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Abstracts

Tuesday 29 June - Session 1
Critical Views on Extraordinary Phenomena

Epilepsy, religiosity, and neurotheology. A historical overview

Júlia Gyimesi

The religious fervour evinced by many epileptics has proven to be a remarkable element of epileptic symptomatology since Hippocrates. Examples of the religious and mystical experiences perceived by epileptics were numerous and manifold in the Western history of medicine and led to further, scientific investigation (Temkin, 1945). By the nineteenth century, the so-called “epileptic religiosity” (including increased sensitivity to religious impulses, frequent and strong religious feelings or mystical experiences of epileptic patients) was represented as an evident fact in contemporary medicine. In France, Jean-Étienne Dominique Esquirol, Bénédict Augustin Morel, Valentin Magnan, Jules Voisin, Henri Mabille, Jean-Pierre Falret and many others referred to the mystical content of the hallucinations experienced by epileptics. In the German-speaking world, Heinrich Vogt, Wilhelm Sommer, Karl Bonhoeffer, Emil Kraepelin, Rudolf Arndt and others called attention to the religious ideas, reactions and acts of epileptics. Similar to France and Germany, the Anglo-Saxon medical world also addressed the issue of epileptic religiosity. Among others, James C. Howden, Henry Maudsley, William James, William Turner, and Pierce L. Clark discussed the question of the religious and mystical experiences of epileptics, thus drawing further attention to the connection between epilepsy and religiosity.

The paper aims to provide a historical overview of the relationship between epilepsy and religiosity. Although the link between epilepsy and religiosity has been observed since the time of Hippocrates (e.g., Falret, 1860; Howden, 1872; Jackson, 1875), empirical research has not yet supported this relationship. The idea according to which there is a link between epilepsy and religiosity has lingered on, and some of the seemingly outdated, highly problematic theories concerning the behavioural aspects of epilepsy have continued to survive. Whether hidden or openly professed, these theories are not only alive, but also influence research questions, theories, or even psychiatric practice (e.g., Devinsky & Lai, 2008).

The rich reference to the historical relationship between epilepsy and religiosity often served as a kind of evidence in itself, even though observations of epileptic religiosity were far less detailed as modern scholars referred to them. A detailed analysis of the connection between epilepsy and religiosity only emerged in the twentieth century. By introducing a symbolic level of interpretation, psychoanalysis significantly contributed to the psychological theory of the epileptic personality in general and epileptic religiosity in particular. However, psychoanalysis, in fact, most often addressed a form of neurosis, not genuine epilepsy. Partly as a result of the limited validity of these psychoanalytic interpretations, the open questions regarding epileptic religiosity survived and found new answers due to the development of twentieth-century neuropsychology.

The theory of the epileptic religiosity proved to be a stimulating framework for several scholars in the field of neurotheology (see e.g., Persinger, 1987). Instead of the relative lack of support for drawing a link between epilepsy and religiosity, the possibility of religious
experiences with epilepsy, and especially temporal lobe epilepsy seems to be widely accepted (Greyson et al., 2015; Newberg et al. 2002; Tedrus et al., 2015; Trimble & Freeman, 2006). This perception continues on even when it is rather obvious that besides the temporal lobe, several, additional neurological areas play a role in the production of religious experience. The aim of the paper is to illuminate the impact of biological reductionist reasoning in this context and call attention to the theoretical and empirical shortcomings connected to views on epileptics’ religiosity.

Bibliography


**The critical standpoint of Hans J. Eysenck towards astrology**

*Nikolett Kanász*

In the 20th century, many researchers tried to make astrology the subject of scientific research using various methodological approaches (see e.g. Dean & Mather, 1977), however it’s probably lesser-known that Hans J. Eysenck (1916-1997) also dealt with the subject, especially between 1975 and 1985 (Dean & Nias, 1997). Eysenck, who was considered an authoritative, but controversial figure within the scientific community, and who also described himself as a „rebel” (see his autobiography entitled “Rebel with a cause” published in 1990) has carried out research on a number of topics which, because of their „pseudo-scientific” nature, were not considered worthy of investigation by contemporary scientists, such as hypnosis, parapsychology and graphology (Eysenck, 1990; Nias, 2016). About his enthusiastic endeavour to confront controversial issues Eysenck seemed persistent: “Unlike most of the critics who dismiss astrology and parapsychology altogether, I have taken great care to read the large literature that has accumulated around these topics, with particular reference to experimental studies and methodological and statistical issues arising therefrom. (...) In any case, the time that is wasted is mine, and to waste it by reading the literature on astrology and
parapsychology is probably better spent than in watching pornographic films, or becoming a football hooligan!“ (Eysenck, 1986, 387.).

His interest in astrology was raised by two key events: on the one hand, a statement published in 1975 in the US journal Humanist, signed by 186 leading scientists, entitled “Objections to Astrology”, which he thought was “unscientific” in its approach (Eysenck & Nias, 1982, 3.) and as fanatic and one-sided as the opinion of astrologers (Eysenck, 1990, 239.); and on the other, he was so impressed by the findings of Michel and Françoise Gauquelin - a French couple whose most famous astrological research became known as the „Mars effect—, that he decided to look further into their work to assess them. In his autobiography he concluded:“(…) the results reported by the Gauquelin (...) can no longer be rejected on methodological or statistical grounds. These results suggest novel and hitherto unknown relations between terrestrial life and effects upon it by the planets.” (Eysenck, 1990, 252.). He also thought that the work of the Gauquelins didn’t confirm the assumptions of traditional astrology, but rather pointed towards „the beginning of a new science of cosmobiology” (ibid, 254.).

As a result of his involvement with astrology, Eysenck wrote several papers on research methods in astrology (e.g. Eysenck, 1981; 1982), assisted in a statistical study (Mayo, White & Eysenck, 1978), wrote a book with D. K. B. Nias about the surveyed scientific evidence for astrology entitled “Astrology: Science or Superstition?” (1982), and became the Chairman of the Committee for Objective Research in Astrology (CORA), the aim of which was to improve the quality of astrological research by providing free guidance and advice for those who wanted to pursue research in this field.

In this lecture I’d like to present Eysenck’s relevant biographical details, his investigations and conclusions in the field of astrology, the critiques of his work, and some different perspectives on the statistical testability of astrology.

Bibliography
Unconscious processes in the explanations of psychological phenomena in Descartes’ natural philosophy

Geir Kirkebøen

The common account of Descartes’s science in psychological literature stands in stark contrast to historical research on his natural philosophy (e.g., Hatfield, 2000). Descartes’ psychology, the beginning of modern psychology, is largely unknown to most psychologists – especially that he, as I will show, postulated unconscious processes in many of his explanations of psychological phenomena.

What is well known is the “transparency of the mind” caricature of Descartes. Leibniz (1646–1716), the originator of this caricature, is often considered the pioneer behind modern ideas about the unconscious mind. He distinguished between something being in the mind and our attending to it, and argued that there can be mental activity that does not reach the level of consciousness. Leibniz thus operated with degrees of consciousness. However, all these ideas are already present in Descartes’ writings (e.g., Cottingham, 1998).

Implicit learning is a main reason why we have knowledge we are not aware of. Descartes pioneered the theory of the conditioned response, a central theory on implicit learning. Descartes also postulated unconscious processes in many of his explanations of psychological phenomena. For example, in his explanation of metric perception in the Optics (1636), he emphasized that the effect of the incoming light on the retina is describable in the vocabulary of physics, and that vision consists of a mapping of the two-dimensional “mechanical” information in the eye onto more or less reliable three-dimensional perceptions. Descartes was the first who explained metric perception in a modern way. One of his radically new hypotheses, which was based on his new mathematics, was precisely that unconscious or “unnoticed” judgments underlie size and distance perception (e.g., Kirkebøen, 1998).

Descartes also considered verbal behavior as being controlled by adaptive unconscious mental processes. In the Passions (1649) he writes: “[W]hen we speak, we think only of the meaning of what we want to say, and this makes us move our tongue and lips much more readily and effectively than if we thought of moving them in all ways required for uttering the same words.” (art. 44).

When it comes to emotions, it is clear that the James-Lange insight that an emotion does not have to be conscious to be functional, was essentially the view proposed by Descartes in the Passions (art. 38). Descartes explicitly analyzed several emotions, among them the emotion of love. In a letter in 1647, he provides an example from his personal experience: “When I was a child, I loved a girl of my own age who had a slight squint. (…) I felt a special inclination to love [girls with squints] simply because they had that defect; yet I had no idea myself that this was why it was.”

Descartes explained in terms of his new mechanistic physiology how our emotional reactions can vary and change. For example, in the letter quoted above, he writes: “So when we are inclined to love someone without knowing the reason, we may believe that this is
because they have some similarity to something in an earlier object of our love, though we may not be able to identify it.”

All in all, contrary to what Wilson (2002), among many others, claim, Descartes pioneered the understanding that our perceptual, linguistic, and motor systems operate largely outside of awareness, and that “the adaptive unconscious” can produce feelings and preferences of which people are unaware (Kirkebøen, 2019). Descartes clearly also anticipated Wilson’s (2002) explanation of why we do not have access to our “unconscious self”: “Because (...) nonconscious processing is part of the architecture of the brain, it may not be possible to gain direct access to nonconscious processes” (p. 16).

Bibliography

«I will always remain as a physician... hungering for knowledge, hungering for understanding». Franz Boas’s Psychophysics and Anthropology of Sound

Irene Candelieri

This contribution addresses the training in psychophysics, experimental and natural sciences that loom large Franz Boas (Minden, 1858 – New York, 1942), the German Jewish scientist who became the recognized founding father of American anthropology as a discipline. The most recent biographical and critical studies centered on Boasian multifaceted legacy and theoretical intakes highlight that «Boas grew into anthropology from his interest in science» (Lévi Zumwalt, 2019, p. 330); nevertheless, even if his personal and academic background as a German Jew is acknowledged, it is not yet «fully explored nor understood» (Müller-Wille, 2014, pp. 26 – 27).

