stunned passers-by. In one of the most widely circulated we see the young man already collapsed on his knees but still holding himself up on his arms and hands. The flames cascade down from his neck as a long scarf flowing lightly between his arms. More flames rise from the floor between his arms and legs, probably from the pool of gasoline dripped on the pavement as he was getting himself drenched in it.

This arresting image says nothing of what happened after Bouazizi’s body caught fire. According to Bouazizi’s sister, people panicked and someone threw water on the flames apparently worsening his condition. Also, the image does not say that Bouazizi survived for eighteen days in a coma and that the now deposed Tunisian despot, Zine el Abidin Ben Ali, promised to have him transferred to a French facility specializing in severe burns, but ultimately did not. From my angle, the most relevant fact about the image of this young man’s self-immolation is that, in becoming the symbolic anchor of the protests that ultimately brought down Tunisia’s regime, it has also become the site of a democratic process.
My analysis echoes Seyla Benhabib’s notion of democratic iterations, assumed as those “complex processes of public argument, deliberation, and exchange through which universalist rights claims and principles are contested and contextualized, invoked and revoked, posited and positioned, throughout legal and political institutions, as well as in associations and civil society.” (Benhabib, 2004: 179)

Far from running the risk of aestheticizing and thus depoliticizing injustice, images of suffering are political practices, and thus are part of the “complex processes of public argument, deliberation, and exchange” that constitute democratic iteration according to Benhabib’s definition. Images of suffering negotiate the tension between the abstract and the concrete, the universal and the particular dimensions of the specific right claim that Arendt posits as the justification of all right claims, and thus as their normative condition: the principle of humanity.

Benhabib takes from Jacques Derrida the idea that “in the process of repeating a term or a concept, we never simply produce a replica of the first intended usage or its original meaning: rather, every repetition is a form of variation. Every iteration transforms meaning, adds to it, enriches it in ever so subtle ways.” (Benhabib, 2007:21)

In this sense, the application of norms cannot be understood as a simple translation from theory to practice, because iteration is never repetition, but entails transformation and interpretation. “Every act of iteration involves making sense of an authoritative original in a new and different context. The antecedent is thereby reposed and resignified via subsequent usages and references. Meaning is enhanced and transformed; conversely, when the creative appropriation of that authoritative original ceases or stops making sense, then the original loses its authority upon us as well.” (Benhabib, 2007: 21)

In the context of images of suffering like that of Bouazizi’s self-immolation the authoritative original is the irreducible nugget that resists being explained once and for all, or, to say it in Adorno’s vocabulary, resists being objectified and reduced to the terms of identity thinking. This is a fragment of contingency and irrevocability that, precisely because it cannot be repeated, does not let the viewer watch the image from a position of detachment but engages her in thinking of herself as a vulnerable bodily subject.

At the height of the Weimer Republic, Walter Benjamin expressed both anxiety at the possibility that the visual deluge would be the mark of an aestheticized and fundamentally passive society and an intense fascination for the
revolutionary potential of photographs: for the beholder, he wrote, “feels an irresistible urge to search such a picture for the tiny spark of contingency, of the here and now, with which reality has (so to speak) seared the subject, to find the inconspicuous spot where in the immediacy of that long forgotten moment the future nests so eloquently that we, looking back, may rediscover it.” Photographs, for Benjamin, are unique repositories of truth, but it is a truth that, while present is not immediately visible. This is the truth of the very instant that “sears” the subject of the representation: the click of the camera. In this perspective, the photograph truthfully testifies to the reality of that unique instant: it is a speck of absolute contingency.

The problem with portraying atrocity is thus not so much that photographs are “dishonest” because they are irreducibly constructed, or that they run the risk of aestheticizing pain rather than critically engage the viewer. The issue is that they may be engineered to induce a numbing of affect that allows the viewer to see the other as not fully real, or human, because it is either demonized or victimized to the extreme. In short, the problem with photographs of atrocity is that we may be put in a condition that we do not recognize any atrocity in them. Following Judith Butler’s idea that others appear to us as truly living only if their lives are framed as exposed and vulnerable, which is, at the risk of being lost and thus grieved, I wish to claim that, on the one hand, images of suffering tap into our deepest level of moral motivations by revealing our vulnerability as contingent bodily subjects. On the other hand, because of the dialectical way in which they signify, these images should be read as contradictions that by negation reveal the system of domination and dehumanization in which they exist.

The legitimate boundaries of showing and seeing cruelty are ones in which the other is allowed to emerge not only as an autonomous and self-sovereign individual, but also as a deeply contingent subject, who, precisely in her vulnerability to suffering, exposure to the ravages of time, and the always impending possibility of loss, finds her uniqueness and lays her claim to the future. In this respect, I believe, we can read Benjamin’s hope photographs hold a magical, indeed, redemptive power.
References


Public media continue to use the terms “multicultural” and “intercultural” interchangeably. For the purpose of this discussion, I would like to make the distinction explicit: a multicultural society implies the coexistence of individuals either born in a different national context or sharing a different cultural heritage. Such a society demands a higher level of intercultural communication competence to maintain respectful relations and derive the value of the cultural diversity.

Almost all contemporary societies constitute a coexistence of multiple cultural national or ethnic groups. Other dimensions of culture, e.g., gender, age, physical ability, or sexual orientation increase the inevitability of intergroup contact. Nevertheless this is not considered a natural process by most of human beings. Thomas Pettigrew (1967, 1979, 1998), a leading scholar in the research of intergroup contact who is following Gordon Allport’s footsteps of the “modest hypothesis” (Allport, 1954), has demonstrated over and over that living together does not imply being able to communicate with one another respectfully (Pettigrew, 2008). Understanding the value of diversity in a multicultural society is not straightforward; everyday news and personal experience show that it is not an easy task. And understanding cannot be achieved simply by creating new laws and new policies. In order to create the possibility for a society to operate at an intercultural level, where people share their differences through communication and create meaning, there needs to be a shift in the way people deal with cultural difference.

The human disaster created by the two world wars of last century has led prominent scholars, humanists and artists, such as Fulbright, Hemingway, Spinelli, or Congdon (Galli, 1995), to support the idea that for restraining such events from happening ever again, there needed to be a change in people’s minds. The idea was simple: had people had the opportunity to travel and live together with other people, they would have understood each other better and learnt to appreciate their basic humanness. This idea generated a dramatic increase in exchange programs, both at a high school and at a university level. The principle was that by creating fluxes of students moving among nations,
solid friendships would have emerged and solidarity among people with different backgrounds would have emerged and been maintained.

In an attempt to support the assumption of the felicitous effect of international exchange, many studies have been conducted on exchange students from the Fifties on. Typical is Stephan (1985), who studied the effects on students who lived abroad on different exchange programs. The study concluded that international contact had a higher impact in the reduction of prejudice of students, compared to domestic intergroup contact, however without a substantial change of stereotypes. In his research he isolated thirteen conditions for making intergroup contact turn into a positive contact, almost all very difficult to realize without a direct supervised intervention. Most of the studies around learning interventions are generated from the premise that for contact to become communication, there needs to be one or more facilitating conditions.

**Cross cultural programs and intercultural learning**

It has taken about fifty years, at least in Europe, to establish the idea that exchange programs were necessary in order to create a new vision of the world. The process of economic globalization going on from the end of the Eighties until now is making internationalization a must for almost any institution of society. Educational institutions have had the imperative then to internationalize their curricula, create new opportunities for exchange and improve access to these programs for larger numbers of students. The ideal of global citizenship however has been frequently overlapped with a more old fashioned concept of cosmopolitanism, wherein the “international person” was a privileged individual with access to people of the same status in other countries. Such highly contexted interactions do not easily transfer respect to other differences in society. Hence, for instance, an Italian could have an African American friend in the United States but would never allow his daughter sitting with an African migrant child at her Italian school. Even rarer is the transfer of cosmopolitanism to respect for other cultural differences such as sexual orientation.

Beyond the status-laden constraints of cosmopolitanism, even people who have had an international experience in a given foreign country, have learnt language and cultural institutions of that place and perhaps even values and ways of thinking predominant in that region of the world, are not necessarily able to transfer their ways of learning to other cultural contexts. For instance,
in order to get the background international experience that is considered to be a pre-requisite for taking on an international professional assignment, a student might enroll in a year-long exchange program to Japan. Even if this improves the student’s competence in things Japanese, it is unclear that he or she will be able to operate more successfully than an internationally inexperienced person in Africa or in Europe: if no work has been done on improving the ability of the person to see herself in cultural context, this person has the same chances as anybody else to succeed or to fail in a new cross-cultural context. The transferability of the ways of knowing about another culture is beyond the realm of simple cross-cultural exchange programs and usually requires an intercultural learning intervention\(^1\).

**From cross-cultural to intercultural programs: definitions and research overview**

The term “cross-cultural” has been used extensively by psychologists to refer to the comparison of personality data across cultural contexts. It has also been adopted by most business school studies in order to refer to different systems of cultural comparison, e.g. Hofstede’s studies (1991, 2003) on value orientations in different countries. In study abroad the term typically refers to the situation wherein the contact occurs: e.g. the university has a cross-cultural program in Chile. As mentioned earlier, all studies, both qualitative and quantitative, including most recent ones (e.g. (Pedersen, 2010; Paige & Goode, 2009; Vande Berg, Paige & Lou, 2102; Bachner and Zeutschel, 2008), show the best achievement of most students after a simple cross-cultural sojourn is to recognize their basic shared humanness with others. This of course is what Fulbright and the others were hoping for at the end of the two big wars. It is a great achievement, but perhaps no longer enough for the kind of preparation students now need for developing professional competence as global citizens.

Basic cross-cultural contact needs to be guided to create the outcome of increased tolerance, but a deeper intercultural encounter needs to be prepared for. The term “intercultural” was initially coined by E.T. Hall (1959) to refer to the interaction among people from different cultures. As the term is used here, it implies the idea, also shared by Gregory Bateson (1972), of “culture as communication,” the collective creation of meaning. Milton Bennett (2009)

\(^1\) The Erasmus program in Europe, one of the world largest exchange programs at University level, has been very successful in terms of universal access of students. However, it usually has not supported any intercultural educational effort along with the cross-cultural exchange.
synthesizes this process as the “interaction of meanings being differently generated.” For an intercultural encounter to happen systematically in an educational setting one needs to establish intercultural learning as a desired outcome of a program.

Intercultural learning is the acquisition of awareness of subjective cultural context, including one’s own. In addition becoming aware of operating in context with ethical constraints supports the ability to operate sensitively and competently across cultures. This leads to a kind of intercultural learning that is culture-general and transferrable. Cross cultural programs striving for this aim share a philosophy of intercultural education, being a systematic effort to promote intercultural learning through curriculum design, including pre-departure, on site and re-entry activities and/or course content emphasizing subjective culture and intercultural interaction and/or the guided facilitation of intercultural experience (Bennett M., 2010). Perhaps the most important shift that has occurred over the last thirty years is that more programs recognize that it is the perception of difference that changes the way one responds to cultural difference. Therefore, competence is not so much a function of what one knows, nor how one feels or what one can do, but of the complex ways one is able to perceptually construe cross-cultural events.

I take “competence” as a manifestation of framing our lived experience in particular ways -- in this case, of organizing our reality of the lived experience of cultural difference in a way that can generate appropriate enactments. It is the act of framing itself that generates experience, according to the constructivist psychologist George Kelly (1955). This is consistent with the constructivist definition of culture as the praxis of living (enactment) in a coordinated system of human beings (Bennett & Castiglioni 2001). This is also the basis of the Developmental Model of Intercultural Sensitivity (Bennett, 1986, 1993, 2004) that is now central to the collection and interpretation of data of many studies on cross-cultural programs.

The constructivist view of intercultural competence emphasizes the framing of experience as opposed to the assumed interplay of cognitive, affective, and behavioral constructs. For example, people are “culturally competent” in their own native cultures despite having no cognitive knowledge of its values per se, limited behavioral skills, and perhaps even a very negative attitude. People nevertheless frame their lived experience in a way that generates appropriate coordinated enactments. In the constructivist view, competence is related to
the extent of perceptual discrimination one brings to an event (Bennett, 1986, 1993, 2004) - what Milton Bennett calls “intercultural sensitivity”. Intercultural sensitivity is a complex experience derived from a highly differentiated construction of reality. To understand the relationship between sensitivity and competence, one needs to speak of a precursor (to use a neuro-biological term) to a certain behavior or attitude or skill (Castiglioni, 2013). The precursor is the constellation of experience, or worldview, that frames and brings into relief certain knowledge, that frames an attitude as a feeling for the whole of the experience, and that is enacted in certain behavior that is effective or not in alternative cultural contexts. Intercultural competence is indeed the capacity to effectively communicate in cross-cultural situations and to relate appropriately in different cultural contexts (Bennett & Bennett, 2004), but competence is not a thing in itself; it is a manifestation of a different way of framing one’s experience – a particular level of intercultural sensitivity. This shift to a more constructivist view of competence calls into question a lot of studies based on personality traits as predictors of i.e. “adaptation skills”, such as tolerance of ambiguity or open attitude (e.g. Hamilton, Richardson & Shuford, 1998; Deardorff & Hunter, 2006; Hunter, White & Godbey, 2006).

At least in some cases, this traditional cross-cultural psychology approach is being replaced by an emphasis on the development of a more sensitive experience of cultural difference. This leads to an important shift in study abroad programs: from cultural immersion to intercultural facilitation. The “sink or swim” strategy of simple cross-cultural immersion programs relied heavily on the concept of personality traits, as well as on the idea that it was experience itself that taught people how to get along in a different culture. That approach did not address at all intercultural learning as I defined it earlier, nor did it address being able to commit to an ethical stand without denying or denigrating other people’s values.

From a constructivist intercultural perspective, getting to know another culture demands a self-reflexive process of understanding how one’s own ethics interplays with that of people perceived as different. This is a developmental approach that goes together with the development of sensitivity to difference as described by M. Bennett’s model, referred to as “intercultural development.” Appropriate educational intervention and support becomes important in this case in order to guide experience, helping to make sense out of it, both reassuring and challenging students to overcome barriers to communication and
Research in the field of study abroad education has mirrored these theoretical and experiential changes by 1) defining intercultural development as a significant learning outcome; 2) studying program conditions that are predictive of intercultural development; 3) using more complex explanatory models in study abroad research; 4) using more rigorous research designs, including longitudinal, experimental, mixed methods, and retrospective tracer studies (Bennett & Paige, 2008).

As for point 1), research studies such as the Georgetown Consortium research study (Vande Berg, Connor-Linton & Paige, 2009), or the AFS International research study (Hammer, 2006) or the Maximizing study Abroad Research Study (Paige, Cohen & Shively, 2004; Cohen et al., 2005), consistently found that study abroad is significantly related to intercultural gains when intercultural learning is planned and facilitated. The Georgetown Consortium Study is a quasi-experimental, longitudinal design with pre-post-post (3 times) measures of intercultural and language development and the use of a non study abroad control group. Maximizing Study Abroad is an experimental design research with random assignment to the in-country curriculum intervention group or the in-country control group. The Youth for Understanding Study (Bachner & Zeutschel, 2008), is a 40 year retrospective tracer study using both survey and interview data. Finally, SAGE research (Study Abroad for Global Engagement) (Paige and Fry, 2008), a 50 year retrospective tracer study with an extensive sample (n= 6,391) and the gathering of both quantitative and qualitative data, which represents the best state of the art research available up to today about longitudinal effects of study abroad. Civic engagement, both domestic and international, together with social entrepreneurship and opting for advanced degrees is a definite result highlighted by SAGE, which is perhaps the most encouraging.

These studies support the idea that study abroad students achieve greater intercultural gains than students who don’t study abroad. This finding, mostly anecdotal before, or referred to single organizations such as AFS, has been found across multiple programs and studies. As for the predictive conditions of point 2), the most interesting studies are the already mentioned Georgetown Consortium research study (Vande Berg et al. 2009), and the AUCP research study (Engle & Engle, 2004). Main factors supporting intercultural development in a variety of programs are a) longer term study abroad (with a minimum variable from 3 to 5 months), b) the activation of pre-departure programs which
include an intercultural dimension, c) the on-site intercultural mentoring, both for individuals and groups and an immersion in the culture. It also has been highlighted in these researches that d) taking host language courses and consequently subject matter courses in the foreign language is highly beneficial in the acquisition of a different worldview. The intense language use is fortified by interacting extensively with host nationals; however, e) the interaction with same culture peers and other international students needs to be valued and supported by the program as well. Evidence shows that students who had the possibility of challenging themselves by a high level of interaction with the host culture, and were supported by the familiar group of peers, had better results in intercultural development than students with only full immersion contact or international peers only. The co-national or international group then serves as a cushion and a space for sharing self-reflections that would otherwise go unconscious. Also, f) the more dissimilar the country from one’s own, the more the activation of the student in learning about differences thus challenging her cultural worldview, the more intercultural learning happens when is guided; g) guided reflection on intercultural experience occurring regularly, both within a group and individually (both through journaling and mentoring) seems to support the “learning to learn” about another culture, aided by intercultural concepts and theory, leading to an intercultural sensitivity transferrable to other contexts.

A good amount of research has focused on students abroad, which should lead scholars to look for what’s happening on the other side of exchange. For instance, I conducted one of the few current available studies looking for intercultural learning of hosting families for high school exchange students in Italy (Castiglioni, 2012). The research has underlined a problem of our internet era: without a more theoretical scaffolding, hosting families don’t know where to put information about a “culture” randomly gathered through research engines. Thus looking for general information on the web does not consist of usable information for most of the people. The lack of a cultural guideline does not allow people to frame events as cultural ones, therefore any communication event is almost exclusively an interpersonal issue.

The outcomes of this research show that there is in fact no intercultural learning by hosting family members, but what I have called a sentimental experience. This is a potential window for adult intercultural education if used appropriately. Opening one’s own home to a stranger is an act of faith showing a willingness to help, but also to share and learn. As demonstrated in the
How do cultural aspects affect the allocation and use of investments, therefore the real development of developing countries?

last twenty years of pedagogical and neuroscience literature, love and emotions are the perfect basis for a long lasting learning experience, both for young and adult subjects (Contini, 1992; Le Doux, 1996). Yet love by itself, if not paired by an educational and learning effort, leaves the experience at a sentimental stage. The highly activated emotional state allows the possibility to learn if followed by adequate cognitive support, such as becoming able to name emotions and observations, intentionally creating categories or making links to already construed frames. The beauty of the hosting experience is that it might create learning about how to deal with difference that is transferrable. Being able to intentionally shift perspective and adapt to a different cultural context requires cultural self-awareness and observational skills. Taking this competence out there, in the working environment, at school, in the social context creates leadership. By raising the overall sensitivity around the value of diversity in society, one becomes a contributor of a more peaceful and thriving environment.

Civic and global engagement at the basis of global citizenship should not only be reserved to privileged minorities who can afford a long stay abroad. Not only should access to these programs be extended, but also receiving institutions to make better use of the available resources could do more work. In this case, foreign students are living resources, whose “educational difference” is scarcely if not at all treasured by schools and universities for creating opportunities for local students. Lack of financial resources, unavailability of trained people, but also lack of initiative are culprits of this missed chance. Internationalization is a dead word if not accompanied by strategic intervention and strategic funding. Raising political awareness to these issues should be an agenda for most civic groups in society.
References


sand Oaks: Sage


Food is one of the constituting elements of human history, not just as an element of biological sustenance necessary for the reproduction of the species, but also as a fundamental element of every civilization. It binds to social dynamics, anthropological changes, technological innovations, economic developments, political conflicts, migrations, and even the construction of cultural identities of social groups, communities and nations.

Within the limitless realm of foods, those prepared and sold in ready-to-eat single portions, by itinerant or stationary vendors in public spaces, streets, squares and markets – so called “street food” – are ubiquitous throughout history and, still, are an important cultural, social and economic phenomenon and a main source of nutrition for billions of people all around the world, either in developed, developing, or emerging countries. A culturally rich, socially multifaceted, economically dynamic reality, appreciated for being quick, cheap, tasty, local, and traditional, street food at a global level (to a greater or lesser extent in each country and city), especially when sold by informal vendors, must face two main hindrances: it is, first of all, widely deemed a jeopardy for public health, and secondly, its mobile character is invariably limited or even prohibited by public authorities.

Why is street food generally perceived as a menace to public health? Why is its mobility opposed? By focusing on street food in some South American metropolises – namely, Salvador Bahia and Sao Paulo (Brazil), Montevideo (Uruguay), Buenos Aires (Argentina), Santiago (Chile), La Paz (Bolivia), Lima (Perù), and Bogotà (Colombia) – I try to unravel these two controversial questions.

*A Poem of Foods*

Comida en la calle, comida callejera, comida al paso, comida de rua: a constant element within the visual horizon of anyone walking through the streets of a South American metropolis.
I encountered a vast variety of street foods from Salvador Bahia to Sao Paulo, descending to Montevideo, crossing the Plata river to Buenos Aires, then heading west through the Andes, Santiago, and ascending the Cordillera up to La Paz, on the way to misty Lima, and, finally, rainy Bogota. Three and a half months wandering all across this continent, and the culinary sumptuousness of a different dish on each day of my travel.

Abarà acaçá acarajé ajies alfajores algodón de azucar almendras anticuchos api arepas batidos baurú maca con leche bebidas bizcochos bollo de pescado bolinho do estudante bolón de platano verde bombones cachitos cachorro quente cafe camote frito canjica caramelos carne a la parrilla carne asada ceviches de pescado chicha morada chicharron chifles chilenitos chinchulines chipá pan de queso chocolomote choclos choripan chorizo a la parrilla churros cocada coco completos criollos cuñape donuts emoliente empanadas encebollado escabeche facturas flan de leche frutas galletas garrapiñada gaseosas gelatinas golosinas gyros habas tostadas hamburguesa harinas heladeria hot-dog humintas jugos lechon linaza llauchas lomitos maduro lampreado mamoncillos maní mariscos masas masitas mates mazamorra mil hojas milanesas milcao mingau mondongo mote palta pan panchos papas fritas pastas pasteles pataska patitas de chancho perro caliente pescado picarones pinchos pipocas pizza pochoco pollo postres praliné de almendras rapsadillo refrescos refrigerios rellenos rosicas queque queso queijo coelho res rosquillas salchipapas salteñas sanduche silpancho platanitos en miel sopapillas tacos tamales te tortafritas tortillas tostadas tripa rellenas tucumanas vacio vatapà vienesa viscera yogures wallaque zanahoria. Variations excluded.

Neruda would have rhymed them. I wonder if 17-year old Pablito, landed in Santiago in 1921 as a young student, walking in front of Portal Fernandez Concha on a Saturday afternoon, actually stepped inside the new shop opened one year earlier by Eduardo Bahamondes to have a bite of long soft bread filled with a sausage covered with ketchup and mayonnaise, enriched with palta, tomatoes and sauerkraut created by that enterprising entrepreneur to meet his countrymen’s taste. Perhaps as he even sketched on a mustard-splotched napkin, the poet would have created a glorious “Ode al Completo!” A new-traditional national dish was born, soon followed by its Italiano, Dinamico, Poor Style variations.

Many, fascinating, legendary old and new stories are told and documented about the birth and diffusion of street foods throughout the continent—a mix
of indigenous recipes, European cuisine, and African magic rituals. Ingredients, techniques and tools preserved in defense of a threatened identity, mixed by passionate encounters, loves and wars, rearranged on the basis of the infinite variety of fruits that the nature of the continent provides, and turned into icons by entrepreneurial genius and ambition – like that of Francisco Serrador, landed in Brazil from Spain at the end of the XIX century. Fascinated by the lights of New York and its hot-dogs, he created Cinelandia in the center of Rio de Janeiro, serving cachorro quente to his audiences. Ever since, a marchinhas is intoned at the most famous Carnival of the world: “Comer Cachorro quente lá no bar / Por certo a moda vai pegar / Um cachorrinho tentador / No Quarteirão do Serrador”.

South American street food has evolved over the centuries; from the modern “gringo” influence, to the ancient Inca Empire, where anticochos, beef heart on skewers, were originally made of llama meat marinated in Andean spices, then replaced with beef by Spaniards in the XVI century, with a touch of garlic and cooked on brochetas, and finally adopted (and adapted) by African slaves by using offal, the only food available to them. Nowadays, they are cooked on high-rise flames by cholitas, Aymara women wearing a Chaplin-like bowler, as the sun goes down beyond the mountains enclosing La Paz. The Bolivian capital is also home of salteñas, maybe the most common street food you can find there. It is said they were invented in the early XIX century by Juana Manuela Gorriti, a woman who would later marry Argentinian President Manuel Isidoro Belzu. Born in Salta, Argentina, during the Juan Manuel de Rosas dictatorship, she and her family were exiled to Tarija, Bolivia. Facing economic drawbacks, to make a living they came up with the recipe of a savory pastry filled with meat mixed in a sweet, spicy sauce.

Survival strategies were mixed with magic rituals brought from Africa to Salvador Bahia. Modern Baianas de acarajé are the secular heir of mães de santos, priestesses of the Candomblé, the Afro-Brazilian religion. During colonial times, once slavery was abolished, in order to survive and purchase their offerings for Iansa, orixà of the winds and storms, former slaves started selling akara (from Nigerian “balls of fire”) setting up a wooden tabuleiro at the side of the road. Starting as a religious ritual, it turned into a trade, and eventually into a tourist attraction. This big sort-of falafel made of black-eye-bean, fried in dende oil, and filled with prawns and sauces, presently represents a source of income for almost five thousand Baianas in Salvador Bahia. Half of them are informal
vendors. No longer a prerogative of Candomble worshipers, nowadays acarajé is sold by a growing number of evangelist women, and some, still rare, men, who call it bolinho de Jesus. Many of them chose the street to make a living in the 1980s, when, at the peak of the so-called “decada perdida”, the most dramatic economic crisis in the history of the entire continent, they lost their jobs in factories.

**A “Refuge Sector”: Between Economic Crisis and Structural Weaknesses**

Among the several informal options, selling food in the streets represented for the jobless an appealing solution, for two main reasons: first of all, preparing foods in general requires little training, and even less if we consider that almost all of vendors specialize in a single dish, which many learned to cook when they were children, watching their mothers and grandmothers (whom, often, were street food vendors as well).

Secondly, the street food trade is an economic activity that, if carried out within a framework of informality, requires a very low start-up investment, and requires low costs for its maintenance. Raw products are relatively inexpensive since street foods are often traditional foods, rooted in the use of local agricultural products and livestock, which can thus be purchased at low cost directly from the producers, usually at local markets. Moreover, they can be prepared with relatively inexpensive tools (often no more than a few pots and a portable gas stove) and sold by small points of sale (bicycles, carts, tables, or even from a window).

Albeit the scarcity of data related to the actual size of this sector as a result of difficulties (not yet overcome) to count and locate street food vendors, largely working informally and thus administratively invisible, the number of street food vendors seems to have increased throughout the continent starting from the 1980s (Munoz de Chavez et al. 2000:138), concurrent to the collapse of the economy.

Hundreds of thousands of unemployed people all across South American metropolises turned on their stoves, loaded small carts with home-made food, and headed to the squares, the avenues, the parks, the bus stations, the city centers, the productive and financial areas, stopped in front of theatres, cinemas, stadiums – wherever economic, social and cultural activities kept going, summoning people, and possibly workers.
Street food vending can take the form of ventanillas, kiosks, pushcarts, tabuleiros, motorcycles, vans, bicycles, carritos, or sellers on foot pushing two, three, four wheels loaded with tanks, refrigerators, ovens, kettles. Hawkers list their products: many names, same old jingle. Or one can find quiet, elderly ladies barely visible behind the shadow of windows facing steep alleys, or sitting at the side of the road frying donuts, dumplings, grilling bread or meat on skewers. This takes the form of Baianas in Salvador, pasteleras in Sao Paulo, tortafriteras in Montevideo, sangucheros in Buenos Aires, cholitas in La Paz, areperas in Bogotà.

We could assume a correlation between the economic crisis and the spreading of informal street food trade, as the result of widespread unemployment and lower purchasing power. Such correlation, though, is not so obvious nor a for-gone conclusion; it is rather the outcome of the interaction between contingencies and structural factors. In other words, the crisis might have magnified the action of broader background structural conditions: first of all, a massive and fast-running urbanization process (nowadays 80% of people in Latin America live in urban areas), and secondly the consequent widespread structural unemployment among new residents coming from the countryside, mainly settled in peripheral areas (which are in general less developed than city centers, and offer less job opportunities). South America presented a socio-demographic structure characterized by wide marginalized ethnic minorities, indigenous people and afro-descendants, high levels of illiteracy among women (especially older women), deficient social security policies, and administrative structures undermined by inefficiency and widespread corruption, etc.

The sum of structural and contingent criticalities brought (in many cases, forced) many people belonging to lower classes, ethnic minorities, and especially women to embrace informal street food trade to stay afloat.

**Health Risks: Between Poverty and Habits**

The implicit supposed connection (partly real, mostly prejudicial) between street food and poverty constitute the basis of maybe the most controversial misgiving about it: its conception as a jeopardy for people’s health. Indeed, street food is often deemed by public authorities and common people of being a disease carrier. Such suspicion, first and foremost nurtured by this trade’s specific location - that is, open air sites, which generate apprehension and concern about
possible food contamination because of environmental pollution and fecal residues carried by flies and other vermin – tends to be magnified when it involves informal vendors, belonging to lower classes, and coming from less developed, peripheral neighborhoods. This is also because of the assumption according to which people (especially older women) from poor classes tend to have lower levels of schooling, and thus little knowledge about health and sanitation issues. Moreover, living in underdeveloped neighborhoods (sometimes in slums), which in general have insufficient and inadequate infrastructures, lack of potable water, and open air sewages, are factors that might actually limit vendors’ ability to meet the minimum safety standards established by the authorities for the preparation (in many cases carried out at home) and for the service of food for public consumption.

Street food vendors in Peru were considered to be among the major carriers of the cholera epidemic which struck the country in 1991, and from there spread to the other countries of the region. Although only a small number of samples were analyzed, studies conducted by PAHO/WHO in Peru and Bolivia at that time succeeded in isolating the Vibrio cholerae in different street foods, thus indicating that these foods actually represented a potential carrier of cholera.

Numerous studies have been conducted on bacteriological contamination of foods around the world (in particular on bacteria that affect the digestive systems such as Salmonella, Cryptosporidium, Yersinia and Coliform bacteria) which constitute a potential risk for the outburst of cholera, salmonella, and shigella. However, even summing up these studies, we still have very little information about actual (not just potential) risks of disease and epidemics arising from the consumption of street food in South America. There is no systematic and comprehensive data about the diffusion and the severity of diseases and epidemics arising from the consumption of street food.

Besides, so far little investigation has been done on the side of consumers, and very little attention has been paid to the latter’s practices and characteristics. For instance, cultural factors are almost totally forgotten, such as the fact that people from different classes or different geographical origins, on the basis of their different lifestyles, might develop different levels of physiological adaptation and resistance to micro-bacteriological contamination of foods. For

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2 Scientific publications specifically focusing on such topic are only a few tens, with a little increase in the last five years. Street food is still largely understudied at an academic level, and most studies fall within a bio-medical perspective, while very little attention has been paid to it by social sciences.
instance, street food might actually represent a greater risk for the members of higher classes that for those of lower ones since the latter are likely to have more antibodies since they grew up in less aseptic contexts. As well, foreign tourists coming from developed countries and traveling to places where raw products, prepared foods, and cooking techniques are very different from the ones they are used to in their home country, are likely to get more easily ill than locals.

Vendors, on their side, underline they would have no benefit from selling bad food, since it represents their income (often the only one supporting their whole family). They say they move heaven and earth to meet, at the same time, sanitary standards, their customers’ tastes, and their own profit. The great majority of the vendors I have met during my travel showed me a sanitary certificate issued to them by the local municipal secretary in charge of public health surveillance. They have attended one, two, or three training courses on food handling, personal hygiene, and food safety.

Here is the paradox: the great majority of them have a sanitary certificate. Not all of them, though, get a permit to set their stand on a spot of public land to sell the food that they are qualified to handle and serve. When street food is no longer a health issue, vendors must ultimately face another obstacle, as they fall under the supervision urban planners.

_A Threat to the Urban Order?_

In South America, street food is rarely sold from ventanillas, fixed assets, kiosks, or window sills. Most vendors, instead, cook and sell at the side of the roads, on sidewalks, in squares from removable stands (in Salvador, Baianas prepare acarajaé on a tabuleiro; in La Paz, cholitas cook anticuchos on a grid that spits high-rise flames; in Sao Paulo, pastel are sold on market stands); as many walk around pushing a non-motorized small or medium-sized cart, which can be easily pushed and managed – even when, loaded with food and drinks, and equipped, if necessary, with fridge and boiler or deep fryer, it can be very heavy. These are the actual “ambulantes”: carritos in Montevideo, going up and down up and down along Calle Sarandi, from Plaza Independencia to the escolliera, selling panchos to tourists, policemen, and fellow street vendors of whatnot. They work from morning until late afternoon, when they finally stop waiting for the fishermen returning on the pier, and share a beer with them. Water ice-cream vendors in La Paz, going back and forth along Avenida Illimani, from
the footbridge that takes one to Mercado Lanza, to Plaza Murillo, where Evo Morales, the first indigenous Bolivian President, sits in the Palacio de Gobierno. Young vendors of cafetinho sell on the beaches of Salvador, competing amongst each other for the most colorful and eccentric self-made trolley.

Large-size motorized means of transportation, equipped with self-supplied electricity and a running water system are predominant in cities where regulations are more strict and strictly enforced, like, for instance, in Sao Paulo, Buenos Aires, and Santiago. Due to their unwieldy size, and to the costs of gasoline, they park and remain in one spot all day long.

Almost anywhere in South America, municipal authorities in charge of regulating and managing urban spaces – although to a different extent, and showing different attitudes – tend to look at street food vendors’ mobility as a problem that should be limited or even prohibited. Authorities argue that it is to ensure the safety of the transit of vehicles and pedestrians. Ill-disposed authorities, moreover, argue that the presence of street food vendors is a menace to the “decency” and protection of historic spaces and premises, especially when these are located within the boundaries of the city center.

Street food’s nomadic character and widespread informality challenge the principles of a sedentary bureaucracy-based civilization, which aims at keeping registers and tracks of every single individual and individual’s activity, pinning them on maps, and dividing cities into productive, financial, residential, and leisure areas, as well as accurately planning and fixing cities’ times and spaces. Whoever and whatever escapes from such logic must be curbed.

In some cities (in particular La Paz and Bogota), public authorities – undoubtedly in good faith – have been gradually trying to remove street food vendors from street squares and open air markets to enclose them within the walls of covered markets. Such displacement, although it was meant to be a positive solution to safeguard, at the same time, vehicles’ and pedestrians’, on one side, and vendors, on the other, it turned out to negatively affect vendors’ activity. In La Paz, for instance, vendors (all women) once selling meals in the area around Plaza Mayor have been relocated at the third floor of a massive building made of grey concrete, the new Mercado Lanza, where an incomplete roof lets the rain in. Their once (more or less) flourishing business is vanishing; they complain that people who are looking for food do not climb up there, and continue buying in the street. In fact, new food carts eventually occupied the spots that these women were forced to leave. In addition, they now must pay a rent.
This is just one example of how and why attempts to enclose street vendors within walls for “safety” reasons or to ensure the “order” and “decency” of public spaces is very likely to fail. For many vendors, despite the rain, the dust, and the melting sun, the street is not a place to escape from, and opening a restaurant (or, we could say: closing themselves in a restaurant) is not their ultimate, ideal goal. The street food trade is not necessarily an undesirable alternative to fixed restoration; it is a sector itself, with its own characteristics, meanings, and organization. If we stop and carefully observe them, hawkers, just like nomadic populations, do not chose their location randomly, nor they walk erratically; ambulantes repeat their paths over and over, all day long, all week long, all year long, carving their own city maps on the basis of their experience, following a strict economical rationality. They are businesspeople, not desperate beggars, they carefully plan where and when their business can be more profitable, and there they go.

Indeed, the equation street-food-equal-poverty – which may evoke a whole corollary of negative images: ignorance, backwardness, illness, illegality, chaos, ungovernability – is a partial and misleading one.

**Not so Poor**

Facts prove that street food is not just a “refuge sector” for poor and unemployed people in times of crisis. It is rather a multifaceted reality made of vendors who carry on by selling day-by-day for mere subsistence, but also small- and even medium-scale enterprises.

Once economic crises have left the pitch to a new economic growth or stability, many of those vendors who started selling street food as a mere, precarious and informal way to survive, turned it into a relatively profitable (either formal or informal) business. Indeed, several estimates carried out in different countries show that the trade of street food can ensure an average income well above the minimum legal wage.

Vendors, thus, might start selling food because it requires little investment and it is easy to make, but then they often go on because, on the basis of a rational economic evaluation, it can be a lucrative business within a structural (not just provisional) demand-supply framework. It is based on a demand coming not only from poor people, but from a larger, relatively wealthier segment of the population.
As street food is not made by poor people only, the same way, it is not bought by poor people only. As we turn our attention from vendors to consumers, we noticed that other factors rather than poverty tend to stimulate the consumption of street food. By being at the same time cheap (but not poor), quick, portable, nutritious, tasty, and, in many cases, traditional, street food is appealing, first and foremost, to a growing sector of the urban population more and more engaged in activities along jagged and long-range trajectories within the increasingly large, complex and differentiated space and times of contemporary South American metropolis. This is the outcome of an epochal phenomenon that goes under the name of urbanization. Middle and middle-low class commuters, living in suburbs of large cities, and employed in the tertiary sector mainly located in the center (or centers) of the city, are required to spend much of their day away from home, and thus they need to eat within the time constraints of their lunch break, and the financial limits of their medium and medium-low budget. Nowadays, they constitute the largest portion of street food consumers, stimulating the growth and spread of street food offerings.

Not just nourishment for poor people, nor just a convenient meal for workers, street food is also a favorite (and sometimes a must) for other groups, in particular “city-users”, students, and tourists. For these groups, street food does not respond to their need to survive nor, primarily, to find quick and affordable meals. They rather eat street food as a sort of “ritual”. For them, street food represents, first of all, a cultural and social item. While workers often grab their sandwich and eat it alone, sitting on a bench or on a run, students more often eat street food as a snack with friends in moments of leisure. For tourists traveling abroad, especially to places where local cuisine is very different from the one they are used to, street food represents an inescapable ingredient of that ethnic-taste experience they often look for, the emblematic representative of “real” local food.

**Street Food Governance: Between Exclusion and Support**

Municipalities in South American metropolises face street food issues from different perspectives, which we can boiled down to four main models: a) exclusive, b) laissez-faire, c) normative, and d) supportive.

To a different extent, all four models can be found in each city: different formulas can be applied to different categories of vendors (divided between
formal and informal, or with respect to the food they sell, or, yet, on the basis of their ethnicity, gender and age, adopted by the various public bodies (agencies dealing with urban planning, public health, tourism, social and economic development...) involved in different ways, and to a different extent in the management of this phenomenon, all more or less in coordination with each other.

The exclusive model is based on laws and regulations banning or strictly limiting both formal and informal street food trade from public spaces, especially from central, historic or commercial areas. Whereas the street food trade is informally carried out despite of such restrictions, local authorities implementing such regulations are actively engaged in expelling (or even in repressing) it. Under the aegis of local municipal bodies managing the urban planning, police forces crack vendors down, sometimes violently, confiscating their tools, carts, and products. When formal trade is permitted, bureaucratic red tape, delays, and sometimes unfeasible requests discourage those who would be willing to regularize their activity. Municipal bodies in charge of public health inspection tend to strictly execute the law, withdrawing the license or heavily fining those few formal vendors who do not minutely fulfill the standards of food safety set by law, even when there is no scientific evidence of actual risks for consumers’ health. Within such framework, authorities do very little or nothing either to know more about this phenomenon, or understand how to better serve this sector to make it more accessible, more acceptable, more profitable, and more sustainable, ensuring better social, economic and health conditions to vendors and, in turn, safer street food to consumers.

The laissez-faire model consists of a noninterventionist approach. It can be found especially in contexts of extreme poverty (urban peripheries and poor neighborhoods) or in times of economic crisis, where public authorities look at street food trade as a useful relief valve (both, for vendors and consumers) allowing low-income people to survive. Despite of existing international and national laws and local regulations (both on the side of public health and public space use), authorities pay very little or no attention to street food vendors, by letting them carry out informal business, and turning a blind eye in relation to food safety risks. Once again, authorities do not implement development projects aimed at improving vendors’ social and economic conditions.

The normative model is based on formal, more or less restrictive laws and regulations, but also on norms, social and cultural routines, customs, traditions, and practices rooted in history. On the basis of general guidelines set at a na-
tional and international level, municipal bodies enact specific rules concerning street food safety and the use of public spaces by taking into account the existing characteristics, dynamics, shape, and dimensions of street food trade within the boundaries of their jurisdiction. Public bodies in charge of urban planning set more or less flexible spatial and temporal boundaries within which vendors can carry out their activity. Public health inspectors carefully superintend these activities, assessing not only whether the size of the points of sale, cooking tools’ materials, and vendors’ uniforms minutely fulfill the formal standards set by the law, but also the actual risks of food borne illnesses, by carrying out scientific tests on food samples to measure contamination levels, and carrying out surveys on both vendors’ and consumers’ practices and health.

Finally, authorities adopting a supportive model are actively involved in collaborations with vendors (usually gathered in associations), coordinating development programs, projects, training courses on food safety, food handling, personal hygiene, and carrying out direct technical and financial support. This model is based on the idea that street food is an inescapable and even useful phenomenon, and that, therefore, its marginalization and exclusion is useless, counterproductive, and dangerous. Its criticisms – A risk for public health? A problem for the urban order? – can only be counteracted and overcome by improving vendors’ knowledge and abilities, as well as their social and economic conditions. Once this is done, threats to public health, if any, will not come from vendors, nor from the food they cook, nor from open air and the street as such; risks are eventually exaggerated by the lack of public infrastructures – public water points, electricity connections, adequate sewage and garbage disposal structures – supporting this special sector.

**Conclusion**

A slow but positive change of perspective has perhaps started to take place in some important urban areas in South America and around the world. Some important local and national authorities are finally investing not only in training and technical support, but also in social and economic development projects for vulnerable vendors (mainly women): in Lima, for instance, the municipal Secretary of Tourism has started English courses for street food vendors to better face a growing tourism.

Street food festivals are spreading; the term “street food” itself is becoming
a sort of brand to attract people at summer feasts, carnivals, and local events, where food carts and stands can’t be missing. Street food is maybe the perfect compromise between fast food – often characterized as being tasty but unhealthy – and slow food – which aims at unifying healthy eating, going-local, and tradition. Street food is a tradition much older that both conceptions, however; whereas fast food is an early XX century invention, and slow food a XXI century quasi-philosophical movement, street food’s roots can be tracked back into ancient human history, which more and more people are finally (re)starting to hose down. Moreover, given the ancient origin of many street food recipes, they are mostly prepared using local agricultural products and livestock. This means there is a tight link between street food vendors and small local producers and farmers, which is a potential fruitful alliance towards the achievement of food sovereignty, one of the most important goals for our future.

In Vancouver (Canada), Portland (USA), Lima (Peru), Penang (Malaysia), Cesena (Italy), Osasco (Brazil), and Dublin (Ireland) among others, we can find evidences of an ongoing reevaluation of street food’s cultural depth, social dignity and economic value, supported by local authorities. The development of the street food phenomenon as a whole (not simply as an economic sector, but as a more complex ensemble of social, cultural, political elements and dynamics) is now made necessary and inevitable.

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II.
Borders, Memories and the Nation
Chapter 6.

John Agnew

**Where is Sovereignty?**

Conventional modernist thinking about sovereignty in the academic fields of political theory and international relations sees the world as divided into neat blocs of space or territories over which states exercise mutually exclusive control and authority. Within this broad conception of sovereignty, two more specific understandings can be distinguished: a Hobbesian account, that defines a state by its borders and the obligations of its subjects to it because of the protection it affords them, and a Lockean account, that gives a state’s citizens a stronger role in terms of the state’s obligations to them, particularly with respect to the provision and enforcement of private property rights. Neither account has ever accounted for the fact that sovereignty has never pooled up neatly in territorial spaces, states have long shared sovereignty with one another and out-sourced it to other agencies both private and public, or that formal legal sovereignty (recognition by other putative states) is not the same as effective domestic sovereignty (delivering the goods to a population) or the Westphalian sovereignty that implies an ability to be effectively autonomous in inter-state relations. Asking “where” is sovereignty is a strategy for disengaging sovereignty from the assertion of contiguous territory as its singular modus operandi and from the assumption that sovereignty is simply exercised neatly by mutually exclusive territorial as opposed to space-spanning competitive and/or contract-ed agents. In this paper I provide some illustrations of the inadequacy of the conventional wisdom, outline what I term a “relational” alternative to it, and offer some conclusions about the alternative and its contemporary relevance.

*States and Sovereignty*

In practice, we all know that states are not equally sovereign in terms of their control over their borders, effective central bureaucracy to achieve collective ends, recognition by other states, capacity to influence and coerce others, or domestic legitimacy in the eyes of their populations (Agnew 1999; Agnew 2009). The term sovereignty is used in all of these various ways to express the relationship between states, on the one hand, and people, considered as subjects or
citizens, on the other. Yet, the world political map and some international organizations, such as the United Nations, are based on the fiction that each territory claimed by a given state is equally sovereign to all others. This is obviously problematic if we consider for a moment how many of the world’s putative states are in fact completely ineffective, absent, lacking in control over large chunks of the state’s territory, and faced with significant legitimacy deficits. Think, for example, of cases such as Somalia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq, Pakistan, Mexico, and Greece. Of course, these are all distinctive cases with various degrees of depleted sovereignty. To paraphrase Tolstoy, happy states may all be alike, but unhappy ones are all unhappy in their own ways.

Many of these states have never had much effective sovereignty. They emerged from colonialism and never achieved real independence. Their borders match neither any sort of cultural entity (such as a nation) nor meaningful economic unit (such as a settlement network or a resource base). Others have become dependents of other states, fractured by organized criminal gangs or secessionist movements, or reliant on debt servicing and remittances from external sources. Finally, some, including many economically developed states, have become subject to policing by various public and private agencies such as credit-rating agencies, law firms and courts, human rights organizations, and charities, that have become sovereigns in their own right as a result of licensing by states because of their superior knowledge, expertise, and claims to neutrality. These agencies and more dominant states exercise their sovereignty through geographical networks rather than by territorial control. Thus immigration enforcement now takes place away from state borders both inside and outside of states, credit-rating agencies based in world cities such as New York rank the sovereign bonds of even the most powerful states, such as the United States, and London based law firms and English courts increasingly adjudicate on cases brought by parties resident in or with assets in long-distant jurisdictions.

Three examples of these “sovereignty dilemmas” can be used to illustrate aspects of my argument. One involves the remarkable degree to which contractual disputes between Russian businessmen are now brought to court in London rather than in Russia. Estimates of as much as 60 per cent of the London High Court’s commercial and chancery divisions’ work devoted to Russian and East European cases are typical (Croft 2012). London is favored because of the weakness of the rule of law in Russia, the fact that many of the assets at stake, though often looted or exported from Russia, are now in scattered
bank accounts well beyond Russian shores, major London law firms specialize in cross-jurisdictional and international disputes, and the plaintiffs in question often live in London, an increasingly popular destination for nomadic billionaires sheltering their wealth.

A second concerns the role of private credit-rating agencies in providing ratings to the bonds used by governments to cover their debts (e.g. Sinclair 2005). During the so-called Eurozone debt crisis since 2009, the three major agencies, Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s, and Fitch, have been major actors in mediating between states, on the one hand, and investors, on the other. In the case of countries such as Ireland and Greece, whose bonds have suffered major rating decline in the period 2008-12, it has become common to speak of a loss of sovereignty to the credit-rating agencies. In fact, the loss is to investors but the process has undoubtedly been facilitated by the agencies. But the role of the credit-rating agencies itself has become so important because states have become so reliant of international bond markets to finance their budgets. Before the 1970s this role was of minor importance.

A third example relates to the de facto sovereignty exercised by the United States government over the US naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba where so-called enemy combatants from the “War on Terror” in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 9/11/2001 have been held without trial. The claim has been that this base, leased from Cuba when the government of that island was allied to the US, is beyond the jurisdiction of US federal courts and thus is not subject to writs of habeas corpus (the right to a speedy trial) guaranteed by the US Constitution to all those within US jurisdiction. Though questioned in a major decision by the US Supreme Court (Boumediene v. Bush (2008)), the in-between jurisdictional status of the base still continues to serve to deny the de jure obligations that would have faced the US government if the prisoners at Guantanamo had been incarcerated within the territory of the US proper. While the effective sovereignty exercised by the US over Guantanamo, therefore, is clear for all to see, notwithstanding the claim under international legal sovereignty made by successive US governments that it is really still part of Cuba, US courts remain confused in their decisions concerning the geographical scope of the basic right to trial for those denied the status of prisoners-of-war, on the one hand, and ordinary criminal defendants, on the other (Ghosh 2012).

In the contemporary world, as illustrated by these cases, people’s interests and identities are not readily and neatly associated with a clear territorial ad-
dress. Flows of people, capital, regulatory authority, and security threats are not easily tied to specific territorial locations. In turn, multiple sources of effective authority suggest that sovereignty is no longer usefully thought of in terms of the conventional wisdom of a close territorial matching between functional area and geographical scope of sovereign control and authority.

**Sovereignty Regimes**

What has been lacking in understanding the range of practices that constitute sovereignty is a means of identifying the co-variation between the effectiveness of central state authority, on the one hand, and its relative reliance on state territoriality, on the other. One approach comes from writing on the historical sociology of power. In distinguishing despotic from infrastructural power, Michael Mann (1984) identifies two different ways in which a state acquires and uses centralized power. These words refer to two different functions that states perform for populations and that jointly underpin their claim to sovereignty: respectively, the struggle among elites within and between states and the provision of public goods by states as a result of placating various social groups and pursuing and legitimizing despotic power. In Mann’s words:

> Let us clearly distinguish these two types of state power. The first sense [despotic power] denotes power by the state elite itself over civil society. The second [infrastructural power] denotes the power of the state to penetrate and centrally co-ordinate the activities of civil society through its own infrastructure. (Mann, 1984: 188)

Before the eighteenth century infrastructural power was relatively less important than it is today. This is because elites have been forced by political struggles to be more responsive to their populations through providing more public goods. But economic development has also mandated increased provision of roads, weights and measures, elementary education, and so on, that will always be absent or underprovided with reliance on private provision. This boosted the territorialization of sovereignty because demand was defined in terms of territorial populations and provision was oriented to satisfying that demand. Technological change, the increased intensity of all kinds of flows across borders, and the vulnerability of state populations to increased global economic competition threatening to public good provision when foreign competitors provide fewer
public goods have conspired to make infrastructural power increasingly net-
worked. City regions and supranational entities (such as the European Union) chal-
lenge the state monopoly over public goods. International organizations, both public and private, have the capacity to deliver regulatory, financial, and legal services hitherto usually associated with states.

