WHAT’S CRIME GOT TO DO WITH IT?
CCTV, urban security and governing elites

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Introduction

In detailing how two open-street video surveillance systems were implemented and are used in two mid-sized Italian cities, the present work aims to make a significant and theoretically innovative contribution to the range of issues raised by the growing relevance of CCTV. In order to do so, the research will combine a micro-sociological account of how cameras are used by local police in the two cities where fieldwork was conducted with a look at the wider scale processes that have made it possible for video surveillance to become a widespread technology for the control of territory.

The starting point of this work is a firm rejection of technological determinism. Rather, in accordance with literature on the social construction of technology (Bijker et al., 1987; Graham and Marvin, 1996) it is assumed that video surveillance is inherently shaped by the organisational and cultural features of the specific context of its implementation, and that the people that end up using the cameras “have some degree of choice in shaping the[ir] design, development and application” (Graham and Marvin, 1996: 105). This is particularly true if we consider police work, and how the professional and practical culture of the police impacts on how video surveillance is received in the context of a police station. This mirrors what emerged from Norris and Armstrong’s study of CCTV in Britain, where the two authors conclude that video surveillance has “become another resource to be selectively utilised by the police in pursuit of their own organisational goals which are not coincidental with the full enforcement of law” (1999: 83). At the same time, though, this is also to say that the implementation of new technology, and its integration within the general practices of an organisation, will bear on the organisational structure as a whole. In this regard, “the vague notion that available, even conventionally acceptable technology will be used and employed without constraint of police practices and local political traditions is naïve and untenable” (Manning, 1992: 391).

In the pages that follow this general framework will be used to present the findings emerged from a comparison between two mid-sized Italian cities, and the role CCTV plays in each of them with regard to the policing of urban space. The choice to focus on
video surveillance mainly stems from two different reasons. First, there is a consistent gap in the literature on surveillance practices in Italy, with the only notable exception being Fonio’s work on CCTV in Milan (2007). In light of this, one of the ambitions of this work is to contribute to fill this void, and document how video surveillance has come to be regarded as one of the key technologies for the control of space. From a more theoretical point of view, I also believe that the final results of the research have the potential to start a wider conversation within surveillance studies in relation to the epistemological problems that emerge when most of the analytical categories and notions that scholars in the field rely on come from very context-specific cases, thus seemingly discarding what happens outside English-speaking countries (also see: Klauser, 2009). Second, I believe that looking at how cameras are used can help us to shed light on how territory is made controllable through the establishment of boundaries and the creation, and consequent enforcement, of a set of rules associated with those. This point mainly draws upon Sack’s theory of human territoriality (1986) to support the claim that the increasing diffusion of CCTV in cities – and the boundaries associated with it – makes it one of the key instruments for the control of urban space through its conversion into territory.

The two cities where fieldwork was conducted are of comparable size, and were chosen in light of the opposite political traditions that are rooted in their respective histories, so as to investigate the link between specific cultures at the local level and the discriminatory potential that video surveillance possesses. Central City is located in one of Italy’s regioni rosse and, since 1946, has been steadily governed by left-wing parties, with the only exception being the years between 1993 and 1999, when for the first, and up to now, last time a conservative coalition administered the city. In much the same way, Northern City was administered by the Democrazia Cristiana up until 1991, and subsequently by either Forza Italia or the Lega Nord, with the only exception being the years between 2002 and 2007, when a centre-left coalition won the elections.

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1 Four regions located in Central Italy: Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany, Umbria and Marche. Traditionally, they are a stronghold of the Italian left.
2 All mayors nominated from 1946 to 1990 were members of the PCI. From 1990 to 1993 the city was lead by a socialist mayor. From 1999 onwards, the city has been governed by centre-left coalitions.
3 There was a three-year break between 1975 and 1978, when a member of the republican party (PRI) was mayor.
order to maintain the anonymity of all the people involved in this study, I have used fictitious names for all individuals, institutions and places.

In light of the concerns stated above, I started my research by assuming CCTV to represent a sign of the shift towards pre-emption in the field of urban policing, so that by looking closely at how operations are carried out on a day-to-day basis, I would be able to gauge how this re-orientation impacts on general strategies for the control of urban space. The key notions I expected to employ come from different fields of inquiry. From governmentality studies (Foucault, 2008, 2009; Burchell et al., 1991; Rose, 1999a, 2000; Valverde, 2003; Rose et al., 2006) I took the idea of the shift from the control of individuals to the management of aggregates, along with the dispersal and diffusion of control and the reconfiguration of the role of the state. Criminological thought provided a meaningful reference in how pre-emption has affected the field of crime control (O’Malley, 1992; Zedner, 2007), and allowed me to consider how notions of defensible spaces (Newman, 1973), crime prevention through environmental design (Jeffery, 1971) and situational prevention (Clarke, 1980; 1997a) affected urban space. Finally, I also looked at urban studies, particularly in terms of the links between neoliberal urbanism (Keil, 2002; Smith, 2002; Hackworth, 2007) and consumption-inspired regeneration programmes. (Katz, 2001; Lees, 2003). However, soon after I started fieldwork, I realised that what I was witnessing did not at all match what the above literature suggests. Thus, I was forced to reconsider my initial assumption that CCTV could be understood as a marker of the shift towards pre-emptive forms of policing. In turn, this opened the door to a new, pressing, question: if CCTV is not what I thought it was, then what is it? In attempting to provide a satisfying answer to this interrogative, the present work is as much a tale on the sudden turns and winding paths field research often leads us on, as it is on video surveillance in two Italian cities.

The research is structured as follows. The first part – chapters 1 to 3 – of the work details the theoretical framework I started with, and the methods I used to collect the data. The second part is dedicated to the fieldwork and begins with a literature review on video surveillance, in chapter 4, to then proceed to reconstruct the process that led to the implementation of a CCTV system in each of the two cities included in the research. Proper analysis of the case studies follows, with chapters from 7 to 10 detailing the strategies and discourses used to frame CCTV, and turn it into a coherent tool for the maintenance of urban security, both at the national and local levels. In this section I also
reconstruct the flows of public funding that have been instrumental in making video surveillance so common in Italian cities. Chapters 11 to 13 present an account of the time I spent in the two control rooms, and detail how in both cities cameras are not used for crime control, but for the management and control, either by peers or by higher ranks, of patrolling personnel. Finally, chapters 14 and 15 take us back to theory, with the development of a new conceptualisation of video surveillance in light of what emerged from the fieldwork.
1. The management of multiplicities: a new paradigm of social control

From the management of individuals to the management of aggregates

Power always had to think of ways to manage large groups of people living and working together, so it is clear how the problem of multiplicities and how to deal with them did not suddenly appear at the beginning of modernity. What changed then were the discourses and the rationality underlying such practices. The forces of the body had to be increased in terms of economic utility while, at the same time, decreased in their political strength (Foucault, 1977). As a result, what was thus developed was a “political anatomy” (ibidem: 138) that explored, broke down and rearranged the human body so as to make it docile and strip any possibility of resistance away from it.

What also changed during the course of the 18th century was the target at which power started aiming; no longer a single body, but the mass of bodies taken together. It is in this shift that Foucault traced the emergence of governmentality and the consequent reorientation of “modern state power [which], increasingly concerned with governing the future, [now] sets out to govern risks” (Valverde, 2007: 163). This new rationality takes charge of the natural processes of life and, as opposed to disciplines, considers the single as part of a group and every individual in his or her belonging to the human race. As such, the aggregate dimension of this new form of rationality allows for the birth of a new political subject: the population. Statistics, a science that was at that very same time being systematised and which Foucault describes as the “science of the state” (Foucault, 2009: 101) makes this new collective both knowable and known. Additionally, through the gathering of data on wealth, national resources and population, this discipline creates a “set of technical knowledges that describes the reality of the state itself” (Foucault, 2009: 274) which is, in turn, functional to a rationalisation in the exercise of power within an administrative apparatus “that at the same time would be an apparatus of knowledge” (ibidem: 274-275). The gathering of statistical data permits the identification of the elements that have an impact on the
population and it is through their manipulation that the latter can be shaped according to two imperatives: increased prosperity and maintenance of peace and order.

Unsurprisingly, the natural processes concerning a population – birth, death, ageing – were the very first fields of application for this new technology. However, pretty early on it also started dealing with the so called problem of the town. “[B]roadly speaking (...) [this] was the question of the spatial, juridical, administrative, and economic opening up of the town: resituating the town in a space of circulation” (Foucault, 2009: 13) in order for things to circulate freely, for the benefit of both the people living there and the state as a whole. Foucault believes that this was achieved thanks to security apparatuses, devices which take into account the material characteristics of a given environment and proceed to try and maximise their utility while at the same time keep risks and inconveniences to a minimum, with the overall aim of ensuring free circulation both within the city and between that and its surroundings. Positioning the town at the heart of security mechanisms provides a way of dealing with the “inherent dangers of this circulation” so much so that these ended up being “canceled out” (ibidem: 65) and the “fact of the town” (ibidem: 64) could be successfully reconciled with legitimate sovereignty.

The regulation of all kinds of traffic so as to ensure fluid circulation is one of the main duties fulfilled by the police. In the 18th century, police was conceived of as a much larger apparatus than it is today, concerned with a variety of tasks such as public health and safety, roads, trade, factories, workers and supplies4 (Foucault, 2002b); in Foucault’s words, its aim was to “develop those elements constitutive of individuals’ lives in such a way that their development also fosters that of the strength of the state” (Foucault, 2002b: 322). Police plays an important role in his analysis of the transformation in the modes of power/knowledge that invested European states at this time. It is “the bridge linking older sovereign practices to newer practices of (state) risk governance” (Valverde, 2007: 164) while also being a template for governmental rationality, and it is in this respect that it allows for an interplay between sovereignty, discipline and regulation (Valverde, 2007; Brighenti, 2010). In accordance with the shift from a logic of sovereignty to one of security, and as demonstrated by the preventive

4 After the 18th century this huge apparatus split and police went on to become the institution that we know today and whose only aim is to prevent crime, disorder and delinquency, while other apparatuses and institutions are now concerned with the other tasks mentioned above.
nature of all its regulations, police is future-oriented. Once again, the natural elements of the context are let free and the internal order of the state is maintained through the definition of thresholds of acceptability and the management of open series of probable events. The site where police regulations would find a most welcome reception was the city. As shown above, the various issues that police had to deal with are inherently urban or, rather, the urbanisation of space was a necessary condition that had to be satisfied for police to come into existence. To use Foucault’s own words, “to police and to urbanize is the same thing” (Foucault, 2009: 337).

As already mentioned, the shift from discourses of control to new ones centred on security means that no longer is power exercised on a single individual, but on the population at large. The basic assumption at the heart of these mechanisms of security is that negative phenomena (be it crime, famine, epidemics) cannot be eradicated from reality but can only be placed “within a series of probable events” (Foucault, 2009: 6) so that a threshold of acceptability can be set to contain them and costs thus arising can be spread among the population. Evidently, such an approach relies heavily on statistics and probability to, on one hand, identify the core factors and, on the other, discover their actual distribution so that it becomes possible to “alter [their] consequences in the aggregate” (Simon, 1988: 773). The government of things is steadily grounded in the reality while forbidding and imposing give way to regulating and steering. The contemporary system of security is, thus, outlined, organised, as it is, “around new penal forms and the calculation of the cost of penalties” (Foucault, 2009: 6).

Significantly, Foucault’s writings can be read along with later works, which link new actuarial practices emerging in the fields of welfare and criminal justice to “a general movement (…) towards the exercise of state power as ‘governmentality’ ” (Feeley and Simon, 1994: 178). However, as much as actuarialism proves a fecund paradigm through which the changing features of the social landscape can be seen and interpreted, it would be incorrect to frame its emergence in evolutionary terms, with a more efficient technology of power replacing older, less efficient ones. As O’Malley acutely suggests, technologies of power cannot be ranked hierarchically in terms of their greater or lower efficiency (O’Malley, 1992), nor it is plausible to believe that, when a new one emerges, it sweeps out everything that existed before. Such an approach also runs the risk of explaining away what does not fit in within the security paradigm as nothing more than residual, to then dismiss it accordingly. What makes this position untenable

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as well is the idea of efficiency it implies; far from being an ever valid criterion whose meaning is shared and peacefully accepted, efficiency is in itself the contested, negotiated and partial outcome of struggles over meaning, success, failure and change, “a political claim couched in terms of the achievement of fairly specific political goals” (O’Malley, 1992: 260). But if we accept the contested nature of efficiency, then the claim that a technology of power is more efficient than another can be articulated in the investigation of the circumstances – or rather, in a Foucauldian perspective, the genealogy – that have led to it being framed in such a way, which would also go against any evolutionary temptation our analysis might fall prey to.

Therefore, when considering mechanisms of security “it is quite clear that this does not constitute any bracketing off or cancellation of juridico-legal structures or disciplinary mechanisms. (…) [T]here is not a series of successive elements, the appearance of the new causing the earlier one to disappear. There is not the legal age, the disciplinary age, and then the age of security. (…) In reality (…) what above all changes is the dominant characteristic, or more exactly, the system of correlation between juridico-legal mechanisms, disciplinary mechanisms, and mechanisms of security.” (Foucault, 2009: 8). The emergence of security cannot “simply do away with the disciplinary technique, because it exists at a different level, on a different scale, and because it has a different bearing area, and makes use of very different instruments” (Foucault, 2003: 242).

So, rather than thinking in terms of new technologies of power replacing older ones, a reconceptualisation is much called upon of the changes so far described, so as to account for the continued relevance of sovereign and disciplinary techniques within an actuarial framework. Graphically, the relation can be best described as a triangle:

![Figure 1 – The relation between technologies of power](image-url)
Thus, the persistency and, in some cases, reproposition of techniques\(^5\) that refer to technologies other than biopower can be explained not as some sort of oddity, but, rather, as the product of the interactions between the three vertexes shown above. Consequently, a more fruitful approach is to describe at the best of our possibilities the specific combinations the various elements create in the context under investigation in order to identify the conditions that played a role in shaping it. Overall, what is here called for is a shift “from a model of technologies of power and their efficiencies, toward a model of substantive political programs which deploy such technologies in ways which cannot be reduced to any simple or direct formula” (O’Malley, 1992: 257).

**Governmentality studies**

At the end of the Seventies, in the course of lectures held at the Collège de France, Foucault (2008, 2009) introduced the notion of governmentality to account for the emergence of a new art of governing that aimed at directing people’s behaviour in order to foster the strength of the state. In the course of this process, Foucault acknowledged, a new idea came to the fore: namely, that the collectivity of individuals is more than the sum of its members, and that this resulting entity displays its own properties and characteristics which can be known and, consequently, steered and shaped. As a result, the target of power changed from the single body to the mass of bodies taken together and the population emerged as a new political subject in its own right.

While Foucault used the lens of governmentality to investigate the genesis of European nation-states through a focus on practices of government rather than traditional historical accounts (Valverde, 2007), scholars in governmentality studies have used this notion to account for the fragmentation and dispersion of control in advanced liberal society (Rose, 1999a).

The starting point of this analysis is a different perspective on the problem of the ‘state’, no longer seen as a monolithic institution that pursues its goals with a considerable degree of autonomy, either through diplomacy or warfare. On the contrary, governmentality scholars argue against an overvaluation of this issue, choosing to

\[^5\] Such as the selective incapacitation of high-rate offenders, incarceration, surveillance and death penalty.
relocate it within an investigation of the problematics of government (Rose and Miller, 1992). “Posed from this perspective, the question is no longer one of accounting for government in terms of ‘the power of the State’, but of ascertaining how, and to what extent, the state is articulated into the activity of government” (ibid.: 177). As a result of this shift, the focus is steadily placed on the practices of government, and the techniques and procedures used for the conduct of conducts, with particular attention to the heterogeneous alliances that come to be established between diverse authorities in order to influence people’s behaviour.

Three crucial implications can be drawn from this. First, the idea of the state as an all-encompassing reality is effectively replaced by a discourse centred on its new enabling and facilitating features, so that “rather than provider and manager” the state now comes to be seen “as partner and animator” (Rose, 2000: 327). At the same time, multiple other centres of government emerge that equally seek to act upon people’s conduct in order to meet a variety of goals: a better health, a better education, a safer house and so forth. Combined together, these developments put the notion of governing at a distance on the front stage; because the competing centres of government that have emerged are separated in time, or in space, or in both, from the people whose conduct they wish to shape, they will have to be able to govern at a distance, that is “through the actions of a whole range of other authorities (…). Such ‘action at a distance’ inescapably depends on a whole variety of alliances and lash-ups between diverse and competing bodies of expertise, criteria of judgment and technical devices that are far removed from the ‘political apparatus’ as traditionally conceived. This generates an intrinsic heterogeneity, contestability and mobility in practices for the government of conduct” (ibid.: 323).

The idea that the state should no longer be the only provider of services, security included, opens the door to the end of its monopoly on control, with the concurrent establishment of “systems of privatized order” (Gordon, 1991: 27) and dispersed, rather than centralised, forms of control. Accordingly, the new limited role that the state is called to perform means that everyone else – and not just people, but organisations, companies, firms and so forth – will have to take on themselves a new series of responsibilities. What O’Malley terms prudentialism (1996) is the need for each individual to be responsible for his or her own decisions, choices and lives. Crucially, the freedom of the subject is a necessary correlate of contemporary strategies of
government and control, which do not seek to eliminate the individual’s agency, but rather need to promote and foster it, so that it is “broadly consistent with particular objectives such as order, civility, health or enterprise” (Rose, 2000: 323).

On a general level, then, the new technologies that have been developed to make governing at a distance possible, revolve around a re-orientation towards autonomisation and responsibilisation, which Rose links to the growing relevance of what he terms ‘etho-politics’, or the “ways in which (…) sentiments, values, beliefs have come to provide the 'medium' within which the self-government of the autonomous individual can be connected up with the imperatives of good government” (Rose, 1999b: 477). Underpinning this development, Rose is also keen to identify an increasingly naturalised dichotomy between inclusion and exclusion and their relative ‘circuits’ (1999a, 2000). Alternatively, these are concerned with using shared norms and values and moral notions of order to bind people together and maintain order, or to keep neatly separated those individuals who cannot be included into the wider societal body and need to be neutralised for the common good. Thus, on one hand we can identify strategies that seek to include individuals through the establishment of inclusive identities, the diffusion of discourses that emphasise the role of individual responsibilisation in creating “partnerships in prudence” (Rose, 2000: 328), and of access to fortified public spaces. At the opposite end of the spectrum, the criminalisation of exclusion is accompanied by new ways to manage the risk posed by offenders, as argued by Feeley and Simon’s ‘new penology’ (1992, 1994).

**Actuarialism and the shift towards the management of aggregates in the field of crime control**

Concerned with the identification, classification, and management of groups based on their dangerousness to society at large, actuarial practices (as can be seen in fields as diverse as criminal justice, insurance and welfare) see the regulation of unruly groups as part of a strategy to maintain order (Feeley and Simon, 1994). Technically, they rely heavily upon statistics to chart the distribution of a set of chosen variables in a given population in order to arrange “strategies to maximize the efficiency of the population as it stands” (Simon, 1988: 773). In a series of papers published between the late 1980s
and the mid 1990s, Feeley and Simon termed ‘new penology’ the re-orientation towards actuarial practices in the field of crime control that emerged in the US between the 1970s and the 1980s. It was during that period that a series of transformations in the narratives, the objectives and the techniques to be used to control crime and offenders led to the emergence of a new conception of penal policy. First of all, new discourses in “the language of probability and risk” (Feeley and Simon, 1992: 450) gained currency, with the focus placed upon aggregates, quantification, formal and systemic rationality. At the same time, attention came to be devoted to the statistical distribution of risks within the population. More precisely, it can be argued that “actuarial forms of representation promote quantification as a way of visualizing populations” (ibid.: 453).

Because it is assumed that crime is an unavoidable feature of society, the aim is no longer its complete elimination but rather its tolerability achieved through increased systemic coordination. In turn, the reformulation of the goals to be pursued calls for the adoption of new criteria for success. Recidivism rate is dropped, with evaluation based upon the control of aggregates rather than on individual cases of success or failure. “Such technocratic rationalization tends to insulate institutions from the messy, hard-to-control demands of the social world. By limiting their exposure to indicators that they can control, managers ensure that their problems will have solutions” (Feeley and Simon, 1992: 456). As a result of this shift, the very understanding of justice also changes, to become a formal system of inside rules, where internal coherence is stressed, and preferred, to a discussion on the distribution of powers within the system.

Finally, new techniques have been developed to deploy on a practical level the new discourses and the new objectives that have coalesced into the new penology movement. While the common feature all these instruments share is the targeting of offenders as an aggregate, they can be divided into two separate categories. On one hand, we have those technologies used for the identification and classification of both risks and people, such as systems for the electronic monitoring of offenders and statistical tools to predict and assess risks. On the other, the theory of incapacitation (Greenwood, 1982) has provided theoretical support to the search for cost-effective forms of custody. What this posits is that crime can be reduced by modifying the distribution of offenders within society; as a direct consequence, it becomes advisable to adjust the length of custodial sentences to the risk profile to which the specific offender belongs, selectively incapacitating those that are deemed too dangerous to be set free.
Overall, economic concerns are key to both classes of techniques presented here, as the need to manage a permanently dangerous population is coupled with the demands for maintaining the system operative and functional at the lowest possible cost (Feeley and Simon, 1992: 463).

Feeley and Simon are explicit in identifying actuarial justice as “part of the general movement noted by a number of scholars towards the exercise of state power as ‘governmentality’” (Feeley and Simon, 1994: 178). While the shift from single cases to aggregates and the consequent understanding of individuals as part of specific subpopulations support this claim, nevertheless some difference emerge between the literature on governmentality and the analysis of actuarialism carried out by the two authors. On one hand, the new penology is centred on the idea that changing individuals is hard and that, as a result, the efficiency of power is increased if we tackle groups rather than single persons. As Simon openly states, “[t]he movement from normalization (…) to accommodation increases the efficiency of power because changing people is difficult and expensive” (Simon, 1988: 773). On the other, though, we have already seen with O’Malley (1992) how ranking technologies of power according to their efficiency is inherently problematic. However, without sharing O’Malley’s concern with the discursive processes through which efficiency is constructed, Feeley and Simon are clear in saying that the new penology cannot yet be seen “as a hegemonic strategy for crime and crime policy” (1992: 451). I believe that this provides some common ground that the two approaches – governmentality and actuarialism – can share, as in different languages both realise that what is observed is the interplay of different political rationalities, rather than the simple shift from older to newer ones.

The common outcome of the transformations outlined above is the emergence of the aggregate as a new collective subject. Belonging to a category is linked to formal attributes and is not attached to any particular meaning. Rather, the subject is generated by the numbers, his/her identity no longer based on attributes that preceded the classification but on “purely statistical data” (Simon, 1988: 791). The aggregates that are thus constructed are not based on common experiences, beliefs or traditions on the part of those belonging to any given category, but are linked to formal attributes, so that people cannot understand their belonging, nor themselves, “as motivated by a common cause” (ibidem: 793), simply because they do not have one. The political implications
of this process of (collective) subject creation are particularly troubling. Specifically, the emergence and diffusion of these practices have made the possibility of resistance on the part of people less likely. Indeed, the construction of groups “along dimensions that erode the basis of collective identity and action” (Simon, 1988: 790) has stripped away the possibility for political empowerment, so much so that we could contend that “actuarial practices are used today to further diminish the potential for resistance by changing the representations through which we come into ourselves as collective subjects” (ibidem: 798).

Within the scope of the research presented in this work, the link that is established between actuarial justice and the urban underclass (Wilson, 1996) is particularly relevant. This label identifies a part of society that cannot be integrated into the wider whole, “a permanently dysfunctional population, without literacy, without skills and without hope” (Feeley and Simon, 1994: 192). Because the increasing reliance on this notion has naturalised the idea of the permanent marginality of some, the traditional goal of the reintegration of the offender into his/her community has become inherently contradictory, with these very same people now “to be treated as a high-risk groups that must be managed for the protection of the larger society” (ibid.)

**A new paradigm of social control**

The common outcome of the developments outlined above is the emergence of a new paradigm of social control, which refurbishes for the 21st century Louis Chevalier’s distinction between the “laboring” and the “dangerous classes” (2000), so as to differentiate between those who are included in the larger society and those who, because of their dangerousness, are to be separated and excluded from it.

The end of the exclusive monopoly of the state as far as the fight against crime and the protection of citizens is concerned is where we need to start if we wish to analyse this new landscape. State sovereignty is facing a reconfiguration, so that “we are now living in the midst of a potentially far-reaching transformation in the means by which order and security are maintained in liberal democratic societies, one that is giving rise to the fragmentation and diversification of policing provisions, and ushering in a plethora of agencies and agents, each with particular kinds of responsibility for the delivery of policing and security services and technologies” (Loader, 2000: 323). On one hand, the
emergence of new political centres at the local level signals the direct involvement of local authorities in the provision of policing services; on the other, though, it is also a symptom of the increasing difficulties that state agencies face in the fight against crime. In relation to this last issue, Garland rightly argues that the political costs arising from the admission that crime cannot be defeated but only contained would be too high to bear. It is precisely because of such a price tag that the very idea that state power is limited does not even get to be openly acknowledged (Garland, 1996). Rather, the need for efficiency in the face of dwindling resources is pushed backstage and hidden from public view, while the necessity of maintaining a tough stance on crime is continuously, and expressively, reasserted. It is precisely through the continual appeal to tough-on-crime imperatives and goals that attempts are made to downplay how “the clash between the institutional logic of cost-effectiveness and the sovereign state gestures of the ‘war against crime’ is (...) a clash of irreconcilable principles” (Garland, 2001: 191).

Within the scope of the research presented here, the coexistence of actuarial and sovereign measures, where an administrative response aimed at lessening the risk posed by specific categories of people in the face of increasing budgetary restrictions is coupled with a resurging attention towards individual offenders and their seemingly innate inclination to crime, brings with it some important implications.

On a general level, this coexistence has resulted in attempts to match cuts to public expenditures and the shift towards rationalisation and efficiency with citizens’ unchanged expectations of being safe and protected, with policy-makers moving towards the introduction of new discourses and strategies for crime control. In spite of the role it played in previous criminological approaches, any attempt at the social understanding of crime is abandoned in favour of the dual assumption that high crime rates are a normal social fact and criminals are rational actors whose only goal is the maximisation of their own interest. What Garland terms the “new criminologies of everyday life” (1996, 2001) are a group of distinct theoretical frameworks – rational choice theory, situational crime prevention, crime as opportunity and routine activity

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6 As will be further elaborated in next chapter, the rise of actuarial measures is part and parcel of an increasing concern with pre-emption, of which the large-scale adoption of open-street CCTV systems is also an element. At the same time, the long-lasting relevance of the expressive element of crime control suggested tailoring the selection of the two cities where fieldwork was to be conducted in order to account for differences in the public discourse on crime and in the degree of openness of urban security policies.
theory (Garland, 1996: 450) – that shift emphasis from the offender’s motivational pattern to what potential victims can do to protect themselves and their properties. Essentially, the overall aim is the reduction of criminal opportunities while at the same time increasing the costs met by those engaging in deviant conducts. This “‘supply side criminology’ (…) aims to embed controls in the fabrics of normal interaction (…), it sets in place a more mundane set of reforms, designed not to change people but to redesign things and reshape situations. A thousand small adjustments are required” (Garland, 2001: 129). This approach wishes to present itself as neutral and apolitical and promotes a vision of social order no longer based on shared values but on the presence of “smart arrangements that minimize the opportunities for disruption and deviance” (Garland 2001: 183). At the same time, though, it can easily be coupled with zero-tolerance policies, or any exclusionary practice implemented with the aim of fostering order, if such a move is believed to lead to a better functioning of the system. At the opposite end of the spectrum, the return to measures of expressive justice that use punitive sanctions to reinforce the idea of the sovereign state being the sole provider of security can be understood as the contemporary re-proposition of the symbolic purpose of punishment. Durkheim explicitly linked this function of punishment to the reaffirmation of the bonds that hold society together. Because he thought of a criminal act as an offence and weakening of such ties, he would famously argue that punishment “does not serve, or serves only very incidentally, to correct the guilty person or to scare off any possible imitators. (…) Its real function is to maintain inviolate the cohesion of society by sustaining the common conscience in all its vigour. (…) The sole means of doing so is to give voice to the unanimous aversion that the crime continues to evoke, and this by an official act, which can only mean suffering inflicted upon the wrongdoer. (…) [P]unishment is above all intended to have its effect upon honest people” (Durkheim, 1984: 62-63).

This re-dramatisation of the whole issue of crime does not sit very well with budget constraints; rather, given the grip the topic has on public opinion, it rather seems “designed more to vent communal outrage than to reduce crime” (Anderson, 1995: 14). However, caution is needed when using these ideas. The rise in the expressive relevance of punishment is far from being homogeneous\(^7\), as both the rise in penal populism ---

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\(^7\) With regard to this specific development, Italy’s position is somewhat peculiar. On one hand, the right-wing governments led by Silvio Berlusconi between 2001 and 2006 and again from
(Roberts et al., 2003) and the reality of a penal system not insulated from political influence have placed the U.S. at one end of a justice spectrum (Hodgson and Kelley, 2002), with much of Western continental Europe at the opposite one and “the other English-speaking countries (England, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) strung out at various points between them” (Petrunik and Deutschmann, 2008: 508). In the same vein, Whitman contends (2003) that there are differences in how acceptable harsh punishment is in Europe and the United States and that, because of such a divergence, European countries, with the exception of the UK, have so far resisted the adoption of degrading forms of punishment and maintain the rehabilitation of offenders as a goal of the penal system.

In spite of these differences however, it cannot be denied that security concerns have acquired a central position in the public debate both in the U.S. and throughout Europe and that there is a common trend towards the commodification of security. In turn, this is likely to aggravate the feelings of risk and insecurity on the part of those who cannot afford to buy protection on the market. At the same time, issues of crime and security are increasingly used to promote new models of governance (Simon, 2007) and to shape how we live. A reflection of this can be found in the drive towards residential segregation, both at the top and the bottom of the social body, the increased reliance on incarceration and incapacitation and the transformations to public space brought about in the name of situational prevention. However, these measures peculiarly seem to be directed almost exclusively towards specific sectors of the population. More precisely, against those very same people that have been hit the hardest by the economical and social changes that took place in the final part of last century, be it the urban “underclass” (Wilson, 1996), immigrants, or welfare recipients. In regard to this, stemming from a line of inquiry that dates back to Rusche and Kirchheimer’s *Punishment and Social Structure* (1939), Wacquant (2001, 2009) links the neo-liberal reorientation of the economy to an ongoing battle to penalise poverty. Penal policy, 2008 to 2011 did strengthen the punitive orientation of some specific aspects of the Italian Penal Code. The sanctions faced by habitual offenders were made tighter (Act 251/2005), the circumstances where the right to self-defence can be successfully claimed were modified (Article 52 of the Penal Code, as modified by Parliament on 24th January 2006) with the expansion of the proportionality clause (Dolcini, 2005) and irregular immigration was turned into a criminal offence (Act 94/2009). However, the same majority also introduced measures to make white-collar crime harder to prove and facing less harsh sentences in case of a conviction, with the depenalisation of accounting fraud being a case in point.
Wacquant contends, is functional to the acceptance of the logics of an unregulated and unprotected job market on the part of those who have been made redundant by the delocalisation of low-skilled jobs to countries where labour is cheaper, with penal institutions increasingly being used to manage social insecurity and contain “the social disorders created at the bottom of the class structure by neo-liberal policies of economic deregulation and social-welfare retrenchment” (Wacquant, 2001: 401). Once again, though, it is necessary to stress how there are differences between the U.S. and Europe so that, while it is possible to say that in America penal institutions are the only contact between the state and its most marginal citizens, in Europe they are still working in conjunction with programmes for universal health care, education and social security. Thus, European countries are “not headed towards a slavish duplication of the American model, that is to say, a sharp and brutal substitution of the social-welfare treatment of poverty by penal treatment backed by all-out ‘carceralisation’. Rather, they are groping towards the invention of a ‘European’ (French, Italian, German, etcetera) road to the penal state, suited to the different European political and cultural traditions, and characterised by a conjoint, twofold accentuation of both the social regulation and the penal regulation of social insecurity” (Wacquant, 2001: 406-407. Emphasis in original.).

**Thresholds of acceptability**

In a context marked by general and greater awareness that we live our lives exposed to a myriad of risks with potentially lethal outcomes (Beck, 1992), more and more often statistical tools are used to calculate risks, assess dangerousness and manage unruly groups. The shift of focus from the single individual in favour of aggregates has contributed to the growing relevance of statistics, so that it progressively morphed into a device of power/knowledge which, through the gathering of data on a population, allowed this to be influenced and shaped according to the two imperatives of prosperity and order. As far as social control is concerned, the action of this mechanism – as seen in the rise of actuarialism –, along with the transformation brought about by late modernity, has led to new criteria for success replacing older ones, in an attempt on the part of the agencies of control to level public expectations towards more realistic – and attainable – results, and to share with citizens the responsibility and the burden of their own protection. As Foucault acknowledged (2008: 256) talking about the changes in the
penal field that were starting to emerge in the U.S. in the 1970s, “penal policy has absolutely renounced the objective of the complete suppression and exhaustive nullification of crime. (...) Good penal policy does not aim at the extinction of crime, but a balance between the curves of the supply of crime and negative demand (...) as society does not have a limitless need for compliance”.

On the one hand, this is testament to the growing relevance of the discourse and language of economic rationality in fields, such as those of penalty and social control, where it did not always play such a huge part. On the other, though, it opens up a whole new series of questions. If crime must be contained, what are the limits within which it will be maintained? Who sets them? How much crime is socially acceptable? Which crimes are tolerable and which are not? What is order made of? Ultimately, where lies the balance between freedom and control? This is exactly the issue at the core of liberal governmentality as liberalism “entails at its heart a productive/destructive relationship with freedom. Liberalism must produce freedom, but this very act entails the establishment of limitations, controls, forms of coercion, and obligations relying on threats…” (Foucault, 2008: 64).

This insuperable contradiction is at the heart of the research I carried out, as I wanted to investigate what the consequences are of the shift towards new strategies for the control of urban space, of which the large-scale adoption of CCTV system is such a large part. However, before proceeding to the empirical section of the work, some words are necessary on the notion of pre-emption, and how this has been implemented in the context of urban policing, as this is the overarching rationale of the transformations I am interested in.
2. Pre-emption in the security society

The security society

In a paper where she analyses the challenges faced by contemporary criminology, Zedner (2007) identifies the four main features of what can be termed the security society.

First, the role of risk. Though the framing of the criminal justice system as completely actuarial in nature is contested (O’Malley, 2000, 2001), the growing role played by risk in the field of crime control is solidly acknowledged in the literature (in addition to the references above, see: Ericson and Haggerty, 1997; Loader and Sparks, 2002; Johnston and Shearing, 2003). Risk-based techniques have already made an appearance in this work, where they have mostly been identified as actuarial in nature (Simon, 1988; Feeley and Simon 1992, 1994). As seen in the previous chapter, these techniques divide “the population into statistical and behavioural categories organized around risk, that tend not to correspond to people’s lived experience” (O’Malley, 1992: 254). Because this makes recognition and mobilisation harder, it follows that any resistance that could form around such categories is made harder and, eventually, neutralised. Crucially, the risk categories that are thus created are used to manage aggregates differentially, with the risk factor employed to objectify and profile offenders according to the dangerousness they are deemed to pose to society at large. In regard to this, the eligibility for parole and the length of custodial sentences are increasingly reliant on an assessment of the risk posed by offenders. At the same time risk is also used as a meaningful predictor of future behaviour to calculate the likelihood of an offender committing a crime in the future.