In this regard, the aim of the presentation will be firstly to illuminate the German academic background that led Boas acquiring a dual competence in both scientific and philosophical fields, particularly as regards the psychophysics; secondly, to demonstrate how this youth psychophysical training enabled Boas to develop a methodology later applied to the study of phonetics, sound, music, through the gradual stages that led him a broaden reorientation in the social sciences (Stocking, 1968, p. 135).

During the academic years in Heidelberg (1877), Bonn (1877 – 1879), Kiel (1879 – 1881), the young Boas was trained in mathematics, physics, chemistry, geography and philosophy, discussing his doctoral dissertation on physics about the optical properties of water (1881). Thanks to the neo-Kantian philosopher Benno Erdmann (1851 – 1921), he was then encouraged in focusing mainly on psychophysics: hence, while volunteering military service between 1881 and 1882, Boas wrote a number of articles in which he exposed his interpretation of psychophysical assumptions.
At the time, Gustav Theodor Fechner (1801 – 1887) was the unavoidable reference for those dealing with the psychophysics in the second half of the nineteenth century, after the publishing of his two-volume *Elemente der Psychophysik* (1860). In this work the German philosopher and physicist, trained in medicine, exposed a set of experimental procedures for relating measured sensory stimulus to reported sensation, contributing to the birth of experimental psychology. The Boasian psychophysical interpretation stressed the role played by the subjective state of mind, precisely the degree of attention, during the discrimination process of two stimuli (e.g., two lengths, weights, colours), just noticeably different from each other (Boas, 1881a, 1882a, 1882b, 1882c, 1882d, 1882e).

In moving from psychophysics to the vast array of ethnographic fieldwork, ethnomusicological pioneering studies and the development of the four-field model in anthropology, Franz Boas broadened his epistemological interests, without giving up the empirical methodology accrued in his German academic years.

This is particularly noticeable in his painstaking research devoted to the Native Indian and Arctic languages and sounds, as the second part of the contribution aims to demonstrate. Boasian fieldwork was marked by a systematic attempt to approach foreign sound system with an inductive method ensuring the correctness of transcribing and spelling. The psychophysical training and framework led him to deal rigorously with the phenomena of mishearing, the problem of sound-blindness and the biasing filter on the perception of sounds (Boas, 1889). More specifically, by underscoring the apperception of a new sound stimuli through similar, already known sounds. Boas would endorse a relativistic approach to perception and mental representations of sounds, fostering his eventual lifelong, hectic concern about an antiracist theory of human mental functions.

Following a biographical contextualisation, the above mentioned historical and methodological issues can therefore be evinced by enlightening the role of Boasian contribution in the realms both of the scientific methodology – ingrained in his early psychophysics training – and of the anthropological fieldwork. So far the critical literature has not paid a thorough attention to his psychophysic early essays, that offer instead a privileged look in observing his methodological issues regarding the problem of measurement, bias and perception. At stake are Boasian empirical research, intertwined with philosophical and psychophysical assumptions that offer a historical and epistemological perspective not only to the psychophysical debate, but also to the psychoacoustics, ethnomusicology and anthropology.

Bibliography


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**Some Historical Questions Regarding Emotionality Research: Is Flügel’s Method Associated with Wundt?**

**Junona S. Almonaitienė**

Notebooks of *The Diary* of a student Vytautas Civinskis (Witold Cywiński, 1887–1910) is being investigated as a primary source of psychology history from 2019. Recently, several data lists and diagrams found in *The Diary* were analyzed carefully, collating them with related notes and calculations. The preliminary assumption that the diagrams represent emotional states was approved, and the “research design” applied by the diarist was reconstructed. According to it, the pleasure-unpleasure of emotional state (positive or negative mood) and its intensity according to a scale ranging from -4 to +4 were evaluated subjectively and recorded several times daily (at least in the morning, midday and evening). On the basis of the data, the diagrams (graphs) were drawn up visualizing the mean emotional state of each day of a month, and separately the mood in the morning, midday and evening. The means for all the month were also calculated precisely, to one hundred thousandths (as many as five decimal places).

Most probably, Civinskis learned the method of monitoring emotional states during his studies at Leipzig, where he attended Wilhelm Wundt’s psychology lectures in 1905. Later, he tried to elaborate the method and to adapt it to his own needs, as the investigation showed (Almonaitienė and Girininkaitė, 2021). Civinskis never attended psychology lectures later, and he never made his research public as far as it is known.
Intriguingly, it was found that several psychologists applied similar method to inquire into human affectivity much later, but none of them were found to mention Wundt or the Institute of Experimental Psychology at Leipzig as a source of ideas. One of them, John Carl Flügel (1884–1955), published his research results in 1925. He applied quite similar method, however, much more sophisticated. “Nine subjects kept a detailed record of their affective life for thirty days or more, entering in this record the intensity of the feelings that were experienced, and the qualitative nature of the chief affective mental states”, as it was referred in academic press. For help in the data analysis, Flügel expressed his gratitude to Charles E. Spearman (1863–1945). The both academics studied experimental psychology in Germany, as it is well known.

Famous Lithuanian psychologist Vytis Viliūnas (1944–2011), professor at the Lomonosov Moscow State University, the author of books on human emotions and motivation, conducted research in the 1990-ties, together with his doctoral students. They referred to Flügel as an author of the method. Viliūnas, however, was the one who highly valued the theoretical potential of Wundt’s ideas on human affectivity and commented on them.

The methodological similarity of the aforementioned studies imply suggestion that all the researchers relied directly or indirectly on the ideas of German origin, most probably related to the Leipzig Institute for Experimental Psychology. Thus, it is possible that further investigations may reveal details about the impact of Wundt’s ideas on theoretical and empirical research related to emotional phenomena in the 20th century.

Based on the analysis of the entries of The Diary and another archival document, Civinskis’ Study Book (Collegien-Buch) issued by the University of Leipzig, it can be stated that Civinskis was the first student from Lithuania to attend Wundt’s lectures there. The diarist’s study of emotional states can be considered to be one of the earliest empirical studies in the history of Lithuanian psychology. Civinskis’ description of some demonstrations of emotion inquiry methods presented by Wundt during his lectures may add some details to what is already widely known.

Bibliography
The Diary of Vytautas Civinskis (1887–1910). Vilnius University Library, Manuscript Department, F1–D1024 to F1–D1052.
Moving beyond disciplinary limits and gender role in Spain: C. Arenal (1820-1893) on psychology

Annette Mülberger

Historians have dealt with the way in which psychology and law started to get connected in the 19th century. Furthermore, they showed how, at the beginnings of the 20th century, the first psychologists, such as H. Münsterberg, K. Marbe, W. Stern and others, were able to enter the courtroom (Mülberger, 2009; Wetzell, 2006; Wolffram, 2018; 2020). In order to understand this historical development it is necessary to take into account the rise of criminology that took place in the 19th century, under the leadership of the Italian anthropologists. Lombroso and his followers pursued a scientific study of human differences, linking criminality to psychological and anthropometrical diagnostic methods (Horn, 2013). Such an anthropological interest in the criminal triggered an important turning point for the history of forensic medicine and juridical psychology, encouraging the collection of empirical observations and data collected through measurements. Spain followed the Italian’s lead. Also there psychology would soon become one of the topics of interest of forensic psychiatrists, criminologists and jurists (Campos, 2013; Carpintero & Rechea, 1994).

In my talk I will argue for the need to broadening our historical perspective by taking a look at the work done by psychologically schooled police agents, social workers and expert witnesses in juvenile courts. In these areas we can also detect the presence of women who successfully promoted themselves as child and youth experts as well as social workers. Recently, Laurens Schlicht (2020) has dealt with the work of the police agent Berta Rahtsam and the psychologist Maria Zillig, assessing critically her contributions from a historical perspective.

In my talk I will deal with Concepción Arenal Ponte (1820-1893), who is well known for her work as inspector of women’s prisons, as well as her leading role in the women rights movement. She managed to study law and became a Catholic humanist, collaborating as a member with the San Vicente de Paul Society. In my talk I will focus on a rather unknown part of her work, putting Arenal’s article on comparative psychology within the broad historical (and intellectual) context and analyze the way she managed to cross both disciplinary and gender roles. Her article, published 1886, contains an attack, not only against the work of the Italian anthropological school, but also against the organization of Spanish society at large. I will show how her text can help us to get a better understanding of what psychology meant to her and how a psychological discourse could be used for a social and political critique.

Bibliography
“Thinking Freudian, speaking Pavlovian.” The transformation of women psychoanalyst’s identity in post-war Hungary

Anna Borgos

In the last (1946) members’ list of the Hungarian Psychoanalytical Society before its dissolution, the proportion of female members was higher than ever (65%), well above that of men. The reason for this shift was not only the continued access of women, but also (even more so) the death or departure of men (to a greater extent than women) due to forced labor, deportation, or emigration. The Hungarian Psychoanalytical Society was dissolved in 1949, which led to the termination of official activities until the 1980s, although many continued their analytical work in the framework of their medical practice or privately. In the 1950s, psychology as a whole was suppressed, in the 1960s re-institutionalization began (in terms of education, publications, associations, etc.), but psychoanalysis was still not presentable. From the 1970s onwards, professional life began to work more publicly in the form of seminars, psychotherapy weekends, group therapy, and an increased Western orientation and contact; in 1975 the Hungarian psychoanalytic group was reintegrated into the International Psychoanalytical Association as a study group.

My paper explores the career of some early Hungarian female psychoanalysts after WW2. The main questions of my lecture are: How did women analysts (those who survived the war and stayed in Hungary) find their place in the fundamentally changed professional and political environment; what opportunities and constraints did they face; what strategies and positions did they seek and find? How did the changed social circumstances transform the significance, meaning, and legitimacy of their different (female, leftist/communist, Jewish, psychoanalytic) identities? What could they preserve from the theoretical and practical system of psychoanalysis, its intellectual tradition, and to what other areas did they orient themselves?