At much the same time, despotic power has come to rely much more on popular legitimacy. Rulers need to establish at least a modicum of popular au-
thority before they can pursue their goals. Such legitimacy as they have is increasingly fragile. As interests and identities cease to conform to territorial norms, rulers must adjust likewise. This can involve pursuing increased influence elsewhere (as in an imperium) or ceding authority to other parties in order to manage dissent and resistance. There is no necessary correlation, therefore, between despotic power and central state authority. Elites are increasingly glo-
balized with respect both to pursuing their goals through expanded statehood beyond home shores and in terms of alliances with multinational companies, banks, and other agents of a more networked world.

The main theoretical conundrum in terms of the “where” of sovereignty is the relative balance between the strength of continued central state authority (despotic power), on the one hand, and the degree to which public goods are provided and regulated on a territorialized basis, (infrastructural power), on the other. The former involves judgment as to the extent a state has acquired and maintains an effective and legitimate apparatus of rule. The latter refers to the extent to which the provision and regulation of public goods is heavily state regulated and bounded territorially.

These dimensions of sovereignty define the degree of state autonomy and the extent to which it is territorial. From these, four extreme or ideal-type cat-
egories or what I term “sovereignty regimes” can be identified. These are rela-
tional in character. They refer to the character of sovereignty as manifested by differing combinations of central state authority and territorialized provision of public goods. They are not best thought of as characterizing particular states in all their aspects; no particular state fits exactly into any of the boxes in question. But they do provide a heuristic basis for identifying the relative complexity of sovereignty around the world today.

This is a patchwork of more-and-less sovereign spaces and flows, not a rig-
idly territorial order, with some states and organizations more sovereign (in terms of their effectiveness) than others. The simplified relational categories are
seen as representing stronger and weaker central state authority (on the vertical axis) and consolidated and open territoriality (on the horizontal axis) (Table 1).

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sovereignty Regimes</th>
<th>STATE TERRITORIALITY</th>
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<td>CENTRAL STATE</td>
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<td>AUTHORITY</td>
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Of the four ideal types, the first one, the *classic*, comes closest to the conventional story about sovereignty. Both despotic power and infrastructural power are largely territorialized and central state authority remains effective. Contemporary China perhaps best fits this case. The second case, the *imperialist*, represents best the case of hierarchy in world politics but with networked as well as territorialized reach. It is the complete opposite of the classic case. Central state authority is seriously in question, often exercised by outsiders if in collusion with local elites, and infrastructural power is weak or reliant on external support. Much of the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa falls under this regime. The other two regimes are more complicated.

The first, the *integrative*, is a regime where authority has migrated to both higher and lower tiers of government as a result of a sharing of sovereignty among states and infrastructural power takes both territorialized and networked forms. Various sorts of unions or confederations of states take this form. The fullest contemporary example would be the European Union from the perspective of its member states.

The second of the two more complex sovereignty regimes is the *globalist*. This regime is closely associated today with the globalization of the world brought about since the 1960s under US auspices. In this construction, the world city system, particularly the cities at the top of it, such as New York and London, provide the geographical nodes for the agents who are central to this regime.

They exercise sovereignty wherever states have ceded authority to external agents because of debt dependence or regulatory oversight. This regime has a potentially worldwide reach but its effects are particularly strong in those parts of the world most integrated into the world economy and without the limits set
on integration by, for example, managed exchange rates and capital controls, by states with greater central authority (such as China). The historic basis of this regime in US hegemony means that at least until recently US governments were able to use this regime as an alternative to the imperialist one. But as authority has slowly seeped out of US governmental hands, other agencies including many private as well as public organizations have picked up the slack.

I do not have the space here to show how useful these regimes are in understanding both the structure of contemporary global finance, particularly in relation to exchange-rate arrangements, and contemporary rules and regulations about nationality and citizenship. I refer you to the appropriate section of Agnew (2009, Chapter 4). Understanding sovereignty, therefore, seems to benefit considerably from considering it in relational rather than simply in the territorial terms that have tended to prevail hitherto in much discussion of sovereignty.

**Conclusions**

We still tend to think of sovereignty in the classic terms inherited from theorists in seventeenth century Europe. Yet, that tradition, based as it was in all sorts of cultural assumptions about the “body politic” and the political theology of early modern Europe, is not very useful in understanding the workings of state sovereignty today. As I hope to have made clear, sovereignty, in combining control and authority, is not best thought of in the exclusively territorialized form that has typically been the case. In asking “where” is sovereignty? my intent has been to show that the assumption of a close match between sovereignty and territory is problematic. In its place I have developed a typology of “sovereignty regimes” that serve to acknowledge and explore the complexities of sovereignty without being overwhelmed by them. That is the purpose of ideal-types.

The approach developed here raises several normative questions relating to constitutional law and human rights that I can do no more than mention. One is whether legal jurisdiction can continue to be defined in such strong territorial terms as it has in recent judicial thinking in the context of a world that increasingly escapes its grasp. The second is that sovereignty is often used as “excuse” or hypocritical defense by governments trying to exclude external critique or intervention in their “internal” persecution of minorities or stigmatized groups. On a relational view, such a claim can no longer bear close examination. The Hobbesian excuse that we can do what we want around here because you do
what you want over there justified in terms of protecting those persecuted internally from external enemies never was anything other than a nasty ploy. It is past time that governments that use it were called out for their hypocrisy.

References


The connections between international boundaries and tourism are multifaceted (Timothy 2001). Indeed, boundaries may have a deep impact on tourism fluxes and exchanges, on the basis of their permeability (that is, consenting exchanges of people and goods) or how impermeable they are (closed). A good example is represented by the renovated success of Marbella as a tourist destination in the nineties, after the opening of the so-called “Iron Curtain” and the appearance of visitors coming from the former USSR and from other ex-Socialist countries.

Boundaries do not just limit fluxes between contiguous political entities; they are powerful dividers of sovereignty. They can, therefore, demarcate regions with different administrations, different laws and different tax systems. In this case, boundaries play a political role as markers of difference, and borderlands are turned into tourist regions simply because they are situated in the immediate vicinity of the boundary itself. Cross-border shopping is probably the most ubiquitous form of borderland tourism: goods can be cheaper on the other side or simply available on one side, while forbidden on the other (Minghi 1994; Timothy 1999). Of course, cross-border tourism is the flipside of smuggling: it just depends on the permeability of the border. In general, it has been observed that “the further people live from the frontier the less frequently they will cross, but the value of goods purchased on each trip will likely be higher”, (Timothy 2001, p. 60). Other forms of cross-border tourism may be connected to specific activities, such as hunting, fishing, gambling, or even medical needs, which are cheaper/more expensive, or legal/illegal on the other side of the border. As far the cost of activities is concerned, one of the most recent developments of cross border tourism is “medical tourism”, the practice of crossing borders in order to get a cheaper medical procedure. For instance, in the borderlands between Italy, Austria, Slovenia and Croatia (Albreht, Pribakovi Brinovec and Stalc, 2006), “dental tourism” is practised, because in Slovenia and Croatia dentists are cheaper. Outside Europe, “dental tourism” is quite common also, from the United States to Mexico.
Some specific forms of medical tourism, such as fertility tourism (the practice of traveling to another country for fertility treatments, which are not allowed at home), could be understood also from a legality/illegality standpoint. However, the most classic form of cross-border legality tourism is represented by border localities attracting visitors from the other side with casinos. Again, Slovenia is a good example, since before the dissolution of former Yugoslavia it used to be famous for its hunting grounds among Italians, and now, it attracts them because of gambling (Dwyer et al., 2012). Other forms of “vice tourism” can be practiced in borderland regions, if alcohol, sex, or drugs are easier to get than on the other side of the border. Indeed, “Welcome to Tijuana, tequila, sex and marijuana”, the song’s refrain by the pop singer Manu Chao, offers a perfect synthesis of the tourist illustration of the U.S.-Mexico borderland, since in the popular imagination, the Mexican borderland is notorious for its liberal laws concerning prostitution and narcotics. All the same, it should be added that this kind of cross-border tourism does not need an international boundary to develop: the tourist resort of Stateline has mushroomed along the California-Nevada border because of the renowned softness of Nevada’s marriage, divorce, and gambling laws.

Apart from cross-border fluxes, other issues concerning borders and tourism pertain to the transnational management of tourist destinations, such as the Tatra Mountains between Poland and Slovakia (Taczanowska 2004), or protected areas, such as the international parks along the US-Canada border (Timothy 1999).

Eventually, borders can represent a tourist attraction in themselves, both because they are barriers of the present, featuring the signs of a confictual landscape, or are other symbolic landscapes. This is the case of “frontiers” and boundaries of the past, marked by the remnants of concrete structures, such as the Great Wall of China or Hadrian’s Wall in Great Britain, or simply perceived as the relict borderscapes of the region.

**Borders as tourism attractions**

Borders can play the role of a tourist attraction in two different ways; first, as material objects, as signs of conflicted present or of a conflicted past. Secondly, in a more nuanced manner, as abstract lines, or better as symbolic landscapes, supposedly denoting a cultural diversity. In the first sense, the most well known
example is Wagah, the only road border crossing between India and Pakistan, where everyday a spectacular border ceremony of closure is performed. Quite famous, in this perspective, is also the border separating the two Koreas, even if, in this case, the most relevant attraction is the network of underground tunnels built up by the northern neighbor. They were probably built for espionage and military purposes, and turned into a tourist spot by the South Koreans, for tourists visiting the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) on the 38th parallel. In both cases, the border denotes a landscape of power, marked by national symbols openly referring to the conflictual situation between the two sides.

In a similar way, relic political frontiers, or areas formerly separating different political entities and still visible in the landscape, are usually fused into the national heritage of the country that they were built to protect. Later, they become tourist attractions in this perspective. In this regard, they can be considered historical monuments and turned into cultural vestiges to be preserved and valued (such as the Great Wall in China, Hadrian’s Wall, and Offa’s Dike, perhaps the most treasured symbol of Welsh nationalism). The Berlin Wall is another relic frontier that is a widely popular European tourist attraction – even if, to the great dismay of many of its visitors, it has now been almost totally destroyed and replaced by a simple line drawn on a pathway as testimony to the old political division.

Political tourism is not only associated with wars, conflicts and cultural tensions. On the contrary, territorial features of the political present, such as border areas, can sometimes be turned into objects for foreign visitors’ curiosity. In tourism terms, the boundary may be interpreted as a severance between something desirable and something that is (or must be) ignored because of its unattractive image. This is, for instance, the reasoning behind the depiction of the Island of Hispaniola on maps as “half an island” so as to avoid the negative reputation of its less fortunate side, Haiti, while promoting its attractive side, the Dominican Republic. In order to stress even further a separation from its other half, the island is very frequently referred to with the touristic name of Santo Domingo.

Most frequently, the boundary symbolizes the limit between something known and something different. Indeed, boundaries have a symbolic meaning, since they denote a supposed difference in cultural terms (Newman and Paasi, 1998). In this perspective, sometimes simply crossing a boundary – with the differences in language and culture it suggests – can be a touristic experience, and
the icons of this demarcation turned into attractive objects (Thimoty, 2001). In such cases, boundaries can function as tourism attractions *per se*.

Occasionally the basic idea of difference can be commoditized as an attraction. For example, San Diego takes advantage of its proximity to the Mexican border to market itself as a quasi-exotic destination, while, in the US, the national fast-food chain “On the Border” takes advantage of the same exotic effect of the border to advertise its Tex-Mex restaurants all over the country.

In some circumstances, the boundary itself – notwithstanding its immaterial nature – is touted as a symbolic marker of diversity and made into a local tourism attraction, even if it cannot be even seen or recognized in the landscapes. This last, peculiar situation will be the focus of the case study analyzed in the present chapter.

*St. Maarten/St. Martin:*

*“Get the experience of visiting two island colonies in the same 37 square miles”*

St. Martin/St. Maarten is a small island in the Caribbean, which is politically divided between France and the Netherlands. The division is a consequence of the colonial era, when the Dutch settled at Little Bay and the French in the Orleans area. A partition treaty between the two colonizer countries was signed in 1648, though later on the Dutch and the French continued battling, each having complete control of the island for years at a time. Only in 1817 was the conflict peacefully resolved and the current boundary established. But the French and Dutch were not the only people to influence the emerging culture of the island. In 1648, as plantations sprang up across St. Martin/St. Maarten, the island began to import slaves from Africa, so Africans also contributed much to the island’s heritage.

Today, the southern part of the island, the Dutch side, has the status of a constituent country of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, its official languages are Dutch and English, and the currency is the Netherlands Antilles guilder (to be substituted by the Caribbean guilder in 2013). While the Northern part of the island constitutes the French overseas collectivity of Saint-Martin, the official language is French and the currency is the Euro. However, since France and the Netherlands are both members of the EU, and signers of the Schengen Treaty, the division between the two parts of the island, which was once the source of many battles, should be considered totally irrelevant. The island should rep-
resent a perfect example of a bi-national, but “borderless”, land. Indeed, both countries are in the Euro area. And the whole island, as with many others in the Caribbean region, is strongly permeated by an American influence, and a large majority of the population is of Afro-American origins. English is also widely spoken, and is in fact the most diffused language on the island.

Notwithstanding this general ethnic, linguistic and cultural homogeneity, St. Maarten/St. Martin’s tourism branding is focused on its cultural diversity, both with texts and images or maps. The importance of the political division is highlighted because of its capacity to distinguish the island from the others in the region (St. Martin/St. Maarten is in fact the smallest divided island in the world). Discourse analysis of Anglophone tourism literature, for instance, points to two major strategies: indeed, in websites and other written touristic materials, the first thing stressed about the place – after its geographical location in the Caribbean – is usually its geopolitical division. This division is constantly referred to, especially through the regular use of the double place name (St. Martin/Sint Maarten). The “uniqueness” of the island is also emphasized by the second strategy. In this case, the cultural differences of the two sides of the island are played up through references to the cultural landscape, the cuisine, the language, and so on. It is also generally mentioned that two different currencies are in use on the island: the Euro on the French side and the Netherlands Antilles florin (guilder) on the Dutch side (even if, as previously remarked, the only commonly accepted currency, all over the island, is the dollar).

Visual analysis of cartographic representations of the island offers similar results. In postcards and tourist maps, the most eye-catching feature of the island – along with the usual icons of tourism, such as bathing beauties and sailing boats – is the international boundary bisecting the land (Rose, 2001). Place names are often recorded in their double version (even if sometimes the English version is added), and textual signs and visual symbols, such as the two flags, recall the Frenchness/Dutchness of the two sides. Likewise, the two flags – whose patterns and colors are similar, but inverted – make a pleasant image that frequently appears on all kinds of objects. Other souvenirs present the map of the island bisected by a big borderline. As stressed by Timothy (2001), guide and travel books make their contribution as well, tending to “promise an international experience that is ‘delightfully Dutch’ and ‘fantastically French’.”

Indeed, the theme of political division is probably the primary selling point of the island; the border is its most outstanding feature. Nevertheless, when you
actually get to visit the place, you cannot see any boundary – prominent on the maps, it is totally invisible in the landscape, where the only physical markers of its presence are a monument and some road signs. Even Euros are not so welcome. Certainly, some distinctions are preserved, even forcibly imposed. On the French side, many restaurant names recall the French connection; on the Dutch side, Delphi ceramics are sold, together with small windmills, as souvenirs. There are even a couple of Indonesian restaurants, keeping alive the old network of the Dutch Indies – although the most popular dish on both sides of the island is American-style spare ribs. Casinos are only located on the Dutch side but are mostly owned by Italians and visited by everyone.

So, St. Martin/St. Maarten’s diversity is apparently much more fabricated than real, a feature promoted merely to give a special flavour to the island and make it look different from the many other “exotic paradises” in the Caribbean Sea. Its border is the remnant of a colonial, and divided, Europe that no longer exists, a Disney-fied attraction to be played up to the mainly American tourists as a condensed stereotype of the far away region’s cultural richness.

Conclusions

From a St.Martin-Sint Marteen standpoint, tourism could be described as a monster, capable not only of turning anything into a commodity (including historical events and geopolitical features), but also of manipulating history and geopolitics for its own ends and resurrecting boundaries, as commoditized attractions, even in those corners of the world that for practical purposes could be totally borderless. However, it is possible to take also the opposite view: tourism is not an ogre, but a very useful tool that can help us to understand the transient meaning of everything, geopolitical issues included. From this perspective, it is possible to appreciate that cultural diversity does not have a geopolitical meaning per se: it can be either a tourist attraction or a reason of conflict and war. In the same way, it becomes possible to understand that even conflict and war, hatreds and passions, can be overcome in time by curiosity and nostalgia. Further, one can understand that even political boundaries created hundreds of years ago to separate the realms of influence of the most powerful colonial nations of the time can now be converted into meaningless souvenirs for borderless tourists.
References


Research on the geography of borders and cultural geography can be interesting if applied to the territories transferred from one State to another, a process that usually occurs after treaties of peace are conducted at the end of international armed conflicts.

For example, after the Second World War, Italy had to transfer some regions to France, such as the Little Saint-Bernard pass, the Mont Cenis plateau, part of Monginevro with Mont Chaberton, Valle Stretta and Mont Thabor, and part of Roya (or Roia, or Roja) Valley.

After a brief theoretical introduction, we will take into consideration this last region as an exemplary case study, leaving the other regions to later research.

Some theoretical opening remarks

It is well known that contact among different cultures, nations, ethnic groups and so on can cause the – anticipated or not – destruction of places, usually strictly in connection with the “dis-memorization” of the landscape (Massey, Jess, 1995). This destruction, for the affected group, is something more than a simple economic deprivation, because it assumes a much more serious consequence: the loss of one’s own past, and consequently, of one’s own being.

Armed conflicts are in this unsafe point of balance between space and time as a moment of great instability, and their consequences are often unpredictable. War acts are, in fact, historical causations that give events a course that, otherwise, they never could have taken. What was passive in nature and shared by a group before a war can evolve into crisis, change and give way to other processes of identity. With an armed conflict, destruction is not only physical but, more importantly, cultural:

“When transformations are rapid and provoke the destruction or the twisting of reference points marking our place in life, a stress we can compare with a physical or environmental one is generated. In many cases these events are caused by external factors, so that the local group feels itself besieged by an extraneous, «other» culture. At the end, the menace of change, which hangs
over its own completed environment is perceived like a menace expropriating its culture and it could be defined as true *cultural stress*” (Caldo, 1994: 24, my translation).

After the end of a war, it is possible to observe, with a different selection of established values, the creation of a new identity by the groups involved. After the consolidation of this new identity creation, a successive process of “re-memorization” of the landscape will follow, based on the newly shared values. Very often, in fact, throughout history, changes of identity by many social groups have occurred, and frequently, these were caused by, or were at least coincident with, an armed conflict. We can think of an instance around the time of the fall of the *Ancien Régime* in France, the achievement of the revolution, and its accompanying republican values in European nations during the 18th century; or in Italy after the Second World War, when nationalist values were replaced with ones of the resistance. The destruction of buildings and monuments symbolic of the past regime, or the changes of the street-toponymy of towns (Raffaelli, 1998), are well known.

Also, a large number of historical examples of regions that were surrendered from one State to another, after treaties of peace resulted in changes of boundaries, assumes particular prominence in this viewpoint. In these regions, the passing from one governmental authority to another frequently causes a remarkable change in the original cultural landscape. For example, in Europe we can think about Alsace-Lorraine, which between 1870 and 1945, was alternatively German and French on two occasions. Each time the cultural property – or heritage – was significantly modified in favor of, or to the detriment of, one country or the other. In addition, we can think about Alto Adige-Südtirol where, after its acquisition by the Italian Kingdom and the establishment of a fascist totalitarian regime, the toponymy was Italianized by force (Bartaletti, 1996) and pro-government monuments were erected.

While sometimes the process of changing the cultural landscape is spontaneous, we must not be surprised if, on occasion, it is induced by the power élite:

The link between memory and power, in fact […] also manifests itself in a negative way: the memory can be activated in relation to the recall of events, which can contribute to demolishing the current power structure and criticism of the present (Fabietti and Matera, 1999: 122, my translation).
Whether the birth of a new group identity (and its consequent expression as part of the cultural landscape) is spontaneous “from below,” or it is created “from above,” it is proper at this point to ask if there is a “good” way and a “bad” way to use the past and historical memory and, if so, if it is possible to distinguish them. Putting aside ethical or deontological scruples, we can take a Machiavellian approach: if there are many spontaneous cultural landscapes, so also are there many artificial ones. In the first case, it is the settled culture that expresses them and gives them a peculiar connotation bearing witness to this culture.

In the second case we observe, instead, an opposite process caused by a power that wants to “legitimise itself” by rigging the collective memory and regulating the use of heritage with the aim of consolidating itself. It is no longer the settled culture, which manifests itself in cultural property, but instead a hegemonic power that imposes itself by taking and illicitly using the territorial property (Corna Pellegrini, dell’Agnese, 1995). As to the means of distinguishing one from the other, the skills and intellectual honesty of geographers come into play.

**The case-study: the Roya Valley**

A minor, but no less significant case study, in regard to the change of boundaries and borderscape is represented by the Roya Valley, partly yielded by Italy to France in 1860 and 1947, where significant examples of “dis-memorization” and “re-memorization” of Italian cultural property in pro-French terms have occurred.

The Roya Valley region was not new to episodes of change of sovereignty, and many historical events had an effect on the valley and on its cultural property. Travelling the Radial Road (Strada Statale 20 del Colle di Tenda / Route Nationale 204), for instance, we can still see in French territory, next to Saorge, an inscription of great dimensions and, a few hundred meters South, another one that is today totally chiselled away. These inscriptions were realised in 1592 and 1784, respectively, to commemorate for posterity the works of modernization of the road ordered and realised by the Duke of Savoy Carlo Emanuele I and the King of Sardinia Vittorio Amedeo III. In 1794, when French Revolutionary troops passed through the Roya Valley, the inscription of 1784, composed of 600 bronze letters, was irreparably destroyed because it was symbolic of the Ancien
Régime. The inscription of 1592, perhaps because it was made from stone or perhaps because it was not so easily reachable from the road, was saved (Bernardini, 1979).

The very first daring division of the valley – which has had important consequences up until now – occurred on July 13th 1262, when the Aix Treaty between Genoa and the Provence dismembered the County of Ventimiglia, giving the lower part of the Roya Valley to the Genoese, the middle part (with Breglio, Fontano and Saorgio) to the County of Nice, which was at the time part of Provence, and the upper part to the independent County of Tenda (Ugo, 1989). So, with the transfer of the County of Nice to France (1860, almost 600 years after), the villages of Breglio, Fontano and Saorgio in the middle part of the Roya Valley became a part of the French Empire and what used to be simply a feudal border became, during the 19th century, an international one. The Roya Valley remained separated into two States: the central part under the French Empire of Napoleon III, while the upper and the lower thirds were under the newborn Kingdom of Italy.

A very pronounced differentiation between the different boundary zones became inevitable, starting with the political conception of that time. In this case, we can observe in the French part the Frenchification of many of the place names (if not cultural property *stricto sensu*, nevertheless very important elements of the cultural landscape), sometimes utilizing again the versions already used during the First Empire: Saorgio became Saorge, Fontano Fontan, and Breglio Breil (then Breil-sur-Roya) (Lamboglia, 1946).

Eighty-five years later, at the end of the Second World War, after the Paris Treaty, among the territorial modifications Italy had to make in favor to France, there was the transfer of whole upper part of the Roya Valley (the municipality of Briga Marittima, including the hamlet Morignolo, and the municipality of Tenda, including the hamlets San Dalmazzo and Vievola), and of a little part of the lower part (the hamlets Piena and Libri belonging to the municipality of Olivetta San Michele) (Ugo, 1989).

The transfer of these territories was decided by the Conference of Peace held in Paris on the 10th of February 1947 and submitted, on the 12th of October 1947 (one month after the Treaty came into force, fixed for the 16th of September), to a plebiscite, which confirmed the treaty by a majority percentage. This now perplexes some authors who study the conclusions of the diplomatic conference (Fini, 1987).
We have already seen the process of Frenchification of the cultural landscape after 1860 in the central part of the valley, continued after 1947 in its upper part. Tenda was transformed into Tende, San Dalmazzo di Tenda into Saint-Dalmas-de-Tende, Briga into La Brigue, Morignolo into Morignole, Vievola into Viève (but with less success, as in fact we can still see road signs with the version Vievola, to be pronounced with the accent on the last “a”), Libri into Libre, and Piena into Piène. At this point, it is pertinent to ask in the same regard what F. Bartaletti asked about Alto Adige-Südtirol:

if it is just to impose at all costs more or less artificially re-built or re-exhumed place names having no significance to the native population […] and often sounding ridiculous […] in an after-war annexed territory (Bartaletti, 1996: 619-620, my translation).

Urban place names, after the transfer of the upper part of the Roya Valley, also suffered contortions. In Tende, for example, the stretch of the Radial Road that passes through the village has been called avenue du 16 septembre 1947, the date of the transfer of the Municipality to the French Republic. In La Brigue today, there is the rue de la République – rather ironic, because in the Italian referendum on a monarchy vs. republic, which was conducted on June 2nd 1946, or only 16 months before the plebiscite, the majority of the Briga population voted in favor of the monarchy – and avenue Charles de Gaulle (Vignoli, 1995).

This process of Frenchification did not limit itself to the toponymy; it often did, but not always. For example, on the inscribed pillar in memory of the two World Wars in Briga there people’s names inscribed, but not on the one in Tenda. Particularly significant in this regard is the example of the monument erected in Briga, in memory of the Italian colonel Giovanni Pastorelli, born in Nice on the 29th of March, 1859, and killed during the Italian-Turkish war in the battle of Ain Zara (Libya) on the 4th of December 1911. After the transfer of Briga to France, on the inscription of the monument, he has been re-named Jean Pastorelli, born in Nice (in 1859 Nice was called Nizza because it was not yet French) and dead on an unspecified field of honor.

After the Second World War, the processes of “dis-memorization” and “re-memorization” of the borderland has, of course, the usual aim to strengthen the new border. But, it also had a new purpose, the deletion of the relict border that separated France from Italy from 1860 to 1947. For this, it is significant that
there was a French plaque between 1947 and 1966 (Minghi, 1991) at the point of the road where the old border used to be, saying:

\textbf{PAR LA VOLONTÉ ET LA TENACITÉ}
\textit{des populations}
\textbf{DE TENDE ET DE LA BRIGUE}
\textbf{LA FRANCE}
\textbf{NE FINIT PLUS ICI}
\textbf{16-9-1947}

It is quite evident that this plaque, clearly aimed to delete the relict border, had the opposite consequence of strengthening it, and perhaps this is the reason why it was wrecked in 1966. In any case, 1966 can be rightly considered the post quem term of the complete deletion of the old border by the French.

On the other hand, the relict border was also stressed by Italians, but in this case, with the aim to not forget it: at least up to 1969 the old border was still clearly indicated on the maps of the Italian Touring Club, and the place names of the transferred territory were still written in both the French and the Italian versions, as if this transfer was not to be considered as conclusive.

\textit{Conclusions}

It is not difficult to establish what the effects have been of these actions upon the borderscape because, as one drives down the valley, there is no difference evident between the two parts of the relict border, while there are stronger distinctions between the two parts of the new one, even if since 1993 the customs between Italy and France have disappeared.

Sometimes, but usually only for touristic aims, the ambiguous Italian and French character of the region is stressed:

So although some villagers might not want it, La Brigue is not your average French town – Italy is close by, not only literally but within the very genes of La Brigue (van Vliet, 2005: 8)

Regardless, if the native inhabitants are asked if they feel Italian or French, they usually answer: “we are Brigasque”, even if now, after decades, the Frenchification of La Brigue is absolutely complete.
References


Chapter 9.

Anna Casaglia

Nicosia: a divided city at the edge of Europe

This lecture is based on the results of ethnographic research conducted in the divided city of Nicosia. The research analyzes the consequences of the city partition and how the resulting divided space has led to the materialization of social cleavages and contributes to the maintenance of patterns of mutual denial. The research resulted from an interest in ethno-national conflicts expressed at the urban level; it focuses on the territorial scale of ethno-national conflicts. Specifically, the lecture deals with the case of cities partitioned by a conflict into two or more homogeneous areas from an ethnic, linguistic, and/or religious point of view. It therefore deals with situations that lead to the creation of borders.

A growing body of literature underlines the role that cities, and especially capital cities, can have in a wider context of reconciliation (Bollens 2001, 2007, 2009, 2011; Calame & Charlesworth 2009, Kliot & Mansfield 1997 and 1999) as the urban environment is the necessary and strategic foundation on which to build an integrated society. The city is often the target or the focal point for ethnic conflict—according to Bollens, it is a catalyst—and therefore it is also the arena where reconciliation can take place. Partition is a tempting solution to separate or contain ethnic diversity, with the aim to create a homogeneous urban space and to pursue inter-group stability. However, as we will see, this emergency solution only obstructs the potential cities have in the management of competing group rights. The path towards partition involves an institutional renunciation to manage the conflict (Calame & Charlesworth 2009); the purification of urban space from diversity is not only a false solution to problems of integration, but it also limits the opportunities for a multicultural environment that a city can enable (Bollens 2009).

The initial question that sparked the research was “how can a city go on living once divided?” and the aim was then to understand the consequences of partition on the urban system. Moreover, attention was paid to the role played by the physical configuration of urban space as a result of the conflict and the political and social turmoil, but also as a tool to affirm and maintain certain ideas and narratives.
Nicosia is a city divided in physical, ethnic, religious, linguistic and political ways by a double line of fences, walls, barbed wire and barrels. The problems that affected the coexistence of the two ethnic communities living in the island—Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots—showed up clearly and with serious consequences in the phase of transition from the British colonial government to the independence of Cyprus; Cyprus was part of the Ottoman Empire and became a colony of the British Empire as a consequence of the Russian-Turkey war in 1878 until its independence in 1960.

The rise of conflicting nationalisms in Cyprus has not followed a regular path, assuming there is one. Minorities’ nationalisms generally arise in contexts of failed nation-building processes (Herb & Kaplan 1999), often as a result of imposed majority rights or as the legacy of colonial rule. Cyprus falls within the realm of those nation states that tried to establish themselves after a period of colonial rule; however, the two nationalist movements developed almost simultaneously. Most scholars agree that in Cyprus a singular national identity concept has never emerged; competing ethno-nationalist concepts had the possibility to spread during the first half of the twentieth century (Papadakis 1998, 2008; Ramm 2007; Mavratsas 2010; Hatay 2008; Vural & Ozuyanı 2008). The explanation for the evolution of nationalistic feelings among Cypriots must be traced in the history of the two groups cohabiting the island. The arrival of a Turkish population in Cyprus dates back to the Ottoman conquest of the island in 1571: before this event the population was mainly composed of Greeks, along with Venetians and French, who had immigrated during the respective dominations (Hill & Luke 2010). Since then, the ethnic composition of the population has always shown a predominance of Greeks, even though the Turks have always represented a strong minority: in 1960, when Cyprus gained its independence from colonial rule, Greeks represented the 79% of the population, while Turks were the 18% (Kliot and Mansfield 1999).

In different periods of history the two groups have lived together maintaining an identitarian differentiation. During the Ottoman rule, Cypriots were classified and distinguished according to their religious affiliation, whereas in the British period they began to be differentiated in ethnic terms, as either Turks or Greeks (Morag 2004). Both communities lacked a sense of a common Cypriot identity, and still recognised themselves as either Greeks or Turks, also as a re-
Neither of the two groups was able to take advantage of the common experience of the imposed colonial power and join together for the independence of the island, while their different positions related to this issue were a major cause of clashes and mutual mistrust.

Although throughout a period of more than four hundred years both communities shared elements of culture and, especially in mixed villages, a certain level of common local identity, they never represented a basis for full integration. After Cyprus’s independence in 1960, each of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities maintained separate education and religious systems. Cypriot “nationhood” had no opportunity to evolve before the inter-communal conflict broke out in 1963-1964 (Kliot & Mansfield 1999: 186). When Cyprus was proclaimed an independent state on August 15 in 1960, the two communities were expressing contradictory demands: Enosis, union with Greece, in contrast with Taksim, partition.

Riots and violent confrontations started to occur in Nicosia around the middle of the 1950s because the city was in the center of the confrontations between opposing paramilitary groups. This led to a first physical partition: the city had in fact been divided before the permanent partition of Cyprus in 1974. The first line – built and controlled by the British and separating some neighbourhoods of Nicosia in order to avoid confrontation between the two communities – dates back to 1956 and was called the Mason-Dixon Line (Papadakis 2006). This event can be considered the “first attempt to give a spatial form to a political problem” (Hadjichristos, 2005: 396).

The years following the proclamation of the Republic of Cyprus were characterised by an increase in the violence of confrontation between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, with a peak in 1963-64. This caused the intervention of the UN Peacekeeping Forces, who patrolled the division line between the two communities (Drousiotis, 2008). In 1974, a coup by the Greek Cypriot EOKA-B movement, supported by the Greek Junta, provoked the military invasion of

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1 During the British rule, Greek Cypriots started expressing their nationalism with a strong opposition to the colonial administration and began the fight for independence and union with Greece. Turkish Cypriots were concerned about the majority’s plans of annexation to Greece, since they feared they would lose their rights as citizens or would be treated as a minority (Yildizian & Ehteshami 2004). They therefore chose to demonstrate their loyalty to the British administration, putting themselves in opposition to Greek Cypriots. Accordingly, “the British hired Turkish Cypriot policemen, who were employed against the Greek Cypriot EOKA insurrection” (Papadakis 1998: 151).

2 EOKA-B was a Greek Cypriot paramilitary organization that evolved from the nationalist military resistance group EOKA (National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters), whose main aim, besides independence from the British rule, was to achieve Enosis, which is the union with Greece. As an answer to EOKA,
Turkey, which led to the partition of the island. A strip patrolled by UN forces called the “buffer zone” was created between the two sides in order to avoid direct military confrontations and clashes. No peace treaty has ever been signed and technically the division is a ceasefire line between two conflicting entities disputing their territorial sovereignty. “Green Line” is the most common name given to the border that separates the island and splits the capital, Nicosia, in two halves.

In 1983, the northern Cyprus community declared itself the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), which has been recognised only by Turkey, while the institutional status of the southern part of the island, the Republic of Cyprus, is internationally recognised and considered under military occupation. According to Kolossov and O’Loughlin’s classification of new geopolitical entities, emerging in the late twentieth century, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus should be defined as a pseudo-state. This category includes self-proclaimed states, mostly not recognised, where, as in the TRNC, there is an identification of an area with a specific nationality. It is also an area of conflict with no permanent control as a result of a civil war and/or a foreign military intervention (Kolossov & O’Loughlin, 1998: 155).

Until 2003, only one crossing point was opened in Cyprus, the Ledra Palace checkpoint, and only diplomatic staff members were allowed to cross. On April 23, 2003, for the first time in 30 years, people were allowed to cross from one side to the other, and during the first three days, 45,000 people (Demetriou 2006) went to visit the other side of Cyprus and to see their abandoned properties, passing for the first time through the buffer zone. Four check points were opened, two of them in Nicosia. On April 3, 2008, another pedestrian crossing point, the Lidra/Lokmaci, opened in the middle of the walled city.

Researching a divided space

The present conditions of Nicosia make it a very interesting case: it is physically split into two parts in which nationality, institutions, administration, language,
and religion are different. The border alternatively marks the exclusivity of two distinct urban areas, two parts of Cyprus, and two benchmark nation-states (Greece and Turkey). Moreover, the island joined the European Union in 2004, and Nicosia’s division has become the extreme eastern border of Europe. This border is particularly significant from a geopolitical point of view, given the political situation of many of its neighbour states. The awareness of the island’s importance as a strategic territory is crucial to understand the role of foreign interventions during the conflict period. Therefore, in this specific case, the scales affected by the border are various; the spatialization of social relations of conflict assumes a very strong meaning as far as its consequences are concerned.

These founding elements of Nicosia’s partition clarify its peculiarity and its emblematic nature. Moreover, the border that partitions Nicosia exemplifies in a very clear way a quality of the urban space identified by Simmel as *exclusivity*, according to which “every portion of space possesses a kind of uniqueness, for which there is almost no analogy” (Simmel et al. 1997: 138); therefore, it is not possible to conceive a localised space in a plural way. Cities become a symbol of territorial exclusivity and represent much more than the space they take up (it is enough to think of the meaning attributed to Berlin during the Cold War).

The research design adopted in order to develop the initial questions consisted of unfolding the diverse aspects that constitute the urban life from a concrete, relational, and symbolic point of view. Furthermore, the aim was to highlight the strategies performed by the different actors (both institutional and non-institutional) to deal with the consequences of partition. Throughout this research path, great importance has been given to the urban space as a container of power relations and a tool for the production and reproduction of narratives and discourse.4

From a theoretical point of view, the attempt has been to maintain a multidisciplinary approach able to focus on the role assumed by space in the urban life, especially in situations of conflict where territory is at stake and is contested between different and competing groups. Sociological literature, and par-

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4The field research lasted nine months (September 2008 – January 2009, April – July 2009) and was conducted through an ethnographic approach that included participant observation and interviews from both sides of the city, focusing on the area inside the old Venetian walls. I conducted thirty interviews with Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, inhabitants of Nicosia and city experts (professors from universities, municipal administrators and town planners), and several unrecorded conversations with key informants (soldiers, policemen, UN representatives), residents, shopkeepers of the city center and tourists. I also used visual techniques in order to grasp those aspects related to the configuration of space and its symbolic value, carrying out an analysis of the political landscape to understand the process of symbolization of public space.
particularly Simmel’s theorisation on the spatial forms, has been combined with approaches still scarcely formalised and used in urban studies, which develop around the Science and Technology Studies and which recognise an important link between the social and material aspects of reality (Fregonese & Brand 2009). The border, and more in general the landscape that has developed due to the division, is a concrete artefact and a clear example of the circular relation between the social and the material (Ibid): it is the result of human activity on the landscape, a social product, but, once it becomes part of the spatial reality, it has a strong impact on people’s lives and social practices. In other words, it defines what psychologist James J. Gibson calls the *affordances*, or the possibilities of action people have in a certain environment. Border studies have constituted another important theoretical base in this research, especially to understand the link between territorial belonging and the process of construction of identity, through the elaboration of a collective memory shared within the inner group (and contested among the different groups), which develops and maintains through the political and symbolic use of space. Although the aim of the research was mostly exploratory, the challenge has been applying this socio-material perspective in the analysis.

*Research outcomes*

The initial questions were developed in two main areas of observation: life in the divided city and the way in which space is shaped by power dynamics.

*Living in a divided city*

As for the first area, the consequences of partition on the urban development have been analysed, observing the urban growth as well as people’s displacement and the creation of sub-division in the already divided city. The division in Nicosia has determined the abandonment of the old city and the border area in both sides, with consequences regarding the spatial distribution of inhabitants and the creation of ghettos. Migrants and settlers have occupied the space left by old inhabitants. What was the center of the city, and a space used and lived in by both communities, has fallen into decay; that is, until artists and students started to appreciate the cheap rent and the decadent atmosphere of its old narrow streets. This has contributed to the development of a process of gentrifi-
cation which has grown in recent years, parallel to a re-investment of the municipality in the area, especially related to the work of the Nicosia Masterplan, which is a bi-communal institution that works for a harmonious development of the two halves of the city, to be easily connected in case of a reunification.\(^5\)

The analysis conducted has shown how the division acts as an enhancer of more subtle forms of city segregation, both for its physical impact on the city, and especially its old core, and for its social consequences. It has promoted a strong nationalism on both sides and mutual mistrust, two features which can easily create more general difficulties of cohabitation with any kind of ‘otherness’ (Casaglia 2010).

The second area of analysis of life in the divided city was aimed at understanding how the administration and management of Nicosia have been reorganized, starting with the assumption that the city, which for many reasons functions as an integrated system, if not a body, would have suffered heavy consequences from the division. On one hand, the partition has led to the doubling of the institutions and of urban governing bodies, as a way to control the contested territory. On the other hand, the research highlights the need to maintain some common services and infrastructures in order to guarantee the functioning of the city. The most famous example regarding Nicosia is the sewage system, which has been the base for the creation of the Nicosia Masterplan. This clearly shows the need for collaboration, at least in technical areas. Other city services, such as the water and electricity systems, are apparently separated; on a closer analysis, it can be seen that there are important linkages that, again, demonstrate the interdependence of the two halves of the city. This interdependence clashes with the presumption of autonomy and self-government expressed especially by the citizens (institutional actors are more likely admit connections and mutual need).

Urban economy is another field in which the consequences of partition have been heavy: the costs of a partition are always extremely high, not only in social terms but also in material terms. Besides costs deriving from the conflict, the break of the urban entity also adds consequences such as the interruption of trade channels, the loss of markets, and problems with spatially interconnected systems of production. These factors, together with the growth of prejudice and

\(^5\) The Nicosia Masterplan is a bi-communal planning institution, set up in the 1980s as a consequence of a first collaboration of the two mayors of the two parts of Nicosia (which regarded the sewage system that was completed after the island’s partition in 1974). They mainly work on the restoration of the old city and the attempt to save buildings in the buffer zone from collapsing, although the aim of the institution is to guarantee a harmonic development of the two parts in view of a possible future reconciliation.
mutual mistrust between the two communities, make it difficult to create the opportunity for the re-establishment of economic relations, despite the opening of the border and the existence of a new regulation for the trade of goods and the crossing of people. The opening of the crossing points has been a significant step towards the enhancement of economic relations between the two communities, in the direction of a future reconciliation. However, building trust between the two groups seems to be a necessary preliminary step.

This is clear also when one observes social relations between the two sides. The mental and psychological border which started dividing Greek and Turkish Cypriots during the 1950s was not less powerful than the physical one erected in 1974. However, its unfolding on space radically changed the meanings ascribed to the differentiation between the two communities. When a limit takes shape spatially, its meaning modifies the content of identity, binding it to a collective dimension and setting up social relations between groups (Simmel et al. 1997).

It should seem obvious that recent developments due to the opening of the crossing points in 2003 constituted an opportunity to change this feature, since they offered the possibility for people to meet and finally compare their ideas with others’ reality. However, the possibility of contact, after an interruption of communication which lasted 30 years, has proved not enough to promote real integration and has not really improved interactions and relations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Research conducted after the opening of the border, together with my own observations and interviews, show that after an initial enthusiastic reaction and the curiosity to go and see the abandoned properties, Cypriots lost interest in the possibility to cross, and the number of crossings has heavily decreased after 2005 (Demetriou 2007; Jacobson et al. 2009). Also, though this general feeling of curiosity induced many people to cross at least once, there are still some Cypriots in both communities who never passed the Green Line.

In both sides, the act of crossing implies political and ideological reflexions, as well as emotions related to the displacement experience and the memories of the war. Relations of friendship between the two communities are still quite rare, and this is especially true among young people, who did not have the opportunity to establish relations before the division. During the interviews conducted, people were asked if they have friends in the other side and, among people born after 1974, very few answered positively. As stated by Calame and Charlesworth in their comparative book on divided cities, “In Nicosia, even the
anger of older Cypriots that has been generated by their personal knowledge and history seems preferable to the idle prejudice of younger citizens whose cynicism is inherited and untested by direct contact” (Calame & Charlesworth 2009: 5).

The issue of education and propaganda has recently become a much debated one, since on both sides there has been an attempt to reflect upon the impact of a partisan way of recounting and teaching history as well as describing the other in negative terms (Papadakis 2008). The recognition of this problem has led to a reform of history books and a general discussion of the history of Cyprus that I had the opportunity to witness during my stay in Nicosia. Some of the interviewees showed awareness of the role acquired by education. They recall what they learned at school about Cyprus and its history as something that does not correspond to reality, but to a propagandistic way of seeing the other as the guilty one.

Another reason for the lack of relations and interactions appears to lie in the absence of “neutral” public places; therefore, the problem is related to the connotation places have for people of the two communities. The buffer zone is the only space which is neutral, in the sense that it does not belong to any of the two ethnic groups, nevertheless the meanings related to that space are strong and its political neutrality does not correspond to a symbolic one. The opening of the crossing points determined a concrete possibility for contact, but at the same time raised moral issues concerning the choice of whether to do it or not.

It seems necessary to foster the right climate to promote encounter and rapprochement out of biases. The long period of total division has made mistrust and prejudice grow and there has been little effort, from a political point of view, to moderate the propaganda operating through the media and even less regarding the way history is told and taught (except for the history book reform).

These opportunities should be combined with an effort by local institutions in the promotion of bi-communal initiatives on both sides, together with the recognition of the political use of space and of the need for neutral, common and sharable places, a demand clearly expressed by Cypriots in both sides during interviews.

*Power and politics on space*
The second part of the research focuses on the analysis of the political landscape created by the division. The visual analysis of the borderscape has shown the process through which space has been charged with symbols and meanings that contribute to the creation and maintenance of certain ideologies and political narratives. The physical aspect of the border between the two sides, together with the different ways used by each side to show and tell history through museums and memorials, reveals the conflicting ways in which the two communities explain past events and interpret the present situation. Place names, maps, and landscape representations also show how power and dominant discourses have infused space: each group has projected its own version of history on the physical space of the city so that the territorial dispute also involves a negotiations upon which conception of the past should prevail.

The partition of Nicosia has led to the separation of the city’s institutions, both political and administrative, and also to the creation of new institutions or institutional processes marking the urban landscape. The analysis of this symbolic and physical layer of Nicosia helps us understand how deep and subtle the process of attribution of meaning to space is.

The most clear and meaningful institutional process that characterises Nicosia’s landscape is the crossing, with all the related defence structures, boundary installations and checkpoints. Rituals, images, and practices associated with these kinds of structures are important places of memory and of symbolical value: through them notions of identity are performed and contested (Till 2003: 297). A peculiar regulation has developed around the border, especially due to Cyprus’s accession into the EU. After the failure of the twin referenda for reunification under the Annan Plan in April 2004, Cyprus joined the European Union in May 2004 as a still divided island. This fact created an anomaly for the EU (Hatay et al. 2008) because the Green Line border technically began to represent an external EU border. Shortly before, in April 2003, the first checkpoints were opened by the Turkish Cypriot authorities on the island. Because of these two important changes, there was the need for a regulation of that border, in terms of the movement of both people and goods. The solution for this problem was found by the EU through the adoption, on 29 April 2004, of the Green Line regulation (GLR). Entering into force on 1 May 2004 and fully operational in

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* We refer to the twin referenda, held in 2004 in both sides of Cyprus, based on the so-called Annan plan and proposed by the UN for the reunification of the island under a federal state. While 65% of Turkish Cypriots agreed with it, 75.8% of Greek Cypriots responded negatively, and the plan was then rejected.
August, the Green Line Regulation defines the intra-island trade and the way in which the European law applies to this peculiar boundary, getting around the legal problems between the Greek and the Turkish sides (Ibid). At every crossing there is a checkpoint on each side of the buffer zone, but the officials’ duties are different on the two sides because of the two very different interpretations of the border itself. Greek Cypriot police only check documents of people crossing from north to south, in order to ensure that only entitled people enter the Republic of Cyprus\(^7\) and that rules concerning goods import are obeyed. On the other side, Turkish Cypriot police are in charge of checking documents and stamp a visa for every person who crosses, regardless of the nationality, at every entrance or exit into or out the TRNC.

The difference in the two regulations are due to the fact that on the southern side there is no recognition of the existence of a neighbour state, thus the crossing process only involves the respect of laws and rules concerning goods and entrance restrictions, and there is no control on exit. On the northern side the division is seen as a border between two legitimate nation states, and the crossing is submitted to the TRNC entrance and exit rules. These examples regarding the border regulation reflects the more general ideas on the issue of partition: from one side the Greek-Cypriot discourse is based on the idea of a peaceful coexistence of the two communities in a unified Cyprus, an idea that finds its (disputable) historical bases in the period before the 1950s. It stresses the role of EOKA in the liberation of Cypriots from colonial rule with no mention of the inter-communal fight. The reason why everything has been left as it was is to show that that is not a border, but a ceasefire line, and also to underline the need of a solution and the non-acceptance of the situation. On the Turkish Cypriot side, the historical narration concentrates on the period of troubles between the 1950s and 1974 and on Greek Cypriots’ violence against the Turkish community; the Turks’ intervention has a totally different meaning and is still told as the salvation from a possible genocide. The presence of the wall states the existence of the border and of the TRNC.

**Conclusions**

The process of division of Nicosia, as in other divided cities, has developed as

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\(^7\) Passport or national ID must be showed and visa permission is stamped when entering the north. Turkish (unless they can show they are married to a Turkish Cypriot) and other non-EU nationals who would normally need an entry visa for the Republic of Cyprus are not admitted south and members of the Greek Cypriot National Guard are not admitted north (Hatay et al., 2008). Moreover, people who enter Cyprus from airports or ports in the north are not allowed to cross to the south.
something unavoidable. The idea that partition can be an emergency and temporary solution to avoid violent confrontations in contested cities and solve conflict has proven to be a false and even dangerous idea (Calame & Charlesworth 2009; Bollens 2009). Thirty years of absolute separation between the two communities living in Nicosia have obviously reduced the number of inter-group killings, but they have also postponed a real solution of the problem, embittering and reinforcing prejudice and mistrust. Whether they are the result of interstate wars or of negotiations walls, lines of partition, or other institutionalised forms of segregation, they have the effect of reifying territorial identity and social boundaries (Bollens 2010a).

In addition, a wall dividing previously united urban contexts causes dysfunctions in the city management, which require efforts in order to be readjusted. Finally, the transformation of the urban configuration and the creation of a physical boundary involve a fixation of social cleavages, which make them permanent and unquestionable. Physical boundaries, in fact, tie people and identity with territory in a process which tends to the naturalisation of cultural and social differences. We have seen how the opening of the border has proved insufficient to achieve reconciliation, and how space has become a strong carrier of power relations, ideologies, and discourse, so that planning can be considered as a socially and politically shaped technology that impacts on social practices and relations (Fregonese & Brand 2009; Bollens 2009).

The opening of the border has given Cypriots the possibility to meet and to start a process of rapprochement. Nevertheless, in order to overcome mistrust and prejudice, it is necessary to act both on a material level, providing real and alternative opportunities for inter-group encounter, and on a social one. A solution implies a stronger effort by the governing institutions, and reconciliation cannot take place without a bottom up process and without the involvement of citizens at every level.
References


Chapter 10.

Cristiano Mutti

Around the Boundary Lines of S. Siro Neighborhood

The route and the most important places:

The main gate of “Villa Triste”
Summary

From Piazzale Lotto, around which public transport stops run along the belt of the urban ring road (viale Migliara), viale Monte Rosa opens as a line. This is an important street that leads to the city center. Slightly before arriving at the new headquarters of the economical magazine “Il Sole24ore”, designed by the architect Renzo Piano in 2005, is the apse of the old church of “San Siro alla Vepra” (in what was once the residence of the notorious banda Koch). We are in Via Paolo Uccello at the number 17, just behind Piazzale Lotto, and from here it is possible to see a part of the urban project “Portello Nord”. The villa Fossati, sadly called “Villa Triste”1, was the headquarters of the notorious “banda Koch”, a militia of the fascist police in the last war. In this building the apse of the old church is embodied and is also (as it is in part the building designed by Renzo Piano) the historical example of a philosophy of intervention that aims to integrate the old urban structure with the new. This is not always the case, especially when there is a large-scale regeneration project, and that is why these projects often become a cause for controversy and conflict with the resident population.

The “Villa Triste”. Photo. C. Mutti, 2009

If the east side of Piazzale Lotto anticipates the daily rhythms of the city, the west side (still to some extent) contains the features of the “sports district” that has long characterized the collective imagination of this part of the city. The Lido Sport Center, founded in the thirties, is a direct expression and consequence.