Second, the concern with risk brings along with it a temporal shift, so that focus is shifted towards what has not happened yet and may never do. This is a key factor in heralding a radical move away “from the largely post hoc logic of criminal justice to the forward trajectory of pre-emption and protection” (Zedner, 2007: 264). The fast growth of crime control measures such as situational prevention testifies to this change of perspective, concerned, as they are, with reducing the opportunities for criminal behaviours through various strategies for target hardening.
Third, within this general movement towards pre-emption the understanding of crime changes, too. No longer a wrongful action, it is now increasingly understood in terms of a potential risk to be avoided. Consequently, the emphasis on punishment as the redressment of a wrong is pushed on the side, while attention is focused upon recovering suffered losses in a strictly economic sense (Williams, 2005), and averting or minimising the possibility of future ones.

Finally, the temporal shift towards pre-emption is matched by an analogous sectoral shift that signals the transformations of established relationships between public and private spheres. The emergence of new political centres at the local level that share the responsibility for security with state actors, along with the implementation of partnerships where private and public actors work together, and the increasing responsibilisation of citizens are all part of the same movement towards the fragmentation and dispersal of control described by governmentality scholars.

This relocation of responsibility means that people are strongly encouraged to think of their everyday life and activities in terms of crime prevention and to act accordingly. Key here is the establishment of preventative routines and behaviours – locking your car, carrying a credit card rather than cash – that can be easily integrated into daily schedules and that are likely to reduce one’s exposure to criminal actions. Were this not enough, security and protection are also available on the market for people to buy according to their needs. This is a radical change from the traditional understanding that sees citizens as recipients of policing services. Rather, we are now called upon to become “self-calculating, risk-monitoring actors with important parts to play in the co-production of order and security” (Loader and Sparks, 2002: 89). However, these new arrangements raise some troubling implications.

The promotion of market-based solutions to the problems of crime and security is likely to spark a new distribution of policing services that favours those that are already at an advantage. The have-haves have the resources to become active risk-managers of their lives and to buy on the market whatever additional security they may desire for themselves, their family and properties. However, due their lack of economic and social capital, the have-nots cannot participate to the security market with the same ease, in spite of being more exposed to risks and, thus, more in need of security. In light of this, it can be seen how responsibilisation strategies can potentially deepen the separations along the lines of class and income that already exist in society.
This introduces the central issue that arises out of the shift towards the so-called security society. While security as a public good is accessible to all, when it becomes a commodity access is restricted by the subject’s capacity to buy (Hope, 2000), so that a market-based discrimination is introduced between those that can buy insulation from a series of risks and those that end up increasing their exposure to those same risks because of their lack of resources. “Policing and security have, in short, become a fragmented, plural, and commodified phenomenon, the distribution of which is being increasingly determined by people’s capacity and willingness to pay” (Loader and Sparks, 2002: 90). As such, the most important distinction when considering the developments outlined above is not who the provider of security is – whether public or private – but the question of access to this good on the part of the less advantaged sectors of the population (Coase, 1974).

**Pre-emption in the built environment**

The transformations described above have brought about a deep change in how we think about crime and criminals. Social theories on the origins of marginality and deviance have given way to moral explanations and a newfound emphasis on individual responsibility of a rational and calculating actor who decides to commit a crime by looking at his or her chances of success. Under this light, crime is recognised as a normal social fact (Garland, 2001), a risk that people must learn to live with and whose likelihood of happening they can decrease by adopting new, more prudent, behaviours. Rather than looking at the motives behind criminal actions, attention is shifted towards the various aspects of the victimisation process – availability of goods, characteristics of potential victims and so forth – with the twofold objective of reducing the benefits brought about by crime while, at the same time, increasing the costs incurred in by the offenders, if caught. Control is to be diffused in space, and integrated into the networks of daily interactions we all take part in.

Though following other paths, and several decades in advance, Jacobs (1961) also reaches the conclusion that the key to urban security is the dispersal of control into urban space. Based on her observations of life in New York’s Greenwich Village, she envisions cities as vibrant, redundant and apparently chaotic spaces that can easily accommodate and favour the maintenance of a sound public life for those living in
them. The starting point of her analysis is the link she establishes between community and urban citizenship. The direct involvement of people in the life of their neighbourhood and the strong sense of belonging to a place that is born out of it all contribute to a vital and lively public space. In turn, the steady involvement of people in the life of their city and the maintenance of this apparently effortless regime of interactions are what makes the city safe for everyone.

Thinking about how the peaceful coexistence of strangers in urban space is achieved, Jacobs is very clear in acknowledging how police are only one of the actors involved in the process, and not even the most fundamental one. “The first thing to understand is that the public peace – the sidewalk and street peace – of cities is not kept primarily by the police, necessary as police are. It is kept primarily by an intricate, almost unconscious network of voluntary controls and standards among the people themselves, and enforced by the people themselves. (...) No amount of police can enforce civilization where the normal, casual enforcement of it has broken down” (Jacobs, 1961: 31-32). Under this light, the development of neighbourhood ties and of a sense of belonging to it are crucial; if people feel a responsibility towards the place where they live, they will exercise a degree of control over it, thus making it safer.

Jacobs goes on to identify the architectural and planning features that, if adopted, can produce safe streets – that is, streets that can handle the presence of stranger and that can make security out of it. Because the presence of people on the street is a key instrument in generating security, all those measures designed to keep streets busy can have a positive effect in terms of security. The “eyes on the street (...) belonging to those we might call the natural proprietors of the street” (Jacobs, 1961: 35), be them residents, shopkeepers or visitors, can, with their mere presence, enforce order in the space their gazes fall upon. Additionally, this ordering gaze is reinforced by that of the other people that, because of the mix of different functions and services along the street, will keep it busy at different times throughout the day. Finally, Jacobs also calls for a clear separation between public and private spaces, so that there are no empty, in-between spaces for which no one feels responsible. Though complex, when this mechanism of informal enforcement of order works, it becomes almost invisible, with people effortlessly participating in making and maintaining their street safe. “The safety of the street works best, most casually, and with least frequent taint of hostility or
suspicion precisely where people are using and most enjoying the city streets voluntarily and are least conscious, normally, that they are policing” (Jacobs, 1961: 36). Jacobs’ work inspired many of the developments that followed in the field of crime prevention in urban spaces; however, what sets her apart is her ability to keep her analysis equally focused upon the built environment and the social relations that exist in it. On the contrary, much of what follows adopts a narrowly selective perspective that alternatively focuses on one of the two elements listed above, rather than on the ties that link the two together. Architects and planners took Jacobs’ observations and turned them into practical guidelines for the design of urban spaces, but in this work of translation the social element that was at the heart of Jacobs’ work was almost completely written off. The first to engage in such and endeavour was Oscar Newman (1973), who in the early 1970s advanced the idea that crime can be prevented and the security of people enhanced by designing buildings so as to put inhabitants in the condition of becoming makers of their own security.

The ideas that led to the formulation of the notion of defensible space emerged out of Newman’s witnessing of the failure of the Pruitt-Igoe housing project. Designed according to the principles of Le Corbusier’s modernist architecture, it was supposed to provide its residents – single parents welfare families – with plenty of communal areas where they could engage in community-building activities. However, the complex soon turned out to be a failure; garbage accumulated, communal areas were soon vandalised, and women living there only ventured outside of their flats in groups. Throughout its existence, the occupancy rate for the buildings never went above 60%, and the whole complex was eventually torn down ten years after its completion. While Pruitt-Igoe was built, partially occupied and finally demolished, a close-by, older complex of row houses, equally occupied by welfare recipients, never experienced comparable problems and easily maintained full occupancy of its flats. It was precisely the stark comparison between these two very similar –yet utterly different – cases that prompted Newman to wonder which physical differences enabled one of the projects to thrive, while the other one went to ruin.

Significantly, walking through Pruitt-Igoe while it was still standing did not only show abandonment and decay. Inside, Newman was invited into flats that were clean and well kept. Outside, where communal spaces were only shared by a small number of families, they were safe and equally well maintained. On the contrary, areas shared by large
numbers of families were the least safe and most affected by vandalism. In light of these differences, Newman concluded that “residents maintained and controlled those areas that were clearly defined as their own” (1996: 11); on the contrary, staircases, lobbies and elevators “evoked no feelings of identity or control. Such anonymous public spaces made it impossible (…) to feel or exert proprietary feelings” (ibid.: 11-12). This realisation greatly influenced Newman’s architectural thinking, as he set out to develop designs that would eliminate all internal public spaces and assign them to individual families for them to control. Accordingly, the theory of defensible space that Newman eventually developed posits that “different building types create spaces outside the dwelling unit that affect residents’ ability to control them” (ibid.: 14).

The notion of defensible space revolves around four key concepts. First, Newman borrowed the notion of territoriality from Ardrey’s work on animal territoriality (1966) for its analytical capability for the understanding of human behaviour. Essentially, the idea is that people develop a strong bond with the place they inhabit, a sense of belonging and of identification with it that is central to their lived experiences. Because people perceive such places as their own, it follows that they will feel entitled to defend and protect them against the attacks of unwarranted intruders. Thus, Newman’s efforts were directed towards the identification of those “physical markers that convey nonverbal cues, or messages, of ownership, investment protection, and a separation between one’s self or family and outsiders for the primary purpose of controlling behavior in a particular place” (Perkins et al.: 1990: 87).

Second, Newman followed Jacobs in emphasising the importance of natural surveillance or, as Jacobs would rather say, of keeping as many eyes as possible on the street. In relation to this, Newman argues that an area will be more easily defended if its physical features allow people to see – and crucially, to witness – what happens around them at all times. Third, this enhancement of visibility is coupled with the attention to the overall image of the building complex, and the presence of features that might instil in passersby, residents and potential intruders alike a sense of heightened vigilance and, consequently, of security. Finally, Newman also cited the location of the building or area within the fabric of the city as the last factor that needs to be considered in

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8 This element bears a strong similarity with Wilson and Kelling’s popular broken windows theory.
discussions on defensible space. To this end, he suggested that that the presence of “safe zones” (1973: 50) can positively influence security levels in neighbouring areas.

The simplicity and plausibility of Newman’s architectural approach to crime can explain its enduring popularity and influence. However, since it first appeared the theory has also attracted a number of criticisms, and methodological reservations on the inadequacies of Newman’s research design began to appear soon after the publication of *Defensible Space*. Upon reviewing the book in 1974, Bottoms thus concluded that “Newman has, in short, drawn our attention to an important theme, but by the crudity of his treatment he has run a serious risk of debasing the importance of that theme” (Bottoms, 1974: 206).

Though by far the most successful, in those years Newman was not the only one working on design-based solutions to the problem of crime. In 1971, American criminologist Ray Jeffery had already proposed a theoretical model of the role played by the built environment in the prevention of crime; however, that work went largely unnoticed upon its publication. “Jeffery's CPTED approach emphasized the role of the physical environment in the development of pleasurable and painful experiences for the offender that would have the capacity to alter behavioral outcomes. His original CPTED model was a stimulus-response (S-R) model positing that the organism learned from punishments and reinforcements in the environment” (Robinson, 1999: 434). In spite of the issues mentioned above, though, it was not Jeffery’s but Newman’s empirical work that became instrumental in establishing the idea that design can be used to prevent crime in light of the unobtrusive role it can play in the reinforcement of informal processes of social control (Ekblom, 1995: 117).

Thanks to consistent funding by the U.S. government, by the mid 1970s programmes were launched throughout that country to test defensible space concepts. However, the mixed results that were produced prompted scholars to advance alternative models that attempted to amend Newman’s original ideas with other CPTED-based features. Among those theories, I now want to focus on Clarke’s idea of situational prevention (1980, 1997a) in that it embraces a wider range of techniques and elements when compared to Newman’s, an architect by training, exclusive focus on design and building layouts. Situational crime prevention “introduces discrete managerial and environmental change to reduce the opportunity for [specific] crimes to occur. Thus it is focused on the settings for crime, rather than upon those committing criminal acts. It seeks to forestall
the occurrence of crime, rather than to detect and sanction offenders. It seeks (...) to make criminal action less attractive to offenders” (Clarke, 1997b: 2). In that this approach discards national crime policies to focus on the ease of implementation of a set of context-specific measures on the part of firms, public or private organisations and individuals alike, it sits well with the shift towards responsibilisation and the fragmentation and dispersion of control that was described in the previous chapter. Equally relevant, it explicitly mentions the use of surveillance cameras in a pre-emptive logic, especially in public spaces.

Theoretically, situational prevention adopts a rational-choice model of the individual and assumes that the motivational patterns behind the decision to commit a crime are not exceptional in kind. Attempts to explain crime by looking at the wider social context where the offender lives are abandoned, in favour of the idea that criminals are rational actors who decide to engage in illicit behaviours in order to maximise their utility. In light of this, it follows that reducing the opportunities available to offenders and/or increasing the risks of being caught will have a positive impact on crime rates in a given setting. The notion of the opportunity structure for crime (Clarke, 1997b) represents an attempt to integrate into a single model all the theories and approaches that influenced the development of situational prevention, namely environmental criminology, rational choice, routine activity and lifestyle theories. However, its relevance is not merely theoretical, as it provides a synthetic representation of the assumptions about crime, offenders and society that are at the heart of situational prevention. The three key components of this model are targets (ATMs, shops, cars, houses), victims, and facilitators (weapons, drugs and other substances). The distribution and availability of all three to potential offenders depends on the wider socio-economic structure in place (“demography, geography, urbanization and industrialization, health and educational policy, and legal and political institutions” [Clarke, 1997b: 12-14]), the characteristics of the physical environment (city layout, housing patterns, prevalent modes of transportation, characteristics of retailing) and people’s lifestyle (patterns of leisure, work, residence). Crucially, “[t]he opportunity structure is not simply a physical entity, defined at any one point in time by the nature of the physical environment and the routine activities of the population. Rather, a complex interplay between potential offenders and the supply of victims, targets and facilitators determines the scale and nature of opportunities for crime” (Clarke, 1997b: 14).
Essentially, situational prevention seeks to modify this opportunity structure in order to make offending harder to pull off. In order to do this, Clarke and Homel (1997) identified 16 different opportunity-reducing techniques that range in kind from the installation of an alarm system inside a store, to the fencing of apartment buildings. Rather than describing each of these techniques, though, I want to focus the attention on the analytical categories used to classify them, as I believe this provides a meaningful synthesis of the assumptions on which situational prevention rests. As Clarke himself acknowledges, the four purposes the techniques serve – increasing the risks, increasing the difficulties, reducing the rewards and removing the excuses – are all implicit in the rational choice paradigm embraced by situational prevention, with the fourth category specifically added to take into account the increasing application of situational prevention measures to crimes such as tax evasion or traffic violations, “which are as much the province of ordinary citizens as of hardened offenders” (Clarke, 1997b: 16).

As for effectiveness, Clarke is clear in saying that situational prevention does not resolve the problem of crime but can only ameliorate it, though at times offences can be consistently reduced. Of particular relevance for the scope of the research presented here is Clarke’s awareness that even the most carefully designed scheme can fall short when contingent (Hope and Murphy, 1983), organisational (Gladstone, 1980), or cultural factors (Mayhew, 1979) are not taken into account in the planning stage.

**Pre-emption in policing**

The move away from reactive to proactive strategies of crime control has affected policing, too. In this regard, I want to focus my attention on community policing for the emphasis it places on individual responsibilities for the protection of one’s neighbourhood, and on Wilson and Kelling’s broken windows theory and the aggressive policing of minor offences in public space in order to prevent more serious criminal behaviours. While CCTV plays a huge part in the shift towards pre-emptive control of urban space, I have made a decision not to include it in the present section, as there will be plenty of opportunities to analyse the role of this technology in the chapters that follow.

The first mentions of community policing appeared in the late 1960s, as a reaction to the more remote approach to policing that had been employed in the course of that
decade. “By the 1980s community policing had become an all-pervasive rhetoric, and was being used to describe any and every policing practice, however conventional” (Garland, 2001: 124). Behind the rhetoric, though, important changes were also taking place, with non-state actors increasingly involved in the provision of policing in order to integrate their crime control practices with the activity of the police. This development reflects many processes that have already been mentioned in the course of this work. First, it resonates with Garland’s analysis (1996, 2001) on the end of the monopoly of the state on crime control – and consequently, on the provision of policing – and the realisation that the sovereign state asserting its power within the nation was nothing more than a myth, albeit a very powerful one. This is directly related to the drive towards the dispersion and fragmentation of control identified by governmentality scholars, and the concurrent articulation of new types of relationships between the state, local authorities, the civil society and the market. Taken together, these two long-standing processes have resulted in the “rebirth of crime prevention with its emphasis upon instrumental reasoning through risk and security management”, arguably “the most significant adaptation to the crisis of confidence and competence in the traditional state-centred approach to policing and criminal justice” (Crawford, 2008: 151. Emphasis in original.).

Simply put, community policing is about the move away from the policing of the community towards the policing along with the community itself. Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux argue that “[c]ommunity policing is both a philosophy and organisational strategy to allow community residents and police to work together in new ways to solve problems of crime, fear of crime, physical and social disorder and neighbourhood decay” (1990: xiii-xv). However, difficulties soon emerge if we want to adopt a less general perspective and identify what kind of instruments and strategies community policing entails on a practical level. “Because of the need to respond locally to local problems, authority is devolved downwards, and away from the centre. Moreover, because communities differ in characteristics and policing needs, what specifically is delivered by way of community policing will vary from one place to another” (Tilley, 2008: 378). Thus, community policing can result in the launch of neighbourhood watch programmes, the establishment of collaborative partnerships between police and neighbourhood organisations, and the support to community-based and community-led initiatives to solve a given problem.
The literature has long acknowledged the ambiguities that plague this concept (Eck and Rosenbaum, 1994; Kelling and Coles, 1996; Skogan and Hartnett, 1997) and how, at least partially, these derive from the complexity of the notion of community itself. While this can be understood in reference to the shared norms, lifestyles and values that bring a group of people together, in practice it is given a strictly territorial dimension, and often conflated with the idea of neighbourhood. “Neighbourhoods, though, can often be divided. Indeed the most problematic ones characteristically are quite seriously fractured, with conflicts over use of space, legitimate lifestyles and appropriate forms of policing” (Tilley, 2008: 377). As a result, the areas where community policing is adopted more successfully are largely well-off, middle class neighbourhood, while in more deprived areas people either do not enjoy the trusting relationship with the police necessary for implementing community policing, or are discouraged from working more closely with officers because of fear of retaliation from other residents. The necessity for community policing of cohesive neighbourhoods where people agree on the identification of the problems affecting their area and on the solutions best suited to address them provides a link with the other innovation in the field of policing that I wish to discuss, namely the (in)famous “broken windows” theory. First formulated by Wilson and Kelling in 1982, this theory posits an irreducible opposition between insider who belong in a given place, and unwelcomed outsiders who cause troubles. On the basis of it, it also goes on to introduce the claim of a close association between urban disorder and crime levels. The idea of order advanced in the original paper describes the path towards decline of a “stable neighborhood of families who care for their homes [and] mind each other’s children” (Wilson and Kelling, 1982: 31) when all of a sudden signs of disorder, left unattended, attract “a criminal invasion” (ibid. 32) of disorderly people. In this context, the meaning of both order and disorder is extremely clear. Where the former signals that “the community cares about is neighborhood and is prepared to enforce norms of orderliness”, the latter “means that no one cares” (Harcourt, 1998: 305). Here, there is no room for ambiguity or negotiation: disorder is always bad. The theory is based on a series of assumptions “about the privilege of order over disorder, and insider over outsider, about the likelihood of criminal invasion in disorderly neighborhoods; and about the suspicious nature of the unattached adult. (…) It reflects an aesthetic of orderliness, cleanliness, and sobriety” (ibid.). Various strategies have been proposed to implement this vision; from the
aggressive policing of the quality-of-life initiatives launched in New York City during Giuliani’s tenure as mayor (Kahan, 1997), to the informal zoning of public spaces (Ellickson, 1996) and the use of shaming penalties (Kahan, 1997). Taken together, these have coalesced into a “neoliberal approach to public order” (Sampson, 2009: 8-9) that Sampson contends is increasingly being exported into Europe from the US.

In spite of its enduring popularity and its appeal to city authorities in several countries, though, over the years this theory has also faced a number of criticisms. For one, disorder is, and remains, a complex concept; along with its physical manifestations, be it litter on the streets, or graffiti on the walls of a building, a relevant, if only recently addressed, role is played by the way people perceive and interpret these signs. In a methodologically and substantially innovative paper, Sampson (2009) has shown how in a neighbourhood some features that do not directly relate to disorder are nevertheless used by people to assess the level of it in an area. Additionally, in spite of the fact that the very signs that are a source of serious concerns for some are bound to be considered by others as the edgy manifestation of a thriving neighbourhood, broken windows posits that the meaning of these signs is unambiguous, and causally linked to crime.

At the same time, scholars have also questioned the categorical distinction between law-abiding people and criminals that the theory posits. While from a purely legal perspective Roberts (1999) challenges the notion of visible lawlessness, Harcourt (1998, 2001) adopts a broader perspective and turns to Foucault to remind us that the categories of order, disorder, law-abider and disorderly upon which the broken windows theory rests are social, and are shaped by the very same strategies that are based on them. “Order-maintenance policing helps create the category of the disorderly and this, in turn, facilitates the very policing of aggressive arrests for minor disorderly conduct. (…) The techniques of punishment (…) create the disorderly person as an object of suspicion, surveillance, control, relocation, micromanagement, and arrest (…) ideally [to be] excluded from the neighbourhood” (Harcourt, 1998: 298).

However, whereas Harcourt (1998) explicitly links the appearance of order-maintenance policing to the disciplinary society of Foucault’s mid 1970s work (1977), I would like to suggest an alternative affiliation which, instead, looks at his series of lectures at the College de France during the final part of the same decade, devoted to the topic of governmentality (Foucault, 2008, 2009). With disciplines, the focus is always on the normalisation of the individual subject, who is transformed thanks to his/her
internalising the rules of appropriate conduct. On the contrary, as seen in the previous chapter, a managerial approach focuses on the creation and regulation of *unruly groups* as a strategy to maintain order, and targets aggregates with no transformative goal in mind, thus allowing for its placement within “the general movement noted by a number of scholars towards the exercise of state power as ‘govermentality’” (Feeley and Simon, 1994: 178). In this context, the essence of order becomes the power to manage thresholds: of acceptability, of tolerance and of inclusion.

On a practical level, the enforcement of the broken windows theory through strategies for the aggressive policing of urban space has been particularly contested in relation to two troubling issues. First, there are the claims of police brutality, as witnessed by the surge in the number of complaints filed against NYPD officers and, consequently, in the sums paid out by NYC authorities in settlements for such cases during the “zero tolerance” years of mayor Giuliani. Second, the focus on minor offences that is at the heart of this strategy of policing mostly affects the poorest sectors of the urban population, thus leading to the disproportionate targeting of minorities (see Harcourt, 1998).

**Conclusions**

The two key notions I wish to take with me from this theoretical section are the shift from the control of individual subjects to the control of unruly groups, and the increasing relevance of pre-emption, particularly in the fields of crime control and policing. Taken together, they provide a solid framework within which it is possible to analyse the new strategies for the control of urban space that result from them. However, before moving on to the empirical section of this work, the following chapter, offers some notes on methods.
3. Studying the police: some notes on access, methods and gender roles.

Access

There are general difficulties involved in studying the police. For one, it is an over-protective institution (Holdaway, 1983), which exerts a great deal of control on how much information on its inner workings, its procedures and its practices is made available to people on the outside. The same, strong distinction between insiders and outsiders is one of the key features of its occupational culture, which often prompts officers to think in “us versus them” terms. Unsurprisingly, my research was no exception in this regard, and because of the problems of access I had to face the research design had to be radically altered in order to come up with research that would actually be possible to carry out.

Initially, the original plan was to pick Milan as one of the cities I would study, to then arrange a comparison with a European one. Thanks to a colleague in my department, I was able to contact the head of the regional direction for the local police, who, in turn, put me in touch with the deputy commissioner of the local police of Milan who managed the division in which CCTV was placed. In the course of two meetings with her, I explained the rationale for my research and the kind of access I would need to carry it out. The reception I got was warm, and it seemed like the police were interested in the project, especially in light of the implementation of a new “smart” CCTV system that was being planned around that time in Milan (spring 2010). I could honestly not believe my luck; was it possible that gaining access to the local police was this easy? The answer is, obviously, a resounding no. Due to privacy concerns, and despite the chief’s interest in the project, things never went any further than what I described above. The police did not want to be studied, and I was forced to radically change the design of my project. The irony was not lost on me that research on how police use video surveillance cameras would be halted because of the risk of the police’s right to privacy being violated, but this was of very little consolation. Thus, while I would strongly argue that because of their role and position, the very opposite should be the
case and that the police should be more transparent and more accountable to external observers, I had to select another city, and hope for better luck.

After much consideration, I decided to abandon the idea of comparative research with a European city, and instead moved on to two mid-sized Italian cities, as this would reflect the urban fabric of the country dimension-wise. Time constraints also played a part in the decision, as there was no way to anticipate how long it would take to finally secure access to two cities, even within national borders. Because of a brief experience in local politics I had in the course of 2008 and 2009, I had a personal connection to the current mayor of a city located in Central Italy, where a CCTV system had recently been implemented. Thus, I was able to secure a meeting with him to discuss the feasibility of the project in that city, what the research would focus on and the general conditions under which I would be carrying out my work. Thanks to his interest in the project, he agreed to discuss it with the chief of the local police, as it was clear to both of us that it would not be possible to conduct the research without the support of that organisation. Second time around, things went better. After a subsequent meeting where I explained to the chief the nature of the research and discussed the conditions and calendar of the observations, fieldwork was finally ready to start.

Once the first city was selected, I drew up a list of other places that could potentially become the second case study to be included in the research. The characteristics I wanted to control were: dimension, presence of a recently implemented open-street CCTV system, and local political culture. Because one of the things I was interested in was the potential for the explicit targeting of visible minorities through the use of the cameras, I wanted to compare two cities with strong, deeply rooted, and opposite, political traditions to see whether these would have an impact on how local administrators instruct the police to use CCTV. Eventually, the list comprised 8 cities all located between Piedmont, Lombardy and Veneto; I went through the same process of identifying relevant actors, contacting them, presenting the research, and waiting for a response. Because of a series of related circumstances, both political and economical, administrators in what ended up being Northern City were keen to have an evaluation carried out of their system, as in the following summer construction works would start for what was to be the third portion of the local video surveillance system, and they wanted to take a closer look at how CCTV was being used by the police.
Being able to start fieldwork, though, did not mean that the process of continuously negotiating and re-negotiating access was over. I did encounter problems and gatekeepers, usually in the shape of suspicious police officers who feared I was spying on them on account of the chief. When this happened, I always made a conscious effort to be as open as possible about the research I was conducting, the kind of data I was collecting, and the conditions under which I asked respondents to co-operate. Often, assurances on the anonymity of the interviews were all it took to deal with resistance on the part of police officers and in the end all the interviewees agreed to be recorded with good grace. In both cities, in order to be able to access the control room I was provided with a letter of authorisation signed by the chief, that I had to carry with me at all times. However, I never used it to pull rank and demand access to documents, people or places, simply because I was entitled to that. Though tempting, I did not think that would be a good strategy in the long run, and certainly not conducive to the establishment of a good working relationship with the police (for a similar situation, see: Goold, 2004). Generally speaking, dealing with administrators was always easier for me than interacting with police officers. Tentatively, I think the very different relationship each of these two groups establish with the public at large can explain, at least partially, their different attitudes towards outsiders, and how good they are at interacting with them. After my experience in the field alerted me to the underlying dynamics of the relationship between city administrators and the local police, I also believe that part of the discomfort I sensed from officers stemmed from the equal access I was granted to both police and local authorities.

Despite being officially partners, it soon became apparent to me that relationships between these two groups are more layered and nuanced than they are made to appear to an outside eye. In relation to this, being able to move quite freely between these two domains probably made it harder for police personnel to categorise me and decide on whose side I was. As soon as I was aware of this, I always made sure that officers knew it was very clear to me that city administrators and police were equally important and, crucially, that I understood which group was working and which one was “doing the talking”. Along the same line, I always asked for clarifications, permissions and authorisations, particularly from street level officers, even when these were not necessary.
Though I was able to access the field and gain a level of acceptance from officers, I am perfectly aware that, in the months I spent in the two police stations, I never became a trusted insider. As much as I worked hard throughout that time to maintain a good working relationship with police officers, access and trust were continuously traded and re-negotiated up till the very last day of the research. Needless to say, there is no sure way of knowing to what extent this affected the data I collected, nor there is any way around this. However, I believe that being open about the challenges I faced while in the field, and realistic about the degree of acceptance I was able to gain from officers, improved the quality of the data I collected, and was consequently beneficial to the research at large.

Methods

This study employed a qualitative approach, mainly relying on interviews with relevant actors, coupled with document analysis and observational sessions carried out in the two control rooms where the CCTV systems are housed respectively, for a total of 66 hours. As for the interviews, from the start I identified some of the people I wanted to talk to: the mayor, the CCTV operators, the chief of police. Additionally, I used theoretical sampling (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983) as I decided who else to interview, how and when, as the research was progressing and a clearer picture was forming of the issues I wanted to investigate more thoroughly and, consequently, of the people who might help me to do so. Eventually, I interviewed 23 people, some of them more than once, for a total of 26 recorded interviews. I decided to use open-ended, semi-structured interviews. Rather than entering the field with a questionnaire, I brought with me a broad list of issues that I wanted to touch upon and used a combination of directive and non-directive questions (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983) to get where I wanted. Clearly, the interviews were structured differently according to who the respondent was and the topics we were to address in the discussion.

With politicians, my main interest was the identification of the narratives deployed to justify the construction of an open-street CCTV system in each of the two cities, and the reconstruction of the security discourse and of the policies implemented locally. As for interviews with police personnel, I was particularly interested in the issue of the integration of video surveillance within more established policing strategies and tools,
and in how operators use the cameras. Initially, the focus was almost exclusively placed on the social construction of suspicion on the part of police officers; however, as the interviews progressed and I got a deeper sense of what was actually going on in the two control rooms, I became more interested in seeing how the police were managing change, and the interviews reflected this shift of emphasis. Before entering the field, I was worried that I would not be able to get respondents to open up about sensitive issues. To overcome this potential problem, I always paid attention to frame relevant questions within a comparison to another case, or to something I had read in the literature, and I find that this strategy really helped to raise the respondents’ interest and to get the conversation going. Finally, I soon learnt not to underestimate how people usually react to awkward silences in the course of an interview and to pause just a little longer than expected; this is a strategy I particularly used with the less vocal interviewees and admittedly it often prompted further elaboration on their part.

Observations were conducted in the two control rooms where the CCTV systems are housed, for a total of 66 hours. The decision to include them in the design of the research stemmed from a variety of reasons. First, there is just another study on video surveillance in Italy, carried out by Fonio in the city of Milan and published in 2007, so the present research can rightly be seen as a meaningful contribution to the development of a deeper understanding of surveillance practices in Italy, an under-investigated field of inquiry particularly when compared to the situation in other European countries. Second, the integration of data culled from the observation with what emerged from the interviews provided a very different version of events from the actors’ accounts. Specifically, thanks to the availability of both kinds of data, I was able to contrast the official narrative of “more cameras mean more security” with a reality marred by technical problems, lack of familiarity with the procedures in places on the part of operators, and relevant problems in terms of the integration of CCTV within the policing strategies adopted in the two cities. As a result, I believe the conclusions I reached in this work go beyond the official gloss that both police and city administrators promote and sustain. Third, the conversations and the informal discussions I took part in while I was in the two control rooms allowed for the gathering of data on sensitive issues such as the use of surveillance cameras in order to monitor the workforce, or the impact of organisational and technical shortcomings on the day-to-day use of the system. Had I not spent time in the police stations, I am not sure I would have been able
to gather the same amount of relevant data and, as a result, to paint a fuller, more complete and complex picture of the role played by CCTV in the two cities where research was conducted.

Once I entered the field, what I witnessed soon turned out to be a major cause of puzzlement. After just a few hours spent observing operators in the two control rooms, in fact, it became apparent to me that the systems in both cities were not used at all, but rather ignored by the operatives, and quite masterfully so. As the amount of time I spent observing the two sites grew, I became more and more aware that I was not gathering the data I had I expected I would find and that there was something I was missing. I was deeply dissatisfied with the ethnographic accounts I was producing, as essentially they were a naturalistic description of what happened or, rather, what did not happen in the control rooms. My initial assumptions and theoretical framework both proved inadequate, and the fieldnotes I produced over those months clearly mirrored that. Reading them after wrapping up fieldwork, it was apparent to me that, while there, I did not have any clear idea on what I was observing, rather writing down everything that was happening. Little did I know at the time that this would turn out to be my saving grace. The wealth of notes I had produced allowed me to go back to a detailed account of events after engaging in a new, more critical and much needed round of theory-building. Relying on all that material, it was then possible for me to develop a new conceptualisation of CCTV, equally based on my fieldwork and on some more general characteristics of Italy as a whole. As for the matter of the actual production of the fieldnotes, this was highly dependent on the nature of the work carried out in the two control rooms. In busy moments, it was possible for me to write down notes while in the room, as people were engaged otherwise. However, in quieter times I decided to put things down in writing at a later time, as it would have been awkward to jot everything down as people were talking to me, or doing small talk with a co-worker.

The experience of the fieldwork definitely represented a learning process for me, where every phase was tightly linked to what came before and after it. On a general level, I moved up and down, and forward and backward, through the data as I was collecting and, later, analysing them in order to identify and explore the main dimensions of my research topic (McCahill, 2002: 29). For one, this reinforced me in my belief that every theory is situated and cannot do without a continuous, and frank, confrontation with the issues and contingencies that inevitably emerge from the fieldwork. Under this light, I
have come to see the relationship between theory and fieldwork as a circular process of progressive adjustments which, in the end, result in the production of “a pieced-together set of representations that are fitted to the specifics of a complex situation” (Denzin and Lincoln, 2003: 5). Denzin and Lincoln’s idea of the researcher as a bricoleur is, in this regard, particularly fitting, as fieldwork forced me to bring together different paradigms and perspectives to come up with a model that, I think, provides an accurate account of the diffusion of video surveillance in Italy. In turn, this made it possible to challenge some of the assumptions traditionally held to be true about CCTV, and to do so with the support of empirical data from the two control rooms. Thus, I think the end product of my research can be best described as an emergent construction, “a complex, quiltlike bricolage, a reflexive collage or montage – a set of fluid, interconnected images and representations. This interpretive structure is like a quilt, a performance text, a sequence of representations connecting the parts to the whole” (Denzin and Lincoln, 2003: 9).

**Gender politics in the field**

Before entering the field, I did not anticipate gender to be a relevant factor that I would need to take into account, mainly because of the differences in perception and image between the local police, on one hand, and the Polizia di Stato or the Carabinieri on the other. However, it soon became clear to me that I had made a mistake, more subtly in the course of the interviews and more and more openly during the time I spent in the two police stations. In each of the two cities, gender was something police officers consistently used to alter in their favour the power relationship they had with me, and to overturn the relevance of other status characteristics such as class and education. I expected, and the fieldwork soon confirmed, that in terms of social and cultural capital I would be at an advantage on my respondents, so what I was initially concerned with was coming up with ways to downplay this difference. On the contrary, what I had not taken into account was the gender-based hierarchy that is still, though unofficially, in place in the local police, and according to which I was placed in a quite uncomfortable position – at the very bottom. In that they only saw me as a young woman, middle-aged male officers found it very easy to put me in my place or, rather, where they thought my place was.