Some of the women analysts who stayed in Hungary (e.g. Lillián Rotter, Alice Hermann, and Lucy Lieberman) had predominantly dealt with child psychology and pedagogy before the war; their psychoanalytic identity was perhaps less essential, and (in accordance with their leftist commitment) they apparently found their place more easily in the post-war milieu in the field of state child protection, kindergarten, education, or special education. Others (such as Lilly Hajdu), although holding important state positions (she was the director of the National Psychiatric and Neurological Institute in the 1950s), have been forced to undergo significant identity changes and various levels of professional and political compromise.

The twentieth-century status of femininity, Jewishness, and psychoanalysis were equally fluctuating and often threatened. While around the turn of the century women had to face barriers in admitting higher education and entering scholarly career on the ground of their gender, from the 1920s-1930s on, it was their Jewishness that became the basis for
restriction/exclusion; and after 1949 psychoanalysis was classified as unacceptable. After the war, the image of working and intellectual woman was more accepted within the given ideological requirements, and Jewishness was not the basis for exclusion either (although it was a taboo subject), but psychoanalytic activities were interrupted. Thus, the career and personal history of women analysts is situated in a complex intersection of origin, gender, social class, and professional and political identities/circumstances and can be understood in context. The presentation explores the period from the dissolution of the Hungarian Psychoanalytic Association in 1949 until the reinstatement in the 1970s through the post-war career of some prominent female analysts: primarily Lilly Hajdu and Alice Hermann.

Bibliography

Psychoanalytic assessment of movement. Influence of drive-theory and ego-psychology on the development of the Kestenberg Movement Profile

Janka Kormos

The paper is part of a doctoral study on the history and development of the psychodynamic theory of movement development and psychoanalytic assessment of movement behaviour, the Kestenberg Movement Profile.

The Kestenberg Movement Profile was developed in the 1960s by the Sands Point Movement Study Group in New York (USA) with the leadership of Judith S. Kestenberg (1910-1999). The Sands Point Movement Study Group was a multidisciplinary team of movement researchers and mental health professionals. Judith S. Kestenberg was driven by her interest as a neurologist and psychoanalyst to constitute a developmental and psychoanalytic understanding of movement. The need for such a diagnostic assessment tool was inarguable, as verbal assessment methods were inapt for working with children in psychiatry at the time. The Kestenberg Movement Profile forms a complex, integrative approach of movement assessment and analysis that examines the interplay between movement development, movement expression and intrapsychic processes.
Through historical analysis the study attempts to examine the work of Judith S. Kestenberg with specific focus on the development of the Kestenberg Movement Profile. The scope of the study pertains to reconstructing the developmental line of Kestenberg’s work from Poland to Vienna and to New York City, USA. Kestenberg’s oeuvre consists of three significant epochs. The first period concerns Kestenberg’s neurological research at the medical school of Vienna and spans until her emigration to New York in 1937. The focus of the second period is New York City between 1937-1975, where she expanded her psychoanalytic work, founded the Sands Point Movement Study Group and devised the Kestenberg Movement Profile. The third important departure in Kestenberg’s work started in 1975 that centered upon psychoanalytic studies on transgenerational trauma of the Holocaust in child survivors and second generation of survivors.

This paper focuses on the second epoch, Kestenberg’s early writings between 1933-1956 which expose the theoretical links between Kestenberg’s approach to movement assessment and Freudian drive-theory and ego-psychology. Presenting Judith S. Kestenberg’s work within its historical context with emphasis on its theoretical grounding, is crucial for understanding its complexity and the embodied developmental perspective it brought into psychoanalysis at the time. Kestenberg’s work presented the body and bodily phenomena as central symbolic tools to psychoanalytic thought. By tracing back the lines of influence on the development of the Kestenberg Movement Profile, issues of the body in psychoanalysis also come into view. The paper specifically attends to the influences of Paul Schilder, Heinz Hartmann, Phyllis Greenacre and Anna Freud on the development of Kestenberg’s psychoanalytic assessment of movement.
Wednesday 30 June - Session 1
Marxist Perspectives

The two Budapest schools and the Other in sexuality. Sexual subjectivity from a psychoanalytical and Marxist perspective

Gergely Csányi

There were two Budapest schools in 20th century Hungary. The first was a school of psychoanalysis influenced by Sándor Ferenczi and marked by such famous psychoanalytic thinkers as Mihály Bálint or Géza Róheim before World War II. The other Budapest school, also known as the Lukács school, was a group of philosophers grouped around György Lukács in the 1960s and 1970s. The school included Ágnes Heller, György Márkus and Mihály Vajda, among others. In my presentation, focusing mainly on the ontogenetic cultural theory of Géza Róheim and the philosophical anthropology of György Márkus, I show that in these two schools the question of subjectivity and the Other appears.

Furthermore based on the wider framework of psychoanalysis and historical materialism I introduce a definition of sexuality that is based on the fact the human body is susceptible to external objects of needs, but also full of potency to make different cultural environments. The plasticity of instinctive energies, or the relative sharpness of bodily modalities, carry within them the possibilities of a multitude of socio-cultural arrangements. Such physical potential is the pleasure of satisfying needs. The potential enjoyment of the satisfaction of caloric needs, i.e. eating, can be described, for example, by the combined effect of the satisfaction of hunger and the stimulation made possible by advanced human chemical perception. Sexual intercourse, which is a prerequisite for long-term reproduction, is a great pleasure for the human skin, but mainly for the stimulation of the clitoris and penis, which have a lot of free nerve endings. The structure of the human body (including the senses and the human brain), and thus the generative sexual potential of the human body, allows for visual and other extragenital sexual stimulation.

Finally, I argue that human sexuality is better understood from the point where the theoretical framework of the two Budapest schools meet. Géza Róheim, psychoanalytic anthropologist and theorist, saw a clear correlation between a person’s prolonged childhood, sociability, social stimulation hunger, and ability to have not (necessarily or directly) reproductive sexuality. He saw the human being from childhood as an animal capable of social stimulation and hungry for social stimuli, which in adulthood can recognise the Other’s desires and has desire to satisfy them during sexual intercourse instead of satisfying their own drives. From the point of view of György Márkus’ philosophical anthropology, we can say that while for the animal the Other exists in the sexual act only as an object of need, for the human being born in history, the Other also has, at least potentially, their own objective existence in the sexual act and thus their own desires to satisfy.

Bibliography
Two versions of marxist concrete psychology: Politzer and Mérei compared

Csaba Pleh

The paper compares the life and work of two Hungarian born, French trained Marxist psychologists of mind twentieth century, George Politzer (1903-1942) and Ferenc Mérei (1909-1986). Both were young left wing Hungarian born Jews studying and doing university studies and social movement related partly clandestine works in France in the 1920-1930s. In their intellectual outlook, both were dissatisfied with traditional laboratory academic psychology. The comparison relies on their work, interviews in the case of Mérei, and secondary literature on their life and psychology. Here is a comparison of their life paths and relevant activities.

**Politzer:** 1919 participates in Communist uprising in Hungary, expelled from schools; emigrates to France, in late 1920s, studies psychology, 1928-29 writes his concrete psychology and critic of Bergson; 1930s moves to communist party school teaching Marxist textbook philosophy and economy; criticizes fascist ideology and is executed by the German occupiers as an early resistant.

**Mérei:** is exposed to modern art and working class movement as a teenager in Budapest; emigrates to France and studies psychology with H. Wallon in the early 1930s while engaged in the communist movement; returns to Hungary becomes a student of Lipót Szondi in the late 30s; starts to publish on educational issues and continues his clandestine communist activities; is taken as a Jew to the Eastern front in a forced labor unit, escapes to the Soviet side; comes back in 1945 as a communist leader of Hungarian education until 1949; starts his publications on social relations in children, Rorschach test, and a child centered socially committed reform pedagogy; due to ‘pedological distortions’ is removed from all of his functions in 1949, and until 1956 lives a deprived life with social engagement in artistic circles; participates in the 1956 revolution, and was sentenced to prison in 1958; he continues his dynamic psychology writing in the prison; after his release in 1963, he has become the central guru of Hungarian non-academic clinical psychology as well as the group processes movement, using sociometry and psychodrama; in retirement, Mérei continued to be the leading left wing opposition reference figure in Hungary.

Comparison of their life and work showed that Politzer and Mérei – who have meet in the French communist movement – had several common points in their general habitus and in their outlook towards psychology. Both had a *debatteur personality*; were committed to a continuity of the enlightenment rationalism and its combination with Marxism of their time. Both had a very critical attitude to academic psychology, considering it to be sterile. Though Mérei never developed a program of psychology that could be labeled ‘concrete” they shared a general outlook for a need towards a psychology that is rooted in the human drama, rather than in abstractions.
They have important differences related to their actual training and work situation. For Politzer, the critique of traditional psychology is mainly conceptual, and his concrete psychology is critical of much of his contemporary clinical psychology i.e. psychoanalysis as well. Politzer’s credo for a dramatic was never spelled out in detail. Mérei in his decades as a psychological researcher and practician tried to spell out a social psychology of elementary relations as a basis for his version of concrete psychology. The inspiration towards his own version of “concrete” in the field notions taken over from Kurt Lewin, Gestalt psychology, and the sociometry of Moreno, as well as the developmental theories of Piaget and his mentor, Wallon. While Mérei remained all his life ironical and critical of laboratory psychology, he has created positive programs of a more person, personal meaning, and social determination centered “concrete psychology”. In his versions of sociometry, the Hungarian Rorschach tradition, and psychodrama, while there is no laboratory work, there is a detailed statistics supporting the personal meaning components. The work of Mérei shows a concrete psychology that is at the same time empirical, thus leading to many followers within psychology proper, while the version of Politzer remained conceptual and philosophical.