From Piazzale Lotto begins via Diomede, a long avenue runs along the wall of the Hippodrome’s racetrack and that horses traveled at one time to go to the training area or to get on track. Along the wall there are still gates which allowed access to the horse track, now closed, because today they face what

has become a symbol which separates the QT8, a famous district built for the Eighth Triennial Exhibition of 1947 and whose motto was “a home for all”. In this initial part of via Diomede one can also find the Youth Hostel, not far from the subway station, and the famous restaurant Ribot, a landmark site for the exclusive of the horse world, both for the “Milanese” and internationals.

To the core of this settlement we can find, further South, in via Harar-Dessié, a similar construction philosophy: that one of the “self-sufficient neighborhood.” This concept, which originated from complex research, was at the time of construction the so-called “garden city.” What remains is still clearly a part of the same urban structure: a central axis, and the streets which divide longitudinally, around a central park, which in the QT8 district is the Monte Stella, a park built with the debris caused by the Second world War that reaches the 56 meters in height.

At the intersection with Via Scarampo, the North border of the QT8 neighborhood, an isolated building dominates the park that was done as a part of the project “Portello Nord,” and is a building that also relates directly to the Monte Stella. It is an intervention on an area of approximately 266,000 square meters, of which 166,000 are declared as being intended for picnic areas and green parks. The Expo 2015 is definitely a driver for most of the projects planned in this strip of land, which lies in the shadow cone that connects the city center to Rho-Pero, the home site of the event.

Next to QT8 is the district of Lampugnano, originally developed as a rural village. This city still tries to defend what remains of its historical identity from the incessant invasion of cement that after the war infested this part of the city. It was not only a process of urban expansion, but was also planned on the basis
of predominantly economic and political interests. Significant in this context are the recent “attacks” of the Ligresti manufacturing family, who have been trying to obtain permits from the City Administration to build on the green areas of the district, a measure which is opposed by the committees of the district residents. The “Gallaratese” is a symbol of the neighborhood build on a human scale, with wide green spaces and well served by public transport.

At the border of administrative area number 7, one of the few cycle tracks in this area runs along via Montale and via Lampugnano, aboard the training racecourse “Maura” until the old village “Trenno”. This is the most prestigious area of the Gallaratese district, where there are tall buildings that overlook on the open space of the training track. These buildings rise and oppose those more prestigious residences of Via Pinerolo, not far as the crow flies, which are the residences of important personalities like football players. Once in Trenno, ostentatious architecture and the character of settlements lose value in relation to the benefits that can result from feeling more integrated with nature and slightly further away from concrete and traffic. The whole of the agricultural areas of this zone are constrained and are under the administrative jurisdiction of the Agricultural South Park of Milan.
Overall, the residents of these neighboring areas, according to the census of 2001, have a social status that is mostly in the medium-high level. As exception there are the district of San Siro (called “il Quadrilatero”), a part of Gallaratese, Trenno and via Harar, via Novara, Quarto Cagnino, that presenting the most negative trends.

Opened in 1888, the Hippodrome of Milan had a decisive influence on the urban development of part of this North-West area of the city. In addition to encouraging the maintenance of an agricultural type of activity, the project also indirectly played another important function, although spatially confined to that area of the city; the use of the land opposed what was in the time a real estate scheme for territorial government. The projects of training racecourses of Trenno (1909) and near to the Cascina Maura (1950) jointly to the new racecourses for gallop and trot (1920), have effectively placed a limit on the erosion

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of their green areas by asphalt and concrete. The area occupied by the horse structures are a total size of about one million square meters. To the West of this lies 100 hectares of space poorly built, which today are completely behind the city center and, for this reason, under the risk of speculative building. We can find an additional area of about 700 hectares, partly agricultural and public green areas, stretching from the Trenno Park (adjacent to the training track of the same name) to the North-West town of Settimo Milanese and which also includes another park further South-West: the “Parco delle Cave”. This territory, under the administrative jurisdiction of the Agricultural South Park, is a real green wedge that fits considerably in the side of the whole structure built of the city. In this area we can find a considerable number of farmhouses still in activity (MF.1), some of which are used for equestrian tourism that is developed in the areas surrounding (MF.2).

As far as the administrative organization and the management of local policies, the whole area discussed is left to the expertise of divisions 7 and 8 and the respective local council. One relevant aspect of this new subdivision adopted in 1999, which led to 9 of 20 the number of the administrative areas, is the

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3 Source: Google Map processing by the author.
criterion used to define some of the boundaries between zones 7 and 8, namely the boundary wall that separates the structures of training and the hippodrome, and which develops along via Lampugnano, via Montale, via Ippodromo and via Diomede. In this way the structures, which originally stood in a central location and significantly characterized the territorial identity of the old zone number 19, become peripheral elements with a marginal role within the zone 7, while concurrently complicating the administrative activities of the council of zone number 8 on horse racing facilities, both in terms of urban development, as well as socially and culturally, despite the fact both areas 7 and 8 continue to be affected by their presence.

The whole of the racecourse facilities is separated from the city by a high cement wall (red) about four feet and a length of about eight kilometers, two of which consist of a metal fence (blue).4

4 Source: Google Map processing by the author.
The wall is also a symbolic border between two worlds that are completely different from each other: the city and the country, modernity and tradition, machines and beings. And, in addition to separating two antithetical sports like football and horse racing, it is essentially a waterproof barrier against the concrete of urbanization. The areas positioned along this perimeter have urban and socio-cultural characteristics that are very different and thus it is not a coincidence if the only part where it is replaced with a fence is at the beginning of Via Pinerolo (where until recently there were still present some old stables) and along the border of the Trenno Park.

The different neighborhoods and residential areas appear as blocks in their own right, each with its own characteristics and specificity, have developed different relationships with the racecourse facilities along all the perimeter. The access through the big thoroughfares like Via Novara in the South, via Sant’Elia, the North extension of the Lakes freeway or, from inside the city, along piazzale Lotto and via Caprilli - Dessé, via San Giusto-via Novara, collides (and often must limit) with the wide spaces of the racecourse gallop and its training areas.

The stadium, despite dominating the whole area, is a structure highly compressed and placed in a space that doesn’t allow a rapid flow of the masses of people.

The central role of the stadium as crucial point is particularly enhanced by its high visibility, a feature that, at the same time, contrasts with the closing condition of the racecourse areas against the city. Particular attention must be given to the fact that the stadium is a cause of some critical problems for the whole area, including a number of issues that are increasingly aggravated with each passing year, including problems with urban expansion and the redefinition of the social groups that live in the different neighborhoods and residential areas located in its proximity.

If we look at the image of the map (M. 1) and follow the numerical order assigned to the
different geographical areas, we have a first zone, which is like a “buffer” area that mediates between the stadium and racecourse gallop (n. 1). In part this area is characterized by a series of service facilities such as the Equestrian Center, restaurants and exclusive clubs on via Pegaso, some of which are owned by the same racecourse, and residential high-level, in front of the old De Montel stables, which are subject to a couple of years in a redevelopment project that aims to transform them into a spa.

Along the private way “via del Centauro” are still some important private stables, built in classical Art Nouveau, as that of Frank Turner trainer and the team Ramazzotti, managed by Mario and Antonio Marcialis. Via Patroclo, via Tesio and at the end of via Ippodromo contain an exclusive residential area (M. 2, q2) which looks in part on the training tracks of Maura and Trenno along the exclusive via Pinerolo. This area is commonly known as the “district of players” because of the fact that several AC Milan football players live there.

In the areas number 2, 3 and 5 single-family houses with gardens alternate to large multi-story buildings used for public housing flats (M. 3, q1).

The complex was designed in 1950-1951 by a group of sixteen architects, including Gio Ponti, Gino Pollini, Luigi Figini, Piero Bottoni and Tito Varisco, the fathers of modern architecture. This architectural ensemble has the particularity to be seen as an experiment in building with low intensity, where the prevalent idea is an area called “village-garden”, which is characterized by a simple juxtaposition of low houses isolated in the countryside which contrast multi-floor buildings in line, known respectively as “insulae” and “horizontal skyscrapers”.

Change of the street near to the Trenno park during a football match. Photo: C. Mutti, 2010.

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This kind of planning, especially that of the large horizontal blocks, is present along the whole route which goes from via Dessié to via Harar. This can be contrasted with the “Quarto Cagnino” neighborhood (1967-1973), near to San Carlo hospital (Fig. 6, q2), the landscape is radically different, with solutions of large and very big housing blocks closed or half open, that develop in height rather than in width and reproduce a modern high density pattern follows the mesh of the road geometry. It is an alternative settlement pattern of the self-sufficient neighborhood in which the basic design reconsiders the relationship between home and city through its large size: 1,100 dwellings for 5,000 residents.6

In the thirties the houses of IFACP (Autonomous Institute Fascist Public Housing) were divided into economic, popular and “superpopular”, depending on whether they were intended to the middle class, blue collar workers or very poor people, evicted from their homes in the historic center (Lucchini, 2008). Following the period of the large “dormitory” town in the suburbs to which these buildings are directly connected.7


1. Historic photo of Quarto Cagnino neighborhood; 2 and 3. some views of large housing blocks in via Marx; 4. One of horizontal skyscraper in via Harar-Dessié; 5. The insulae by architect Paolo Antonio Chiesa.9 Photos: Sartori, 2011; Lucchini, Pugliese, 2008
To the south-east of Quarto Cagnino district, adjacent to San Carlo hospital, is located the residential area of Via Pastonchi, also called the Vercellese neighborhood (M. 3, q3), consisting of approximately 650 housing units, a good supply service and green spaces, but with a few spaces for gathering and socialization activities. In this area the presence of the elderly is very high, a frequent feature in ERP neighborhoods (public housing) but presenting here with an even higher concentration. The presence of children, in line with other ERP districts, stands at 20 children for every 100 households\(^\text{10}\).

Going up to the north, at the number 66 of via Don Gnocchi there is the seat of the Santa Maria Nascente socio-educational center for the disabled, administered by the Don Gnocchi foundation. Overall, this part of the territory is not characterized by luxury and exclusivity and, at the same time, it is not an area excessively degraded (M. 3 q4 and part of q5). Approximately it can be defined as a transition area between the settlements of high-level, which develop from via degli Ottoboni, close to the racecourse gallop in Piazza Esquilino. From this square begins the residential area usually called “il Quadrilatero di viale Aretusa and Piazza Selinunte”, and that is the real area of San Siro neighborhood: 370,000 square meters, of which 230,000 are used for public housing.

The biggest, unresolved issues of this area is the prevalence of single class settlements, corresponding to the most needy and elderly population group and, in addition, the significant number of immigrants and children at risk. It is a mix that generates not a few problems of integration. Critical issues regarding social and housing matters have emerged during the last decade with many ordinary and extraordinary maintenance operations for a total investment of around 50 million euro. The District is served, from an energy standpoint, by a single thermal plant located in Piazza Selinunte, the central nucleus of the area and where there are also several retail businesses and a municipal market. The plant is the result of an experimental rationalism of the early twentieth century implemented gradually and carefully to the solar thermal exposure of buildings and a balanced layout of the private spaces.

The district includes 1,142 dwellings for 6,642 residents, of which 2,591 are elderly people over 65 years and of which 3,592 are non-EU foreigners\(^\text{11}\).

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As reported in an article on a local Islamic culture web site: “The inhabitants are of all nationalities and all ages, but a good majority are Egyptian citizens, almost completely coming from the region of El Sharkiya (agricultural region about 50 kilometers from Cairo), from the villages of Dakhmasha and Mit Suheill; there are families with young children or grown-ups already, and many young workers.”\(^\text{12}\)

1. The “Quadrilatero”, a view from above; 2. San Siro neighborhood, along via Mar Jonio in 1930\(^\text{13}\); 3. via Mar Jonio today; 4. Piazza Selinunte\(^\text{14}\)

Photos: ALER, 2011; http://www.alermicentenario.it; http://www.aljarida.it

Piazza Axum, writes Simon Ravizza\(^\text{15}\), separates two cities within the city: on one side one can see buildings and villas with private garden and pool, and on the other dormitory houses. This is true all the way up Via Stratifico, from Piazza Axum to Piazza Segesta, which represents the boundary of these two opposing territories. In particular, with the terminus of tram 16, Piazza Segesta is a crucial point of contact between populations of residents who have radical differences: social, cultural and ethnic.

\(^{12}\) http://www.aljarida.it, 29 settembre 2010.
\(^{13}\) http://www.alermicentenario.it.
\(^{14}\) http://www.aljarida.it.
\(^{15}\) Corriere della Sera, 29 August 2003.
In via Mancini, close to Via Caprilli, is still what remains of the historic farmhouse called “Brusada,” (M. 4, q2, a), a ruin submerged by the vegetation and surrounded by buildings and prestigious properties, including the exclusive French School Stendhal. This farm was a very popular restaurant from the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. There was a restaurant Minli, frequented by those that were a part of the beautiful world of horse racing. Napoleon is said to have stood here during the return from one of his battles\textsuperscript{16}. After World War II, a large investment was made in the infrastructure that covered this part of the area near the racecourse gallop along via Caprilli and via Monleale (M. 4, q2). They built houses and buildings for the bourgeois classes with a high standard of living. This area, in the plans of the Municipality, should have been a city park.

Initially contractors had been given provisional approval for detached houses, which later they turned into one of the most exclusive neighborhoods of Milan, with buildings and architectural avant-garde experiments designed by famous architects. It is also called the French district, due to the presence of the French school “Stendhal” and because it is inhabited by many French families.


\textsuperscript{17} http://www.liceobecaria.it.

\textsuperscript{18} http://atcasa.corriere.it.

\textsuperscript{19} http://www.lsmi.it.

\textsuperscript{20} http://case.mitula.it.
VISUAL CONTRIBUTION - Around the boundary lines of S.Siro neighborhood

- **A**: gallop racecourse; **B**: training track Trenno; **C**: training track Maura; **D**: trot racecourse; **S**: Meazza football stadium

- **1**: area near to the racecourses, Centro Ippico Lombardo (CIL); **2** e **3**: housing blocks close to Meazza stadium; **4**: housing blocks close to “Quadrilatero di viale Aretusa”; **5**: south area of via Novara; **6**: south area of piazzale Lotto, viale Monte Rosa, viale Monte Bianco; **7**: area between piazzale Lotto and Portello project; **8**: sports center Lido; **9**: residential area close to park “Monte Stella”; **10** e **11**: housing blocks close to training racecourse Maura; **12**: Gallaratese residential area

- **a**: park “Monte Stella”; **b**: Trenno park; **c**: agricultural areas; **d**: park “Bosco-incittà”; **e**: green areas of Gallaratese district; **f**: park “Parco delle Cave”; **g**: training military area Santa Barbara barracks.

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21 Source: Google Map processing by the author.
M. 2 – Area 1 22

M. 3 – Area 2, 3 and 5 23

22 Source: Google Map processing by the author.
23 Source: Google Map processing by the author.
Agricultural environment, the farmhouses “Caldera” and “Campi”

Photos: C. Mutti, 2010

24 Source: Google Map processing by the author.
MF.1 - Map of the farms in the north-west of Milan

Two images of the old stables and training race Maura from GoogleEarth
Photos: GoogleEarth “Panoramio”

Source: Google Map processing by the author.
MF.2 – Map of the horse riding activity and the main trails used for equestrian tourism (red lines)

Equestrian tourism around “Parco Nord” and “Trenno” district
Photo: C. Mutti, 2010
III.
Frontiers and Human Mobility:
the EU as a Space of Opportunity or a Fortress?
Twenty-three thousand Tunisian citizens, in March 2011, reach across the seventy miles that separate them from Italy. They embody the mobility demanded by the Arab Uprising, and Lampedusa—the tiny Italian island closer to Tunisia than to Sicily—is their gateway to the global North. These North African harraga [“burners”] set ablaze humiliation, documents, frontiers, and adversities in the pursuit of dignity, whatever its toll. But after almost a month of continuous arrivals, many are still stuck in Lampedusa. The detention facility is full. They have to sleep at the ferry station, sharing only two restrooms next to the turtle conservation center. Many prefer resting under the elements, on the promontory between the airport runway and the ferry station that some locals will call the “hill of shame.” Their day is spent strolling and hanging around the town’s piazza and San Gerlando parish. At this point, the mayor is hosting some families and minors in his family’s empty villas. Through the media he declares something that to most citizens—in Lampedusa as in the rest of Italy—sounds increasingly impractical if not utopian: if all residents did this, there wouldn’t be migrants on the street. Indeed, Lampedusa has some 6,000 residents, but housing available for 60-70,000 seasonal tourists.

The Tunisians’ massive arrival constitutes “the most memorable day” in the life of some of the local youth they befriend, and there are many instances of solidarity. And yet there is also a perceived threat to the image and economy of the island, as prospective tourists start making reservations in March. There is also a pervasive sense of disruption of social order, of morality, and of safety. “Faces one has never seen” make it impossible to leave the keys in the motorcycle, or to keep your home open as usual.

Headed to southern Italy, Syrians, Afghans, Kurds, Pakistanis, Egyptians, Palestinians and others—transiting through Greece, Turkey, and Egypt—are occasionally able to survive the unscrupulousness of their smugglers. They slip away from FRONTEX1 and Italian maritime patrolling, and disembark in the southern regions of Apulia and Calabria. Small groups of migrants2 might be

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1 The “European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union,” or FRONTEX, is the EU agency for external border security.
2 My use of “migrant” points to what is generally called “mixed migration,” consisting of both asylum
noted as they walk from the coast toward larger cities, hoping to catch a train to northern Italy or northern Europe.

Maritime migration has been conspicuous for two decades. Coastal residents might still share food and drinks. But there is no longer an abundance of good Samaritans. Tourists are reassured that “there is no danger” as migrants are locked in detention centers, not strolling down via Roma. More and more often residents simply inform the armed forces of new arrivals. It is others – governmental and humanitarian agents – who will take care of the migrants, in the appropriate venues. What are, then, the meanings and implications of such shifts in solidarity and hospitality? And what is the cultural genealogy of the overarching practical aesthetics of confinement?

Massive demonstrations in Tirana, Albania, bring down Enver Hodza’s statue on February 20, 1991. Only a few days later, in early March, more than 1,000 profughi [refugees] disembark in Brindisi in Apulia, southeastern Italy; another 7-8,000 are approaching the coast, including on the vessel Lirija [liberty]. Some profughi are hosted in local hotels. Others, about 1,200, in a tourist camping ground. Two hundred children are entrusted to Catholic parishes and Caritas branches. Local families voluntarily host them for dinner on weekends. Many coastal residents spend their nights on the shores bringing blankets, clothes, and homemade meals. Hundreds of adults are also privately sheltered by families and priests. Medical, police and other personnel work after-hours or voluntarily.

The Vlora leaves the Albanian port of Durrës improbably crammed with ten tons of Cuban sugar and “twenty thousand refugees,” as all chronicles recite and as travelers themselves tell me. The “sweet ship”4 is eventually allowed to land in the port of Bari, in Apulia. It’s August 8th 1991, a very warm day. In a cacophony of sirens, surgical masks, gloves, stretchers, and batons city police, volunteers, the Police and the Army serve water, food, medication, coffee, and occasionally tear gas to an estimated 20,000 people. Police agents work shifts

seekers (potential refugees) and economic migrants. Nevertheless, all migrants become rifugiati [refugees], clandestini [undocumented migrants], extracomunitari [non-EU migrants], Islamici [Muslims], and immigrati [economic immigrants] in state-centered and contingent legal, social, and moral taxonomies. My use of “migrants” and of “migration,” which then includes would-be asylum seekers and refugees, also takes into account that these persons often share transborder social networks and the necessity to resort to the same providers of unauthorized transport to Italy and the EU.

3 Caritas is the large relief, development and social services international organisation inspired by Catholic social teachings.

4 A phrase I borrow from Daniele Vicari’s 2012 documentary on the subject, titled precisely La Nave Dolce.
of 36 hours. Many residents bring water and cookies, others open their homes or help the Albanians get away from Bari. But as decided in Rome, and despite the opposition of Bari’s mayor, the refugees, including women and children, are locked in the old soccer stadium. Helicopters and cranes drop food rations and water. The stadium is lawless. After having been promised a residence permit, several hundreds are instead returned to Albania on military flights.

Albania was no longer communist, and its citizens were no longer political refugees represented as heroes. Concentration in the stadium and the pervasively broadcast imagery of misery, chaos, and sanitary and security threat also helped legitimize such unprecedented repatriations. More broadly, the stadium “solution” to the humanitarian and security “emergency” constituted an early step in the construction of bureaucratic and cultural knowledge of what immigration management is about. Symbolically, but also in terms of logistics, this first instance of internment in a novel border zone anticipates successive permanent structures of internment in Italy and the EU. What I just sketched is the birth of a border, if you wish, and the birth of the detention centre as a way – the way – to manage and contain its trespassers.

March 1997 represents a major turning point in the institutionalization of migrant reception. Don Giuseppe, a Catholic priest, recalls that after the arrival to Apulia of 15,000 Albanians, in a situation again defined as an emergency, the police prefect of Lecce, “on behalf of the state,” asked the help of local voluntary forces and Catholic dioceses in finding sleeping quarters for at least 600 migrants. The 600 places were made available by Otranto’s diocese and Caritas, but in twelve different locations. That offer was rejected by the prefect, Don Giuseppe explains, because “immigration was considered more as a problem of public order rather than as a social-political issue.” In other words, migrants could not be dispersed because that would not ensure their manageability by the state. On the other hand, the diocese of Lecce offered a single site, the “Regina Pacis,” with up to 500 potential places. The state accepted the diocese’s offer to help and 500 migrants were sent to the centre.

The involvement of local volunteer and Catholic services, to a degree solicited by the state, proved indispensable to the management of migration. In the

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1 Social, political and military upheaval characterized Albania during early spring 1997, largely due to the collapse of pyramid financial schemes, the consequent widespread loss of savings and the popular suspicion of the Government’s corruption and involvement in the schemes.
2 Personal interview, 11 August 2004.
3 “Regina Pacis” was a former seaside resort for children on the Adriatic coast near Lecce, donated to the diocese by a private citizen.
words of the “Regina Pacis” director, the Church often served as “the nurse of the state.” But with very few exceptions religious and lay volunteer actors were not able to take full advantage of the political leverage ensured by the state’s dependency on their services. In short, they were not able, or willing, to try and foster a legislative shift of the “public order” approach to migration. The 1998 immigration law institutionalized previously informal shelters and charitable activities, structuring and financing such allegedly disorganized and isolated charitable grassroots efforts. Thus, it was generally well received by Catholic and other voluntary actors, even though it was a law quite narrowly focused on policing and regulation.

Detention centers, originating as an emergency and temporary “solution” in a novel border zone, today structure the national and EU network of migrant-processing facilities. At present, in Italy there are thirteen “identification and expulsion centres” of administrative detention, run and managed on behalf of the state by independent cooperatives and NGOs – with a maximum length of stay of 18 months. Journalists and others in the public sphere rarely refer to identification and expulsion centres using their proper—admittedly changing—definition. Rather, for years they have been inadvertently using the implicitly celebratory centri di accoglienza [centres of reception]. Inmates are defined as ospiti [guests] instead of trattenuti [arrested]. Even the police, in official documents I have seen, routinely indicate such centres as centri di accoglienza. The implications of such euphemisms are evident. If these centres provide accoglienza, then they must be run with a humanitarian spirit and purpose, and have been established for the migrants’ own good. And if “guests”

8 The Catholic Church, Don Cesare says, has built a net of solidarity and reception working as “l’infermiera dello Stato” [the state’s nurse] (Don Cesare, Movimento Cristiano Lavoratori Conference, Lecce, 21 January 2005).
9 Law 40/1998, “Turco-Napolitano.” The law legally defined the “Regina Pacis” and similar centres, with an oxymoron, as “centri di permanenza temporanea e assistenza” [centres for the temporary permanence and assistance of migrants]. The new immigration law of 2002 (189/2002, “Bossi-Fini”) further restricts the channels of legal migration, including asylum and work residence, and reinforces the policing function of centres, sanctioning them as the only legitimate and functional shelters for most types of migrants. Most recently, legal dispositions on security (Law 125/2008) formally rename the old “centri di permanenza temporanea e assistenza” as “centri di identificazione ed espulsione” [CIE, centres for the identification and expulsion of migrants].
10 For a period of up to eighteen months before deportation or before the notification of an expulsion decree they detain several “categories” of people. For example, migrants who have been detected on the Apulian coastline or rescued off the coast of Sicily, and might or might not able to submit an asylum application; who have been caught with expired residence permits or forged documents; or who have just been released from prison (after having served time for common crimes) and are transferred to the migration centres awaiting deportation or the expulsion decree.
11 In addition, there are twelve centres of accoglienza [reception] formally intended for short term immediate assistance [CDA] and for the reception of asylum seekers [CARA].
rebels against their benefactors, they are just ungrateful. Indeed, the state has entrusted the labour of migrant assistance, detention and sheltering to NGOs, cooperatives, and foundations whose work is often guided precisely by human rights, charity and nongovernmental independence.

Documentary accumulation, medicine, psychiatry, anthropology, photography and bureaucracy can traditionally gain access to people, including migrants, also because they are placed in camps.\(^{12}\) To this series of gazing practices, we can add humanitarianism. As the legitimacy of confinement is reinforced on humanitarian grounds, ironically the inmates’ condition of administrative (and occasionally extrajudicial) detention, suffering and isolation becomes disembodied from “the totality of human miseries and burdens,” as Ivan Illich would put it.\(^{13}\) Critical voices and practices of resistance—which I cannot include in this short discussion—have often been expelled from mainstream public discourse, and associated to the radicalism and alleged utopianism of leftist, anarchist, and Catholic groups.

The cartography of sovereignty I have mapped, then, needs to be appreciated in all its post-structuralist vagaries and just-in-time strategies. Rather than a “rolling back” of the state in the neoliberal predicament, or the state “giving up” some of its power to nongovernmental actors, the cases under investigation show various state agencies and government departments sustaining themselves through a strategic use of, religious and lay organizations.

Migrants surviving legal restrictions, border militarization, and unauthorized transport are certainly rescued, fed and sheltered in border locales. By means of these very processes they are also fingerprinted, identified, interned and sometimes deported.

Migrants’ internment is performed as beneficial to society, as it seems to protect public order, confine social instability, and contain illegality. Indeed, justifications to restrictive border regimes often invoke the need to ensure citizens’ social and cultural cohesion, welfare, security, and sovereignty. To put it differently, the legitimization of the governmental project of migration regulation is often captured under the rallying point of the preservation of citizens’ common good. In line with larger trends after September 11, 2001, the defense of citi-


zens’ common good is portrayed as attainable through the militarization of the Mediterranean and the policing of the national sphere. As a Maltese high-ranking police agent puts it, after all “that’s what governments do: lock people up.”¹⁴

But what I have been accounting for indexes also a broader moral economy. A caring and safeguarding concern is not directed exclusively toward citizen subjects. It is mirrored in governmental discourses and practices of salvation of migrants’ physical and moral wellness, for example by providing food and shelter at the border and by preventing trafficking, drowning, prostitution, and vagrancy (enabled by governmental provisions in the first place). As the same Maltese police agent puts it, detention camps on the island are necessary as they “provide housing” and “ease migrants’ integration.” In other words, militarized patrol, interception, detention, and deportation are effected and legitimized also through a political-theological paradigm that claims not only citizens’ common good, but also migrants’ humanitarian salvation. The border functions also as a threshold of salvation, and geopolitical sovereignty as moral sovereignty. In one example: FRONTEX executive director Colonel Ilkka Laitinen claims that “[b]y implementing preventive measures off the West African coast, [Frontex’ Operation] Hera has almost completely stemmed the flow of irregular migration to the Canary Islands via this particularly hazardous route. As a result, hundreds if not thousands of lives have been saved.”¹⁵ A military-humanitarian continuum is thus established, sharing a temporality of emergency in its interventions, an appeal to emergency ethics, and an overarching invocation of morality and values. The edges of the Italian state and of the EU—extending well beyond national boundaries—are not merely marginal spaces then. Rather, they become centre stages of liberal-democratic myths of self-legitimation.

National armed forces, FRONTEX risk-assessment specialists, detention staff, and volunteers generally think of themselves and are seen as technicians of sovereignty and as “humanitarian operators”—rather than as actors effecting and producing policy and ideology. It is precisely by managing the border that religious, institutional and volunteer actors participate in the European restructuring of humanitarianism, power, and sovereignty.


Immigration, asylum, humanitarianism, and sovereignty are eminently political issues. But as I attend to the venues, mechanisms, and actors involved in their practice and deliberation, I find a constellation of discourses and procedures that translate such political issues into bureaucratic technicalities and into humanitarian, identitarian, legal, and moral facts. As technicalities and facts they are allegedly exempt from political discussion and from the public quest for alternatives—alternatives that after all might be more just, rather more compassionate, than the status quo.

References


Andrew Burridge  
**The Limits of Europe: Frontex and the Issue of Human Rights**

Gregory Feldman has stated that, “To justify the apparatus [of border control] in humanitarian terms, EU officials speak fluently in the language of human rights with regular references to fair treatment, due process and personal dignity” (2012, p.83). Increasingly, border management agencies are deploying humanitarian discourse not only in press releases and interviews, but also in their policy and operational manuals. While academics have explored the question of whether human rights are applicable for migrants, or what access they might have to certain rights, here I ask to what extent, why, and how are border management agencies integrating fundamental rights frameworks within their policies and practice? In particular, I explore the more recent trend of such agencies forming official agreements with fundamental rights groups.

Within this paper I specifically consider the European Union (EU) external border management agency, Frontex, and its agreements with the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and the European Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA), along with its funding of the University of Birmingham to produce an ‘Ethics of Border Security’ study (University of Birmingham 2010).

I focus then most directly on Frontex’ more recent efforts, since 2010, at formulating fundamental rights agreements and partnerships, following its statement that “Whether assisting Human Rights Watch with access-to-information requests and interviews with senior management, or holding dialogue with civil society and NGOs participating in public debate, human dignity and the rights of the individual became ever more a focus of the Agency’s work in 2010” (Frontex General Report, 2011: 21).

How do agencies such as Frontex understand the role of human rights vis-à-vis border management? What forms do such agreements take between fundamental rights and border management agencies? What has led to these strategic partnerships, and with what outcomes? How do such agreements operate ‘on the ground’, if at all? In this research I agree with Feldman’s above assertion, but suggest that a burgeoning trend in contemporary border management has been the adoption of formal policies through the brokering of strategic agreements with human rights agencies. This research also considers recent reports
by both government and non-government organizations that have critiqued the supposed human rights standards of Frontex and individual EU Member States’ border control practices. My aim here is not to suggest that the notion of human or fundamental rights is unproblematic, nor to promote Frontex and other border agencies’ efforts to appear as humanitarian organisations. Rather it is to begin to understand the role of creating such strategic partnerships and policies within a wider framework of contemporary border management practices.

A Brief History of Frontex

Frontex was created through Council Regulation EC 2007/2004 on 26 October 2004. As Sarah Leonard (2009) states, “The establishment of Frontex came as a response to the perceived need for an increase in cooperation amongst EU Member States with regard to external border controls” (p.375). This was due largely to concerns over migration into the EU, particularly following the accession of new member states, and hence the shifting outwards of the EU external boundary in 2004. Leonard goes on to note that the establishment of Frontex “would increase the visibility of EU action in the field of border controls, which was significant given the importance of migration issues on the political agenda of many European governments” (p.380). However, the responsibility for control and surveillance of the external borders remains with the Member States’ whose borders adjoin a non-member state. The predominant causes that led to the Member States of the EU agreeing to the formation of Frontex in 2004 were stated as being: (1.) migration flows into the EU, (2.) the enlargement of the EU in 2004 and concern over the new Member States’ inability to control their external borders, and (3.) the events of 11 September 2001 and the fight against terrorism (Hobbing 2006; Leonard 2010).

The substantive work of Frontex is based in its production of risk analyses conducted by the Agency’s Risk Analyses Unit (RA). This specific practice is situated within the agency’s primary roles, set out in 2004 upon its establishment: (1.) Coordinating operational cooperation between Member States regarding the management of external borders; (2.) assisting Member States in the training of national border guards, including establishing common training standards; (3.) conducting risk analyses; (4.) following up on developments in research relevant for the control and surveillance of external borders; (5.) assisting Member States when increased technical and operational assistance at
external borders is required; and (6.) assisting Member States in organizing joint return operations.

Although Frontex, whose headquarters are based in Warsaw, Poland, was established in 2004, it did not begin operation until October 2005. However, it was the joint aerial and naval surveillance and interception operations conducted by Frontex that began in July 2006 that brought outside attention to the agency due to lack of oversight and claims of fundamental rights abuses, particularly through the lack of respect of the principle of non-refoulement (Hyndman and Mountz 2008). Operation HERA I and II – which operated in collaboration with the Spanish authorities – was concerned with halting migration to the Canary Islands (Carrera 2007). Following this, Frontex maritime operations moved to the central Mediterranean, in response to shifting migration routes, and focused on migration towards Lampedusa and other Italian territory in the Mediterranean under Operation Nautilus (Papastavridis, 2010). Other maritime operations have since included the waters between Greece and Turkey (eastern Mediterranean) under Operation Poseidon (not to be confused with the territorial Poseidon mission that followed later).

During its short existence, the budget of Frontex, and hence its capabilities, have grown substantially. Between 2006 and 2010, the annual budget grew from €19 million to €88 million (Perkowski 2011). However, while its budget has grown considerably, funded almost entirely by the European Commission, Frontex still relies on Member State cooperation, and draws most of its agents and technical resources from these countries (Kasparek and Wagner, 2012). Since its formation in 2004, Frontex has become a growing presence at the external borders of the European Union, growing in strength and size rapidly, while developing as a more autonomous agency over time. Much has been written about the agency and both its maritime and territorial activities, though little is still known of the practices of agents under Frontex during these missions.

**Fundamental Rights and Integrated Border Management**

While integrated border management (IBM) in the EU remains loosely defined, Frontex has frequently added its interpretations and amendments to the concept and practice (see Carrera 2007, 2010; Hobbing 2005; Koslowski 2006). Of particular interest in this paper has been Frontex’ discussion of fundamental rights vis-á-vis IBM. Within the preamble to its 2011 Fundamental Rights Strat-
The limits of Europe: Frontex and the issue of human rights

It is stated, “Frontex considers that respect and promotion of fundamental rights are unconditional and integral components of effective integrated border management” (Frontex 2011a, p.1). Further, within the Stockholm Programme (European Council 2010), which sets out the European Union’s priorities for the area of justice, freedom and security for the period 2010-14, IBM is discussed explicitly under Section 5: Access to Europe in a Globalised World. Within this section, external border management of the EU, conducted primarily by Frontex, is contrasted with the fundamental rights of those seeking entry to the region:

The EU must further develop its integrated border management and visa policies to make legal access to Europe efficient for non-EU nationals, while ensuring the security of its own citizens. Strong border controls are necessary to counter illegal immigration and cross-border crime. At the same time, access must be guaranteed to those in need of international protection and to vulnerable groups of people, such as unaccompanied minors. Consequently, the role of Frontex (the European external borders agency) must be reinforced so that it can respond more effectively to existing and future challenges” (European Union, 2010).

The integration of fundamental rights into the concept and practice of IBM is therefore seen as an essential component in meeting EU obligations to asylum seekers and migrants. While this is clearly stated, the methods in which fundamental rights protections should be implemented and undertaken within day-to-day border management and immigration controls is however much less clear. What current measures are Frontex implementing to supposedly meet these requirements?

**Frontex and Fundamental Rights Strategies/Partnerships**

Since Frontex began its operations in 2005/2006, the agency tasked with implementing border management and security on the external boundaries of the EU, both maritime and territorial, has received significant attention and critique. This has included violations to the right to asylum; creating obstacles to the “right to leave any country” (under 1951 UN Treaty on the Declaration of Human Rights); failure to respond to distress calls at sea and emergency situations; informal push-
backs and deportations; violation of the principle of non-refoulement; conducting return flights contravening EU regulations on mass deportation; inhuman and degrading treatment of migrants and asylum seekers; transfer of persons to inhumane detention facilities under the control of other agencies; violations of the right to the protection of personal data; and discrimination, amongst others (see for example Keller et al. 2011; Human Rights Watch, 2011).

While Frontex asserts that it respects the fundamental rights of all persons, and adheres to EU and international regulations, a lack of ability to independently monitor operations, and continued reports citing abuses and violations, suggest that significant issues remain within the operation of the agency. The recent events of the Arab Spring point to some of these ongoing concerns; the UNHCR reported 2011 as being the deadliest year for migrants in the Mediterranean with over 15,000 deaths recorded and documented cases of distress calls at sea by vessels carrying migrants not being answered (UNHCR 2012). Although Frontex has been obliged under several regulations since its formation to respect fundamental rights, such as the 2006 Schengen Borders Code, which calls upon guards to fully respect human dignity and contains a duty to respect the principle of non-refoulement and to protect persons in need of international protection, and the December 2009 Treaty of Lisbon, in which the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU became legally binding on Frontex, it has been argued by groups such as Human Rights Watch (2011) that Frontex has failed to maintain the fundamental rights of those persons it is interdicting at the land and maritime borders of the EU.

In recent years Frontex has developed agreements with the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the European Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA), the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), and the EU Anti-Trafficking Coordinator. However, it has also more recently been subjected to an ongoing investigation of its fundamental rights practices by the European Ombudsman (Frontex 2012), combined with pressure from individual Member States of the EU, as well as independent agencies and NGOs, to comply to EU and international law regarding migrant and asylum seeker rights (Guild et al. 2010). While it is not possible to go in to detail for each of the above stated agreements, I want to discuss some of the key partnerships and strategies Frontex has adopted in order to demonstrate its supposed commitment to fundamental rights, and in response to EU and EC requirements placed upon the agency.
UN High Commission for Refugees Partnership (2007)

One of the first measures implemented by Frontex to respond to critiques regarding its observation of fundamental rights was to develop a partnership with the UNHCR. In 2007 a liaison officer was appointed to Frontex from the UNHCR “to help ensure that border management complies with the international obligations of EU member states” (UNHCR 2010).

In an interview I conducted with Michele Simone, the current liaison officer, it was stated that this partnership developed from a mutual interest from both organizations. He also noted that the relationship was seen as a recognition that Frontex’ actions have impacts upon the people that the UNHCR is concerned with, while for Frontex, the UNHCR partnership is seen as a benefit, due to its authority and status regarding fundamental rights and international protection of persons.

This partnership was followed by the establishment of a working agreement on 13 June 2008, which according to a report conducted by the European Parliament Greens group, “focuses on different aspects of cooperation: regular consultations, sharing information, expertise and experiences, and participation in training, especially on human rights and the rights of refugees. To this end the UNHCR helped to train the Agency’s border guards and incorporate the concept of protection into their work” (Keller et al. 2011, p.29).

While a strategic partnership with the UNHCR may create a positive outcome for those seeking entry to the EU, particularly in regards to the ability to conduct trainings for Frontex border guards, Michele Simone has stated in another interview that, “the UNHCR has little information on joint operations, making it difficult to evaluate the impact of training.” He also pointed out that, “all staff should be trained in fundamental human rights, not just those working on the ground” (Keller et al. 2011, p.29). A key concern then remains with the ability to observe missions, and the implementation of fundamental rights training and international protections during the operation of missions within the territory of specific Member States or at sea.

EU Fundamental Rights Agency Partnership (2010)

Following the establishment of a working agreement with the UNHCR, Frontex developed a Cooperation Agreement with the EU Fundamental Rights Agen-
cy (FRA) in May 2010. This partnership entails “training, [and] the sharing of expertise and development of good practices, including with respect to joint operations and Joint Return Operations.” It also “foresees collaboration in data collection and sharing of information on the situation at the EU’s external borders” (Guild et al. 2011: 39).

At the now annual European Day for Border Guards (ED4BG) in 2010, Morten Kjaerum, Director of the FRA, stated that “...respect for fundamental rights is an essential component of modern border management” (FRA 2010a, p.2). He continued, “But what does this mean in practice? If respect for fundamental rights is an important component of the management of external borders, what can we do to translate this in to practice?” The FRA therefore sees its role as creating this connection between policy and practice, as stated in its agreement with Frontex:

“[The role of the agreement is] to foster a common understanding of fundamental rights in the context of border management [...] and coordinate their actions, where appropriate” (FRA/Frontex, 2010: 3).

In explaining the role of the partnership, the Greens/European Free Alliance of the European Parliament further elaborate that “at the request of Frontex, the FRA provides expertise during the various phases of Joint Operations, especially advice on how border guards should take into account fundamental rights. The parties also undertake to develop activities for border guards, especially to train those guards in how to identify vulnerable people” (Keller et al., 2011: 30).

Responding to the agreement, Frontex Executive Director Ilkka Laitinen has stated that “Frontex is dedicated to upholding the highest possible standards in border management for the EU – in all its aspects [...] This new cooperation arrangement with our colleagues at the FRA will provide us with access to valuable expertise in the pursuit of this aim” (FRA, 2010b).

Similar to the UNHCR agreement then, this partnership focuses predominantly on aspects of training and information and expertise sharing in regards to developing a form of ‘best practice’. While seemingly more detailed and expansive in its scope than the UNHCR agreement, the FRA agreement still remains limited in its capacity during operations.

In 2011 the FRA released its report Coping with a fundamental rights emergency: the situation of persons crossing the Greek land border in an irregular manner (FRA 2011).
This report followed up on site visits by the FRA to the Evros region of the Greek-Turkish border. Frontex had been deployed here in response to a request by the Greek government for support in managing the heightened levels of irregular migration being witnessed in the second half of 2010 (Burridge, forthcoming).

While providing a critical insight, the report generally promoted an optimistic response to Frontex operations there, noting that the agency had “an overall positive impact on the initial processing of individuals” who had been intercepted crossing the border irregularly, and that it had helped to reduce the risk of informal push-backs of these persons to Turkey (FRA 2011, p.8). It did however critique the limited role of Frontex (through the EU) in initial processing, while not taking responsibility for improving the “inhuman conditions in which persons are currently being held” in detention (ibid. p.9).

**Frontex Fundamental Rights Strategy (2011)**

In March 2011, Frontex adopted its Fundamental Rights Strategy, which sets out its “commitment to fundamental rights and obligations” under the 2007 Lisbon Treaty and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

This was reportedly developed with input from the FRA, UNHCR and IOM, and was seen as developing upon the existing Code of Conduct for its agents. Within the preamble to the Strategy, it is stated “Frontex considers that respect and promotion of fundamental rights are unconditional and integral components of effective integrated border management” (Frontex, 2011a: 1).

The Strategy, in response to this amendment, sets out the specific measures to operationalise the fundamental rights objectives, which include “the commitment to put in place effective monitoring and reporting systems to cover joint operations (JOs) and joint return operations (JROs), and to include staff with fundamental rights expertise in operations” (Frontex, 2011a).

This Strategy is also to be followed by the integration of an Action Plan into the agency’s programme of work, though this has yet to be done.

It is noted however, that while “the measures outlined above have been welcomed, they stop short of imposing legally binding obligations on the Frontex agency” (Guild et al., 2011: 39). It is questionable then what weight this Strategy carries given its non-legally binding nature.
Amendment to the Regulation of Frontex, European Parliament (2011)

The development of the Fundamental Rights Strategy was followed by an amendment to the Frontex Regulation by the European Parliament, implemented in October 2011, which was concerned also with fundamental rights practices of the agency. In particular amendment to Article 26a of the Regulation states that Frontex shall “draw up, further develop and implement a Fundamental Rights Strategy, and (b) put in place an effective mechanism to monitor respect for fundamental rights in all its activities” (Frontex, 2011b).

The Regulation refers to European Border Guard Teams (coordinated under Frontex) and requires that they shall, in the performance of their tasks and the exercise of their powers, fully respect fundamental rights, though does not state how this should be done. This amendment:

legally obliges Frontex to implement and monitor its fundamental rights strategy, to appoint a fundamental rights officer and to set up a consultative forum on fundamental rights that will assist the agency’s management board. In addition, the Executive Director of Frontex will be empowered to suspend or terminate an operation should he/she identify a violation of the law or of fundamental rights, and the agency will develop a fundamental rights-compliant code of conduct to underpin its operation activities (Guild et al. 2011: 40).

It should be noted then that the only legally binding measure implemented in regards to fundamental rights by Frontex has been led by the European Parliament, rather than the Agency. While legally binding, Guild et al. (2011) note that “the lack of independent and effective monitoring and reporting mechanisms in the final text of the Regulation raises questions as to the extent to which these fundamental rights aspirations will be realised in practice” (Guild et al. 2011: 40).

Ethics of Border Security: Centre for the Study of Global Ethics, University of Birmingham (2010)

Asides from the formation of strategic partnerships, developing strategic plans, and the amendment of European policy, Frontex has also looked to other ave-
nues to defend its fundamental rights concerns. One specific measure has been the commissioning of a study on the ‘ethics of border security’ in 2010. After an open tender, the study was awarded to the Centre for the Study of Global Ethics - University of Birmingham, led by Professor Tom Sorell.

The study involved an assessment of border management practices across the 27 Member States of the EU, focusing particularly on those Member States that have specific border enforcement agencies (as opposed to using police or military units). The overall intention was to identify ‘best practice’ in border management practices, and was to be implemented within the Frontex Code of Conduct for its border guards (University of Birmingham 2010). Within a Frontex press release that followed the publication’s release, it was stated that “this study is a vital part of the Frontex Fundamental Rights Strategy, which aims to embed the respect of fundamental rights and freedoms in every aspect of Frontex’s work. It is also expected that the publication of this study will help in one of Frontex’s core aims of harmonising and raising standards among the EU border guard community.” (Frontex Press Release, April 29, 2010)

Similar then to the agreement struck between the UNHCR and FRA, this effort at developing an ethical code for border guards and border management was targeted predominantly at the training level rather than at the implementation and practice level. Specific recommendations were not made regarding the actual implementation of ethical practices, but instead remained at the level of ‘best practice’, nor were any of the recommendations legally binding.

**Rights on the Ground – Implementing Fundamental Rights within IBM**

This article has sought to understand how Frontex has integrated fundamental rights frameworks within their policy and practices. The recent efforts by the agency to do so, particularly over the past 4-5 years, have opened up the question of are fundamental rights compatible with integrated border management when concerned with the restriction of the movement of people?

It is perhaps too early to comprehend the possible outcomes of Frontex’s recent efforts through strategic partnerships, commissioned studies, and from outside pressure by the EC and EP in the amending of existing regulations. Reports by human rights and NGO agencies like Human Rights Watch (2011), the European Greens group and Migreurop (Keller et al., 2011), as well as recent events such as the significant number of drownings during the Arab Spring mi-
migrations across the Mediterranean, and the ongoing crisis in asylum processing in Greece (FRA, 2011; Human Rights Watch, 2011), suggest a need for caution about possible improvements to fundamental rights at the external borders of the EU.

From this analysis of the recent measures taken by Frontex to integrate fundamental rights within its practice of IBM, I have found some common outcomes and enduring concerns. As mentioned earlier in this report, IBM remains a loosely defined term, open to interpretation and refashioning. Frontex has sought to define this concept in regards to its practices, arguing that fundamental rights are an inseparable element within IBM. These statements however, along with recent partnership agreements and strategies have not developed beyond largely simplistic statements of the compatibility of fundamental rights and IBM. Efforts to define best practice of border management in respect to fundamental rights are also questionable when not followed up with the ability to independently observe operations in the field.

Second, all existing agreements and partnerships do not involve an independent monitoring and observation role, particularly within maritime operations and forced removal operations. This is important as it has been the primary critique of Frontex operations previous to the development of strategic agreements. The question remains then of what happens when border guards, under the control of Frontex, are deployed in the field? What impact do fundamental and international rights trainings have when guards are confronted with situations at the borders of the EU, at sea, or during deportation flights to third countries? As Morten Kjaerum, Director of the FRA, notes that “knowing the theory [of fundamental rights] is not necessarily enough to be able to deal with the daily challenges when on duty at an airport or patrolling the sea, where decisions often are taken within a few minutes.” (FRA, 25 May 2010: 2).

Morten Kjaerum He continues that: “I wonder however if it would not be worth [...] involving some form of independent monitoring, also for border control and surveillance. I have no doubts that more transparency can assist in promoting respect of fundamental rights without being an obstacle for efficiency.” (FRA, 25 May 2010: 3)

This call for further transparency is also reflected in the 2011 report by the Greens/Migreurop, who in considering Frontex reporting of operations, argue that “Despite the partnership agreements with UNHCR and FRA, the annual reports provide no indication at all of actions taken during FRONTEX joint op-
operations to ensure the protection of individuals. It is extremely difficult, impossible even, to evaluate the impact of the training provided by UNHCR and the FRA on actual border operations, especially those on high seas” (Keller et al., 2011: 30).

Following these critiques, Feldman’s (2012) statement that “the humanitarian gesture is greatest when the migrant is farthest away from EU territory” (p.94), appears an accurate observation. Transparency and the ability for independent monitoring therefore remain the key concerns regarding the implementation of fundamental rights by Frontex and other border management agencies. While agreements and partnerships present a positive development in Frontex operations, a true commitment to respecting fundamental rights of migrants and asylum seekers attempting to enter the EU requires concrete measures, with legal backing and independent oversight. Agreements and working partnerships with the UNHCR, and the FRA, as well as with the IOM, EASO and others remain a minor but important and developing aspect of Frontex. While the true impact of such agreements remains to be seen, this paper has shown that a developing trend within EU border management is towards the use of fundamental rights agreements and strategies in promoting the operation of such agencies. Who benefits out of these agreements – the border management agencies, the fundamental rights groups, or those directly at risk of having their rights ignored – remains open to question.

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Chapter 13.

Tatjana Sekulic

Reconciliation through justice as a border-crossing practice

The short XX century came to an end in Europe with the breakdown of the communist regimes and the opening of the two Europes, Western and Eastern, to one another. The fall of the Berlin wall in November 1989 started new forms of conflicts and solidarity throughout the European continent. At that time, in the early 1990s, the European Union was formed by 12 countries, including the unified Germany, who were preparing to sign one of the most important treaties in its history: The European Union Treaty, known as The Maastricht Treaty (1992). The dissolution of the federal post-communist states was going on in a dimension parallel to the creation of the European Union, together with complex problems associated with the transition and consolidation of new democracies. Both dimensions were related to the re-negotiation of the fundamental nation-state principle and to the differentiation of levels of sovereignty, and thus to the re-definition of the borders and boundaries among groupings who shared the European geo-political space. At the same time, this was not possible without rethinking concepts and categories like national and transnational, nationhood and statehood, democracy and citizenship, culture and identity, forms of recognition and redistribution, along with violence and justice.

The project of the European unification was inspired by the desire to build a solid ground for peace in the continent in front of the horrors and atrocities of the two world wars. The event of Holocaust, symbolically represented by the image of lager as an extreme product of Fascism and Nazism and the extermination project of entire groups of people - Jews, Slavs, Roma people, or ideological enemies such as communists and ‘imperfect’ forms of Arians - were the most shocking peaks of the totalitarian terror as a new form of the permanent war. The utmost degree of huge scale violence through technological capabilities was demonstrated, particularly by the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki; the experience of crossing the tiny line between war crime and legitimate war action was carried out, by the new models of ‘conventional’ instruments of violence, as razing to the ground entire cities (Dunkirk, Berlin or Dresden); a growing proportion of victims among civilians rose with respect to soldiers.
These rendered more acute the collective awareness of destructive potential on a global scale, even where the violence was legitimate and justified as a resistance or a necessity to defeat the criminal enemy.