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9 Respectively, the national police and the military police.
I need to make it clear that this gendering never entailed overt propositions on the part of my respondents. Rather, there was always a more or less explicit undercurrent of surprise at the idea that “such a pretty girl” would be interested in studying the police and, even more amazingly, something as dull as CCTV. In spite of my presence, jokes and sexual innuendos were commonplace in the two control rooms, with bantering always following a very precise dynamic. One officer would tell a dirty joke, hilarity would ensue, and finally someone would invariably apologise to me for his co-worker’s rudeness, all the while laughing heartily. When women officers were also present, they would join in the laughter, too, to then tell me that that was what they had to deal with everyday. This said, it is easy to understand how the biggest problem I had to face while in the control rooms was how to be taken seriously as a researcher by the officers, rather than seen as a pretty thing that they could look at. This realisation led to two distinct, but closely related, decisions on my part.

First, I had to choose what the best way was to react to this state of things. In a different setting, I would have been quick, and very firm, in contesting the officers’ attitude; however, in this case I did not do it. On a personal level, this was the hardest thing for me to do, and it prompted me to wonder how important my feminist beliefs really were to me. If they were, the self-examination would go, I would challenge the officers rather than smile coyly and pretend not to pick up on what was said in the control room. As Gurney writes in a passage that I co-sign to with no hesitation, “I often wished I were a more militant feminist who would lecture the staff on their chauvinism and insensitivity and change their attitudes toward women. Instead I was always the polite and courteous researcher who tolerated much and said little. I occasionally wondered if I was betraying my beliefs and values, but I allowed it to continue. My tolerance of sexism was based upon (...) my concern with maintaining rapport” (Gurney, 1985: 56).

Undoubtedly, I needed my respondents’ co-operation for research to progress, and initially I feared this would mean having to accept, and apparently conform to, their gender expectations. However, I also realised that I could use these very expectations as a research tool in their own right. This brings me to the second decision I had to make, about the kind of role I wanted to play while in the field.

Essentially, I tried to turn officers’ attitude towards women to my advantage and to manipulatively exploit it in order to elicit information. Because of this choice, I took up the role of the naïve young woman in order to cast myself as an unthreatening outsider
to whom things could be said without much consequence. Alternatively, I played the part of the willing student, when I realised an officer was eager to show his professional competence. This mirrors exactly Glebbeek’s experience during her research. “When I noticed that an interviewee liked to display his knowledge, as if he were a teacher speaking to a young student, I became an eager pupil. When I recognized that an interviewee was probing my academic knowledge of policing, I adopted the role of an expert, showing that I had good academic knowledge about police institutions. When an interviewee was authoritarian, I became subordinate. When I discovered that someone was sensitive to ‘female charms’, I used them” (Huggins and Glebbeek, 2003: 375).

I am still conflicted about the manipulative nature of the strategies I used while in the field, and have spent much time pondering the ethical implications of my decision. Perhaps, if I had anticipated more precisely the reality of the environment where I was to conduct research, I would have been able not to exploit the officers’ expectations to my advantage. Though I was spared overt propositions and did not have to deal with harassment nor threats to my personal safety, throughout my field research I very much felt torn between my identity as a researcher and my identity as a woman. I believe I did not abuse the trust respondents gave me and I honestly tried to do my best in a situation where my “femaleness” did not always put me on par with the police officers who participated in the study. What I am ready to admit, though, is how naïve I was in assuming “that the fieldworker is ‘Anyman’ and that the interaction between researcher and setting members takes place in a context devoid of gender and sexuality” (Gurney, 1985: 59). If anything else, then, fieldwork had the merit of alerting me to an issue that is not often dealt with in methodological literature, and to make me reflect critically on my own role and identity within the research I conducted.
4. Theorising video surveillance

Some brief notes on the history of video surveillance

The use of video cameras for surveillance purposes allows for the recording and transmission of footage to a control room, in an effort to prevent crime and facilitate the apprehension of offenders.

In spite of televisions becoming commercially available by the 1930s, however, it was not until the 1960s that the evolution of technology made CCTV systems viable. The appearance of the videotape and the VCR eliminated the need for the chemical processing of film, thus making it possible to build a network of cameras that would transmit footage to a control room where images could be remotely monitored and stored. Clearly, at such an early stage problems were still significant. On one hand the possibility of storing images for indefinite amounts of time clashed with the costs involved, particularly in terms of storage-space. On the other, because the technology was analogue, in order to identify an event or a specific person operators would have to watch all the footage recorded in a given time frame. In spite of these shortcomings, the first CCTV system was launched in 1967 by Photoscan, which advertised it as a means for deterring and persecuting shoplifters. As such, it was mainly marketed to the retail sector (Norris and Armstrong, 1999: 18).

As is now widely known, the UK was first nation in Europe to adopt CCTV systems on a large scale. In 1985, Bournemouth was the first city to implement a large-scale video surveillance system, with the decision having its roots in the risk posed by Northern Irish terrorism. That year the city was to host the annual conference of the Conservative Party, which had been marred in 1984 by an IRA attack that had resulted in the death of five people; “as a result, additional security was provided to the conference venue by introducing CCTV along the sea front” (Norris et al. 2004: 111). However, it was not until 1994 that the diffusion of CCTV systems in the country saw a steep increase, when the then Home Secretary Michael Howard launched the first City Challenge Competition to promote the adoption on the part of local authorities of open street CCTV systems. By 1999, £ 38.5 million had been thus allocated to 585 projects nationwide; subsequently, the Crime Reduction Programme, in place between 1999 and
2003, allocated a further £170 million for the development of video surveillance systems throughout Britain (Home Office, 2007). As can be gleaned from the dates, CCTV was equally supported by conservative and labour governments, as they both saw it as a fundamental instrument in their strategy to tackle crime and disorder.

Compared to the UK, the diffusion of open street video surveillance systems has generally been slower and more limited in mainland Europe, though there are sensible differences among the various countries. Data gathered thanks to the Urbaneye project\(^\text{10}\), which investigated the diffusion of video surveillance in public space in seven European countries (UK, Norway, Denmark, Austria, Spain, Hungary, Germany), shows how at the time the research was conducted huge disparities marked the adoption of this technology in the countries surveyed. As for Italy, in a relatively small number of years cameras have become a common fixture in cities, both large and small, with the allocation of funding by the national government instrumental in the diffusion of the technology throughout the country.

These brief notes cannot come to a conclusion without a mention of what turned out to be a watershed moment in the history of video surveillance: digitalisation. While this passage could, potentially, solve all the problems mentioned above, I believe a certain degree of caution is still necessary. Clearly, digitalisation has had an extremely positive impact on the storage of footage and the overall quality of the images recorded; however, the same cannot be said for the automatic processing of these very images. Automated face recognition technologies are still in their infancy and the results they offer still prevent a large-scale adoption of this particular feature. The position of the single camera, along with the lighting conditions and an individual’s personal attire still pose a problem, which can explain why, to this day, this technology is most effectively used in traffic management for the automatic recognition of number plates. As for video indexing and retrieval, it is still often the case that operators have to sit through all the footage recorded in a given period of time if they need to locate a given person or see how a specific event unfolded.

\(^{10}\) www.urbaneye.net The project was a 30-month long collaborative research, concluded in 2004.
CCTV works, or: video surveillance and crime prevention

The first strand of literature I wish to analyse frames video surveillance as a technological instrument for the maintenance of public order and the prevention of crime.

If we consider CCTV in this capacity, three key preoccupations come to the fore: the question of the effectiveness of video surveillance, its measurability and the costs associated with its use. These should be understood both in monetary (i.e. cost effectiveness) and social terms. In this regard, the negative social externalities potentially generated by the adoption of this technology need to be considered, with particular attention to the threat posed to the privacy of citizens and the risk of displacement of crime in areas not covered by CCTV.

Given how these systems are commonly financed with public funds, it may come as a surprise to know that studies trying to assess the effectiveness of CCTV are few, far between and concentrated only in a handful of countries. As a result, the general validity of their conclusions remains disputable, though a look at the volume of resources involved makes it clear beyond doubt that governments continue to support video surveillance and to see it as a valid instrument for crime prevention. Certainly, this is the case in Italy and in the UK, too, where, “CCTV has been and continues to be the single most heavily funded crime prevention measure operating outside of the criminal justice system” (Welsh and Farrington, 2009: 19). Nevertheless, the fact remains that, still, it is hard to come to a clear conclusion on whether or not it is advisable to spend consistent amounts of public money on video surveillance. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the necessity to allocate public resources for projects that are efficient, effective and economical means that a good part of the research on the effectiveness of CCTV has been commissioned by public bodies. To put it simply, they need to prove that they are spending public money the right way.

I am now going to present the findings of three different studies on the effectiveness of CCTV: the first, by Gill and Spriggs (2005), is a research study published by the British Home Office. Along with this, I consider a report produced by the Justice Analytical Services of the Scottish Government (2009) and, finally, a meta-analysis conducted by Welsh and Farrington (2009). Two of the three works considered here hail from the same country, which is understandable when considering the number of cameras and the
amount of money spent on CCTV in the UK. However, this surely makes a further case for the issue of the generalisation of the results these studies come to.

The research carried out by Gill and Spriggs (2005) on behalf of the Home Office assessed the impact of 14 CCTV systems in 13 projects in a collection of diverse settings: town centres, car parks, residential areas and hospitals. The research team used official crime statistics to see if crime levels in areas covered by cameras had changed before and after the implementation of the systems, and conducted surveys to measure the level of public support to CCTV, also before and after the implementation of each system. The research also considered control room operations and the economic impact of the systems. While caution is needed on a number of issues, such as the unrealistic expectations associated with CCTV and the decision to measure effectiveness with reference to crime rates (for more detail see: Groombridge, 2008: 77-78), still the data gathered led to the conclusion that, generally, the systems failed to reduce either crime or fear of crime. It also emerged that CCTV impacts differently on different kinds of crime, being more effective in case of planned offences. “Assessed on the evidence presented in this report, CCTV cannot be deemed a success. It has cost a lot of money and it has not produced the anticipated benefits” (Gill and Spriggs, 2005: 120). A consideration of the politics involved in doing research can partially explain why, in light of such disparaging results, in the final section of the report the authors try to build on the positive and go on to suggest a number of strategies to increase the effectiveness of CCTV in the future. However, the fact remains that this first study on the effectiveness of CCTV concluded that, generally, video surveillance does not work and is, at best, ineffectual.

Without considering the issue of the fear of crime, nor the level of public support to these systems, Welsh and Farrington (2009) tried to evaluate in as methodologically sound as possible a way the effectiveness of CCTV in terms of crime reduction. In order to do so, they conducted a meta-analysis on 41 studies that assessed the effectiveness of CCTV in a variety of settings: public housing, city centres, car parks, public transportation, hospitals and residential areas. Though the evaluations came from a number of different countries (US, Canada, Sweden, Norway), the most representative sample is by far that from the UK, where 34 studies were conducted. Of the remaining 7 cases, 4 come from the US. Overall, their conclusion is that CCTV has a significant positive effect on crime; however, this position needs to be clarified better. The meta-
analysis concluded that CCTV can significantly help to reduce car thefts in car parks, and that video surveillance is overall more effective in the UK that in the other countries included in the research. The authors are also very clear that the results do not show any effectiveness of CCTV in city centres. While the sheer number of British studies can help to explain why video surveillance appears more effective here than in other nations, the circumstances under which many of them were conducted have to be taken into consideration, too. Specifically, most of the funding for these assessments was provided by the British Home Office and, given its heavy financial involvement in these schemes, it could be not unreasonable to assume that it had every interest in demonstrating that video surveillance work and is, as such, something worth investing in. Another relevant point that the authors make is that very little can be said on the cost-effectiveness of CCTV, which is particularly grave when public resources are involved as significantly as they are here. The authors’ overall conclusion is that “[t]he exact optimal circumstances for effective use of CCTV schemes are not entirely clear at present” (Welsh and Farrington, 2009: 75).

The last report is a review on the effectiveness of CCTV compiled by the Justice Analytical Services of the Scottish Government, published in December 2009. It is based on research conducted after the year 2000 and it differs from the reports previously analysed in that it not only includes quasi-experimental studies, but also evidence gained by a variety of other methods – interviews, focus groups, observations and psychological laboratory experiments – given the small number of quasi-experimental studies on the effectiveness of CCTV conducted so far. Thus, the final review also considers 4 interview-based studies, one observational piece of research on behavioural adaptations to CCTV and 2 works that employ psychological experimental methods. Overall, the aim of the document is to review the evidence gathered thus far on the effectiveness of CCTV in relation to crime deterrence, displacement and detection, and the role of video surveillance footage during investigation and prosecution of offenders.

As for deterrence, though acknowledging the methodological problems involved in measuring it, the report concludes that, on a general level, CCTV does not deter crime and that, when video surveillance does have a positive effect, this is dependent on the type of crime that is targeted and the characteristics of the area where the system is implemented. Thus, a consistent finding in the literature is that video surveillance works
better in less complex and smaller areas, such as car parks. In relation to displacement, the review can only admit that this is an “inconclusive topic” (Justice Analytical Services, 2009: 24) as, while it is deemed possible to have a diffusion of positive effects (i.e. reduction of recorded crime) in the areas adjacent to where the cameras are, this is also observed to wear off in time. In this regard, factors to be taken into account are the diminishing media coverage of video surveillance stories, and people’s ability to trick the cameras, once they have worked out their location.

For CCTV to be effective in terms of detection of crimes, the studies under review seem to conclude that, while stronger than deterrence, factors other than the characteristics of the system itself need to be taken into consideration. Of particular relevance is the speed of deployment of personnel on the part of the police in the face of a crime being witnessed from the control room. A relevant point is made that a positive effect on detection can reverberate on other organisational aspect of police practices, which can, for example, result in a more rational allocation of officers and resources within a given area. While it is clear that these benefits can have an economic value, few (Owen et al., 2006) have so far attempted to quantify them in monetary terms. Finally, the effectiveness of CCTV during the investigation and prosecution of offenders is related to the amount of time that can be saved if there is footage available. However, there are problems. On one hand, sometimes courts lack the appropriate equipment to view the footage; on the other, it is likely that the recognition of unfamiliar faces on footage has a consistent risk of leading to wrongful identifications.

After a presentation of the finding of each of the studies, the report concludes with some recommendations for future research. What is acutely needed, it says, are studies which assume a more long-term perspective in the evaluation of the effects of video surveillance, along with a stronger focus on the economic benefits it brings about, especially relevant in light of the costs involved. “Overall, it would seem as though the impact of CCTV on crime has been variable. (…) Furthermore, the belief that CCTV alone will solve the problem of crime is unrealistic. It has been shown that there are many other factors that are likely to mediate the effect CCTV has on crime including police resources, training and level of efficiency of CCTV operators, and the level of communication between these groups.” (Justice Analytical Services, 2009: 23)

What is apparent from a comparison between the three reports presented above is the lack of solid scientific evidence on whether or not CCTV delivers what it promises.
More than that, the evidence emerged so far seem to suggest that video surveillance is, often, ineffective. However, the fact remains that video surveillance schemes do continue to be planned and implemented in a growing number of diverse settings in several countries. In spite of such disparaging results, its proponents argue, this does not mean that CCTV does not work, but rather that we need more of it. If we want better results, we just need more money, spent on more cameras, so as to cover more space: effectiveness, their line of reasoning goes, is dependent on quantity, rather than careful planning.

Because of the inconclusive results of the studies presented so far, I will now move beyond a mere consideration of what CCTV does, to see what lies behind the cameras, in an attempt to explain the ongoing appeal of video surveillance.

For a visual articulation of the different theories on video surveillance, see the figure below.

![Figure 2 – Theories of CCTV](image)

**Surveillance studies**

Surveillance studies are, by now, established as an interdisciplinary area of inquiry devoted to the investigation of surveillance in all its forms. Though embracing a variety of methods, approaches and theoretical backgrounds, what scholars in the field share is an understanding of surveillance as something that is not limited to contemporary society (among others, see: Torpey, 2000; Higgs, 2004) or necessarily sinister (Lyon, 2001). Indeed, the acknowledgement of the inherently ambiguous nature of surveillance is without doubt a most important acquisition, in that it has opened the door to a more
nuanced understanding of it. Theoretically, surveillance studies are concerned with the relation between freedom and control. As Foucault highlighted, the one cannot exist without the other, as the very act of producing freedom “entails the establishment of limitations, controls, forms of coercion, and obligations relying on threats” (Foucault, 2008: 64). Empirically, their overall aim lies in the desire to come to an understanding of surveillance practices that has moved away from grand narratives of a Big Brother society to offer a more complex and messy view on these phenomena. In order to achieve this, the investigation of specific sites proves vital, as it allows us to better understand how surveillance practices and the responses to them are shaped.

A number of authors have engaged in empirical investigations of surveillance practices. In the case of CCTV, this has taken the form of studies on the social construction of suspicion and the workplace politics of control rooms in a variety of settings, from police station to shopping centres, from hospitals to residential areas.

References for these studies can be found in different strands of literature. First, Goffman’s attention to the details of face-to-face interactions and his ethnographic sensitivity to the nuanced reality of people’s behaviour in public places (1961b, 1963) come to mind. More specifically, his notion of ‘normal appearance’ (1971) is of particular relevance when considering how CCTV operators construct sets of working rules in order to make sense of what they see. When confronted with live footage, in fact, operatives need to determine as quickly as possible who is going to engage in illicit activities so as to maximise the likelihood of targeting the right person. In order to do this, clearly any assumption on what looks “normal” or “out of place” in a given context is of paramount importance, as it is only against a backdrop of orderliness that what looks unusual or suspicious can be spotted. In that it focuses on the cognitive procedures police officers use to infer the probability of criminality from someone’s appearance, Sacks’ work is directly related to this last point. In detail, I am here referring to what he calls the “incongruity procedure” (1972), which is based on the idea that things that look out of place in a given context are those that call for further scrutiny, thus reinforcing the traditionally assumed association between deviance and distinguishability.

Second, organisational studies (Clegg and Dunkerley, 1980; Westwood and Clegg, 2003) deserve more than a passing mention, in so far as they acknowledge how organisational structures, professional cultures and values have a bearing on the work of
CCTV operators. In the same vein, the sociology of work (Roy, 1972; Hodson, 1995; Fleming and Spicer, 2003; Grint, 2005; T.J. Watson, 2008) is also important in analysing the informal work practices that take place inside the control room. Analytical inquiry can also be focused upon the strategies for resistance, coping or escapism (Cohen and Taylor, 1992; Jermier et al. 1994; Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999; Fleming and Sewell, 2002) enacted by the operators. Finally, the literature on the social construction of technology (SCOT) needs to be taken into account, too. As this specific approach aims “to understand how technology and its uses are socially and politically constructed through complex processes of institutional and personal interaction” (Graham and Marvin, 1996: 105), it is a useful reminder of the necessity to avoid the traps of technological determinism and its unilateral view of CCTV systems. Thus, rejecting such a limited perspective affords for a renewed interest in how social actors shape the technology they operate while operating it, and in how the use of the same technology can be mediated differently in different social contexts. Methodologically, most of the studies we are now going to introduce are observational-based, and consistently use ethnographic methods to provide a vivid account of what goes on inside a CCTV control room.

The micro level politics of video surveillance

The first and most established line of inquiry has focused on two directly related topics: targeted surveillance and the social construction of suspicion by CCTV operators. Norris and Armstrong’s seminal study (1999) was the first extensive research to investigate these issues, with data gathered in 600 hours of observation conducted in three different control rooms\textsuperscript{11} over the course of two years. As for targeted surveillances, the study concluded that young men are the group most at risk, both for crime or other order-related reasons; people of colour are also more likely to be targeted, as they are overrepresented in this group in comparison to their percentage in the general population. Having coded seven different kinds of suspicion that can lead to a targeted surveillance, the authors also found that one-third of those could be

\textsuperscript{11}Respectively, the three systems covered were: the commercial centre of a major metropolitan city, the market square of a country town and the high street in a poor inner city borough.
categorised as instances of categorical suspicion. This result bears serious implications for all those who enter an area covered by a video surveillance system.

Essentially, people are likely to be targeted “not because of what they have done, but because of who they are, and operators identify them as belonging to a particular social category which is deemed to be indicative of criminal or troublesome behaviour” (Norris and Armstrong, 1999: 112). This peculiar brand of selectiveness is fostered by the development of working rules that, it is argued, come to be the end result of the social construction of suspicion carried out by the operators. What differentiates Norris and Armstrong’s work from Sacks’ is the choice to take into account the operatives’ assumptions on which categories of people are most likely to offend or engage in illicit behaviour, thus acknowledging the truly social character of the notion of suspicion.

Finally, it is also worth mentioning how the research showed that police interventions are not dependent on the kind of behaviour witnessed through the cameras, but rather on a series of formal and informal organisational characteristics, such as the level of integration between the CCTV system and the police and the level of personal discretion afforded to operators.

McCahill’s work (2002) also provides a micro sociological account on the daily operations of three systems, located in various settings – two shopping centres, workplaces and a high-rise housing scheme – in Northern City, England. Overall, what the study demonstrates is how people in different contexts use the same technology in different ways, and for different goals.

When operators are responsible for other tasks in addition to video surveillance, this impacts on their ability to use the system effectively; as a result, “the idea of permanent and omnipresent surveillance” (McCahill, 2002: 105) has to be substantially reconsidered. Data on the categories most at risk of targeting are consistent with Norris and Armstrong’s findings on the overrepresentation of young men, especially if dressed in tracksuits and baseball caps. Overall, what McCahill stresses is the use of CCTV for the exclusion of unwanted categories of people from quasi-public space, with groups of youths explicitly targeted because of their potential for the disruption of consumption, rather than their actual behaviour.

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12 Here defined as “based merely on personal characteristics such as dress, race, membership of subculture group” (Norris and Armstrong, 1999: 112).
Additionally, the inclusion of workplaces as a setting for research sheds light on the exploitation of video surveillance systems as a managerial tool used to monitor performances and “target the ‘internal threat’ posed by the workforce” (McCahill, 2002: 149). In this way CCTV is effectively reframed as “an instrument of disciplinary power” (ibidem: 162), which not only affords management the possibility of seeing whether or not employees meet the requirements of the job and their overall level of compliance, but can also instigate anticipatory conformity in the workers. However, as the author pointedly notes, the extent to which CCTV is used to manage the workforce “depends [in part] on how the introduction of this technology fits in with existing social practices and informal rule systems in the workplace” (McCahill, 2002: 163). Accordingly, in the contexts he examined the class solidarity between CCTV operators and their colleagues made it less likely for the cameras to be used in a strictly disciplinary fashion, in spite of the guidelines issued by management.

In the course of the years, a consistent body of literature has formed, that has investigated who and what gets targeted in a variety of settings and in different countries. Though clearly there are some context-specific variations in relation to the identification of the groups most at risk of targeting, these works replicate the studies we presented above both methodologically and substantially and can, therefore, be presented in a less detailed way. McCahill and Norris’ study of a shopping mall in south London (2003) shows how the level of organisational conflict can gravely undermine the overall effectiveness of a video surveillance system, while Mork Lomell et al.’s (2003) conducted comparative research on the construction of suspicion in a series of control rooms in both Oslo and Copenhagen. Both are part of the Urbaneye project mentioned above. Finally, we also need to mention Fonio (2007), who studied the police-run video surveillance system in Milan.

On a different note, Smith’s work (2004, 2007, 2009) seeks to answer an apparently simple question: what happens inside a control room? He focuses his attention on the micro-level dynamics that inform the operational culture of the place in order to challenge the assumption that video surveillance systems are monitored constantly and operated effectively and efficiently at all times. In relation to this last point, Smith talks explicitly about the bore that CCTV operators face during their shifts, and provides a vivid account of what they do to kill time – reading, chatting, smoking – employing the Goffmanian notion of secondary adjustment (Goffman, 1961a) to account for operators’
use of the cameras for goals other than the official ones. What becomes apparent is also how the routine of the control room allows for the creation of mediated and disembodies relations between watchers and watched (Smith, 2007), thus allowing for a consideration of CCTV in its capacity as a social medium. In this regard, it is possible to account for the construction of narratives on the part of the operators, along with the creation of characters based on those under surveillance and the attempts by these same people to outsmart the operatives that try to track their movements. Placing the focus on the watchers can, then, shed some light on the complexities of the job and on the multiplicity of roles they enact in the course of it. While as watchers they are empowered by the gaze of the cameras, in their capacity of workers operators are disempowered by their position in the hierarchy of the workplace and their inability to intervene directly in the scenes they witness through the monitors (Smith, 2009). Such helplessness is due to structural and physical elements alike. Because they are unable to leave the control room, operators need someone else to act on their behalf, but at the same time, they do not have the authority to order a deployment. Perhaps unsurprisingly, then, CCTV operatives make for a disillusioned and uninvolved workforce that feels imprisoned by the cameras. The overall result, Smith argues (2004: 391-392), is that “the efficiency of CCTV operation that is assumed by many commentators (...) appear[s] (...) to be undermined not only by the realities of ‘control room culture’ (i.e. the boredom, monotony and alienation endured by the operators), but also by wider economic and socio-structural factors (i.e. the low pay, and general derision the operatives received)”.

We have clearly come a long way from initial considerations on the effectiveness of CCTV as if insulated from any social, cultural or human element, to a more nuanced and informed understanding of it. Before moving on to a more general level in our review of the relevant literature, though, I wish to mention, albeit briefly, one last study (Heath et al., 2002), conducted within the enclosed space of a London Underground station.

In this context, the authors show how cameras are used to make sense of conducts and behaviours and to develop co-ordinated responses in the event of a problem or emergency. Because of this, cameras are inseparable from the practical knowledge of the place that station supervisors possess, as without a deep, localised understanding of this specific environment the views afforded would be useless and, more importantly,
meaningless. CCTV is used according to a geography of risk within the space of the station and, thus, “provides supervisors with ways of configuring the environment to perceive, even ‘read’, action in organizationally relevant and situationally appropriate ways” (Heath et al., 2002: 198). In this context, CCTV becomes a tool for the recontextualisation of action within the space of the station.

The macro level politics of video surveillance

• The panoptic paradigm

At the end of the 18th century, English reformer Jeremy Bentham (1791) developed the idea of the Panopticon, a prison whose design would allow for inmates to be watched at any given time without them knowing whether or not they were under surveillance. In addition to being less expensive to manage than other prisons of the time, in the long run the Panopticon would also lead, Bentham’s idea went, to the appearance of morally reformed individuals.

Michel Foucault’s reading (1977) of Bentham’s work elevated the Panopticon to paradigmatic status. In his interpretation, the Panopticon is considered as a symbol of the progressive emergence of disciplines as a new technology of power, and in itself a device for the creation of the modern subject. The focus is shifted towards docile bodies, with the overall aim of maximising an individual’s economic utility while, at the same time, decreasing his/her potential for political resistance. To this end, assuming to be always under control would lead to the internalisation of the norms on the part of those subjected to it, which, in the long run, would induce anticipatory conformity in them.

With the growth of CCTV, the idea of the Panopticon has come to be seen as a conveniently ready-made reference, whose use is backed by a series of obvious similarities with the reality of video surveillance systems. Obviously, CCTV recreates an asymmetrical relation between the watchers and the watched as it allows operators the possibility of watching people at will, without them knowing; as such, the power it generates is visible and invisible at the same time. Also, as it is marketed as a tool for crime prevention, the underlying assumption is that it, too, induces conformity in those that fall under its gaze. However, just a small number of scholars (Davis, 1990; Fyfe and Bannister, 1996; Reeve, 1998) have automatically and unproblematic applied the
panoptic paradigm to developments in the technologies for surveillance and broader questions of social control. As the literature devoted to the study of the daily practicalities of surveillance systems has shown, though, the extent to which CCTV can enact the panoptic principle of anticipatory conformity is dependent on a number of factors, structural, cultural and organisational. For one, the shift from institutional enclosed settings to public spaces makes control harder, so that continuous monitoring of people cannot be achieved as easily. In light of these limitations, other authors, (Norris and Armstrong, 1999; McCahill, 2002) have, thus, tried to save the general validity of the panoptic paradigm, applying it in a qualified manner that allows for modifications and reservations. As a result, the functioning of panoptic power as Foucault describes it is generally accepted, but caution is exercised in “unreflectively applying it to public settings in which surveillance takes place. The problem (...) seems to be one of degree, rather than kind” (Yar, 2003: 256. Emphasis in original).

Following a different path, a second strand of scholars has tried to retain the use of the notion of the panopticon as a metaphor for developments in the global capitalist economy. In this vein, Gandy (1993) understands panopticism as a mechanism to sort people into categories according to their estimated value and as “a powerful metaphorical resource for representing the contemporary technology of segmentation and targeting” (Gandy, 1993: 10) of consumers. Along the same line, Poster has introduced the notion of the superpanopticon to stress how advances in the technologies for surveillance, along with the “discourse of databases” (Poster, 1990: 97), now allow for a new, extensive form of panoptic control of people. The normalising gaze that is, thus, produced allows in fact for “the multiplication of the individual, the constitution of an additional self, one that may be acted upon to the detriment of the ‘real’ self without that ‘self’ ever being aware of what is happening” (ibid.: 97-98).

If approached with caution, then, it seems that the concept of the panopticon could still be used in analytically fruitful ways. It is in this vein that Boyne (2000) advances his suggestion that we retain the notion of the panopticon as an ideal type, while Lyon (2006: 5) concedes that “[i]f not as an actual architecture expressed in stone and cement, the panopticon still functions as an ideal, as a metaphor and a set of practices”.
While it cannot be denied that Foucault remains a “foundational thinker” for surveillance studies (Wood, 2003: 2), nevertheless the risk of tokenism looms large, so that, increasingly, attempts have been made to formulate a contemporary theory of surveillance that would move “beyond Foucault” (McCahill, 1998). The choice to keep it in the singular, though, is more than debatable, as the variety of perspectives that can be adopted makes it difficult to sum everything into a neatly packaged and internally coherent theory. Rather, what can be said is that different aspects of surveillance can be accounted for by different strands of literature, from the Foucauldian notion of governmentality and governmentality studies (Burchell et al., 1991; Rose, 1999a, 2000; Valverde, 2003; Rose et al., 2006), to the risk society (Beck, 1992), to critical urban studies (Harvey, 1989; Coleman, 2004; Raco, 2003).

At the end of the Seventies, in the course of the lectures held at the Collège de France, Foucault (2008, 2009) introduced the notion of governmentality, to account for the emergence of a new art of governing that aimed at directing people’s behaviour in order to foster the strength of the state. While Foucault used the lens of governmentality to investigate the genesis of European nation-states through a focus on practices of government (Valverde, 2007), scholars in governmentality studies have used this notion to account for the fragmentation and dispersion of control in advanced liberal society (Rose, 1999a). The end of the monopoly of the state on control has resulted in forms of control that are no longer ‘centralized, but dispersed” (Rose, 2000: 325) and the emergence of multiple other centres of government that equally seek to act upon people’s conduct in order to meet a variety of goals: a better health, a better education, a safer house and so forth. Because these competing centres of government are separated in time, or in space, or in both, from the people whose conduct they wish to shape, they will have to be able to govern at a distance, that is “through the actions of a whole range of other authorities” (ibid. 323). On the other, the new limited role that the state is called to perform means that everyone else – and not just people, but organisations, companies, firms and so forth – will have to take on themselves a new series of responsibilities. What O’Malley terms prudentialism (1996) is the need for each individual to be responsible for his or her own decisions, choices and lives.

The emphasis on the necessity for people to manage their own risks is the bridge that takes us from this first group of authors to the literature on the risk society (Beck, 1992)
that we are now going to consider. However, in spite of some similarities in the terms employed, much caution needs to be exercised when considering these two approaches. In spite of the shared focus on risk, in fact, Beck’s preoccupations clearly set him aside from the work carried out by governmentality scholars. Whereas the latter do not seek to identify macro sociological causes for the phenomena they analyse – the focus is not on ‘why’ things happen, but rather on ‘how’ they come to happen the way they do – Beck is keen to trace back the rise of the risk society itself to the acceleration in the speed of technological change and scientific advancement brought about by capitalism. Basically, he argues, technology has evolved so rapidly that we cannot control it any longer, nor are we able to face the possibility or the consequences of a technological disaster, should it happen. Because of this inability, risk technologies are increasingly employed in an attempt to identify potential risks and adopt preventive countermeasures against them with the unlikely result, though, that “in the risk society, risk” ends up being “merely an ideology concealing the current ungovernability of modernization risks” (Rose et al., 2006: 96).

As far as policing is concerned, a penology based on the treatment and (possibly) the re-integration of the offender into society is replaced by a “New Penology” (Feeley and Simon, 1992, 1994), which manages groups according to their dangerousness to the wider societal body. The focus is steadily placed on the management of risks and the pre-emptive measures that can be deployed against them; the undesirables themselves become a risk to be policed. Most importantly, many of the strategies and programmes adopted in the field of crime control do not emanate from the nation-state, but exist beyond it, in community groups, local authorities and organisations of the civil society. This strongly resonates with Garland’s analysis (1996) on the crisis of sovereignty and the resulting strategies for crime control; it also overlaps with the strategies of responsibilisation discussed by O’Malley and Rose. When the state can no longer guarantee security and protection to its citizens, responsibility for risk management is shifted towards local authorities and other non-state agencies. People become co-responsible. As Garland has masterfully showed (2001), this is directly linked to political struggles over the maintenance of the welfare state and its progressive demise and replacement with neo-liberal political programmes revolving around the ideas of the free market and individual responsibility. The inability of the state to provide security and guarantee control means that the former becomes a commodity that can be acquired.
in the marketplace, though somewhat paradoxically, the people who are most at risk are often unable to buy it good, due to their lack of resources.

I will now turn to a final group of authors who have analysed the implications of post-Fordism at the urban level, to offer the final elements for a multi-faceted, and plural, contemporary theory of video surveillance.

We can analyse the growth of CCTV in light of the broader social and economic trends that have deeply affected the local economies of cities and, to this day, continue to do so. The delocalisation of production to countries where labour is cheaper and less regulated has resulted in the large-scale de-industrialisation of cities in most Western countries, with local authorities scratching their heads in search for alternative sources of income that would allow for the cities’ own survival. No longer places of production, in many cases cities reinvented themselves as places of consumption (Zukin, 1995), as it was believed that this, along with leisure, could foster a new wave of economic growth. “[A]t the urban level, (...) the construction of new spaces of consumption has been an almost universal response to de-industrialisation in British and U.S. cities” (McCahill, 1998: 48) and elsewhere (Swyngedouw et al. 2002; Holm 2006; Herzfeld, 2009).

This strongly resonates with Harvey’s argument (1989) on the transformations of urban governance from managerialism to entrepreneurialism in late capitalism. Increasingly, he says, urban governance is concerned “with the exploration of new ways in which to foster and encourage local development and employment growth” (Harvey, 1989:1). All the while, cities are encouraged to display an entrepreneurial attitude, with local authorities using their powers to actively court outside capitals and persuade them to invest in their city. In short, cities have to (re)brand and promote themselves as attractive, exciting yet safe places both for investors and consumers, where everyone (who has money) is more than welcome. The first implication that can be drawn from this emphasis on urban attractiveness is that the need to lure external resources necessarily puts cities in competition the one with the other (see: Schneider, 1989; Lever and Turok, 1999). Moreover, the increased speed of movement for international monetary flows, and the ease with which resources can be moved from one place to the other, only aggravates the situation further, as now not only do cities have competitors in the same geographical area, but may be forced to compete with other ones, located hundreds or thousands ok kilometres away. “The reduction of spatial barriers has, in fact, made competition between localities, states, and urban regions for development
capital even more acute. Urban governance has thus become much more oriented to the provision of a ‘good business climate’ and to the construction of all sorts of lures to bring capital into town” (Harvey, 1989: 11).

The new spatial organisation of the city that has been promoted in the name of consumption is not without casualties, though. The unwillingness or, more often, the inability to participate in consumption is re-interpreted as a form of deviance, with flawed consumers (Bauman, 2004) coming to be seen as a threat to the commercial image of the city. It is in relation to this category of people that CCTV can be used for the “purification” of city centres (Sibley, 1995). As we have already seen, research on targeted surveillance has demonstrated how those who get targeted are the individuals who do not belong in the places of consumption, be it the mall or the high street, and that targeting per se is not linked to crime, but to the protection of the image of these sites as places for safe consumption.