The analysis of their lives and works shows that they tried the almost impossible crosstalk of left wing communist ideas with liberalism. They also showed that the crosstalk between political engagement and psychology has remained always ambiguous in their work. But the human message clearly indicates in the case of Mérei that openness and crosstalk are important resilience virtues. An originally over-politicized scientific life can still lead to important discoveries in social science. Further the tension between formality, and informal guru roles in social science can be fruitful.

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The personality and organizational skills of the research teams’ leaders are resources to ensure the effective organization of scientific activities. They define one of the main problems of the social psychology of science (Feist, 2011). However, this problem is at its initial stages largely due to the lack of opportunities offered to experimental study.

The existence of a significant amount of contemporaries’ testimonies about eminent organizers of science and their activities provides the prospects for historical and scientific research of their abilities.

I analyze materials about the life and scientific work of the leading organizers of Soviet psychological science Georgy I. Chelpanov, Vladimir M. Bekhterev, Lev S. Vygotsky, Sergey L. Rubinstein, Boris G. Ananyev. Memoirs of their students, relatives, and contemporaries, biographical and historical-and-psychological works were studied. As a result, I identify types of abilities of scientific leaders in Soviet psychology. These are mental, creative, organizational, and pedagogical abilities.

For example, contemporaries and researchers of the scientific work of Vladimir M. Bekhterev testify to such mental abilities as “exceptional observation” (Osipov, 1947, p. 60), “the ability to quickly navigate in a variety of issues, grasp the essential, and make wide and valuable generalizations” (Loginova, 2005, p.72), etc.

Boris G. Ananyev’s student Natalia A. Loginova speaks of his organizational abilities. “Boris Gerasimovich has always become the center of scientific life. He involved his staff, Leningrad city psychologists, and students in one flow of research according to the general plan” (Loginova, 2006).

Lev S. Vygotsky’ students wrote about his creative abilities that “every new fact gave rise to new ideas, and he generously shared them with other” (cited by Vygodskaya, Lifanova, 1996, p.228).

Thus, among the identified types, there are not only the abilities directly related to the production of scientific knowledge, but also the characteristics of leading scientists, ensuring the work of teams under their leadership. They are not only organizational abilities, but also pedagogical abilities. The last ones provide a motivation of young psychologists to choose research activities as professional. For instance, a number of testimonies of Lev S. Vygotsky’s contemporaries about his outstanding abilities manifested during lections were discovered (Artemeva, Sinyova, 2020).

At the same time, work with young scientists is also personal contact and consultations that require capacity for individual approach to each student. For example, Sergey L. Rubinstein’s student Elena A. Budilova wrote that he “could praise so much that the approval brought true joy and gave strength for further work” (Budilova, 1986, p.413).

Soviet scientific leaders also brought up their students. Rosa E. Levina and Natalia G. Morozova said that L.S. Vygotsky “brought up” them with his thoughts, judgments, and his attitude to science, to life, and to people (Levina, Morozova, 1984).
The research and analysis concluded the significance of not only the mental, creative, organizational, but also the pedagogical abilities of the scientific groups’ leaders. The supervisor’s work requires not only the organization of the scientific team activities and the creation of new scientific knowledge, but also the training the scientists of the future. The proposed types of abilities can be combined into two blocks. The first block consist of mental and creative abilities related to the production of scientific knowledge. The second one presents pedagogical and organizing abilities ensuring the work of the scientific team. Obviously these 4 types of abilities are universal, not specific only to the leaders of Soviet psychology.

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Bibliography

The concept "Social" in Russian psychology: Specificity, causes and consequences

Irina A. Mironenko

Specificity of the conceptual system, which formed in the course of relatively isolated development of psychology in Russia throughout major part of the 20th century, makes a significant hindrance to integrating developments of Russian psychology into the historical context of the international science [3]. The concept “Social” is one of the most important for Soviet psychology and its meaning is not identical to that in the international discourse.

In Soviet psychology, “social” primarily meant the quality, which distinguishes humans from animals. In line with the cultural-historical theory, “social” designates culture, socially preserved and transferred, which determines the development of human personality and mental processes, basing not on biological laws, but on that of the social. The role of the Vygotsky’s cultural-historical theory (and the Activity Theory, which developed on its basis as the “mainstream” of Soviet psychology) is obvious in the fact that this interpretation of the concept firmly established itself in Russian psychology. The “biosocial” problem - the problem of the interrelations of biology and culture in humans was central for the Russian psychology of the Soviet period [4].

The meaning of the concept of the “social” in the international discourse formed not in the context of the dichotomy of “biology vs culture”, but in the context of the dichotomy “individual vs group”. It is important to mention that in Russian discourse, the difference in the
meaning of the concept "social" when it is defined through the dichotomy "biology vs culture" in comparison with the definition through the dichotomy "individual vs group" clearly manifested itself only in the last decades of the twentieth century, due to achievements of biological sciences, namely, the discovery of the mechanisms of the so-called group selection. These made it possible to explain as biologically expedient those types of behavior that were traditionally opposed to biologically determined individual behavior - various manifestations of altruism and self-sacrifice. Until then, there was a strong tendency in Russian psychology to identify biological with individual and cultural with social. For example, Alexey Leontiev in his monograph "Problems of the development of the psyche" [2], speaking about the difference between humans and animals, argues that an animal always acts by itself, as if alone. Even when several individuals do something together, for example, ants are dragging a straw, for an ant, others are just elements of his environment. The phenomenon of cooperation between members of a group, in accordance with this theory, appears only at the level of human psyche.

Nowadays, the term “social” is widely used in Russian psychology as the antonym of the concept of “individual”. Hence, the practice of using the phrase “social behavior of animals”.

The fact that the problem of the social was posed in Russian psychology, primarily, as a problem of human mentality, and in Western psychology as a problem of interactions between an individual and a group, caused a difference in the area of research on the social. Western psychology focused on relations between individual and group (inter-individual approach), Russian psychology - on specificity of human mentality, problems of consciousness, etc., (intra-individual approach). That is why Russian social psychology of the Soviet period very closely integrated with general psychology. Actually, we may say that there was no social psychology in Russia from the early 1930es until 1960es, when that was re-started trying to straddle both worlds: Marxist methodology of Russian general psychology (the Activity theory), and methodology of the North American mainstream of social psychology [1, 5].

Bibliography
Psychotherapy at the University of Rome between the 1960s and 1970s. An unexplored terrain

Andrea Romano & Massimiliano Pompa

Some contributions on the history of psychotherapy in Italy have been published in recent years (Cimino & Foschi, 2017, Foschi & Innamorati, 2020). Nevertheless, the role and development of psychotherapy within non-psychiatric institutions such as university counseling services has still been little explored. This presentation aims to introduce an exploratory work in order to retrace a historical description of the first psychotherapeutic experiences within the University of Rome.

To date, the center of Child Neuropsychiatry at Sapienza University has been considered as the birthplace of innovations in the field of psychotherapeutic intervention in the 1970s in Italy (Algini, 2007; Fiorani, 2013). Although this pioneering center were decisive for the institutional psychotherapy development, the present work intends to demonstrate that the first applications of psychotherapy in Rome, outside of private practice, were developed in the Clinic of Nervous and Mental Illnesses of the Roman University. Some psychiatrists looked for alternative therapeutic tools to overcome an obsolete psychiatric practice, that was criticized by an increasing number of physicians. In fact, in 1965 a mental health service was established within the Center for Preventive Medicine at La Sapienza University, where psychotherapy services for students were provided. This experience forerun the development and establishment of counseling centers that, since the 1990s, spread to almost all Italian universities on the Anglo-Saxon model (Biasi, 2019).

The mental hygiene service was coordinated by Luigi Frighi (1922-2004), who held the chair of Mental Hygiene. Since 1972, after the institution of the degree course in psychology (Romano, 2020) many of the psychology students attended the Mental Hygiene course.

At the same time, in the Neuropsychiatric Clinic of the University of Rome directed by Mario Gozzano (1898-1986), group psychotherapy for non-student patients was provided. Jaime Ondarza Linares conducted the groups since 1967, attended mainly by office workers and young professionals (Ondarza Linares, 1972).

The main objectives of these initiatives were to reduce the prescriptions of psychotropic drugs and electroshock (Stroppiana, 1985). It is necessary to consider not only the scientific merit of this experience, but also its social impact, taking into account the historical context in which it took place: the Sapienza University played a central role in students’ revolts that led occupations and violent clashes between young people and the police (Balestrioni & Moronoi, 1988).

Moreover, the impressive growth of university enrollment increased the requests for psychological support for students (Flores & De Bernardi, 1998). We assume that the clinicians who took part in this experience were able to respond to youth discomfort through the creation of therapeutic spaces for them, sharing the same student discontent for the University Reform of 1969 (Frighi, 1972).

Furthermore, it must be kept in mind that the attention of the ‘psi’ movement, between the 1960s and 1970s, was focused almost entirely on the asylum reform and that Franco
Basaglia (1924-1980) -the leading figure of Italian radical psychiatry- had a negative opinion about psychotherapy.

We can state that the Sapienza University’s psychiatrists started a groundbreaking experience by proposing a new way of intervention, alternative to the old practice, that broadened the application of the “psi” care.

We hypothesize that these psychiatrists’ approach was different from traditional psychiatry on the one hand and from radical psychiatry on the other. This could be the reason to understand why Italian historiography has not provided yet a systematic study on these scholars and their relationship with other groups such as the ‘Milanese Group of the Development of Psychotherapy’ that, in those years, played a crucial role in institutionalizing and spreading psychotherapy in Italy (Cimino & Foschi, 2017).