Re-construction of memory of the Second World War – still narrated by the last survivors –, continues to open new boxes of hidden truth. The main question opened in Germany in the aftermath of the war – How to come to terms with the past? (Vergangenheitsbewältigung) –, became the expression of the deepest national trauma, that emerged especially during the 1960s, with the new post-war generations who had to face the facts and events in which their elders took part. It seems that the research for the answer has not come to an end yet, but rather is constantly re-actualized in every corner of Europe; in those societies in which the leading political parties and common citizens took an active role in Nazism and Fascism – as in Italy and Spain, in the France of Vichy government, Hungary, Norway, Baltic States, Croatia and others, this issue is deeply felt. It happens also in those societies in which the organized resistance to Hitler and Mussolini, or to a local Fascist government, produced an excess of violence. Just to mention some of them: the responsibility of the United States for using the atomic bomb, killing of the German civilians by the Alliance forces in Berlin and other German cities, and partisan’s revanchism in Yugoslavia towards local Italian and German civilians despite their real role and responsibility during the war, or towards their ideological enemy – Croatian Fascist movement of ustaša or Serb monarchist četniks. The problem of the ‘justice of winners’, raised by the revisionists of history, cannot turn over the historical evidence of what was just to do in that particular situation, but it may help us to shed light to the spots of truth covered by shadow, and turn our attention to the new way of thinking about the politics of conflict resolution and its instruments.

The question of justice was the first one to be faced immediately after the end of the War: the internationalisation of justice by institutionalisation of the International Tribunals of Nurnberg and Tokyo and the creation of the new legislation related to war crimes and crimes against humanity, the foundation of the new type of crime – genocide – proposed by Rafael Lemkin in 1948, the change of the international constellation of the Society of Nations into the United Nations, and the adoption of the Chart of the Fundamental Human Rights

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1 One of the characters of the recent film ‘Sarah’s key’ (Gilles Paquet-Brenner 2010) on the French role in the exportation of the Jews during the German occupation, when asked about his personal role in a particular situation, answered: “What could I do? Call the police?!” – as it was the French police deporting his neighbours to the concentration camps.
in the aftermath of WWII. (Arendt 1977; Calloni 2006) The definition of the responsibility through justice was fundamental for the process of reconciliation among nations and citizens, particularly on the European ‘soil’, where everything had started and everything had gotten to an end, producing in that lapse of time an immense damage. As it was highlighted by Jaspers during his lessons at the University of Heidelberg in 1945-46,2 the complexity of the question of guilt had to be faced in all its nuances: from the criminal one – for the actions that transgressed the laws and that could be proved in front of the Tribunal, the political – that consists in the actions of the ‘men of the state’, but also in being citizens of a certain state and thus holders of the political responsibility, moral guilt regarding the moral responsibility of every individual for its own actions, and finally the guilt he called the metaphysical one – of the humans as such, bounded by the solidarity and thus co-responsible for any act of injustice and injury, even in the case of passive non-acting when the other is menaced.

The fall of the Berlin Wall and the transformation process of the Central and Eastern European societies revealed another urgent question: constitution of a memory of the Stalinist past and of the internal responsibility for the crimes committed in the period of totalitarian rule, and for the violation of human rights during the decades of post-totalitarian changes of the core model, with different degree of liberalisation, from the Soviet Union to RFS Yugoslavia. Stalinism was well explored years before its final collapse, by scholars such as Hannah Arendt and Karl Fridrich, Frankfurt and Budapest school writers and many others. The literature and art contributed to build the knowledge about this model of abnegation of the society and of individuals, as in the writings of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn or Danilo Kiš. Another problem was how to come to terms with the post-totalitarian past, once that regime(s) collapsed. In that sense the definition of the revolutionary movements in those societies from 1989 on became extremely important, and it was confronted by a set of still open questions. I will mention here just a few of them: Can we speak about revolutions, or was it just a kind of reforming process? Who were the main actors and what kind of society did their movements produce? Which are the main competing narrations of the past? (Habermas 1990; Sztompka 1996; Elster et al.1998; Tismaneanu 1999)

2 Karl Jaspers held these lessons during the winter semester in a. a. 1945-46 at the Heidelberg University. They were published for the first time in 1947 by Lambert Schneider Publisher with the title ‘Die Schuldfrage’, The question of Guilt.
It is not possible, of course, to enter here into the interpretations and inquiries concerning these matters; notwithstanding, some important remarks should be mentioned. The transition from the one-party system to the political pluralism and the first democratic elections was relatively peaceful all around post-communist Europe. Transitional justice mechanisms, aimed to settle account with the communist élites, with the exception of Romania, did not go beyond some specific ‘lustration’ laws and practices, which assumed a distinguished local character, as in Czech Republic and Slovakia (Elster 1998; Gledhill 2013; Kostoviceva 2013; Schwarts 1995, 2000). In the majority of cases even the former communist party nomenclature members were re-integrated into the democratic system embracing social-democratic or liberal political orientation, but also neoconservative nationalist ideologies.

However, the collapse of the communist regimes and the process of democratisation of the societies of the Central, Eastern and Balkan Europe was going on with the other form of transformation in a large part of these countries: the dissolution of the Federations as Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia, described in terms of partition or fragmentation. In the case of the Yugoslav federation, it was the process of dissolution that liberated a huge amount of different forms of political violence. According to many scholars, the politics of partition, in this specific case, damaged profoundly the emerging civil society and new fragile democratic institutions throughout the new states, and still represent the main burden for the re-pacification of the Yugoslav space, its peoples and citizens (Bianchini and Iveković 2006). In that sense, my intention here is to question the role of justice in its different forms and practices for the process of reconciliation and trust reconstruction in this part of Europe.

In the next chapters I will first analyze the relationship between politics of partition and forms of political violence in the process of border redefinition, related to the case of former Yugoslavia in the last twenty years. Then I will examine some of the salient aspects of the reconciliation process, considering different practices of justice that have been promoted by transnational and international organizations and institutions (UN, ICTY, EU), or by governments and civil society agency on regional and national level.

*Politics of partition and new borders in Europe*

Partition as a model of a new geopolitical constellation in Central and Eastern
Europe seems to be at odds with the process of European integration. At the same time, most ex-communist countries were oriented towards and stimulated by the political will for (re)integration within Europe, which culminated with the block-entrance of ten CEE countries in 2004 and of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 into the European Union. The process of Europeanisation, however, goes beyond the borders of the EU; the next (possible) entries to the EU are part of the ‘Western Balkans’ countries, together with Turkey, getting progressively the status of potential candidate, candidate or accession country: such as Croatia, who became an EU member in July 2013. Different forms of partnership have been developed with the so-called ‘neighbouring countries’, many of them in Africa or Asia. All these processes render internal geopolitical borders of the continent softer and at the same time augment the reciprocal commitment and responsibility among states and citizenry of the countries involved, redefined every year by the national and EU strategic documents. The rule of law is one of the pillars of this commitment.

Democratisation versus dissolution: the former Yugoslav case

Partition of the federal communist countries in the early 1990s followed previously defined borderlines of the relatively autonomous units of these composite states – as in the case of the Soviet Republics, Czech Republic and Slovakia, or of the Yugoslav sovereign socialist republics. While in the first two cases, in spite of the complexity of transformation, the division of the territory and competencies mostly respected institutional procedures, Yugoslavia entered, after the first democratic elections on the republican level, into the ‘vicious circle’ of violent partition. The causes of the Yugoslav wars (1991-1999) cannot be examined in this place, nor is there a unique interpretation of them. (Bianchini 1992; Pirjavec 2002; Power 2002; Sekulić 2002) I will point out just a few important institutional features regarding politics and cultural policies that strongly influenced the course of the events.

The Yugoslav Constitution, since its first version in 1946 to the last one in 1974, guaranteed the right of the Republics and of the constituent peoples/nations to separate from the Federation. It was the ambiguity of the constitutional definition of the subject of sovereignty - republic or nation? – that permitted its different interpretations in the new turbulent social and political context in the late 1980s. The Federal State was organized in six socialist republics, one of
which, Serbia, included two autonomous regions: Kosovo and Vojvodina. Yugoslavian society was composed by six constituent nations – Slovenians, Croats, Serbs, Muslims (as a nation, not as a religious group), Montenegrins and Macedonians. Albanians, situated prevalently in Kosovo, were the major ‘minority group’.

The problem consisted in the fact that there was no congruence between groupings (defined in national or ethnic terms), and territory of the single republics, with the exception of Slovenia. The ‘identity’ constituent cultural characteristics, as language, religion, traditions, and myth of origin, were overlapping and trans-border over the territory, but also among (and inside) the imagined communities. The language is perfectly comprehensible in Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro. Catholicism is a major religion in Slovenia and Croatia and it is also diffused in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Serbia and Montenegro. Orthodox Christianity is dominant in Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia, while widely present in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In Croatia the Orthodox Christian community decreased after the exodus of the Croatian Serbs in 1995. Some of the most relevant Orthodox monasteries and churches are situated in Kosovo, where the Orthodox Christians, after thirty years of conflict, are in a position of absolute minority.

Islam is present in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in Kosovo and in parts of Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia. Judaism is one of the multi-religious pillars in Bosnia and Herzegovina, although the community diminished notably after the last war; Jewish communities are present and respected in other republics; local Roma groupings are both Christian and Muslim. If we speak of myths of origin, different narrations have been competing since the XIX century, in the ‘eve of Nations’, until nowadays; Yugoslavism – based on the idea of South Slavic common roots and fate – was one among the others, that prevailed in XX century for different and complex reasons (Banac 1984).

From 1918 to 1991, with the exception of the Second World War period, these nations shared the common history as a part of Yugoslavia, and from 1945 on several cohorts were socialized in the socialist pattern of a ‘brotherhood and unity’ principle. Other narrations embraced the idea of separate ethno-national identities and were strongly regained by the ‘nationalist entrepreneurs’ in the late 1980s and during the 1990s. In fact, it was not only the absence of congruency among nations, territory, cultural identity and religion that caused issues in the Yugoslavian region: the process of the embodiment of the major
groupings on the ethno-national principle was still unfinished. The aim and the consequence of this type of narration was the augmented degree of ‘groupness’ of every single ethno-national ‘body’ (Brubaker 2004). The balkanization discourse (Bjelić and Savić 2002; Petrović 2009; Todorova 2002), in this specific context – characterised by the production of a ‘surplus of history’ - allowed the legitimisation of those historically based arguments aimed to nation-reinforcement, using and reinventing the memory of violence between groupings and its enormous capability to (re)produce hatred, while both ‘brotherhood and unity’ were denounced as another ‘communist’ fallacy.

War-time and its legacy


There are many definitions of this type of conflict, that could be summarized in the following one: “Ethnic conflict means violent conflict among groups who differ from one another in terms of culture, religion, physical features, or language” (Levinson 1994: 62). On the other hand, several social scientists warned about what Brubaker and Cooper called a ‘terminological chaos’, as terms like ‘ethnos’, ‘people’, ‘nation’ or ‘culture’ get used both as definiens and as definiendum of a collective identity, not only by the essentialists, but often also from the constructivists’ perspective (Brubaker and Cooper 2000; Geertz 1999). This warning seems to be even more important in a complex context, as it was (and still is) in the former Yugoslav or ‘Western Balkans’ space.

There is no room here to explain the dynamics of the ‘spiral of violence’ in which people of these countries gradually found themselves, in a peculiar situation where the first steps of democratic transition were hardly made and the level of democratic political culture was generally quite low. Democratic institutions and the political opposition were too weak to prevent the belligerent tendencies that came to the fore (Andjelić 2003; Janković and Mokrović 2011; Sekulić G. 2009). The violent dissolution was provoked basically by the hegemonic claims of the ethno-nationalist leadership of Serbia, supported by the military elites and means of the Yugoslav Army, that found their strongest counterpart in Cro-
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Atia and Slovenia, and was echoed by other similar political forces throughout Yugoslavia. Once the federal state monopoly on the legitimate use of violence was broken, new forces of the ethno-national movements, equipped with the new armies and paramilitary formations, commenced to use violence as a tool of diversification and division of their respective ethnic/national ‘bodies’ - including men, women, territory and resources – towards the others, with the objective of redefining and reinforcing the borders between communities.

The main war strategy used in the conflict by the ‘aggressor’ forces, but also many times by the ‘defensive’ parts, was the so-called ‘ethnic cleansing’, understood here as an instrument of nation-state building. It could be defined as a project of a certain group (self)identified by shared biological and cultural characteristics, to annihilate another distinctive group, not only in terms of a physical extermination of members of negatively identified opposed collectivity, but also as a symbolic abjuration of their ‘natural’ and cultural characteristics. Genocide may be seen as one of its possible solutions, the most radical conclusion of the project of ethnic cleansing. (Jones 2006) Strategies of ethnic cleansing pass through bodies and identities; they engrave themselves on the collective and individual memory. The first strategy and the most immediate one is the physical annihilation - murder. The second one regards sexual violence: rape, sexual abuse and humiliation of women and men of every age. The third strategy concerns forced displacement of entire groups of population. All of these strategies operated on the territory of the former Yugoslavia during the wars, and produced, besides new borders, an immense quantity of human victims and material damage. (Mann 2004; Power 2002; Sekulić 2006, 2008).

The way in which the conflicts were conducted continues to obstruct in a time of peace the process of reconciliation, understood here as reparation and restoration of relationships and re-building of trust. (Clark 2011, 2012a, 2012b, Cohen S. 2001; Minow 1998).

The dynamics of negotiation between the request for partition by the new democratically elected leadership in all republics of the former Yugoslavia, and the International Community bodies, with their instruments of conflict prevention and resolution, had been turning around the nation-state-grounds dominated principles from the very beginning, yet before the first shots were fired. The result was that the only option that had been taken into consideration was the internationally recognized separation, with tragic consequences especially in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Sekulić T. 2002).
The challenge of Europeanization

The former Yugoslav states find themselves today more or less integrated into the European Union space: Slovenia has been its member since 2004, Croatia hopefully from July 1, 2013, and other states are committed to the process of integration on different levels corresponding to the enlargement norms and procedures. The process of Europeanization had a crucial impact on the foundation and consolidation of the Rule of Law in the new democracies; still the Progress Reports of the European Commission denounce the actual progress made regarding justice and human rights, as not yet sufficiently harmonized with the EU standards. The legacy of the wars is quite persistent, and the sovereignty negotiations among groupings not yet accomplished.² The danger of another outbreak of violence is still a threat. In that sense, an inquiry on how the ‘truth’ about crimes has been emerging throughout the public sphere(s) of the post-Yugoslav states remains one of the most important scientific goals, and justice is one of the main disposals at hand. In the next chapter I will briefly describe different practices of justice related to the former Yugoslav space and question their capability to reshape the narration of the war, to pave the ground for reconciliation as the border-crossing experience among ethno-nationally defined groups who share this particular life-space. The specific case regards the Srebrenica genocide, that took place from 11 to 19 July 1995 in a little Eastern Bosnian town, in which more than eight thousand men and women of Muslim nationality were killed and more than 20,000 people forced to leave the city, by the forces under command of the Republic of Srpska Army.

Perpetrators, victims and all the others between guilt and grief, denial and memory

Criminal strategies used in these conflicts – war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide – were twisted with the ethno-nationalist narratives that had been produced from the very beginning of the conflict and that still persist in a part of these societies. Crime here is seen as a device of a nation-state building, or a tool to highlight distinction from otherness, producing victims, but also perpetrators (ideological, symbolic and material), observers and resisters. It had a crucial role in the new borders definition, and not only considering the

² Serbia and Kosovo, FYROM, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovenia and Croatia.
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territorial conquests: as in the case of the Srebrenica genocide, new boundaries were inscribed into the collective memory both of the victims’ and of the perpetrators’ communities.

*International community and the institutionalisation of a global justice*

While the ‘international community’ – the UN and the EC as its main actors – were setting up their tools of conflict prevention and resolution, violence was already on the stage in Slovenia and in Croatian villages and cities, such as Vukovar and Dubrovnik, Zadar and Knin. The first Resolution (n. 713) of the Security council of the United Nations concerning the Yugoslav crisis was adopted in August 1991: by this Resolution the ‘Conference on Yugoslavia’ was founded and the European Community (from 1992 European Union) assumed the responsibility of searching for an adequate conflict resolution. (Caplan 2005) A number of international conferences followed the first one, The Hague conference (September 1991) and different Resolutions of the UN were proclaimed from 1991 on. It became obvious very soon that the diplomatic and political efforts of the ‘international community’ and EU institutions, together with the military operation of the Peace keeping forces (UNPROFOR – United Nations protection forces) could not stop the widespread violation of the Genève conventions and of the International humanitarian law. (Ramcharan 1997, 2011) The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was founded by Resolution 827 in May 1993, based in The Hague, as a space- and-time framed institution. It was conceived to prosecute war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide on the principle of individual responsibility and guilt, by applying retroactive justice, as its jurisdiction regarded the period since January 1, 1991 on. ICTY was aimed to act against the highest ranking people, while the other crimes were supposed to be brought to justice by the national courts. (Calvetti and Scovazzi 2004)

The impact of the ICTY foundation was immediate as it gave a legitimate legal definition of the types of crimes that had been perpetrated, by formulating the indictments based on the systematically collected evidence of the criminal acts. Notwithstanding, its goal - expressed in the following words: “By bringing perpetrators to trial, the ICTY aims to deter future crimes and render justice to thousands of victims and their families, thus contributing to a lasting peace in
the former Yugoslavia"⁴ - was achieved only partially, as it missed its deterrent
effect. In that sense the case of Srebrenica - pre-announced by Resolution UN
819 adopted in 1993, that proclaimed this city 'a safe zone protected by the UN
military forces' in order to prevent violations of the International humanitarian
law and genocide, which then actually happened in July 1995 - has become a
symbol of the weakness of the international community in its capability to pre-
vent these grave violations of human rights. It was confirmed in the Resolution
of the EU Parliament on Srebrenica (January 2009):

“C. whereas this tragedy, declared an act of genocide by the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), took place
in a UN-proclaimed safe haven, and therefore stands as a symbol of the
impotence of the international community to intervene in the conflict
and protect the civilian population”.

From 1993 until the present, 161 persons were indicted, and except ten of
them who died before, all the others have been brought to the Tribunal. The
last ‘fugitives’ - Radovan Karadžić, arrested in 2008, president of at time self-pro-
claimed and not yet recognized Republic of Srpska; Ratko Mladić, arrested in
2011, chief commander of its Army forces and Goran Hadžić, arrested in 2011,
who was President of the Government of the self-proclaimed Serbian Auton-
omous District Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem (SAO SBWS) and subse-
quently President of the Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK). 136 cases had been
already concluded: 36 persons had their indictments withdrawn, or deceased
(10 reported deceased before transfer to the Tribunal, 6 after), 18 were acquit-
ted, 69 have been sentenced, while 48 have served their sentence, 3 died, and
13 were referred to the national jurisdiction. For the remaining 25 cases, the
proceedings are ongoing, and the time-framing schedule of the Tribunal fore-
sees to conclude its work before the summer of 2016. The indicted were mem-
bers of the highest hierarchies of the political, military, police, secret services
or paramilitary forces of the Republic of Srpska and Serbia (about two-thirds),
Croatia, Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and FYROM. The types
of crimes committed can be best illustrated by listing the indictment of Slobodan
Milošević, former president of Serbia and of the ‘third’ Yugoslavia, who was in-
dicted by the Tribunal in 1999, arrested in April 2001 and transferred to the

⁴Official site of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia: http://www.icty.org/
Hague in June 2001. He was charged for:

“genocide; complicity in genocide; deportation; murder; persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds; inhumane acts/forcible transfer; extermination; imprisonment; torture; willful killing; unlawful confinement; willfully causing great suffering; unlawful deportation or transfer; extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly; cruel treatment; plunder of public or private property; attacks on civilians; destruction or willful damage done to historic monuments and institutions dedicated to education or religion; unlawful attacks on civilian objects in Kosovo, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.” (ICTY 1999)

Milošević died in the middle of the proceedings and in his case justice through the final verdict could not be made any longer. I will here briefly describe three significant cases, related to the Srebrenica genocide, in which the verdict might have the power of challenging war narratives based on denial or distortion of truth and thus help the process of reconciliation.

First case: Dražen Erdemović was one of the few ‘simple soldiers’ of the Army of the Republic of Srpska who was brought to the Tribunal, but also the first among the accused, charged for participation to the murder of Bosnian Muslim men in Srebrenica in July 1995. He was arrested by the authorities of the FR Yugoslavia and transferred to the ICTY in March 1996. Erdemović immediately pled guilty for his crimes (defined first in terms of crimes against humanity, and that retreated as crimes against laws and customs of war) and became one of the main witnesses for the Srebrenica case.

Second case: Radislav Krstić was a Chief-of-Staff and Deputy Commander of the Drina Corps of the Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) and was indicted for crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and law and customs of war in the case of Srebrenica. He was arrested and transferred to the Tribunal in November 1998. Krstić was the first person to be convicted for genocide, first sentenced in 2001, and confirmed by the Appeals Chamber Judgement in April 2004. That was also the first time that the case of Srebrenica was legally defined as a genocide. Nonetheless, Krstić never pled guilty.

Third case: Dragan Obrenović was a Chief-of-Staff and Deputy Commander of the 1st Zvornik Infantry Brigade of the Drina Corps of the Bosnian Serb Army
(VRS), that was involved in the Srebrenica genocide. He was indicted and arrested in April 2001, condemned for crimes against humanity. At the beginning, Obrenović pled not guilty, but then, in May 2003, he admitted his guilt.

The first dimension that emerges from this brief case description is the temporal one. The ICTY was founded in the late 1993 and became operative in the beginning of 1994. If we consider the final events of the Srebrenica case, in July 1995, the lapse of time between the crime commitment and the prosecution seems to be an eternity from the perspective of justice disposals for reconciliation. A five-year process was needed for the first sentence on genocide; the main accountable parties, Karadžić and Mladić, were brought to the Tribunal only a few years ago. Yet there is no better or even other acceptable solution in this very moment, as the respect of legal procedure rules is the founding principle of justice in general, that distinguishes ethical from criminal praxis.

These three cases point thus at the moral dimension of the question of guilt on an individual level, concerning the perpetrators. A plea of being guilty or not goes beyond the evidence of committed crimes and the Tribunal sentence, or a simple interpretation based on rational choice of the defendant in order to avoid heavier sentences.

It could be described better as a complex individual act of consciousness, in opposition or in spite of the strong ideological support in terms of the ‘sacrifice to supreme goals and ideals’ that the ethno-nationalist political and intellectual leadership produced in order to confer sense even to the worst crimes. At the same time, the admission of individual responsibility, in a context where such grave violations of the international humanitarian law were perpetrated among local communities – and where, as Obrenović said in his plea, “we lost ourselves in hatred and brutality,” - seems to be indispensable in the process of ‘coming to terms with a past’ as a collective effort.

Therefore, it regards that strenuous reflexive process in which victims and perpetrators, observers and resistants try together to give a sense and significance to the horrible events, and to produce a minimum common narration that could operate as a ground for the new social and political constellation of a peaceful living-together. As Sevima Sali-Terzić, member of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, affirmed in an interview, “We have to know what happened and we have to reconcile with that” (Orentlicher 2010: 41).

This process, strengthened by the cross-border practices of justice, might be crucial to avoid a long-term stigmatization both of the victims and of the perpe-
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Until the end of 2012, just twenty persons indicted by the Tribunal pled guilty. Their statements are public, as the videos are available on the site of the ICTY. These videos were used in several documentary projects aimed to promote a public discussion about the recent past in the former Yugoslav space. At the same time, more frequent cases as the second one mentioned before, that of Radislav Krstić, could potentially reinforce the collective denial of the active or passive participation to the systemic criminal acts in that historical period.

In that sense the work and the decisions of the Tribunal need to be continuously followed and interpreted, as they are not sufficient without constant critical support of the global and local public spheres and of the civil society actors, including scientific and research institutions. The Tribunal itself proposed from 1999 an ‘Outreach programme’ offering capability building trainings, seminars and presentations on regional level. In 2004 and 2005 ICTY promoted a specific project called ‘Bridging the gap with local communities’ – within which five field conferences were organized in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in Brčko, Konjic, Foča, Srebrenica and Prijedor. In these occasions, the officials of the Tribunal were at the disposal of the citizenry and representatives of local administration and NGOs to discuss together several relevant matters. (McDowall 2009) All these initiatives were aimed to augment the active role of the justice instruments in the process of peace building and reconciliation in the region. As it is affirmed on the official site of the Tribunal, “With the establishment of Outreach, the Tribunal recognised that it had a role to play in the process of dealing with the past in the former Yugoslavia.”

From the sociological point of view it would be very difficult to prove any kind of statement, positive or negative, regarding the real effects of the action of the ICTY on the reconciliation process without huge scale empirical research, although this is the topic of the current public and academic discussion. Anyway, the practices of justice, on international, regional and national level, that have been exercised from 1994 on, created authoritative premises for a cross-border public dialogue among different individuals and groups that make part of the ‘Western Balkans countries’. In the next paragraph I will describe just a few important and breakpoint events related to the role of the politics and

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5 http://www.icty.org/sections/Outreach/OutreachProgramme.
6 For basic information on inquiries and surveys about public attitudes towards the ICTY see Orentlicher 2010.
Politics and civil society actors towards the question of guilt

The government of the Republic of Srpska, one of the two entities of the Bosnia and Herzegovina, formed in 2003 a Commission for inquiry on the events in and around Srebrenica from 10 to 19 July 1995. The official report of the Commission was published in June 2004 with the detailed description of the events and number of the victims of murder, rape and forced migration. The guilty were clearly identified and during the investigation a significant quantity of new evidence was collected, as a list with the names of people who were somehow involved in the case (about 20,000), or the detection of 32 new primary and secondary mass grave locations. It was the first time that such a document was proposed by the highest authorities of the Republic of Srpska and it had a strong effect on the public opinion throughout the former Yugoslav space. At the same time, on June 22 2004, the President of this entity, Dragan Čavić, addressed the citizens with the Declaration on Srebrenica, describing the event as a ‘tragedy’ that represents a ‘black page in the history of Serb nation’ and a ‘crime against its own people’. Čavić defined the report of the Commission as crucial in what he called a ‘path to truth’, that presupposed the search for the ‘balance in justice towards perpetrators, instead of a balance among committed crimes’.

In 2005 Serbian state television broadcasted the BBC documentary film, produced in 1999 and directed by Leslie Woodhead, Srebrenica - a Cry from the Grave. What mostly unsettled the Serbian audience was the record of the cold-blooded assassination of five men belonging to the Muslim national group, one of them a 16 year old boy, by the RS Army units. At the same time, on July 11 2005, Serbian President Boris Tadić attended for the first time the commemoration ceremony in ‘Srebrenica Memorial Center Potočari’.

A significant number of civil society actors in Serbia had fought for years for the truth and evidence of these crimes, strengthening the importance of a strong political position towards the Srebrenica genocide and the role of Serbia (and Serbs) in the Yugoslav wars. In 2005, the Serbian Parliament was not yet ready to produce a common statement on the events, and only a few political parties commemorated publicly the event with a moment of silence, interrupted by the protest of other radical nationalist members of the Parliament. Finally, in March 2010, the Serbian Parliament adopted the Declaration on Srebrenica, avoiding again to define it as a genocide. The difficult political consensus about
the Declaration was in a certain sense extorted by the EU diplomatic pressure, as the candidate status of Serbia was conditioned with the extradition of the ICTY ‘fugitives’ and the political dissociation from the criminal politics during the times of Milošević’s power. A year before, in 2009, the European Parliament adopted the Resolution on Srebrenica, which, in Article 2 states:

“Calls on the Council and the Commission to commemorate appropriately the anniversary of the Srebrenica-Potočari act of genocide by supporting Parliament’s recognition of 11 July as the day of commemoration of the Srebrenica genocide all over the EU, and to call on all the countries of the western Balkans to do the same;” (European Parliament 2009 P6_TA(2009)0028)

In April of the same year Boris Tadić published in The Wall Street Journal an article entitled ‘An Apology for Srebrenica’, in which he addressed both global and regional public opinion. Anyhow, in this article he defined again the Yugoslav wars as ‘civil wars’, as a counter-narration to the ‘Serb(ian) aggression’ dominant version in Croatia and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina; and the Srebrenica events as a ‘massacre’ and not ‘genocide’. Tadić stressed the ‘critical importance of the reconciliation seen as a moral imperative to tell the truth’, but both the Declaration and his statement did not satisfy the victims, as the nuances of the truth-telling were not clear enough. (Tadić 2010)

The new wave of denial arrived with the new Serbian President, Tomislav Nikolić, elected in May 2012. In his statement to Italian daily Corriere della sera in October 2012, he affirmed:

“Genocide did not take place in Srebrenica. This is about individual guilt of members of the Serb people. The Serbian parliament condemned this crime, but did not say it was genocide. No Serb recognizes that genocide took place in Srebrenica, and I am no different.” (Gergolet 2012)

Shortly after, on 25 April 2013, Nikolić gave a surprising interview to the Bosnian Television BH1, speaking about the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and especially about Srebrenica in quite different nuances, apologizing for the ‘crime’ committed in Srebrenica, and other crimes made in the name of Serbs and of Serbia. Even this time the word ‘genocide’ was not mentioned, except to
underline that many tragic events all over the territory of the former Yugoslavia had some characteristics of genocide. However, regardless of the political or personal motivation of the Serbian President, his words expressed deep awareness of the tragedy of Srebrenica, and remorse and acceptance of the responsibility from the political leadership of Serbia. In that sense his words became politically and ethically important, especially for the young generations in Serbia and in Republic of Srpska, although we could question his real sincerity. These words add an important piece to the narration of what has happened in the Nineties, even if they were still insufficient for the victims. In cases such as Srebrenica, but also Prijedor, Višegrad and many others, it is hard to pronounce the ‘right’ words, able to restore justice once forever, and to ease the pain of the victims and their families. The refusal of Serbian politicians to name this crime as genocide is experienced as another manifestation of the denial of the truth and of the responsibility for what was done.

The question is even more complex, it is not just a dispute between conflicting parts: coming to terms with the past concerns victims but also perpetrators; guilt needs to be elaborated, as well as mourning, and for both there are quite limited dispositives. Those concerning the systems of justice, albeit they are not perfect, remain irreplaceable, even when the decisions of different Tribunals, the ICTY in our case, seems to be sometimes ambiguous and unjust.

Yet these systems are not sufficient to rebuild the trust and confidence among citizens and groups of the post-Yugoslav states, in which the day-by-day creation of new bonds in the economic sphere, regional cooperation, culture and subcultures, science, and research starts to produce results, helped by the institutional conditions imposed by the EU integration process. In that sense, the agency of civil society has enormous importance for the cross-border trust and confidence restoring. I will mention here some of the most significant cases of the civil society action concerning the seeking-for-truth process, where the dignity of the victims as persons is understood as its central point.

In December 2012, The Research and Identification Centre of Sarajevo published The Bosnian Book of the Dead, in which Mirsad Toka a and his team collected more than ten years of work in putting together names and stories of the people who lost their lives or disappeared during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 95,940 names are listed in alphabetical order, with the data set of their gender, ethnicity and description of place and time of their death. Another 5,100 persons are named in this four-volume book, but the circumstances of
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drastic changes. The evidence of the victims permits now statistical elaboration, and thus tells us, for example, that 59.18% of dead persons were soldiers and 40.82% civilians; 65.88% were Bosniaks, 25.62% Bosnian Serbs and 8.01% Bosnian Croats; finally, 83.33% of the dead or disappeared civilians were Bosniaks. But also that 89.96% were men, and 10.04% were women, of whom just 0.68 were women-soldiers. Or the terrifying fact that more than 40% of the dead were young-sters and young adults of the 18-35 age class. Personalization of every victim returns the complex identity to every person and places his/her biography in a specific historical context. In this way the collectivistic ideological reduction of the plural identities to a singular ethno-national belonging component - that becomes a kind of a straitjacket, denying the freedom principle itself - is strongly counteracted.

The Humanitarian Law Centre was established in Belgrade – Serbia, in 1992 with the aim of documenting the ongoing human rights violations throughout the former Yugoslavia. Its actual work regards, among other goals, the collection of ‘human losses’ in armed conflicts. HLC published in 2011 the first volume of the Kosovo Memory Book 1998-2000 as a collection of data and stories of one part of the victims during the war in Kosovo, with the strong message: Let people remember people. Other evidence and documents are constantly published on the site of the Centre.

The third one is Documenta – Centre for Dealing with the Past, founded in Croatia in 2006 by a number of human rights associations. The Center works on the evidence collection of the civilian victims of the war in Croatia (Bužinkić 2012), promotes inquiries like the opinions and attainments research on how the Croatian citizens deal with the war past (Kadrov et al. 2010), and organizes educational projects related especially to the young people.

These three NGOs are the main promoters of one of the most powerful initiatives for cross-border transitional justice in the region: the foundation of a Regional Commission for establishing the facts upon conflicts in the region (RECOM). The initiative has started in 2006 and has been sustained until now by about 1,900 civil society organizations and 545,000 citizens, but it has not yet been formally established. In December 2012 the promoters invited officially all Presidents of the former Yugoslav states to give their support to the project, but it is still uncertain if the political commitment of the highest state
Institutions will be effectively given from all parts. Meanwhile, some things start to move from the dead point: in June 2012 two ministries of BiH – Ministry of Justice and Ministry for human rights and refugees – formed a working group that produced the draft version of the Strategy of the Transitional Justice in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2013-2016 first to the public discussion, and then for adoption by the government. While the retributive justice practices were defined by the previous documents, the new strategy proposes to focus the attention on the ‘documentation of truth’, to the mechanisms of reparation and compensation, and to the institutional reforms regarding human rights on a state level. A similar decision was taken at the same time, in June 2012, by the Kosovo government, who set up the Working group for transitional justice aimed, among other things, to sustain the dialogue among civil society and the politics on the recent past.

Conclusions

The aim of this brief article was to question the role of justice in the process of reconciliation and trust re-construction in the Western Balkans countries. Different legal and informal practices were described and explored, from ICTY as a global justice representative institution, to the governments and civil society actors, committed to the process of truth-seeking about the political violence and its victims during the Yugoslav wars 1991-2001. Of course, just certain aspects of the conflict interpretation and a few among the relevant events and cases, such as the Srebrenica genocide, were mentioned and analyzed, while others were left apart, such as the controversies about the case of the chief-commander of Kosovo Liberation Army Haradinaj, Croat Army Generals Ante Gotovina and Mladen Markač, or General of the Serbian Army, Momčilo Perišić, found not guilty by the Appeal Chamber of the ICTY. The important questions related to the politics of human rights and military intervention on international level, or war crimes prosecution on national level were also just touched upon, together with the civil society voices operating in the direction of nationalism and borders reinforcement.

For more information about prosecution of war crimes on national level see reports and articles published by the International Centre for Transitional Justice. http://ictj.org/about/transitionaljustice?gclid=CKJ535vexLYCFXHLtAodWIYATg

The Trial Chamber of the ICTY pronounced in April 2011 the indictment by which Ante Gotovina was sentenced to 24 and Mladen Markač to 18 years of imprisonment. The Appeal Chamber in November 2012 revised this sentence to non-guilty one. In February 2013, Momčilo Perišić, who was previously sentenced to 27 years of imprisonment, was also acquitted.
Nonetheless, what emerges from my research could be illustrated by the assertion of Bakšić-Muftić that, although the reconciliation does not simply follow justice, the reconstitution of civic bonds among the groups would not be possible without justice (Orentlicher 2010: 40). For these societies, involved in a decade of war conflict and more than twenty years of a political dispute about the new constellation among the nations, justice practices inevitably impose the condition of crossing the borders among states and ethno-national collectivities. The top-down intervention of the international community would never be sufficient without the civil society resources capable of creating new transversal networks among citizens and organizations, and to empower the political and social dialogue on the common past but also on the common future. The framework of the European integration process, in spite of the actual financial and political crises and enlargement fatigue of the EU, remains that core binding commitment of the governments and citizens of ‘Western Balkan’ states to establish the institutional conflict resolution disposals based on the Rule of Law and global justice covenants.

The ongoing process of ‘coming to terms with the past’ through criminal justice tools, but also through the action of the civil society and the political institutions in the former Yugoslav space, constitutes a continuum with the global institutionalization of the instruments of justice – from Nurnberg and Tokyo to the Hague. The tragic cases of genocide in Rwanda and Bosnia in the 1990s accelerated the times for the foundation of the International Crime Tribunal in 1998. It does not seem so far that the existence itself of such a Tribunal has strengthened the deterrent impact of global justice instruments, as the assiduous violations of human rights in cases like Syria or Mali has shown. The realization of a cosmopolitan legal order still remains one of the greatest challenges in the post-national constellation. (Balibar 2001; Calloni 2006; Habermas 1999a, 1999b; Held 2002).

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Films and Videos


The European Union for me is a neoliberal economic experiment. It’s a fantasy, or rather an attempt to make a fantasy real": with these words begins Mare Nostrum, a visual inquiry along the Mediterranean borders of the European Union, authored by Andrea Kunkl, Giuseppe Fanizza and me.

As a mixed team of theoreticians and practitioners in the field of border studies and representations, we moved from the concept of “imagined community,” (Anderson, 1991) and applied it to the construction of a supranational political and cultural community. The European Union is in fact a figment of the political imagination of its founding fathers. It is a fantastic and ideal – even before territorial – construction, based on the values of peace and respect of fundamental rights, and on the overcoming of divisions and conflicts between nation states through the removal of borders and the free movement of people and goods. Our research aimed to find and reveal today’s social imaginaries (Taylor, 2004) that shape (or deny) this imagined community, right in those “borderscapes” where the project of a Union as the abolition of frontiers seems further than ever away, replaced as it is by the tangible reality of barriers that rise up to defend the European “Fortress”.
We intended to analyze how citizens inhabiting border towns and regions represented their being part of a transnational political entity whose decision-making institutions are located at a great distance from them, and at the same time how they looked at neighboring non-EU countries. Thus, we selected as our fields of study: Lampedusa, a small island in the deep South of Italy, 113 km away from the Tunisian coast; Ceuta, a Spanish enclave in the African continent, overlooking the Straits of Gibraltar and surrounded by Moroccan territory; and Lesvos, a Greek island in the North-West Aegean Sea, only 5.5 km away from Turkey.

The visual research

Mare Nostrum consists of 80 video-interviews filmed in the work and life spaces of the respondents, who were asked to answer only four simple questions:

1. What does the European Union mean for you?
2. What could be in Lampedusa/Ceuta/Lesvos, in your opinion, a symbol of belonging to the European Union?
3. What could be instead a symbol of the local identity of Lampedusa/Ceuta/Lesvos?
4. What is – in your opinion – the opposite of Europe? (The opposite idea, concept, image…)

Questions were formulated as specular queries which allowed us to organize representations and imaginaries on the basis of the opposition of terms belonging to positive and negative semantic areas.

The respondents were chosen as representatives of social groups differing by income, profession, education, ethnicity, and length of residence in the inquired territory. Our questionnaire served as an “equalizer”, leading the person-on-the-street to easily express her views, while at the same time containing within strict boundaries the more cultivated opinions and representations of politicians, academic staff, experts in the field of migrations and asylum, NGO operators…

The latter frequently reacted to our questions with some kind of skepticism, due to the difficulty to transfer their knowledge and political elaboration into very open but also very personal questions. On the contrary, common people responded with ease.

One aspect not to be undervalued is the performative effect of the shooting
that, on the one side, strongly influenced the time of response, forcing respondents to be rapid and immediate. On the other side, though, we believe that it allowed the spontaneous expression of an imaginative thinking, removing most reflective filters.

**Southern borderscapes**

The territories we visited share many common features, from a geographical, socio-economic and political point of view.

**Between EU and non-EU**

First of all, they are border places located in a much greater proximity to non-EU countries than to the geographical and political center of the member states they belong to.

As said, Lampedusa finds itself closer to Tunisia than to Sicily (Italy), from which it is separated by a sea loch of 127 km. The citizens of Ceuta, when the air is clear, can see the skyline of Gibraltar in front of their headland, but far more visible to them is the Moroccan province of Tetouan across the land border. The distance between Lesvos and the closest strip of Turkish land could even be crossed by swimming.

**The cultural métissage**

The second feature shared by the three places is a past and present condition of cultural “métissage”.

Lampedusa has been for centuries a natural harbor for sailors in the Mediterranean Sea. Since the Middle Ages, travelers’ tales document the existence of a church, on which now stands the shrine of Madonna di Porto Salvo, where both Christians and Muslims were used to go and pray.

Today, when the island is a landing place for thousands of migrants and asylum seekers from Africa and Asia, in most critical circumstances the native population, which counts only 5,000 inhabitants, is doubled by that of non-islanders: foreign citizens, soldiers, NGO staff, volunteers, and journalists.

Ceuta lies where the Pillars of Hercules from ancient times were thought to stand, on the borderline which separated the world that was known from
what was unknown, the closed sea (the Mediterranean) from the open ocean (the Atlantic). It has been always seen as the door from Europe to Africa, and from Africa to Europe. Due to its peculiar location, it served as a commercial and military base for all the political powers that dominated the Mediterranean over the centuries: Carthaginians, Romans, Arabs... In the XVII century Ceuta became a Spanish possession and, since then, the enclave has remained a piece of ispanidad in African territory, which still preserves and defends its difference from the surrounding continent, while at the same time is open to various contaminations. Currently it hosts four religious communities: Christian, Muslim, Hindu and Jewish, and considers multiculturalism as its distinctive identity.

The border between Ceuta and Morocco is crossed every day by up to 30 thousand people, living in neighboring region of Tetouan and working mostly as “atypical traders” by buying various goods in Ceuta (which is a tax free zone) and selling them to the Moroccan bourgeoisie. Some of them are also employed in the construction industry, in fisheries and in the service market.

Lesvos was for centuries a disputed land between East and West: from the Byzantine age, passing through Venetian domination and the Turkish conquest. It was part of the Ottoman Empire until 1912, when it was conquered and annexed by the Greek state. The architecture and monuments of Mytilini and other towns and villages on the island preserve the memory of this domination, while its close proximity to Turkey fuels a relationship of familiarity with the other side of the sea. The same proximity explains the peculiar role that Lesvos plays in the routes of migration flows from Asia and the Middle East to the European Union. The island is used to host large groups of migrants and asylum seekers in transit towards Athens or other bigger centers, while a small but significant population of foreign citizens, from other European and non-European countries, live and work there, mainly in the field of humanitarian assistance, and in the international forces patrolling the coasts, namely Frontex - The European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders – which has at her disposal a small number of ships in the port of Mytilini.

*Migrations*

The third feature Lampedusa, Ceuta and Lesvos have in common is their being entrance doors to the European Union from other continents.
Italy, Spain and Greece are part of what Italian sociologist Enrico Pugliese called the “Mediterranean migration model” (Pugliese, 2006). They are:

– countries with a long tradition in emigration where, starting from the 70s, immigration has gradually replaced emigration;

– countries that attract foreign labor, with a significant percentage (about 50%) of female labor, in sectors other than the traditional large industry: mainly agriculture and services;

– countries that were not provided in the initial phase of rules to regulate immigration and almost at the same time, in the 90s, have produced legislation or restrictive practices to control incoming flows.

At the southern peripheries of the EU, border control takes the shape of massive physical barriers and intrusive militarization.

Lampedusa and the Southern route to Europe

In Lampedusa, the arrivals of boats crammed with migrants and asylum seekers, sadly referred to by the media as “desperate landings”, started in the 90s. It is estimated that two hundred and fifty thousand people have landed on the island of Lampedusa in the last 15 years.

In 1998 the first reception/detention center opened, which in following
years would often recurred in the news and in the reports of humanitarian organizations for its constant overcrowding, for the violation of the rights of minors and asylum seekers, and in general for its inadequacy compared to necessary reception standards.

Ten years later, in 2008, the Ministry of the Interior decided to open a new Center for Identification and Expulsion, against which the entire population mobilized, resisting the transformation of their small piece of paradise into the biggest prison of the Mediterranean.

In 2009, political agreements between Italy and Libya enforced the patrolling of the Channel of Socity, resulting in the systematic rejections of boats sailing from North Africa and in the sharp decrease of landings by sea. This situation, however, has rapidly and dramatically transformed with the “Arab Spring”, the series of revolts that took place in 2011 in all the countries of the southern side of the Mediterranean, leading to radical changes in their political assets, and to the sudden reopening of the route to Lampedusa for migrants and asylum seekers. About 50,000 people landed on the island in the first half of 2011.

These numbers must be put beside the tragic accounts of people who have died in the attempt to reach the Italian coasts. Since 1988, according to “Fortress Europe” (http://fortresseurope.blogspot.it/), the Channel of Sicily has become the grave of more than 6,000 men, women and children.

*Ceuta: the valla and the land border*
The enclave of Ceuta has an ambiguous nature, primarily due to its legal status: while being part of a Schengen member country, it is, as its sister-enclave Melilla, subjected to a special regime of border control in the transit of citizens and non-citizens to the Iberian peninsula. This measure was adopted in order to filter the influx of migrants from the African region to the EU.

On the other side, between the enclave and the surrounding territory, a fence was built starting from 1999 which did not exist before: the *valla*. Today, this barrier between Ceuta and Morocco is impressive, 6 meters high, equipped with infrared cameras, and patrolled by either side by Spanish and Moroccan military.

It was 2005 when Ceuta joined the “black list” of the most dangerous border areas, in accordance with NGOs and international organizations for human rights. Between the end of August and the beginning of October of that year, thousands of migrants reached the border after crossing the Sahara, close enough to the EU to see the land beyond the narrow stretch of sea that separated them from their goal. The temptation was too great to avoid the risk of a jump over the fence. On 29 September 2005, a mass of migrants and asylum seekers, 600 people, tried to bypass the valla, but while several hundreds of them made it, the majority was stopped and rejected by the Moroccan police in the desert. Over 100 of them were injured and some died under the shooting of the security forces of both sides, Spanish and Moroccan.

Today’s figures show a drastic decrease of attempts to enter through the borders of the two enclaves, perhaps because of these tragic cases, and certainly for the transformation of migration routes caused by Spanish migration policy, less and less inclined to let foreigners who entered illegally pass on the peninsula.

Irregular migrants and asylum seekers who cannot leave the enclave are hosted at the Centro de Estancia Temporal (CETI), where they live in a limbo of suspension, in a “soft prison”: they cannot get out of the enclave, unless they accept to be repatriated, neither they can work or build a future in the new country they live in.

In addition, readmission agreements between Spain and Morocco are in force which – according to what is reported by observers and activists for human rights (Médecins Sans Frontières, 2006) – allow the EU country (representing itself as progressive and democratic) to transfer on a third country the “dirty work” of deporting migrants and asylum seekers in the desert.
Lesvos and the issue of asylum seekers

When, in the 90s, migration flows towards Greece got stronger, with a significant increase of undocumented accesses, Lesvos became one of the first landing places for migrants and asylum seekers sailing from the Turkish coast. Today the routes to Greece depart from Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, the Middle East, and from Africa as well.

The Pagani detention center, in the town of Mytilini, was designed for 300 people, but has housed at times up to thousand migrants, in conditions well under the standards of human rights respect. In September 2009, 160 under-age refugees were detained in a single room, sharing the same toilet. They started a hunger strike demanding immediate freedom, and in October 2009 the government announced the closure of the camp, which is today only used as a place of transit.

In the same year, Lesvos hosted the No Border Camp, attracting activists from all over Europe. They denounced the violation of international convention on the non-refoulement for asylum seekers (Geneva Convention) committed by the ships of the European Agency for the control of external borders (Frontex) patrolling the stretch of sea that separates Lesvos from Turkey.

The serious deficiencies of the Greek policies for asylum have been reported
several times by Amnesty International and the High Commissioner for Refugees of the United Nations (UNHCR), who called on EU countries not to transfer asylum seekers to Greece, due to the risk of violations of their fundamental rights. Indeed, the percentage of recognition of asylum application is today close to 0.5%.

**Polysemy and multiplicity of the border**

The outer border takes different shapes in the three places we have analyzed: the form of a super high guarded fence in Ceuta, and the punctiform shape of military ships and bases in Lampedusa and Lesbos.

In the lives of people who inhabit these frontier communities, however, the border is represented as polysemic and multiple, a “border of borders”, which organizes diversities in “concentric circles”: there is the dividing line between EU and transnational third countries, there is the national (Italian, Spanish, Greek) border, and there are ethnic and religious divisions within the community (immaterial boundaries) (Castan Pinos, 2008).

In Ceuta this pattern is mirrored almost perfectly by spatial topographies:

a) the valla, whose construction was 75% financed by the EU, is in Ceuta the most obvious symbol of the popular metaphor of “Fortress Europe”, the hard border;

b) of a soft, permeable, porous border you can talk instead referring to the relations the inhabitants have with their neighbors from the region of Tetouan. Cross-border work and “atypical” trade (the purchase of European goods in the enclave to be sold to the Moroccan middle class) show the constant exchange, supported by mutual economic benefit, which binds the people who live on both sides of the border (Serughetti, 2010).

c) internal divisions, especially between the Christian and Muslim, are spatially organized through the establishment of residential areas: Muslim districts and Christian quarters. Another inner boundary is what separates irregular migrants and asylum seekers housed in the CETI from the rest of the population.

We find the same internal division in Lampedusa and Lesbos. As long as the reception center in Lampedusa and the Pagani Camp of Lesbos have been in full swing, these small island communities have been crossed by a material and symbolic high-impact walls, behind which hundreds or thousands of migrants and asylum seekers were detained.
Even the distinction between a national and a transnational border is adequate to the two Mediterranean islands of our visual inquiry, albeit in a less immediately visible way, if compared to Ceuta. On the one hand, we have the hard border of the Schengen area, highly patrolled and militarized. On the other hand, the soft, porous sea border which, as far as Lampedusa is concerned, allows the continuous encroachment of vessels from Italian to Tunisian national waters and vice versa, as well as, in Lesvos, allows trade, tourism and cultural exchanges between Greece and Turkey.

**Flexible borders and isolated borderlands**

In addition to these concentric circles, we should consider the “eversion” of the border due to its “flexibility” (Mezzadra, 2004), that is the outsourcing of border controls through bilateral agreements (in exchange with economic aid) made by the three EU member states – Italy, Spain and Greece – with neighboring third countries from which come the greatest flows of migrants.

Turning the gaze from outward to inward, toward the inner space of the EU and the political centers of their respective nation-states, Lampedusa, Ceuta and Lesvos appear further confined to a geographical condition of isolation.

It is Lampedusa’s geographical destiny to lie at great distance from Italian peninsula, but its isolated position is further accentuated by the sense of being abandoned by the State and by regional as well as supranational institutions.

In Lesvos, but in Lampedusa as well, the feeling of isolation is exacerbated by the economic crisis.

Ceuta, despite being separated by a narrow strait from the Iberian Peninsula, is the place among the three in which the fear of isolation, of a loss of identity and political sovereignty is stronger, fueled as it is by the secular ambitions of Morocco to annex the Spanish enclave to its territory, and by the internal growth of the Muslim population.