In relation to this, several authors have considered urban regeneration programmes and the ensuing strategies for crime control in these newly revamped sites as directly linked to a “neoliberal urbanism” (Coleman, 2004: 294) centred on morally-tinged discourses on propriety and decency in public urban space (among others, see: Rogers and Coaffee, 2005; Young et al., 2006; Graham, 2010).

Because urban regeneration programmes are usually occupied with the revamping and relaunch of marginal, depressed areas, often with a bad reputation for street level crime, security is a key concern in such endeavours. Thus, “[e]nsuring that new urban spaces are safe and are seen to be safe are, consequently, among the main priorities for regenerating agencies. Regeneration programmes are therefore as concerned with creating new discourses and meanings of place as they are with changing their physical form” (Raco, 2003: 1870. Emphasis in original). While policing strategies do reflect wider-scale trends, Raco also makes a case for a consideration of how local socio-political relations influence the adoption and implementation of these. In his analysis of urban regeneration programmes in Reading, UK, he shows how highly visible strategies for the control of public space are combined with other, less visible, tactics that seek to influence people’s behaviour. To this end, while situational prevention measures signal the intention of designing out crime and embedding control in the design (i.e. through the removal of climbable drainpipes, the use of anti-graffiti walls and paint, and the strategic collocation of public seating so that the area is clearly visible to CCTV
cameras. Raco, 2003: 1881-1882), the governmental approach seeks to foster the creation of law-abiding subjects. However, it is apparent how the city’s rebranding in the name of consumption is in contrast with the notion of a truly accessible public space, with difference seen as a “threat to the perceived security” of the city (Raco, 2003: 1871) and thus discouraged and fought rather than cherished. Within these programmes, CCTV then becomes a “key ideological and political player in the construction and reproduction of particular categories of crime and visions of social order” (Coleman and Sim, 2000: 637). The idea of order that ensues as a discursive and ordering practice, Coleman contends, is functional to the elimination of the markers of inequality within urban spaces, in part thanks to the adoption of crime prevention strategies to control those groups who do not fit into the neoliberal re-imagining of the city. In this regard, CCTV can be successfully employed to enforce this image and to “put into effect what can and cannot be seen on the streets” (ibid.: 301), so as to effectively conceal the consequences of neoliberalism in the city. A precise narrative is unfolding here, with “the city [seen] as a space of segregation, division, exclusion, threats and boundaries, where the story of city life as mixing and mingling is replaced by a story of antagonism, fear and exclusion” (S. Watson, 2006: 1), with CCTV functional to the *de facto* segregation of urban poor.

**Conclusion**

Research conducted in the vein of both governmentality studies and the risk society paradigm shows how control is increasingly dispersed, decentralised and stemming from entities other than the nation-state. Strongly intertwined with the redefinition of the role of the state as facilitator, more and more people are encouraged to take upon themselves responsibility for their choices, decisions and lifestyles. Within the shift from managerialism to entrepreneurialism in urban governance (Harvey, 1989) and the stress on consumption as the key to new economic growth, security, both real and perceived, becomes a key concern, especially in light of the increased mobility of both people and monetary flows. The image of the city as a safe place is of paramount importance and anything that could disrupt it needs to be targeted as efficiently and quickly as possible. As a result, flawed consumers and all those who do not belong in the new consumption-led city become the casualties of the purification
of urban public space. CCTV is one of the tools used to enforce this vision; it also effectively conceals the consequences of the neoliberal transformation of urban space. So far, I have presented a brief account of the theoretical development in relation to the growth of video surveillance, up until the most recent formulations, which link CCTV to the commodification of urban space under the auspices of a neoliberal drive. However, some questions are left unanswered in the narrative that has, so far, unfolded. To put it simply, can we just uncritically adopt a line of thought that originated in English-speaking countries and apply it to the study of the same phenomenon – the use of CCTV to police urban public space – in a Southern European country?

In the pages above, we have seen how the automatic application of the concept of the panopticon in analyses of video surveillance is far from unproblematic and how it is more analytically correct and fruitful to consider it as a metaphor, a suggestion, rather than the blueprint for every system that has ever been activated. In the same way, it seems only fair to wonder if, and to what extent, the ‘commodification’ paradigm can be used in the research here presented, and what modifications could be necessary in order to do so. Even more problematically, though, I cannot help but wonder if, in any case, the attempts and the effort to modify the paradigm just enough so as to have it fit to a different context are justifiable – desirable, even. While it is clearly tempting to focus on the analogies with analyses that are, by now, established in the literature, potentially it could be far more interesting and analytically productive to look at the differences, so as to see how the characteristics of the context do influence the wider issues at hand here. More importantly, the contribution that this research wishes to offer is an understanding of video surveillance that is less dependent on the specific, historically determined, experience of a small number of countries and on political transformations that have changed the political landscape much more strongly in the UK and across the Atlantic, as opposed to what happened in mainland Europe.

It may border on the obvious to say that the history, the culture and the political development of any nation are factors that cast a large shadow on what happens within its borders\textsuperscript{13}, or that changes in them, when they take place, do not so overnight. To put it differently, states do still matter. However, when it comes to video surveillance, more often than not this simple common sense statement is overlooked and we are confronted

\textsuperscript{13}Clearly, this is not to deny the growing relevance of transnational organizations nor the impact they have had on the very notion of national sovereignty (the E.U. being a case in point).
with research saying that the same phenomenon – the growth of CCTV – follows an easily recognisable pattern, with the same consequences and the same risks pretty much anywhere. While there is no intention here to diminish the value of such studies, which have, after all, deeply influenced my own work, I believe there is a small question that is worth asking: what if things were different?
5. The story of video surveillance in Central City

The initial debate

Spanning more than a decade, the story of video surveillance in Central City is a long one, though full of interruptions, false starts and new beginnings. Because of the obstacles, the unwillingness of some to cooperate and the changes in national legislation that occurred while the project was being put together, the original scheme underwent many significant transformations which, in the end, deeply altered its original conception.

The first step took place between 1999 and 2000, when a protocol was elaborated and then signed by the mayor, the president of the province and the prefecture to lay down a common strategy that would involve both national and local actors in the promotion of urban security and crime prevention. Entitled “Protocol for a safe and welcoming city”, it aimed at strengthening the cooperation between the Polizia, the Carabinieri and the local police and contained the first official mention of video surveillance as a tool that could, potentially, be used in support of more traditional policing activities. Around the same time, the province and the municipality opened a debate with entrepreneurial and professional associations\textsuperscript{14}, whose members were concerned with the risk of thefts, trespassing and vandalism faced by premises located in the industrial parks on the outskirts of Central City. As the then-mayor said:

\textit{The debate on video surveillance was born out of the necessity to introduce elements of control and vigilance in the industrial parks, to prevent thefts, trespassing and things like that.}\bigskip
\textit{Former mayor of Central City}

Significantly, the idea of implementing a city-wide video surveillance system only came later on, when the original plan of a CCTV system for the protection of premises in the industrial parks that would be, at least partially, publicly owned was discarded, mainly because it was not possible to reach an agreement between the parties involved on where to place the cameras. As a matter of fact, the planning of the areas where video

\textsuperscript{14} Confartigianato, Confindustria, Confapi, CNA.
surveillance was, supposedly, going to be introduced, make it objectively difficult to guarantee a satisfactory degree of control through the use of cameras, as the grid of roads is shaped so that they could easily be avoided, unless placed at each and every junction, as the following images show.

Figure 3 – Industrial Park A

Figure 4 – Industrial Park B
So it was soon clear that, in order for video surveillance to be effective, any system would have to be extensive, with cameras for each of the warehouses in the area, and, consequently, expensive, too.

*Placing a single camera along the main road can help you to see if suspect people are wandering around, but the grid of roads making up both industrial park A and B is shaped so that you can avoid walking along that road and just take another one. (...) We realised that, for video surveillance to be effective in those areas, it was necessary for each company to put up its own system but at the time [they said] the costs were too high.*

*Former mayor of Central City*

The final mention on the issue of financing introduces what was to be another reason for conflict between the municipality and entrepreneurial associations. From the very beginning the administration made it clear that they would not use public money for the protection of private premises but, rather, provide the necessary infrastructure so as to put every company in the condition of setting up its own system, covering the areas with a network of optical fibres that everyone could plug into. However this concession was not considered sufficiently attractive and when the moment came to secure funding the initial willingness of the aforementioned associations to provide financial support was withdrawn, while during meetings every owner started to push for the cameras to be placed in front of his/her premises. Consequently, the debate soon came to a stop and the project for a video surveillance system in Central City was put on hiatus:

*In the end we couldn’t come to a decision as to where to put the cameras, because everyone was worried for his own premises, so in the end the whole thing came to nothing.*

*Former mayor of Central City*

After a regional bill offering funds for the co-financing of projects in the fields of urban security and victim support was first passed in 2002, the municipality decided to put together a new project for a video surveillance system in the central areas of the city and submit it to the region in the hope of obtaining financial support for the new plan. When funds were granted for 40000 €, the City Council approved the scheme, which differed greatly from what had been discussed a few years before. With the passing of the new plan in the summer of 2004 the idea of adopting a city-wide system of video surveillance with an explicit focus on urban security finally came
to the fore. The resolution approving the scheme explicitly acknowledged the relevance of the issue of security in the government of the city, while once again calling for the coordination of the distinct police forces active there and introducing, to this end, a division of the territory into smaller areas to make policing activities easier. Also because of the decrease in costs that had occurred in the meantime many companies were now in the condition to put up private CCTV systems for the protection of their premises in the industrial parks, so the administration could now plan a system that would only focus on areas in the city centre without running the risk of facing the opposition of those same associations. Consisting of 20 cameras connected to two control rooms, one located at the *Questura*\(^{15}\) and the other at the local police station, the video surveillance system was, according to the project, only going to cover areas in the city centre, with the location of the cameras chosen after consultations between local and state police. At this stage it was also proposed that both police forces (national and local) be jointly responsible for the daily management of the system. Overall, the system would cost 450000\(€\), of which 40000\(€\) granted by the region.

**Problems**

However, in spite of the claims of the then-current administration of how video surveillance was going to be functional to the goals of the security policies it adopted, and the approval of a project in the summer of 2004, once again plans for a CCTV system were put on hold until 2007 as, in the words of the deputy chief of the local police, “suddenly the administration lost all its interest in the project; the decided to focus on other things and video surveillance was simply left behind”. Along with this, other factors strongly contributed to the stop.

After the plan was first approved, it was commonly understood that the project would be carried out by a publicly-owned instrumental company in which the municipality has shares, but soon the problem arose on whether such an assignment would impinge on the possibility of a fair competition between contractors, thus violating competition laws in the process. People involved in the project did not know exactly what path to follow, so everything was put on hold while the issue was investigated more thoroughly. Were the suspect that the assignment had not been transparent to emerge,  

\(^{15}\) State Police Headquarters.
the entire project would have been forcibly stopped, a risk the administration was not wiling to take.

Juridically, we had to study how to call for tenders the right way because at the time we didn’t really know how to do this without violating European laws... and clearly this took some time.
Former deputy chief of the local police of Central City

Another burning issue was privacy, as in those years it still was not clear where the boundaries laid that local administrations had to respect in terms of citizens’ right to privacy. While, since the end of the 1990s, video surveillance had rapidly spread throughout Italian cities, relevant legislation had lagged behind so many administrations implemented video surveillance systems unsure as to what they could or could not do privacy wise, and in fact many of the first experiments appeared in Italian cities in those years were later sanctioned by the Garante per la privacy\(^{16}\) on the grounds of their illegitimacy.

This state of things is testified by the foreword to the first general provision on video surveillance, issued in April 2004, which reads:

The Garante considers it appropriate to update and supplement its provision of 29th November 2000 (...) [partly because] in the three years following implementation of the above provision\(^{17}\) several cases were submitted to the Authority via complaints, reports and requests for opinions, pointing to the increasingly frequent use - often in breach of the law - of audiovisual equipment to continuously acquire images - at times in association with sound - related to identifiable individuals; the relevant data are often recorded and stored as well.\(^{18}\)

The former deputy chief of the local police of Central City was particularly aware of this pitfall and, in order to avoid it, decided to collect evidence of the best practices used in other cities for their systems and, where possible, to adapt and copy them for the system they were planning to put together in Central City:

\(^{16}\) The Italian data protection authority. Hereafter: the Garante.

\(^{17}\) Decalogue on video surveillance, issued by the garante on 29 November, 2000. Available in Italian at: http://www.garanteprivacy.it/garante/doc.jsp?ID=31019

\(^{18}\) First general provision on video surveillance, foreword. Available in English at: http://www.garanteprivacy.it/garante/doc.jsp?ID=1116810
I paid attention to how these systems were planned in other cities, I was already a member on the Italian Forum on Urban Security so I had lots of contacts and it was really helpful to compare the experiences of other cities, like Bologna and Florence... We decided to focus on features that the Garante had explicitly approved, appreciated... (...) We really tried to put to good use the best practices that other cities had come up with and also to avoid the mistakes others had already made.

Former deputy chief of the local police of Central City

Strictly linked to this, and an equally important factor in the delaying of the project, is the fact that, until the modifications introduced in August 2008, the notion of urban security was not clearly defined in the legislation and, as such, was virtually indistinguishable from public security, the provision of which was, and still is, firmly in the hand of the central government. Specifically, the problem the municipality of Central City was facing was how to launch initiatives in the field of security without stepping onto the competences attributed to state police, which would render them illegitimate. In order to overcome this obstacle, as the debate on video surveillance went on it was initially decided that the system would have two control rooms, as the involvement of the police in the project would make all the reservations about the legitimacy of the plan superfluous. However, because of the numerous interruptions the project suffered during its planning phase, when it was time to move on to its execution these precautions were no longer necessary, as a decree from the Ministry of Internal Affairs had, by then, finally introduced a definition of urban security into Italian legislation19. This serves to explain why, when the then-state police commissioner was no longer able to secure funding for the creation of the second control room to be located in the Questura the project was not halted, because by then the local police was institutionally entitled to manage the system independently.

A new start

After a lengthy interruption, plans for a video surveillance system in Central City were revived in the summer of 2007 when the City Council decided to relaunch the project, though with substantial modifications in light of the years passed since the original submission. Between December of that year and the following March the project finally

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came together, with three subsequent drafts submitted both to the City Council and to the then-deputy chief of the local police so as to gather their considerations; during this phase the core features of the system were mainly defined, with the exception of minor modifications that were to be made during the construction works. The first draft was presented at the beginning of December 2007; while the overall plan was for a city-wide video surveillance system of 45 cameras that would cover both the city centre and the outskirts, from the very beginning this was divided into two smaller projects to make it financially sustainable for the municipality. One section included 11 cameras covering the city centre and would be the first one to be built and activated, while the second segment of the overall system would only be built when additional funding would become available. To this day though, because of the lack of financial resources, plans for the expansion of the system are still halted indefinitely.

The draft detailed the construction of the city centre portion of the system, initially consisting of 11 dome cameras which could be managed from two control rooms, located respectively in the local police station and the Questura. At such an initial stage, it was already explicitly mentioned that this would only be a first stage, as the system was designed to be easily expandable with the future addition of further cameras, more operators and other control rooms. During this phase two of the cameras belonging to the second step were also supposed to be activated. According to the project, the official goals of the system were three-fold: the protection of public property, the prevention and repression of illegal activities and the management and possible improvement of traffic flows; the plan included a motion detection system for the automated search of the images recorded and was supposed to become active in June 2008. The whole project was framed in terms of a quality of life initiative, where security was coupled with a concern for city habitability and environmental healthiness, while particular attention was made to lessen the impact of the system both environmentally and visually, with efforts made to adapt the characteristics of the cameras to those of the built environment. Because the draft precedes the definition of the concept of urban security that occurred with a decree of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in August 2008, it clearly states that state actors are those with the exclusive responsibility for the maintenance of public security, public order and the fight against crime, while the scope

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20 As the state police-run control room was to be put up by the police itself and not the municipality, it was not included in this project.
of action of local actors is very narrow, limited as it is to initiatives for the social prevention of disadvantage and the promotion of a better quality of life in the urban area. Throughout the draft, an ongoing narrative of efficiency unfolds; even at this early stage there is a shared assumption that the implementation of the video surveillance system will save the city money, because the system will allow for a more rational allocation of policing resources, while the technological infrastructure necessary for the system would also be used for the electronic transmission of documents and data between different offices and departments.

Both the second and the third, and final, draft only introduced minor modifications, leaving the main features of the plan unchanged; nevertheless, worthy of mention is that the activation date was put off to the end of September 2008 and the 2 cameras belonging to the second phase were dropped from the final plan. The total cost of the project was set at 980000 €, of which 460000 € for the first operational phase.

After the final project was approved by the relevant municipal departments and the former deputy chief was officially appointed as referent for the whole project in April 2008, construction works were supposed to start right away; however, once again the project was stopped, only to be resumed at the beginning of 2009. This time, though, the interruption had more solid grounding, as in spite of the optimistic claims scattered throughout its pages and the activation date set to the following September, the final draft was seriously underdeveloped and it took several months and much effort to draw a plan that would detail precisely the construction works necessary for the implementation of the system. The executive plan was finalised in January of the following year, with the addition of a further camera to the system, thus bringing the total up to twelve, in return for the free concession of the placement of an antenna for the transmission of the wi-fi signal used by some of the cameras on the rooftop of a hotel. For some time prior to the discussion on video surveillance in fact, the management had been reporting acts of vandalism occurring in a hidden area behind the main building, which had seen them both increasingly concerned and increasingly dissatisfied with the attempts of both state and local police to curb the problem. The placement of the camera was thus seen by them as a way to tackle the issue and, by police officers, as a way of dealing with future requests for intervention without much trouble. In March, the regional agency for environmental protection approved the level

21 Security, ICT, Finance, Development.
of the emissions of electromagnetic radiation generated by the system and the company which had successfully bid for the tender regarding the first portion of the project was officially authorised to start construction works throughout the city. The system was finally activated on 1st December 2009. On the same day the local police officially adopted a code of conduct regulating the use of the video surveillance system.

**Summary**

The key points emerged in the accounts offered by those involved in the setting up of a city-wide video surveillance system in Central City can be summarised as follows.

As far as financing is concerned, the inception of the project saw the administration looking into the possibility of establishing a public-private partnership between the municipality and entrepreneurial associations in order to provide the two industrial parks of the city with video surveillance, in an attempt to curb more effectively the cases of theft and trespassing that had been reported in the area. This falls in line with the general trend towards the creation of partnerships and of business improvement districts (BIDs) and with the shared assumption that the introduction of private capital into the public sector helps to overcome the shortcomings and the inefficiencies in the way public actors, notably local administrations, allocate goods, while at the same time providing much-needed relief to cash-strapped municipalities. In the field of video surveillance, the most famous instance of this drive are the “City Challenge Competitions” launched by then-Home Secretary Michael Howard between 1994 and 1998 in the UK, where in order to access funding “local partnerships would have to demonstrate matched funding from other sources, particularly business contributions” (Norris, McCahill and Wood, 2004: 111). However, the case of Central City appears to be much more limited, both in its ambition and its results. In spite of the decision of the municipality not to spend public money on the protection of private premises, a position which was made perfectly clear during the initial discussions with representatives from entrepreneurial associations, in the end the administration was never able to secure funding from them, which eventually led to the abandonment of the whole plan. It is arguable that in this instance companies did try to free ride, and that it is because of their unwillingness to participate in a public scheme that those areas are now covered by
a number of isolated private systems, while a more organised form of control is, to this
day, lacking.

Another important feature emerging from the documents detailing the origins of the
system is the economic justification underlying the whole project. From the very
beginning it was claimed that the system would save the city money that could then be
redirected to other sectors. However, this claim is particularly hard to put under
scrutiny. To begin with, in the several drafts submitted to the administration a proposal
was advanced of using the network that was going to be put in place not only for video
surveillance, but also as a tool to increase digital communications between offices and
departments scattered throughout the city. Admittedly, it was hoped that such a move
would result in a partial decrease in the overhead costs sustained by the administration
and in a new boost towards greater efficiency. However, once the system went live it
was decided that the network would be dedicated to video surveillance on an exclusive
basis, in an attempt to lessen the chance of the network being, either voluntarily or
involuntarily, violated and the images being released to unauthorised personnel. As
stated in the security policy protocol adopted by the Municipal Police:

*The images recorded by the cameras are transmitted via a proprietary network, using
both optical fibres and wireless technology, exclusively dedicated to this service. The
transmission of data is digital and code encrypted. The system is not connected to any
public network of telecommunications.*

When we consider the ordinary functioning of the video surveillance system in light of
its supposed money-saving quality, new contradictions do emerge. During the analysis
of the drafts and other relevant documentation produced in relation to the creation of a
video surveillance system in Central City and in the course of interviews with city
administrators, it became clear that two conceptually distant dimensions were often
collapsed into one; namely, if video surveillance acts as a replacement for patrolling
officers or, rather, as a tool in support of traditional policing activities, with this
unresolved dilemma lingering heavily on what the municipality thinks of video
surveillance and the goals that it can help to accomplish. Were the replacement strategy
chosen, it is perfectly legitimate to say that a camera is less expensive than an officer,
though, such a formulation is, probably intentionally, incomplete, as it is the *marginal*
cost of adding a new camera to an already existing system that pales in comparison to
the costs incurred for training and hiring a new police officer. However, if we move
from marginal to overall costs incurred for setting up the system in the first place this position clearly reveals itself as untenable. In the case of Central City, around 550000 € have been spent so far for construction works related to the video surveillance system, from the laying of the optical fibre cables to the positioning of wi-fi antennas for the repetition of the signal, the buying of the cameras to the setting up of the control room. The second phase of the project, currently on hold because of the lack of funding, is deemed to be slightly more expensive. Also, we cannot fail to mention that, like any device, a surveillance system can break down or be intentionally damaged and tends to become old quickly, which opens the way to other expenses for maintenance and technical assistance, along with the mid and long term investments necessary to keep the system updated and fully functional.

Interestingly, this unresolved tension between the poles of replacement and support goes much further than the borders of Central City, and is reflected in the relation between the municipality and the central government. In an attempt to respect the budgetary constraints imposed to EU members, national authorities decided for a hiring freeze in public employment both at the national level and for local authorities. This has resulted in a chronic shortage of personnel for police forces, both national and local ones, throughout the country, and in a general lack of the economic and technological resources necessary to provide effective policing. Understandably, such a situation left the government in an extremely vulnerable position as to its efforts to guarantee security to the population, especially in consideration of the relevance of the topic of security in its rhetoric, which is partly why the decision in 2008 to launch a special fund for the co-financing of initiatives in the field of urban security was given extensive coverage in Italian media. In 2009, the plan, whose main proponent was the previous Minister of Internal Affairs Roberto Maroni, who turned urban security into one of the main areas of concern and intervention of the Ministry, provided co-financing to projects presented by local administration; however, funding cannot be used to hire new staff, but only to improve the technical equipment of municipalities and police stations. Particular relevance is given to the expansion of video surveillance throughout the territory, with cameras listed as one of the key areas of intervention in the decree announcing how funds were going to be allocated following the first call for projects in 2009:

*The Minister of Internal Affairs, Roberto Maroni, has signed the decree for the allocation of funds for projects presented by municipalities in the field of urban security.*
and law enforcement. (…) The fund has been partially used to (…) implement interventions in the field of urban security, with particular reference to the activation or the expansion of video surveillance systems.\footnote{Press release from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 10 dec. 2009. Available in Italian at: \url{http://www.interno.it/mininterno/export/sites/default/it/sezioni/sala_stampa/comunicati/comunicati_2009/0568_2009_12_10_Comunicato_100_milioni_Fondo_Sicurezza.html_1375993315.html}}

It can then be said without much trouble that, at the national level, video surveillance is seen as a tool that can effectively replace officers on active duty so much so that, while resources are not available for hiring officers, funds are quite generously allocated for technology-based projects which, as it is implicitly communicated, can provide comparable levels of security at a cheaper price. However, the reality of Central City tells a quite different story. Both police personnel and political staff strongly reject the proposition that video surveillance alone can make up for the lack of officers on active duty and for dwindling resources, all the while maintaining a more reasonable attitude on what video surveillance can realistically accomplish than their counterparts in Rome.

As the former mayor of Central City said:

\textit{At a certain point the situation became more complex: on one hand we had the tension between control and privacy and on the other the fact that video surveillance was more and more considered not as an additional element, but as a replacement for other things. Personally, if I think about my experience as mayor (…), I believe this approach is weak… I mean, video surveillance works if we have human resources to match it, to use it effectively, otherwise if we think of it as a replacement then security is no longer tangible.}

\textit{Former mayor of Central City}

This mirrors almost to the word what the \textit{assessore alla sicurezza}\footnote{The Italian position of \textit{assessore} refers to a member of the executive council of decentralised governing bodies (i.e. local authorities). In cities with a resident population larger than 15000 (as is the case with both Central and Northern City), the person who is appointed as one does not necessarily have to be an elected city councillor, as the mayor can choose the most suitable candidate for the post. However, because the position is incompatible with that of councillor, if one is appointed as \textit{assessore}, he/she has to resign from the position of councillor. As there is no exact equivalent of this position in the British or American system, I have decided not to translate it.} in the current administration said during his interview:
CCTV must support both the local and the national police, and that’s it. We never set out to use video surveillance to overcome the lack of police personnel. Current assessore alla sicurezza in Central City

These excerpts open the door to other considerations which go beyond a purely economic point of view to assess if a camera can at all replace an officer on the beat, both in relation to the prevention of misconduct and criminal offences and the expectations of citizens and their perceptions of security levels in a given area. However, as already seen in the literature review, it is hard to say if a given video surveillance system “works”, especially in a place like Central City, where the bare fact that, according to maintenance and repair workers24, vandalism had decreased in the city centre was considered undeniable proof that video surveillance works and was, as such, worthy of further investments on the part of the municipality.

A final note worthy of mention is the fact that all the interviewees maintained a clear-cut distinction between publicly-run and privately-owned video surveillance systems and the different goals they pursue; whereas the former are focused on prevention and deterrence, the latter are mainly used by their owners to gather evidence in case of something happening on their premises. Once again, the former mayor of the city offers a meaningful passage:

I believe we have to think of video surveillance as comprising two different kinds of systems; one is private and is used as a way to gather evidence in case something has happened after the event has taken place, while the other is public and is, or should be, mainly targeted at prevention and deterrence and, if necessary, at quick interventions on the scene. In order to do this, however, it is necessary that we do not have too many cameras to look at and that, previously, an agreement has been reached on where the problematic areas in the city are. Former mayor of Central City

This is something that will be discussed in greater detail later on, as the observations carried out in the control room of the system will help us to see if this distinction is maintained in the daily use of the system. What we can already say is that two contradictions clearly emerged, one referring to the supposed money-saving and officer-replacing qualities of video surveillance, and the other relating to video surveillance as a

24 I tried to contact the director of the municipal department for maintenance and public works in Central City to see where this claim came from and if specific data was, to this end, collected, but he never agreed to an interview.
tool for prevention or, rather, the apprehension of suspects. Fieldwork will provide the data needed to assess whether these impact on the daily use of the system on the part of police officers.
6. The story of video surveillance in Northern City

The evolution of a structure

The possibility of implementing a city-wide system of video surveillance in Northern City was first discussed between the end of 1999 and the beginning of the following year. This followed the development of a new traffic plan for the city, devised soon after the arrival of the newly appointed chief of the local police. However, it was not until 2004 that talks moved further, when a new assessore alla sicurezza was appointed in the person of interviewee N_P1. Significantly, N_P1 has been working for the last ten years for a company specialising in the development and distribution of technology solutions applied to security and mobility.

Things really started moving in the fall of 2004, when I was appointed. I have been working in the development of technologies for security and mobility in this company for ten years now, so I really believed that, in spite of the few resources we had available at the time, a technological support could be a valid and useful tool for the local police in their interventions and everyday activities.

Former assessore alla sicurezza of Northern City

Once the municipality had agreed on the project and funds were made available, though, a new problem emerged, as it had to be decided who would be responsible for the planning and the implementation of the system. While strongly supportive of the scheme, the local police had no intention of actively participating in this phase. Rather, it saw its contribution as limited to the definition of the purposes the system would have to serve once implemented, with top officers well aware that within the force the necessary technical competences were missing.

Our role [as Local Police] was fundamental in the finalisation of the system... I mean, we knew we didn’t have the technical competences to decide what kind of characteristics the cameras should have, but we had very clear in mind what we wanted.

Former chief of the local police of Northern City

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25 See footnote no. 23.
Other, more mundane considerations also helped to inform this decision. As the deputy commissioner who acted as the liaison officer between the police and the municipality throughout the duration of the project points out in the following passage:

*At the time, the question was if it would be convenient for us to acquire internally the administrative and technical competences necessary to do this thing, when we knew from the start that, at best, we would be doing this one, maybe twice a year. From our point of view, it was nonsense. You cannot put people onto this, organisationally there’s no way this is going to make sense, and then you have to consider that you’d likely have to face controversy because people do not want to have officers bound to a desk, but on active duty in the city.*

*Former deputy commissioner of the local police of Northern City.*

The same competences could not be found in the various departments of the municipality, either, so time was spent in the identification of a body suitable to take on these responsibilities. In this respect, the fact that the decision to implement a video surveillance system in Northern City came at a time when a number of cities had already implemented one in their territory, allowed the administrators to look at what others in their situation had done. Accordingly, it was decided to copy the best practices that were around at the time. Again, the professional experience of interviewee N_P1 proved invaluable, as that had exposed him to the variety of experiences mentioned above.

*The first problem that we had was deciding who was going to set this system up, because at the time I didn’t think we had the competences that we needed to do it. This made the whole operation a bit more complex, as politically we decided to put a society which is under the control of the municipality, called ***, that was previously only responsible for the network of public transportation, in charge of the whole process. We gave them other duties, too, with a model that I copied from other examples coming from all over the country. In my job it is common for us to deal with a controlled company rather than with the municipality. (...) We arrived late, but this allowed us to copy the good practices that other cities had adopted.*

*Former assessore alla sicurezza of Northern City*

At the end of this process, the company became responsible for the management of the project up until the moment when the system was activated. Taking its guidelines from the specifications coming from the administration, it organised the call for bids, selected the offers and, finally, awarded the contract, both for the first part of the system and its expansion. Both the administration and the police were satisfied with this choice, as it
enabled both parties to focus on their daily activities while the development of the project went on, though, admittedly, in a slow moving fashion. While initial talks took place in 2004, the first portion of the system was only activated at the end of the winter of 2007, just three months before the local elections that, incidentally, resulted in the defeat of the left-wing administration in office at that time and its replacement with a right-wing one.

*It was really a lengthy process, and we only activated it [the system] when our tenure was about to come to an end, but we really believed in the quality of the intervention and even more in the importance of the process that we had set into motion and that didn’t exist before. (...) I think this was a good result that I achieved in the time I was in office... (...) Before we started there was nothing, we really had to create the system from scratch, and that means passing bills, administrative actions... It was all about the evolution of a structure.*

Former assessore alla sicurezza of Northern City

**The first system**

Activated in May 2007, the first portion of the video surveillance system in Northern City comprised 23 cameras. Of these, 8 were previously part of a no-longer functioning CCTV system that had been positioned along the perimeter of City Hall. The cameras were all placed in the city centre; while seeking to contrast some of the problems that were specifically affecting that area, the choice also stemmed from the need to provide coverage for the most crowded areas of the city:

*As for the location, the choice was to focus on the presence... I mean, we thought that we should put cameras first where there are people.*

Former deputy commissioner of the local police

Police and administration alike agreed on the identification of the city centre as the starting point for the implementation of the system. However, the choice as to where exactly to locate every camera was left to the former, as the assessore acknowledged administrative personnel did not have the expertise to participate proactively to the process.

*The choice was made by a group of police officers that had been invested with this responsibility. We knew how much money we had and the number of cameras that we could afford, so I asked them to decide on what perspective we should adopt. For the*
first batch of cameras (...) Interviewee N4 was the one that was in charge of the list, [as] that was not something a politician should do.  
**Former assessore alla sicurezza of Northern City**

It was our choice, fundamentally. We had extensive knowledge of the territory, we knew where it would be possible to monitor the phenomena that we were interested in, because we were interested in urban security, but also in the possibility of monitoring traffic flows. Not many people think about that, but this is really a big part of what urban security is.  
**Former chief of the local police**

Significantly, one of the efforts of the administration was explicitly directed at taking the topic of urban security away from the political arena, so as to strip it of any party connotation or affiliation\(^26\). At the same time, the role of law enforcement agencies was brought to the fore, as its members were the only actors with the legitimate responsibility to fight crime and foster security. In a way, it was hoped that such an approach would downplay the relevance of the theme in the public debate and discourage third parties from any attempt towards its exploitation. This overall approach is clearly outlined in the words of both the mayor and the assessore of the time.

**Our global approach to security was based on some elements... Not on fear or on its aggravation. In those years, and still now, some political parties put their stakes on fear, on immigration, on crime. If we look at the data from the prefecture, *** is a quite safe city, and we never had to deal with the serious problems Milan has. (...) Our approach to security was never about crying wolf, or setting up groups of vigilantes or other things like that.**  
**Former mayor of Northern City**

Security-wise, respecting the institutions was paramount to us. I say this because I believe that security is not a political issue, but an institutional one and that there’s been an abuse, an exploitation of this theme for questionable goals. I don’t want to say anything harsher. From our point of view, we tried to maintain a very strong relation with law enforcement agencies, which in our republic are institutionally appointed to a role of security. (...) I believe it is fundamental that security remains under the wing of the institutions and not someone else’s, that it becomes a flag, something that people use for good and not so good things. (...) Our guiding criterion was lawfulness, and that applies to everyone.  
**Former assessore alla sicurezza of Northern City**

One of the consequences of the approach outlined above was that the very meaning of the notion of urban security was widened, so as to include in it phenomena that are

\[^{26}\text{In this regards, it has to be stressed how Northern City has always been a safe area, particularly if compared to neighbouring cities like Milan.}\]
usually not considered under this rubric. Thus, along with incivilities and minor misdemeanours, additional problems that came to be targeted through video surveillance were traffic and environmental violations. In turn, this strongly influenced how the system was initially planned and how and what it would be used for once activated. As traffic-related problems are a source of particular concern in the city, it was clear from the very beginning that the video surveillance system would have to play a part in tackling these. In this regard, while the number of car accidents was reduced through an extensive programme of road renovations, CCTV was mainly used to control the unauthorised entry of vehicles in the city centre, where car traffic is restricted. This is a peculiar choice, as, in cities where video surveillance is implemented, it is more common to control access to restricted areas through an automatic system for plate recognition.

We identified the crossroad where extensive monitoring was needed, possibly even with cameras. The first system (...) crossed the city centre from north to south as there we had a big problem with the enforcement of the pedestrianised zone. We couldn’t keep patrols on the spot day and night, so we just connected the main points of entry with a series of cameras. (...) The whole plan was all about traffic, mobility, and safer roads, though clearly the cameras have been useful for other things, too. (...) This was a positive side effect, which allowed us to keep other problems under control too, mainly related to urban decorum.

Former mayor of Northern City

Leaving traffic aside, other issues were, as the passage shows, considered residual. In the city centre, they could be identified in the presence of unauthorised street vendors and graffiti writers, with the former being a particularly relevant problem given the commercial vocation of the area. All the interviewees agreed that the activation of the system led to the almost complete elimination of this problem, as, particularly at the very beginning, vendors would be targeted quickly and with particular strength. As a result, at the time this research was conducted they had already moved towards the parking space surrounding the city hospital where, still, they are consistently targeted by patrols.