Bibliography


With the current resurgence of interest in the medical potential of psychedelic drugs (ie hallucinogenic drugs such as LSD and psilocybin), historians have been stimulated to dig further into the use of these substances in 1950s and 1960s psychiatry. In Canada, historical scholarship has focused mostly on Saskatchewan, where psychiatrists such as Abram Hoffer and Humphrey Osmond investigated the biochemical and therapeutic properties of LSD and mescaline in the 1950s. However, less attention has been paid to the history of LSD therapy in Canada’s biggest city, Toronto. Several historical studies acknowledge that Ontario’s Addiction Research Foundation, located in Toronto, conducted a randomized controlled trial of LSD therapy in the 1960s, but these studies tend to suggest that the psychiatrists involved in this trial possessed a negative bias towards LSD. Therefore, the little historical attention that LSD therapy in Toronto has received portrays it as naïve, misguided, and negatively biased.

This paper intends to show that, in contrast, LSD therapy in Toronto enjoyed a period of celebration and popularity in the 1960s. Several psychiatrists in the city used LSD to treat psychiatric patients and addictions in private clinics and in public hospitals. These psychiatrists were enthusiastic about the drug’s therapeutic potential, and some had considerable experience using the drug in psychiatric contexts. In fact, the psychiatrists involved in the Addiction Research Foundation study had positive attitudes towards LSD and developed their own fairly sophisticated, albeit controversial, method of conducting LSD therapy. Further, news media promoted this research and highlighted the enthusiasm of these psychiatric researchers. This paper will thus add to existing historical knowledge about LSD therapy in Canada by expanding the discussion beyond the typical narratives that focus on Saskatchewan and Ewen Cameron’s work in Montreal.

To make my case, I focus on the work of three LSD therapy programs that existed in the city. First, I will explore the work of Earle Baker and Lionel Solursh, the psychiatrists who administered the LSD for the Addiction Research Foundation’s study. Starting in 1961, Baker and Solursh practised LSD therapy at Toronto Western Hospital. They used a high dose of LSD within a psychoanalytical context to help reveal a patient’s unconscious conflicts. They also used LSD to train nurses and psychiatry students. While they were excited about LSD’s potential, their method received a lot of criticism from North American LSD researchers because they restrained patients to a bed after giving them the drug. Even after LSD became illegal in Canada in 1968, Baker and Solursh managed to gain approval to continue using it at the hospital.

Second, I examine the unique case of Florence Nichols, a Canadian psychiatric missionary who gained experience using LSD in India and England in the 1950s before returning to Canada. In 1961, Nichols took a position at the Bell Clinic in Toronto, a private clinic focused on treating addiction. Nichols used LSD to treat over 100 patients suffering from
alcoholism. While many narratives in the history of LSD therapy in Canada focus on men, Nichols' story reveals that not only men practiced LSD therapy in Canada.

Finally, I look at Robert Pos, a Dutch immigrant who used LSD to treat patients in the Toronto General Hospital. Aside from using LSD therapeutically, Pos also used observations of LSD experiences to generate a sophisticated account of sensory processing.

In addition to these three cases, I also pay attention to how these researchers were celebrated by the news media in the 1960s. I conclude that historians ought to acknowledge and further chart how LSD was widely used in Ontario, in order to extend the historical narrative beyond Saskatchewan.

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**Wednesday 30 June - Session 4**  
**Keynote**

**The Scientific Self: A historiographical program**

*Professor Herman Paul  
Leiden University*

This paper presents three arguments in support of a history of scientific selfhood, the most important of which is that it allows for transdisciplinary comparisons of the kind to which both historians of the human sciences and historians of the humanities are committed. The paper then proceeds with two case studies. The first one examines how three prominent nineteenth-century scientists with different disciplinary backgrounds envisioned the self – that is, what skills, virtues, or talents they considered indispensable for scientific work. If this first example focuses on ideals of selfhood, the second one examines how such ideals translated into practice, if at all. Zooming in on research and teaching practices at the University of Strasbourg in late nineteenth-century Germany, this last part of the paper shows how seminar teaching, editorial work, and book reviewing, among other things, were practices imbued with expectations about virtues and commitments that participants should display or develop.

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**Thursday 1 July - Session 1**  
**ESHHS Business Meeting**

**Agenda**

- Opening remarks
- Early career award 2020
- Financial report
- New members
- Election of the board
- Revision of ECA regulations
- Upcoming conferences
- Other business
In my presentation I would like to demonstrate how psychoanalysis influenced Jean Piaget’s thinking in the 1920s, specifically in his interpretation of autism, egocentrism and socialization. Piaget was fortunate with the start of his career, as both the conceptual and the personal circumstances were ideal for the development of his thinking. Two of these circumstances are important for us now. One is that he started his academic career in Paris, in what used to be Binet’s laboratory, working for Théodore Simon, and became familiar with the biological perspective on child psychology, as well as with experimenting. The other is that he was also interested in psychoanalysis, not only in theory but also in practice, as he himself went into analysis. These two approaches and their interference continued to develop in the few years (1921-1925) when he was working in the also intellectually bustling town of Geneva, in the Rousseau Institute (IJJR), at the invitation of Édouard Claparède.

Within the framework of these two approaches, already at the beginning of his career Piaget discovered the research topic that stayed with him throughout his life: mapping the process of how children create symbols. In this early stage, however, he did not so much examine this process within the framework of genetic epistemology and the development of mental structures, rather as part of the process leading from autistic thinking through the stage that Piaget called egocentric to socialized thinking. (His take on the issue at the time is best reflected in two studies he published in 1923: La pensée symbolique et la pensée de l’ enfant [Symbolic thought and the thought of the child], which expressly shows the influence of psychoanalysis, and his book entitled La langage et la pensée chez l’ enfant [The Language and Thought of the Child].)

In Piaget’s description of the process from autistic to socialized thinking, the inspiration of psychoanalysis can be clearly and demonstrably seen; though his knowledge of psychoanalysis came from many sources (Bleuler, Jung, Silberer etc.), his point of orientation remained Freud.

He considered two vantage points when describing these phases: the nature of thinking (how conscious, directed and symbolic it is) and communication as an aim.

In terms of the nature of thinking, autistic thinking is not conscious, not directed and symbolic, while socialized thinking is conscious, directed and logical. However, in contrast to Freud, Piaget does not view the two types of thinking as opposites, rather he claims that autistic thinking is a rudimentary form of socialized thinking.

In terms of communication, autistic thinking is not aimed at communication, it is for the self, whereas socialized thinking is a means of turning outward and presupposes the separation between the self and the outside world.

The egocentric stage, which is an intermediary phase between autistic and socialized thinking, is positioned between the two others with regard to both these factors: thinking is already conscious, directed and logical but not yet targeted at communication.
Though they are not inspired by psychoanalysis but rather the influence of the Geneva structuralist linguistic school, Piaget’s ideas about language are also worth mentioning with regard to communication.

An important element is that in Piaget’s view, language is just one and not even a privileged area of the development of thinking. Its role is representational, it is an instrument of separation from the hic et nunc, a form of symbolization. The other connected factor related to my point is that for Piaget, it is not linguistic forms but functions that play a determining role. Matching Piaget’s three phases to Karl Bühler’s language functions: in the autistic and egocentric phases the expressive and conative functions dominate, while in the socialized phase the representation function does.

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**Discussion of uploaded paper: “The genetic epistemology of Jean Piaget”**

*Jeremy Trevelyan Burman*

I propose a discussion session of an essay that contains the first English-language archive-driven history of what Jean Piaget was doing that wasn’t “the stage theory of cognitive development.”


Jean Piaget (1896–1980) is known for his contributions to developmental psychology and educational theory. His name is associated especially with Stage Theory. That we believe him to have focused solely on cognitive development, however, is not because he did. This is instead the result of the popularization of his writings in the United States during the Cold War. (A period of crisis and subsequent education reform.) The overpowering influence of those interests blinded us to his larger framework, which he called “genetic epistemology,” and of which his stages were just a part. To address the resulting and continuing misunderstandings, this essay presents original historical scholarship—distilling over a thousand pages of archival documents (correspondence, diary entries, budgets, and reports)—to provide an insider’s look at Piaget’s research program from the perspective of the Rockefeller Foundation: genetic epistemology’s primary funding agency in the United States from the mid-1950s through the early-1960s. The result is an examination of how a group of interested Americans came to understand Piaget’s writings in French in the period just prior to their wider popularization in
English, as well as of how Piaget presented himself and his ideas during the reconstruction of Europe after World War II. My goal, however, is not to summarize the whole of this misunderstood program. Instead, I aim to provide a source of archivally-grounded perspective that will allow for new insights about the Genevan School that are unrelated to American Cold War interests. In the process, we also derive new means to see how Piaget’s experimental examinations of the development of individual knowledge served to inform his team’s investigations of the evolution of science (and vice versa).

The essay itself is quite long, but it covers all of the highlights of their correspondence, contextualizes it, and concludes that Quine’s dismissal of Piaget’s epistemological program is better considered as boundary-work in relation to what Apostel called the “crisis” in logic (viz. the relevance of Brouwer’s intuitionism and Carnap’s intension). This then provides a new way to consider issues from the era, including Quine’s indeterminacy of translation, as developmental problems that can be resolved through interaction.

The essay will also be published online as part of the *Oxford Research Encyclopedia* collection. When it goes live at the ORE portal, it is then expected to be accessible in the open only for the first month. After that, it will be accessible by subscription.
During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, an academic genre called Hodegetik (Wegweisung, or ‘showing the way’) provided students from the German lands with guidance on how to study and live well. Although currently insufficiently researched, hodegetical courses were popular, and their corresponding textbooks circulated widely amongst scholars. The emergence of the genre coincided with the rise of a new type of Protestant university and did so for a reason. Due to students’ relative freedom and the lack of standardized examinations at these universities, means for guiding students were called for, if only to take away the concerns of well-to-do parents. In a sense, by ensuring that students from wealthy families would benefit from attending their university, these universities affirmed their right to exist.