**Border imaginaries**

Considering the geographic, political, social and cultural backgrounds described so far, which share many common features but differ in some important respects, it is no wonder that the responses to our queries resulted as partly similar and partly very different from each other. Social representations are indeed the
result of a complex of historical, physical, cultural factors.

In Ceuta, imaginaries related to the European Union are mostly sustained by positive concepts as protection, security, development. This is how two adult members of the white, Christian community of Ceuta express it:

“The contribution by the European Union is crucial for us. Dwelling on the border, the security that gives us to belong to a so important political entity is a priority. In fact, if we’d stop to be part of the European Union we could fear threats to our city. So, for us this membership is very important, we feel more secure.”

This is perhaps not coincidence, since in the last decades the Spanish enclave has received substantial funding from the European Regional Development Fund. On the contrary, in Lesvos and Lampedusa the EU is often represented for its negative impact on the issue of human rights for migrants and refugees.

Lesvos, Salinia.

As Salinia, young woman of Lesvos, puts it: “The European Union in a good sense doesn’t mean anything to me, but in a bad sense it means a lot to me. It means injustice, it means borders for some people and not for others, not for money, not for trade. So in a positive sense I don’t have any connection with the idea of Europe, but in a bad sense I have a lot”. And she continues: “I think what is most symbolic in Lesvos, as a symbol of the European Union, is the detention center for undocumented migrants, and also the presence of Frontex, since they constitute the main institutions of the European migration policy and migration control”.

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Especially in Lampedusa, the EU is also criticized for its absence on aspects of economic and social wellbeing. When we asked “What could be in Lampedusa, in your opinion, a symbol of belonging to the European Union?”, an old sailor, Peppe, answered this way: “I guess it’s only the flags, the flags that fly in front of the town hall”. Finally, we have heard the voices of people who live at the margins of the margin. They are migrants and asylum seekers who are neither in nor out, who have crossed the border full of hope, believing in the “European dream”, and now find themselves forced to immobility, uncertainty and lack of resources in some detention or reception center in the Mediterranean sea.

“When I lived in India, I could see Europe on television but I didn’t know exactly… [...] I imagined to find in Europe a good job and a good life. But I haven’t yet managed to enter Europe”, says Raj, an Indian migrant forced to immobility in Ceuta.

As Navid Kermani, German writer of Iranian origin, wrote “who loves Europe is who cannot have it” (Kermani, 2006).

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STUDENTS' CONTRIBUTIONS

IV.
WOMEN’S RIGHTS AND MULTICULTURALISM
Long, cherry blonde hair cascades down Venus’s back as her blue eyes stare wistfully past the viewer. Pearly white skin appears illuminated by divine favor, gloriously exposed for all to see. Though Venus draws our first glance, we soon notice a woman running to cover her indecently exposed figure. In Botticelli’s famous painting, one can see a familiar iconic dichotomy, or border, between different types of womanhood begin to form. This iconic dichotomy is one that defined the ideal woman in Renaissance Italy and continues to influence portrayals of western women today. The great Renaissance artists’ treatment of women was intentional and specific: while women were meant to be perfectly beautiful and sexualized, they also were expected to be chaste, modest angels. Dante falls in love with his Beatrice in La Vita Nuova instantly upon seeing her, because she is angelic and forever untouchable. The beauty he describes, and the beauty Botticelli envisions, are representative of the Renaissance ideal of beauty for the same reason: the beauty of Beatrice and the beauty of Venus are not the beauties of a real woman. They have marble skin with no imperfections, perfect dainty features and figures, and represent the two opposing sides of how women were expected to act.

This study of Renaissance ideal causes one to question, how much has changed? Women certainly have many more rights and opportunities than they used to in Italy. But one thing has not changed: the way that popular culture treats the image of femininity. To effectively move forward as a global community, we must identify why this problem persists and what can be done about it; without willingness to identify the problem there will be no means with which to successfully combat it. Italian feminism is key to understanding how Italian women see themselves in the contemporary Italian culture.

In the documentary Il Corpo delle Donne, Lorella Zanardo presents the horror of what women do to themselves in order to be considered beautiful. It is a process that we as females undertake solely to appeal to men, and this forces women to mask who they are and stifle their inner self. Plastic surgery is the modern day “marble skin” of Venus; it is a way to hide what makes the female
form most vulnerable. The face is what allows a human to empathize another human; it reveals an essential part of who we are. When women seek to cover this with venom injected under their skin, and surgery meant to conceal the effects of time, they mask their hearts and minds in order to conform to an impossible ideal. Women aren’t allowed to be beautiful and natural; they constantly face the artificial ideal of what they must be in order to have success in the western world. The film ends with a horrifying question: “The survival of our identity is at stake. Why don’t we do something about it?”

Economically, Italy continues to struggle with the relationship between the sexes, currently ranking 74th out of 134 countries in the World Economics Forum’s Global Gender Gap Report 2010. They are ranked below not only all of Western Europe, but also behind non-western nations such as China, Venezuela, and Ghana. There has been recent outrage at the treatment of women under the former Berlusconi government, in which women were marginalized and sexualized in popular programming (run by the Berlusconi empire), and in his scandals with prostitutes and female government appointees.

This is no small problem: half of Italy’s women are unemployed, despite being more educated and skilled than their male counterparts (Wallis, 2008). It would appear that, even with the enormous strides that women have made in the modern world, some are still being held back by ancient stereotypes and prejudices. Italy is the best location in which to understand the conflict between the modern woman and the acceptable woman, for the feminist movement is strong and vibrant but patriarchy is noticeably present.

In the words of previous European Affairs Minister Emma Bonino, “It is important that women understand what is happening to them, and take the strength publicly to say it is unacceptable” (Wallis 2008).

I went to Milan expecting my ideas to be generally reinforced, even to confirm that my theories were on point and my study was on the right track. Instead of being confronted with the expected academic theory, my interviews came to consist of listening to stories of women’s lives. I heard stories across borders that described pain, love, a journey for acceptance, and a struggle for identity in the contemporary west.

This forced me to reconsider why I was studying feminism in the first place: was I searching for ways to prove my own ideas about patriarchy, imagery, and oppression, or was I on a journey to discover what is unique about the female identity?
One key to understanding how women react to the cultural pressure around them lies in studying a society’s relevant feminist movements. Feminism in Italy has traditionally had a left wing connotation and has been very politically involved; however, issues of media representation have become salient much more recently, personified in the Italian feminist movement “Se Non Ora Quando.” The feminism of the seventies identified strongly with what Americans associate with our own second wave, yet had its own philosophically independent motivation (Se Non Ora Quando, Interview). Italian feminism is specifically the feminism of difference; it is a feminism that moves toward a goal of equality under the law and equality of rights, but acknowledges strong disparities between the sexes that are said to be biologically based (Se Non Ora Quando, Interview). Issues of representation had to come after Italian women had secured the right to divorce and the right to an abortion under their country’s legal system.

The more I learned from women in Turin, Milan, and Rome, the more I realized that Italian feminism is about reclaiming true womanhood, not solely about overcoming historical and institutional barriers to success and participation. The experience affected my academic work strongly; I now focus on the positive societies of women that have banded together for decades, forcing out the cultural stereotype of Venus-like beauty or succumbing to artistic tropes such as the virgin/whore dichotomy well known to feminism. Instead of focusing on the preeminence of the male in cultural representative history, these societies of women have supported each other and reinforced a positive self-image in response to negative pressure from the modern media.

Another extremely important lesson I learned, and one that will inform all future research projects, is the necessity of seeing particular cultural movements through the eyes of those that live them. I assumed that Western feminism followed the same trends and had the same goals across Western Culture, but my research exposed that not even Italian feminism is ideologically unified. Each feminist group I interviewed had different political and social goals, and consequently different reasons for seeking each goal. What they shared was a common interest in giving women a voice, which came to be the central pillar of my research. I had preconceived that feminism across borders had to have the same ideological formation to be relevant; I discovered something quite different.

Italian feminism taught me the great importance of giving a culturally marginalized group the chance to speak for itself and, just as crucially, a forum to be heard. The women’s collectives I spoke with were sources of independent
publishing, forums for discussion, and a means for political involvement. They provided the access point for women of all different kinds of backgrounds to speak their story. The importance of active listening and debate was paramount to the success of each organization.

Speech and the validation of specifically female speech are common themes that run throughout Italian feminist theory, which serve to contradict the prevalent iconographic (and by definition, mute) woman. There is a problem of articulation, for as Marina Mizzau argues, “But the word through which the woman, long relegated to silence, begins to express herself cannot always or immediately be articulated in a full, direct way. This word is often oblique; what is not said leaks into what is said; what is said is only the pretext, the symptom of a just but confused claim which has not yet found a way of articulating itself coherently” (Kemp and Bono, 66). The speech of “woman” (as a biological category) is still arguably a non-essential fact, but my research has led me to understand that Italian feminism is comfortable working within both essentialist and constructivist paradigms. There is an unwillingness to completely ignore the female essence in itself, evidenced by Marina Camboni when she argues, “To be unconscious means to allow words an inner experience, to strip them of the acquired authority of their social significance... It also means to cultivate the silence which surrounds and nurtures words, the very silence out of which a woman’s life might surface” (Kemp and Bono, 86). Thus, the consciousness of being female and one’s constructed femininity is only part of the picture; a woman’s life is still something of an essence.

Simone de Beauvoir wrote in The Second Sex, a work highly influential in Italy, “One is not born, but rather becomes, a woman” (de Beauvoir, 1989: x). This too identifies the dialectical tension present in Italian feminism. Is one born a woman, or does one become a woman? To deny that one is born a woman denies any specificity to the female form and experience, but to deny that one becomes a woman is to deny the cultural factors at play that undoubtedly shape what femininity is. I approached this research leaning heavily towards the idea that one becomes a woman, and believed that allowing the essentialist argument to creep in would reinforce stereotypes created by a patriarchal society. My focus on the media was a way for me to prove this; I sought to look at images of femininity and figure out how they are mirrored in the real world. This feminism was comfortable and familiar to me as an American.

As aforementioned, it was not until I crossed borders, until I looked at fem-
inism through the eyes of Italian women, that I realized my ideas were much less sound than I believed them to be. While Italian feminist theories and practices are just as widely variant as in the States, there is a much stronger emphasis on understanding womanhood in itself, or rather, what it means to be born a woman. Imagery plays a part in this, but imagery is only one part of the argument. There exists a vast array of ideologies underneath the umbrella of the mass media, and its infiltration into the Italian female psyche is obviously not consistent. However, Italian feminist groups were the most interesting cultural manifestation of this defiance against patriarchal norms. In Italy, one can find a feminist outpost in every major town, and several in the larger cities. Cultural events are put on all the time, and Italian women regularly attend these events. Coming from a territory as vast as the United States, this group cohesion was truly amazing for my research. The emphasis that these groups put on learning and teaching others allowed me invaluable insight into the world of feminism in various cities, and gave me the opportunity to gain insight into what drove women into feminist organization in the first place.

I was very privileged to be able to interview Lorella Zanardo, the creator and director of Il Corpo delle Donne, one of the documentaries that originally inspired my research. Though Zanardo does not necessarily identify herself as feminist, she gave extremely interesting insights into women’s lives in Italy and acknowledged her work’s feminist bend. As a former Milanese businesswoman, her life story was also relevant to understand in the context of her work. She had achieved all of the accolades that a “modern woman” could hope for; she was quickly advancing at Unilever, was making a good income, and was powerful on her own. The reason she left a stable income, increasing prestige, and respectable job is almost as indicative of a human condition in the west as it is of western women: her passion was not in her work. What she saw in the streets is what bothered her; what she saw in the media bothered her (Lorella Zanardo, Interview). Zanardo is an amazing example of a woman who felt that her voice needed to be heard, and stuck to that instinct. That passion to share her voice is something that everyone can learn from and something that Italian feminism has espoused all along. What gives individuals power and strength is being heard, and unless they speak up, nobody will listen to them.

I now have the context from which to spring forward into the newest third wave era of Italian feminism, and the border-crossing experience has been unparalleled in my research experience. In compiling stories of strong women,
I am able to understand the people behind the feminist movement instead of merely studying theory. Most of all, I have learned that crossing borders is absolutely essential to reexamining one’s own ideas and contextualizing inter-cultural experience. I hope that through my work, I can be one more advocate for these women, fighting to get their voices heard in my own culture.

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The act of crossing a border can take many forms, such as a person physically leaving one legally bound state for another, the renegotiation of a border between two states, or even the exchange of ideas between people of different geographic locations. The case of John Stuart Mill and Anna Maria Mozzoni is one such exchange. John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) and Anna Maria Mozzoni (1837-1920) were practically contemporaries of each other. However they were writing from very different circumstances: John Stuart Mill was a politician and philosopher in Victorian England, who had a career that expanded from clerk work with the East India Company to being an elected member of Parliament, starting in 1865 (Bourne, 1873: 20). In contrast, Anna Maria Mozzoni was born to a middle class family in Milan, at a time when Italy was not yet unified. She subsequently lived through the period of Italian unification, the Risorgimento (1815-1861). Mozzoni was an ardent feminist with “intellectual roots in the French utopianism” (Dawes, 2011: 488). Although producing many of her own writings, Mozzoni is notable for being the first to translate John Stuart Mill’s Subjection of Women (1861) into Italian, as La Servitu’ delle Donne in 1870. Through an analysis of Mozzoni’s introduction to the translated work, it can be proven that Mozzoni used John Stuart Mill as a way to legitimize her own feminist views and ideas for women’s equality in Italy. Mozzoni used her fruitful interaction with John Stuart Mill as an attempt for increased political traction of her ideas.

The issue of increasing suffrage, especially women’s was very important to John Stuart Mill. Fred Wilson even argues that “among the things for which Mill campaigned most strongly were women’s rights, women’s suffrage, and equal access to education for women” (Wilson, 2012: 14). Mill was elected to the House of Commons in 1865 as a candidate for Westminster (Bourne, 1873: 20). During this time, he supported Mr. Disreli’s Reform Bill of 1867, which extended the right to vote to all householders in the boroughs as well as lodgers who paid rent of 10 pounds a year or more and reduced the property threshold in the counties and gave the vote to agricultural landowners and tenants with
very small amounts of land ("Reform Act of 1867", 2012). Mill even “criticized and helped to alter in committee” some of the clauses of this important suffrage bill” (Bourne, 1873: 23). Even more relevant to the discussion at hand, he even moved for an amendment, which would have given women the right to vote. Unfortunately, this movement failed. However, it is significant to note, that even before Mill wrote his Subjection of Women, he was a very active practical and political advocate for the rights and position of women in England. This practical and active form of advocacy would find a parallel in the works of Anna Maria Mozzoni.

A brief summary of a few of the main arguments of John Stuart Mill’s Subjection of Women will help to illustrate the important cross-border connection of Mill and Mozzoni. Mill starts by arguing against the tyranny of the popular opinion: “I do not therefore quarrel with them for having too little faith in argument, but for having too much faith in custom and the general feeling” (Mill, 1869: 430). He also compares the legal and social subjection as women to other practices based on tradition that were considered to be wrong in his day, such as slavery and absolute monarchy. John Stuart Mill emphasizes the importance of women’s education; the current education practices of women condition women to believe that “being attractive to men” is their main goal (Mill, 1869: 444). There are many other compelling arguments to John Stuart Mill’s essay, however the key issues of education and women’s suffrage were particularly important to Anna Maria Mozzoni and her similar work in Italy.

Anna Maria Mozzoni was particularly active during the Italian Risorgimento movement or the movement to unite Italy. It has historically been divided into two phases. The first phase of the Risorgimento can be categorized as “idealistic, romantic, and revolutionary” (Chastain). A key figure of the early revolutionary sentiment was Giuseppe Mazzini (1805-1872), who founded the national group, Young Italy, in 1831. It aimed to unite Italy under one flag and government, however there was disagreement on the best process to employ. Disputes arose as to whether unified Italy should be a confederation or centralized and a republic or a monarchy. The inability of the revolutionaries to find agreement resulted in the failure of revolutions that occurred in 1848-49. There was no cohesive common army, preliminary constitution, or most importantly, a united front to present to their common enemy: the Austrian army. Mozzoni was significant because she believed from as early as the 1860s that Mozzoni’s writings advocated for “a parallel development between national independence
for Italy and the political, civil, social emancipation of women” (“Anna Maria Mozzoni”, 2008). Mozzoni even published the first works on Italian feminism, prior to the publication of John Stuart Mill’s essay. Her first work, “La donna e i suoi rapporti sociali” or “The woman and her social relations” was published in 1864. Another Italian publication preceded even Mozzoni: the Neapolitan politician, Salvatore Morelli and his La donna e la scienza, which was published in 1861 (Dawes, 2011: 488). Mozzoni’s work prior to John Stuart Mill was noteworthy, but by translating Mill’s text, she gained legitimacy for her Italian feminist movement, by linking it to the international feminist struggle, such as the one in England.

Anna Maria Mozzoni illustrates in her preface her desire to legitimize and internationalize her own women’s rights movement and use this affirmation to put her theoretical ideas into practice in Italy. An analysis of Mozzoni’s preface from 1870 will demonstrate this.¹ Mozzoni opens with declaring the merits of Mill’s essay, Subjection of Women. She describes its as “released from an authoritative pen, strong from an compelling argument, fitting, based on unshakable principles and universally accepted” (Mozzoni, 1926: 1). Mozzoni’s pronouncement of the merits of John Stuart Mill is both a confirmation of Mill’s own ideas and also serves to underscore her own position on women’s rights in Italy. An interesting facet of the crossed border sharing of ideas between Mozzoni and Mill is that for Mozzoni in particular, to support the women’s movement as an international endeavor, it serves very real practical purposes in her attempts to influence policy in her particular nation, Italy.

Mozzoni frequently emphasizes the practical nature of both her and Mill’s theory of women’s rights. This is seen very early on in Mozzoni’s preface, as she directly writes, “pushing the principle to the end of its theoretical deductions, and addressing until the last of its practical applications, such is its exercise, which claim all the vigor of the thinker and the skill of a diplomat” (Mozzoni, 1926: 1). Here, Mozzoni purposefully and explicitly states the need for there to be a very real and political application of the ideas of gender equality. This practical approach is continued in Mozzoni’s preface with specific calls to action of different groups in her current Italian society.

The groups, which she addresses, are women, men, religious ministers, physiologists, the general association of Attorneys, and the representative Camera. For every single one she has specific instructions and actions, which she

¹ The translation Anna Maria Mozzoni’s preface from Italian to English is my own.
believes they should take as a result of Mill’s essay. Mozzoni demands for women to be “increasingly diligent and enlightened about their interests, and not comprising on having as they may have, to claim their rights” (Mozzoni, 1926: 1). Her message for men is similar: she addresses it to the men, “in which the prejudice of the inability of women based on the strength of custom and on the inertia of the mind, rather than personal selfishness and passion of the body” (Mozzoni, 1926: 1). This reveals that Mozzoni draws a distinction between types of men: those who intentionally enslave women through their own egoism, and those who merely haven’t had the means to break out of their own prejudices. Her address of religious ministers is particular interesting. Mozzoni has been labeled as an activist of secular feminism, as opposed to a parallel movement for Catholic feminism (Dawes, 2011: 488). However, even with her classification as secular, Mozzoni is so strong of an advocate for women’s rights, she is willing to include any group that might be willing to support her cause. It is in her treatment of representative bodies in Italy that Mozzoni and the idea of praxis is most relevant.

Her inclusion in her preface of the general association of Attorneys and the representative Camera are demonstrative of her promotion for real legal reform, similar to the ideas of Mill, is seen. Mozzoni demanded for the general association of Attorneys to reach “an enlightened opinion” while “studying the reforms to be applied to the law” (Mozzoni, 1926: 2). She even accuses the representative Camera for failing to “to have presented more of a document relating to this thesis, and preferred to give up” (Mozzoni, 1926: 2). Mozzoni’s attempts at legal reform and politically changing the status of women are articulated first in this preface. Mozzoni personally demonstrated the use of the cross-border theoretical treatises when she later, along with the Neapolitan politician, Salvatore Morelli, introduced a petition to parliament in 1877 regarding women’s suffrage. An interesting comparison, Italy did not even have universal male suffrage until 1912 and the issue of women’s rights did not gain widespread traction until the feminist movement in Italy of the 1890s (“Anna Maria Mozzoni, 2008). Mozzoni and her writings are inherently practical, similar to the legal and practical aspect of Mil’s work.

Mozzoni intentionally makes her women’s rights claims international and cosmopolitan in nature. In her preface, which is already drawing together two geographically diverse locations, England and Italy, also makes specific references to policies and feminist movements in other countries; “Oh, think in Italy
that in America, in France, in Switzerland, in Sweden, in Catholic Belgium, in belligerent Prussia, and finally in autocratic Russia, women are finding justice, and in Italy only, the opinion has dried up, progress has stopped” (Mozzoni, 1926: 2). Here, her use of adjectives serves to convey that the norm of women’s rights is cosmopolitan in nature. This is achieved by using words that would intuitively not be associated with equality of human rights, such as “Catholic”, “belligerent”, and strongest of all, “autocratic”. Mozzoni is showing that the international nature of the women movement can be applied anywhere, even the fledging democracy of Italy in 1870. This cosmopolitan aspect is even further emphasized at the end of the preface. Mozzoni draws parallels between the movement for women’s rights and the fall of autocracies “across the European terrain” and ends with the message to prepare for all of mankind “another history and a better future” (Mozzoni, 1926, 3). It is apparent that Mozzoni believes that the issue of women’s rights is one that does not have borders, but is necessary for all people in all lands to progress.

An important aspect of crossing borders goes beyond the physical; ideas can develop a cosmopolitan nature, uniting people who are separated by physical borders. One example of ideas transcending borders is the case of John Stuart Mill and Anna Maria Mozzoni on the issue of women’s rights. John Stuart Mill’s famous essay, Subjection of Women, was published in 1869 and geared towards the practical obstacles that were currently preventing women’s equality with men: mainly, women’s suffrage and education. As a member of Parliament, John Stuart Mill not only wrote on this topic, he also attempted to put his principles regarding women’s rights into practice. Anna Maria Mozzoni found much in John Stuart Mill’s essay that resonated with her and her attempts at reform in Italy. As a result, she published the first Italian translation of Mill’s Subjection of Women, in 1870. Mozzoni, like Mill, fought for women’s rights to gain traction in the political realm by introducing a petition to parliament as early as 1877. In her preface, she purposefully draws connections between Italy and England’s plight and their mutual need for improvement in women’s human rights. She also invokes a number of other states and their treatment of women, in order to present it as an international issue based upon cosmopolitan norms of human rights. Mozzoni would probably not have been terribly surprised to find today that cosmopolitan norms of human rights are an important force in today’s rhetoric and policies. After all, she made similar claims towards the end of the nineteenth century.
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In September 2011 a Moroccan citizen, Ghalfi El Mohammed, attempted to rape a twenty-one year old girl in Alassio, Italy. He was immediately arrested. The girl’s parents, owners of a café in the city center, decided to hang on the door a poster that said “Entrance forbidden to Moroccans”. The mother explained: “From today all non-EU immigrants who enter my café are to be chased away. The place is mine and I decide what to do.” (La Repubblica, 7.09.2011)

This is not just a news item, nor is it only a story of ordinary racism. Since the beginning of large-scale immigration, in the middle of the nineties, Italian media has portrayed immigrants as potential criminals. Immigration immediately became a security issue. Transnational migration flows are described with terms like “invasion”, “penetration”, “exodus”. Politicians and institutions make use of the same securitarian rhetoric. Scholars have studied the identification process of the immigrant with the enemy: the exclusionary claim that opposes “us” against “them”, national family against alien group, and the unity of traditions and culture against diversity of newcomers (Aime, 2004; Dal Lago, 1999; Ferrajoli, 2010). Nevertheless, the relationship between immigration and security does not only hide the social construction of fear in front of the Other. In fact, there are at least two other features of this relationship that should be considered: a) immigrants are very often depicted not as generic criminals but as sexual criminals, and b) the social alarm has very precise spatial collocation.

As emerges from the National Research on Immigration and Asylum in Italian Media, immigrants appear in the news much more often than Italians when responsible of crimes against the person, in particular sexual violence (24.1% against 7.2%). Italian media offers a gender-oriented portrait of the immigrant: he is a man (80%), almost always a criminal, with only one personal detail – his geographic origin. Intended victims of immigrant’s crimes are, of course, women, but are not always limited to females. The same research has highlighted that the most frequent words associated with “security” and “illegal immigrants” are: “Italy”, “city” and “woman”. Aliens represent danger both to women and to national territory. Their “penetration” violates a land and a woman. Or rather it violates land as a woman. The identification between territory and the female
body represents one of the deepest theoretical assumptions of Italy’s social and geographical organization. In order to understand the securitarian reaction in front of large-scale immigration, it is then useful to concentrate on the sense of territory, which is strongly tied up to identity, culture and political power.

Let’s go back to the story. The author of the crime is described by his geographical origin, in contrast to the victim, described by her age: hence, the nationality of the criminal appears to be a significant piece of information in an attempted rape’s report. The journalist’s presentation of the facts apparently confirms the link between immigration and sex crimes. Moreover, the parents’ reaction shows the alarm’s spatial relevance: once the criminal is arrested, they decide to close their café’s doors to all Moroccans. They do not decide to protect their daughter, to accompany her when she goes out, to defend her in Court against her assailant. They decide instead to lock up their café, their place. The risk of the girl’s sexual violation immediately recalls the risk of the place’s physical violation, as if the girl and the place where almost the same thing. This example may help to understand the relevance of geographical meanings and definitions in contemporary societies: how people consider and relate to spaces and places, to lands and territories, connotes both individual attitudes and community policies.

**Space, place and gender**

Humanistic geography studies space and place through their relationship with the human existence. Though it is common to presume that geometrical space is the objective reality, in fact such interpretation of spatial elements appears only during the 16th century as a “sophisticated human construct” (Tuan, 1974b: 389). In this cultural framework, space is a geometrical abstraction that can be understood by means of quantifiable data and the language of mathematics. The same word “space” comes from the greek stadíon: for ancient Greeks, the stadium was the unit of measure for distance, therefore it meant literally a standard metric linear interval. Inside space’s realm all parts are equivalent and subject to the same abstract rule, that is the scale. Indeed it is from the 16th century that the scale appears systematically in maps, erasing all qualitative difference from the world’s surface (Farinelli, 2003: 11).

Before the birth of well-ordered, geometrical space, the earth was considered as an aggregate of places. The concept of place has then coexisted with, and
resisted against, the geography of space. Place is a unique entity, “a reality to be clarified and understood from the perspective of the people who have given it meaning” (Tuan, 1974b: 387).

There is little abstraction in places: human beings establish places in physical settings through emotions, memories and networks of interpersonal relationships. Places are “fields of care”: they can be known only from within (Tuan, 1974b: 416). The place’s meanings influence both people’s identity and the complexity of social relations (Massey and Jess, 1995: 66-67). Identity is defined in competition and in conflict with others: the place’s loss by means of exile or invasion, but even the simple threat of loss, awakes people’s sense of place and induces their defensive reaction. Every place is a small world (Tuan, 1974b: 421), unique and irreplaceable, seat of security and stability, autonomous from any other. People actively build places by imagination and practices. Such protective practices aim at keeping out strangers who “do not belong”: stability is connected to enclosure and to the sense of home (Massey and Jess, 1995: 36-38).

Feminists have criticized the idea of place as stable and fixed, as such notion is implicitly related to the unequal gender construction in Western societies (Massey and Jess, 1995; Wilson, 1991). Thinking of the place as home, as peaceful and relaxing, is a gendered description, inasmuch for many women the house is not the place of rest but of work. The feminist theorist Michèle Barrett (1980) sustains that the social organization of the house is the principal instrument of women’s oppression. Therefore, the disposition to characterize place as home is in itself a male attitude. Already in ancient Greece domestic space – closed and protected by a roof – has a female connotation, whereas the external space has a male connotation. Women’s realm is at home, while men represent the centrifugal element of the oîkos. Such gendered division of space is mirrored by the divine couple of Hestia-Hermes: goddess Hestia inhabits the house and protects the fireplace – the center of domestic space –, she is a symbol of fixity and permanence. On the contrary, Hermes is the god of messages, he is always outside: Hermes represents movement, openness, change (Vernant, 1965: 147-156).

Massey (1995) shows that the “place as home” is generally connoted in female terms and precisely as a Mother/Woman, that is something fixed and immutable to which people may always return. Thus both women’s mobility and
the possibility for a place to change are denied.¹ Such geography of power ties women to a place in order to keep them under control: women are banished into the private sphere of the house, while men are free to enter into the public sphere. In this dichotomy Young (1989) grounds the ideal of universal citizenship: modern political thought opposes the universality of the public realm of citizenship to the particularity of private interest, and this opposition corresponds to those between reason and passion, masculine and feminine. Hence the condition of possibility of the public realm is the exclusion of women, who lack the rationality required for good citizens. Generality rests on manly virtue, so women have to remain in the private realm of the family “as the place to which emotion, sentiment and bodily needs must be confined” (Young, 1989: 254).

It is then clear that geographic meanings and social meanings are tightly connected to one another. The tension between space – as universal abstract norm – and place – as the unique realm of memories and emotions – corresponds to the political tension between public and private, as well as to the social tension between men and women.

The supremacy of space: the woman under the map

Cartographic projection uses a mathematical rule to determine the exact correspondence between a point on the map and a one and only point on the world’s sphere. In fact, this operation transforms a three-dimensional entity in a two-dimensional one: in drawing a map human beings subtract one dimension from the earth. The first map collection was printed in Rome in 1570 by Antonio Lafreri (Farinelli, 2003: 11). Before the appearance of the atlas, travelers and sailors consulted special books called isolari (from the Latin insula, “island”) where the world was decomposed in a variety of islands, which are all contained in the ocean. Each island has its own measure and they are in proportion to one another: the spherical world of ocean and islands is a world of places, where space does not exist. Space is a normative standard based on Euclidean geometrical properties, that is continuity, homogeneity and isotropism: such properties belong specifically to cartographic representation (Farinelli, 2003: 13). Maps are fundamental instruments of modern times: they allow a faster circulation of

¹ It is not a coincidence that in the 19th century the only women who could escape from social conventions were the so called “travelers” (Massey and Jess, 1995: 54-55). Of course most of them belonged to the upper class but there are also examples of lower status women who freed themselves by traveling, such as the socialist writer and activist Flora Tristan.
people and goods through the ideal transformation of roads into straight lines and of journeys into routes. In the realm of space the map replaces the world: what is represented on the atlas is the only truth. That’s why Christopher Columbus, the first modern traveler, believed he had arrived in India: because that is what was written on his map.

In modern Europe space dominates the earth and places disappear from the normative set-up of the world’s representation. What I wish to suggest is that the supremacy of space in geographic narratives corresponds to the supremacy of men in modern social and political organization. As we have already seen, place is generally connoted as feminine: places are like the fireplaces of Hestia, they represent the private domestic environment, where emotions and passions have to be confined. Nevertheless places are not necessarily related to the private sphere of the family: the symbolic representation of the place-as-home constitutes the expression of European modern societies’ hierarchical organization. If the universal norms on which the political order is grounded are set up by men, women have to be excluded as they per definitionem differ from the norm. As much as the geometrical standard of space expels places from geographic representation, the male standard of general public reason expels women from the political realm.

The supremacy of space, far from being the natural development of geography, arises from an act of violence. Farinelli (2003) recognizes in the story of Ulysses and Polypheme the mythical narration of the place’s defeat: to free himself and his companions, Ulysses decides to attack the Cyclops when he is sleeping. The Greek hero orders to rub down an olive log and to sharpen one of its ends, so that they could use it to blind Polypheme. Ulysses and five other men dispose themselves in regular intervals along the log: in this way they form a living scale, that is the archetype of the metrical scale used in cartographic projections. Then they plunge the log, previously heated on the fire, into the only eye of the Cyclops – an eye that is spherical as the earth – and they burn it to the root. When Ulysses burns Polypheme’s eye, he erases all sort of depth: what was once a globe has become a flat surface, that is a map. Through the scale’s invention, the Greeks have constrained the earth into the two-dimen-

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2 It should be noticed that the word “norm” comes from the Latin norma, the set square used to measure right angles. According to Farinelli (2003), the same word in Greek, nomos, originally meant “the first unit of measure from which all measurement derive” (Farinelli, 2003: 160). Already at a lexical level, political meanings are related to geographical meanings: the rule of geometrical space corresponds to universal political norms.
sional form of the map: once Ulysses blinds the Cyclops, he has created space (Farinelli, 2003: 4-5).

What is important to notice, though, is that the establishment of space’s power over place is a violent act which has a sexual connotation: the penetration of the pointed log in the Cyclops’ eyeball symbolizes males’ sexual domination over females. The vertical, hierarchical rule of space dominates the spherical earth: in this geography of power men control women as much as the map controls the world through the meridian and parallel grid lines.

There is a significant artistic tradition in modern Europe that represents the land as a female figure, so to testify the symbolic conflation between the earth and the feminine. At the end of the 16th century, in the newly born realm of space, the Italian scholar Cesare Ripa published an extensive collection of allegorical illustrations in order to help artists and poets to decode the ancient representations of the world. Ripa’s oeuvre, that readily became a real best-seller, contained a rich repertoire of feminine geographical allegories: Italian regions and cities are depicted as female icons holding symbols of the places they represent.

In a world dominated by the rule of space, human beings needed instructions to understand the geography of places. Such geography worked as a rhetorical structure: through symbols and figures it helped people’s memory recall the right information about each different place (Dallari, 2006). What Ripa presented to his contemporaries is a description of the past: in modern geography allegories are replaced by maps, whose universalistic aim is to reduce the world’s differences to the order of the scale. An account of this shift of meanings is given by the modern cartographer Sebastian Münster. In Münster’s map of Europe, the continent is still shaped as a woman but it is already a cartographic projection. European modern nation-states thus identify national borders with the female body (Pitch and Creazzo, 2009; Pompili, 2012): as space controls and dominates the earth, gendered political power controls and dominates the national territory.

*C cartographic paradigm and international migrations: the case of Italy

International migrations call into question the supremacy of well-ordered space inasmuch immigrants – in particular illegal immigrants – completely diverge from the norm. The geography of space is no longer able to offer a truthful
image of the world: suddenly, those who were at the map’s periphery are now right inside Europe’s borders. The breaking of space’s normative set-up calls back the centrality of places: in front of the social and geographical Other, people’s identity appears to be strongly tied up to the emotional construction of the sense of place (Massey and Jess, 1995: 83). According to Tuan, “residents not only sense but know that their world has an identity and a boundary when they feel threatened, as when people of another race want to move in” (Tuan, 1974b: 419). Migrations awake the exclusionary practices involved in place-building: to be unique and safe, each place must defend itself from the faraway Others.

Moreover, people’s defense of a place is gender-oriented: since national territory is identified with the female body, immigrants’ entry is perceived as a sexual violation. The competition that characterizes places conflates with the competition for women’s possession. For this reason security has become a central issue in European policies as a need to protect “our” women against foreigners who rape and murder. In collective imagination women are depositary of cultural and national identity’s continuity, hence immigrants are per se rapists inasmuch they contaminate such identity (Pitch and Creazzo, 2009: 9). The identitarian rhetoric of “blood and soil” rests on the control of, and the violence against, women.

Since the beginning of the nineties, Italian social and political discourse has reflected this theoretical framework. Dal Lago (1999) has analyzed how Italian media contributed to the immigrant-enemy identification: for example, in 842 articles about immigrants published on 7 national newspapers in the years 1992/1993, almost half (47%) report news of offences committed by immigrants and very few (8%) quote episodes of racism and xenophobia (Dal Lago, 1999: 71). Immigration is almost always defined in terms of illegality and urban decay, while citizens asking for security are commonly described through their territorial belonging: citizens’ committees become new social actors defending their neighborhoods, or rather defending the places that determine their individual and collective identity. Immigrants are represented by their bodies: murderous bodies, hyper-sexualized and phallic bodies, beastly and dirty bodies. Similar bodies have to be cut off, evacuated, eliminated (Dal Lago, 1999: 97). Again, the description of immigrants as aggressive and obscene involves both the sexual dimension of rape and the territorial dimension of the menace. The language of fear that is used by the media reflects the attitude of Italian institutions towards immigration: in fact, in the last decades, media campaigns against
immigrants came along with the adoption of policy measures for social security. Such measures have increased territorial control and presented immigrants as a serious danger to the community.

The Italian feminist movement has denounced the predominant securitarian narrative, which considers the female body both as an object to be kept safe from others and as an instrument for the enforcement of racist policies (Pompili, 2012). Media, politicians and institutions all agree in saying that women are at risk in the public space because of dangerous aliens, while the private space is safe and peaceful. In fact, this mainstream discourse is the result of the social construction of a gender-based sense of security. As it emerges from the national research on violence against women of 2006, the authors of gender violence are by large men with whom women are in close relationships, while strangers are the minority (6.2%). Partners and ex partners are the most frequent authors of sexual violence and rape (Pitch and Creazzo, 2009: 29-30).

The Italian case shows clearly how geographical meanings are related to social and political meanings. Large scale immigration discloses the unequal gender construction in Italians’ sense of place: places are conceived as stable and reassuring, as the feminine realm of the house and the family. Women represent the place, they have to remain in the place, and to a certain extent they are the place. For this reason the presence of aliens produces a fearful reaction: immigrants undermine men’s dominion over places and women.

Conclusions

In the perspective of humanistic geography space and place are social constructions. Thus it could be possible to re-imagine places and re-create geographical definitions. The conception of the “place-as-home” is just one of place’s possible meanings. According to Young (1990) places can be the seat of separation and conflict but also of communication and consensus. It is then necessary to think of the place as open and interactive, where differences are welcomed rather than assimilated. Hestia’s fireplace is not only the symbol of an isolated world but also the possibility of a relationship with the foreigner: the warming fire and the shared meal open the domestic space to outsiders, receiving them into the community (Vernant, 1965: 169).

Rethinking places in times of globalization implies abandoning the idea of
pure and exclusive identities: places should become more and more hybrid, open and porous.

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Paris: F. Maspero.


The fight for women’s rights recognizes no borders. An emerging player in the fight for equal rights is the European Court of Justice. Through its decisions, it has assisted women in fighting for important rights such as equal pay for equal work and pregnancy rights. It is important to discover how these cases reach the ECJ because understanding the mechanisms may help our understanding of how to further women’s rights through litigation strategies. Additionally, it is imperative to note that these cases often go against the wishes of the individual nation states that compose the European Union; this brings into question the concepts of national sovereignty and how it interacts with women’s rights. Examining how these cases are heard by the ECJ can help shed light on how these cases are heard despite state interests. There is evidence that interest groups play a major role in ensuring these cases are heard by the ECJ. Thus, what this paper seeks to explain is as follows: how do interest groups influence the process whereby women’s rights cases reach the European Court of Justice?

The importance of this subject cannot be overstated in terms of questions regarding borders, sovereignty, and women’s rights. Most evidently, these court cases show how the court system can be used to further women’s rights and improve gender equality. Along these lines, it speaks to the importance of interest groups in promoting rights and their more general role in advocating certain issue areas; it is also extremely relevant to the social movement theory in determining how social movements, in this case the women’s movement, affect courts. Furthermore, the issue of interest groups and the ECJ in particular relates to issues of nationalism and sovereignty. It shows the effect that European Union membership has on member states and consequently how much sovereignty can be lost when states join the EU and become subject to EU law. A deeper understanding of this subject is integral to our comprehension of how politics and pressure groups can influence the courts as well as how the course can influence politics.
Background

There is important background information to consider regarding the ECJ and the EU before a full discussion on using the ECJ to further women’s rights. The first is the Treaty of Rome’s Article 177. Article 177 provides for preliminary rulings concerning “the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Community” and “the interpretation of the statutes of bodies established by an act of the Council, where those statutes so provide” (European Economic Community, Treaty of Rome, 1957). Furthermore, they may request the ECJ to review a decision or provide one where “there is no judicial remedy under national law” (European Economic Community, Treaty of Rome, 1957). This article is important because it gives the ECJ the power to clarify disputes between member states and provide rulings on important cases. It also allows, and in some cases requires, national judges to request clarification from the ECJ. This article expands ECJ jurisdiction and gives it the power to influence national law. This is significant because it places a limit on national sovereignty and gives the ECJ broader control over the rights it sees fit to protect.

Another important article in the Treaty of Rome deals directly with women’s rights. Article 119 states that member states should receive “equal pay for equal work,” further defining equal pay without sex discrimination as “that pay for the same work at piece rates shall be calculated on the basis of the same unit of measurement” and “that pay for work at time rates shall be the same for the same job” (European Economic Community, Treaty of Rome, 1957). This is an important step in creating equality for women in society. This article has proven itself as integral to the advancement of women’s rights in the workplace. Together with Article 177, these articles have proved indispensable to groups seeking to use the ECJ as part of a litigation strategy to further women’s rights.

Two significant European Union acts of legislation have further allowed the courts to be used as a path to advancing women’s rights. The first is the Equal Treatment Directive. Enacted in 1976, this directive implemented the principle of equal treatment between men and women in European Union labor law. It mandates equal pay for work to which equal value is attributed and bans gender discrimination, stating “no discrimination on the grounds of sex either directly or indirectly by reference in particular marital or family status” (European Economic Community, Council Directive 76/207/EEC, 1976). This legislation is of great importance to later cases because it specifically provides for equal
pay between the genders, making any pay differential based solely on gender or marital status illegal. The second important legislative act is the Pregnancy Directive, which came into effect in 1992 (European Economic Community, Council Directive 92/85/EEC, 1992). This directive created specific protections for pregnant workers; it mainly codified rights that had already been extended by the European Court of Justice. This was another major step forward for women’s equality because it meant they could not be penalized due to reproductive reasons. It is also significant because it suggests that the court was already seeking to further women’s rights before this initiative. Studied together, these two legislative acts show how the ECJ is a possible litigation strategy to achieve rights equality.

There are two major European Court of Justice decisions of note that need to be discussed before moving into later analysis. The first is the groundbreaking Defrenne II decision in 1976. In this case, Ms. Defrenne sued her employer, the airline Sabena, on grounds of pay differential during her employment as an air stewardess, as she was being paid less than her male counterparts for the same work. In the resulting decisions, the ECJ expanded the scope and purpose of aforementioned Article 119. Through their decision, the court made it clear that this article could be invoked for claims against private employers before the national courts, as well as against the State; private citizens were not limited to state-sanctioned discrimination (Gabrielle Defrenne v Société Anonyme Belge de Navigation Aérienne Sabena, European Court of Justice, 1978). In other words, private employers were to be held to the same standard as those in the public sphere. Additionally, through this decision the ECJ showed it could create enforceable rights in national courts—regardless of national implementing legislation.

The decisions made were to be honored in all member states; the ruling of the ECJ superseded any wishes of the sovereign member states. Furthermore, it showed that the scope of Article 119 required further clarification and development. The second case is the Dekker case, one of the most important cases regarding gender equality and the European Court of Justice (Dekker, European Court of Justice, November 8, 1990). In this 1990 case, the European Court of Justice ruled that discrimination in employment opportunities on grounds of pregnancy constitutes direct sex discrimination; this provided explicit protection of pregnant workers under EU law. This is crucial because it gave a new interpretation of sex equality for women—this ruling emphasized the disadvan-
tage to women rather than comparable treatment with men. Moreover, these two decisions are noteworthy because these decisions indicate that the ECJ may have been seeking to empower itself through these decisions. Because it was ruling in favor of women’s rights and showing its commitment to equality, it may have been signaling a willingness to hear other cases regarding human rights. Fitting in with the social movement theory discussed later in section III, the court set itself up as an elite ally of interest groups looking to further rights equality by providing a political opportunity for groups to have their cases heard outside of the national court systems. This would have put the ECJ at the center of rights litigation and provided a clear pathway for the ECJ litigation strategies used later by interest groups.

In regards to interest groups, it is important to understand the Equal Opportunities Commission. It is a United Kingdom-based interest group that works to promote women’s rights in the workplace. To do this, it has targeted British policies that contributed to gender discrimination in the workplace. As an independent, non-departmental public body, this interest group worked to enforce the Sex Discrimination Act, the Equal Pay Act, and other gender equality legislation. Part of its strategy to promote women’s rights was to use the paths provided by Article 177 of the Treaty of Rome to ensure its cases reached the European Court of Justice. As Karen Alter and Jeannette Vargas describe in their article, the EOC “adopted a litigation strategy targeting British policies that contributed to gender discrimination in the workplace…the EOC had considerable success in forcing a Conservative government to accept significant changes in its equality policy based on European Court of Justice jurisprudence” (Alter & Vargas, 2000: 453). This tactic plays an important role in the cases discussed later in the analysis found in section IV.

**Theoretical Background**

Several authors need to be mentioned to lay a theoretical framework for the remainder of the paper. Walter Mattli and Anne-Marie Slaughter provide an account of how interest groups can affect courts. In their analysis, they distinguish between what they call “one-shotters” and “repeat players.” As they write in “Revisiting the European Court of Justice,” repeat players include actors who appear multiple times in front of a court and include “public interest ‘pressure groups’ seeking to use a variety of political and legal strategies to advance par-
ticular causes” (Mattli & Slaughter, 1998: 187). It is important to understand the presence of an interest group as a repeat player because these groups have put a considerable amount of time and effort into cultivating a relationship with the court. Because of this, they can be extremely influential in a court’s decision-making process and ensuring cases reach the court. Mattli and Burley emphasize the importance of pressure groups in the court’s decision-making process.

Interest groups like those discussed by Mattli and Burley are becoming increasingly relevant in the European Court of Justice. Karen Alter and Jeannette Vargas present an argument on how the European Court of Justice is utilized by domestic actors to further their own causes. They argue that the ECJ has transformed weak organizations into political players with the capability of influencing national policy, creating an important tool for domestic actors (Alter & Vargas, 2000). Through the ECJ, policy actors can fight for equal treatment for the groups they represent; this includes women’s rights groups who can use the ECJ (and the necessary loss of sovereignty it correlates with for nation states) to affect actual change. Importantly, they note that it is vital to elicit national judicial support to interpret equality laws because the national courts must ask the ECJ to review a case for it to reach the ECJ.

Furthermore, there needs to be both national government and interest group follow-through after the ruling to ensure its stipulations are put into effect; it is essential that litigants “follow up their legal victory by drawing on legal precedents to create new political and material costs for the government and private actors” (Alter & Vargas, 2000: 453-454). It is noteworthy that the ECJ is empowering interest groups to use the ECJ as an additional source of authority increasing rights for groups in the individual member states. Because of this, there are two major reasons why a group might choose an ECJ litigation strategy. For one, it creates a “means to circumvent opposition within the national judicial hierarchy” and secondly, “a change in policy based on EC law is much harder for national governments to reverse than a legal victory based on domestic law” (Alter & Vargas, 453). It is useful to understand their explanation of why a group may choose an ECJ litigation strategy because it points to other theories discussed later and the importance of political openings and opportunities in creating change.

This activism on the part of the European Court of Justice can be seen in two different ways. In their article, Geoffrey Garrett, R. Daniel Keleman, and
Heiner Schulz explain two different approaches to the role of the European Court of Justice. The first is the legal autonomy approach. In this view, the ECJ pushes its agenda against the interests of other member states and was able to develop “a powerful set of legal doctrines and [co-opt] the support of domestic courts for them” (Garrett, Keleman, and Schulz, 1998: 149-150). The court is seeking to be an autonomous body with its own rights and powers; it seeks to have more sovereign power over its member states. In the second approach, the political power approach, the support for the ECJ comes from below; the judges are constrained because they “realize that their power is ultimately contingent on the acquiescence of member states and hence are reticent to make decisions of which governments disapprove” (Garrett et al., 1998: 150). The member governments have supported ECJ activism. In this view, the actions of the ECJ have been supported by their national governments.

Regardless of why the European Court of Justice has acted in this manner, it has had a significant impact on women’s equality. In her article, Rachel Cichowski presents an argument on how women’s rights are affected by the European Court of Justice. She points out that equal pay and pregnancy rights have both been positively affected by the decisions of the court. She also notes the European Union’s reluctance to concretely define rules in gender equality and that “when legal questions arose from those vague policy prescriptions, the ECJ did not hesitate to expand both the meaning and scope of this equality legislation” (Cichowski, 2004: 496). The ECJ steps in and “in an attempt to bring greater clarity to the EU right in question, the Court often dismantles national practices, regardless of member state opposition” (Cichowski, 2004: 498). Through this, it is evident that the ECJ is unafraid of enforcing rights found in the Treaty of Rome and other EU legislation, even against the interests of the member states. Because of this, the ECJ is willing to use pre-existing legislation to ensure rights are extended to all members of the EU, despite what individual member states may desire. This is important to women’s rights issues, especially when they are economic in nature, such as equal pay and pregnancy rights. Extrapolating from the evidence that the ECJ has assisted in furthering the cause of women’s rights, it is clear that an ECJ litigation strategy can be effective.

The remainder of this paper focuses on how women’s rights cases reach the ECJ. It does this by drawing on existing explanations regarding social movements and interest groups. The first is the social movement theory advocated by Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald. They emphasize
the importance of political openings/opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing for social movements in general (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, 1996: 1-20). Another theory, the interest group theory, is put forth by Lee Epstein in her book Conservatives in Court. She argues that groups prefer direct sponsorship over participation via amici briefs or other means of outside influence with the key to achieving goals in litigation being material resources (Epstein, 1985).

The two theories are interrelated. They are, to some extent, similar; both examine the role of specific groups in affecting change through the judiciary. Both look for political openings, but at different points in their plans to achieve their goals. They are also place a high value on mobilizing structures; for both groups, material resources are key. Both are aware that the availability of existing structures that can provide resources is important to achieving goals. Finally, they both focus on the importance of framing. Social movements pay close attention to how an issue is framed and what ideas are being used to describe it; interest groups, such as conservative interest groups, focus on redefining norms to fit their own worldview.

They are, however, distinct from one another. The interest group theory is much more specific about how groups go about exacting policy change whereas the social movement theory lays out broad guidelines about how groups may utilize the courts to their advantage. They are also different in that social movements look for specific political openings and can even arise when the proper political openings exist. The interest group theory, however, focuses on the resort to courts when political options run out. While social movements capitalize on what they see as political opportunities, interest groups will turn to the courts after other political options have been exhausted. Moreover, organizationally, these two types of groups differ. Social movements can be defined as “informal linkage institutions that generate interest among otherwise unassociated citizens on broad-ranging topics of general concern” (Browne, 2012). Interest groups, on the other hand, have “specific public policy goals and lobbying tactics to achieve them” and have a “core leadership group” (Browne, 2012). So while it is true that they contain similarities, these theories are separate entities.

Analysis

I now move to cases that directly involve the Equal Opportunities Commission. In both of these cases, the Equal Opportunities Commission played a role
in ensuring these cases reached the ECJ. The first is a 1994 case dealing with retirement age for women. In Advel Systems, the ECJ ruled that raising the retirement age for women to that of men cannot be accompanied by measures designed to limit the adverse consequences that such a step may have for women. This case prevents employers from retrospectively raising the retirement age for women. In Advel Systems, the Equal Rights Commission submitted a written observation on behalf of Constance Christina Ellen Smith (Advel Systems, European Court of Justice, 1994). In the 2006 case Cadman, the ECJ ruled on equal pay for men and women. As in Advel Systems, in Cadman the ECJ considered observations submitted on behalf of the EOC; furthermore, in this case, the EOC is listed as an intervener in the case (Case C-17/05, European Court of Justice, 2006). Both cases show clear involvement from the EOC, making them excellent examples to study the social movement and interest group theories.