The dynamic is that when one street vendor arrives, the others follow. Cameras gave us the ability to see if someone was setting up the display, so we could immediately send a patrol, because the problem for us was that if you have 20 vendors the intervention... You cannot send two officers, it becomes a matter of security of the agents. The
possibility of acting just as the problem would present itself allowed us to tackle it before it spread.
Former assessore alla sicurezza of Northern City

At a cost of 250000 €, the whole project was entirely financed through the municipality’s own resources and put under the control of the local police. As for the carabinieri\(^\text{27}\) and the state police, they both had a client installed on their premises soon after the system was activated. This allowed them to see the images captured by the cameras with no delay, but gave them no possibility of controlling them. In regard to this, while there was never a problem with the circulation of footage, the management of the system was always thought of as something that should remain under the exclusive control of the local police. Because of a combination of factors, no one among police personnel and administrators ever cast doubts on who would end up running the system. First, the monetary allocation for the system was budgeted as destined to the renovation of the operational centre of the local police station. Second, it was possible to use the normative coverage provided by regional bill 4/03, which allowed forces other than state police to participate in the provision of security-related activities. The following excerpts account for these two separate perspectives:

\(\text{From the start, it was quite clear that we would be put in the charge of the system, mainly because there was no one else that could have done the job... We were also the ones that pushed to have the system implemented, so really this was never a problem. (…) We were the ones spending the money, so we would be those in charge.}
Former deputy commissioner of the local police

\(\text{At the time, the regional bill 4/03 had already made it possible to use private policing\(^\text{28}\) in certain areas of intervention. For the organisational model that the local police had set up, and because of the discussions we had had with the chief, the deputies and the whole staff, we were absolutely convinced that the operations centre should be the focal hub from which all the initiatives could be controlled. Personally, I always thought we should leave it under the responsibility of the police.}
Former assessore alla sicurezza

From the very beginning, it was clear that the system should be expandable and conceived as part of a growing network of technological tools used for the control of traffic flows and mobility and the provision of security. Throughout the planning phase,

\(\text{27\ }\text{Italian military police.}\)
\(\text{28\ Lombardy regional bill 4/2003, articles 34 and 35.}\)
interest in the project on the part of citizens and retailers grew sensibly. Many even asked for a camera to be placed in the close proximity of either one's house or shop, in the misplaced belief that it could be used as a private alarm system. The scarcity of resources available made it impossible for the administration to accommodate these requests; instead, a bill was drafted, introducing the possibility for private parties to integrate their cameras into the system. This was made conditional upon the public relevance of the proposed installation, so that it would not just be the expression of a private interest.

*If a private citizen lives in a listed building and this building is constantly vandalised with graffiti, the owner’s interest in the protection of his propriety matches the public interest in the maintenance of urban decorum and the fight against deterioration. As a consequence, in a case such as this, a private citizen would be allowed to intervene. This was done mainly to limit the number of requests we would receive, as we didn’t want cameras to become a must have... I understand that everyone would like their house to be safe and protected, but the resources we can use are always limited.*

Former chief of the local police

Basically, the publicly funded project would constitute a flexible foundation and provide the technological infrastructure onto which other cameras could be plugged into, so that, if someone wanted to add their camera, they could do so at their own expenses. Initially, it seemed that many were interested in the possibility; in the end, however, just three cameras were added.

*Retailers were asking for cameras to be placed everywhere, so we came up with a flexible system, an open one (...). The system was modular, so if someone wanted to they could become part of it. Some people actually did, though it was just in three cases, while at the beginning it seemed like everyone would want to be part of that... (...) After a while, these things die out, it is all about gut feelings... it’s fear, it’s fear, and we have to run in help... But, then, as soon as we try to share these responsibilities with private citizens, to involve them, they back off.*

Former mayor

**Widening the net**

As it has already been said, the system that was activated in 2007 was always considered as just the first step in the construction of a city-wide network of surveillance cameras. While the local elections held in May of that year resulted in a change of administration, with a new mayor and a centre-right majority in the city
The two schemes described here comprise 47 cameras. The remaining six make up a system for the control of accesses to a very large park located at the outskirts of the city centre; though forming an autonomous system, they are nevertheless remotely connected to the same control room. Plans have also been made for a further expansion of the network, but, at the time this research was conducted, the project had been forcibly put on hold because one of the companies that had participated in the bid decided to appeal against the final decision.
The following passage neatly summarises how a consideration of the political opportunities involved did play a considerable part in informing the choices made in such a sensitive area, both while campaigning and after the victory:

*If we talk about our area, crime rates have been going down, but people’s perceptions go in the opposite direction. Four years ago, when we were campaigning, it really surprised me how people would come to talk about security. I had never thought Northern City could be compared to Chicago in the 20s and I should know, I was born here. But the thing is, people don’t like leaving the house after a certain hour. (...) We decided to follow this path because the request was so evident, that people wanted help, that we felt it was natural for us to go on along this path.*

*Current mayor of Northern City*

In relation to video surveillance, with the new administration the understanding of privacy also changed deeply. On one hand, the former mayor clearly linked the citizens’ right to privacy to a city that is welcoming, open and democratic, as can be seen in the following excerpt:

*I never though of video surveillance as a phenomenon of... I tried to work on the areas were we knew mobility was a problem, but we never wanted to use it to invade the sphere of socialisation. I believe that the city, and I wrote this in my electoral programmes, should be open, for everyone and of everyone. I think we should never promote the idea that citizens are controlled, that there’s an eye watching over everything people do. I think this is a deterrent against democracy and against the responsibilisation of the individual. If you behave it’s not because there’s a camera, but because you are convinced of it, someone taught you so. (...) And anyway, we cannot conceive of a city in military terms.*

*Former mayor of Northern City*

However, the new administration overturned this approach, under the belief that if you have nothing to hide you have nothing to fear, as the saying goes. What became apparent in the course of the interview with the current mayor is how, in relation to surveillance, distinct dimensions are at times overlapped and overlapping. Because of this, while technological determinism can be identified as one of the major themes influencing the conversation, it is not always so easy to separate a discussion on CCTV in Northern City from other technologies that, though available, are not implemented by the local police. Additionally, the very idea of privacy as being under threat because of the growing diffusion of video surveillance system is rejected, with the concept itself

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30 Such as DNA testing and fingerprinting.
discarded as irrelevant. While one’s image is not considered as personal data relating to the individual, quite interestingly phone calls are, as became clear when wiretapping was mentioned in the course of the interview.

_Talking about video surveillance, I really cannot see what the problem is with it. Maybe what I’m saying is trivial, but realistic too, because if you are about town minding your own business and you’re not hurting anyone what do you care if someone’s watching you?_  
_Current mayor of Northern City_

This is accompanied by an unrealistic understanding of what goes on in the control room and, consequently, how the police use the system in their day-to-day activity. As it will be shown later in the research, a control room operator rarely focuses his/her attention on the cameras, so claims relating to the feeling of reassurance provided by knowing that someone is watching what happens on the streets need, at best, to be radically reconsidered. Clearly, this also impacts on the possibility of direct intervention by the officers in case of an emergency. Noticeably, in the course of the interview with the current mayor much of the discussion was informed by a rather bleak vision of human nature, with the conversation moving from elderly ladies being robbed on the street to the possibility of strangers attacking you while you are travelling by train. People are predators, social encounters are inherently dangerous and we need to protect ourselves; responsibilisation gives way to the need to defend oneself from other people.

**Bumps in the road**

Along with the shift in the priorities of the system, other more mundane issues hindered the smooth advancement of the scheme.

Before the proper planning started, the first decision that had to be made was on how the network would be connected, with the two possible alternatives being wi-fi or fibre connectivity. When the geographical characteristics of the area do not require the forced adoption of one of the two possibilities, a wireless network is a less expensive solution, as there is no need to lay cables. As a result, this solution is usually favoured by administrations which are trying to implement a video surveillance system on a tight budget.
We didn’t have that much money to spend, so for us the video surveillance system had to be something that could be included as part of another project, a by-product of it. (...) The choice of the technology was really forced on us. I don’t dig up the whole city to lay down the fibres for a video surveillance system. The costs were beyond us, honestly. So we went wireless.

Former deputy commissioner of the local police of Northern City

Once it became clear to the administration what kind of system they wanted to implement, the call for bids was published so that potential contractors could apply. As said above, the whole procedure was managed by a society whose ownership rests in the hands of the municipality; however, this shift of responsibilities was not enough to guarantee the smooth running of the process. Law dictates that call for bids published by local authorities and other public bodies must abide to norms of transparency and fairness and be open to contractors based in any EU member state. While the procedure is precisely detailed, in Northern City problems arose in relation to the video surveillance system for every instalment of the project, with consequent delays in the activation of each portion of the overall network. When fieldwork started in January 2011, works were supposed to be on their way for the most recent addition to the system; however construction was later slated for the fall of 2011.

Bureaucratically, a call for bids issued by a public body is always, always problematic. When you are running a public body you cannot buy what you want, everything has to be advertised and this takes time. This is one of the biggest differences between private companies and public administrations.

Former chief of the local police of Northern City

In the course of the interviews this emerged as an extremely common problem for the municipality, both generally and also specifically in relation to the construction of the CCTV system. For each of the two expansions approved by the administration, the contractor getting second place after the company winning the job appealed against the decision; while the appeal was always reject by the competent judiciary authority, as a result the completion of each scheme was quite consistently delayed.

We never had a call for bid that someone did not appeal against... It's really insane when you have to govern and deal with all this, it almost seems as if... If you do things the wrong way, it's only fair that someone forces you to correct your mistakes, but we... Appeals have always been rejected, but in some cases it took a year and a half to get the whole thing clear.

Current mayor of Northern City
Once the system was activated a new series of problems emerged, related to the characteristics of the room where the control room was housed. While a more detailed description will be offered in the section presenting the observations there conducted, what can be said here is that the problem is openly acknowledged by high and low ranking officers alike, though no one believes much can be done about that:

Our police station is located in a rented building that was not designed to house anything of this sort, so as a result there is a series of important structural limits to it. And our force has been having this problem for the last 30 years. For the last 30 years we’ve been told that next year we’ll move to a new station. Then every year we stay where we are.
Former chief of the local police of Northern City

Finally, we can conclude this section with a final remark on the issue of the maintenance of the system. Again, a more detailed analysis will be presented in the prosecution of the work; for now it suffices to say that, in spite of its relevance, the problem is not properly addressed but rather seen as one of the areas where it is possible to save money without much consequence. As a result, during the time spent in the control room, it was common for the system not to work properly and break down quite often, with assistance usually slow and poor in quality. Thus, it was a commonly shared hope among the interviewees that the company responsible for the implementation of the third portion of the system would be able to take the matter in its hands and overturn this quite sorry state of things.

A map of the system

Presented below is a map of the CCTV system in Northern City. Blue pins are for the first batch of cameras, while pink ones are for the expansion activated in the summer of 2009.
Figure 5 – CCTV system in Northern City

Figure 6 – CCTV cameras in the city centre
7. National to local: new powers, new narratives, new regulations.

Introduction

Italy is a latecomer in the use of CCTV in public areas (Fonio, 2006). In order to address the question of such delay, it is necessary to take a step back and look at the peculiar process that resulted in the issue of urban security gaining currency in public discourse. As opposed to what happened in other countries, this development took place decidedly late. For long, organised crime and domestic terrorism had monopolised the attention of authorities and citizens alike, with feelings of insecurity generally conveyed into a collective demand for greater participation (Pavarini, 1994). “Security became a burning issue very swiftly in the early 1990s in the midst of a political rather than economic crisis; it was not so much the social state that was failing, rather the political and institutional foundations of the First Republic” (Pavarini, 1997: 81). As such, it was only then that concerns started to emerge about the dangerousness of urban life in the country (Selmini, 1999). These preoccupations were instrumental in sparking political and legislative processes which, taken together, opened up a space of autonomy where local authorities could play a proactive role in the provision of security to citizens. Before describing this development in greater detail, though, two further points need to be made. First, it is significant that the issue of urban security was at first tackled by progressive rather than conservative forces, with right-wing parties not exploiting it for electoral gain, nor including it in their programmes. As a testament to this, one of the first initiatives of note was the Città Sicure (Safe Cities) programme launched in 1994 in Emilia Romagna, traditionally a stronghold of the Italian left. Second, from the very beginning urban security came to be seen as one of the issues at stake in the dispute between the central state and local authorities in relation to the distribution of competences between different institutional levels, and was as such interpreted. Thus, it is my claim that the diffusion of video surveillance in Italy was, on one hand, possible thanks to a broader process of reconfiguration of state sovereignty, where powers were progressively shifted from the national government to local authorities. On the other, this rearrangement has to be considered along with the claims on the state of
emergency in the country, promoted by the centre-right coalition that was in power for most of this last decade\textsuperscript{31}, which turned the claims on the dangerousness of Italian cities into a widespread preoccupation. As a result, most regions passed laws aimed at the promotion of integrated systems of security in their cities, while an explicit \textit{right to security} first appeared in Italian legislation. However, in spite of the proactive role of regional governments, the regulation of CCTV to this day remains strongly centralised.

\textbf{The reconfiguration of state sovereignty}

The modern notion of sovereignty was first elaborated in the 16\textsuperscript{th} and 17\textsuperscript{th} centuries in the works of Jean Bodin and Thomas Hobbes. Writing in an age characterised by extreme social unrest, they were mainly concerned with the establishment of an authority which would be able to maintain public order over a given territory. About 300 years later, Max Weber provided a fundamental contribution to our understanding of the concept with his claim that the state is identified by its successful exercise of “the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (Weber, 2007: 78).

Along with their responsibility for peace and the maintenance of public order through the use of force, in the course of time states have acquired a new series of obligations that were once discharged by other institutions. However, the inclusion of an ever wider array of functions such as “the guarantee of sound money to the economy, the assurance of clear, judicially interpreted rules regarding the basic exchanges of property between buyers and sellers, lenders and borrowers” (Strange, 1996: xii) and the provision of education and healthcare to its citizens did not proceed smoothly. Rather, it was instrumental in sparking a “crisis in the relationship of the state to the wider society” (Hirst, 2000: 280), as the increased expectations of people made it harder and harder to satisfy the growing demand for advanced provisions.

Politically, all these processes did reverberate in the loss of centrality of the national scale, and the corresponding shift of powers, both downwards and upwards. The downscaling of governance can be seen in the “growing diffusion of authority to other institutions and associations, and to local and regional bodies” (Strange, 1996: 4) that

\textsuperscript{31} Being the leader of the centre-right coalition that won the general elections in 2001, Silvio Berlusconi was Italy’s Prime Minister from 2001 to 2006, and once again from May 2008 to November 2011.
has emerged from the weakening of the authority and regulatory powers of states. This redistribution is evident in areas that were previously under the strict control of the state and that, today, are regulated by other institutions, either public or private. The restructuring of welfare state processes that ensued is marked by two distinctive features: the increased reliance on practices for the governing of individuals from a distance, and the responsibilisation of subjects that have to take upon themselves those duties that were previously discharged by the state (O’Malley, 1996). The field of crime control is another case in point. In his work, Garland (1996, 2001) links what he believes has proven to be an unsustainable notion of sovereignty to the late modern state’s “inability to deliver the expected levels of control over crime and criminal conduct” (Garland, 2001: 110) especially in light of rising crime rates. Among the key trends in the institutional answers elaborated to face them, Garland identifies the alienation of state responsibility, as mirrored in the creation of public-private partnerships with other relevant actors – be them groups of citizens, business associations or economic firms. Essentially, what is attempted is the prevention and fight against crime through the redistribution of the task of crime control itself. Accordingly, “the state ceases to be the directive core attracting to itself a monopoly of functions and, instead, begins to shed or share many activities and responsibilities” (O’Malley and Palmer, 1996: 141), thus using its limited powers to steer others into action (Rose, 2000). According to Rose, at the core of this transformation lies a double movement of “autonomization and responsabilization”. In light of this process, “the state is no longer (…) required to answer all society’s needs”, with other subjects having to “take on themselves – as ‘partners’ – a portion of the responsibility” (1999b: 476).

A reason for the relevance of the case presented in this work is that the analysis of the Italian case partially challenges this picture. Both Garland and the governmentality literature quoted above are explicit in linking the sovereignty crisis faced by the state to the rise to prominence of new, non-public actors, engaged in the provision of services that were previously discharged by the state, either independently or in partnership with public authorities. For one, “this willingness to blend public and private provision has begun to affect policing, as the public police have been encouraged to recognize and cooperate with their counterparts in the rapidly growing private sector police” (Garland, 2001: 117). At the same time, other instances of the same general process can be
identified in the rise to prominence of the third sector in health and social services (for the UK, see: Powell, 1999), and the role played by business improvement districts (BIDs) in urban regeneration programmes (Ward, 2006). In regard to this issue, Italy offers a dramatically different situation, characterised by the marked inactivity of private actors. While a substantial reconfiguration of the notion and reach of state sovereignty is currently underway in the country, this process has so far remained steadily managed and controlled by public actors, although located at different territorial scales of government. As such, the resulting picture differs to a degree from what is accounted for in the literature, thus supporting the claim that, as far as Italy is concerned, the crisis of sovereignty faced by the central state is, more precisely, how this is being reconfigured to accommodate the establishment of a new type of relationship between the state and local authorities.

In light of the difficult process of national unification, for more than a century the topic of regional autonomy was not on the political agenda in Italy and local authorities simply did not exist. Though created in 1947, regions only became fully functioning administrative bodies in 1970, when local councils were elected for the first time. Whereas until then in Italy political power was not distributed and only emanated from the central government, this event marked the first step in a process of administrative decentralisation that lasted three decades. Between 1970 and 1972, in fact, the statutes laying out the principles according to which each region was to be governed were approved, and the distribution of competences between the state and local authorities was regulated for the first time. A few years later, between 1975 and 1977, a new round of legislation conclusively settled the matter, with article 117 of the Italian constitution listing the areas of intervention that fell under regional competence. What was left out was, consequently, a state prerogative, in a model consistent with the centralised organisation of Italy at that time. This process culminated with the passing of law 59/1997 which substantially modified the relation between the state and local authorities, moving as decidedly towards decentralisation as it was possible without changing the constitution.

This long path can be seen as part of a general reformative process seeking to simplify and rationalise the organisation of the Italian state and its four levels of government: national, regional, provincial and urban. While the adoption of subsidiarity as one of the guiding principles of EU law did play a part in the process at hand, by the 1990s the
need for a radical reorganisation of the state also became a politically relevant issue, especially in light of the emergence of openly secessionist political parties. While some in the richest regions of the North of the country were particularly vocal about this issue, the same preoccupations were shared by many others for different reasons, as it was generally feared that the high costs of Italian politics would eventually prevent the country from joining the Euro. When combined, these very different agendas coalesced into the idea of the central state as an “unproductive mechanism” (Caravita, 2004: 2), which rapidly gained currency in the political discourse of the time. This sparked a process where attempts were thus made to include the principles of federalism into Italian legislation and move the decision-making process closer to citizens. As a first step, in 1999 the direct election of the president of the region was introduced. Two years later, in 2001, the left-wing government of the time passed a major reform that significantly modified the fifth chapter of the constitution, which regulates the relations between the central state and local authorities. The balance between the different levels of government was completely overturned, with the constitution now listing the duties reserved to national government and those in concurrent legislation, thus leaving everything else to the competence of each region. While this marked the end of centralised control on regional legislation and administration, its margins of discretion paved the way for institutional conflict, as the new formulation of article 117 is not always clear on who is responsible for what. Though “it is probably impossible to devise a list of powers that would take into account all contingencies” (Caravita, 2004: 4), as a result it was then left to the Constitutional Court to try to rationalise the distribution of roles and tasks between the different institutional levels concerned.

In 2004, an attempt to overcome this impasse was made by the then Minister for institutional reforms and devolution Umberto Bossi. In this capacity, he proposed a further series of modifications, which, if approved, would have accelerated the federal reorientation of the state. In the new institutional architecture that was to be introduced, sectors such as education and healthcare would have fallen under the exclusive competence of regions and a federal fiscal system would be created. However, the proposal did not pass a referendum held in June 2006, and was subsequently scrapped.

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32Founder and key figure of the Lega Nord, literally the Northern League. Federalist and a time secessionist political party rooted in the North of Italy, particularly in Veneto and Lombardy.
Overall, the result of the developments traced here has been the substantial empowerment of local authorities which, from an initial condition of substantial powerlessness, have progressively been given more and more powers and responsibilities in terms of the governing of people and the control of territory. In the following section, I will now move on to see what kind of discourses and ideas have contributed to shape this new space of autonomy.

**Emergency as a paradigm of government**

Emergencies arise when a particular event produces such a severe disturbance of the order and political system of a state that its very survival is threatened. In such cases, a *state of emergency* can be declared, in which military strategies and tactics are legally employed to prevent the complete disruption of the political system (Armitage, 2002). The key feature of such a state can be identified in the expansion of the powers of government and the conflation into one of the executive and legislative spheres, as witnessed in the possibility on the part of governments to “issue decrees having the force of law” (Agamben, 2005: 5). Thus, such a declaration is, essentially, of a conservative nature; the provision of special powers to an appointed authority can only be temporary so that, once the threat is neutralised, order and the division of powers can be restored. The “conservative purpose is [also] reflected in the fact that the executive is not permitted to use emergency powers to make any permanent changes in the legal/constitutional system” (Ferejohn and Pasquino, 2004: 211).

In consideration of the risky nature of this mechanism, however, advanced democracies do not necessarily choose to turn to specially appointed powers when dealing with an emergency. On the contrary, the declaration of a state of emergency has now given way to the consolidation of the abolition of the distinction between legislative and executive powers as a “normal technique of government” (Agamben, 2005: 14). Historically, the roots of this transformation can be traced back to the first world war, when emergency legislation became a common occurrence in belligerent and non-belligerent countries alike. Today, ordinary, though time-limited, legislation is rather used in most cases to delegate powers to the executive. In this respect 1970s Italy and Germany are cases in point, as at that time both countries passed special laws in order to face the threat posed by domestic terrorism. Ferejohn and Pasquino have taken this transformation into

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account in their development of a *legislative* model of emergency powers, where emergencies are handled “by enacting ordinary statutes that delegate special and temporary powers to the executive” (Ferejohn and Pasquino, 2004: 217). Their overall preoccupation here is for emergency powers to be understood as exceptional, so that once the crisis is overcome the ordinary division between powers can be reinstated and proper functioning of the state resumed.

In spite of the precautions, however, there are still risks involved. Even though special powers may not be appointed and the ordinary functioning of the political and legislative systems could be maintained throughout, “the laws made to deal with the emergency may become embedded in the legal system, essentially enacting permanent changes in that system under colour of the emergency. (…) If this happens, the *conservative* nature of emergency legislation will be lost: a permanent change in the legal system will have occurred in circumstances of emergency” (Ferejohn and Pasquino, 2004: 219. Emphasis in original.). This mirrors Agamben’s position, who sees the state of exception “as the dominant paradigm of government” (Kruger, 2005: 338) in today’s world. In his view, what was once an exception has become the rule, a “regular practice in the European democracies which has perhaps only today reached its full development” (Agamben, 2005: 13).

In this instance Italy is a case in point. Legislating by decree has always been a common practice of the executive, so much so that the country can be seen as “a true and proper juridico-political laboratory” (Agamben, 2005: 16) where the law-decree was first transformed into an ordinary source of legislative production. Significantly, in this regard there is a strong continuity between the monarchical, fascist and republican regimes, in that they all consistently resorted to (ab)use this possibility. As article 77 of the constitution states:

*The Government may not, without an enabling act from the Houses, issue decrees having the force of ordinary law. When in extraordinary cases of necessity and urgency the Government adopts provisional measures having the force of law, it must on the same day present said measures for confirmation to the Houses which, even if dissolved, shall be summoned especially for this purpose and shall convene within five days. The decrees lose effect from their inception if they are not confirmed within sixty days from their publication. The Houses may however regulate by law legal*
In spite of the limitations set by the constitution, governments have often used decrees to fast-track the passing of bills and, to this day, continue to do so. Such a practice is so common and widespread that “the democratic principle of the separation of powers has today collapsed and (…) the executive power has in fact, at least partially, absorbed the legislative power. Parliament is no longer the sovereign legislative body that holds the exclusive power to bind the citizens by means of the law: it is limited to ratifying the decrees issued by the executive power. (…) And it significant that though this transformation of the constitutional order (…) is perfectly well known to jurists and politicians, it has remained entirely unnoticed by the citizens” (Agamben, 2005:18). The formulation of article 77 also highlights the fundamental aporia that lies at the heart of the notion of emergency. Far from being an “objective given” (Agamben, 2005: 30), its declaration implies a subjective decision on the part of someone who believes that a certain problem represents a lethal threat to the existence of the state. Essentially, for circumstances to be declared an emergency someone needs to decide they are; thus, the objectivity of necessity comes to be couched in individual subjectivity.

In addition to using law-decrees to move power away from Parliament into the hands of the government, the previous executive (2008-2011) also exploited the idea of emergency as a discursive device to justify the introduction of legislation that explicitly targets minorities and provides special powers to local authorities and local police forces. Central to these developments is the claim that Italy is now facing a security emergency because of the increasing presence of immigrants in our cities. This development can be linked to the growing relevance of the Lega Nord since the early 2000s. As the political weight of the party was increasing, both in absolute terms and, more importantly, within its alliance to the Berlusconi-led Popolo della Libertà, the themes at the centre of its agenda – federalism, emphasis on policing and security, anti-immigration stance – started shaping both the national debate and, more importantly, the narrative that the PdL proposes to its electorate. As a result, the description of Italy as facing unprecedented levels of crime because of the ever-growing flows of immigrants coming to the country became an acceptable and commonplace narrative.

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33The English version of the Italian constitution is available on the website of the Chamber of Deputies. See: [http://english.camera.it/cost_reg_funz/345/346/listarticoli.asp](http://english.camera.it/cost_reg_funz/345/346/listarticoli.asp)
The two decrees\textsuperscript{34} that the government passed soon after taking office in April 2008 perfectly reflect this state of things. A state of emergency was first declared in the regions of Campania, Lombardy and Lazio, and then extended to the whole country because of the “extremely critical situation generated by the presence of numerous irregular and nomad foreigners who are permanently installed in urban areas” (Merlino, 2009: 11). Maintaining the same stance on immigration and diversity, the security package of 2008-2010\textsuperscript{35} went on to provide special power to authorities, both at the national and local level, in their fight against crime and immigration, both seen as a threat to ordinary people and their lives. In accordance with the discourse centred on the topics of crime and security that was shaped and exploited by the government, another measure contained in the security package established the so-called urban security fund for the financing of “urgent initiatives for the maintenance of urban security and public order” (Law 113/08, art. 61, section 18. My translation). With an endowment of €100m, the fund allocated resources to security-related projects throughout the country, mainly for the establishment of camps for nomadic populations (around €45m) and the implementation of open-street CCTV systems (around €29m).

On a general level, the package is based on the assumption that local authorities and administrators have a better knowledge of the problems a given territory is facing. As such, it provided mayors with increased discretionary powers in matters of public order and urban security in relation to situations of urban decay, drug dealing and prostitution, begging and other behaviours, either offensive to public decency or that endanger a safe access to public space. As is evident, not all the problems listed above are criminal offences; nevertheless, they came to be treated as such, thus providing a clear example of a governing-through-crime approach (Simon, 2007) to urban governance. The competences to be undertaken by local police forces, traditionally unarmed bodies occupied with traffic regulation, were also extended. This was much to the dismay of both the Polizia and the Carabinieri, respectively the civilian and military police forces to whom the enforcement of public order was previously assigned on an exclusive basis.

\textsuperscript{34}Decree of the president of the council of ministers, 21 May 2008 and decree of the president of the council of ministers, 25 July 2008.

The most serious implication of this set of measures has been the extension at the local level of emergency as a paradigm of government, with city bylaws now functionally equivalent to law-decrees. As such, this development is plagued by the problems already mentioned, namely that of the subjectivity of claims of emergency and the risks of institutionalisation of a mechanism that should only be used in exceptional circumstances.

This is all carried out under the justification of an incumbent threat to orderly life in Italian cities. Particularly in the North of Italy, mayors have, thus, been using their new powers to produce bylaws on a variety of issues, all formally related to the problem of urban security. However, as a study carried out by the National Association of Italian Municipalities shows (ANCI, 2009), the areas of intervention these bylaws target – prostitution, consumption of alcohol in public places, hooliganism, begging – are not exceptional in nature and as such should not call for the use of such an instrument. In the same way, in most cases no temporal limits are set for the provisions thus established. In light of these developments, it can be said that bylaws have effectively made it possible for legislative production by decree to become common at the local level, with mayors now effectively bypassing the city council, and the political plurality it reflects, while using their new discretionary powers to introduce permanent modifications to the local legislation.

**Standardisation**

In spite of the empowerment of local authorities, though, to this day the regulation of CCTV remains strongly centralised. Since its creation in 1996, the action of the Italian data protection authority has been instrumental in the transposition of the principles expressed in the European Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data of 1981 into national legislation. Thus, not only is its action relevant for the regulation of CCTV, but also in that it allowed for the legislative vacuum on the issues of privacy and data protection to be filled. This was achieved with the passing of law 675/1996 and the subsequent modifications introduced

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36 The region where mayors have been using bylaws more consistently is Lombardy (ANCI, 2009: 16).
37 Law 675/1996.
with legislative decree 196/2003; taken together, they contain the guiding principles that inform all Italian privacy laws. Essentially, these two bills introduced the notion that personal data must be protected and the processing must always respect the principles of lawfulness, minimisation and purpose specification. Data subjects have the right to know who stores information on them and who and why has access to it, and can ask for its update, rectification or erasure; on legitimate grounds, they can also object to their data being collected in the first place. However, if data are being processed by the police for reasons of public order or security, these rights do not hold. Video surveillance is only mentioned to encourage the adoption of codes of practice on the part of data controllers. A very important distinction is also made in relation to the nature – be it public or private – of the data controller, as public bodies can only process personal data if this falls within their institutional tasks. Private entities, on the other hand, always need the explicit consent of the data subject, unless the processing itself is instrumental to the satisfaction of a legal obligation on the part of the controller or to the resolution of a contract between the parties.

Turning our attention specifically to CCTV, since the release of the so-called decalogue in 2000, the Garante’s activity has been characterised by a strong regulatory drive, aimed at balancing the impetuous diffusion of video surveillance in the country with the protection of the privacy of citizens. As such, one of the threads connecting the national level of government to local authorities can be identified in the enforced standardisation via legal measures of the uses of CCTV.

Though municipalities had been using video surveillance systems in public areas for some time39 with law 675/96 as their legislative reference, it was not until the year 2000 that the Garante issued a decalogue specifically dedicated to CCTV, along with the recommendation that the legislative vacuum existing at the time be filled as soon as possible by the legislators. As the name suggests, this is a list of basic precautions to be respected when considering the implementation of a video surveillance system – the most important being the proportionality between the means employed and the ends pursued. The complete definition of a regulatory framework for video surveillance in

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39 In 1997 a group of councillors in Milan asked an opinion from the Garante on the implementation of a CCTV system in a city park where criminal activity had been on the rise. The Garante’s answer (in Italian) can be read at: http://www.garanteprivacy.it/garante/doc.jsp?ID=39849
Italy was achieved four years later, when the *Garante* issued the first general provision on video surveillance\(^40\) in April 2004.

The Provision described in detail the requirements applying to all video surveillance systems and, most importantly, defined the general principles to be respected. Briefly, they can be described as follows:

- **Lawfulness**: for public bodies, it means that they can only use video surveillance if this leads to the fulfilment of an institutional obligations;
- **Data minimisation**: as the installation of a CCTV system can limit people’s freedom and unduly influence their actions, video surveillance cannot be used in applications which are “unnecessary, excessive or redundant”\(^41\). Also, if the purpose of the system can be achieved through anonymous data, it will not be possible to use information relating to identifiable individuals;
- **Proportionality**: it indicates how “one should refrain from making what is simply the least expensive, easiest, or most rapidly applicable choice, which might fail to take into account the impact on other citizens’ rights and/or different, legitimate interests”\(^42\). Significantly, the bill stresses how the proportionality principle must be respected throughout the duration of the process regarding CCTV system, from the decision-making to the implementing stage. As such, systems cannot be installed in areas where there are no concrete risks and there is no need for deterrence, so that CCTV systems are to be used only if other measures are insufficient or have proved unfeasible. As far as the implementation is concerned, respecting the proportionality principle implies careful consideration on whether or not to use zooming, where to locate cameras and their viewing angle, what data to collect and how to process and store them and for how long to keep the images;
- **Purpose specification** which maintains that the purposes the video surveillance system serves must be specific, explicit and, of course, lawful.

As said, the bill also sets various requirements CCTV systems must satisfy. People must be given clear notice that they are about to enter an area where a video surveillance

\(^{40}\)For the English version of the provision go to: [http://www.garanteprivacy.it/garante/doc.jsp?ID=1116810](http://www.garanteprivacy.it/garante/doc.jsp?ID=1116810)
\(^{41}\) Paragraph 2, section 2.
\(^{42}\) Paragraph 2, section 3.
system is in place, through the use of clearly visible placards placed close to or within the area under surveillance. If there are deemed to be specific risks for the subjects’ freedoms, rights or dignity, as in the case of a system connected with other databases storing personal data, or that is able to index images so as to make automated and personal searches possible, or that implements dynamic forms of surveillance which allow the tracking of routes, the implementation of the system must be prior-checked by the Garante. In addition to this, data processors must always specify in written form who is in charge of the processing, who can use the equipment and who has access to the data; the employment of subcontractors carrying out part of the surveillance work is only possible if their duties are instrumental to and depend upon the decisions made by the controller. As far as data retention periods are concerned, “the amount [of time] must be proportionate to the degree of indispensability [of the data] and should be no longer than necessary”\textsuperscript{43}. The limit is set at 24 hours at the longest, but in particular cases, depending on technical factors or the dangerous nature of the activity carried out by the controller (e.g. a bank), it is allowed to store data for longer; however, any further extension must be considered exceptional and as such assessed. In accordance with the distinction introduced by the 2000 decalogue, the bill only allows public bodies to perform video surveillance if this is necessary to discharge an institutional function of theirs, maintaining the principles outlined before are respected.

The modifications introduced with law 38/2009, part of the so-called security package, prompted the Garante to replace the 2004 provision. As it was said above, municipalities are now institutionally responsible, in co-operation with national law enforcement agencies, for the provision of policing and the maintenance of urban security. Additionally, the law explicitly authorises them to set up CCTV systems to discharge these new functions. In light of these changes, a new general provision on video surveillance was released in April 2010. While the core principles remained unchanged, for one the updated version of the document acknowledges the technological advances occurred since 2004. CCTV systems that allow for the automatic detection of deviant behaviour or are coupled with technology that can collect and read biometric data must be prior-checked by the Garante before implementation. Security measures are also tightened, with the introduction of personal credentials for each of the operators managing a system suggested as a way to decrease the risk of loss,

\textsuperscript{43} Paragraph 3, section 4.
destruction or unauthorised access to the footage. Significantly, the data retention period is extended from 24 hours to 7 days, with a strong nod towards the automatic deletion of footage once the limit has passed. However, it has to be noted how the document makes it clear that this is only in order to integrate in the provision the modifications passed with law 38/2009:

*As regards municipalities, the images may not be retained for longer than “the seven days following collection of the information and images via video surveillance, subject to specific requirements”. This is based on recent regulatory provisions, and only applies to the use of video surveillance for protecting urban security. (Article 3.4)*

In case of necessity, data can also be retained for longer periods of time. However, it is necessary to file a request to the Garante in order to do so.

While some problems remain and are explicitly acknowledged in the letter of the new provision⁴⁴, nevertheless the present regulation clearly represents a source of standardisation in relation to the diffusion of video surveillance in the country. In relation to this claim, data culled from the fieldwork conducted in two control rooms will be used in the following sections of this work to investigate how this regulatory stream is implemented locally, and if there are variations in how CCTV is used on a daily basis.