In order to have students succeed in their future careers and lives, hodegetical authors gave various types of advice. Part of the counsel was practical. It dealt with the development of technical skills and knowledge needed for specific future professions. Hodegetical authors often presented students with characterizations of the different (sub)disciplines to be distinguished. They indicated which subjects should be taken, and in which order, describing them as main, side, or preparatory disciplines. Besides truly practical advice, however, major attention was paid to the knowing and the development of the soul. Some authors indicated that students needed to recognize their character traits in order to know which career would be a good fit. They furthermore were supposed to develop their heart or soul in such a way that they would be able to carry out their future work responsibly and live their lives as was expected. The psychagogic element of the Hodegetik was Aristotelian and likely had its roots in the various early modern, interconnected, Aristotle-inspired spiritual practices.

An often-overlooked genre, the Hodegetik provides a wealth of practice-based information regarding the emergence and rise of so-called modern psychology as well as the institutionalization of ideals of Bildung. Hodegetical authors necessarily assumed notions of inclination, suitability, character, and its malleability, either explicitly or implicitly. Therefore, their texts embed changing approaches to introspection, behavioural change and the individual, and showcase processes of professionalization. Moreover, hodegetical sources give insight into how young students, that is future scholars and professionals, were actually prompted to think about themselves, their goals and their various possible careers and future responsibilities. Lastly, because of the inclusion of characterizations of disciplines like psychology, ethics, pedagogy and (the pastoral side of) theology, these sources also provide straightforward descriptions of such changing concepts as taught to students.

In this paper, I will focus on Friedrich Eduard Beneke’s Allgemeine Einleitung in das akademische Studium (1826). According to Beneke, his book contains a written account of the series of freely spoken lectures that he repeatedly gave at the university of Göttingen. Unsurprisingly, Beneke, a post-Kantian psychologist, stresses the importance of understanding the psyche. He argues that there is an intimate connection between „the science of the human soul and the purposes of all the particular professions (Berufgattungen) that are prepared for
in university studies.”¹ The basic and constant need to find and mould students to be a good fit for their future destinations was met by likewise continuous hodegetical efforts. Focusing on Beneke’s lectures, but using other hodegetical sources as well, I examine how the solutions to this task shifted in the face of changing methods of and ideas about soul searching and developing.

**Bibliography**


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The historical reconstruction of the debate on psychoanalytic education

*Dóra Szabó*

The educational adaptation of psychoanalytic theory seems to be a recurring research topic throughout the history of psychoanalysis. According to Ernest Jones (1957), Sigmund Freud considered this new interdisciplinary collaboration as a political question. Freud presumed that the educational useability of his theory did not just strengthen the scientific position of psychoanalysis outside psychiatry but the role of lay analysts became even more valuable within the analytical community as well. Although the importance of this issue had been realized, a proper strategy was still needed to be developed by the members of the psychoanalytical movement. Therefore, the concept of psychoanalytic education faced several definitional problems both from theoretical and methodological perspective.

It has been well documented that many psychoanalytic pioneers paid much attention to the possible educational utility of psychoanalysis – for instance, Siegfried Bernfeld, August Aichhorn, Hans Zulliger, Oskar Pfister, Anna Freud, Susan Isaacs –, however, there was no general consensus on this specific question. On the contrary, the discourse concerning the educational application of psychoanalysis was quite heterogeneous and suffered from inconsistencies. These circumstances made it difficult to articulate clear directives for pedagogical practitioners. The lack of consensual guidelines caused misunderstandings in respect of psychoanalytic conceptions and probably intensified the preconceptions about the psychosexual development of children. Consequently, despite the initial great expectations towards this new scientific cooperation, in the second half of the century, the relationship between psychoanalysis and education was still interpreted as a neurotic and dysfunctional marriage (Bettelheim, 1969). This metaphor illustrated the core problem: in spite of fact that

these two branches of sciences could be mutually enriching, the insufficient communication decreased the possibility of a fruitful partnership.

Therefore, the aim of this study is to analyse some theoretical papers connecting to this discourse (Searl, 1932; Isaacs, 1933; Freud, 1935; Zachry, 1941; Fenichel, 1945; Hoffer, 1945; Kris, 1948; Bettelheim, 1969), in order to reconstruct the main breakpoints and contradictions concerning the notion of psychoanalytic education. This presented research also investigate that how the fragmentation of scientific viewpoints hindered the establishment of a new and well-defined pedagogical approach built on strict psychoanalytic theory. There were different standpoints concerning not only the fundamental psychoanalytic phenomenon such as the developmental function of repression and unconscious phantasies but also the flexibility of boundaries between psychoanalysis and education. Consequently, this presentation attempts to highlight the authors’ critical reflections on both the limitation of psychoanalytic useability and the failures of educational adaptation.

Furthermore, the broader objective of this research is to illuminate that the difficulties related to the educational application of psychoanalysis are not rooted only in the different viewpoints on psychoanalytic knowledge and practice, but also in the fundamentally problematic relationship between theory and practice (Usher & Bryant, 1987). Therefore, the examination of the so-called psychoanalytic education may provide new perspectives for reconsidering the relationship between theory and practice.

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In November 1932, the Swiss Society for Psychiatry’s annual meeting was held in “Burghölzli” Psychiatric Hospital of Zurich. On that occasion, the Swiss psychiatrist Ludwig Binswanger (1881-1966) gave a lecture about The problem of space in psychopathology (Das Raumproblem in der Psychopathologie). As it is well known, in his work, Binswanger tried to combine clinical psychiatry and psychotherapy with phenomenological and existential ideas. He explains existential analysis as an empirical science involving an anthropological approach to the individual essential character of the human “presence” (Dasein). On this basis, Edmund Husserl’s “life-world” (Lebenswelt) and Martin Heidegger’s “being-in-the-world” (In-der-Welt-sein) are the conceptual structures in understanding the subjective experiences of the psychopathological condition. According to Binswanger, indeed, in mental diseases we face modifications in the fundamental structure and being-in-the-world structural links, and mental illness represents an alteration in the lived experience of time, space, body sense, and social relationships.

In this context, my contribution aims to analyse the theme of space (and spatiality) in Binswanger’s work. The space is the core of the reflections carried out by Binswanger in his 1932 lecture, but also in others writings like Dream and Existence (Traum und Existenz, 1930), On the flight of ideas (Über Ideenflucht, 1931-32), Basic forms and realization of human existence (Grundformen und Erkenntnis menschlichen Daseins, 1942), Henrik Ibsen and the problem of self-realization in art (Henrik Ibsen und das Problem der Selbsteinalisation in der Kunst, 1949), and Three forms of failed existence (Drei Formen missglückten Daseins, 1956). In 1932 lecture, the issue of the constitution of space opens original perspectives in the psychopathological and clinical field and takes philosophical importance. On Husserl’s phenomenology influence, Binswanger analyses the structure and the meaning of the space of the “natural world” as oriented space, geometric space, and physical space. In addition, he considers (on the undoubted influence of Heidegger’s thought) the specific relationship between space, mood (Stimmung) and body in terms of thymic space (gestimmter Raum). Thymic space is a particular form of space that tunes Dasein to its world, resulting from the innermost sphere of Gemüt (not the simple mind, but the disposition, the temperament, the feeling, etc. of the human presence) which is constitutive of his being. According to Binswanger, such a notion of space allows us to understand the psychopathological condition even more fully, as a specific transformation of the thymic space and its symbolic universe.

Bibliography
When interviewed for an oral history project, Alan Baddeley, a long-time associate of the Applied Psychology Unit (APU) at Cambridge and its director from 1974 to 1996, recalled “a change in focus around the 1970s at the unit, from being essentially concerned with normal people under abnormal environments, to being concerned with people who had neuropsychological problems as a result of brain damage” (Reynolds and Tansey, 2003, 23). Where psychologists still speak of a revolutionary rupture separating behaviorism from cognitive science, the subsequent transition to neuroscience is usually depicted as a seamless transition if not an inevitable outcome. On this reading, neurology provides the self-evident physical platform on which cognitive programs run. The turn to the brain represents no fundamental shift in theory; neuroimaging merely serves as an innovative method for answering existing questions. In contrast, Baddeley’s recollection suggests a sharper break in thinking about thinking in the late twentieth-century, one tied to a shift in the kinds of bodies that mattered to psychologists. Champions of universal and timeless models of the mind, the APU’s own experimental practice represented a historically bounded, distributed, and embodied cognition.

The Medical Research Council began funding the APU in 1944 as part of the war effort. The Unit’s wartime studies of information flows in human-machine interactions became foundational to the cybernetic-inspired cognitive revolution of the 1950s. Committed to solving practical problems for paying clients, the APU quickly became an internationally recognized center for cognitive science. Its scientists returned concepts like attention and memory to the psychological mainstream, granting them respectability by redefining them in terms of then novel communication theory. Although their models of the mind became a staple of introductory psychology textbooks, the current historiography of the cognitive revolution and cybernetics has largely neglected the Unit. Sociologist Andrew Pickering’s definition of cybernetics as “a postwar science of the adaptive brain” partly explains this neglect (Pickering,
Computational methods feature prominently in twenty-first-century neuroscience in the form of imaging technologies, but as metaphors brains and computers had opposite historical trajectories within the discipline of psychology. At the height of the cognitive revolution, the APU psychologists deliberately skirted the reduction of mind to neurology then abruptly reversed course in the 1980s. By emphasizing certain tensions and transitions the historiography tends to ignore, the Unit provides a unique vantage point for considering the cognitive revolution and how it ended.

Encounters with three sets of bodies drove changes to cognitive theory at the APU as theoretical models got extracted then abstracted from their encounters with a shifting pool of favored participants. These theory-laden bodies became available at different historical junctures as novel technological systems transformed the lives of ordinary Britons in ways both mundane and potentially catastrophic. Cognitive theory's three bodies were the vigilant military recruit of the 1950s, the “unskilled,” female technology worker of the 1960s, and the amnesic neuropsychological patient after the 1970s. The APU's mandate to advance basic science by addressing applied problems meant these shifts mirrored changes in postwar political economy. The bodies of interests and the tasks they performed reflected the transition from an imperial warfare state to the nationalization of industries to their subsequent privatization under neoliberalism and the prioritization of health as an economic problem. The changes at the APU did not represent the fate of cognitive science as a whole, but the view from the Unit's home on Chaucer Road clarifies two key shifts in postwar psychology: namely, the transfer of cybernetics from military to civilian life in 1950s and the seemingly strange death of the computer metaphor for cognition amid the personal computer revolution of the 1980s.