These cases have clear implications for the research question proposed earlier, which seeks to explain how interest groups affect how a case reaches the European Court of Justice. The cases can be used to evaluate two separate theories of how cases can reach a certain court. The first is the social movement theory. Social movement theory emphasizes the importance of political openings and opportunities. In these cases, it is apparent that the Treaty of Rome article 177, which allows national courts to appeal to the ECJ, and article 119, which provides for equal pay for equal work, played integral roles in allowing these specific types of women’s rights cases to reach the ECJ. They provided the political opening the EOC needed to push the two aforementioned cases to the court. The theory also points to the importance of mobilizing structures. The EOC itself fits this criterion. Because of the work the EOC did to promote these cases, it mobilized the appropriate people and resources. Finally, the theory notes that framing can be vital. The framing in this situation is one of women’s equality. By framing their cases with this type of human rights/feminist language, the EOC was able to show the vital importance of these cases for the advancement of women’s equality.

The second theory of importance is the interest group theory. This theory observes that groups prefer direct sponsorship to participation. This is clear in the two cases discussed because the EOC had a role in direct sponsorship of cases. Another important part of this theory is the achievement of goals through litigation. Clearly, the EOC used an ECJ litigation strategy to achieve their goal—improving women’s rights. These two aspects of interest group theory differ from
social movements, who rely on disruptive action and “radical flank effects.” (McAdam et al., 1996: 13-14). While they may use the courts to achieve goals, they also use outside action to make their views known. The theory also notes that it is important to have material resources and that interest groups resort to courts when interest groups influence law. It is not clear from the research that these are relevant to note in the case of the EOC. Both of these theories, however, have clear implications for how women’s rights cases reach the ECJ. It is evident that the EOC played an important role in ensuring the above cases reached the European Court of Justice, whether it is was through the mechanisms described by the social movement theory or the interest group theory. The EOC had a major role in securing these cases a spot on the ECJ docket.

Conclusions

This paper has argued that social movement theory and interest group theory can play a role in explaining how the European Court of Justice has positively impacted women’s rights. Through the use of an ECJ litigation strategy and aided by political openings, groups have used the ECJ as another court to have their cases heard outside of their national court systems. This has allowed groups like the Equal Opportunities Commission to circumvent national legislation to appeal to a higher court and have that national legislation overturned by an ECJ decision. Using the social movement theory and the interest group theory, I have argued that both of these can be used to help explain how women’s rights cases reach the ECJ.

While it is apparent that the Equal Opportunities Commission played a major role in the cases discussed, there are, of course, limitations to this argument. First, the cases discussed are limited to how one group helped cases reach the ECJ. For a more in-depth discussion of how interest groups can assist movement through a litigation strategy, there must be additional research done on other interest groups’ roles in this type of strategy. Moreover, the research here has focused on women’s rights. To gain a deeper understanding of interest group theory and social movement theory, this research needs to be expanded to other areas where interest groups may have had an influential impact. Finally, more research needs to be done on how social movements can impact a case’s path to the ECJ.

This research, however, still has its merit. Through this research, there is a
A deeper understanding of the ECJ now that we understand how interest groups ensure their cases reach the Court. Through this study of the Equal Opportunities Commission, we can see how an interest group can use direct participation in the court system to make sure cases that pertain to important policy goals are heard by the ECJ. Along those lines, we also have additional knowledge of how interest groups can effectively use the ECJ to achieve their goals and therefore additional knowledge of a way to further women’s rights. Furthermore, we also have an increased understanding of how the structure of the European court system allows national interest groups to appeal to the ECJ. Because of how the Treaty of Rome lays out the process whereby a case can reach the ECJ, interest groups can use that as the political opening necessary to push their agenda through a litigation strategy. They can use this opening to win cases that go against the wishes of their national governments, which is a threat to national sovereignty. Overall, we have a greater understanding of the importance of analyzing the relationship between the European Court of Justice, interest groups, and the sovereignty of the member states of the European Union.

References


Chapter 19.

Marianna Nobile

Female Genital Mutilation: a New Challenge of Multiculturalism

A nyone who pays attention to the transformations that our health care systems are undergoing, cannot avoid confronting herself with the many-sided issues that have risen nowadays from the multiethnic and multicultural character adopted by Western countries. The presence of subjects belonging to communities, whose tradition sometimes clashes with our values, on one side arouses the question of the adequacy and applicability of a health-care model based on notions – such as health and disease – and principles – such as freedom and equality – alien for those subjects.

On the other side this presence forces us to examine the strength of our ethical perspectives, with particular attention focused on the right to live according to one’s own moral principles, with the only limit of not harming others, as an essential condition for coexistence, and to the principle of autonomy, as an indefeasible right. Assuming a pluralism of values and a variety of substantial moral views, as well as the difficulty of giving the “good” an objective and largely shared connotation, we must prefer the way that reverses the traditional paternalistic model, giving priority to the individual evaluation of what constitutes one’s own good.

The model based on the principle of autonomy orients toward the respect of personal choices regarding one’s own care, even when it is about choices which are profoundly different from the ones approved by the majority and, especially, from the treatment that doctors would consider as the best choice in order to realize the best interest of the patient, as required by the principle of benevolence.

The considerable increase of migratory activity has led to a further diversification of ethical and cultural systems in name of which the health-care beneficiaries claim their right to make choices and to require special treatments and clinical interventions. But to what extent can these claims be justifiable? Can we consider justifiable and acceptable requests made in name of a demanded right to unconditional respect of a minority culture, even when these practices are in contrast with the fundamental principles of the liberal society and with the protection of personal dignity and integrity? Does the distinction between acceptable and unacceptable practices in light of our principles inevitably mean
that we are denying these minorities their cultural identity, incurring in a kind of “ethical imperialism”?

In order to answer these questions, the privileged observatory is made by problems related to women. The reason is given not only by the considerable presence of women and by their prevalent recourse to health care for breeding, but also by the fact that most of them belong to cultures with limits and taboos that increase health workers’ difficulties in guaranteeing the right to health care. In other words, foreign women in the multicultural context have more problems, since most of them are not emancipated in their country of origin. Furthermore, many institutions, habits and beliefs of their countries seem to be functional concerning anything except for the well-being and interest of the women.

This is the case of female genital mutilation that is requested by an increasing number of immigrant families for their daughters. This practice constitutes a paradigmatic example that can be the starting point to study what multiculturalism means, especially when it is related to women, and what policies Western societies should adopt in order to integrate as much as possible people belonging to cultures so different from ours.

**FGM as a social and political issue**

Female genital mutilation (FGM) is defined by the World Health Organization (WHO) as all “procedures that intentionally alter or cause injury to the female genital organs for non-medical reasons” (WHO, 2012).

Generally speaking, African women do not like the name female genital mutilation because of its strong negative connotation, as if it is a stigma, a sign of disablement that refers to imperfect bodies, precisely mutilated ones. However, for them they are anything but bodies that correspond to an ideal standard of beauty.

FGM is a name that is a source of embarrassment even for us because of its ethnocentric mark that reinvents the immigrant’s body as something different, and grotesque, than the Western body model. It creates a body-stigma that functions as a symbolic border between “us” and “them”.

Yet it was African women who decided to officially use this name for all the traditional practices consisting of the removal and/or the alteration of part of
the woman’s external genital system.¹ It is a word that serves as an alarm bell to indicate that in those bodies so altered there is something wrong. For this reason the practice and even the formal term used to describe it became a taboo, which is even difficult to pronounce out loud. In fact, FGM is not the name for the practice widely used in Africa.

African women prefer the name handed down by their own culture or merely circumcision, even if it is an inaccurate term that assimilates this practice to an operation which is much less invasive, that of male circumcision. Even among those African women who started to distance themselves from FGM there is a preference for using the traditional names to describe the practice.²

This disparity of meanings is not only an ethical problem, but first of all it is an epistemological problem: it seems that, when using such different terms, we are talking about different practices. For us the term “mutilation” has a pejorative meaning, it refers to a disablement, to a disfigured body, which has lost its integrity and natural harmony. But for them this practice represents an operation that strengthens the integrity of the body, through the removal of those parts of the female genital organ that make it impure.

Recently, Western women and organizations involved in this issue suggested to substitute these terms with expressions that do not excessively alter the related perception of the practice. For example, “female genital cutting” is a more neutral term, while “FGM is too morally condemning and female circumcision too euphemistic” (Saharso, 2008:13). In fact, the term “cut” has a less strong meaning than “mutilation”, and it is also less Eurocentric.

Even more problematic is the definition that includes the FGM in cultural facts. This definition does not provide any reference frame that permits to understand the common meaning where this particular cultural fact acquired its intelligibility. Assuming FGM as a cultural fact means converting it into a decontextualized practice that can be subjected to any interpretation. If we reduce FGM to a mere cultural fact, its eradication could be much more unlikely as it influences the policy to be adopted.

The idea related to this cultural definition finds the solution of the FGM problem in interventions aimed to increase African women’s level of information and education. No doubt information and educational programs can do

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¹ In 1990, the Inter-African Committee on Traditional Practices Affecting the Health of Women and Children (IAC).
² For example Somali women call FGM “sewing”, where the emphasis lays on the activity of sewing, while for us it lays on the activity of cutting, excising, deforming.
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much, but certainly they are not able to eliminate a deep-rooted and widespread habitus in the society. Campaigns against FGM promoted by NGO’s\(^3\) and local governments have positive effects towards few elites, but none on the lower classes, despite heavy investments.

This policy comes from an interpretation of change that entrusts the transformation of the society to the development of education and the rise of cultural level. It is the heir of the nineteenth-century social pedagogy that ignores the complex and conflicting ways of how societies change in contexts where every innovation has to face the inactivity of a tradition embedded in behaviors and customs. But it is also the effect of a narrow idea of the purpose that FGM has in the overall system of social and economic relations in those societies.

FGM is not a mere cultural practice, it is a social fact. It constitutes that particular social institution which has the prerogative of involving a plurality of traits in which the society is structured, such as the price of the bride, polygamy, arranged marriages, early aged brides, etc. This is the pivot of an economic-symbolic structure based on a complex system of marriage strategy that characterizes the social fabric of most of the African societies, which invested in FGM their power of controlling bodies, constraining behaviors, and subjecting people.

We must restart from this culturally-situated standpoint if we really want to eradicate FGM: understanding from within a domination system that grips sub-Saharan Africa as well as the institutions that contribute to perpetuating it. Otherwise, we will continue to partially address a problem that we are unable to solve. Without adequate knowledge and policies adapted to the complex issue at hand, Westerners will keep female genital cutting in the comfortable yet ineffective family of “humanitarian” interventions.

**Bodies as borders**

In some cultures FGM is considered a “rite de passage”: a ritual that guides, controls and regulates changes of status.\(^4\) It marks the different life stages transforming them in an orderly path endowed with a meaning that meets the needs

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\(^3\) For example TOSTAN, a NGO supported by UNICEF and the government of Senegal, is a program that aims to enhance women’s capacity for autonomy. The goal is that the whole community supports the decision to stop FGM. See (Mackie, 2000:259) and (Saharso, 2008:16).

\(^4\) According to Mackie, FGM is often not an initiation ritual, since in some groups it is done in infancy. Nevertheless elsewhere it can be done as late as after the first child. However in coastal West Africa, from Senegal to Nigeria, FGM is associated with initiation ceremonies at puberty that involve entrance into a women’s secret society (Mackie, 2000:274).
of identity and recognition. In particular, FGM is an initiation rite through which girls become women. It transforms the sexual identity in an acquired status, redeeming the biological destiny linked to sex and turning it into a “social essence”: the woman.

Alternatively, these rites have a function needed to demarcate the boundary between male and female identity. In fact, according to some traditions “at birth a child has both a male and a female soul. The female soul of the boy is in the foreskin, the male soul of female of the girl resides in the clitoris. A child can therefore only become fully male or female by being cut” (Saharso, 2008:14).

FGM is the access door to one’s own community and constitutes the point of no return that divides who is in and who is out. It is a “symbolic wound” through which each group writes its name on the bodies, impressing a mark that turns these bodies in bearers of culture. FGM represents an “ethnic border” that marks the social identity from the inside. This border emerges in the widespread tendency to observe endogamy, which is the custom, but more often the obligation, to choose the partner within the group.

The role of FGM acquires the particular meaning of conservation and legitimacy of the ethnical identity during emigration. In absence of stable identities of reference, the need of those women’s bodies, experienced as the silent deposit of an irreplaceable collective belonging, that originates the cultural challenge, becomes even more binding. These wounds are the embodied memory of the community that turned women in bearers of a complex symbolic system through which every ethnic group can recognizes and reconfirms itself.

Policies of recognition between ethnocentrism and cultural relativism

The need of recognition, strongly connected to the issue of personal identity, is the foundation of most of the claims made by minority groups. This recognition can be achieved in two ways, which, even if they are both based on the equality principle, come into conflict in the practice: the model of equal rights for individuals (civil, political, social) and the model of the policy of differences, i.e. the model of differentiated rights that, recognizing the diversity, realizes equality.

From Taylor’s point of view the first model refers to a State “blind to differ-

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5 The reasons for being subjected to FGM are more than these and depend upon the tradition and culture of each group. Following Mackie, infibulation is required for marriage and honor. It is proof of virginity and secures fidelity. It is sometimes justified as clean and aesthetic, it is said to promote health and fertility and to enhance male intercourse (Mackie, 1996).
ences”, also called neutral,\(^6\) that ignores the difference that it wants to safeguard through neutrality, coming to assimilate diversity to the prevailing ethical perspective. Thus, the blind State does not seem neutral at all, because it tends toward standardization, applying rights without taking into account the different cultural background.

Minority groups ask for a judgment of equal value for every culture. But which criteria should we use to express a judgment? If we use criteria belonging to our culture, the risk is standardization. A positive judgment of this kind would not only be condescending, but also ethnocentric. We should set the limit within which a request for political recognition can be considered valid.

Recognition, whose driving force is the ideal of human dignity, is realized both with the protection of fundamental and individual rights and the acknowledgment of the specific needs of every human being as member of different cultural groups.

Unlike Taylor, Habermas thinks that the phenomenon of multiculturalism could be faced taking into account only individual rights. The State can legitimately demand only assimilation, meant as the approval of constitutional principles, within an interpretative perspective defined from time to time by the “citizens’ ethical-political self-understanding” (i.e. mutual respect and recognition) and by the “political culture of a Country” (i.e. consensus over the Constitution and the procedures of political integration).\(^7\)

In light of these clarifications, assuming the principle of individual autonomy as fundamental, we come to the question if it is legitimate that political institutions state if a practice belonging to different cultures, such as FGM, is permissible or not. Based on this principle we must embrace the so called “culture rights”, thus we must recognize and guarantee to the members of a minority group the right to live in observance of their traditions.

The condition to which the recognition and protection of this right is subjected, as stated by Kymlicka,\(^8\) must be identified in compatibility with respect for freedom and autonomy. This means that we must consider inadmissible not

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\(^6\) According to Taylor’s perspective, the neutral state is a state that does not align itself in respect to differences and that considers rights as universal and equal for everyone, independently of the reference values of single individuals. (Taylor, 1992)

\(^7\) See (Habermas, 1996).

\(^8\) A liberal perspective cannot justify internal restrictions, aimed at limiting autonomy of members of the group. It is the concept of tolerance itself, in the liberal interpretation, which rotates around the value of personal autonomy and freedom of choice (Kymlicka, 1995). See also (Raz, 1994:67-69) for a defense of multiculturalism on condition that the right to choose the culture one belongs is recognized.
only practices susceptible to oppress and exploit people belonging to different groups, but also practices that are not chosen, but, in name of tradition, are imposed by the group to individuals without the right to convey their will.

To those who objects that this means forcing a community to reorganize itself following liberal principles, we can reply that we must have the ethical and political courage to assert that every kind of abuse, especially those against weak people, is not tolerated. This means that we must carry out all the strategies to ensure that these abuses cease.9

Conclusions: the Italian case and a possible strategy to stop FGM

In order to eradicate FGM, Western societies have adopted a legal approach issuing a ban with legal enforcement and punishment. But a ban seems an ineffective way to fight FGM, as in these cases habits are more binding than any law. The reason is that the sanctions due to the transgression of the custom are considered heavier than the one that follows the violation of the official law. A sanction that corresponds to exclusion from the community, as there are no men willing to marry an unclean woman, would shameful for the whole family.

In Italy criminal law enacted against FGM10 turned out to be substantially inapplicable and self-defeating, thus the results are the paradoxical increase of this practice, the reluctance to recur to the national health service if the need arises and the unwillingness to report harmful behaviors. This law has an unequivocal ideological appearance: criminal law gains substance not by abstractly imposing values, but by protecting assets formerly shaped by consensus and dialogue. A different strategy was proposed in 2004 by a Somali/Italian gynecologist, Omar Abdulcadir. In order to prevent illegal infibulations, he offered Somali women the realistic possibility of not doing FGM anymore to their daughter by replacing it with a symbolic ritual. He suggested a small injection on the clitoris, after having applied anesthetic cream, pulling out a drop of blood and then giving the family a certificate that states that the daughter has been circumcised.11 In this way the ritual was safe, but without harm and permanent damages.

Even if this symbolic ritual does not entails the crime of personal injury, public opinion strongly condemned it, arguing that there is no difference be-

9 See (Borsellino, 2009).
11 See (Pasquinelli, 2007) for more details.
between the symbol and the mutilation, since body inviolability is a universal value that cannot be wrangled in name of the reduction of harm. But we can object that, if body inviolability is an absolute principle, we should also prohibit every form of piercing and aesthetic manipulation, as well as male circumcision.

Behind the appeal to body integrity we can also find the unanimous repro-bation towards a barbaric ritual that permits men to maintain symbolic control of female sexuality. What matters is only the implicit confirmation that we get from our reassuring body integrity, to which we entrust the safeguard of our civil values in opposition to their tribal backwardness.

But where do we find this certainty about our body integrity? Behind this belief there is a naturalistic perspective of the body that hides the cultural manipulations through which every culture built different conceptions of bodies. There is nothing further from nature than bodies: on each body is impressed the indelible mark of cultural belonging.

Integrity is nothing else than particular cultural construction of the body. We experience our bodies in the unawareness of their symbolic dimension, which is very easy to be decoded in others’ bodies, objectified by our naturalist point of view. Both our bodies and theirs are symbols, where supremacy and asymmetry connections of gender relations peculiar to the respective society are mirrored.

The “symbol efficacy” of the alternative circumcision permits to reach concrete results without going through the narrow door of reality, since some acts, especially rituals, have the power of having effects on reality while acting on its representation. But it seems that the Italian politics, by banning every ritual that recalls FGM, has effectively made an amoral and extreme maxim prevail in practice: if girl’s body cannot be touched by law, let it be slaughtered outside of law instead.

A possible solution could be to allow the symbolic ritual in order to avoid illegal FGM.\textsuperscript{12} It could be seen as a step forward to recognize a different culture and the importance of its tradition.

At the same time we should increase social and educational programs that support women to integrate in our society. It could be a nondirective program,

\textsuperscript{12} A parallel can be drawn between what is happening today in Western countries with FGM and what happened in the United States with regard to access to safe and legal abortion. At the end of the nineteenth century, American medical professionals played a leading role in criminalizing abortion. In 1973, however, the increase of rates of mortality and morbidity, particularly among poor women, related to clandestine abortion, led to reforms in the abortion law. Nevertheless, these reforms were based not on the right of women to health care, but on the avoidance of the more serious consequences of not permitting this practice. See The Safety of Legal Abortion and the Hazards of Illegal Abortion, NARAL Pro-Choice America Foundation, 2003.
women should be never told what to do, but provided with a background of skills and information that facilitates autonomous choices in health. Our aim is not to prohibit a practice that we consider wrong in name of our liberal ideals, but to give to immigrant women the instruments to gain autonomy in order to help their daughter to become women in a multicultural society, free from any kind of imposition.

References

STUDENTS' CONTRIBUTIONS

V.
CULTURES, BARRIERS, VIOLENCE
Chapter 20.

Francesco Gori

The Spectacle of Society

“The enemy is the embodiment of your own question”

Theodor Däubler

In one of his most famous songs Jimi Hendrix wondered: “if the 6 was 9?”. Instead, we will ask “if 9/11 was 11/9?”.

The collapse of the Berlin Wall (11/9/1989) and the one of the Twin Towers (9/11/2001) are the two “falls” that, at inverted dates, have unmade and remade the world where we live in the twinkle of two decades. In a famous interview issued to Giovanna Borradori a few months after the 9/11 terrorist attack, Jacques Derrida argued that “in many respects, it was a distant effect of the Cold War”. Starting from this suggestion, this article will attempt to outline a genealogy of our present time, from the “balance of terror” of the Cold War to the current “time of terror”, not only by identifying the deep connections between those two epochs, but also by stressing their historical differences.

Hence, by asking “if 9/11 was 11/9?” we are really posing the question: which are the continuities and which the fractures in our recent history? What did remain the same, and what has changed from the Cold War to the present? In order to make such a question useful for the social sciences, however, it’s necessary to relate it to a defined framework, with the intent to find a common ground of comparison. This is the reason why I decided to work on the notion of spectacle, in which Guy Debord recognized at the end of the Sixties the very essence of post–industrial societies, ruled by the twin idols of consumption and telecommunication.

The word spectacle doesn’t designate any kind of object, but rather a kind of relationship: “the spectacle is not a collection of images; it is a social relation between people that is mediated by images”. The point of this thesis, as Debord himself underlines, doesn’t reside in the concept of image, but more properly in the one of mediation: since an “image” is whatever representation supported by a medium, the society of the spectacle, then, is far more a “society of the media” (supporting a complex of discourses, music, conversations, pictures, videos etc.) than simply a “society of the images”.
The Spectacle of Society

The relationship between people mediated by the complex of discourses and pictures of the spectacle, however, is rooted in a more fundamental relation that has existed long before the appearance of the interconnected system of mass media. This relationship is the one between the facts and their representation, or between the events and the words and pictures through which they are depicted. From this point of view, we could set the birth and development of the Society of the spectacle as a stage in the long–term history of such relationship, namely as the form it has taken in the age of electricity and global media. As WJT Mitchell points out, in fact, what remains invariable across the ages is that:

every history is really two histories. There is the history of what actually happened, and there is the history of the perception of what happened. The first kind of history focuses on the facts and figures; the second concentrates on the images and words that define the framework within which those facts and figures make sense. Thucydides’ history of the Peloponnesian War, for instance, is rigorously divided into a history of “what happened” and “what was said,” the narrative and the speeches. The War on Terror, similarly, can be broken down into two histories: what happened, and what was said to justify, explain, and narrate it as it was happening.

Once we identify the spectacle as an historically determined form of the perpetual interplay between facts and representations, so, we are in condition to undertake a critical genealogy of it. This will be the argument of the first part of the article, in which I chronologically retrace the three historical stages of the society of the spectacle: first, its bipolar separation during the Cold War into “concentrated” and “diffuse”, then, its integration after the Berlin Wall’s fall (11/9) until what I call its “inversion” with the 9/11, when we entered the “spectacle of the society”, swapping the two components of the Debord’s formula in parallel with the inversion of the dates of the two “falls” that have marked the history of the last two decades and shaped the contemporary world.

The spectacle is both a political and an aesthetic (i.e. “perceptual”) regime, since it merges in a zone of nebulosity certain events and narrations, facts and interpretations, and political and perceptual life. In this part I will leave aside the aesthetic aspect of the spectacle (in which resides its actual “philosophical hardware”), to stress its political implications. The theoretical framework I’ll
work in is Schmitt’s definition of the ‘political’ as system of immunity towards a defined enemy. The three different ages of the spectacle, then, will be taken into account, as many stages of the political dialectics of friend–enemy, from the rigid “separation” between two opposite regimes during the Cold War, to the “integration” of the Nineties (and the consequential political crisis of the nation states due to the disappearance of a recognizable enemy), up to the “inversion” of the spectacle with “age of terror” inaugurated by the 9/11 attacks, corresponding, in the global politics, to a hunt for an unrecognizable “inner” enemy. While the first two steps of this genealogy has already been widely discussed by Debord and his commentators, the third step still needs to be recognized as such; this is what I’ll seek to do in the second part.

On 11 September 2001 the “society of the integrated spectacle” in which we lived and to which we were, by that time, accustomed (if not addicted), was shaken by something that, if on the one hand was the more crystalline expression and the ultimate synthesis of it, on the other hand inexorably decreed its overcoming. As Derrida affirmed, in fact, the true objective of the terrorist threat was not “only a great number of forces, powers, or ‘things’ that depend, even in the most determined adversaries of the United States, on the order that is more or less assured by this superpower; it is also, more radically still, the system of interpretation, the axiomatic, logic, rhetoric, concepts and evaluations that are supposed to allow one to comprehend and to explain precisely something like ‘September 11’”. In order to understand the transformations it has produced in our lives and relationships, thence, we are called to question the whole palette of concepts, beliefs, values and social practices of our civilization, the very foundations of our culture.

Starting from this assumption, I’ll take into account two pillars of the western cultural identity that have been profoundly upset by the facts of 9/11: first, the notion of ‘event’ in relation with its verbal and visual representations (to which is dedicated this part of the paper), second, the concept of ‘enemy’ in Schmitt’s political dialectics.

The simultaneous reconfiguration of these concepts reveals a deep transformation in the regime of the spectacle. Such regime, it’s worth restating, rules our world as a whole, not only in politics and economics, but more fundamentally in the way we perceive and conceive the phenomena composing our reality: in other words, what has been changing since a bit more then a decade is our perception of reality as such, to the point that, as Derrida declared in the
The immediate aftermath of 9/11, we didn’t even have the linguistic tools to speak about something like that. In the same interview, however, he also affirmed, seemingly in contradiction with that, that it would have been a mistake to consider it a “major event”: but how can one conceive both that through 9/11/2001 something happened so crucial for our history that we couldn’t even linguistically articulate its meaning and, at the same time, that what happened wasn’t anything but a “major event”?

The contradiction disappears when we define correctly the meaning of a cultural formula as “9/11”: as we will see, in fact, the 9/11 is not properly an “event”, but rather a process, and a process that in many respects is still going on. By saying that, I want to stress the fact that the formula “9/11” consists more of a wide range of narrations and representations, both verbal and visual, than of material elements. Its absolute importance, therefore, is not due to its greatness as a material event, but rather to the fact that it condenses in an image a whole historical process, that has come suddenly to light in that precise moment of history. From this standpoint, 9/11 (just as the Mauerfall of 11/9/1989) corresponds to what Walter Benjamin called a “dialectical image”: a symbol able to capture the dialectics of history in the suspension of a snapshot.

Every political system, not only the one of the spectacle, is a device of immunity vis à vis a defined enemy. If, in the first part, I examine the historical process that has led the function of the political to transform itself in a syndrome of auto–immunity towards a faceless and unrecognizable “inner” enemy, in the third part, I’ll analyze how with the war on terror this process has reached the point of creating an “absolute” enemy. This enemy is represented by an inhuman being plotting against the fundamental human values, and therefore is considered outside the humanity. Then, most importantly, I’ll analyze how this rhetoric of an absolute enemy has permitted the global economical and political powers to govern on an undefined state of exception based on the permanent emergency of this ineffable enemy’s threat.

Since 9/11, an “absolute evil” is threatening our civilization, becoming the source of legitimacy of any political measure. The historical movement epitomized by the dialectical image of the fall of the Twin Towers, therefore, is the process of globalization as such, with all the anxieties it entails, and in particular with its master–fear, that links the the rhetoric of terror of the last decade with the current narrative of the global financial crisis: the collapse of the whole system of our political, social-economic values, that is, the “end of the world”.
This paper contains just an attempt to forge some theoretical tools to understand what Foucault used to call the “ontology of the present”, and for this reason it cannot be anything but open-ended. In the conclusion, then, after this sketchy contribution to the comprehension of some features of the time we are called to live in, the only thing I can do is to leave a question, my question, to the reader: how long will this present last?

Genealogy of the Spectacle

After the 9th of November 1989, the process of unification of the Society of the spectacle came to get grandly staged: the Fall of the Berlin Wall fulfilled the last prophecy of Guy Debord and the “integration” of the two regimes of the “spectacle” and the “concentrate and diffuse”, could finally come true.

Actually, the scene of such “integration” – or, in more up-to-date terms, “globalization” – was already prepared thirty-five years before with the construction of the wall itself, that was devoid of any strategic/political/military meaning except for its enormous aesthetic and symbolic value: it was the only place in the world, in fact, where the two opposing visions [Anschauungen] of the same spectacular image of the world [Weltbild] – the capitalist West and the Communist bloc – could face directly with each other. But, as Mitchell argues, the establishment of an idolatrous symbolic regime arouses always, sooner or later, an iconoclastic movement that will drop it in order to institute a new idolatry. If, in fact, with the erection of the Berlin Wall the spectacle had given a material consecration to its two different orders, the diffuse and the concentrated, with the iconoclastic event of the Mauerfall it was finally able to fulfill its vocation to achieve a “totality”, imposing itself as the only economic–political system worldwide. But why create the “integrated spectacle” rather than create a strong and enduring planetary empire, fallen into crisis in the lapse of a single decade? Why, despite the enthusiastic proclamations of the liberalistic “monothought” of the early ‘90s, didn’t history end? Why hasn’t a new pax augustea descended on earth, sustained by the two undisputed pillars of the unlimited production of commodities and services and of the inalienable freedom of consumption of any individual?

The current crisis of moral values, cultural identity, economic project and institutional legitimacy of the globalized West, is rooted in the ontology of the ‘political’ itself, namely in the fact that any political identity necessarily needs
a dialectic counterpart. This is what Carl Schmitt has condensed in his famous opposition “friend–enemy”, grounded in the observation of the geopolitical relations among the nation–States of modernity. Once the “enemy” failed, therefore, how to recognize the “friends”? How should we determine our cultural identity? Where should we find our political legitimacy? These are the fundamental issues, already predicted by Schmitt, of the globalized world derived from the fall of the Berlin Wall.

Schmitt’s formula, in fact, is ruthlessly clear: in the absence of an enemy, the whole political system is in danger, and with it, the identity of a civilization and the source of legitimacy of its institutions. The rhetoric of “post–ideology” systematically used by the technocratic governments of the 90’s didn’t work to stop the hemorrhage of sense that was bleeding Western civilization dry, whose very foundations were undermined by the absence of a dialectical counterparts and, consequently, of an ideological perspective in which to cultivate its cultural values and its project for the generations to come. The rule of human communities, in fact, is made by definition of “political” decisions, that is, of choices between different technical options on the basis of determined values, whether moral, religious, metaphysical, traditional, economical, ecological, or whatever. A formula of a “technical government”, thence, sounds almost like an oxymoron, since any “government” is precisely “government of the technical”; a government is a politically oriented choice between several technical possibilities in competition with each other.

What is, then, a “technical government”? Can it really exist and be effective in solving the problems of communities, or isn’t it rather just another political regime that doesn’t want to be considered as such? If we remember, during the nineties the great winners of the political elections were the leaders able to present themselves as “post–ideological”, not to say, “post–political.” It doesn’t matter if they belonged to the (once) right, as Berlusconi in Italy, or to the (once) left, as Tony Blair in England; the secret of their success resided in the fact that they managed to interpret the people’s tiredness and dissatisfaction towards the old ideological separation – i.e., the previous regime of the “separated” spectacle – by offering them an “integrated” message of optimism, stability and economical prosperity beyond any political division.

After the integration of the spectacle subsequent the 11/9, however, the post–ideological rhetoric has become anything but non–ideological: on the contrary, it has been the most effective ideology of that time, and thanks to which
elections have been systematically won all over the west. As many critics have observed, the most representative figure of this period has been no doubt Silvio Berlusconi, who has been able to ride the post-ideological wave better than anyone else: a billionaire media tycoon who presented himself as the “new man” against the previous corrupted political establishment, building his political consent on the promise to rule the Italian country as a successful company.

Let’s stop here: what is the essence of this message? Is it “technical” or “political”? At first glance, of course, it seems to be just technical. But are we sure that the mere fact of conceiving a country as a company, of reducing politics to business, is not, as such, a political decision, and, what’s more, a very strong one? What stands behind it, in fact, if not a whole vision of the world, a precise choice of value? In short, what has been smuggled for years for simple technical issues beyond the ‘political’ are all in all the product of a political ideology, and namely, the one of neoliberalism, that is really a “technocracy”, but in the sense of the political supremacy of the market issues, of free trade, of global finance, sustained by the myth of an indefinite economic growth.

It is in this ideological framework that started in Seattle the social protest movement of 1999 that got violently repressed during the G8 in Genoa, in the summer 2001. Such authoritarian crackdown was nothing but a prelude to the claim of historical and political legitimacy of the technocracies of the global era that would have found full expression in their response to the terrorist attacks of the 9/11.

From a Schmittian point of view, the ‘political’ element of the anti–globalization movement seemed to consist precisely in that “no” opposed to the regime of the “global” spectacle. Since, in Spinoza’s terms, omnis determinatio est negatio (any identity can be determined only by “negative”, that is, in differential relation to its context), the one-dimensional world of the “integrated spectacle”, the “global society”, could not have produced any other ideological movement than the one of an endogenous self–criticism or, that’s the same, self–denial. The “no–global” movement, hence, recognizing the “enemy” in the structure itself of its own society, the only one apparently left, attempted to revive the political ideal of self–transcendence by denying the whole palette of values, mechanisms and hierarchies of the neoliberal system. For this reason it sought to oppose the pseudo–Leibnizian ideal of “another world is possible” to the system of the spectacle as a whole, as dictatorship of the immanence, as pure intimacy without an “outside”.
In light of these considerations, we can classify the dialectics of the nation state, that, at least until the fall of the Berlin Wall, had been the guarantor, though in a more and more rarefied way, of both collective and individual identities. More than a response, however, we should rather see in it a symptom of the cultural, ethical, metaphysical, or, in one word, ‘spiritual’, disease opened wide by the dissolution of a defined political counterpart and the consequent “integration” of the spectacle, – and namely the social symptom, as the technocracies have been the political one.

By affirming this I mean that the process of “globalization” (i.e., of the political imposition of the market economy worldwide) and the “no–global” movement could be considered as two faces of the same coin, two expressions of the same ideology, or, at least, of the same cultural crisis. Furthermore, already in 1984, the lucid thinker Michel Foucault had warned us with astonishingly prophetic words against all projects that claim to be global or radical, whether political – the global integration of the market economy in the unique regime of the spectacle) or social (the consequent no–global protest): “the claim to escape from the system of contemporary reality so as to produce the overall programs of another society, of another way of thinking, another culture, another vision of the world, has led only to the return of the most dangerous traditions. I prefer the very specific transformations that have proved to be possible in the last twenty years in a certain number of areas that concern our ways of being and thinking, relations to authority, relations between the sexes, the way in which we perceive insanity or illness; I prefer even these partial transformations that have been made in the correlation of historical analysis and the practical attitude, to the programs for a new man that the worst political systems have repeated throughout the twentieth century.” From this standpoint, the difference between the post–historical “last man” theorized by the neoconservative thinker Fukuyama and the “new man” of the no–global movements is much thinner than one can think.

It is hard to say what the anti–globalization protest would have produced if the geopolitical conditions in which it was formed had persisted. Either way, it’s a matter of fact that on the 11th of September 2001, within a single day, these conditions have been brutally wiped out. From them on its critical instances, grounded on the identification of the enemy “inside” the structure itself of the global society were absorbed in the framework of the “new spirit” of capitalism (whereof they probably were from the beginning an unintentional expression)
and the “self-denunciation” of our civilization’s unsustainable values, was reversed by the global power into a hunt for an inner enemy, invisible and undefinable, that has triggered the self-destructive process compared by Derrida to an “auto-immune” syndrome.

Before considering the historical implications of this crazy hunt for a spectral, ubiquitous enemy (that will be the argument of the third part), we must seek to understand the process of deep transformation of the relation between events and representations that has been occurring in the global culture since a couple of decades ago and suddenly came into light with the dialectical image of the 9/11 terrorist attack.

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In the cataclysm of Manhattan, in the attack on the Pentagon, in the contradictory TV broadcasts, in the picturesque figure of Osama bin Laden as head of the “bad guys”, the global technocracy had found the “mystical foundation” of its political legitimacy it was lacking until then. But if we want to understand how it has been possible to establish so rapidly a “new world order” starting from that, we must try to stand on the “suspension” of the dialectical image of 9/11 and investigate something so relative as a material event (if compared with the great catastrophes of history) has produced such huge consequences at a global scale.

As we have seen in the introduction, the cipher of the 9/11 “epocality” doesn’t reside in the horrible tangle of bodies and rubble of Ground Zero (i.e., its materiality as an event), but rather its televisual live broadcast and its obsessive, “pornographic”, media repetition in the years to follow. So, how should we interpret something that “happened” live and simultaneously on all the radio and television stations and on all the electronic platforms on earth? And, more on the whole, how in the last decades has the relationship between events and images radically changed? The prosecution of Mitchell’s passage I quoted in the introduction gives us a useful indication:

In our time, both the things done and the things said are filtered through mass media, and the role of images and imagination (which were already quite significant for Thucydides) is much expanded. Contemporary war can be seen and shown in multimedia presentations in real time – and not just broadcast media such as television, but social media like YouTube and Twitter, on devices
such as cell phones and digital cameras. The shaping of perceptions of history does not have to wait for historians or poets, but is immediately represented in audiovisual–textual images transmitted globally.

In the age of digital media, there is no longer a delay between the facts and their narration; they take place simultaneously and in a certain way, as we’ll see, even in the same place. This means that the field of our perception, already expanded during the XXth century by the radio and television, has been enormously enlarged by the interconnected system of digital media, that has indefinitely extended our perceptual life. By now, however, this fact is quite universally recognized, what is crucial, instead, is to understand the concrete impact of new media on our lives, epitomized – and this is my point – by the dialectical image of the “impact” of the 9/11 planes on the Twin Towers that has marked the historical transit from the “society of the integrated spectacle” to what I call “the spectacle of society”.

But what has the 9/11 to do with this deep reconfiguration of our perceptual life due to the worldwide diffusion of the digital media? In order to answer this question we must recall what is the very aim of a terrorist attack: to perturb the sense of peace and security of a community, in the case of the 9/11, of a whole country, not to say, of the entire globalized world. Unlike any kind of war action, in fact, the actual target of an act of terrorism is separated from its contingent objective, since it is an aggression towards the nervous system of a broad “audience”, and not a military offensive against a specific and strategic enemy target. It follows from that, that such a “war of images” is not conceivable outside the framework of a society based on a widespread system of telecommunication, i.e., outside a society of the “spectacle”. In order to be successful, in fact, a terrorist attack must be as “spectacular” as possible and seen by the largest possible number of people, because its actual sphere is not represented by the portion of material reality it manages to damage (the number of the victims, the buildings and vehicles destroyed, the practical inconveniences caused to the normal activities of a community, etc.), but rather by its capacity to terrorize the public imagination with images of destruction and insecurity. In other words, what counts for the terrorists is not what they really do, but what they manage to make us fear they could do.

With the 9/11 attacks, however, the tension between facts and representations has reached such an extreme that their normal relation – in which verbal and visual images reproduce a material event – got inverted, and the spectacle
has gained a grade of autonomy and sovereignty unknown until then, literally crumbling the concept itself of event as we used to know. By affirming this I don’t mean in any way to deny the tremendous material consistency of the terrorist attacks that took place the 11th of November 2001: independently from their reasons, their executors, their actual architects and the whole bunch of conspiracy theories, they are an undeniable, tragic matter of fact. From a critical standpoint, however, the bloody facts that happened on that date and the cultural formula “9/11” must be rigorously separated, inasmuch the former belongs to the domain of things, while the latter is made only by discourses and pictures. But here we’re not in front of the classic distinction between the facts and their delayed narrations: for the first time in history, in fact, on 9/11 facts and representations, the historical events and their mediated accounts, took place at the same time, giving rise simultaneously to two different kinds of event: on the one hand a “material event”, made by things and people (the attack itself) and, on the other hand, something I would call an “iconic event”, consisting in a “texture” of texts and pictures.

What is, in fact, the actual object of the formula “9/11”, which is its denotatum if not its textual/iconic proliferation as such in the media universe? For the billions of “tele–spectators” who have paradoxically attended without participating to that event (including the most New Yorkers), “9/11” had – and still has – no other reality then the plethoric mass of pictures and speeches around, above and about it. In this second order of reality, the spectacle found its most pure expression, overtaking by far the boundaries of material reality. Immediately after the first plane’s crash, in fact, when we all turned on our televisions, a continuous stream of information started to proliferate in the media sphere and is still going on.

It is starting from that moment, when we began witnessing the live broadcast of the whole attack (the second plane’s crash, the collapse of the towers, the contradictory images of the two other phantom planes, at the Pentagon and in the countryside nearby Pittsburgh) that we entered what I call the “spectacle of the society”, in which facts and media representations are not separated anymore, neither in space nor in time, but float in a “zone of in-discernment”, where they seem interchangeable. As we will see in the third part of the paper, it is in this fundamental “in-distinction” of the global spectacle of terror that a new political global order, based on a permanent “state of exception”, could have been established.
In the light of these considerations, if we stop over on the threshold of indistinction of the dialectical image known as “9/11”, we can observe how deeply it has shaken our fundamental assumptions about the space and time of an event: where and when, in fact, has “9/11” really taken place? If an “event” is something that happens, ad–venit, in a specific place at a given moment, what spatiality competes to the temporal index “9/11”? New York? Washington? The neighborhood of Pittsburgh? Or shouldn’t we better seek for it in the thousands of interviews, accounts and depositions gathered all over the world by the global media system, or in the incessant refrain of caricatural images (mostly file tapes) of generic “Arabs” burning (who knows where and when?) American flags?

Pushing forward these questions, one could doubt even what seems obvious overall: the temporality of 9/11. If one asks “when did that happen?”, is “September 11, 2001” a sufficient answer? Let’s think, for instance, to the so–called “amateur images” of the two planes’ crashes into the towers. As everyone recalls, they began to circulate only in the weeks and months after the attack. Here we encounter a truly unique cognitive phenomenon: the fact that our present memory of those tragic moments is largely composed (and is still being composed!) of images we have seen only later. In this process, the amateur videos we have watched even years later (together with the pictures we still haven’t seen, and even with the ones we’ll never see!), produce a kind of paradoxical retroactive synthesis of our experience, as if those moments had crumbled indefinitely over time, slowing down almost to a stop, to be collected piece by piece in our cognitive space like an endless mosaic.

In summation, if a material event is something that happens in a specific here and now, the peculiarity of the “iconic event” consists in the fact that it is what we could call an “absolute event”, inasmuch it is free from any defined space–time coordinates, but happens continuously, in a sort of “eternal now” and in an “ubiquitous here”. This is made possible by the fact that the reality in which it operates is not the material world of things and events, but the collective mind mediated by the incessant flux of texts and pictures of the media sphere. In this second order of reality one can voyage to his liking back and forth in space and time and manipulate indefinitely the texture of the events.

So, when we ask “what happened during 9/11?”, we should also ask what is still happening ever since, not only in the material reality, but in our perceptual lives. This is because there can be no spectacle without spectators; our minds contain the actual stage upon which the iconic events of the spectacle
take place. And so, how did every one of us take part in it? And most importantly, how did that event, this infinite event, reconfigure the relations among reality, truth, image, perception, society and politics? Because if, until 9/11, the representation could still be considered as a reproduction, although “spectacularized”, of the events, 9/11, for the first time in history, has been the spectacle itself to manifest itself in the physical reality, or better, to produce itself autonomously through the material reality, pushing the “society of the spectacle” to a limit beyond which there is nothing but “spectacle of society”.

Before concluding this part, I would like to dwell shortly upon a concrete example of the post–9/11 “spectacle of society”; I wish to analyze the great success, during the last decade, of the so–called “reality show”, based on the same inversion of facts and images we’ve just analyzed. In this kind of TV format, in fact, it is only when transformed into images that some individuals locked in a house “are doing something”, even while sitting on a sofa, defecating, or sleeping. The “eventness” of their otherwise insignificant actions is decreed by the presence of a camera and by the invisible glance of the witnesses/telespectators. The relation between material reality and media representation is thus turned upside down, and the bodies of the competitors become the physical media through which the spectacle can come to “reality”: in the spectacle of society, again, no longer do the facts find a representation in the images of the spectacle, but conversely, it is the spectacle itself that presents itself autonomously through the material reality, and namely through the ingenious brutishness of some human beings locked as lab rats.

The formula “reality show”, then, means that now the “show” itself, i.e., the spectacle, has finally become the “reality”: it doesn’t put on, as one can think at first, a show on real life but, on the contrary, the achieved autonomy of the spectacle. With reality shows, therefore, the exceptional “inversion” between events and images of the 9/11 has come to a sort of “normalization”, through a massive industrial application, and the spectacle has managed to shake off another bond of its annoying and uneconomic trade with material reality, to forge by itself its own “reality.”

*The permanent State of Exception and the absolute Enemy*

Whatever happened on the 11th of September 2001, even if it was actually the Martians of the film Independence Day to bring down the Twin Towers, that
A day has come into being a new world political order, based on the paranoid, autoimmune, protection against an internal, invisible and protean enemy.

While in first the decade of the XXI century, this enemy has been identified with “international terrorism”. Starting from the financial crisis of 2007–2008, it has been slightly turned into the spectre of a “global economic breakdown”. If we observe more closely these two seemingly disparate issues, we can observe their convergence in the narrative of the global spectacle. What is, in fact, the financial crisis if not a form of international terrorism? And isn’t international terrorism a global crisis as such? Two watchwords, “terrorism” and “financial crisis”, two emergencies supposedly neutral, located outside of politics – one in the realm of police, the other in the one of economics – through which the global capitalism, in order to maintain the status quo, has imposed its emblematically political decisions, smuggling them for mere technical matters thanks to an extra-political petitio principii.

Starting from the state of emergency generated by the 9/11 terrorist attack, this new world order has found a terrific source of legitimacy in what G.Agamben, returning to Schmitt’s theory of sovereignty, calls a permanent state of exception: “an attempt to include the exception itself within the giuridical order, by creating a zone of indistinction in which fact and law coincide” in order to “produce a situation in which the emergency becomes the rule, and the very distinction between peace and war (and between foreign and civil war) becomes impossible”. Therefore, after the ideological collapse of the nineties and the ineffective and systematically repressed attempts of the no global movement, the emergency of 9/11 has offered to Western regimes a great chance to redesign its political identity, deducing it conversely from the common effort against a new “enemy”, defined surreptitiously in apolitical terms.

It’s worth dwelling upon this last point, because put this way, it could seem that, after the “confusion” of the Nineties, we simply reentered the boundaries of the Schmitt’s political dialectics by identifying a new enemy with the classic Spinozian principle of the “omnis determinatio est negatio”. Such interpretation would mystify the very essence of this new enemy, and, together with it, of the new regime of the spectacle. The new “global” enemy, in fact, is devoid of all the features that properly define the ‘political’ enemy: it has no face, no identity, no nation, no flag, and no soil. It’s like a phantom (Derrida), or a clone (Mitchell), which insinuates itself into the social body mingling with it; no one knows who he is but it is certain that he is the “public enemy”, the enemy of any publicity, a
lethal danger for the unity itself of the global society, founded on the free trade, on the world trade, on the ideology of a world of trade. Therefore, who or what destroyed the World Trade Center is something beyond a regular ‘political’ enemy: he is an “absolute enemy”, an enemy of humanity, and fighting him/it is not a ‘political’ choice (and then questionable and disputable) but a moral obligation to be universally recognized, a crusade against an absolute evil to which all the the free (trade) world is called to participate.

And yet, so many decades ago Carl Schmitt had already clearly warned us against the danger of any claim of “humanitarian” war: “to confiscate the word humanity, to invoke and monopolize such a term probably has certain incalculable effects, such as denying the enemy the quality of being human and declaring him to be an outlaw of humanity; and a war can thereby be driven to the most extreme inhumanity”, we have witnessed this to the point of not fighting him directly anymore, whoever he is, but sweeping him away by using drones, cruise missiles and forbidden weapons, or torturing him with impunity. It is what happened, for instance, in the secret prisons of Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib, where such out of law practices have been declared by the U.S. authorities nothing but “standard operating procedures”.

In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, this “absolute enemy” has been identified with some figures a bit grotesquely but with a sure impact on the media. This can be seen in the “axis of evil”, led by the ineffable sheikh of terror Osama bin Laden and the “poker cards of the bad guys”. At a later stage, he (it?she?) was recognized in the archenemy of the U.S., Saddam Hussein. Although fanciful and arbitrary (particularly the latter, devoid of the least proof connecting him to the 9/11 attacks), these incarnations of the phantom enemy of the global order created by the propaganda of the spectacle have produced a great deal of devastating consequences in the “real world”, the one of things and people, and namely two of the most nefarious military campaigns in the history of the United States and the imposition of disputable counter-terrorism measures all over the planet, suspending the state of rights for an indefinite period of time.

Over the years, however, this “absolute enemy” has begun to reveal its (his/her) true nature, gaining more and more the blurred outlines of an “inner enemy”, bred in the womb of our society as an autoimmune disease, and as such impossible to eradicate. Furthermore, this device of the internal enemy, spectral (not to say “specular”) and indefinable, was already clearly readable in the dialectical image of 9/11, namely in the figures of the “terrorists”: all of Arab origin
but raised and educated in the U.S., where they also took the flying lessons to carry out the attack. In this respect, the fact that the identities of these people were real or fictitious – and the very fact that two commercial planes have really crashed into the Twin Towers and the Pentagon – is almost irrelevant: as we have seen, the symbols of the spectacle produce real effects independently of their referential consistency.

The figure of the “global terrorist” is therefore a surrogate of the system, a clone, like Dolly the sheep, which, as Mitchell points out, doesn’t frighten us because she is a wolf in sheep’s clothing, but precisely because she is a sheep in sheep’s clothing. But in what consists, exactly, the threat of such enemy? Why do we perceive it as “absolute”? In order to answer this question we must take a step back, and return to the first reaction after the 9/11 attacks, when the U.S. authorities identified the enemy with the so-called ”axis of evil”. As Derrida argued, this grotesque, almost childish, expression revealed much more about the real stakes of the war on terror than one could think at first glance: “there is, in fact, and from every quarter, an absolute ‘evil’ whose threat, whose shadow, is spreading. Absolute evil, absolute threat, because what is at stake is nothing less than the mondialization or the worldwide movement of the world, life on earth and elsewhere, without reminder”. This means that, in the age of terror, it is the world itself that is in danger, as horizon of collective operability, as social enterprise of creating and defending the fundamental human values.

Leaving aside all the philosophical speculations throughout the centuries on the concept of “world”, in this context it is sufficient to say that is not at all an absolute concept, but rather it is a contingent notion depending on the culture and on the epoch. From a logical standpoint we can call “world” any consistent set of elements endowed with sense, a definition that fits quite well also with the cultural concept of world, whose elements are represented by the basic shared values of a human community.