**Funds**

As said above, the funding for the implementation of CCTV systems throughout Italy has so far mostly come from public sources. However, it is necessary to look into the origins of these flows of capital, as the actors involved and the wider frame within which each of them has made financial resources available to municipalities are, indeed, very different the one from the other. Because of this, I have grouped funding bodies into two separate categories, with the first comprising Italy and the EU and the second all the Italian regions which have active programmes for the funding of security-related projects.

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⁴⁴ For example, in relation to the definition of urban security the provision states: “it is not up to this DPA to define ‘urban security’ and set the operational scope of this type of security vis-à-vis ordre public” (section 5.1).
European and national funding

In order to correct the imbalances existing between richer and poorer regions in the EU, the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) funds projects under the three general objectives of the EU regional policy: convergence, competitiveness and territorial cooperation. As for convergence, projects in eligible regions must be aimed at the modernisation and diversification of economic structures, with actions to be taken in areas as diverse as innovation and entrepreneurship, risk prevention, culture and health, among others. Launched under the cohesion policy banner, the last two convergence programmes have seen the implementation of a series of actions strategically aimed at strengthening security in the regions of Southern Italy. The first operational programme, covering the years between 2000 and 2006, was called “security for the development of the Mezzogiorno” and included Sicily, Puglia, Campania, Calabria and Basilicata. Within the scope of this work, the priority area no.1 is of particular interest, as it provided funding for the “development and adaptation of information system and communication technologies for security”, with available resources amounting to 925’499’467 €, of which 472’570’305 € coming directly from the EU. The same operational programme, with the exclusion of Basilicata, was re-launched in 2007 as “security for development”, with one of the priorities for action being the implementation of measures to foster “security for economic freedom”. 49.5% of total investment was reserved for this line of intervention, with Italy and the EU contributing equally for 286’625’017 € each. While in the first operational programme CCTV and its technological infrastructure were just one among the solutions financed, they came prominently to the fore in the current plan, with 49% of resources reserved for priority area no.1 being spent on CCTV-related projects.

45For more information, see: http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/thefunds/regional/index_en.cfm
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operational Programme</th>
<th>Regions</th>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>Total contribution for area (in €)</th>
<th>Amount spent on CCTV-related projects (in €)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000-2006 “Security for the development of the Mezzogiorno”</td>
<td>Sicily, Calabria, Puglia, Campania, Basilicata</td>
<td>“Development and adaptation of information system and communication technologies for security”</td>
<td>EU: 472'570'305 IT: 452'929'162 TOT: 925'499'467</td>
<td>16'971'352.81 (1.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007-2013 “Security for development”</td>
<td>Sicily, Puglia, Campania, Calabria</td>
<td>“Security for economic freedom”</td>
<td>EU: 286'625'017 IT: 286'625'017 TOT: 573'250'034</td>
<td>280'926'566.11* (49%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 - ERDF programmes, 2000-2013

In addition to this, funds have also been made available at the national level. In accordance with the discourse centred on the topics of crime and security that has been shaped and exploited by the last Berlusconi government, one of the measures contained in the security package established the so-called urban security fund for the financing of “urgent initiatives for the maintenance of urban security and public order” (Law 113/08, art. 61, section 18. My translation.). This financial measure was introduced in order to promote a more efficient control of the territory; with an endowment of €100m, a little less than 1/3 of the resources available have been spent on the implementation of CCTV systems. Thanks to this level of financial support, along with the relaxation of the requirements to be respected for the implementation of video surveillance systems, widespread open-street video surveillance has effectively become a common occurrence in many Italian cities.

The following map of Italy provides a visual representation of the territorial distribution of the funding.

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47 The exact amount is close to €29m. The complete list of the projects financed is available at: [http://www.interno.it/mininterno/export/sites/default/it/assets/files/17/00056_Fondo_sicur_urbana-graduatoria.pdf](http://www.interno.it/mininterno/export/sites/default/it/assets/files/17/00056_Fondo_sicur_urbana-graduatoria.pdf)
Regional funding

The proactive stance assumed by local authorities in order to deal with the perceived dangerousness of public space was not limited to transforming the practices of government but also found expression in the consistent legislative production devoted to the issue of urban security. In 1999 Emilia-Romagna was the first region to pass such a law, testament to its being at the forefront in the development of a new approach to this matter. Other regions soon started to follow, so that by 2011 only Molise and the autonomous province of Alto Adige / Südtirol were left out\(^\text{48}\). Notably, there is consistent uniformity in the general principles that inform these acts, which supports the conclusion that a new institutional framework for the promotion of urban security is being established throughout the country thanks to the proactive role of local authorities. The main inspiration is the idea that any issue to do with security is to be

\(^{48}\)Taken together, the two areas are home to only 1.36% of the Italian population.
dealt with locally; accordingly, the role of municipalities in the development of specific policies and initiatives also becomes central. The aim of this legislative output has been the creation of integrated systems of security where different public actors co-operate together, thanks to the establishment of networks of communication and exchange between different authorities and levels of government.

The integration of different spheres of competence and expertise brings with it two closely related developments. First, the notion of urban security is no longer equated to that of public order. Second, because the link to crime and crime control is loosened, the very definition of security changes – thus acquiring new meanings in the process.

Moving on from the field of law enforcement and repressive policing, the concept shifts decidedly towards pre-emption, eventually coming to be used to indicate the whole set of actions and programmes that are implemented to foster social inclusion, fight urban decay and mediate social conflicts.

Finally, regions are also actively supportive of local authorities, to this end providing funding for security-related projects. Consistently with what was said above, there is no mention of the role that private actors could supposedly play, and legislation is explicit in stating that, in the case of co-funded projects, resources have to be made available by the different public authorities promoting them. The flow of resources that has thus been made available presents some peculiar features which are consistent with the idea that the notion of urban security is being used as a device to promote stronger ties between different governing bodies. First, the submission of projects is encouraged that either involve an association of municipalities or foster co-operation between different departments within the same administration. This emphasis on co-operation has also led to the transformation of the notion of security, which has become, in the eyes of local legislators, an all-encompassing concept, with funds available for interventions falling into one of the following categories: technological update of local police forces, social activities for at-risk groups, urban regeneration programmes. In this regard, some regions even limit explicitly the provision of funding to projects that cross the boundaries between the categories listed above. While coherent with the idea of establishing networks of co-operation between different departments and municipalities, this sensibly added to the already huge difficulties involved in any attempt to quantify precisely the amount of resources allocated to each set of interventions over the years.

What can be said, though, is that until the year 2009 there was a constant increase in the
funds made available nation-wide; while in 2002 a total of €22m were allocated, they had grown up to €67.5m seven years later. The following year however, saw a steep decrease in the quantity of funds available, which amounted to almost €43m, with the biggest cuts in funding taking place in Friuli Venezia Giulia (-86%), Lazio (-78%) and Piedmont (-79%).

**Conclusions**

The reconfiguration of state sovereignty that took place in Italy at the turn of the century, coupled with the claims of emergency on the dangerousness of public space and life in the city opened up a space of autonomy for local authorities to engage in the provision of security to citizens. Financially, this turn was vastly facilitated by the availability at different levels of public funding for security-related projects throughout Italy. However, the activism of public actors has not been matched by their private counterparts’, yet. The eligibility of projects for funding is, in fact, conditional upon the availability of matching co-funding from the municipality or local authority that is submitting the proposal, so that the resources going into a given development all come from public sources, albeit belonging to distinct levels of government. As a result, the progressive securitisation of Italian cities has so far been a process led exclusively by the public sector, with no contribution from private investors. In light of these developments, two points can, thus, be made.

First, in spite of the new powers of regions, the central government remains an important actor, as exemplified by the efforts spent in the development of a national legislation for the regulation of open-street CCTV systems. Second, the consistent funding made available for the implementation of these systems suggests that in the course of a decade video surveillance has grown to be one of the key strategies for the control of the territory.
8. Local to national – an introduction

In this section the rhetorics and the strategies employed locally in order to support and justify the decision to implement an open-street CCTV system will be analysed. As seen in the previous chapter, the conflation of a series of processes – legislative, political and financial – has essentially resulted in the opening up of a space of autonomy for local authorities in Italy, that are now responsible for the provision of a growing number of services to the population. However, the choice to occupy this very space, at least partially, with cameras is not a pre-determined outcome, nor a necessarily consequential decision. Rather, it is the result of a lengthy process that developed and evolved over time, in accordance with the wider transformations that occurred within each of the two cities where research was conducted. Using excerpts from the interviews conducted with local administrators and high-ranking officers of the local police, I will identify the discourses and the strategies that relevant actors in each city activated in relation to video surveillance. I will also investigate how these were organised into a coherent narrative, and with what degree of success.

In the case of Northern City, I will first use the interviews to demonstrate how the two administrations that governed the city while the CCTV system was being implemented had radically different ideas on how conflicts within the city ought to be managed. On a deeper level, this can be traced back to a diverging understanding on the kind of relation that should link together each citizen to the local government, seen in turn as enabling (Donzelot and Estèbe, 1994) or patronising. The securitarian discourse that emerged out of this shift is one of the sharpest tools used to shape the narrative of CCTV in Northern City. However, a contrasting managerial discourse also appeared, based on an understanding of video surveillance as a technology that can be used in the rationalisation of the activity of policing. After a more detailed characterisation of these two discourses, I will finally identify the themes around which the underlying tensions existing between these two approaches coalesce, and what kind of problems emerge as a consequence.

The situation in Central City was somewhat different, with police and political personnel in agreement over the definition and the use of the cameras, univocally understood as tools in support of the action of police officers. The decision on the part
of the administration to implement a video surveillance system in the first place was framed within the progressive embedment of video surveillance in the everyday life of cities throughout Italy. At the same time, the notion of urban security was decidedly re-spatialised, so as to link it to physical interventions carried out on the material space of the city itself, and widened. This movement brings with it two related developments. On one hand, the rich conceptualisation of urban space that was promoted and implemented locally by political actors allowed the urban environment to become an active locus for the production and maintenance of urban security. On the other, the efforts to include into the notion of security more spheres of activity can be linked to an approach to security that is socially oriented and geared towards inclusion.
9. Discourses on CCTV in Northern City

From co-responsibilisation to fear

Before specifically analysing how actors in Northern City defended their decision to have a CCTV system activated in the city, three preparatory steps need to be taken. First, it is necessary to define what urban security comes to mean in this specific context, so that, second, the most pressing problems and concerns that emerge out this locally negotiated definition can be identified. Finally, this will allow us to see how cameras get to be used in order to address the issues mentioned above.

Between 2002 and 2007, Northern City was governed by a centre-left coalition, responsible for the implementation of the first portion of the CCTV system that now covers a large part of the urban area. However, both the then-mayor and the then-assessore agreed in saying that video surveillance only played a small part in their overall strategy for urban security, and was only used in relation to strictly limited goals. The general approach the administration adopted in those years was strongly inclusive, defined at its core by two simple ideas: that the city belongs to everyone, and that public space should not be threatening. In the words of the then-mayor:

*I always believed cities should be open. Even in my campaign programme the city was open, at the same time belonging to everyone and welcoming for everyone... (...) [All our efforts] always tried to instil the idea that the street is a familiar space, not a space people should be scared of.*

*Former mayor of Northern City*

As already seen, the administration effectively tried to remove urban security from the political arena while at the same time stressing that all competences in terms of crime control exclusively resided (at the time) in the hands of law enforcement agencies. The focus was, thus, placed on lawfulness and the necessity for everyone to respect the laws already in place.

*Security-wise, respecting the institutions was paramount to us. I say this because I believe that security is not a political issue, but an institutional one and that there’s been an abuse, an exploitation of this theme for questionable goals. I don’t want to say anything harsher. From our point of view, we tried to maintain a very strong relation with law enforcement agencies, which in our republic are institutionally appointed to a*
role of security. (...) I believe it is fundamental that security remains under the wing of the institutions and not someone else’s, that it becomes a flag, something that people use for good and not so good things. (...) Our guiding criterion was lawfulness, and that applies to everyone.

Former assessore alla sicurezza of Northern City

Within this very general understanding a series of problems were identified and strategies consequently developed to address them. First, efforts were made to establish a local branch of the Protezione Civile\(^{49}\), whose absence during the flood of 2002 was strongly felt by the administration and the population alike.

(...) we set up a branch of the civil protection, because *** didn’t have one. In 2002 a serious flood happened when the river broke the barriers, we started the municipal branch of the civil protection and now we have 170 volunteers and it’s a wonderful structure. We organised courses, we trained the population, we had simulations of floods, so now the population is more informed and prepared. (...) We have alarms, pre-alarms so that what happened in 2002 won’t happen again. It really was tragic, we had to improvise as we went along. I had just been elected and we didn’t have a branch of the civil protection, we had nothing.

Former mayor of Northern City

Along with actions taken in relation to environmental risks, the administration also pursued an active policy of support to the immigrant population residing in the city, with programmes launched in conjunction with state schools to ease the integration of foreign students. In the same light, the municipality set up a shelter for single women with children.

*We worked a lot with schools and their answer was amazing. We have classes where 12%, 15% of students are foreigner and while private schools were just pushing them away, public schools did a fantastic job in terms of welcoming them and ease their integration into the student body. We launched a residential shelter for women with children, because sometimes it happened that they would arrive here and they would end up with no support, so we did that and it really helped.*

Former mayor of Northern City

Overall, the immigration policy adopted by the administration was characterised by efforts to ease the inclusion of immigrants into the public life of the city. To this end, a

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\(^{49}\)Literally, civil protection. Governmental agency whose goal is the protection of people, their environment, property and cultural heritage in the event of major natural or manmade disasters.
Consulta degli stranieri was created to facilitate relations with the various national communities residing in Northern City and to maintain an open channel of communication with the administration and local authorities. Well aware of the political sensitivity of the issue of immigration, most of the efforts on the part of the administration were thus made to build bridges between the different communities, with programmes and activities strongly oriented towards inclusion and integration. In this regard, transparency and the reaching out to other groups were strongly encouraged, as it was believed that knowledge and information would fight the emergence of panic and intolerance.

We worked with the various national communities, we set up a Consulta degli stranieri so that they could have representation at the institutional level, not in the city council but in regular meetings. We would arrange with them how to best interact with the general population and all communications on the activities carried out by the council were to be in Italian, too. (…) We wanted to avoid panic as much as possible... (…) Our approach to security was strongly informed by efforts towards integrating groups and reaching out to people.
Former mayor of Northern City

Finally, the last line of intervention that the administration identified was in relation to traffic control, specifically in terms of accidents, fatalities and injuries. In this regard, the municipality embarked upon an extensive programme of road renovations and increased presence of traffic patrols. This is where the decision to implement a CCTV system originally stemmed from, as video surveillance cameras were activated to control entry in the pedestrianised areas of the city centre. In relation to this decision there is a series of implications that need to be considered.

First, it is apparent how CCTV in Northern City was initially used in a very focused and strictly defined fashion, essentially as a replacement for patrols enforcing the pedestrianisation of some areas of the city centre. In relation to this, it has to be noted how the system that was implemented was not specifically geared towards this end and did not possess features enabling the automatic recognition of number plates. To this day, the system still does not allow for this. Second, other possible areas of intervention were explicitly considered as residual, with potential results essentially seen as positive side effects. As such, the installation was, at the time, seen as a tool for the management

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50Migrant council.
of traffic and the enforcement of relevant regulation, and only secondary as an instrument to be used to curb criminal or deviant behaviour. Specifically coming to the case of Northern City, we have already seen how video surveillance cameras were used to tackle the presence of unauthorised street vendors and the activity of graffiti writers, both concentrated in the city centre.

The restrained way in which CCTV was use in Northern City is a telling characteristic. The caution with which the administration operated the system and the concern about the possible effects the activation of the system would bring about are evident in the words of the then-mayor:

*I tried to have cameras where we knew there was a problem with traffic, but definitely not to invade the sphere of socialisation. I always believed cities should be open. Even in my campaign programme the city was open, at the same time belonging to everyone and welcoming for everyone. The idea that citizens are controlled should never get through, that there is an eye that sees everything people do. I think this is a deterrent to democracy, to the responsibilisation of the individual. If you behave correctly it’s not because there is a camera that controls everything, but because you have been taught, you are convinced that’s the right thing to do... Otherwise, as soon as the camera is over you rape someone. And a militarised city is not something that can be imagined.*

Former mayor of Northern City

If we were to sum up the approach to security that was adopted in Northern City between 2002 and 2007, then, we could say that the aim was to work towards the inclusion of all categories of people into the life of the city. In turn, this was based on the assumption that most people will not be a threat to others and was played out within a general framework where the competences and the attributions of law enforcement agencies were of paramount importance. With the new administration entering office in the spring of 2007, though, a sensible shift of attitude in how conflicts are to be managed took place. As a result, a different discourse centred on the themes of fear and security emerged, providing the background to a phase of extensive development of the CCTV system in Northern City.
The securitarian turn

The security approach adopted by the current administration revolves around the theme of fear. The choice to focus on this issue is the result of the balancing of two contrasting sets of arguments, both clearly portrayed in the course of interviews with the current mayor and assessore. On one hand, both describe Northern City as a safe place where crime rates are on the decrease, especially in comparison with neighbouring cities like Milan. Both men’s experience of life in Northern City is placed in stark contrast with the requests for a tougher stance on crime and security advanced by citizens, as first witnessed in the course of the 2007 electoral campaign. The puzzlement the interviewees experienced in that occasion stemmed from their perceived inability to compose into a coherent narrative the different representations different categories of people had of the city. While at the time this fracture resulted in the re-orientation of the campaign so as to have it centred on the problem of security in Northern City, in the longer run it provided the administration with one of its most effective discursive devices. In the following excerpt we can see how the interviewees were, at first, surprised by the emphasis people placed on the need for security:

Law enforcement agencies have these statistics (...) and crime rates are going down. I don’t want to say that it is an oasis of happiness, but according to them Northern City has always been quite a good place. If we compare it to Cinisello, Sesto, Milano or Rozzano there isn’t really much to say. (...) In our area, crimes have gone down, but people do not feel this way. When we were campaigning, four years ago because we have to vote again next year, what really surprised me was that the first thing people would mention was security.
Current mayor of Northern City

After the initial puzzlement, though, the interviewees were quick to appropriate the topic, once this was put on the table. Starting with the mayoral race of 2007, the right-
wing coalition took full advantage of the prevailing atmosphere that depicted public life as inherently dangerous, which in turn allowed for a successful reframing of the electoral programme and, at a later time, of the style of government in terms of security and protection. As Bauman pointedly writes, a “lot of tension accumulates around the quest for safety. And where there is a tension, political capital will surely be spotted by bright investors and expedient stock-brokers” (Bauman, 1998: 117). Also to be noted is how this widespread fear is generated by, and is turn explicitly directed against, a very specific category, that is the immigrant population residing in Northern City. This is a classic instance of the breaking out of a moral panic. When this happens, a “condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests [and] its nature is presented in a stylized and stereotypical fashion by the mass media” (Cohen, 1972: 9). An important point to bear in mind is that moral panics “have to do with transitions in the social, economic, or moral order of the society” (Garland, 2008: 14); in the case of Italy, the sudden transformation from a society of emigration to one of immigration. This is not to say that there is no awareness in Northern City of how the various phenomena discussed here – fear, anxiety, need for reassurance, immigration – are inextricably intertwined, as can be seen in the following excerpt:

*The Italian society is rapidly changing its customs. We have different ways of living public space, different schedules to live public space, different traditions in how people spend their free time. At times, then, this feeling of insecurity is really a situation where there is a situation where people do not feel at ease because they have to share the same space.*

*Former chief of the local police of Northern City*

At the same time, though, it cannot be denied that targeting the immigrant population and tailoring the provision of security in relation to their presence in Northern City is, at once, an easy decision to make, in terms of it symbolic effectiveness, political visibility and its resonance with some deep-seated beliefs the administrators share. This sits well with the idea of moral panics, where an us-against-them situation develops, and we feel entitled to do anything to protect ourselves and our world from those who do not belong to it. As Goode and Ben-Yehuda (1994: 227. Emphasis in original.) say: “[t]he message of the moral panic is clear: This is behavior we will not tolerate”. In this regard it is interesting to see how subtle and cautious or, on the contrary, upfront and wary the
justifications produced by the interviewees are. The following excerpts are, I believe, meaningful in their comparison:

For example, we can have a group of citizens, generally non-EU immigrants\textsuperscript{51} because this is more common among them, but in some cases they could be from the EU or even be Italian, that at 5 PM go to the park and drink beer on the bench. They are not doing anything illicit, but this goes against our idea that these public spaces should be dedicated to children, so four adult men that drink beer and are laughing out loud (...) this doesn’t go down too well.

Former chief of the local police of Northern City

Then what happens in people, in citizens? It happens what happened during the times of the internal migration from the South. It’s the same thing. When people are scared this is how it goes: they are all hobos, they are all criminal and you see someone on the street and maybe they are going home from work and are just tired, but you are scared so you cross the street to the other pavement. In people’s imagination these things can take root easily. I know this is wrong, but you watch TV and you read the news...

Current mayor of Northern City

Or even more explicitly:

People are scared, they have the jitters, people do not rent a house to immigrants, unless it’s a family, because what happens is you rent your house to one person and then they move in and it’s 22 of them and they trash your property. People refuse to rent. In *** there are lots of empty flats, vacant, but people won’t give them up.

Current mayor of Northern City

These statements are in stark contrast with the attempts carried out by the current administration not to cast their decision to concentrate their efforts on security in a political light. Rather, they stress that the current securitarian turn is down to the desire to meet the citizens’ needs, while being in no way linked to an overtly political agenda.

The interest of the administration lies in the strengthening of the instruments that are already available (...) so as to strengthen people’s perception of security, as this is a fundamental element. Citizens are asking for this and this is also an important part of the overall quality of life (...). The problem we wanted to deal with is the perception of security on the part of the citizens...

Current assessore alla sicurezza of Northern City

\textsuperscript{51}Though this is the literal translation of the Italian “extracomunitario”, the original expression is usually understood in a derogatory way. While strictly speaking a US or a Canadian national could be defined as a non-EU immigrant, in everyday language the label is only used to identify people coming from the global South and is associated with a low socio-economic status.
In order to successfully accomplish this turn, the administration introduced a different definition of urban security upon which to build a justification for the choices made. Thus, in the interviews we can identify the attempts made to this end, with a discursive strategy that is not unlike the one adopted by the previous administration. However, whereas the goal once was to widen the scope of the notion of security so as to include in it issues such as the management of traffic flows and flood control, this time the same tactic is used in the opposite direction. As a result, what was once widened is now shrunk again, so as to conflate the issue of urban security with crime and immigration control. The language adopted by the interviewees in their attempts to avoid any potential source of controversy and to downplay any political connotation is also telling, with two tropes coming strongly to the fore. On one hand, there is the populist and oversimplified discourse of the politician as a ‘man of the people’.

I can understand that someone arrives here and doesn’t have a place to stay, doesn’t know where to find food and has no job... After three days with no food, I would go into a delicatessen and rob the place, but not of cash, rather of cheese... So I am not someone who’s ready to condemn no matter what. At the same time, though, these situations... (...) These people that spend all their time on the street, [engaging in] petty crime... I am not comparing it to the ‘ndrangheta’, but when you are desperate you can do dangerous things. Snatching an old lady’s bag, and then she falls and breaks her collarbone, her shoulder or her head... it’s a bad thing.

Current mayor of Northern City

On the other, the instrumental neutrality of the administrator as a bureaucrat:

Our approach to security has always been extremely pragmatic, so the first thing [for us to do] was an analysis of the situation in *** in order to identify the instruments best suited to solve a series of problems that had almost become normal and that were mostly met with resignation, as if we would have to live with them. Then the administration identified the means and the modalities to improve what was already at our disposal.

Current assessore alla sicurezza of Northern City

These two self-representations are used alternatively, in the course of the interviews, to rebut the accusation of racism that is frequently thrown at Lega Nord politicians, both at the national and the local level. This is a problem that the current mayor openly

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52 Criminal organisation, originally from Calabria.
addressed at the very beginning of his interview and that, for most of the time, provided a muted reference against which much of what was being discussed could be projected.

If I may, I want to say that I cannot stand all those speculations that are going around now, just to be clear, of racism... Thank God, I am at peace with everyone. I am mad at no one. I am not racist.
Current mayor of Northern City

The only other occasion in which the issue of racism resurfaced again happened later in the same interview, when the mayor had this to say in relation to the possibility of storing the fingerprints of undocumented immigrants who may have committed a crime:

Some time ago someone said that it is actually useless to collect fingerprints from the hands, because they burn them intentionally. They burn them and you no longer have them. We should collect fingerprints from the toes, because if you have no sensitivity under your feet you have to pay attention when you are walking if you don’t want to fall off. Someone said that and, to be clear, this someone belonged to the Lega. “Racist, ignorant, localist, nazi, murderer”. There are all things we’ve been called, that I have personally been called for 23 years.
Current mayor of Northern City

Overall, though, efforts were continuously made by the interviewees to cast themselves in a different light, more positive and less controversial. Here, the tendency towards social desiderability (Crowne and Marlowe, 1960) can be seen at play on two separated, but related, levels. On one hand, it is traceable in the self-representations of individual interviewees, who use the variety of roles they play in their everyday lives – father, husband, GP – as evidence of their good standing in society and their willingness and ability to interact smoothly with people from all walks of life. On the other, it is used in a more openly strategic manner by the same interviewees, this time in their capacity of public administrators and members of a political party, to defend the political decisions they have made and to avoid, whenever possible, controversy and protests.

Overall, the approach to security that has been adopted in Northern City shies away from social initiatives while, on the contrary, wholly embracing a police-oriented and technology-based declination in terms of the identification of both the problems to be addressed and the strategies best suited to solve them. On a practical level, the administration of Northern City directed most of its efforts towards the consolidation of the local police force. This process saw three main areas of intervention. First, an
increase in the level of territorial control, strongly interlinked with, second, the increase in the visibility of the presence in the city of patrolling officers on duty. Finally, technology-based solutions were also adopted: along with the expansion of the CCTV system, the local police has also recently acquired a new digital radio system, coupled with a GPS navigation system that allows for the real-time tracking and dispatching of patrols throughout the city.

We can now move on to see in greater detail how CCTV fits into this wider approach. The first point that can be made is that not one of the people interviewed had any doubt on the fact that video surveillance works. Specifically, the picture that emerges from the interviews has this technology working effectively on two distinct, but related, levels: symbolically, as a visible sign that the administration is doing something to protect its citizens, and substantially, in terms of the positive effects registered in the control of crime in the city. The interviewees all agreed that knowing that someone is looking over your movement in public is a source of comfort as, in case something happens, police can intervene quickly. In the mayor’s own words:

_Honestly, when I leave city hall at 1 AM after meeting with the councillors, aside from the fact that I am always in a group of people, you’re never alone, but the fact that someone is watching what I am doing makes me feel more relaxed. After all, I just take my car and leave, so this makes me more relaxed. I think this should be, though everyone is entitled to their own feelings, how an ordinary person feels...*_

Current mayor of Northern City

As for the substantial effects brought about by CCTV, the implementation of the system was seen as a way to steer the action of the local police towards a greater attention to deterrence and pre-emption. However, none of the interviewees gives more than a passing nod to the concept of prevention, in spite of its complexity. The reorientation towards future offences, as exemplified in what Feeley and Simon termed “New Penology” (1992, 1994) “has the effect of greatly expanding the scope of offending under view from that already known to that which is as yet only estimable” (Zedner, 53)

53 The above excerpt nevertheless shows a complete ignorance of how the system is actually managed on a day-to-day basis. Given the organisational routines in place in the control room, in fact, it is highly unlikely that, at any given time, an operator is actually watching the monitors. If that were the case, the availability of patrols would also need to be weighed in, so that the claim that video surveillance allows for the quick deployment of police personnel in case of an emergency remains open to verification.
2003: 159. Also see: Shearing, 2001). It also causes increased anxiety and heightened sensitivity to risks in citizens, who start “to think about their everyday and/or working lives in terms of crime prevention and act accordingly” (Loader and Sparks, 2002: 89).

We focused our attention on the strengthening of the presence of officers in the territory, not only in order to suppress episodes, but above all to prevent and to deter. We coupled the attention we paid to the local police with comparable attention, and creativity too, to the identification of new instruments that can help the administration to fulfil these goals, such as video surveillance.

Current assessore alla sicurezza of Northern City

As we have already seen, mainly the CCTV system has helped to uproot a series of phenomena from the city centre: the presence of unauthorised street vendors, graffiti and other acts of vandalism to public property, while in the greater area of the city it has been instrumental in curbing the illegal dumping of waste. A series of points can be made in relation to this. First, that the areas of intervention where CCTV can be profitably employed are limited to a series of clearly defined, and clearly visible, phenomena whose eradication from the target area can be easily verified. However, this is not to say that the activation of a video surveillance system has solved these problems for the city as a whole. While the issue of the displacement of target phenomena to areas that are not covered by cameras has long been debated in the literature (for a recent contribution to the conversation, see: Waples, Gill and Fisher, 2009), the same concern was not traceable in the words of the interviewees. In spite of their awareness that in some cases the cameras have simply caused a different spatial distribution of a given phenomenon in the city, this piece of information is considered very matter-of-factly rather than as a problem to be analysed in its own right.

In some cases [the problems] have been eradicated, because the presence [of the street vendors] remains occasional. In other cases, [the cameras] have helped to contain them, there has been a redistribution, a concentration of some problems in some areas that are not adequately surveilled, covered yet, but we have strongly curbed a series of phenomena in the areas that are covered.

Current assessore alla sicurezza of Northern City

As the above excerpt suggests, the solution envisaged by the administration is to extend the areas covered by the system, which is consistent with the plans for future developments that will be discussed in a few pages. Also, this passage shows how the
symbolic and the substantive dimensions of security policies in Northern City are inextricably intertwined, as the emphasis placed on the visibility of police interventions in the city centre can, and should, be interpreted as part of a political strategy to reassure the population by displaying a tough and proactive stance against crime.

That the problems mentioned by the interviewees are generally administrative rather than criminal offences is not something that city administrators dwell on in the course of the interviews. From an institutional point of view the preoccupation with urban decorum is perfectly understandable, as its maintenance is one of the main tasks municipalities must attend to. Surely, this is also and important aspect of the overall quality of life in a city. After all who, given the chance of living in a clean and nice neighbourhood, would decide otherwise? However, the efforts made to tackle disorder in urban space have a darker side to them, too. Famously, the contested “broken windows” theory (Wilson and Kelling, 1982) closely associates the visible presence of signs of disorder left unattended with a necessary rise in crime rates, thus positing that the meaning of these signs is unambiguous, and causally linked to crime. Policy-wise, this has opened the door to the zero-tolerance approach to policing adopted in New York during Giuliani’s administration, and to the quality-of-life initiatives that re-direct efforts and resources to the curtailment of minor violations. It is now understood that the common outcome of these programmes has been a substantial increase of the brutality of the police and, consequently, of the complaints filed by citizens, with a consistent concentration in the poorest and most disadvantaged areas and neighbourhoods (Wacquant, 2009). On an equally disturbing note, there is substantial evidence to claim that the drop in crime rates that in the US advocates ascribe to these policies has not been caused by them, but rather by a series of demographical, social and economical transformations common to tough and soft on crime cities alike (Harcourt, 1998). The broken windows theory and its offsprings are also troubling from a purely sociological point of view as disorder is, and remains, a complex concept. Along with its physical manifestations, be it litter on the streets, or graffiti on the walls of a building, a relevant, if only recently addressed, role in the definition of what disorder is is played by the way people perceive and interpret these signs. What also needs to be weighed in is the fact that the very signs that are a source of serious concern for some, are bound to be considered by others as the edgy manifestation of a thriving neighbourhood. In short, caution should be strongly advised when administrators decide
to be tough on disorder. From a purely legal perspective, the distinction between crime
offences and administrative violations is also important in terms of the sanctions each
calls for in the Italian judiciary system.

In spite of the relevance of these objections, the only clear acknowledgment of how
CCTV is more effective in curbing minor incivilities rather than in tackling serious
crimes comes from the deputy police commissioner who was responsible for the initial
implementation of the system.

We have a benefit in terms of intervention, because where there’s a camera no one
writes graffiti on the walls, where there’s a camera no one dumps their waste, no one
sets up their unauthorised stall. It’s a series of behaviours that are not necessarily
illegal in terms of criminal laws, but simply from the point of view of administrative
regulations, that are norms of peaceful coexistence, of politeness, of civility. If we
consider the situation under this light, we have had an effect. On average, people’s
behaviour in front of a camera, when there’s a nice sign that tells you that there’s a
camera, because they need to know that there’s a camera there... it helps to comply
with the rules, to not write graffiti, to not stomp on benches or damage trees in the park.
We have had a result with these minor behaviour... I mean, these are the things that
make people worried... (...) So, from this point of view it helps to give an impression,
and it remains to be seen how true this is, of a more orderly context, which is not a bad
ting.

Former deputy commissioner of the local police of Northern City

In the same interview, interviewee N_V2 provided an effective, and critical, synthesis
of what the municipality wished to achieve in relation to the CCTV system, especially
in light of the consistent amount of resources spent on the project. When talking about
the effects in terms of deterrence generated by video surveillance, it is worth noting how
the vocabulary is at the same time strongly assertive (it is “intuitive” that the results are
“evident”) while being vague and distrustful (there is “some kind of effect”, but the
matter “should be investigated in greater detail”).

Even intuitively, for those who never had to anything to do with it, it appears quite
evident that the implementation of a video surveillance system for urban security,
because this is what we are talking about, does have some kind of effect in terms of
deterrence, pre-emption. There are studies, so we shouldn’t... There is a general
usefulness, though I think it should be investigated in greater detail, I don’t really trust
the numbers I read, but it is evident, it is intuitive. But I also think, and my opinion is
worthless, that the costs are not justified. (...) However, there is also a positive effect in
terms of image, of propaganda for the politicians that we cannot underestimate. This is
something else, but it still is true, it is an effect that we have.

Former deputy commissioner of the local police of Northern City
The support enjoyed by CCTV is so strong and the benefits it brings about so notable in the eyes of the administration that privacy has become something that can be easily discarded and renounced without much qualms. Because video surveillance is considered so effective a tool for the control of the territory, in turn privacy is seen as an expendable casualty. This argument is presented in three consequent steps. First, the old adage that “good”, law-abiding people have nothing to fear because they have nothing to hide is introduced to cast the presence of surveillance cameras in a benevolent light, akin to an attentive parent who checks upon their children. Different strategies are at play in this phase. First, the vocabulary becomes intentionally simple and trivialising, to give the impression that this “so-called privacy” is actually not that important to begin with. Also, the mayor once again assumes the role of the unassuming man of the people through the strong reinforcement of the ordinary quality of his everyday life, which is “completely normal” and comparable with everyone else’s:

*I never thought of video surveillance as something that could intrude upon this so-called privacy. I am on the street and the camera frames me. If they have nothing to do, they can see me as I go into a delicatessen, or as I park my car. But my assumption is: “who cares?”. I am a completely normal person, just like millions of other people, and I go around minding my own business and that’s it.*

*Current mayor of Northern City*

Under the same light we can understand the humble appeal to down-to-earth reasons:

*Going back to video surveillance, I think there’s nothing wrong with it, for the banal reason, I admit it, but it’s a realistic one, that if someone is minding their own business and is harming no one, even if they see me I couldn’t care less.*

*Current mayor of Northern City*

Second, the idea is introduced that because of technological advancements in communication technologies the notion of privacy has been emptied of any possibly meaningful content. Privacy is not that big a deal and, even if it were, there is not really much we can do about its progressive disappearance.