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Behavioral science's ghost in the machine: Amazon Mechanical Turk, crowdsourcing, and survey participation

Jiemin Tina Wei

The worlds of academic social science research and the contemporary "gig" economy collided in the early twenty-first century. Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk), the crowdsourcing labor platform owned by the internet giant Amazon, aspired to provide any individual or organization on the internet with access to “a global, on-demand, 24x7 workforce.” Capitalizing on this online labor trend in droves, academic researchers—particularly social scientists—heavily leveraged MTurk for collecting survey data, conducting as many as 50,000 academic studies on the site each year and publishing thousands. MTurk was emblematic of the new “digital sweatshop,” which hired online workers to do precarious, extremely-low-waged tasks while effectively stripping them of any protections, aside from those they built for themselves through information-sharing. In this presentation, I examine MTurk through the history of labor markets and the history of social science research participation, asking how the labor conditions of research subjects impacted the research conducted on them. As I argue, the methodological crisis concerning behavioral science research conducted on MTurk lies at the intersection between social science’s notion of an ideal research subject and the concerns, interests, and vulnerabilities of crowdsourced participants as a class of exploited and unprotected workers. Academics’ methodological innovation in using MTurk for research, driven by the perennial labor shortage in social science research participants, led to a vicious cycle between researchers and participants as each attempted to out-maneuver the other on the platform for financial gain, knowledge production, and self-protection. As workers devised bots and strategies for earning more money, researchers engineered new “checks” for verifying participants’ attention, honesty, and humanness (proving they are not bots). Interpreting research participation as a form of work, I analyze how the labor-extraction dynamics on the MTurk platform implicated social scientists paying (cheaply) to harvest crowdsourced data. Understanding research conducted on MTurk through the context of extractive labor relations sheds light on researchers and scientists as agents in a capitalist order and on MTurk as the platform providing access to a growing class of deskilled workers who furnished raw materials for extracting behavioral data.

Bibliography


Several generations of critical theorist have accustomed us to equate empiricism, positivism, and ‘scientism’ with technocratic domination and the forces against which any emancipatory project must struggle. But there was one context, contemporaneous with the early Frankfurt School, in which the opposite view predominated: empiricism and positivism were considered forces for human progress and emancipation, and metaphysics – very broadly understood – a force of reaction. This context was Red Vienna of the 1920s and early 1930s, and it was a time and place that had a disproportionate impact on the development of social research, not least due to its internationalization through the exile of figures such as Paul Lazarsfeld and Karl Polanyi (to the US), and Maria Jahoda and Otto Neurath (to the UK).

This paper seeks to contextualize the emergence of social and social-scientific research in the political and intellectual debates in Vienna at this time and locate them in their institutional context. Specifically, we take Othmar Spann and his circle as representative of radical conservatism, and what Thomas Uebel (2005) has called the ‘left Vienna Circle’, the Austro-Marxists, and (Karl) Polanyi as the chief critics of this strand of reactionary speculation. Spann’s conservatism was universalist and corporatist. The relevant institutional fact is that conservative intellectuals had a stranglehold on the universities – particularly the University of Vienna – while radical and more empirically oriented researchers (many of whom were Jewish, or of Jewish background) were excluded from the universities and located in extramural education (the municipal Volkschulen) and private research centres and circles.

In this context, empirical research and empiricism crystalized into one side of a political struggle. For the Austro-Marxists, Marxism was empirical social science (see Fisahn et al (eds), 2018); indeed, for Neurath, Marxism was the only logical-empirical sociology. It was out of this Austro-Marxist milieu that empirical research into working-class living conditions emerged, culminating in a lasting classic: Marie Jahoda, Hans Zeisel and Paul Lazarsfeld, Die Arbeitslosen von Marienthal (see Clavey, 2019 for the political context and implications of this study). For the left, empirical social science was to serve practical ends: not merely improving the living conditions of working men and women, but also contributing to their improvement; to the social democrats’ project of ‘Spätauenklärung’ (late-Enlightenment – see Stadler, 1981) or to shaping ‘der neue Mensch’.

The emergence of empirical research in the context of opposition to reactionary metaphysics and closely aligned with a (left) social democratic project raises two broader questions. First, what is the relationship between social research and political intent? Did these researchers distinguish between their political commitment and scientific work, as Kranebitter and Reinprecht (2018) argue, or were political commitment and social research conjoined, as Clavey (2019) suggests? Secondly, what is the politics of universalizing social theory? For the more radical empiricist members of the Viennese left – notably Neurath – the distinction between understanding and explanation, and with it the rejection of the unity of science
hypothesis, is itself part of a reactionary metaphysical worldview, which can only be overcome by a rejection of the human-nature divide.

Bibliography


« Il faut écarter systématiquement toutes les prénotions » Emile Durkheim’s rhetorical use of Francis Bacon’s theory of the idols

*Edurne De Wilde*

Emile Durkheim’s references to Francis Bacon have not gone unnoticed. Scholarship has identified Francis Bacon as a source of inspiration for Durkheim and has suggested how Bacon’s thought influenced Durkheim’s philosophy of science, and more specifically, his conception of the sociological method (e.g. Schmaus 1994). The references themselves, however, which are readily used to corroborate claims about the intellectual connection between Durkheim and Bacon, have not been examined in their own right, nor have scholars recognised the rhetorical purposes these references served. This paper aims to do exactly that: it considers Durkheim’s practice of referencing and calls attention to the rhetorical dynamics at play. Why did Emile Durkheim, a nineteenth-century French sociologist, choose to refer the writings of Francis Bacon, an early modern English philosopher and statesman? What associations did Bacon’s name evoke among Durkheim’s readers? How common was it to refer to Bacon in nineteenth-century academic debates about the sociological method?

In this paper, I focus on Durkheim’s references to one particular aspect of Bacon’s philosophy: his theory of the idols. In a nutshell, Bacon’s theory of the idols disclosed the vulnerabilities of the human mind. In his famous *Novum Organum* (1620), Bacon stressed that knowledge could only be acquired if one’s mind was freed from the idols, defined as “impediments of various kinds which interfere with the processes of clear human reasoning” (Jardine and Silverthorne 2000). Nowadays, one would call them “biases” or “cognitive errors”.

Concentrating on these references, which can predominantly be found in Durkheim’s main methodological work *The Rules of Sociological Method* (1895), it becomes clear that Durkheim’s references to Bacon’s theory of the idols were neither plain, nor accidental. First, they illustrate the meticulousness of Durkheim’s practice of referencing (Grafton 1997, Kray 2016). In *The Rules*, Durkheim adopted Bacon’s (Latin) terms and expressions, notably the synonymous terms *idola*, *praenotiones* and *notions vulgares*. He explicitly ascribed them to Bacon and systematically added references to Bacon’s *Novum Organum* (1620) – with the respective page numbers – in his endnotes. Second, and more importantly, Bacon’s idols were crucial to Durkheim’s argument. Even though *The Rules* only included a handful of explicit references to Bacon’s idols, these references were part of a rhetorical strategy used by
Durkheim to underpin one of his main methodological assertions, namely that “one must systematically discard all preconceptions”.

Opting for a "rhetorical" approach, which builds upon the “anchoring innovation” framework as presented by Ineke Sluiter (2017), I propose to study Durkheim’s references to Bacon’s idols as creative appropriations. I argue that Durkheim engaged in an “anchoring activity” by wilfully calling attention to the origin of one of his central ideas. He understood that he did not need to keep silent about the pre-history of his ideas. Rather, by using Bacon’s idols as “anchors”, defined by Sluiter as “the concrete phenomena or concepts that are perceived or experienced as the stable basis for innovation”, Durkheim added rhetorical power to his claim to innovation. This claim to innovation had to do with application rather than invention. Durkheim arguably thought of himself as an innovator because more than two hundred years after Bacon, he was the first sociologist to apply Bacon’s principle to the study of the social reality and to work out a corresponding methodology.

Bibliography

Socio-political factors in the development of Soviet psychology in the 1930s

Rafikova Veronika Aydarovna

The period of the 1930s includes a number of moments of high significance, turning points for the history of Soviet psychology, including the intraparty strife of the 1930s, with the ensuing political and ideological consequences. This period became a time of global changes not only for Soviet science: for American psychology, the 1930s also became fateful, they fell on a period that many researchers call “the shift of the intellectual center from Europe to America” [2], associated with the state of German psychological science in the time of the formation and subsequent defeat of fascism and the emigration of psychologists from Germany. Comparison of the trends in the development of Soviet and American psychology becomes especially important in the context of the transition to the post-war "bipolar" world. This study revealed the main factors that influenced the shape of the world psychological science today. An analysis of archival materials, Russian and foreign sources made it possible to draw the following conclusions: the 1930-1935s were a turning point for both Russian and foreign psychology, which was caused by socio-political factors, such as the need to reorient the already built (in the 1920s years and earlier) ideological and methodological foundations of science, the need to search for a new self-determination. In the USSR, this was influenced by the course clearly articulated by the authorities to combat dissent and non-Marxist forms of scientific research, associated with I.V. Stalin, and in the United States - the realization that followed the Great
Depression of the impossibility of further dependence on one material source, the crisis of applied and practical psychology and the need to revise their own grounds for responding to the urgent needs of their time caused by the economic crisis). The years 1935-1939 as a special stage in the development of Soviet psychology are associated primarily with the defeat of psychotechnics and pedology in the USSR [2], repressions against the leaders of these areas, the almost complete destruction of their institutional status (by the end of the 1930s, pedological and psychotechnical research institutes were closed) and the final consolidation of the policy of social order. In this regard, one can compare the position of Soviet psychology at that time with the period of the crisis of applied psychology in the United States [5], since psychotechnics and pedology were the leading and almost the only practice-oriented areas of psychology in the 1920s – 1930s. The second half of the 1930s was also characterized by the consolidation of the intervention of ideology in science and the self-determination of psychology (the first results of which were the works of Soviet and American psychologists, reflecting a certain social order); awareness of the phenomenon of an individual scientist as an engine of science and an instrument of influence (which in Russian psychology manifested itself in repressions against some scientists, and in the United States - in the mass relocation of recognized psychologists from Nazi Germany, which determined the shift of the intellectual center from Europe to the United States).