In short: as the logical world and the cultural one are not determinable once and for all; they are identified by the nature of their elements. When we talk about the “end of the world”, then, we are necessarily referring to the set of political, economic, ethical, social, religious, aesthetic values of an historically and geographically determined culture. It follows that the “absolute evil” (and the paranoid “war on terror” generated by it) is nothing but the fear of the civilization we belong to and of the end of its uncontested domain on the rest of the world.
In the late 60’s the Italian anthropologist Ernesto De Martino had recognized in the fear of the “end of the world” – identified in recent years by the system of the spectacle with the threat of Islamic terrorism first, and then with the global financial crisis – the “secularization of the Christian eschatological theme”, and therefore a structural element of the same culture that had produced the process of globalization, deeply rooted in its theological-political substrate. The “global terror” of the end fostered by the issues of terrorism and crisis, thence, can be read as both the “globalization of terror” – the spread worldwide of a diffuse sense of insecurity and distrust – and, especially, as “terror of globalization”, formula in which the genitive oscillates endlessly between subjective and objective, and where to be threatened is the project of our civilization as such, the whole intersubjective mundus in which we conduct our lives: as De Martino puts it, in fact, it is the “cultural apocalypse” underlying risk of globalization, its spectrum, its uncanny double.

How long is now?

On 9/11/2001 mankind lost another veil of its innocence, encountering a new point of no turning back, similar to those represented by Auschwitz, the “absolute horror”, and the atomic bomb, “the absolute weapon”. On that date, in fact, we all took part to what we can name an “absolute” event, since what happened is something “loose”, “untied”, and “independent”, from any space-time coordinate, from the hic et nunc an event must mach to be such, but that rather floats in a sort of endless and atopic present.

If in the “old” society of the spectacle a fact could rise to the dignity of “event” only when broadcasted in the media system (only when, by metonymy, transformed into images), with 9/11 this relationship has been inverted, making the texture of pictures and discourses produced and diffused by the digital media – with their indefinite proliferation in space and time – the event itself, to which the material reality is in some way subordinated. In the suspension of that dialectical image, thence, the “society of the spectacle”, after its “integration” with the fall of the Berlin Wall, has been turned into the “spectacle of society”, that it is both its conservation and overcoming, or, in Hegel’s words, its Aufhebung.

There’s a phrase written on the facade of the center Tacheles, the heart of the Berlin independent art: “How long is now?”, it says. In these words, beyond
their claim to be “cool”, I read all the despair of a time that seems to have lost any projection into the future, any ability to dream of a more authentic way of living the relationships, or to find a meaning for today that is rooted in a promise for the generations to come. It was as if those words were pronounced by a prisoner under torture. And yet, when is the spectacle itself to produce the history, how can we hope one day in the coming of the justice and the truth?

Let’s ask, then: how long is now? And then, how long will the eternal present of the post-9/11 permanent state of emergency last? How long will the historical forces we have unleashed – such as global terrorism, the financial crisis, the ecological risks – govern us before we will be able to rule on them? How much longer are we going to live in the shadow of that cursed event? When will it stop happening?

References


Chapter 21.

Ilaria Cattani

Borders and Tourism

This paper aims to analyze the relationship between borders and tourism and how these two factors can influence each other. By analyzing the examples of two islands, divided between two different governments, I seek to understand how international boundaries can influence tourism and what tourists should know before choosing a particular geographical area for their holidays.

International boundaries influence tourism in many ways. The flow of tourists, their choice of destinations, tourism development, different types of marketing campaigns and the extent of these campaigns are all affected by the nature of political boundaries. There are different types of borders, but here I concentrate only on political borders.

Borders of an important historic area are also important touristic attractions. Thinking about the Great Wall in China, Hadrian’s Wall in Great Britain, or the Berlin Wall in Germany, we can immediately notice that these places have an important effect on tourism, perhaps because they represent some relics of the past, but also because they are tangible frontiers of something that no longer exists. They were political boundaries.

Sometimes these frontiers divided two different worlds and political points of view, as it happened in Germany, where the Berlin Wall was the symbol of the global division between Communism (represented by Soviet Union) and Liberalism (represented by the United States). The people who lived in the two parts of Germany led completely different lives. They had different lifestyles, laws, and jobs—even if they had done the same things before the division. They could not see what happened beyond the wall that divided cities, people, and families. While the wall was functional, there was a military area to ensure that no one crossed the wall, especially from East Berlin to West Berlin. Now there is a museum, the Borderlands Museum, in Berlin, which has been erected near the remnants of the wall. Since the wall no longer exists (there are only some bricks), the government decided to create a red line instead of the line where the wall once stood, in order to remember what has happened and to create a new tourist site. It is a symbol of Berlin, and Germany in general, so all tourists
should visit it.

Political tourism, however, is not only associated with the past. Territorial features of the political present, such as border areas, can sometimes be turned into objects of curiosity for foreign visitors. In some situations, the boundary itself is considered as a symbolic marker of diversity and made into a local tourist attraction.

In general, we can say that some international boundaries have become tourist attractions. The International Peace Garden is one of the best examples in North America. In 1932, this botanic garden was formed straddling the border between North Dakota and Canada. It was strategically placed in the centre of the continent halfway between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. Each summer, more than 150,000 flowers are planted and ceremonies are held to commemorate the peaceful relations between Canada and the US. This garden is one of the most important tourist attractions in both countries. There are other examples of border cities, which are attractions themselves, as can be seen along the border between the US and Mexico. This border is so famous around the world that it is something that tourists want to see during their journey in that region.

There are different reasons why tourists decide to cross some international frontiers. They travel for leisure, business, and other reasons. One major reason is shopping. People cross the frontiers because on the other side they can buy something that is illegal on “their side” or because it is cheaper across a border. It can even be only because they can find something that does not exist in their country or because outside the border they are allowed to buy or to do something legally, which could include activities like gambling and hunting.

As stated earlier, tourist images of some border zones are emphasized by tourist guides or by marketing approaches. Thanks to these techniques, many tourists decide to travel to a precise border place only because they want to have the impression of being in two different countries or continents at one time. This is the reason why a lot of buildings or commemorative constructions have been built. They attract many tourists, who go there only to see these
monuments or to take photos. The best-known example in North America is the Four Corners Monument, where Utah, Colorado, Arizona and New Mexico meet. This is the only place in the United States where four states meet in one spot, and the exact location is marked with large granite, bronze and concrete monument that stands on a tiny corner of each state. Thousands of visitors stop by the site every year because they want to have the impression of being in four places at once.

Another example of how marketing strategies can influence the tourist vision of a place is represented by the Caribbean Island of Saint Martin/St. Maarten, which is bisected by an international boundary. This small island is politically divided between the French and Dutch governments. After centuries of battles during the colonial period, this island was divided between France and the Netherlands in 1817.

As two different European countries rule the island, the major attraction for tourists is that here they can see one island with two cultures; this peculiarity has become the most important element in the island’s tourism promotion. Guidebooks and travel writers promote St. Martin/St. Maarten as an international experience because in one island you can live a double experience; French and Dutch cultures and lifestyles take place at the same time. This is possible due to different cultural landscapes and types of tourist attractions. For example, the government on the Dutch side has allowed the spread of casinos, but on the French side they are not permitted; nude beaches are more common on the French side, but shopping facilities are better developed in the Dutch side. Languages should also be different (beaches and the names of the cities are written in French and Dutch), but it is very common there to speak English because of the tourist influence of the United States. It is so common that many of the native residents on the French side speak English at home—unique within borders of a French nation. It is the “metropolitans” from continental France who maintain the island’s French identity. Dutch is used on St. Maarten in schools and by the administration. Spanish has become common with a wave of immigrants from the Dominican Republic. One would think that natives too should be quite different, but since most of them have African origin they speak American English and have the same customs. There are also two different currencies, but people there prefer using American Dollar, which is the official currency on the Dutch side (Timothy 2002).
As we have spoken about cultural landscapes but also about different laws, we can imagine a precise border which has the role of dividing the two sides of the island. Unfortunately, it is not like that: there are no physical boundaries to delineate the two parts of the island. Even if this island lacks a dividing border, many souvenirs and guidebooks emphasize the peculiarity of this island. Everywhere, one can find two different flags and souvenirs that have a border on them to point out that two different realities live in one single small island. On the official website of the island, the border is emphasized as soon as you look at the homepage: “SINT MAARTEN - SAINT MARTIN provides vacationers the opportunity to enjoy three distinct cultures on one 37 square mile island. There is the delightfulness and soberness of the Dutch on one side, the savoir-faire of the French on the other, and the blending of both with exotic native heritage.” (“The Island’s Information Portal”)

There are no political restrictions for people who want to cross the border, but in order to develop the tourism market this border is used only to promote this small island of the Caribbean Islands.

In the previous example, one can examine a small island where a border is not a problem, but a way to promote its image all over the world. To show that this is not always the case, we must turn to another island in the Mediterranean Sea, which is also divided between two states. This is the island of Cyprus, which has been divided into Greek and Turkish halves since 1974.

During the 1960s, Cyprus was an important tourist destination thanks to its position in the Mediterranean Sea and its natural landscape. Approximately 20,000 tourists arrived in Cyprus in 1960. That number had grown to nearly 140,000 in 1970 and by 1973, foreign tourist arrivals had doubled to nearly 300,000. The island’s two main resorts, Famagusta and Kyrenia, contained 65% of the island’s hotel bed capacity in 1973 and hosted 63% of the island’s inbound tourists in the same year. This success was interrupted in July 1974, when Turkish military forces entered the island and many lives were lost at the
hands of both the Turks and the Greeks. The intervention was sparked by coup against the country’s leader, organized by extremists who desired unification with Greece. The Turkish population of both Turkey and Cyprus feared that the coup would lead to a rapid annexation of Cyprus by Greece. After negotiations failed to produce the desired outcomes, the Turkish government landed military forces on the island and occupied the northern third of the landmass. Once the occupation was complete, the Turkish military declared a ceasefire line in August 1974. After 1974, the political landscape of the island changed dramatically. The demilitarized zone extended 180 kilometers from Kokkina in the northwest to the southeast coast just south of Famagusta (Timothy 2002).

This barrier, known as the Green Line or Attila Line, has become a major impediment to tourism in Cyprus. The best beaches and the two aforementioned resort communities, Kyrenia and Famagusta, were cut off from residents of the south and the main flow of tourists by the boundary. Tourism declined sharply immediately; tourist arrivals measuring nearly 300,000 in 1973 immediately dropped to 150,000 in 1974 and 47,10 in 1975 as a result of the conflict. This downward trend, however, lasted only a couple of years. Since 1976, the Republic of Cyprus, which is the southern half of the island, has experienced a remarkable recovery with regard to its tourism industry. Several new resorts have been developed in attractive locations and annual tourist arrivals regularly reach into the millions.

This can be contrasted with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, which is recognized only by Turkey, where tourism has grown only recently. This is due in part because the Turkish authorities emphasized only the development of agriculture, textile milling and food processing instead of tourism. Another factor is represented by the boundary restriction imposed by Turkish authorities. It is not easy to cross this border. There is a military area before the border and if you want to cross from north to south Cyprus you can do it only on foot. The best passage is in the capital Nicosia through the Ledra Palace Hotel (“Il Confine Nord/sud”). A white iron gate marks the entry to Turkish Cypriot-controlled territory, after which lies the fairly innocuous Turkish Cypriot checkpoint building. A prominent sign welcomes you to the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’.

There are a lot of elements that let one understand why this division is so strong. One of the major reasons is that geographical maps of north and south Cyprus are completely different. When one looks at the Cyprus map us-
ing the official website, which is interactive, one can find hotels, beaches, pubs, and museums, but also churches, monasteries and mosques only in southern part. The northern side is not mentioned. Everything finishes along the border. When we control the same map from the northern part, we can see that in the southern part there are only mosques—only the symbols of Muslim religion belonging to Turkey. It is a way to continue the same culture and origin. Once you are on the island, you can see tangible elements of borders, because in the capital there are a lot of symbols of division. One of the notable one is the use of different languages, underlining the division between cultures.

This is the reason why tourists must be informed before traveling in these regions. Travel guides and official websites promote Cyprus as a beautiful island, full of magnificent beaches, works of art and a region where different cultures have met during centuries. It is interesting that there is one official site called “Visit Cyprus” that is related only to the southern part of the island, which does not mention problems of boundaries, and another website named “North Cyprus” where there is information on the Turkish part only. Analyzing these two tourist websites, we can see that the history of the island is not mentioned and so tourists who read only these web guides perhaps do not know that the island is divided in two parts and therefore also do not know that they cannot cross the border wherever they want without problems.

At the same time, this point allows us to understand that tourism has become an important market for Cyprus and thus its peculiarity of being divided is not used as touristic attraction. The boundaries are not mentioned at all because nobody wants to scare tourists. The most important point that the tourist industry wants to communicate is that Cyprus is a wonderful island, peaceful and full of beautiful beaches, with a perfect climate year-round where they can enjoy a unique experience. In this case, having a border can be considered something negative that could deter tourists and so often it is hidden. Experts of communication know that a recent war or, more generally, a place characterized by political tension can be seen as something to avoid by tourists because they prefer spending their holiday in a so-called peaceful and beautiful place. That is the reason why people promoting Cyprus tend to omit the problem of the border.

In conclusion, it is possible to say that boundaries strongly influence tourism for reasons related to laws, rights, safety and problems. Sometimes guidebooks or travel agencies use border areas to promote their product, promoting the idea that different cultures can mix easily and peacefully. Borders in general are
attractive places, at first because they give the impression to be in two or more places at one time, live two or more cultures at one time. Maybe they are attractive only because people are curious to know about the reality on the other side of the border.

References

Chapter 22.

Arianna Brusadelli

Campione d’Italia: a Tax haven beyond the Border

This paper wishes to analyze the Municipality of Campione d’Italia and the relationships this town has with its political, geographic, cultural, administrative and touristic borders. This “exclave,” situated in a particular position between Switzerland and Italy, is a clear example of the concept of boundary. It is also interesting to emphasize how these two states can live in a condition of cosmopolitan integration where there are borders but in a way, there aren’t.

An exclave is a small territory completely isolated from the state that it politically belongs to. It is part of the territory of a sovereign State located out of the nation’s borders (the opposite to enclave). Generally, there are three types of exclaves. First, there are a large number of exclaves that are simultaneously exclaves in relation to the state that surrounds them (e.g. Büsingen, Kleinwalser-tal, Livigno); second, there are exclaves that represent simultaneously semi-enclaves (e.g. Ceuta, Gibraltar, Melilla); third, there are pure exclaves, entities that are surrounded by more than one foreign state and, consequently, are not exclaves in relation to these states (e.g. Cabinda, Nakhichevan). The Campione d’Italia exclave belongs to the first category (Vinokurov, 2007). These enclaves/exclaves are characterized by four fields of uncertainty: first, there is an uncertainty of access, and second, the classical fields of internal policy, such as transportation, postal service, medical services and education are often transformed into the problems of foreign politics by the mere existence of an enclave. Third, the political and economic uncertainty and the long transit routes to the exclave from the home country contribute to the economic complexity of an enclave/exclave situation. Fourth, the uncertainty of the future prospects of an enclave/exclave causes low immigration and high emigration, leaving an enclave with a senescent population (Nies, 2003).

To determine what part of the territory is the mainland and what part is the exclave, we have to consider the relative location of the country’s capital, the relative size of territory and the relative size of the area’s population. (Vinokurov, 2007).

The importance of enclaves in international relations is far beyond their
small size in terms of population and land. It is not restricted to the people who live in them, but goes beyond it, influencing the bilateral relations of their respective mainland and surrounding states. Enclaves may cause severe disruption of otherwise constructive and peaceful relations. The conditions of isolation, typical of the case of enclaves and exclaves, have helped the creation of an identity system that is completely different from the culture that characterizes the territories all around it.

Italy has only one international exclave, Campione d’Italia in the province of Como (in northern Italy), completely surrounded on all sides by Swiss territory. Campione d’Italia is an Italian Municipality in the Lombardy region, occupying a position within the Swiss canton of Ticino, separated from the rest of Italy by Lake Lugano and mountains. It is a small area of 1.7 km² with about 2,689 inhabitants, with a density of 1,368.8 ab./km². The exclave is less than 1 km at the shortest point from the rest of Italy, but it is impossible to cross the border passing through the lake without crossing into Switzerland.

The history of this town is long and old: in 777 AD, Totone, a dealer of a rich Lombard family, left the territory of Campione for the Monastery of Saint Ambrogio, in Milan. This act created a special relationship between Campione and Milan: when Ticino chose to become part of the Swiss Confederation in 1798, Campione’s people chose to remain part of Lombardy, which subsequently became part of Italy in 1859. After the Second Independence War and the creation of the Kingdom of Italy, the Swiss and the Italian Governments revised the border that was already established with many difficulties with the Treaty of Varese (1752). Even as Ticino was fully absorbed into the Helvetic Republic, Campione maintained its ancient privileges, remaining part of the Cisalpine Republic. The
new Convention of October 5, 1861 provided the transfer of the Coast of Saint Martin to Switzerland, on the other border of the lake. From 1861 onward there were no further changes. The agreement led to an increasing symbiosis of Campione’s economy with Switzerland’s, causing Mussolini to assert the exclave’s “Italianness” in the 1930s by adding the epithet d’Italia, and by building an ornamental gate at the entrance to the town. Mussolini carried out several public works in order to make the town more attractive. Today, the entrance to the town is clearly announced by the Campione Gate that stands on Campione territory. Immediately south of the gate is a brick line in the road that closely follows the border.

![Fig.2: Gate seen from Swiss territory looking into Campione](image1)

![Fig.3: Boundary’s marker territory looking into Campione](image2)

When discussing borders and frontiers, we always think of problems with integration between two parts that are usually completely different. Borderlands become symbols of power: they are examples of the boundary of the sovereignty that inscribes the territorial limits of states. The negotiation of state power is a central motif in any narrative of the world’s borderlands, but it is certainly not the only one. A cultural focus on international borders can illuminate the role of border identities and regions; borders exert a powerful influence and define how people think as well as what they do.

The situation of the Italian and Swiss border isn’t the result of a military invasion or a divided territory. The exclave of Campione d’Italia represents a political and economical partition that has influenced the development of an area that is considered a tax haven.

In the town there is strong evidence of both Italian and Swiss influences: from the past until now, there has been integration and coexistence between cultures, but there are some elements that remained typical of one of the two States. Currently, car plates are not Italian, but Swiss; similarly, the telephone system is almost entirely operated by Swisscom, meaning that calls from Italy
and all other countries outside Switzerland (with very few exceptions such as calling the city hall) require the international dialing code for Switzerland (+41) and the Ticino area code (91). Mail may be sent using either a Swiss postal code or an Italian one using Switzerland or Italy as destination country. It seems to be the land of contradictions: politics, education and electricity are Italian, but salaries and currency are Swiss. Maybe it is also this “multi-ethnic” aspect that makes Campione d’Italia a unique place.

The development of the post office between the boundaries is also interesting. After an agreement with the Swiss post office, on May 20, 1944, Campione began to use its own stamps. During World War II, the exclave was cut off from Axis Italy by neutral Swiss territory, so it issued and used these very unique stamps under authorization from the Italian delegation in Bern, Switzerland. They were issued in Swiss currency and they remained valid long after the war ended, through May 31, 1952. Italian stamps came back to the town of Campione only from March 10, 1957.

Ever since the stamps became invalid, Swiss stamps have been sold in Campione’s Italian post office for mail addressed to Switzerland and Italian stamps are sold for use on mail going everywhere else. Today there is a post office, managed by the town of Campione, where operations can be done with both the Italian and Swiss post systems.

![Mail from Campione d'Italia, 1948](image)

The most important quality linked to Campione is that it is the only Italian town exempt from the EU VAT, which has encouraged many people to settle there. From a customs point of view, Campione is considered a single territory within the Ticino Canton, which is why Swiss regulations are enforced in the import-export transitions from and to Campione d’Italia. This peculiarity allows the Swiss government to exert regulations upon a small Italian territory, which in turn exerts them upon the rest of Italy.

A remarkable importance in the economics of the exclave is the presence of the gambling casino. This casino was set up in 1971 by the Italian government with the explicit intention of being a “listening post” to extract sensitive military
information from foreign diplomats in a relaxed atmosphere. The structure was opened in 1933, becoming fulcrum and driving force of the economy of the exclave.

Its tax-exempt status arguably proved more useful to the Italian state: since its extension in 2007, the casino now has 56 tables and 500 slots, and is not only one of the largest casinos in Europe, it is also the largest employer of the exclave. Its revenue is more than enough to allow life in Campione to be pretty much tax-free. The new base of the casino, projected by the architect Mario Botta, is a modern and functional building that does not invade the town in a negative way. The complex, composed of three big buildings, is full of large rooms and open spaces. It was designed to receive tourists in a place that is efficient and comfortable.

The beauty of this Italian exclave in Switzerland does not belong only to the past; it also is an alive and futuristic place. Today, the influence of the casino on the celebrity of the town is obvious; everyone who comes to Campione wants to go to the casino. The casino, together with the historical and environmental heritage of Campione and its cultural events, has the capability to attract a significant flow of tourism.

Campione represents the union between social life and relaxation, elegance and openness, leisure and culture: this uniqueness has made the town a destination for cosmopolitan tourists and base for cultural and sportive international events.

The closeness of Campione to Lugano, Switzerland, where the Mediterranean culture meets elements of the Helvetian “trilingualism”, accentuates the singularities of a territory without continuity with the State to which it belongs, and assures residents the typical Swiss comfort in terms of security, well being and welfare. The casino determines the economy not only of Campione d’Italia but also of the neighbor States. More than 65 percent of the inhabitants of Campione work in the casino and 150 are communally employed. These
employees pay lower taxes and they earn three times the salary of the average Italian employee. This is a privilege creates a fight against the higher cost of living that an Italian faces when he or she lives in Switzerland. As one can see it’s not only an issue of physical borders but also a kind of “identity border”! Campione d’Italia is not known for its borders and frontiers, nor is it known for problems arising to cross these boundaries; rather, it is a famous place in Europe and in the world because of tax exemption, which makes it a tax haven.

In Lombardy there is another town, Livigno, which is an extra-customs zone. This status has encouraged its touristic development since 1950. The customs situation created an irregular situation of “commercial tourism”, a considerable movement of people that come here to buy on the cheap. This situation can be noticed in the high density, structure and dimension of shops. West European small enclaves/exclaves, such as Baarle-Hertog, Llivia and obviously Campione, prosper on tourism and cross-border shopping.

Borders, and in this case Campione d’Italia’s borders, reflects in a way the diversity of two cultures, the Swiss one and the Italian one. Here, boundaries don’t want to discriminate but to create a special link of growth and integration between the two states. The fact that some laws and regulations are Italian and some Swiss, is the clear example that the exclave wants to take “the better” from each state, promoting a successful place.

Cosmopolitanism needs to be political and economical applied and, in a way, in Campione, it finds a positive and fertile breeding ground. All that Campione wants to offer is security, happiness, comfort, features which are very important not only for tourists but also for everyone who decides to cross the borders.

Tourism almost always involves the crossing of some political boundary: sub-national and international boundaries may have significant implications for tourism, especially in terms of planning, promotion and taxation. Campione is the synthesis of this concept and, probably, the achievement of the town born out of this.

In conclusion, Campione d’Italia can be considered a symbol of the political, social, economic, cultural and psychological effects of borders on tourism. It is the tool that explain the relationships between borders and tourism, the concrete case that demonstrate how borders need tourism and how tourism needs borders.

Campione, well known as tax haven, is an important identity that, differently from other cases (for example Kaliningrad) is respected, recognized and
don’t have problems of membership. There is no kind of conflicts: the exclave can be considered a happy island, symbol of an historical and cultural heritage, of a rich present and of a comfortable and touristic future. Boundaries are not contested: borders are only a physical barrier to enter and discover the identity that Campione has become: a tax haven or a touristic destination.

The idea to cross the state line is one of the push factors of tourism: so, visit Campione, a unique and attractive place where everything is possible!

References

Chapter 23.

Caleb Hamman

Visualizing Borders: Seeing Past Sectarianism in Irish League Football

During my first match at Cliftonville Football Club, I was struck by the architecture of the football ground. I stood on the terraces, along the southern length of the field, surrounded by young men in their late teens and early twenties. We faced the pitch, but we were separated from it by a wall of brick and wire. To our left, along the western width of the field, sat the visiting supporters. We were separated by a series of gates and fences and by a fifty meter dead zone of empty space. To our right, along the eastern edge of the pitch, sat the majority of Cliftonville supporters, those preferring the comfort of the stands to the terraces. Like us, those supporters would not be allowed to exit the stadium until ten minutes after the match had finished and the visiting fans had departed. Until then, Cliftonville supporters were literally locked inside the ground.

This was Solitude, the North Belfast stadium of Cliftonville Football Club. As an American, I was unaccustomed to this sort of divisive, fortress architecture in a sporting arena. However, I would come to see it as the norm for football grounds in Northern Ireland.

In the case of Cliftonville Football Club, stadium architecture amounts to a material manifestation of sectarian division. Of the twelve teams in Northern Ireland’s premier football league, ten are considered Protestant. Cliftonville is one of two “Catholic” teams. This means that more than ninety percent of all football games played at Solitude are between a Protestant team and a Catholic team. The division of space in the ground is thus, in effect, a sectarian division.

I spent eight months carrying out fieldwork at Cliftonville Football Club. During that time I attended 30 matches, home and away, spending most of my time with a group of young male Cliftonville supporters: about 25 individuals, most aged between 16 and 25.

The overwhelming majority lived in neighborhoods around North Belfast. All identified as working-class, and all identified as Catholic. I was with these young men at matches, on busses, at pubs, about the town, and so forth. It was with this group—who I will refer to as the “Cliftonville lads”—that my research
was concerned.12

I had come to Northern Ireland to research “youth and peacebuilding,” and I carried into the football ground certain assumptions about what I would find there and which of those things would be most important. Appadurai (1986) has identified “gatekeeping concepts” in anthropological theory, concepts that “seem to limit anthropological theorizing about the place in question” and that “define the quintessential and dominant questions of interest in the region” (357). Appadurai gives the example of caste in research on India. In anthropological studies of India, it is rare that “caste and hierarchy are not the sole points of interest” (360). In the case of Northern Ireland research, it can be strongly argued that sectarianism has functioned as a kind of gatekeeping concept. For example, the literature on youth in Northern Ireland is marked by a focus on issues surrounding sectarian division.3 Having read this literature prior to fieldwork, I arrived at Solitude expecting sectarianism to be salient among young supporters. This expectation was met, and subsequently reinforced, by the architecture of the ground, by the performances of fans, and by discourses of Irish League Football emanating from sports authorities and academics. Everything seemed to suggest that sectarian division was the main border at work at Cliftonville football club.

It took months of fieldwork before my perspective began to change. Eventually, I came to see Cliftonville as a place of numerous borders and border crossings. The setting was much more than the site of a seemingly impermeable sectarian border. Sectarian divisions were present, to be sure, but sectarianism was not the only border in operation. What was unique about sectarian divi-

1 It should be noted that I did not spend significant research time with young women. The reason for this is a simple one: the young men with whom I spent most of my time rarely interacted as a group with young women. Gender segregation among young people was the norm, especially during football matches. Though girl-children and mothers were not uncommon at matches, teenage girls and women in their early twenties were almost never present. Explaining this gendered segregation is not a task I take up in this paper, though it can be said in passing that the football ground is a location of considerable sexism.

2 Another notable feature of my research is that I did not spend any significant time with Protestant young men. This was not an ideological decision, but rather a methodological one. I would not have been able to discoverer many of the things I did if I had attempted to conduct ethnography at two football grounds (one “Catholic,” one “Protestant”), to say nothing of a bigger sample. This paper is perhaps the best evidence for this argument: moving back and forth between different groups of supporters, it is unlikely I would have developed a deep enough relationship with either group to allow me to see past sectarian divisions.

sions was the way in which focus upon them obscured the presence of other borders and border crossings. The sectarian border was so visible that it effectively rendered invisible other divisions and their negotiations.

This paper comments on the visibility of borders by examining borders at play at Cliftonville Football Club. It is shown how borders and border meanings are revealed through narrative, and how narrative can construct and deconstruct borders. At Cliftonville, focus on sectarian divisions obscures other borders and border crossings. This paper gives particular attention to one such obscured border: a border between the mundane realities of everyday life and the fantastic elements of football—a border young Cliftonville supporters attempt to erect in various ways, but ultimately a border they cross and trespass.

Visibility and Borders

Certain borders can be more visible than others, especially to a researcher in a heavily researched setting such as Northern Ireland. In contexts like these, a particular border may appear so salient that it risks rendering others borders invisible.

How do certain borders become more visible than others? Rosaldo (1988) has identified “zones of cultural visibility and invisibility” in the doing of anthropology. The thrust of Rosaldo’s argument is captured by his thought experiment, a “Handbook for Young Anthropologists.” The handbook advises thus:

Go to India for hierarchy, New Guinea for pollution, Oceania for adoption, Africa for unilineal descent, and so on across the globe. Conversely, those interested in the unilineal descent group should steer clear of the Philippines where they’ll only be afflicted by the cognatic problem (Rosaldo, 1988: 79).

Similarly one might go to Northern Ireland for sectarianism. Rosaldo’s point here is not that such generalizations are baseless or useless. Rather, it is a matter of distortion and exclusion:

The question is one of limits: Where do these typifications yield insight? How do they exclude certain problems from ethnographic study? To what extent can they be understood as ideology? (Rosaldo, 1988: 79)

This issue is not the accuracy of the generalizations. Rather, it is the possibility of a typification characterizing a place to such a degree that other phenomena in the setting are overlooked and ignored. Zones of cultural visibility and invisibility are produced. The invisible includes the “cultural phenomena that
escape analysis because they fail to conform with standard expectations about the typical and authentic” (Rosaldo, 1988: 79).

Here, I want to suggest that Rosaldo’s points about zones of cultural visibility and invisibility are relevant to the study of borders. Certain borders can dominate a researcher’s vision, obscuring and making invisible other border phenomena.

By the term “border” I mean to suggest both material and immaterial borders. Newman (2006) notes that borders are difficult to define. Different disciplines have used the term “border” in different ways. Geographers, political scientists, and international relations scholars have tended to focus on physical boundaries and the political and natural processes influencing their demarcation (Newman, 2006: 145). Although anthropologists and sociologists have not ignored borders in this sense, they have tended to conceptualize borders differently, namely as distinctions and differences between individuals, groups, spaces, and meanings, often at the level of everyday life (Newman, 2006: 147). These are the “personal, often invisible to the eye borders, which determine our daily life practices to a much greater extent than do national boundaries” (Newman, 2006: 148).

Despite differences among disciplinary conceptions of borders, certain interdisciplinary trends have emerged. While borders have traditionally connoted separation and division, there has emerged an emphasis on borders as sites of bridging, meeting, and crossing (Newman 2006: 149-152). Borderlands are seen as potential producers of hybridity (Newman, 2006: 151). Emphasis is placed not only on the border as a point of separation, but also on the bordering process, how borders are “demarcated and managed” and reproduced (Newman, 2006: 148).

In this paper, I am mostly concerned with borders in what I have identified as the anthropological sense: as everyday, often immaterial sites seemingly about difference and distinction, but also containing possibilities for hybridity and trespassing. These borders are real for individuals if they experience them as such. They manifest materially, but their origins are in narrative, experience, and meaning.

Sectarianism: A highly visible border

Since the outbreak of the Troubles, the study of borders in Northern Ireland
has been marked by a concentrated focus on a particular border: the sectarian border, or what has been called the “community divide” (Whyte, 1990) or the “sectarian divide” (Jenkins et al., 1986). This border is typically understood as a binary division between Catholics and Protestants, the former characterized as nationalists desiring a united Ireland, the latter as unionists wishing to maintain the Northern Irish state as part of the United Kingdom.

This sectarian border is material and metaphorical. It is material in that it finds physical expression in Northern Ireland, most saliently in urban, territorialized spaces marked by flags, murals, painted curbs, and other symbols. The border is metaphorical in that it also operates immaterially, influencing thought and action, what is done, what is said, and what is left unsaid.

Researchers have characterized the sectarian divide as influencing nearly every aspect of Northern Irish society (Whyte, 1990). Sectarianism has been the predominant lens through which social and political study of Northern Ireland has been conducted since the outbreak of the Troubles. So much has this been the case that John Whyte’s canonical analysis of the Troubles could simply be entitled “Interpreting Northern Ireland” when it was published in 1990. This text – perhaps the most widely regarded in the regional literature – is an exemplary case of a sectarian reading of Northern Irish society. The first half of Whyte’s book is devoted to analyzing how the “community divide” is expressed in religion, economics, politics, and psychology. The second half of the text argues that the community divide is the driving force behind the Northern Irish conflict – an interpretation that has become widely accepted. The point here is not to criticize Whyte’s work, but rather to note it as indicative of an understandable tendency to make highly visible the sectarian divide when mapping Northern Irish society in social and political analysis.

The sectarian border in Irish League Football

As the sectarian border appears the most visible border in Northern Irish society, so it appears in Irish League Football. The visibility of sectarian division in football is attributable to a number of sources, including academics and sports authorities.

The main border which appears in academic studies of football in Northern Ireland is the sectarian border. (Bairner, 1999, 2001; Bairner and Shirlow, 1998; Sugden and Bairner, 1991, 1993; Sugden and Harvie, 1995). For Bairner and
Shirlow, this focus is warranted:

The general relationship between politics and sport in Northern Ireland is already well established... The broad argument that the organization of sport in the province not only reflects but can also exacerbate sectarian attitudes and the politics of division cannot be challenged... (1997: 168)

It is argued that this “general relationship” between sport and sectarian division is especially salient in the case of football (Bairner, 2001). According to Sugden, “if there is one single sport which does most to emphasize the polarity of Northern Irish society it is association football” (1995: 208).

Government officials have also been focused on sectarian divisions in football. Legislation passed in 2011 criminalized sectarian chanting at football matches (Justice, 2011). The same legislation instituted a banning system whereby individuals convicted of engaging in football related violence or disorder would be barred from attending football matches for a period of at least three years. Disorder is defined in the legislation so as to include “stirring up sectarian hatred.”

In an interview I conducted with a senior sport official for the Northern Ireland government, it was revealed that the department—the Division of Culture, Arts, and Leisure (DCAL)—had asked for the 2011 legislation to be brought forward. The legislation’s provisions were designed to advance the department’s vision for football, namely to “bring in families and isolate the hooligan.” Furthering this goal was said to be the “theory behind our safety policies and justice and everything like that.” The abiding presence of sectarianism in football—and the need to confront it—was a reoccurring theme of the interview.

The Irish Football Association (IFA) has also targeted sectarian divisions in football. The IFA is the independent body which governs football in Northern Ireland. The organization’s strategic vision aims to “challenge sectarianism and promote football for all, creating a fun, safe, and inclusive culture” (IFA 2011). The IFA’s 2012 licensing regulations require all football clubs to adopt an “anti-racism/anti-sectarianism” policy (IFA 2012). Accordingly, clubs must declare “they will not tolerate any form of sectarianism, racially offensive behavior, or chanting” (IFA 2012: 22).

Academics and sports authorities in Northern Ireland are united in their identification of the sectarian border as the most pressing border at play in Irish League Football. They identify this border as a site of division. In the case of football, the sectarian border is not crossed, but rather is reified.
Visualizing a hidden border

Newman (2006) notes that it is through narrative that we perceive borders and the meanings borders have for others. Narratives shed light on the borders that are most real to individuals in everyday life. They reveal borders that may not appear on political maps or in research paradigms. Narratives can reveal borders usually invisible to outsiders, those unaccustomed to the setting or those who arrive burdened with assumptions. Meanings given to borders and to border experiences emerge through narrative. By listening to narratives, researchers can better understand whether borders believed to be important are really important to those in the borderlands. Different individuals and groups will attribute different meanings to a border. Some of these meanings may be what the researcher expects; others may be different. It may be the case that a border believed to be highly significant is, in fact, not so significant to those who negotiate it. Alternatively, the significance of a border may have shifted. Meanings may be more complex, or even unexpected. In an important sense, borders become real when they take on significance for groups and individuals. However, the significance of a border does not necessarily determine its visibility. Borders significant to those in the borderlands may be invisible to outsiders. This may be because outsiders have never negotiated the border. However, it may also be that those in the borderlands have attempted to hide the border from view. It is by attending to narrative that borders and border meanings can come into view.

Narratives, of course, cannot always be taken at face value. Interpretation is a difficult business (Geertz 1973). Performances are at play (Turner 1988). It can be difficult to discern the front stage from the back stage (Goffman 1959). Informants have their own agendas, especially in politically charged contexts such as periods during and after armed conflict (Robben 1995). Narratives are not only used to reveal borders and border meanings, but also to hide and obscure them. Individuals can publicly exaggerate the importance of a border. Conversely, they can understate, or choose not to reveal, the significance of a border they wish to hide. Whether narratives will be used to make borders visible or invisible is a reflection of context. However, the way a border is narrated always reveals something—whether directly or indirectly—about the meanings attributed to that border by the narrator.
Fuji’s (2010) notion of “meta-data” is meant to capture the indirect, unintentional revelations contained in narratives. Meta-data are the “spoken and unspoken expressions about people’s interior thoughts and feelings, which they do not always articulate in their stories or responses to interview questions” (Fuji’s 2010: 232). Forms of meta-data include silences, evasions, denials, inventions, and rumors. Meta-data is data because the saying and the unsaid can reveal as much, if not more, than the statement. To acknowledge meta-data is to acknowledge the “social and political landscape…shaping what people might say to a researcher” (Fuji’s 2010: 232). As Fuji argues from her own fieldwork in Rwanda, the connection between politics and narrative suggests that attention to meta-data may be especially important in settings emerging from armed conflict, where the “stakes…are usually higher than in non-violent settings (Fuji’s 2010: 232). The identification and interpretation of meta-data depends on the researcher’s immersion in the field. It is this that “transforms the researcher’s own sense of what is normal or credible” and “creates the opportunity to build trust and rapport” (Fuji’s 2010: 240).

Like narrative, meta-data can reveal borders and border meanings. In my fieldwork, it was silence—a type of meta-data—that provided the first hints of a hidden border. Silences suggested the presence of a border different from the highly visible, sectarian border that was presented in so many narratives, performances, symbols, and material divisions. What was suggested by silences was a less visible border: a border between the everyday and the fantastic. My informants, the young men of Cliftonville, had attempted to erect a border between the mundane realities of everyday life and the excitement and power they found in football and the weekend. They had attempted to build this border through silence. Consequently, it was silence that suggested its presence.

Silence has been recognized as an important phenomena in Northern Ireland (Donnan and Simpson 2007), though not in the way I present it here. Historically, silence has been discussed in relation to the Troubles. Silence about the conflict has been identified as a discursive norm, influencing what is said and what is unsaid in certain conversations. In Northern Ireland, for example, one does not typically ask a stranger whether she is Catholic or Protestant. Instead, one usually resorts to a process known as “telling”—a way of identifying individuals based on suggestive signs such as dress, speech, school, name, or neighborhood. For instance, a boy wearing a Glasgow Celtic football jersey will be identified as Catholic. Conversely, someone who refers to Northern Ireland’s
second city as “Londonderry” (rather than “Derry”) will be identified as Protestant. It is typically a transgression of a discursive norm to speak of sectarianism in everyday, public conversation, especially in shared spaces, such as the Belfast city center. If something is said, it will often be said in a lowered voice, or in an indirect way, even if the utterance is made in the security of a segregated neighborhood.

How are silences like these to be interpreted? Donnan and Simpson (2007) note that silences in Northern Ireland can have many meanings. Among them, they identify the silence of “fear and intimidation,” the silence of “stoic suffering,” and “the guilty silence of those who do not wish to incriminate themselves” (2007: 15). Yet none of these can sufficiently explain the widespread silences of so many individuals, many of whom have not been intimidated, do not suffer, and have no fear of incrimination.

Feldman (1991) has suggested that silences about the Troubles are connected to a desire to avoid contact with violence. According to Feldman, “silence in Northern Ireland expressed the need to avoid polluting contact with the economy of violence, with the exchange system of death” (Feldman, 1991: 110). Feldman suggests that individuals use discursive strategies like silence and secrecy to create alternative spaces for their own purposes:

In a colonized culture, secrecy is an assertion of identity and of symbolic capital. Pushed to the margins, subaltern groups construct their own margins as fragile insulations from the “center.” Secrecy is the creation of centers in peripheries deprived of stable anchorages. (Feldman, 1991: 11)

For Feldman, silence and secrecy are tactics for escaping the suffering of violence and marginalization. They create a space for the assertion of the self.

I do not wish to claim here that these are fair generalizations for silence and secrecy throughout Northern Ireland. However, I do mean to suggest that Feldman’s reading is a useful perspective for understanding the silences I encountered.

At Cliftonville, the young men were not silent about sectarianism. Sectarian division was visible and vocal: in flags, symbols, songs, gestures, sayings, jokes, stories, and so forth. To put it simply, it could not be missed. I invoke Feldman in order to suggest that sectarianism – at least as it was being performed publicly most of the time – was not, for the young men of Cliftonville, associated with an “economy of violence” or an “exchange system of death.” Rather, if anything was identified as such, it was everyday life, the world of work and life at home,
a universe of an eternal, mundane present in which the future was dead and consequently one did not tend to feel purpose and hope but rather powerlessness, immobility, and boredom. This was the “economy of violence,” and it was here deep silence could be found. Everyday life was not spoken of at Cliftonville. The quiet was an active process, an understood, almost always observed rule, one that functioned to erect a fragile border between the unpleasant realities of quotidian existence and the fantastic elements of that which was “Cliftonville.” Through silence a division was made, a margin on the margin, to paraphrase Feldman. A space was carved out for “the assertion of identity and of symbolic capital.” An alternative universe was created, maintained by a tenuous border which depended on ignoring that which lay beyond.

Most of my time in the field was not spent standing on football terraces watching matches. Rather, it was spent in pubs, bars, and the Cliftonville social club, sitting around a table of pints with the Cliftonville lads. It was during these occasions that I was introduced to what is known as “the craic.” Craic can connote a number of things in Northern Ireland. It can refer to a good time, something fun or enjoyable, such as in the expression “that was good craic.” Similarly, craic can describe an individual, as in, “he’s good craic when he’s had a few pints.” The term is also encountered in the common greeting, “What’s the craic?”—similar to “What’s up?” or “What’s going on?” Relevant here is a fourth sense of the word: craic as a kind of conversation. Conversational craic are marked by humor, banter, and storytelling. They tend to be prolonged, and to involve groups. Conversational craic is facilitated by drinking alcohol, and for this reason is often found in pubs and bars.

Every day of a football match—and often on the days before and after a match—I spent hours engaged in conversational craic with the Cliftonville lads. These sessions appeared ideal for an ethnographer. Everyone knew I was an anthropologist, but the only effect this seemed to have on conversation was to provide a basis for banter. It appeared as if little or nothing was being taken off the conversational table due to my presence. I was especially struck by the willingness of the lads to speak about sectarian issues. Where I had expected silence, I found stories, explanations, and even humor forthcoming. I was presented with characterizations of Protestants and Catholics; narratives of the Troubles; mental maps of territorialized spaces; first-hand stories of fighting and trespassing; and questions about my own support for Irish republicanism. During my first weeks at Cliftonville, the popular joke was to instruct to me
to go about Belfast saying “Tiocfaidh ár lá,” an Irish Republican phrase meaning “our day will come.” This conversational discourse worked alongside other performances, symbols, and material divisions on the football terraces to make sectarianism highly visible. It seemed the most important border at work in the setting, and that those in the borderlands were eager for me to know about it.

Many weeks of craic had passed before I began to notice the silences. Our conversations touched on sectarian issues from time to time, but mostly they concerned other topics: football, funny stories, fishing, women, vacations, headlines, sport bets, and tales of adventure from previous weekends. Given the range of conversation, certain silences became increasingly apparent over time. A number of topics were noticeably absent: namely, anything concerning work, school, and the family. The everyday, the mundane, the quotidian – these were covered in silence. The only way I could learn about these dimensions of life was to raise the question myself, typically off to the side in a private conversation.

The issue was not that everyone except me already knew what there was to know: where people worked, where they lived, what their plans were for the future, and so forth. People were familiar, but the silences did not arise from familiarity. In the craic, the same old stories can be rolled out again and again, even if everyone has heard them before. Silence surrounded the mundane not because everyone already knew it, but because, in an important sense, everyone already knew what it was about, and what it was about had no place at Cliftonville, on the football weekend, on the favored side of a fragile border continuously erected through silence, a border meant to quarantine the everyday and thereby create a space for something else. It was a place for the making of alternative meanings, a place for the assertion of the self.

Over time I was able to learn more about the everyday lives of individuals. In private conversations, and on occasions when the border was transgressed and silences were lifted, I was presented with narratives of life in North Belfast. Most of the Cliftonville lads still lived with their parents, even those in their early twenties. Most had jobs, but did not have university education. Several worked as clerks and servers. There was a welder, a plumber, and an electrician. A number of individuals were youth workers – yet none of them ever mentioned this until I asked, despite my well known interest in “youth culture.” There was a computer programmer and an unemployed drug dealer – both sorts of jobs were rare. Some of the lads were still in secondary school, though this
did not seem to prevent them from drinking alcohol or from attending special matches on school days. Reflections on work and education were rare. However, several sentiments were shared by many. Belfast was said to be “shite” as a setting for both work and leisure. Many individuals contrasted Belfast with Australia, where they believed better opportunities could be found. Some were prepared to leave Northern Ireland if given the chance, while others preferred to stay at home despite their frustrations. Obtaining a visa was identified as an issue. Several individuals seemed to know the process intimately. It was complained that any degree of criminal record – even “lifting a bag of crisps” – could make a visa application unsuccessful. The lads appeared to share a belief that they – as a group of working-class young men from North Belfast – were viewed with suspicion, unease, and even hostility by others, especially by adults. These assumptions were manifest during nights out in Belfast, when the lads would debate whether or not they would be allowed into certain pubs in the city center, ostensibly nothing at issue other than their age and their sex and the size of the group.

What emerged from narratives like these was a contested, yet collective story about everyday life. It was characterized by social and spatial immobility; pessimism about the future; boredom; marginalization from spaces of power and privilege; vilification of working class young men; and entrapment. It was a fragile story, one not free from contradictions. Few would agree to it without reservation, and even they might not characterize their lives in such a way publicly. A popular Cliftonville football song proclaims “North Belfast is wonderful.” In this and other ways, individuals revealed a strong sense of communal and territorial pride. Yet behind this discourse lay the silences.

Silences simultaneously marked and reified a border. One side of this border was meant to contain the mundane realities of everyday life. With these held in check, the other side of the border could become an uncontaminated space of fantasy, escape, and agency. This was the place for football and all the phenomena accompanying it. Whereas the young men identified boredom, powerlessness, and marginalization with everyday life, they associated excitement, assertiveness, and mobility with football. The lads spoke of Cliftonville not only as a football team, but also as a family, an activity, and a place of belonging. That it was not about football as such became apparent over time: matches could be skipped for better craic, groups might leave games early to drink pints at the pub. Away matches were considered by many to be better than home match-
es, for they allowed revelry on the bus and a chance to leave Belfast. The bus, like the football terrace, constituted a space under the young men’s control. In these places they would sing and say whatever they liked. They would drink alcohol on busses and smoke pot on football terraces – breaking the law in both cases. Disregard for law and order was not uncommon: breaking into a football ground, urinating on the street, or stealing sweets and sunglasses from a petrol station. The prospect of hooligan violence was a source of excitement for many, though fights tended not to materialize. The use of ecstasy and cocaine was not uncommon, though many abstained from taking hard drugs. However, the heavy use of alcohol was common to all. I point out these practices not to vilify the young men, but rather to show how, by a variety of actions and performances, the boredom, immobility, and powerlessness of everyday life were contained, making room for football to provide a different kind of space.

For the Cliftonville lads, Cliftonville football is about much more than sport. It involves a diversity of experiences and relationships, activities engaged in to different degrees by different people for different reasons. Nonetheless, emerging from it all is what Sewell has called a “thin coherence” of meaning (1999), one sufficiently legible to be distinguished from the meanings attributed to everyday life by the young men of Cliftonville.

**Conclusions**

In this paper I have suggested that borders assume different degrees of visibility, and that the visibility of borders is linked to narrative. Narratives not only suggest border locations and border meanings, but also can be used to create borders, through strategies like silence. Borders constructed by silence and secrecy can be difficult to visualize for this reason alone, but they can also be difficult to visualize due to the play of forces that demanded reticence in the first place. Conversely, other narratives can make borders highly visible: the stories of groups and individuals in the borderlands, and the stories of outside observers and researchers.

Borders and border meanings may emerge through narrative, but the identification and interpretation of borders remains a difficult task. In the case of Cliftonville Football Club, many narratives work to make the sectarian border appear the most visible in the setting, from the stories of fans, to the material divisions of the football ground, to the discourses of sport authorities and ac-
ademics. In this paper I have tried to suggest not so much that the sectarian border is illusory at Cliftonville, but rather that it is made highly visible to those surveying the setting – perhaps more visible than it ought to be given the meanings of football for young Cliftonville supporters.

To observe so many stories, symbols, songs, material divisions, and discourses, and then to suggest that all of this visibility might be a bit too much, a little deceptive, a pronunciation mismatched to the meanings of the setting, is to offer an interpretation depending on a close reading of narrative, one attending to the saying and the unsaid as well as the statement. The silences of young Cliftonville fans suggested a border other than sectarianism at work around football. It was a border that blocked off the everyday and the mundane and associated meanings of boredom, powerlessness, and immobility. With these contained, the other side of the border could constitute an alternative space, one for excitement, movement, and assertion.

Of course it cannot be so neat as that. It certainly was not so in the field. The erection of the border was a collective process. Construction was a mixture of successes and failures. Not all participated, and those who did participate were not uniform in their motivations or their visions. The act of division was built on contradictions. The young men were not powerless in their daily lives. There was mobility, even fun in the mundane – though perhaps not as much fun as might found in football. On the other side of things, the lads were contained and controlled as football supporters. They were policed and put under surveillance. Tensions existed between the young men and the club management. There were days when the team lost, when the weather was terrible, and when friends did not show up. Nonetheless, all of this appeared as peripheral to most.

The border was not without its violations and transgressions. Border crossings occurred: times when silences would lift, or when worlds would collide. However, in an ironic sense, it was during times of border crossing that the presence of the border was most starkly revealed.

One Friday evening I met two of the Cliftonville lads at a pub in the Belfast city center. They had experienced a frustrating week at work – a topic they broached in our conversation. After a few minutes of the discussion, one of the young men remarked that the subject was “depressing” and suggested we should “talk about something else.” This was a discursive pattern in our conversations – but in this instance it took on a rare explicitness. Typically, if the border was crossed, it was hastily repaired, usually unconsciously. If the craic was
dwindling, someone would intervene automatically, steering the conversation back onto its usual course by renewing the banter or by rehearsing a story. In this particular case, however, the act of trespassing was identified explicitly, and a conscious judgment was made by the group to reinstate the border.