*Nowadays, privacy really makes me laugh. We all are on the Internet, on Google… I mean, you could say “what am I doing here?”*. “Born in, done this, done that…” I mean, that’s my own business, isn’t it? That’s a violation of privacy, but today there’s
nothing you can do about that. Truth is, today privacy no longer exists, you can pass all
the laws you want but it doesn’t exist. (...) Technology has led to this, too.
Current mayor of Northern City

The above excerpt makes a series of interesting points. First, the reconstruction of one’s
movements thanks to open-street CCTV is equated to the availability of information
relating to oneself that can be found on the Internet. However, there is reason enough to
disagree with the above claim. Though it is debatable how much thought is, on average,
put into such a decision, people usually choose to be traceable and identifiable on the
Internet. They open their profile on Facebook or join other social networking sites
intentionally and have, with varying degrees of ease and success, control over what they
share and with whom they do so. On the other hand, though, the same cannot be said
about video surveillance of public space. If we want, or need, to move through an area
covered by CCTV we have no choice but to fall under the gaze of the cameras with no
possibility to control the amount or quality of the information we are making available.

“The uncertainty entailed by our inability to know who is watching or why diminishes
personal freedom and reduces our quality of life. (...) [Overall, s]patial restrictions may
further limit access to goods and services and impede participation in social life for
those subject to them” (Zedner, 2003: 170-71). Also, the above passage can be said to
imply that, while data publicly available on the Internet are personal information that
can lead to the identification of the person and should, as such, be protected, footage of
that very same individual is not. More precisely, once again it is the nothing-to-hide-
nothing-to-fear mantra that makes it possible not to consider images relating to
someone’s movements in public space as worthy of protection. Finally, technological
determinism is called upon to justify the lack of concern in relation to privacy
protection. Technological advancements dictate change: information is now easily and
widely available and there is nothing we can do to oppose these developments.
Technology has brought us where we now are.

The third, and final, passage in the line of reasoning that is deployed against privacy
presents the discussion specifically in relation to the issue of urban security. What is
claimed here is that, when it comes to crime control, privacy is something people can
easily make do without in light of the benefits that video surveillance brings about.
Once again, this passage too shows a lack of knowledge on the part of the interviewee
of how the system is actually managed.
Citizens welcome these things warmly, essentially because a citizen doesn’t indulge in mental masturbations like politicians do. The citizen goes to the market, goes grocery shopping, plays sports, goes to the cemetery, parks his car and doesn’t really care if they see him. However, if they see me maybe they can protect me if something happens, or they can intervene quickly…
Current mayor of Northern City

Finally, under the same light we can analyse the future plans for video surveillance in Northern City, which include further expansion of the system in spite of increasingly tight budgetary restrictions.

We have all the intention to go on with the system, in front of schools particularly, where they give drugs to kids in middle school. (...) We need to go on, it is necessary. We have serious problems with our budget, but in spite of them our intention is to go on. Current mayor of Northern City

The approach to security in Northern City in general and the use of video surveillance within it in particular do raise a series of unanswered questions. First of all, the amount of public resources already spent on CCTV, coupled with the decision to pursue further expansion of the system, introduces into the discussion the need for reliable indicators, so that a cost-benefit analysis could be attempted. While this is something the interviewees are aware of, the claims that CCTV works are invariably conveyed in a vague and unspecified vocabulary, where costs and benefits are not clearly defined. The idea that the system works, thus, becomes a sort of self-fulfilling prophecy, where the fact that someone says that video surveillance is effective is proof enough that the system works. Difficulties may arise, though, when interviewees are asked to elaborate on the matter at hand:

Positive outcomes (...) Collectively, people have fallen in love with this technology, but obviously it is not the nostrum. Now we have requests for installations that if you think about it do not even make sense. And maybe if you consider it in terms of the functionality of the system these installations could be illogical or even counterproductive. The support that has been gathered sometimes leads to the misinterpretation of the actual meaning of what we have achieved. Current assessore alla sicurezza of Northern City

As already discussed, in the literature a clear conclusion has not been reached on whether it is advisable to spend consistent amounts of public resources on video
surveillance. A review of studies carried out on the effectiveness of CCTV (Gill and Spriggs, 2005; Justice Analytical Services, 2009; Welsh and Farrington, 2009) leads to the conclusion that, assumed that CCTV works, nevertheless very little can be said about the cost-effectiveness of the technology. If we want to find a more balanced view on the development of video surveillance in Northern City, then, we need to turn our back to those same administrators that pushed for the system to be expanded. On the contrary, the lack of reliable indicators that could provide information on how the system was performing is something the former deputy commissioner was well, and frustratingly, aware of.

**Accountability is one of those things that should become commonplace for the civil service, but it isn’t always easy, because you have your goals and you have some resources and there must be something that says whether the resources have been used well or in the wrong way. Not to spy, but simply to see if you need to do something different. But in all honesty here [with video surveillance] I couldn’t think of anything. In the control room we would keep a record of everything that happened, but then practically we couldn’t find something that was objective... because in terms of accountability I have seen some crazy things. Final reports where the indicators of results where simply the list of the resources employed. I don’t do something like that. Either I find something that measures, or else... So in the end this thing was not resolved and was left hanging...**

*Former deputy commissioner of the local police of Northern City*

Based on the passages presented above, we can then say that the claims on the effectiveness of CCTV in Northern City come to be inextricably linked with the attempts at self-legitimation carried out by the same administration that pushed to have the system expanded. As such, they are not understood, nor used, by the actors in terms of their adherence to a factual situation, but rather as discursive and strategic tools, in light of their contribution to the creation of a successful – i.e. uncontested – narrative where Northern City is seen as needing more and more policing and more and more cameras.

On a more general level, the interviews also raised some questions on how politics should deal with people’s expectations, specifically in the field of crime control, and on the idea of human nature that emerged from the interviewees’ words. As for the former, we need to recall the surprise experienced by the current mayor when he was first faced with citizen’s fears during the electoral campaign of 2007. While on a personal level unable to reconcile these requests with his own experience of life in Northern City, he
nevertheless embraced them, so much as to turn them into one of the central points of his electoral programme.

*When we were campaigning, the first thing people would want to talk about was security. And I thought that *** was not like 1920s Chicago, I was born here. (...) And I was so surprised by this, because I know my city well and I never thought there would be this widespread perception of insecurity.*

*Current mayor of Northern City*

However, given the sensitive nature of the issues considered here – security, crime, immigration – the move to push a law & order-inspired agenda could easily backfire. A small example can be found in the observation I carried out in the control room, where everyday people would call in to ask for the physical removal of gypsies and immigrants from their neighbourhood, because their very presence was scaring them and making them fear for the safety of their car, house, children or pets. The irritation and frustration of the callers when the officer on duty invariably replied that it is not possible to remove people from the street if they are not engaged in illicit activities was deeply instructive and demonstrated first hand how common and widespread among ‘ordinary’ people a siege mentality is. This simple example also shows some of the perverse and paradoxical consequences of the pursuit of security (For a complete list, see: Zedner, 2003). What is attempted in order to foster reassurance and make people feel safer and more protected brings about, more often than not, heightened feeling of insecurity as the same people are made more and more aware of the risks facing them. In turn, the accumulation of “these strategies of security lead[s] to the further erosion of social solidarity” (Zedner, 2003: 171).

Having said this, I do think it is fair to wonder whether or not it is a sound decision to exploit security for political gain. However debatable, appealing to the lowest instincts in the electorate because of a calculation for emotional support is nevertheless a strategy that the current administration in Northern City has not been afraid to put to good use. This tactic also sits well, and is directly related to, the idea of human nature that the current mayor shared in the course of his interview:

*When you are on a train there are lots of crimes, of bullying. When I travel by train I have my seat, I just stay there reading my paper. Maybe I can go and get something to drink, I might need to use the toilet... but if someone comes up at me, threatens me with a knife and get off at the following stop maybe they can see him and call the police.*
Current mayor of Northern City

While I am not in a position to know which kind of trains the interviewee usually takes, this excerpt prompts two concluding points. First, it cannot really come as much of a surprise that the people of Northern City are scared, given how their administrators depict reality in such bleak terms. Second, the Hobbesian idea that “homo homini lupus est” ends up providing the backdrop to an understanding of daily life where people are predators, social encounters are inherently dangerous and we need to protect ourselves. We need to group with those that are similar to us. It remains open to personal opinions whether or not this sounds like a good place to live in.

Managerial discourses on CCTV

“Police technologies historically have developed to increase the probability that the police will be present when the untoward arises” (Manning, 2003: 109). While this statement certainly holds true, though, it is necessary to investigate this claim in greater detail. The potential benefits to policing brought about by any given technology are, in fact, not simply a function of the technology in itself. Rather, we need to look at how the technology will be socially constructed in its context of use (Graham and Marvin, 1996) that is, how the organisation as a whole and its members will interact with it. In turn, because we also know that individual and collective responses to the introduction of any technology will be, at least partially, shaped by the organisational culture and practices of the context of interest (for an example, see: Barley, 1986), we need to first look at the culture of the context of implementation. So, if we want to identify the narratives, the discourses and the tropes that the police as a whole mobilised in order to make sense of the arrival of CCTV in Northern City, we need to consider them in relation to the police culture (Skolnick, 1966; Muir, 1977; Chan, 1996; Paoline, 2003) which is expressed and reproduced by the force as a whole and its members alike and is clearly pre-existent to the activation of the video surveillance system. In addition to this, we also need to consider how while “the culture of the police (…) is neither monolithic, universal, nor unchanging” (Reiner, 2010: 117), the police in itself, as is the case with bureaucratic organisations, does possess a degree of resistance to change, both at an organisational and operational level. Two meaningful conclusions can be, thus, drawn. First, that “it should come as no surprise that existing patrol practices and widely held
beliefs amongst officers can have a significant effect on how individuals and the force as a whole respond to and use technologies like CCTV” (Goold, 2004: 171). Second, that we need to keep in mind how “traditionally the police have been extremely conservative, both in their approach to the task of street policing and in their willingness to embrace new technology” (ibid.).

In relation to the analysis that is being carried out here, there are two features of police culture that are particularly important: the continued relevance of the beat – the physical presence of officers on the streets – and the high degree of autonomy enjoyed by officers in their daily routine. With excerpts culled from interviews with high ranking officials and operators alike, I will now move on to show the discursive strategies and the rationalisations used by the police force of Northern City to integrate CCTV into existing policing practices. Once I have done so, I will also identify the problems that arise out of this configuration.

In Northern City, there is overwhelming agreement among all ranks of the local police that the beat is an essential part of the activity of policing. Equally significantly, it also emerged how central it is to the self-representation of police officers. Overall, the assumption is that patrolling officers can produce a series of positive results merely thanks to their being in the city.

We are in the city centre, in an area of the city centre, and there is an agent patrolling on foot. I believe this is an instrument that we cannot make do without, because the control of territory comes with physical presence, first of all. If am there, those who shouldn’t be there are not there. If I leave, they arrive.
Former deputy commissioner of the local police of Northern City

Significantly, the same metaphor is evoked for patrolling personnel and surveillance cameras alike. Both are the eyes of the police in the city, allowing for the quick identification of problems and consequently the deployment of officers. On a general level, then, CCTV is first introduced as something that improves the ability of the police to see and, therefore, to intervene.

Before, the eye of the city was the officer. The officer on the street was the only eye on the city, that was able to see what was happening on the street and to report to the station via radio. (…) This is another structure that is added to what initially was the mere presence of the officer, that I believe remains fundamental.
Sergeant of the local police of Northern City
More specifically, CCTV was introduced into the policing strategies adopted in Northern City essentially as a tool for a more efficient management of the resources available, with particular emphasis placed on three distinct aspects of policing: the territorial distribution of patrols, the safety of officers while on duty and the reliance on third parties for information. As for the first, the idea was to re-think the deployment of patrols in light of the activation of the cameras. This was particularly true in the case of officers performing tasks that could easily be discharged by the cameras. The control over accesses to pedestrianised areas of the city centre is a case in point, as the presence of patrols became less necessary once the system was activated.

*If I have the opportunity of these technologies, I can imagine something like this: I implement my video surveillance system and then I try to connect these two things. So, I have my agent on the spot and maybe I can also end up saving some of them, because it can be used to rationalise our services.*

Former deputy commissioner of the local police of Northern City

*We cut across the city centre [with cameras] because in the historic centre we had an objective problem where people would not respect the limited traffic area so, especially in light of the impossibility of having patrols monitoring the situation day and night, we just connected these two focal points with a series of cameras.*

Former mayor of Northern City

CCTV was also framed as a tool that would guarantee a higher degree of personal safety to patrolling officers. The availability of images relating to situations where deployment could be necessary, in fact, was to offer the opportunity of tailoring it so that police agents would be less likely to end up in unexpected – and potentially dangerous – situations and, as a consequence, be less exposed to attacks and injuries.

*If you know there’s going to be 10 of them, you organise your work in a different way. If you know there’s going to be 10 of them you cannot send just one officer.*

Sergeant of the local police of Northern City

Traditionally, the police are heavily reliant on citizens for the provision of information, with citizens usually contacting the local police by calling the station. However, it is a problem officers are painfully aware of that citizens’ accounts of events usually are fragmented, imprecise and focused on secondary details. As such, it can be difficult for police personnel to get an idea of what is happening when the only available information is the fraught description made by an upset caller. In this regard, the idea
was thus promoted that cameras would allow the police to be more precise and “bullet-like” in their activities. The possibility of watching events unfolding live on the monitors of the control room was, then, seen as a way to decrease the reliance on third parties for information and details on the situations officers would be called to attend to.

Our expectation was to have a much easier finalisation of our services, because in the areas that were covered, in the case an accident would happen, or a traffic jam or a problem of urban security, patrols would be able to leave the station with the correct information, knowing the right place and getting there at the right time. It had the three conditions that finalise our service. Let’s say that we expected to become more bullet-like in relation to our goals.

Former chief of the local police of Northern City

Under the same light, cameras would also make it easier for officers assigned to the control room to screen phone calls and to make a decision on the necessity of a deployment, the number of officers needed or to what emergency to attend to first.

Maybe the citizen calls us because they have seen one [unauthorised street vendor] so going there… I am not saying is wrong to send someone when there’s only one, but maybe in the time it takes us to get there they have already left, so…

Sergeant of the local police of Northern City

Overall, it has to be noted how this rationalisation was framed within a general movement towards the increasing technologisation of policing in Northern City. In the eyes of higher ranks, in fact, the implementation of CCTV was considered the first step in the creation of a city-wide network of different technologies that would allow the gaze of the police to expand throughout the urban area.

After that I can also imagine more complicated things, because you could think about, though maybe it is almost science-fiction, though it is technically feasible in a city covered with wi-fi hot spots and things like that... I install devices on my car, so when something happens and I send some officers at the same time I give them the address, the images, so they can take a look at what is happening while they are on their way there. I can imagine an integration of my CCTV system with other devices that are in the city, for example with the traffic lights: every traffic light has sensors and LED lights and I can imagine that I could use these (...) so that [if something happens] an alarm goes off in the station and the camera automatically moves in the right direction so that the operator knows that something is happening and can take a look.

Former deputy commissioner of the local police of Northern City
While stressing the importance and the potential benefits to be reaped thanks to the increasing reliance on technology, though, in the course of the interviews a competing theme also emerged. Specifically, all the interviewees belonging to the local police invariably maintained that the competences and expertise of an officer are irreplaceable, with technology only seen as a useful support. The following passage can, in this regard, be understood as an instance of the self-representation of a professional group with its own set of skills and competences, with the interviewee depicting himself as part of a community of experts.

*The basis is the operator that knows how to do their jobs, because any instrument used by a stupid, by a fool... (...) There are lots of instruments that we have at our disposal, what is emerging is an excess where it is expected that these instruments could replace the person. It is not a replacement, it is a support. The officer on the street is the first thing.*

*Sergeant of the local police of Northern City*

What is significant is that the claims presented above mirror perfectly Goold’s finding, that in his study saw “few serving officers regard[ing] cameras as the equivalent of having a police officer on every corner” (Goold, 2004: 171). Also, while the adoption of CCTV is couched in terms of efficiency, higher ranks were well aware of the problems arising when trying to quantify these very benefits. Again, this is consistent with the wider literature on video surveillance. While among practitioners and criminologists there is a shared understanding that CCTV does “work” – whatever we take this “working” to mean – the difficulties encountered in attempting to calculate the benefits generated are considerably hard to overcome, with the only study ever to attempt such a task (Owen et al., 2006) carried out in the English town of Milton Keynes.

In light of what has been said so far, the integration of CCTV into the existing policing strategies for Northern City was framed in terms of an increase in the degree of complexity involved in the management of the resources available on the part of the local police. However, soon this rationalisation encountered resistance, both from outside and inside the police. First, the ratio of officers assigned to active or office duty became highly problematical. On one hand in fact, for the video surveillance system to have any effect in terms of policing, it is necessary to have someone actually looking at the cameras. On the other, though, this directly clashed with the desire expressed by the administration to have as many officers on patrol as possible. This measure was seen as
instrumental to the re-organisation of the force as a whole, which aimed at increasing
the visibility of both police personnel and their activities. Because the local police is
directly dependent on the guidelines and the orders issued by the administration, these
political considerations were, at the same time, binding and in contrast with the
discourse that the higher ranks of the force were trying to put together and reproduce.

Now the trend, the guideline is to save personnel [assigned to office duties] and send
more officers outside, which is at the same time sensible and dangerous. It is sensible
because personnel are the scarcest and most precious resource, and so to be used
rationally, but on the other hand it is dangerous because if you are not able to govern
such a process you end up favouring immediate advantages, an additional officer on the
streets, against problems that will eventually manifest themselves. If I do not govern
administrative processes inside, when I realise there's a problem it's too late and it
becomes harder to solve it. (...) This is what I was talking about before, you need to
govern the process. If you can see the process, you can keep things together, you can
manage the personnel and rationalise our services and things like this. If you are not
aware of the process, you’ll end up doing harm.
Former deputy commissioner of the local police of Northern City

The decision to favour the visibility of police interventions, and the consequent re-
structuring of the organisational arrangements in place in the control room is especially
puzzling if we consider the continuous expansion of the CCTV system of Northern
City.

You must manage the cameras sensibly. You need personnel to watch them, to launch
an alarm if that’s the case... While what we have is a situation where the control room
with all the monitors... at night there is only one person there and we only have one
patrol in the whole city because we cannot afford to have more than one. At the time I
would issue some guidelines with specific concern for the suburbs, but now I don’t
know... I would send patrols where there were no cameras, but now I see that patrols
are always in the city centre so that everyone can see them, but it’s useless that they are
there, because patrols must go to the peripheral areas, in the toughest zones, where
there’s drug dealing and prostitution...
Former mayor of Northern City

What went missing in the passage from the previous to the current administration was
the willingnes, on the part of elected figures, to acknowledge that the police do possess
a specialised set of skills and competences and that, because of this expertise, they are
better equipped to decide how things should be done. Significantly, the lack of regard
the current administrators display in their dealings with the police is accompanied by a
profound unawareness of how the police force operate on a day-to-day basis, and what
kind of problems officers have to put up with everyday. A comparison between the following two passages is in, this regard, significant:

My role was political, so I was supposed to provide recommendations on what to do and what not to do, so I had the responsibility of defining the priorities and making sure that resources would be available and conditions would be met so that we could get things done. Beyond that, I never set foot into the control room, because I don’t think that it’s a politician’s job to go into the control room and to attend to actions that, in some moments, require qualifications that a politician does not have, but police officers do.
Former assessore alla sicurezza of Northern City

Our approach to security has been very pragmatic. We started by analysing the situation so that we could identify the best instruments to use in order to solve some problems that had become common in our city (...) and then the administration identified the means and the strategies so as to improve the instruments we had available. (...) So we deal with this issue [the implementation of the CCTV system] at the right time, with technologies that guarantee a smooth functioning and a series of results and do not put use in the condition to worry about whether something works or not, or to face high maintenance costs.
Current assessore alla sicurezza of Northern City

Along with the tension stemming from the way the relation between the administration and the police has come to be structured problems are also arising internally, because of the resistance to the adoption of CCTV and its integration into policing strategies within the force. The present issue will now be explored in greater detail.
Two points need to be made. First, from an organisational point of view, technologies can be considered as “occasions that trigger social dynamics which, in turn, modify or maintain an organization’s contours” (Barley, 1986: 81). Under this light, it is not tenable to assume that the implementation of video surveillance will not have an impact on the overall organisation of the local police, both internally, in terms of the strategies and practices they adopt, and externally, in relation to the other institutions involved in the provision of policing within the space of the city. Second, I also wish to emphasise how difficult it generally is for the police to change their strategies and programmes of action, and how the force has generally shown little capacity to effect modifications in its management patterns, organisational practices and internal power distribution (Kelling, 1983: 159). Taken together, the above assumptions are a clear indicator of how, in light of their inherent conservatism and respect for tradition, the police do represent an interesting case for charting the process through which a technology comes
to be accepted into the practices of an organisation. In this regard, the former deputy
commissioner of the local police in Northern City was a particularly relevant informant.
For one, his sharp vision on how CCTV should have been integrated into existing
policing strategies strongly informed both the actual implementation and the discursive
attempts on the part of the police as whole to make sense of video surveillance. Having
experienced them personally, though, he was also well aware of the resistances that
emerged after the system was activated.

It’s the resistance to change, which is always there. It went on for quite a while, let’s
say that not everyone was completely involved, [video surveillance] did not change the
mentality. I really have to say we failed in this. (...) I ended up with a bad reputation
among the officers... It is such a widespread mentality, they thought I was a sort of Cain.
But it’s not possible, we need to provide a service and we must do so at the best of our
possibilities, but then... The problem was not with the system of video surveillance in
itself, but with the potential effects in terms of how our job was to be organised. That’s
why it was seen with concern, alarm, because it was feared that it would disturb
internal balances.
Former deputy commissioner of the local police of Northern City

While the conservatism and the change-averse orientation of the police can lead to the
labelling of any change as bad, it is interesting to note how the opposition to CCTV and,
on a more general level to the technologisation of policing in Northern City, does
exploit extremely contemporary language and arguments. What officers protest is not,
in fact, the rejection of the traditional strategies and instruments used by the police, but
rather the loss of privacy they have suffered because of the presence of the cameras.
However, in the course of informal conversations with police officers during fieldwork
it soon became clear that what they presented, and mourned, as a loss of privacy, was
actually a loss of autonomy. Below is an excerpt from the field notes I produced during
my time in the control room.

Session 6 – early evening.
The officer assigned to the control room is telling me why the cameras are directed the
way they are. Pointing to an image that is reproduced on three different monitors, he
says: “Do you know why that camera is pointed at the door of that church? Do you see
how it is shown on three other monitors? [He points at each of them] Can you see that
side alley, next to the building? We walk there to go to a bar nearby, so they can always
know if maybe you stopped there 5 minutes for a coffee and then it’s a pain in the ass
for you. Can you see the other side [pointing to another monitor]? Can you see that it’s
on 2 monitors? If you go that way it’s another way to get to the same bar and so it’s
always them controlling. And I mean, according to the Workers’ Statute they couldn’t do it but they do it anyway. I talked to the woman who was here before about this but she was all like “If I don’t put anything down in writing, I can do anything”. So, this is what it’s used for, to control us. Even ex-cons who have just gotten out of jail are not under the same scrutiny, that’s why they put them up. Even the radios, can you see? The new ones have a GPS, so they can control you at all times.”

The outrage felt by patrolling officers is understandable in light of the mock bureaucratic nature (Gouldner, 1954) of the police. While in principle the actions of police officers are rigidly regulated by law and there is a well defined line of command which should ensure the control of higher ranks on street level officers, this depiction is far from the truth. “The essentially unbureaucratic and nonmilitaristic nature of low-level police work (…) suggests that the police organization presents an impressive hierarchical façade that only serves to disguise the nonbureaucratic reality of much activity” (Punch, 1983: 228-229). “Because police tasks at the lower level are ill-defined, episodic, non-routine, accomplished in the regions of low visibility, and are dispatched in ways that most often bypass the formal chain of command in the organisation, control over the work resided largely in the hands of those who perform the work. In this sense, (…) only the appearance of control, not the reality, is of managerial concern” (Van Maanen, 1983: 277). As opposed to the management of the resources available or the modification of policing strategies, where the integration of CCTV proved problematic, the policing of police officers is a much more straightforward matter. In an interesting turn of events, in Northern City officers felt strongly about becoming objects of surveillance, though not out of fear of the footage being used as supporting evidence in the filing of complaints for police malpractice (as is the case in Goold, 2004), but rather for the tighter control technology enables higher ranks to exercise. Two implications can be drawn from this last point. First, that the use of any technology is socially constructed by the actors who interact with it in light of the specific culture and practices of a given context – in this case, in light of the strained relationships between officers and management in Northern City. Second, and directly related to what has been just said, that the same technology can generate different effects in different institutional settings. Technology is what actors immersed in a specific culture and operating in a given setting make of it.

To sum up, police attempts to justify the adoption of CCTV revolved around the idea of efficiency, specifically trying to build the notion that video surveillance could become a
tool that would make policing more effective. The resulting discourse is, thus, completely internal to the dynamics of the force; as such, it is essentially the expression of a managerial, professional and instrumental logic. However, this discursive construction faces strong opposition from two different sides. On one hand, strong resistances hail from within the organisation, with police officers viewing the implementation of the CCTV system as a threat to their autonomy. On the other, the official police discourse on video surveillance is also undermined by what the current administration is doing, with its efforts to place more emphasis on the symbolic value of CCTV. In this light video surveillance is promoted as a tool that can enforce a moralist – and inherently discriminatory – notion of what constitutes an acceptable behaviour in the public space of the city. Essentially, what is at stakes in the conflictual interaction between higher ranks and street-level officers on one hand, and between the police as a whole and the administration on the other, is the ability to define univocally what video surveillance is and how it should be used.

**Replacement or support?**

As we have seen, two competing rationalisations are proposed in relation to what CCTV is and how it should be used in Northern City. On one hand, the administration seeks to advance a securitarian discourse centred on the theme of fear and the need to protect oneself from the dangers of public life. Within this general approach, video surveillance is seen as an instrument that enables the enforcement of higher levels of control, thanks to the quick deployment of police personnel in case of need. Because of a lack of knowledge about what happens in the control room and the daily reality of how the system is managed, it can be said that the current administration has effectively bought into the illusion that CCTV guarantees total control in the city. This also explains the plans for further development of the system that are currently underway in the city. At the same time, the police express a different series of concerns, with video surveillance considered in its capacity to improve the efficiency of policing. As a consequence, what gains centre stage is the understanding of how video surveillance can be successfully integrated into existing policing strategies, specifically in regard to the rationalisation of patrolling activities and the better allocation of available resources. However, the view on video surveillance within the force is far from homogenous. While there is
widespread agreement that cameras could never replace officers, the level of support
does change sensibly according to one’s position within police hierarchy. On one hand,
high-ranking officers support the technology in spite of the lack of proper evaluations
on the results obtained thanks to it. On the other, though, street-level officers, who have
a clearer view on the reality of CCTV in Northern City, are far more skeptical on the
benefits to be obtained thanks to the cameras. As I was told while in the control room:

Session 10 – early evening.
May I tell you something? I think video surveillance is a lot of crap, completely useless.
The only thing it can be used for is if it catches a glimpse of what is passing by, so I can
use it to reconstruct the dynamic of a car crash, but that’s about it. With these 700’000
€ we could have bought three new officers and they would be much better in terms of
surveillance.

At a cursory glance, it could seem that these two discourses are effectively reflecting at
the local level of Northern City Garland’s distinction between “criminologies of the
self” and “criminology of the other” (Garland, 2001). Briefly, what separates these two
paradigms is the portrayal of the offender each perspective assumes to be true. While
the former embodies a managerialist approach where criminals are rational actors that
seek to maximise their personal utility, the latter re-dramatises crime and sees offenders
as the embodiment of irreducible other-ness. In Garland’s view these two sets of
assumptions are mutually incompatible and give rise “to a set of policies that are
increasingly dualistic, increasingly polarized, and increasingly schizophrenic. Behind
these contradictory policies and practices stand criminological frameworks that are
diametrically opposed in crucial respects” (Garland, 2001: 137). However, there are
sound reasons to believe that the relation between the securitarian and managerial
discourses identified in Northern City is less contradictory and more nuanced than it
might be initially suggested. On a general level, Zedner states that “it is simply a
mistake to regard contemporary penality as displaying two contradictory faces (…) [as]
risk assessment and incapacitation are founded upon the same notions of individual
responsibility and are both grounded in rational choice theory (Zedner, 2003: 161).
Looking more specifically at the Italian context and the case study of Northern City, a
variety of factors needs to be taken into consideration, thus sensibly complicating the
overall picture and forcing us to abandon any temptation of adopting an oppositional
view.
On one hand, people’s growing feeling of insecurity and the corresponding demand for protection sit together well both with the law & order agenda pushed by the administration and the recent transformations occurred in Italian criminal law. In this regard, while white-collar crime has been substantially de-criminalised, the passing of the security package has resulted in an increase of severity in the sanctions afforded for street-level crime, as this was deemed to generate heightened levels of alarm in the population. At the same time, a series of norms⁵⁴ on habitual offenders and immigration have led to a sensible rise in the prison population, with an over-representation of immigrants – which account for 36.2% of the inmates, but only for 7.5% of the general population. National and regional funding available for security-related projects can also be considered as expression of the same approach to security, specifically in their almost complete refusal to finance the hiring of new personnel as opposed to the acquisition of technology.

Under such circumstances, the expert opinion of the police and the managerial approach they embody seem to be in striking minority. However, a closer look at the reality of video surveillance in Northern City forces us to reconsider this last claim. The organisational arrangements that have been adopted in the daily management of CCTV have appointed the police with the management of the system – thus effectively allowing them complete control on how the system is used and to what ends. As such, even if their discursive strategies are at odds with the prevailing climate and they depend on administration-issued guidelines to know how they are expected to do their job, there still is ample room for agency and autonomy on their part. Thus, this realisation forces us to analyse the issue at hand in different terms, namely that of the relationship between expertise and rule in Northern City.

Miller and Rose (2008) see the role played by expertise in advanced liberal societies as being intermediary between the governed and those who govern, thus effectively making governing at a distance possible. Under this light, expert language plays a relevant role, as “it can translate the objectives and values of others into its own terms”, while “its norms and values seem compelling because of their claim to a disinterested truth, and the promise they offer of achieving desired results” (Miller and Rose, 2008: 35). Potentially, expertise can represent a threat for political power, as experts can generate what Giddens (1985: 13) termed enclosures, that is bounded areas “within

which their power and authority is concentrated, intensified and defended” (Miller and Rose, 2008: 69). However, the authors believe this threat can be neutralised thanks to the pervasiveness of economic modes of calculation – auditing, accounting, budgeting – which end up governing areas previously regulated by bureaucratic or professional norms. While this is certainly a solid account on the large-scale developments that have taken place in advanced democracies in the past decades, this is not an apt representation of the situation in Northern City.

The differences have already been brought to light in the course of this chapter. For one, the managerial language adopted by the local police does not translate the agenda pushed by the administration into the less politicised terms of a disinterested truth, but rather provides a more poised counterpart to the vocal claims on crime and security made by the administrators. Also, the necessity for more “objective” tools for the assessment of policing performances is called for by the police themselves and is not used as a way to limit their autonomy by tying them to a series of indicators. As such, we can conclude that Northern City can be seen as a case where there is a fracture between rule and expertise, with police and administration disagreeing on what constitutes a problem, what constitutes “good policing” and which strategies and tools are best used to reach this goal. Also, because of the role played by the local police in the provision of security in Northern City, the administration is not in a position to neutralise or silence the alternative discourse they promote. What city administrators have managed to accomplish so far is relegating it to the backstage, so that the impression that is projected outside is a spectacle of unity, rather than the picture of a quarrelling couple. However, this representation remains superficial and no permanent balance is ever achieved between securitarian and managerialist approaches. As a result, the understanding of CCTV in Northern City is marked by confusion, disagreement and unrealistic expectations on what the cameras can accomplish.
10. The re-spatialisation of security in Central City

The small-town feel of Central City

Before analysing the role played by video surveillance within the overall approach to security adopted in Central City, a few words are necessary to describe some important features of the context under investigation. Located in one of the regioni rosse, since the 1970s\(^5\), the city has been almost invariably governed by centre-left coalitions. Two important, and directly related, points can be drawn from this. First, the hegemony at the local level of a very specific political culture means that there is substantial agreement between the two administrations that have governed the city while the CCTV system was being implemented. This goes to explain why the current administration has not challenged any of the decisions made by the previous one, while embracing the identification of both the policy goals to be pursued and the strategies best suited to achieve them. Second, the self-representation of members belonging to this specific political culture plays a fundamental role in shaping the interviewees’ answers to the contingent governmental problems that they faced or have to face in their capacity of city administrators. Characterised by a strong emphasis on inclusion and social solidarity, its influence is apparent in the languages and images conveyed in the course of the interviews. While it may border on the obvious to say so, though, this is not to say that the policies and strategies implemented in Central City are necessarily inclusive, but that an overarching narrative exists, that the interviewees use to create a history of Central City where actions and policies necessarily proceed towards greater and greater inclusion and social cohesion.

The first narrative that emerged from the interviews is understandable if we consider the significance attached to notion of the Italian provincia. Literally translated as province, the word identifies the network of small to medium-sized towns that makes up the urban fabric of Northern and Central Italy, where daily life is traditionally depicted as being not as anonymous and alienating as in larger cities. Bearing this notion in mind, it becomes easier to understand why, in spite of the actual number of people living there, many of the policies implemented by the administration revolve around the idea that the

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\(^5\)Regional and provincial elections were first held in 1970.
small-town feel of the city is something desirable and, as such, to be actively maintained. The following passage explicitly acknowledges the matter:

*This is still a city that still remembers perfectly when there were 15000 people living here... For its characteristics, there are 110000 residents now, this is a city where the issue of human resources for the safeguard of public order is still central...*
*Former mayor of Central City*

Generally speaking, the overall goal that the security policies implemented by the administration wish to achieve is the reassurance of the population. In the specific case of Central City, there are two distinct, but related, ways in which this is pursued. First, efforts are made so as to make the institutions that govern the city closer to the population and, second, this is coupled with attempts to decrease the overall exposition, of both the city and its inhabitants, to risks. This is what the current mayor had to say in this regard:

*The policies we are implementing have not to do with security, but rather with reassurance. This means that the goal we have is to have the institutions of the city with their organizations come closer to the citizens, so as to promote a city where life is not exposed to risks.*
*Current mayor of Central City*

On a practical level, the shift away from security towards reassurance has sparked a twofold process of decentralization of control, on one hand, and of polycentralisation of the urban fabric on the other.
As for the first aspect, this resonates with the work carried out by governmentality scholars, which have used the Foucauldian notion to account for the fragmentation and dispersion of control in advanced liberal societies (Rose, 1999a). The end of the monopoly of the state on control means that this is no longer “centralized, but dispersed” (Rose, 2000: 325) and that multiple other centres of government emerge, that equally seek to act upon people’s conduct in order to meet a variety of goals: a better health, a better education, a safer house and so forth. In light of this, the idea of the state as an all-encompassing reality has been replaced by a discourse centred on its new enabling and facilitating features. The limited role now being played by the state has, for the scope of the analysis being carried out here, two meaningful implications.
The first is that there has been a consistent shift of powers downwards, so that local authorities have acquired duties that were previously discharged by higher levels of government. This redistribution is evident in areas that used to be under the strict control of the state and that, today, are regulated by other institutions, either public or private. The field of crime control is, here, a case in point, with local authorities increasingly involved in the provision of policing (Loader, 2000). In this regard, the local authorities of Central City have long tried to enforce control along two separate lines of intervention. First, efforts are constantly made at maintaining relaxed relationships with law enforcement agencies based in the city; second, the spatial allocation of local police personnel was always planned so as not to leave out any area of the city itself.