Bibliography
How human scientific approaches have marginalized in the psy-scientific discipline? A critical psychological analysis on the institutionalization of psychology

Kata Dóra Kiss

Every society at every age has been producing its value system on which behavior is considered normal and which is not. For the modern state, one of the most fundamental institutions to establish this value system is psychology through its related theories and practices, which we could call psy-sciences in general (Rose 1999). Although the concept of the normally functioning human being has been changing through history, psy-sciences perpetually seek to establish an overarching definition of the healthy mind and behavior. Modern psy-sciences had started to emerge during the 19th century, but unlike most disciplines, they still struggle to define their own scientific identity. There has never been a consensus among professionals on the boundaries of the discipline, the main subject matters, and the most suitable methods. Psy-sciences are still fluctuating among natural scientific and human scientific viewpoints (Pléh 1998).

While most textbooks emphasize complex, physiological and humanistic perspectives, in practice cognitive scientific and neuroscientific attitudes have predominated education and research in the recent decades (Kőváry 2017, 55). From the psychopharmacological revolution of the 60s and the 70s, when technological development has made it possible to gain more precise data on human neurobiology and the function of the brain, psychology has anchored itself to biological explanations and the neurological disease model (Kolk 2014). Another reason for this may be the constant attempt of psychology to present itself as a “hard science” among other disciplines, therefore it committed itself to the empirical and evidence-based natural scientific method (Walsh, Teo, Baydala 2014). As a result, most commonly used theories focus more on the individual aspects and less on the societal dimensions of human life. Even in social psychology, social and cultural questions of the behavior are subordinated to biological functions.

Still, the status of psy-sciences is questionable, as its subject - the human behavior - is influenced by both physical and societal elements. According to critiques, explanations that are mainly based on physical factors put social determinations in the second place, therefore these are incapable of subtly apprehend the complexity of our psychic existence. Many theoreticians suggest that psy-sciences should put more emphasis on other human scientific branches, such as sociology, anthropology, critical theory, or even philosophy. While these disciplines have got more speculative methodology than natural sciences, they could help to create a profound picture of our psychic structure. Natural sciences involuntarily establish a kind of norm: an objective, general, and well-measurable concept on psychological health that is, at the same time, in tension with the diverse experiences of human beings (Fox et al. 2009).

The purpose of the presentation is to reveal how natural scientific explanations have become the mainstream paradigm of psy-sciences and to analyze the societal, scientific, and therapeutic aspects of it from the critical psychological perspective. The analysis applies a transdisciplinary approach by social sciences, critical theory, and philosophy to focuses on those external factors (e.g. societal, political, and even economic) that have shaped the current
structure and modus operandi of the discipline. By the natural scientific commitment institutional procedures have the power to promote desirable lifestyles and to stigmatize those who are undesirable for the mainstream society e.g. because of cultural differences, sexual orientation, or class status. The investigation would analyze how the theory and the related practices of psy-sciences reflect upon the subject’s social embeddedness. The presentation aims to raise awareness of the importance of the integration of human sciences to the dominant psy-scientific point of view for a more complex understanding. I assume that the analysis may help professionals to develop a more socially sensitive concept on psychic health that may provide more effective solutions in practice.

**Bibliography**


**From oppression to resistance: Psychology in the GDR**

*Martin Wieser*

In the last decade of the GDR, the balance of power between the socialist party and the polyphonic opposition had shifted more and more towards the latter. As the party leaders saw the economy crumbling, they became more and more dependent on loans from capitalist countries in order to maintain the power structure of the state. In turn, they officially agreed to confer to the Helsinki declaration and to grant all citizens their human rights, including the freedom of belief, expression, and travel. Under these new circumstances, the East German Ministry of State Security, the “shield and sword” of the socialist party, was assigned to protect the hierarchy of power without raising attention from Western media towards its practices. To achieve this mission, the intelligence service relied on many different institutional, material, technological and scientific resources for the identification, surveillance, interrogation and persecution of supposed enemies of the state. Psychology represented one of these resources – but the secret service was not the only one who built upon it.

This paper focusses on one specific field of psychological practice in the context of the last decade of the GDR: The confrontation between the secret service and the opposition. On the one hand, members of the Institute of “Operative Psychology” worked for the secret service in order to provide psychological knowledge for interrogation, persecution, the recruitment of informants and the “disintegration” of oppositional groups and individuals. On the other hand, oppositional groups became increasingly self-organized in the 1980s, and despite the oppression they started to prepare for the encounter with the state security by various means, which also included psychological practices to go through interrogation without naming any other members. Archival material and interviews with contemporary witnesses from East
Germany are taken into account to shed light on the use of psychology during the last years of the GDR. The use of psychological knowledge on both sides of the confrontation is interpreted as a sign of “modernization” of the GDR, meaning that scientific and technological means are used to solve social and political conflicts, even if these means had been previously regarded as problematic on ideological grounds.

Bibliography

Reimagining social inquiry and social inquiry for social reconstruction in the post-1960’s US: Marcus Raskin and the Institute for Policy Studies

Mark Solovey

In my 2013 book Shaky Foundations: The Politics-Patronage-Social Science Nexus in Cold War America, I showed that a largely new extra-university funding system for American social science emerged in the early Cold War era between the late 1940s and mid-1960s. Major patrons in this system included the Defense Department, National Science Foundation, and Ford Foundation. Of special interest here, all of these patrons embraced two key commitments, to scientism and to social engineering. Yet by the mid-to-late 1960s, those two commitments were under increasing attack from a range of critics, including those who questioned the contributions of defense intellectuals and other supposedly objective social scientists to the US Cold War apparatus. Among the critics was the left-liberal, activist-scholar Marcus Raskin, a co-founder and long-time leader at the Institute for Policy Studies, arguably the most influential leftist think tank in the latter third of the 20th century. Focusing on the period from the 1960s to 1980s, this paper examines Raskin’s effort to rethink the nature of social inquiry for the purposes of social reconstruction by drawing on an eclectic mix of Marxism, pragmatism, existentialism, and feminism.
Friday 2 July - Session 3
Stigma & Disability

Reporting facts of insanity around the world: The certification of lunacy between stigma and standardization (1850s-1890s)

Filippo Maria Sposini

The certification of insanity was a medico-legal procedure that became an essential step for civil confinement into lunatic asylums. By mid-nineteenth century, many jurisdictions followed the so-called “English system of certification” which involved two medical practitioners personally examining the alleged insane at the presence of witnesses. Each doctor was required to fill a standardized certificate which required them indicate “facts of insanity personally observed” and “facts of insanity communicated by others”. Only after the completion of this form, people could be officially certified as insane and be recommended for asylum treatment.

In spite of the medical, legal, and social impact of the certification process, we still know very little about this procedure. My presentation will trace the development of the “English system of certification” for then exploring its international diffusion in North America, Australia, India, and the Caribbean during the second half of the nineteenth century. I will explore how practitioners engaged with their role as certifiers, how they proposed to depict “facts of insanity”, and the legal bearings of their actions.

By considering its transnational trajectory, I will suggest that the certification of insanity provides an interesting opportunity for addressing the origins of stigma in mental health and disability. As statutory documents holding legal power, certificates of insanity transformed family concerns into a medical, social, and political issue. Not only personal examination exposed intimate family dynamics to the public, but it also created a written record difficult to erase from bureaucracy and social memory.

Bibliography
In recent years, disability history has grown enormously, and disability has increasingly become an analytical category in historiography at large, alongside more established categories such as gender, race or class. There remain, however, distances and animosities between disability history and the history of science and medicine. In the roughly 40 years of academic institutionalization, disability history and studies has often maintained a monolithic perspective of science and medicine as pathologizing institutions that oppress the voices and perspectives of people with disabilities; likewise the history of science and medicine is seen as perpetuating this view. Disability studies instead promotes a sociocultural model of disability that defines it as a something determined by disabling social attitudes and biases.

The origin of this sociocultural model is usually located in the disability rights movement of the 1970s, 80s and 90s. However, a look at the US in the middle of the 20th century complicates this picture. Already in the 1940s, American social and Gestalt psychologies developed social models of disabilities, defining, for example, deaf people as a social and phenomenological minority. In the 1950s and 60s, leading social psychologists and their students – among them Fritz Heider, Roger Barker, Tamara Dembo and Beatrice Wright – developed the new field of rehabilitation psychology that defined disability as a social and relational phenomenon negotiated between individual and society. Their work was part of a larger body of research on prejudice, bias, stigma, the topological relationship between individual and groups, and the situation of disadvantaged minorities that was mirrored in a larger societal and political interest in these topics. People with disabilities, too, were seen as such minorities and their situation compared to e.g. that of African Americans or immigrants.
Contextualizing the disability-related research of Heider, Barker, Dembo, and Wright in the larger field of Gestalt and social psychology, I argue that disability was not a marginal category but a key concept for driving developing topics in these fields. It was related to their understanding of (social) psychology as a discipline that could provide an impetus for social change. Not the least, their work would go on the influence, for example, Erving Goffman’s study of stigma or Irving K. Zola’s sociological studies of disability. At the same time, I put their work in its historical social context and point to the ambivalent relationship between the psychological concept of individual and social ‘adjustment’ and ableist assumptions of normal bodies and minds.