How borders are visualized carries consequences for those in the borderlands. Authorities have instituted legislation and rules designed to remove sectarianism from football. What this amounts to in practice is a threat of removing young men from football matches, for it is young men who are most heavily inscribed with the discourse of hooliganism, sectarianism, and anti-social behavior. On the maps of authorities, sectarianism appears the most visible border in the football ground. What is missed on these maps are other borders, such as the border discussed here between everyday life and football. Because they have not visualized this border, authorities run the risk of counterproductivity. By removing young men from football in the name of sectarianism, it is possible authorities will intensify the threat they attempt to eliminate. If young men are deprived of football, they will be forced to search elsewhere for power and identity. In places like North Belfast, sectarianism – including sectarianism of the most extreme sort – is a performance readily available for adoption outside the football ground. It is because the sectarian border is so visible to authorities – and other borders so invisible – that they overlook the role of football as a constructive space for young men to assert themselves and to find meaning in relatively peaceful fashion.

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Chapter 24.

Alessandra Lafranconi

**How do cultural aspects affect the allocation and use of investments, therefore the real development of developing countries?**

From the 1970s on, a huge flow of money has been going from Northern to Southern Countries, in the form of multilateral aid (World Bank grants and loans), bilateral aid (official development assistance), private investments (foreign direct investment, portfolio investment and bank lending) and international assistance from foundations. In the latest years, with the lowering of both economic and physical borders, and the consequent increasing mobility of workers, personal remittances have become a consistent source of finance, too. Microfinance, enabling micro-entrepreneurs to start and maintain small businesses, is also believed to be an effective instrument to deliver wealth to the poorest.

The nature of personal remittances, micro-grants and micro-credits ensures that these money flows will better the social condition of those receiving financial aid, at least in most cases. This doesn’t hold true for official and large-scale financial projects, either public or private.

Some clamorous examples include corruption on the part of receiving governments and the redirected flows of international aid through governments’ own pockets rather than to the officially agreed projects. In addition, there is the problem of the environment-damaging projects undertaken by private investors, thus worsening the living conditions of the natives instead of bringing in wealth. And finally, there are the numerous scandals involving national and international NGOs, taxed with inexperience and superficiality.

Even without recurring to the aforementioned cases, it is clear that different countries attract different types of aid, face different problems during the aid delivery process and ultimately show a different grade of progress.

Understanding why developmental aid doesn’t always succeed in delivering real development is challenging and requires the analysis of different insights. Economical aspects, such as the volatility of aid and the consequent risk of exposure to economic shocks are some aggravators. Personal reasons behind the investments, especially in the private sector, are crucial for the success or failure
How do cultural aspects affect the allocation and use of investments, therefore the real development of developing countries?

of development projects. Also, donor countries might have specific interests in financing certain types of projects: publicly subsidized financing has been justified on humanitarian, geopolitical, and commercial risk-sharing grounds. Recipient countries have the responsibility to attract investors, but also to allocate resources in the optimum way; therefore, not only the presence of natural sources, but also the creation of a positive economic and institutional environment plays a central role.

Cultural aspects lay behind the way individuals, and therefore countries, behave. In the field of study, cultural aspects are believed to influence the way donor countries, investors, and receiving countries allocate and use funds, thus affecting the real development of the recipient countries.

The aim of this paper is to analyze how different forms of aid vary greatly from country to country, and how this differentiation impacts countries in terms of real development. The paper will be structured in three sections: first, forms of capital inflows will be described, a list of challenges encountered when delivering aid will follow, and finally, a few case studies will be presented, with particular attention to type of aid flow, encountered challenges, and policy recommendation.

**Financing development**

An effective finance structure for sustainable development will include sufficient sources of financing and proper methods of delivery. The focus of this section is an analysis of financing tools that support local economic development. There are several major sources of finance: official aid flows include bilateral support through official development assistance (ODA) and multilateral support through the World Bank (WB) group, government-backed export credit agencies (ECA) that ensure public financing to private companies, private financing or foreign direct investment (FDI), portfolio flows and bank lending, and remittances that are composed of institutional funds and personal earnings.

ODA is direct monetary or nonmonetary support given to a country by another country, from government to government, in the form of a bilateral arrangement. It quantifies the country’s “aid effort”, specifically provided by donor governments for the purpose of promoting economic development and welfare in the developing world, and it is administered by agencies of the donor country. Donor countries have different motivations in promoting bilateral fi-
nancial aid; in addition, there are quasi-legal “obligations” to do so. At the Earth Summit ’92, held in Rio de Janeiro, it was stated that “developed countries reaffirm their commitments to reach the accepted UN target of 0.7% of GNP for ODA and, to the extent that they have not yet achieved that target, agree to augment their aid programs in order to reach that target as soon as possible and to ensure a prompt and effective implementation of Agenda 21”. ODA was instituted in the 1970s, when the world’s richest countries agreed to give 0.7% of their GNI (Gross National Income) as official international development aid, annually. The total flow of ODA was around $50-60 billion/year in the 1990s; it reached $120 billion in 2009. The US is the world’s largest contributor (nearly 30 billion), but one of the smallest in terms of GNI percentage (0.21%). As a percentage, Sweden is the largest donor and one of the few countries to meet the International Aid Target of 0.7% GNI.

Loans from the WB-Group to governments and to firms as well constitute multilateral lending. Multilateral aid is channeled through international agencies, such as the WB and UNDP; it is funded by contributions from wealthy member nations and comes in the form of grants or, more commonly, loans. WB is a UN agency composed of 187 member-countries; it provides assistance to LDCs, from the 1950s with the creation of infrastructures and from the 1960s with the broader aim of poverty reduction. Within the WB Group, there are 5 different agencies: IBRD (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development), IDA (International Development Assistance), IFC (International Finance Corporation) are three of the five WB Group different agencies. Credit needs to be given to the WB-IFC, the first group to take account of the environmental and social implications of the projects they finance.

National-government-backed export credit agencies (ECA) loan or insure loans for specific projects undertaken overseas by their national firms or joint commercial ventures. They are governmental or quasi-governmental financial institutions that provide government-backed loans, guarantees and insurance, available for multinational enterprises based in their home country. They work with the aim of promoting international trade and investment, thus acting as a catalyst for private-sector activities. ECA currently finances approximately $430 billion of business activity abroad, of which $55 billion is devoted to developing countries. According to the ECA-Watch, these agencies are the largest public financers of large-scale infrastructure projects in developing and emerging economies. The projects they finance include large dams, coal and nuclear power
plants, mining projects, roads, oil pipelines, chemical and other industrial facilities, and logging and plantation schemes, thus provoking severe detrimental effects on the environment, social structures, and human rights of developing countries. ECA often ends up financing projects that have been classified as not eligible for grants, therefore rejected, from the WB.

Foreign direct investment (FDI) is self-financed investment, mostly financed by multinational corporations for specific commercial ventures. Together with bank lending and international portfolios, it constitutes the private capital flow of development aid. From the recipient country’s perspective, it is far less risky than bank lending, because foreign investors are sharing much of the recipient country’s risk, thereby reducing the country’s exposure to volatility. Moreover, FDI is a transfer of financial resources, technology, managerial skills, and market access. It can create new jobs, and resources are channeled to their most effective use; FDI not only increases economic growth by adding to a country’s capital stock, but it also influences the complex equilibrium between international trade, technological change, and growth, generating endogenous growth as well. FDI arrangements require an investment of time and effort, therefore high costs need to be born, and capital outflows may occur. In 2009, FDI was $2.1 trillion, of which $478 billion went to developing countries.

Private banks can issue loans to firms undertaking projects in developing countries, while portfolio equity flows consist of venture capital funds to start up new projects. Form the recipient country’s perspective, bank lending is riskiest type of capital inflow, followed by portfolio investments, because it is the first type of capital to be withdrawn in case of troubles (economic shocks, political turmoil) and the risk of such outflows is fully borne by the recipient country.

An alternative form of bank lending is microfinance, in the form of credits, grants, savings, and insurance services. They reach out to the world’s poorest giving a recipient the necessary capital to open a small business; positive attributes are not only the outreach, but also the long-time permanence and the potentially large-scale application.

Institutional remittances, as a form of international assistance from US and European foundations, are channeled through international institutions such as World Health Organization (WHO) and Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO). Funds are also transferred through international NGOs and public-private global health partnerships, such as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, or the GAVI Alliance, Global Alliance for Vaccine and
Immunization.

Private remittances are an important source of external development finance. Remittances are money flows arising from the cross-border movement of nationals of the country, as migrants or occasional workers. Remittances have been growing in terms of absolute volume and also in relation to other sources of external finance. They are the most stable source of external finance, as they provide crucial social insurance in many countries afflicted by economic and political crises.

Critical assessment of developmental aid

The focus of this section is the analysis of the main difficulties and obstacles encountered when financing the economic development of DCs and LDCs; finance flows do not take place in a perfect vacuum, but rather in a complex space, where economical and geo-political considerations play a huge role. Challenges routinely encountered are: volatility of developmental aid, government involvement, aid fungibility, conditionality, biased money flow, lack of effective coordination, and potential for capacity building. While the first aspect is merely financial, the others are related to cultural traits of donor and recipient countries.

The term “volatility” expresses the uncertainty of aid flows, which reduces the value of the flows themselves and has significant and negative effects on growth. All this holds true for both public and private money: for example, ODA has been found to be five times more volatile than GDP and three times more volatile than exports for the average recipient country. In recent years, ODA fell by 15 to 20 percent in real terms. The effects of this trend are seen at the macro level, where volatile ODA can negatively impact growth, and at micro level, where volatility can affect fiscal planning and investments, quantitatively and qualitatively. The consequences seen at the micro level are shared with other types of volatile flows, such as private capital flows. Bank lending is the type of capital more exposed to volatility, but portfolio and FDI aren’t free from volatility, therefore the receiving country may be left vulnerable to economic shocks.

Government Involvement is particularly felt one analyzes the reality that the policies of recipient countries really affect the impact of aid on growth; aid works in all countries, but it works better in countries with better policy regimes.
Issued related to recipient governments include a lack of coordination and aid fungibility (explained below), while problems related to donor governments arise with tied projects and with the political influence they might have, on receiving countries and on multilateral organization as well. Moreover, governments must avoid taking advantage of international aid for their own purposes, unrelated or even detrimental to development (e.g. military expenditure). Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs), which are often in the position to help, do not have a legal status and are therefore left out in this type of negotiation.

The term “fungibility” describes the propensity of recipient countries to reallocate the international aid and grant they received from the donor countries, diverting it from the original project to a different sector. Donors have tried to avoid fungibility by imposing a set of conditions that were meant to ensure that the aid funding would be additional to what the government would have done in any event. These attempts have generally failed because in these cases the donor was in effect financing projects that the government did not consider worth financing itself.

“Conditionality” means that financial assistance is allocated not simply with the aim of project implementation, but in exchange for the commitment by the recipient country that certain predefined and broad policy changes would be implemented. Conditionality characterizes the so-called structural adjustment (anti-corruption measures, but also austerity or privatization of public services) and the so-called tied aid (the aid is tied for example to the use of goods and services from donor countries).

Moreover, money flows, especially if private, can be seen as biased against the poor, because investments flow only to a small number of countries, typically not the poorest, but rather the emerging economies. Lack of information and difficulties of implementation are held responsible.

The failure or success of an investment has to do with the effective coordination of the project itself as well. Three aspects are believed to limit the effectiveness of investments: first, aid projects are often duplicative or even counterproductive, second, donors often do not pay sufficient attention to specific national and sectoral characteristics before allocating funds, and third, costs of long-term projects are often underestimated. Decentralization and competition among donors may improve the efficiency of the aid program, but increase the risk of lack of coordination.
Finally, conflicting interests between donors and recipients, who often have different objectives, complicate the effective transference of know-how and thus capacity building in recipient countries. As it was stated above, FDI and multinational involvement often imply endogenous growth as well. On the contrary, in the case of activities financed through ODA, recipient countries usually do not have sufficient ownership of the developmental projects.

Case studies

In this final section, three case studies and a few related policy suggestions will be presented. The first case regards climate change and allocation of public funds. Different historical and cultural aspects between northern and southern countries, and related governmental involvement, imply different visions as to who is responsible for climate change, what the main problems and priorities are and who is in charge to fix them and with whose money. The second story talks of FDI in Asia: education and culture affect skills and competencies of Chinese and Indian entrepreneurs living abroad, thus influencing the way their own investments are allocated into their home countries. The third case describes the dependence of Sub-Saharan Countries on external funds for their own development, and the consequences of it.

The case of climate change: financing structures for the environment or for poverty alleviation?

Climate change is perhaps the most global condition we face, meaning that every single country feels its consequences. Yet, there is no agreement on causes, responsibilities, and therefore duties related to this phenomenon, as testified by the highly controversial international debate on the Kyoto Protocol, whose legal strength is still nonexistent.

Historically, since the Industrial Revolution, northern countries have been combusting fossil fuels and emitting greenhouse gasses (GHGs), that provoke global warming by trapping heat inside our atmosphere. The development of the northern regions and the consequent free trade benefits they receive has never internalized social and environmental costs, which seems to be the main determinants to the current levels of GHGs.
This vision is endorsed by the European Union, which has voluntarily decided to reduce GHG emissions of the member states under the Kyoto Protocol. This is in line with the funding principles of the EU in the matter of Health and Safety (H&S) and environment, such as the so-called precautionary principle and shared-responsibility principle. Developing countries and LDCs approve this position and many of them are voluntarily controlling their emissions, too. One exception is China, which won’t limit its own emission until the US will do so and recognize their full responsibility, paying the price of their historical externalities in developmental aid for LDCs. Policy implications related to this first disagreement are already included into the notion of “common but differentiated responsibilities”, a pillar of Kyoto Protocol.

A second controversy is related to various priorities regarding climate change: the northern countries are primarily concerned with global warming, deforestation and loss of biodiversity, while the southern regions have to deal mainly with scarce availability of clean drinking water and land degradation. Concretely, developed regions are interested in reducing GHG emission through mitigation processes, which don’t influence poverty alleviation as much as adaptation strategies would. Policy implications should include a clear separation of objectives, to prevent aid fungibility in the form of redirection of developmental aid for poverty alleviation to mitigation strategies; win-win strategies can be adopted only if there is a net benefit for the financed regions, while detrimental strategies, as the construction of those facilities having negative impacts on environmental and social structures, should be avoided at any cost.

Related to the last concept, the third dispute is over additionality. The flow of aid going from northern to southern countries to control and adapt to climate change, through the Adaptation Fund, should be additional to the quasi-legal obligation of ODA in proportion of 0.7% GNI; but at the moment, neither ODA nor the Adaptation Fund have any legally binding obligations. Policy implications should include not only the already mentioned clear distinction of the two financing systems, but also a systematic involvement of the public opinion, thanks to enhanced transparency and to data accessibility, in the vision of every single citizen as stakeholder in the issue.

*The case of Indian and Chinese FDI diaspora: is it all about low cost labor?*

It is widely recognized that diaspora contribution to the state of origin brings in
considerable money flows, through private remittances and FDI, and helps the transfer of knowledge and enriches the entrepreneurial network.

Chinese and Indian migrations are the world’s largest diaspora. If similar for many aspects, including for all the feelings of national pride and achievement, these two mass movements present a crucial difference: diasporic FDI is a leading element for Chinese development, and on the contrary it is very modest in India.

While the different level of government initiative, such as trading facilities, tax policies, and permit policies, could explain part of the observed phenomenon, two elements are believed to matter more. First, Chinese entrepreneurs, mostly from the ethnically Chinese dominated economies of Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore, invest in China and bring in their industrial facilities because they are attracted by the availability of low wage labor. Indian businessmen prefer to place their partnerships in South-East Asian countries, where the cost of labor is lower than in India.

Second, professional figures expatriated from China are often entrepreneurs in small scale manufacturing business, while most of Indians are either professionals or traders, thus providing services more than labor-intensive goods, and don’t have the experience of managing large-scale, export-oriented and labor-intensive manufacturing facilities. Moreover, the nature itself of service-oriented business makes it harder to create a network of ethnic Indian entrepreneurs across the world.

It may be argued that the level of FDI is quite low because Indian migrants prefer to send back their gain in form of private remittances. Nevertheless, it has to be considered that remittances enhance the quality of life of the receiving family or few families, while the benefits of FDI are usually extended to a larger scale of population, because FDI investments bring in job possibilities and the share of knowledge.

The main challenge encountered in the Indian context seems to be related to capacity building and effective coordination. Given the positive effects of FDI to local economic growth and human development, and given the nature of Indian diaspora, centered on professionals and traders, auspicial policy recommendations should include the creation of wider expertise and research networks of ethnic Indian entrepreneurs. Joint ventures should include the educational sector and two-sided experiences, with Indian scholars sent abroad and with visiting professionals called for teaching trials.
Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries have historically been, and still continue to be, heavily dependent on external resource flows to finance their own development and needs. ODA has always been the most common form of money income and has seen increasing development in the last decade, reverting the stagnant and critical situation of the ‘90s. A contribution to the trend reversal has come from the help of a new group of aid-donors, such as Brazil, China, India, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia, which have started to fill some of the funding gaps left by the traditional donors.

Most SSA countries, due to their low income and weak economic policies, have never received attention from private investors. From 2000, as it has happened for new donors, the presence of new investors has increased as well, and those SSA countries enjoying higher economic growth have been able to attract private capital, especially in the form of FDI and mainly in sectors with high revenues, as oil and natural resources, showing an obviously biased money flow. Portfolio bond and equity flows are still almost nonexistent, and private debt flows and bank lending are mostly in short-term forms: less than half of SSA countries have sovereign ratings, and most of the rated countries have below-investment grade ratings.

Over the last 10 years, worker remittances to SSA countries have more than doubled in absolute terms, but the amount of capital brought in seems generally lower than ODA and FDI. Capital outflows from the region have decreased, but the stock of flight capital from SSA countries remains high.

One of the most evident differences between the traditional and new donor countries is about conditionality: traditional donors have always linked aid to political and economic reforms, while new donors, as China and India, don’t include these criteria in the evaluation of their projects. This could cause a race to the bottom in governance and environmental issues.

Policy options should include the enhancement of those forms of aid that are provided from natives, thus loosening the interference of foreign governments and private investors. Reducing remittance costs, increasing remittance flows to SSA, creating diaspora bond, raising financing from overseas diasporas, and recovering flight capital are some of the available options.
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The control of space does not occur only in its geographical mapping. Defining its functionality, organizing it, establishing how it should be experienced, used, inherited, conquered, exchanged, given up and occupied are themselves forms of space control.

The occupation of space is a polyvalent gesture. It can be a way of valuing a neglected place, or of giving voice to a protest – like some forms of graffiti and street art; one can be hosted in a place or, on the contrary, use a space to exercise his or her power. Power can be made visible through places designated for minimal space usage, conceived to convey the grandeur and the majesty of the power and also to intimidate, to create that subtle feeling of inferiority one has in front of massive architecture. This effect can be seen from the ancient pyramids to the modern skyscrapers of trade centers, from huge political buildings to the enormous squares that extend as far as the eye can see.

Yet, there are further ways of occupying space, somehow subtler and less visible. That is the case of control and surveillance of a space, of the pan-optical gaze of security cameras, like what is happening in London, currently the most surveilled city in the world\(^1\). Or, in siege conditions, like the way checkpoints occupy space, which can transform a city into a sort of control theatre where mobility is normalized.

Even destroying a place turns out to be an instrument of occupying space. The denaturation of a place and the disintegration of its urban order changes the way citizens experience it. This form of contamination and radical transformation of a territory threatens the existence of that place. In an urban configuration such as cities, this means setting off a process of killing memory and urban metaphors. A destroyed space, therefore, has to find a new shape in which an organized political community can be able to reread and renegotiate its contents and its functionalities, and to find a new semantics to its socio-spatial horizon.

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War works also as an instrument of redefinition of the experience of the space, both that of the landscape and of the city. It violently occupies the space, molding it through apparatus and mechanisms of discipline which regulate the semantics of the signs and symbols in which that space can be experienced. A space perverted by war is an abnormal space, because here the distinction between war space and space for civilians’ daily life disappear.

On the one hand it is a space with fleeting trenches, where borders are no more the space adjacent – so Agamben –, a “nearby-space”, porous, dialectical bordering\(^2\), but turn instead to be “no man’s land”, space where rules are suspended, point of contact with an external space not as a relational moment, but as the experience of menace.

On the other hand, it is the anonymous and inhuman space of mass graves where individuality is abolished; it is a space which asks to forget, ignore and homologate.

But such is also space transformed into minefields, where every day the human rights to life and security are menaced and trampled over. Spreading mines on the ground is a way of destroying the experience of that place in the present, and also of canceling every projection of the place in the future. It means disciplining it as space of death, depriving it of any possibility to be a place of civilians’ social experience and mental configuration of visual and spatial symbols. Military norm turns the potential polysemy of a space into the monosemy of exercise of military power.

The ubiquity of menace is the main characteristic of space occupied by war. Constant menace alarms, loose bullets, shootings and grenades flatten the space, remove its several functionalities, and render it into a homogeneous place of death, because here the experience of city-life and of citizenship is cancelled and banned. Sacking, mines, bombs and demolitions prove a violence inflicted upon the territory, giving evidence of the will of abolishing it and of destroying its relationship to the population. This phenomenon of urban disintegration has been theorized as urbicide and is a well-established war practice, so that urbicide is commonly acknowledged as a subcategory of genocide\(^3\).

\(^2\) For the notion of neighborhood as the space adjacent, from the Latin ad-jacens, adjacentia, see Giorgio Agamben (1993), *The coming community*, trans. by Michael Hardt, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, p. 25.

Eventually war can dominate a space also by rendering it into a permanent state of exception, where law is suspended and sovereignty is in charge of military power. An occupied or besieged city is closed, cut off, encircled as a space out of the juridical nomos, where just this exclusion of the norm is its constitutive characteristic. Such a space becomes a camp, that is – as Agamben explains – the “biopolitical paradigm of the modern”. About camp as space of exception Agamben writes: “If this is true, if the essence of the camp consists in the materialization of the state of exception and in the subsequent creation of a space in which bare life and the juridical rule enter into a threshold of indistinction, then we must admit that we find ourselves virtually in the presence of a camp every time such a structure is created, independent of the kinds of crime that are committed there and whatever its denomination and specific topography”\(^4\) (Agamben, 1998: 98).

**Grozny: the Anti-City**

Still in 2009 reports of the Russian Human Rights Center ‘Memorial’, one of the few ONGs that still remained in Chechnya, described social dynamics in the area based on violence, illegality, silence and fear.

Since 2003, with the so called ‘chechnization’, the conflict had turned into an internal war, fierce and abnormal, between two factions: partisans, who claim for independence, accused by the official government of being terrorists, and supporters of the Russian regime. As Prime Minister and from March 2007 as President of Chechnya (actually at first nominated by Putin and only thereafter on approval of Chechen parliament), Ramzan Achmadovič Kadyrov has been somehow entrusted by Russian government with the regulation of Chechen conflict. Since then, the situation has become worse and a sort of protracted urban conflict has been established. Memorial, Human Rights Watch, the Council of Europe, and Amnesty International report a heavy amount of illegal detention of civilians, often kept without any trial, detentions based on false proofs and confessions wrung with force and torture. Cruel and degrading treatments of detainees, arrested individuals, and the use of torture have been and are everyday-life-conditions. In 2006 Lidija Yusupova, a journalist

of ‘Memorial’, recorded in an interview with Lucia Sgueglia: “Over the last
years thousands of disappearances are registered, people have been kidnapped
during the night in their own houses by masked men, and have disappeared.
Media splashed ‘terrorists’ across the front page, but if it has to be demonstrated
that a prisoner has been tortured, that case literary vanishes: no proofs and no
investigation. […] People live and govern under a special regime, even though
the state of emergency has actually never been declared” (Sgueglia, 2006, transl.
and italics by the author).

Even after the official end of the conflict in April 2009, Chechnya was still
in the hands of armed gangs and human rights violations were happening on
a daily basis. The American organization ‘Freedom House’ included Chechnya
in the “Worst of the Worst” list of the most repressive societies in the world.
Records on human rights documented a terrible amount of enforced disappear-
ances, ostracism imposed to a lot of ONGs by the pro-Moscow Chechen regime,
a high level of corruption, daily conflicts and the impossibility of guaranteeing
medical assistance and education. The Commission of Legal Affairs and Human
Rights reported in April 2009: “‘filtration stations’ were used in Chechnya to
‘treat’ large numbers of persons arrested summarily, mistreated, kept for some
days or weeks, after which most were released, but some disappeared for good”5
(Haibach, 2009).

By establishing sovereignty in the merger of police and military as well as
through Kadyrov’s private army, in Chechnya the classic boundaries between
state and non-state actors have been hybridized and a threshold of indistinction
between rights and violence has been marked. A non-declared form of state
of exception has been set up and is still at stake. Still today the tensions have
not died down, as the last kamikaze attack demonstrates. On the 6th of August
2012 two suicide bombers struck the Oktyabrsky district of Grozny, near a mil-
itary-owned store, killing four Russian soldiers. The suicide attack has been
immediately defined as a terrorist act and ascribed to Khuseyn Gakayev, one
of the leaders of the independents. The usual procedure of Kadyrov’s regime
is actually that of showing efficiency in finding out who is on charge of such

5 See also Rudolf Bindig’s reports at the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights: Doc. 10774
(Human Rights Violations in the Chechen Republic, 2005-12-21), Doc. 10283 (The Human Rights Situation in
the Chechen Republic, 2004-09-20) and Doc. 9732 (The Human Rights Situation in the Chechen Republic, 2003-
03-13), all retrieved 2012-08-14. In www.assembly.coe.int. See furthermore the two Public Declarations
concerning the Chechen Republic by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT), CPT/
eng.htm, retrieved 2012-08-14, retrieved 2012-08-14.
attacks. As a matter of fact, by turning into a police state, sovereignty has slid towards police law, whose power – as Agamben remarks – considers itself not to be in charge of respecting any juridical rule and whose legitimation also makes it necessary to criminalize the adversary as terrorists.

What did and does it thus mean to live in Grozny?

An Ad hoc Committee of the Council of Europe reported in 2000, one year after the second Chechen war broke out, in a state of cease-fire, that the centre of the city had been totally and systematically destroyed. With the recapture of Grozny in February 2000 and with its systematic destruction the Russian authorities had declared the capital a “closed city” until 1 May 2000. “Although the city had already suffered damage in the earlier conflict in Chechnya, the current level of destruction suggests that Grozny has been the target of indiscriminate, disproportionate bombardment by the Russian forces”.

What does it also mean to walk in a besieged city? Which mechanisms are at stake if checkpoints are placed and work as foucaultian ‘functional emplacements’, that is places where the utilization of space aims at the control and supervision of human beings? How can the diktat of control and menace be able to redefine the city structure and thus the experience of it?

By placing the city under a curfew and displacing checkpoints, as has happened in Grozny, the police law operates within the frame of a state of sovereign exceptionalism that turns indeed into the normal sovereignty of the city. In cities experiencing conflict, political and geo-political projects become concretely visible through the urban built environment such as in the occupation, division and even destruction of portions of the city. As the state of exception legitimates politics of juridical, political and spatial control, urbicide is, as a matter of fact, a political gesture. But also, checkpoints are disciplinary apparatuses of localization and delocalization, able to govern the space and regulate how people

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7 Results of the Ad hoc Committee’s visit (9-13 March 2000) in the context of the evaluation of Russia’s compliance with Recommendation 1444 (2000), Doc. 8697. In ‘Conflict in Chechnya - Implementation by Russia of Recommendation 1444 (2000)’, [http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc00/EDOC8697.htm](http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc00/EDOC8697.htm), retrieved 2012-08-14. “The state of the city and the accounts given by people from Grozny in refugee camps in Ingushetia clearly indicate that many civilians perished in the bombardment. Only a thorough enquiry will be able to determine the exact number of victims”.
should live within it. Patrols, curfews, mined camps, and control barriers like barracks and suspicious checkpoints reproduce the deep connection between spatial-geographical and juridical-political forms. This organization of the space is effectively a means of discipline the body, the bios.

As Foucault has pointed out, forms of control are deeply related to functional emplacements. Like in prison, even in a besieged city, space is rigorously distributed and divided in order to respond to the bio-political necessity of tracking movements and disciplining behaviors. Like in prison, entrance (to the city) is ruled, like in prison, people are forced to stay in their places. If movements are constantly confined to such an extent by curfew and checkpoints, by barracks and police stations setting boundaries and internal frontiers that operate as apparatus of surveillance and exercise of power, then Grozny, a besieged city, is a place experiencing an endless state of suspension, where “daily life is militarized” (Mbembe, 2003: 26); movements, even humanitarian actions (like carrying injured to the hospital during the curfew), require permission. On a report about the city written in December 2005, the journalist Astrit Dakli describes everyday-life in the capital of Chechnya as an interiorized state of exception, where the population seems not to take care of the many armed men wandering in the city and brandishing Kalashnikovs. In Grozny, as well as in all of Chechnya, the entrance of the concept of sovereignty in the figure of police has turned right into military arbitrariness, into power exercised through the occupation, organization and division of the space, where everything – like in Fanon’s description of the spatialization of colonial occupation – “is regulated by the language of pure force, immediate presence, and frequent and direct action” (Ibidem). Chechnya is indeed very similar to a colony, in fact those relations of force that Achille Mbembe recognizes in the late-modern colonial occupations, that is the “combining of the disciplinary, the biopolitical, and the necropolitical,” are actually at stake (Mbembe, 2003: 27). As a matter of fact, here politics happens to affirm themselves through a polemical code: armed gangs or military are in charge of everybody’s life, of bare life, and have such a self-determined right to shoot and to kill, to allow to live, or to expose to death, that they hold a sovereign power capable of politics and life, and thus

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11 Mbembe refers here to Frantz Fanon (1991), The Wretched of the Earth, trans. by C. Farrington, New York: Grove p. 39.
politics and death merge\textsuperscript{12}.

Suspension of rules and human rights and military arbitrariness are expressions of a sovereign power that can erode the relationship of citizens to their own city. Curfew, checkpoints, patrols and violence rewrite the city-map, constituting a “special bio-political zoning, that de-politicizes citizens by depriving them […] of their own right […] and, through barriers and checkpoints, is able to steal whole areas […] to the use of their citizens” (Petti, 2007: 115, transl. by the author).

To re-map the city in the perspective of disciplinary control means also to let people live by grouping them by territory, them, that is – as already Hannah Arendt had pointed out – by localizing population outside juridical-state spatial frames, transforming a state of rights into a state of permanent menace. In this kind of state everything can happen to everybody in every moment\textsuperscript{13}.

The irrationality of zaciske, as combings are named, of punitive expeditions and of false imprisonments, and of rapes and plunders, make the city an anomic place, where life is suspended and is at the mercy of military and patrols.

In Grozny, citizens’ relationship to their city has been denaturalized and has determined a perverted localization, in which not only a regime of prohibition and normalization rules, but the condition of prohibition itself is interiorized\textsuperscript{14}. In a context where arbitrariness of justice has become law “curfew is […] really rigorous for all the ones, who are no outlaws. […] [but] asking at a checkpoint permission of carrying an injured to the hospital means inviting oneself to torture” (Politkovkaja, 2004: 13, transl. by the author).

Through the imposition of curfew, the demolition of houses, schools, public and religion buildings, plundering and bombing, the functional emplacement of checkpoints, barracks and police stations, military patrols violate peremptory norms of international law. These patrols violate on one hand the international humanitarian laws: the IV Geneva Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and its additional protocols of 1977, along with the Aia Convention of 1907. On the other hand the international laws on human rights, such as the freedom of movement and mobility rights, right to property, right to equality before law and to justice, right to security, right to have a family, a house, and

\textsuperscript{12} See Michel Foucault (2003), Society has to be defended: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-1976, transl. by David Macey, New York: Picador.

\textsuperscript{13} Hannah Arendt describes this realm where “everything is permitted” in her chapter Total Domination, in Id. (1958), The origins of Totalitarianism, Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 2\textsuperscript{nd} ed., pp. 437-459.

the right to education.

The abuse of those rights and the entrance of the concept of sovereignty in the figure of police have suspended the state of law and reduced citizens to bare life, that is men and women without any political right. When life is inscribed in a spatial and geopolitical frame, in the political-juridical structure of the camp, city becomes a negation of itself, camp, that is the materialization of the state of exception, an anti-city\textsuperscript{15}.

\textit{The Chechen Enclave}

“The neo-sovietic Russia, molded by Putin’s state-machine has decided to create on its territory an enclave of suspension of civil rights. We can call it residence zone, or ghetto for Chechen people” (Politkovskaja, 2004: 27, transl. by the author, italics in the original).

With these words Anna Politkovskaja, brave and tenacious reporter of the Chechen war, killed by anonymous murderers in October 2006, has described in 2004 the condition of rights in the area during the second Chechen war. An enclave, an officially ‘closed city’ replaces here the idea of a national territory and becomes paradigm of a state of exception in which the diktat of presumed security and anti-terrorism campaigns abuse rights and pass over laws: “A person in Chechnya is a biological subject without any right and without any possibility of counting on state structures” (Ibidem).

The scholar Alessandro Petti has described the functional and symbolic role of physical and spatial apparatus considered as paradigms of a disciplinary society that obeys geopolitical plans legitimated by the rhetoric of security. He has identified in the ‘enclave’ one of the structures of space exceptionality as forms of socio-spatial government. The enclave – a separated, not connected island – is the symbol of suspended spaces, “that is places confined and located outside the spatial and juridical system they belong to” (Petti, 2007: 115, transl. by the author).

By defining the second Chechen war as “anti-terrorism campaign”, Moscow had indeed legitimated the slogan that ‘everything is allowed’\textsuperscript{16} and had ren-

\textsuperscript{15} “The camp is merely the place in which the most absolute conditio inhumana that has ever existed on earth was realized” (Agamben, 1998: 95). The abnormal condition of the camp is the very fact that the camp is not a temporary suspension, but moreover a permanent spatial arrangement that remains outside the normal state of law.

\textsuperscript{16} In \textit{The Origins of Totalitarianism} Hannah Arendt has observed that it is in camps that emerges more than
dered Chechnya a ‘space of suspension’ in which forms of control and of spatial and social discipline were constantly being re-produced. Checkpoints, curfews and barracks, as panoptical and surveillance apparatus, have transformed a nation into a camp, or into “a space in which the normal order is de facto suspended and in which whether or not atrocities are committed depends not on law but on the civility and ethical sense of the police who temporarily act as sovereign” (Agamben, 1998: 99).

As space at the stake of military irrationality, where chaos and arbitrariness become mechanisms of socio-spatial regulation, Chechnya has experienced the condition of a permanent state of exception, where citizens have been deprived of their political relationship to their territory. A piece of land outside any normal juridical frame, the camp has a special juridical and political ontology, in which nomos and anomos merge and create that ubiquitous and permanent condition of menace.

In such a condition every relationship between public space and population collapses, every place loses its social and civil function and becomes space-to-be-abolished, instrument of humanitarian menace: “the camp is the very paradigm of political space at the point at which politics becomes biopolitics and homo sacer is virtually confused with the citizen” (Agamben, 1998: 97). Deprived of his political rights, the citizen is reduced to bare life: exposed (etymologically from Latin ex-positus: ‘banned’, ‘at the mercy of’ and also ‘freely to be excluded’, thus ‘put outside’, ‘put against and thus in danger’) to the endless menace included in the political order of his life. The Chechen is homo sacer, constantly “exposed to an unconditional capacity to be killed”, without any trial and without having his murderer being arrested.

**Conclusions**

Space adjacent, space of borders tout court, and rich in resources and traditions, Caucasus has always been a symbol of instability and of contrasts, a historical, cultural and religious melting pot, where different identities used to merge.
Groznaja was founded in the middle of the XIX century after a terrible conquest campaign of Caucasus’ populations. To remind the people of the military power dominating them, a fortress was built: ‘Groznaja’, what means ‘the terrible’. Grozny was therefore born as a closed city, a fortress, conceived to take Caucasus’ populations under control.

In 2003 the UNO declared Grozny the most devastated city in the world. Still in 2005 in the old city there were no schools, no hospitals and no public transport. Yet the main street of Pravda, the old headquarters of the communist nomenklatura whose name means ‘true’, had been renamed: prospekt Kadyrov.

Now it is the seat of the actual press fortress of the official voice of the pro-Russia government, Rossiskaja gazeta. The siege of the city has carried on a process of erasing the memory of the city, of cultural cleaning, where everyday life space has been forced to abandon its semantics.

With the end of the second Chechen war, a process of reconstruction of this memory has started. Grozny is now being rapidly rebuilt, and a new territory ordering has been given.

On the one hand the old city is experiencing a further form of occupation, that goes beyond urbicide: new odonyms and a new toponomy reveal the political project of re-dominating the space. The re-memorization as attempt to establish a new memory of the space is actually a new subtle form of space domination, that aims to control the creation of urban metaphors and experiences of the city.

On the other hand, a new Grozny is being built on the border of the old city, not far from Khankala, the huge Russian military base. This area is equipped with all the necessary infrastructure a community needs and testifies the attempts of Kadyrov’s regime of a politics that could attract investments.

Yet, even after in April 2009 Russia ended its counter-terrorism operation and pulled out the bulk of its army, the territory is as a matter of fact under military control, and the city does not look like so different from what was being recorded during the second Chechen war.

Both these forms of reconstruction of urban configurations have been de-

17 On urbicide as politics of cancelling the memory of the urban space configuration see Elena dell’Agnese (2002), *Urbicidio e smemorizzazione del paesaggio urbano: Vukovar, Dubrovnik, Sarajevo (e Tirana)*. In Elena Dell’Agnese / Enrico Squarcina (eds.), *Geopolitiche dei Balcani – Luoghi, narrazioni, percorsi*, Milano: Unicopli, pp. 155-173.

18 “At its most the territory is empty, like a sort of big security board – very likely mined – between the external fence and the fortified perimeter” (Dakli, 2005).
scribed as ‘cultural stress’, which happens when transformations of a place are carried out in such a haste that they can destroy and turn upside down the reference points which belong to our spatial and emotional experience of that place\textsuperscript{19}.

What is actually at stake in this process is the upset of collective memories, which are thus forced to redefine their horizon of experiences\textsuperscript{20}. The siege of the city has not only resulted in its destruction but eventually even in the attempt to create a new identitarian memory of that space. Indeed, memory is a mental construction which also involves space, that is the experience and the perception of socio-spatial frames. So, to cancel or to transform the memory of a place is also a way hegemonic strategies are carried on\textsuperscript{21}.

A geopolitical and spatial reading of Chechen situation reveals the very political project of the siege and urbicide of Grozny, but also of its reconstruction. Like in every city experiencing conflict, the urban environment conceals forms of occupation of the political and social territory and of normalization of its relationship to the population.

Technologies of power over population produce strategies of space control and regulation that need surveillance apparatuses but also instruments exercising power over life (biopower) and over death (necropower). In this sense urbicide is an act of political violence, it is a political gesture. Yet, even reconstruction turns out to be exercise of power.

To identify the perversion of space in relation to the rights of its population allows one to draft the renegotiated visions citizens have of their territory and to show how these visions become materially visible in the way the destroyed and rebuilt environment is represented and experienced in urban life. The spatial condition of permanent state of exception has rendered Chechnya a space in suspension, an enclave, that is a space where the very relationship between territory and population collapses and constantly new experiences and metaphors of the city are being re-constructed and re-negotiated.

\textsuperscript{19} On the concept of ‘cultural stress’ and on the connections between memory and power see Costantino Caldo (1994), Monumento e simbolo. La percezione geografica dei beni culturali nello spazio vissuto. In Costantino Caldo/Vincenzo Guarassi (eds.), Beni culturali e geografia, Bologna: Pàtron Editore, pp. 15-30
\textsuperscript{21} The deep relation between memory and space is investigated in Ugo Fabietti /Vincenzo Matera (1999), Memorie e identità. Simboli e strategie del ricordo, Roma: Meltemi.
These strategies of space control in Chechnya are not over, even after the official conclusion of the so-called counter-terrorist operation in 2009. They are still at stake, now that the country is under the unofficial control of armed gangs and of Kadyrov’s militia and Chechnya is experiencing the paradox of a violent pacification, where suicide attacks are actually still being carried on.

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Chapter 26.

Dan Deng

The multiple meanings of borders: the example of the border and conflict between Chinese and Tibetan culture

The definition of ‘border’

Clearly demarcated boundaries have become a crucial element in an increasingly global state system since the seventeenth century. “Borders” in this sense refer to the legal lines separating different jurisdictions, to a “frontier area” of variable width on either side of this legal line, or simply to a broad “zone of transition” between different societies and centers of power, as was more typical of some pre-modern states and their “frontier societies”.

Border as frontier area or zone has a meaning which merges into “border region”, and this expression also has a variety of meanings; it encompasses areas immediately beyond a state’s external border, or straddling it, and also administrative regions abutting a border whose centers are physically and socially distant from that border.

From an historical-anthropological point of view, borders are spatial and temporal records of relationships between local communities and between states.

The essence and function of ‘border’

In the article ‘On Borders and Power: A Theoretical Framework’, David Newman wrote that the essence of a border is to separate the “self” from the “other.” As such, one of the major functions of a border is to act as a barrier, “protecting” the “us insiders” from the “them outsiders” (Omen 1995; Sibley 1995).

A spatial dimension is usually inherent in the definition of the Other, in the fact that the Other typically lives somewhere else. If the Other lives here, we-defined in specific narratives--are in any case different from it. In the case of nations, the discourse on culture, language etc. constitutes the “we” and distinguishes it from the Other (Anssi Paasi, 1996: 13).

The determination of what can and cannot move beyond the border is a function of how the power elites of a given society or country view the border.
The border acts as an institution which protects those who are on the “inside” or are “here” from the (perceived) negative impact of those who have been excluded and are on the “outside” or are “there.” The protection function takes on many forms—at the primordial level protecting the citizens of a country from invasion by foreign armies or from the inflow of illegal weapons across the border. The barrier function of borders also protects those inside from other “harmful” elements, such as drugs, migrant labor, competition in the marketplace and so on.

Under international law, each country is generally permitted to define the conditions which people must meet to legally cross its borders, and to prevent persons from illegally crossing its borders.

The process of ‘bordering’ is a dynamic in its own right, and the border terminologies which focus on the binary distinctions between the ‘us’ and ‘them’, or the ‘included’ and the ‘excluded’.

**Multiple meanings of ‘border’**

The above interpretation regarding the definition and role of the ‘border’ is mainly from the point of view of geopolitics. From a broader point of view, the ‘border’ can be roughly analyzed through three levels of meanings. It has a variety of material use and symbolic meanings and displays an apparently bewildering diversity of characteristics and relations.

**‘Border’ under natural physical conditions**

First of all, the human body can be seen as a basic boundary space that is separated by the skin, which is the most original and basic condition of the formation of “Self” and “Others”. This personal physical barrier provides the foundation for which a person builds his or her own identity.

Natural borders are geographical features that present natural obstacles to communication and transport. Existing political borders are often a formalization of these historical, natural obstacles. Some geographical features that often constitute natural borders include oceans, rivers, lakes, forests, mountain ranges and so on.
‘Border’ under the influence of historical, political and economic development factors

In the process of developing human society, the political, economic, and social system along with other factors are the main reasons for a large number of borders and boundary changes. States establish borders to secure territories which are valuable to them because of their human or natural resources, or because these places have strategic or symbolic importance to the state. Borders are the political membranes through which people, goods, wealth and information must pass in order to be deemed acceptable or unacceptable by the state. Thus, borders are agents of a state’s security and sovereignty, and a physical record of a state’s past and present relations with its neighbors.

“European integration” is a broader institutional context for the social, cultural, administrative and economic changes which are taking place in the territorial structures of nation-states.

For example, the purpose of the Schengen Treaty is to cancel internal border checkpoints, and to co-ordinate external border controls in the Schengen area. If a person holds a valid identity card or visa in any member-state in the territory he or she can flow freely between all of the member-states. According to the agreement, if tourists hold a valid visa of one of these countries, they can flow freely to visit all the other Schengen countries. The visa serves as a way of breaking political barriers.

‘Border’ under ideology, religious spirit and values

This level concerns culture, folk customs, daily life, patterns of behavior, laws and policies of communities divided by borders. It is the most essential factor causing the greatest distinction in the various spiritual and material worlds. It is the top level of the superstructure that determines geopolitics, economic development history, ideology, religious beliefs and universal values.

“Order change” also can be defined in quite different ways. Most obviously, it refers to completely new, revived or geographically relocated state borders; more subtly, it refers to changing the symbolic meanings and/or the material functions of existing borders in situ (O’Dowd, 1998b). For example, the collapse of the Soviet Union into several new independent states caused the changing of the geographical borders, but it also symbolized that the spiritual and ideologi-
The multiple meanings of borders: the example of the border and conflict between Chinese and Tibetan culture

According to the point of view introduced above on the meanings of ‘border’, I would like to talk a little about the relationship between the Chinese and Tibetan culture, helping understand the conflict and ‘border’ between these two.

The Tibetan culture from the point of view of natural and geographical conditions

Hundreds of millions of years ago, the Himalayan Orogeny formed what is today a 2,500 km long, 300 km wide uplift, named the Himalayas, of which the Tibetan plateau is included. The total area of the space is bigger than the sum of France, Germany, Italy and Japan.

The Tibetan plateau has an average elevation of 4,000 to 5,000 meters and there are numerous mountain ranges at altitudes of above 6,000 meters. The Tibetan Plateau forms a huge protrusion on the Earth’s surface. The Earth’s highest point, Mount Everest, is also on it. The Tibetan Plateau is known as the world’s third pole, “Gondo”. Because of its altitude, the climate is completely different from other places in the world.

As famous Chinese writer Lixiong Wang (2009) described in his book ‘The Struggle for Tibet’, from a historical perspective, this specific combination of mountains and big rivers continue to decide the fate of the Tibetan people and the development of its history. The Tibetan Plateau stands at the height of the surrounding areas, and thus the mountain ranges constitute the most solid natural borders of Tibet. Outsiders who attempt to conquer Tibet have to face the strongest natural moat in the world.

The huge natural moat has been the most basic and original factor to divide and separate Tibetan culture and Chinese culture since ancient times. Thus establishing the difference in economic, social development, history, and even ideology and pursuit of spiritual values between the cultures of two peoples.

Border and conflict between the Chinese and Tibetan culture under historical, political and economic development factors

Historically, in the process of the Sino-Tibetan ethnic and cultural exchange, the Chinese government has carried out the policy of segmentation of areas origi-
nally in Tibetan jurisdiction, a process that took place during the Qing Dynasty (1644 A.D.—1911 A.D). For example, the Chinese government created geopolitical lines which still influence the present “Tibet Autonomous Region” under the CPC governance.

The author of The Struggle for Tibet uses “interface” as a metaphor for the Amban system in the Qing Dynasty. The Amban system was a kind of system to dispatch ministers to Tibet on behalf of the central court of Qing Dynasty to handle Tibetan political affairs and supervise Tibetan leaders. It was used by the Qing government in order to show its influence on the Tibetan Dalai Lama and the Kashag government.

All subsequent control of Tibet in the Qing dynasty was through this “interface”. In this case, we can believe that the “interface” in fact was a form of expression of “border” or could be seen as a form of similar “marchland”. It was a kind of buffer zone, but was also the forefront of the battle between those two totally different cultures.

In addition, there are issues concerning Tibet’s administrative boundaries both between the Chinese government and the Indian government, and between the Chinese government and Tibet regarding their respective conflicts and disputes. Citing the Sino-Tibetan contradictions as an example, Tibet is defined and designated by the central government of China as the “Tibet Autonomous Region”, an area of only 1.2284 million square kilometers, accounting for one eighth of China’s total area.

However, from the point of view of Dalai Lama, Tibet’s area is another thing entirely: it is the area covered by the Tibetan civilization. It does not only include the Tibet Autonomous Region divided by the Communist Party, but also parts of the Qinghai, Gansu, Yunnan, and Sichuan provinces in which numerous Tibetans now live. It contains 10 autonomous prefectures and two autonomous counties, and covers more than a population of six million people. It accounts beyond a quarter of China’s total area.

From above we can see that from the point of view of Dalai Lama the “Greater Tibet” concept is more appropriate to define Tibet to protect the people’s culture and spiritual values.

This clearly reflects spiritual pursuits and values, but also inevitably conflicts with those values built on other real and material interests, which have become the insurmountable gulf in the Sino-Tibetan relations for decades of years.
Border and conflict between the Chinese and Tibetan cultural under the spiritual pursuits and values

It has been argued that language and religion are probably the key elements in the ideology of nation building (Glassner and de Blij, 1980) and that religious diversity still plays a part in the political organization of space (Gottmann 1973:137).

The significant role of religion in the history of nationalism is apparent in a number of investigations which show the dominant role of religion on the determination of state boundaries and even in the creation of states (Anssi Paasi, 1996).

The so-called “communitarian” ideologies of nationalism (Benedict Anderson, 2006) in particular have emphasized by tradition the role of religion and assigned significance to the community, based on shared beliefs and sentiments (Smith 1983).

Let’s continue to examine the example above: in November 1950, when faced with the Chinese Communist soldiers’ arrival, the Tibetan Kashag government issued an “appeal to the Secretary-General of the United Nations”. He once defined the relationship of the Qing Dynasty and Tibet: “In the years prior to 1912, the Chinese emperor and supreme Dalai Lama indeed had personal close and friendly relations. Such contacts and exchanges were bred on the basis of a common faith, could be accurately described as the relationship between the followers and the teachers but without any political implications.” This statement can be regarded as the spiritual “border” showed in the secular sense, and the pursuit of the integrity and uniqueness of a spiritual world.

In addition, Charles Bell once described why the 13th Dalai Lama did not want Tibet to enter the international community. The 13th Dalai once explained: “Some countries may want to dispatch representatives to Tibet, travelers may wish to enter our country. These representatives and tourists may propose some disconcerting questions to me and the Tibetan government. Our customs are very different from Europe and the U.S.A. We do not want to change these customs. Christian missionaries may come to Tibet, in an attempt to spread Christianity, but we can not tolerate it when our religion is sung in a different tune” (Bell 1946).

In these decades, since the Chinese Communist Party has ruled Tibet, especially the most recent 30 years of reform and opening up, it has given Tibet huge
economic assistance and policy tilt. This has improved the life of the Tibetan people in a certain sense, but it has failed to fundamentally change the conflict between the two peoples and the cultures. Religion is often significant in the construction of socio-spatial distinctions. Religious language nevertheless commonly spatializes the distinction between good and evil, or the power of light and darkness (Harle 1990, 2-3).

**Borders--strengthen or ablate?**

In summary, the border is firstly created by the natural physical factors, the lowest level of border demarcation. Then, it is triggered by the factors of spiritual pursuit and values. In today’s world, globalization and diversification are increasingly integrating, and many borders have been fading away. But, because the unified “golden rule” on the basis of global common values has not been established yet, the political and the spiritual “border” is hard to make disappear. The exploitation of religious ideas of a “chosen people” is a much more common phenomenon on a world scale, and ideas of a “nation closer to God than any other” or “Gods own country” have been typical in the construction of national social space. Typically “we” are on top, our “allies” come next, after that probably “ neutrals’ and finally “evil enemies” (Harle 1990, 9).

In some parts of the world, as misunderstanding and conflict deepen between nations and cultures, the “border” hinders and increasingly solidifies. For quite a long period of time in the future, borders’ strengthening and ablation are likely to coexist. Nevertheless, ultimate responsibility in the pursuit of freedom and equality are bound to weaken and reduce the barrier-styled borders.

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