The fundamental theme in terms of stronger perceptions of security, in terms of reassurance and of security policies, for us was always the diffusion over the territory of local police forces. Over the years, we tried to get every district to have its own local precinct and its own police officers. Clearly you cannot cover the whole territory, but still... This is the direction we always tried to follow.
Former mayor of Central City

Also of significance are the attempts on the part of the administration to involve citizens in the achievement and maintenance of high levels of security. The active role that people living in Central City are encouraged to perform is part and parcel with the shift towards a more limited role for the state to play. According to Rose, at the core of this transformation lies a double movement of “autonomization and responsabilization”, with other subjects having to “take on themselves – as ‘partners’ – a portion of the responsibility” (1999b: 476). Essentially, when the state can no longer guarantee security and protection to its citizens, responsibility for risk management is shifted towards local authorities and other non-state agencies. People become co-responsible. There is a striking similarity between the quotes presented above and the language and vocabulary used by the administrators to explain how they tried to get people involved into the making of security in Central City:

With the prefect we launched a series of little publications, leaflets about the safe city: the risks to avoid, the things not to do... And they were easily available at the post office, at the bus stop... The issue of prevention, of sharing information with citizens so as to make them more actively responsible was always very close to our heart.
Former mayor of Central City
The second security strategy implemented by city administrators intervenes directly on the urban fabric of Central City. The assumption that transforming the urban form of the city will foster positive policy outcomes – in this specific case: reassurance – is what lies at the heart of the consistent efforts spent in promoting a radical reorganization of the structure of the city itself. The keyword here is polycentricity. However, before presenting in greater detail what the concept came to mean in Central City and how it was used planning-wise, we need to take a step back and see how the notion of polycentric urban forms has developed in the literature.

In the course of time, different models of urban forms have been developed to advance a conceptualization of possible patterns of urban growth. However, the first models to appear were decidedly monocentric, and mainly based on US case studies. In this regard, within the ecological analyses carried out by the urban sociologists of the Chicago School, Burgess’ 1925 essay is a famous case in point, in that it presents a model of urban forms where a series of concentric circles divides the city into five different areas.

![Figure 8 – Burgess’ model of urban form (1925)](image)

However, in the face of rapid change, monocentric models eventually became inadequate to explain the spatial structure of cities; as a result, from the 1970s onwards polycentric models started to gain more and more currency in the debate. Among other factors, the transformations that occurred in the relationships between firms have played a relevant role in promoting the growing relevance of polycentrism as a valid conceptualization of contemporary urban patterns (Scott, 1988; Porter, 1990; Krugman, 1991). In spite of its significance, though, the notion of polycentrism remains elusive,
meaning, as it does, different things at different spatial scales and for different people. At the intra-urban level, it refers to the patterns of clustering of activities within the same city, while at the inter-urban level it describes a region where several urban centres all act as alternative poles of attraction. Finally, at the inter-regional level it is instead used to promote a conceptualization of urban regions that moves away from the traditional opposition between core and periphery\textsuperscript{56} (classification taken from: Davoudi, 2003).

The meaning also changes depending on who is using it, thus only contributing to perpetuating the confusion. As Davoudi notes, “urban planners use the concept as a strategic spatial planning tool; economic and human geographers use it to explain the changing spatial structure of cities; (...) and civic leaders use the term for ‘place-marketing’, presenting the notion of polycentricity as synonymous with pluralism, multi-culturalism and dynamism, as well as a symbol of the ‘post-modern’ life style. It has become part of the new vocabularies of inclusive politics” (Davoudi, 2003: 979-980).

This is exactly how city administrators have come to use the notion of polycentrism in relation to the urban development of Central City. Planning-wise, this has resulted in efforts to provide every area of the city with the necessary facilities and services so as to make it self-sufficient.

\textit{Since 1999 (...) we introduced the theme of the polycentric city. That is, a city where there is not a historical centre to preserve, to protect, to develop and then a series of shapeless suburbs. Rather, a diffused city, so that every neighbourhood would have its own school, its own park, its own community centre, its own theatre, so that if young people want to go and spend time in the city centre it’s ok... But what I wanted to stress is that they wouldn’t have to do so out of necessity, because in their neighbourhood there’s nothing. And if you think about all the regeneration projects that we embarked upon... these ideas really informed all of them.}

\textit{Former mayor of Central City}

The polycentric rearrangement of the urban pattern of Central City is also advocated and promoted because of the beneficial effects it is believed to generate in terms of urban security. More to the point, the interviews are explicit in linking the regeneration efforts undertaken in the city to the attainment of higher levels of security within the

\textsuperscript{56}The EU’s European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDPS) is, in this regard, a case in point.
urban area. In this regard, it is also significant that the succession of different administrations in the time frame considered did not lead to any change to this approach. A comparison between the two excerpts below does show how the former and current mayor of Central City share the same views on the issue at hand:

*We always considered this [polycentric urban planning] as the pivotal point for a safe city, because of the assumption that a looked after city, with quality public space, produces more security and less deviance than a neglected and forsaken one.*

*Former mayor of Central City*

*Feeling safer has to do with the urban environment, when a city is... If there are signs of decay, of lack of care, lack of attention, then people will feel more exposed to delinquency, because they signal that you do not control the territory.*

*Current mayor of Central City*

The link that is established between security and urban care is strongly resonant of the association between disorder and crime that is posited by the broken windows theory (Wilson and Kelling, 1982). However, in the case of Central City this has not lead to the implementation of strategies of aggressive policing, as the following section will show in greater detail.

**The broken windows theory, Central City style**

As seen above, the initiatives launched in Central City essentially aimed to establish a “system of urban quality based on the diffusion of services and facilities throughout the territory of the city” (Interviewee C_P1). Significantly, in the interviews this approach was justified by explicitly referring to the broken windows theory, as exemplified by the following excerpt:

*If you toss a cigarette butt, those who see you do that will do the same, because they will think that no one... If you do not fix a broken glass, the following day you’ll find that three others have been smashed.*

*Former mayor of Central City*

First formulated by Wilson and Kelling in 1982, the broken windows theory introduced the claim of a close association between urban disorder and crime levels. In spite of its enduring popularity and its appeal to city authorities in several countries, though, over
the years it has also faced a number of criticisms. For one, disorder is, and remains, a complex concept; along with its physical manifestations, be it litter on the streets, or graffiti on the walls of a building, a relevant, if only recently addressed, role is played by the way people perceive and interpret these signs. In a methodologically and substantially innovative paper, Sampson (2009) has shown how in a neighbourhood some features which do not directly relate to disorder are nevertheless used by people to assess the level of it in an area. At the same time, Sennett (2009:58) suggests that we distinguish between “a police officer’s definition of disorder purely in terms of crime (...) [and the] realm of decay, a consequence of being left behind, of being forgotten” that the poor are condemned to. In spite of the fact that the very signs that are a source of serious concerns for some are bound to be considered by others as the edgy manifestation of a thriving neighbourhood, though, broken windows posits that the meaning of these signs is unambiguous, and causally linked to crime.

The idea of order advanced in the original paper describes the path towards decline of a “stable neighborhood of families who care for their homes [and] mind each other’s children’ (Wilson and Kelling, 1982: 31) when all of a sudden signs of disorder, left unattended, attract “a criminal invasion” (ibid. 32) of disorderly people. In this context, the meaning of both order and disorder is extremely clear. Where the former signals that ‘the community cares about is neighborhood and is prepared to enforce norms of orderliness”, the latter “means that no one cares” (Harcourt, 1998: 305). Here, there is no room for ambiguity or negotiation: disorder is always bad. The theory is based on a series of assumptions “about the privilege of order over disorder, and insider over outsider, about the likelihood of criminal invasion in disorderly neighborhoods; and about the suspicious nature of the unattached adult. (...) It reflects an aesthetic of orderliness, cleanliness, and sobriety” (ibid.).

On a practical level, the enforcement of the broken windows theory through strategies for the aggressive policing of urban space has been particularly contested in relation to two troubling issues. First, there are the claims of police brutality, as witnessed by the surge in the number of complaints filed against NYPD officers and, consequently, in the sums paid out by NYC authorities in settlements for such cases during the “zero tolerance” years of mayor Giuliani. Second, the focus on minor offences that is at the heart of this strategy of policing mostly affects the poorest sectors of the urban
population, thus leading to the disproportionate targeting of minorities (see Harcourt, 1998).

However, the case of Central City is significant in that it demonstrates that there is no necessary link between an administration concerned with the quality of life in urban space and the implementation of strategies for the aggressive curtailment of misdemeanours. Rather differently, the vision of orderly neighbourhoods promoted by the administration revolves around a different series of interventions, that impact on the urban environment of the city in a decidedly softer manner.

*Security for us is about a variety of interventions. We have CCTV cameras (...), then we have the “Taking care of the city” project, where we created a team that along with volunteers chosen among the elderly in each borough, intervenes where there are signs of decay, such as unmown grass, or garbage bins that have gone unemptied. (...) Other measures are aimed at the curtailment of car traffic in the city centre, so as to diminish the risk both for the citizens and the environment.*

*Current mayor of Central City*

In light of this, the identification on the part of the administration of what, in its eyes, makes Central City safe appears coherent with the overall strategy outlined above. Essentially, efforts are directed towards the fight against social marginality, as it is assumed that this will lead to a fairer, and consequently safer, city. The initiatives launched to this end fall into two broad categories. On one hand, there are all the services in support of at-risk sectors of the population, such as live-alone elderly or disadvantaged youths. On the other, special attention is paid to support employment levels in the area. As such, efforts are made to provide opportunities for continuing education and training courses for those who find it difficult to enter or re-enter the job market. As the former *assessore alla sicurezza* said:

*I always said that this is a quiet city, where the quality of life is good. The feeling of insecurity among the population are the result of one factor, people are insecure about their jobs, about employment. This was the number one priority for me.*

*Former assessore alla sicurezza of Central City*

The attention paid to the quality of life in Central City goes hand in hand with an emphasis on respecting the division of competences that exists concerning public order and law enforcement. This has allowed for the establishment of a much warmer climate
of co-operation between the administration and the local police, on one hand, and national law enforcement agencies – mainly, Polizia and Carabinieri – on the other.

_We always put much effort into creating the conditions for co-operation. If today there’s a strong connection between urban policing and community policing, it’s mainly thanks to the work that has been done over the years. We were never into passing the buck... We always rolled up our sleeves and worked together._
Former mayor of Central City

Before moving on to the next section, the following passage can be quoted as a neat summarisation of the overall approach to security that has been adopted in Central City. The quick mention of CCTV provides the bridge to the pages that follow, where the role played by video surveillance within the security policies of the city will be analysed in greater detail.

_There’s no doubt that this was our perspective: a city that is looked after, with a better quality of life, is safer. If the quality of life worsens, if poverty increases, if public property is neglected due to lack of resources, if young people drop out of school because education has become unaffordable for families... You honestly cannot expect that cameras will curb street-level crime. The technological system that we put up for deterrence and pre-emption only really works if it rests upon a solid social and cultural fabric._
Former mayor of Central City

**Political and policing perspectives on CCTV**

In the course of their interviews, administrators only had words of praise for the CCTV system, as it had matched the expectations they held prior to its implementation.

_We achieved what we wanted to achieve so we are satisfied. We believe the money used for the CCTV system was well spent._
Current mayor of Central City

The deterring potential of the cameras is cited as being responsible for the decrease in the number of acts of vandalism recorded in the areas of the city centre covered by the system. However, these statements are not based on analyses carried out specifically to identify the effects brought about by CCTV in the city, but on a series of indirect indicators that were already available through the different city departments, which had collected them for other purposes. At a cursory glance, this could well be a smart
strategy to overcome the known difficulties involved in quantifying the benefits, both in terms of efficiency and effectiveness, brought about by video surveillance. In the course of the interviews, though, it became clear that not much effort has really been put into finding ways to assess CCTV and the results it generates; as if the mere availability of a technology is sufficient to produce “some” results.

_We assessed that these acts [of vandalism] decreased sensibly in comparison to what the situation was like before [the activation of the system]. It’s not like we calculated percentages, it’s just that several departments, mainly the local police, public works and maintenance, believe that there has been a decrease in this kind of acts_.

*Current mayor of Central City*

What is, I believe, more interesting is how the positive assessment of CCTV is effortlessly coupled with the decision to put the further expansion of the system on hold, because of monetary matters. Originally, the plan was to complete the extension to 46 cameras by the end of 2011 and, to this end, the municipality had successfully applied to the region for co-funding. However, because of the cuts in the amount of resources transferred to local authorities from the central government, the municipality was subsequently forced to adopt a series of austerity measures, among which the temporary suspension of the extension of the system. In this regard, many authors (among them Bauman, 1998; Garland, 2001) have rightly highlighted the potential for electoral gain that is inherent to the pursuit of security, and how a tough stance on crime is conducive to popular support. However, other concerns are also important to administrators who wish not to alienate their supporters, and Central City provides an exemplary case where two competing forces – security and economic concerns – are at play at the same time. Under this light, the following passage neatly presents the political considerations that ended up informing the decisions of the current administration:

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57 In an attempt to get a closer look, I therefore contacted the head of the maintenance department of the municipality, to see whether or not he agreed with the statement above. Sadly, this did not settle the matter conclusively, as he was not sure the decrease that had indeed occurred was sensible, or whether or not the cameras could be held responsible for it.
From the outset, we chose not to increase taxes, so we were forced to put off the schedule for the implementation of some projects, and the extension of the video surveillance system is one of those. 

Current assessore alla sicurezza of Central City

The relatively secondary role played by security issues in Central City can help to account for the present situation. However, the contradiction between the results that political actors believe CCTV has brought and its expandable quality remains. In regard to this, the following section will analyse this issue in greater detail, to try and identify the reasons that prompted the administration of Central City to embark upon a very expensive project without supporting it to the fullest, but, on the contrary, cutting it short halfway through its completion.

The uncritical support of CCTV on the part of the administrators is matched by the much more nuanced view expressed by police personnel. For one, thanks to their deeper knowledge of the daily reality of CCTV operations, they are more aware of the results the technology has actually helped to accomplish in Central City. Their first-hand experience of the system also goes to some length to account for the evolution of their perspective on video surveillance. As opposed to the unchanging views expressed by political personnel, using data gathered during fieldwork it is actually possible to trace the development of the relation between police officers and CCTV. Interestingly, the evolution of the perception that police personnel have of video surveillance mirrors precisely the development of the theoretical debate on the same topic. More specifically, a shift can be noted, away from the idea of cameras as all-seeing eyes, in favour of a more realistic depiction based on the grim reality of control room operations.

At the very beginning, the police had extremely high expectations for the system to fulfil, as it was widely believed that the cameras would deliver on all fronts and accomplish everything they promised to.

Cameras were supposed to solve all our problems. Everything. Though it’s clear this is not possible. (...) This misunderstanding really has strong roots, that video surveillance always works and works automatically, and not because it displaces [problems], but because it solves them…

Former deputy commissioner of the local police of Central City
Cameras would be able to do so because, second, the mere presence of CCTV was deemed more than enough to induce conformity in people. Consider the following two excerpts, and how they similarly discuss the effects on people of a disciplinary gaze, such as the one embodied by the cameras. It is not the crude enforcement of order, but the possibility of being subjected to the gaze of CCTV that makes people behave.

*What positive effect we had was because people know, they can see the cameras...So, at least in some places, people pay more attention and try to... They know that they are under control, so in some situations they pay more attention. This is where I think [video surveillance] achieved something, because people know that cameras are up there. Then, because not everyone knows things perfectly, maybe someone knows that there are cameras, some may know where they are, but other may not know that, so they will... If you don't know the exact locations, maybe you pay more attention all the time because who knows where they are? (...) I think it is a specific psychology...*  
*Control room operator C1*

*Hence the major effect of the Panopticon: to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power. (...) So it is not necessary to use force to constrain the convict to good behaviour, the madman to calm, the worker to work, the schoolboy to application, the patient to the observation of the regulations. (...) He is who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes responsibility for the constraints of power: he makes them play spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in himself the power relation in which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the principle of his own subjection.*  
*(Foucault, 1977, 201, 202-203)*

However, just as the analytical problems involved in the automatic application of the panoptic paradigm have prompted scholars to take into considerations the daily practicalities of surveillance systems, too, so the local police soon realised that a number of factors impact heavily on how well, and to what extent, CCTV can be used for the policing of urban space. Thus, once the grim reality of the control room and of video surveillance operations set in, cracks soon appeared in the accounts of CCTV provided by police officers. In the course of the interviews, a common motif that police personnel emphatically stressed was how it is not really possible to spend a full, 6-hour work shift looking incessantly at the monitors. In the specific context under examination here, there are a number of structural and organisational factors for which this is actually not feasible. In relation to this, the analysis carried out below does overlap, in some of its parts, with themes and issues that will also feature prominently in the section of this work devoted to the analysis of how the policing of urban space is
actually carried out in Central City. As such, the choice has been made to support the arguments presented here in large part with excerpts culled from the interviews, while the field notes produced during the time spent in the control room will be used more prominently in the chapters that follow.

The first issue that emerged from the interviews mirrors perfectly one of the main findings produced by scholars interested in analysing the reality and variability of surveillance practices and experiences. As seen in the literature review on video surveillance, the organisational and structural features of the context under examination are fundamental in determining how CCTV comes to be used in practice, and what kind of results can be expected in light of them. Under this light, McCahill’s study of an English shopping mall demonstrates how the variety of tasks that CCTV operators are responsible for means that they “cannot dedicate the whole of their time and effort to monitoring the images displayed on the TV screens by the CCTV cameras” (McCahill, 2002: 105). The same can be said of the police officers assigned to the control room in Central City, so much so that this problem was mentioned by all the police officers interviewed in the research. The following passage is pretty exemplary of the concerns shared by police personnel.

*I think the important thing for video surveillance is the availability of personnel, because otherwise... (...) During the day, when you are in the control room there are lots of things that require your attention, the radios, the telephone... So when there is a situation of real danger, in the moment when something actually happens, then you could just miss it or maybe you cannot react to it as quickly as you should, and this is really the key issue here. (...) I mean, if you’ve got cameras then someone must look at them.*

*Control room operator C2*

Even in the cases when there are two officers assigned to the control room, other problems loom large. Simply put, being a CCTV operator is a boring job, as you are required to watch “hours of routinized, uneventful televisual images” (Smith, 2004: 388). As a result, it really is extremely hard to maintain any degree of concentration when watching nothing happening on the screens, especially during night shifts. In this regard, the two passages that follow can be read one along the other.

*Watching hundreds of television screens intently for hours on end in a bid to spot disorder and ‘suspicious’ individuals is no easy undertaking. (...) Whilst each shift is unpredictable regarding what may happen on the cameras, for the most part, everyday*
life in the public arena follows a generally routinized, orderly trajectory. (...) The threats of frustration, stress and alienation are never far away from this particular workplace culture (Smith, 2007: 294-295).

It’s not easy. The person who is in charge of the cameras, imagine yourself in that position... You are looking at 12 screens that go on, 12 situations... (...) So, you have all these images that you have to watch at the same time, and if you keep two or three under control, you lose sight of the others and in the end you are not looking at any of them. This is physiological, really, we are not machines, we’re humans... After a while, your attention is just gone (...) so in the end there’s always something that is not under control at any given time.

Sergeant A of the local police of Central City

In spite of their different perspectives on CCTV, what brings together administrators and police personnel is the firm belief that video surveillance cameras can never replace the physical presence of patrols on the streets, but only act in support of them. Once again, the relevance of human resources as the key tool to be used in the government of the city comes back to the fore:

Within the general context of the security policies of Central City, video surveillance is a partial tool, because the biggest problem we have is how to best use the human resources available with the local police in order to promote these policies.

Current assessore alla sicurezza of Central City

The supporting role played by video surveillance in Central City completely goes against the stance of the previous minister of the interior, Roberto Maroni. As argued in a previous chapter, he saw CCTV as a technological tool that could effectively replace police officers, with positive outcomes to be had both in terms of the overall cost effectiveness of the provision of policing services, and also in relation to the efficacy of policing activities in themselves. It is to this end that he made funding available to encourage local authorities throughout the country to share his vision. In relation to these developments, the administrators of Central City acted strategically, though unsuccessfully, in a bid to get access to funding, verbally embracing the vocabulary and discourse promoted by the ministry.
The funds given by the ministry of the interior dictated that the projects could not apply for funding to more than one body. I tried to argue that the second part of the system was an independent project, but it didn't work.

Former deputy commissioner of the local police of Central City

As opposed to the situation in Northern City, then, on the part of the administration of Central City there is full acknowledgement of the expertise of the police. Because of this, there are no conflicts over the definition of the use of video surveillance cameras. In the prosecution of this work, we will see how this state of things impacts on how CCTV is used on a daily basis for the policing of urban space in Central City.

Why CCTV?

As seen in a previous chapter, the transformations occurred at the level of the central state effectively opened up a space of autonomy and possibility for local authorities to fill. Given the scope of the present research, attention was specifically focused on the issues of crime control and urban security and how local authorities have used their new powers as far as these matters are concerned. In spite of the funds made available to this end at different levels of government, though, the implementation of a CCTV system remains the result of a process that originates locally. Accordingly, the pages that follow will try to provide a clearer characterization of how this process unfolded in Central City, particularly in light of the contradiction that lies at the heart of how city administrators acted in relation to video surveillance.

The reconstruction of how the decision to put up a CCTV system in Central City was justified by the administration has highlighted how video surveillance is seen at the same time both as a useful tool to be used in the policing of public space, and an expendable casualty in the face of growing budgetary restrictions. In light of this, then, there still remains an unanswered question: why CCTV in the first place?

Additionally, the decision to build an open-street CCTV system in Central City can also be considered peculiar in light of two relevant characteristics of the urban context. Data show that the region as a whole suffers from the penetration of organised crime into legit economic activities, with retail and construction as particularly at-risk sectors. Partly due to the close proximity of Rome, it is also an important transit zone for drug

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58The first part of the CCTV system in Central City was partly financed with regional funds.
trafficking. In spite of these problems, however, Central City has, so far, been spared the serious issues that affect the regional capital, with crime rates substantially stable and street-level crime still a manageable matter. On top of this, the socially-oriented approach to security heavily relies on a variety of non police-related tools, with efforts made to integrate strategies and policies that are deemed to produce positive outcomes in terms of urban security without being linked to the field of crime control.

In light of the characteristics mentioned above, in order to find out why the municipality decided to implement an open-street CCTV system in Central City, some elements need to be taken into account. First, the certainty has to be considered, with which city administrators claimed that video surveillance has brought about notable results as concerns the control of the city centre. In spite of the lack of reliable data, CCTV is believed to have been particularly beneficial in terms of its potential for deterrence and, under this light, the expansion of the system is seen as something worth pursuing. Therefore, on the back of the analysis carried out in the pages above, I argue that this stance is the superficial reflection of an underlying attitude towards technology in general, and video surveillance in particular, on the part of city administrators. The notion of the technological fix is, in this regard, worth mentioning. Essentially, this is the idea that technology, as the name suggests, has the innate capacity to fix things, to solve the problems that might arise, in this specific case in relation to the policing of urban space. As Haggerty and Ericson acknowledge, “[t]echnological solutions have a strong cultural allure in Western societies and high technology has emerged as an important marker of progress and organizational reputation. Institutions can, therefore, be tempted to embrace technological solutions to address problems that might be better served through more mundane initiatives” (2006: 14. My emphasis.).

Within the scope of the argument I am advancing, the key element here is the mention of the reputation of the organisation that chooses to adopt a technological solution for one of the problems it has to face. In the case of Central City, I believe that the process that is at play is a reflection of the increasingly uncontested, almost self-evident, necessity for a city to have its own open-street CCTV system. Essentially, an idea is being established that any municipality worth its salt implements video surveillance just because this is what you do. In this development there is a striking resemblance to what Graham has been arguing in relation to the diffusion of CCTV in the UK.
The points he makes in relation to the growth of video surveillance in Britain provide a meaningful reference through which the situation in Italy, and more specifically in Central City, can be viewed. The progressive extension of the coverage of video surveillance so as to gradually cover the entirety of the urban area, along with the growing possibility for interconnection and interoperability of such systems, points in the direction of CCTV becoming synonymous with urban spaces. Looking at the specifics of the Italian situation, it is also apparent how the development of national legislation, along with the provisions made available at different levels of government for local authorities to implement video surveillance, does play a huge role in the progressive embedment of this technology in everyday life.

The acknowledgement of the embedded nature of CCTV allows us, on one hand, to share Graham’s claim that the development of video surveillance mirrors precisely that of networked utilities, which first emerged “as small, specialized networks, geared towards a myriad of uses, utilizing wide ranges of technologies and covering only small parts of cities” (Graham, 2002: 238). Just as we now take water, electricity, gas and phone networks for granted, equally, Graham believes, CCTV “looks set to become a fifth utility” (Graham, 2003: 147), so interwoven into the fabric of daily life so at become less and less visible. On the other, this argument opens the door to the analysis that will be presented in the following chapters, which detail how control is carried out in the two cities where fieldwork was conducted. In doing so, the research will also shed light on what are the practices, strategies and actions that contribute, or work against, the embeddedness of CCTV into the daily policing practices of Central and Northern City.

The spatial and political character of urban security

In the final section of this chapter, some concluding remarks can be offered, both on the role played by CCTV within the security policies of Central City and on the overall notion of security that emerged from the interviews.

As for the former, it was shown how the substantial agreement between police and political personnel on the role to be played by video surveillance is not hindered by the different ways in which the technology is perceived by the two groups. Discursively, there are no tensions over the definition or the use of the cameras, with these remaining
steadily confined to supporting the action of police officers. Rather, the contradictions that emerged were internal to the decision-making process of the administration in relation to the very decision of implementing a CCTV system in Central City. In regard to this, the chapter has argued that this choice can be understood in light of the progressive embedment of video surveillance in the everyday life of cities throughout Italy, so that the failure or the refusal to participate in this process is seen by political actors as potentially damaging of the public reputation of the municipality.

Moving on to how the notion of urban security is understood and implemented in Central City, two further points can be made. First, as detailed in the first sections of this chapter, the security discourse in Central City comes to be inextricably linked to physical interventions carried out on the material space of the city itself. In light of this relation, the understanding of security that emerges is not exclusively based on policing and law enforcement, but starts from – and crucially, returns – to urban space. As such, the space of Central City is no longer only seen as the end destination where policies are implemented, but rather as an active locus for the production and maintenance of urban security. In this regard, Jacob’s words spring to mind:

[Sidewalks and those who use them are not passive beneficiaries of safety or helpless victims of danger. Sidewalks, their bordering uses, and their users, are active participants in the drama of civilization versus barbarism in cities. (Jacobs, 1961: 30).

In the same vein, it is apparent how the urban space of Central City becomes more than just a geographical space, invested, as it is, with ideas about what a good city should be like, and shaped by them in return. The urban fabric of the city can, thus, be understood as “a milieu for capturing and shaping forces (human, spatial, and ideological) proper to a particular stylisation of managing or governing conduct” (Osborne and Rose, 1999: 737). In turn, the re-spatialisation of security that takes place in Central City is made possible by the rich conceptualisation of urban space that is promoted and implemented locally by political actors. Significantly, this mirrors the theoretical shifts that have recently invested geographical thought, as Soja acknowledges in the excerpt below:

Thinking about space has changed significantly in recent years, from emphasizing flat cartographic notions of space as container or stage of human activity or merely the physical dimensions of fixed form, to an active force shaping human life. A new emphasis on specifically urban spatial causality has emerged to explore the generative
effects of urban agglomerations not just on everyday behavior but on such processes as technological innovation, artistic creativity, economic development, social change as well as environmental degradation, social polarization, widening income gaps, international politics, and, more specifically, the production of justice and injustice. 
(2008: 32)

The second claim I wish to make relates to the political implications possessed by the notion of urban security, as understood and implemented in Central City. As seen above, the local approach to security is social, rather than police-based, and is strongly characterised by the efforts made to widen, rather than restrict, the very definition of urban security itself. From the interviews, it emerged that the main concerns of the two administrations that have governed the city in the time frame considered are employment and social inclusion. None of them is crime-related, while both are pursued through the dynamic integration of a variety of strategies, from the use of volunteers to the launch of urban regeneration programmes. Looking at how the broken windows theory has not been implemented in Central City through the enforcement of strategies for the aggressive policing of misdemeanours strongly reinforces the argument made here, too.

So, while in Northern City there was a forceful movement that seeks to deprive the notion of urban security of any political connotation, the very opposite was observed in Central City, where the definition of security is widened so as to include into it more spheres of activity. However, this is just one part of a bigger picture. Based on interviews conducted with both political and police personnel, this section sought to identify the discursive devices and the narrative tropes that the interviewees used to make sense of their actions in light of the ideas they hold about what life in Central City ought to be like. As such it should be considered. In the following chapters, then, the reality of how control is produced on a daily basis in Northern and Central City will be examined, so as to complete the picture presented in the pages above.
11. Rearranging urban space

CCTV and the layering of urban space

The concise Oxford dictionary of mathematics defines discretisation as “[t]he process of approximating a continuous function or relation by a discrete alternative” (Clapham and Nicholson, 2009), thus making it suitable for implementation on a computer. Within the scope of my analysis, the concept is relevant in that it can be used to account for the process through which video surveillance imposes a virtual layer over the space of the city, thus effectively creating a discrete counterpart to it. In light of this process, the material world retains its complex and messy nature, while, on the other hand, a technology-mediated layer, with well-defined boundaries and characteristics, is superimposed to it. Visually, the relationship between these two spaces can be imagined as if represented through the interface of a GIS mapping software, where the set of layers that occupy the left-hand side of the screen creates the map that is presented on the opposite side.

This second layer is made up of a variety of both abstract and physical elements. On one hand, the cameras, the control room and the technological infrastructure (wires, antennas, cables etc.) necessary to put the system in working conditions give it a physical and tangible quality. However, this all come into being only because of ideas about the dangerousness of problem areas in the city, and about the desirability of remote control of people and places.
This is a reflection of the shrinking role of the state and the concurrent emergence of multiple other centres of government that equally seek to act upon people’s conduct in order to meet a variety of different goals. Because these competing poles are separated in time, or in space, or in both, from the people whose conduct they wish to shape, they will have to be able to govern at a distance, that is “through the actions of a whole range of other authorities” (Rose, 2000: 323). Additionally, the new limited role that the state is called to perform means that everyone else – and not just people, but organisations, companies, firms and so forth – will have to take on themselves a new series of responsibilities. The growing activism of local authorities in the field of urban security is a reflection of this process.

The emphasis on the necessity for people to manage their own risks is also reminiscent of the role played by notions of risk in structuring this layer. Essentially, problem spots within the area of the city are selected, where cameras are to be located according to a logic of pre-emption. When taken together, all these elements coalesce into a new risk-based geography, which selectively picks problem spots to create a new map of the city, organised according to the dangerousness of each area in the eyes of the police. Drawing upon the work of Foucault (1972), we can argue that maps are power/knowledge devices, inextricably linked to the activity of governing. To map a territory is to know it and, therefore, to govern it. Historically, it is no coincidence that mapping often went hand in hand with the establishment of systems of taxation, or with colonial expansion, as information on the territories that were progressively conquered
was necessary in order to exploit them more profitably. However, mapping always entails creating hierarchies of importance and, in light of those, choosing accordingly as, out of necessity, maps cannot show everything. Therefore, a selection is always necessary, of the features that we want to include in our representation. In light of this discretionality, it can be argued that maps provide a visual representation of a specific configuration of authority and power – incidentally, the same power that gets to select, and decide, what gets and what does not get onto the map itself. Thus, maps are not intended to represent the actual reality of the society they depict, for they represent only that slice of it that interests the official observer. When allied with power, maps allow much of the reality they depict to be remade (Scott, 1998: 3).

In relation to how the location of the cameras creates a new map of urban space, the two cities where research was conducted present a strikingly similar situation. The places where cameras were placed are those where it is usually easier to find marginality – the train station, the parks, the parking lots –, so that it can be argued that the distribution of cameras throughout the two cities, that in the eyes of the police charts the distribution of risk and crime, is just as accurate in tracking the spatial arrangement of marginality. Thus, in a governmental perspective, the map created by implementing a CCTV system in the two cities allows for a shift of focus from citizens in general to specific categories of “dangerous” people, that are believed to populate the train station or the city parks, and that need to be managed and controlled. A specific configuration of the relationship between those that govern and those that are governed, and of how power is exercised in the city, and over whom, is, thus, stabilised in the spatial arrangement of the cameras throughout the urban terrain.

The overall aim of the implementation of a CCTV system is to reduce the complexity of both urban space and public encounters so as to make policing easier. Spatially, this is achieved thanks to the identification of problem spots within the urban fabric of the city where cameras are, then, installed. As a result of the implementation, these locations are singled out from their surroundings and interconnected through a network that then brings isolated fragments of urban space into the operation centre, before the eyes of CCTV operators. The reduction of complexity, thus, proceeds by decreasing the amount of bare information that police officers are faced with, with the assumption that viewing these snapshots will put the operators in the condition to decide whether or not something is happening, either under the cameras or in their immediate surroundings.
Therefore, what becomes central are the activities and the processes through which the images projected by the monitors are invested with meaning, and consequently used as a basis for decision-making and problem-solving. In order to make sense of what they see on the cameras, operators must possess a deep, localised understanding of the environment, without which the views afforded would be useless and, more importantly, meaningless. Thus, cameras are inseparable from the practical knowledge of the space of the city, and, as such, are used according to a geography of risk within its space, providing police officers “with ways of configuring the environment to perceive, even ‘read’, action in organizationally relevant and situationally appropriate ways” (Heath et al., 2002: 198).

The implementation of a video surveillance system also changes the way police interact with the public. Rather than patrolling officers having face-to-face interactions with people, their street level gaze taking in the wealth of information arising from the scene, CCTV establishes an asymmetrical, and technologically-mediated, relationship, where the police can watch, but are not subject to the gaze of people, nor have access to contextual information other than the visual cues picked up by the cameras. The elimination of four out of five senses forces CCTV operators to rely almost exclusively on, once again, their practical knowledge and their assumptions on what constitutes ordinary behaviour in public, in a given place, at a given time. In relation to this, Goffman has alerted us to the negotiated, yet stable, character of interactions between strangers in public, and to how people continuously elicit information from those around them:

Whatever an individual does and however he appears, he knowingly and unknowingly makes information available concerning the attributes that might be imputed to him and hence the categories in which he might be placed. (…) Face-to-face situations, it may be added, are ones in which a great variety of sign vehicles become available, whether desired or not, and are, therefore, situations in which much information about oneself can easily become available. Face-to-face situations are, in fact, ideal projective fields that the participant cannot help but structure in a characterizing way, so that conclusions can be drawn about him, correct or incorrect, whether he wants it or not. (Goffman, 1961b: 102)

However, the reduction of complexity in the interaction between watchers and watched is not without perverse consequences. The main assumption behind any form of visual control is that deviance is visible and can, therefore, be spotted if we know what to look
out for. In this regard, police officers use what Sacks (1972) called the “incongruity procedure” and its idea that things that look out of place in a given context are those that call for further scrutiny. Video surveillance works exactly in the same way; however, empirical studies (among them: Norris and Armstrong, 1999) have demonstrated how potentially open to abuse video surveillance is because of its over-reliance on the sense of sight. We now know that visible minorities are disproportionately targeted, and that most cases of targeted surveillances are not to do with crime or related offences.

The problem is the operative does not have prior knowledge which would enable them to determine which persons are going to engage in criminal activity. It is therefore an occupational necessity that they develop a set of working rules and procedures which seeks to maximise their chances of selecting those most likely to be involved. (…) When assessing who is worthy of a second glance, CCTV operators bring with them taken-for-granted assumptions about the distribution of criminality within the population. (Norris and Armstrong, 1999: 117-118)

Once the virtual layer of video surveillance is in place, it starts to interact with the material space of the city, though the relationship that emerges is not one of opposition, but rather a diadyc one, where one element exists in light of the other. On one hand, CCTV cannot come into being without being superimposed over the physical space of the city; on the other, its very existence produces effects and transformations onto the city itself. The end result of this interplay is the emergence of what can be termed the surveillant spatialities of urban space, and which can be defined as the rearrangement of urban space in light of the implementation of a CCTV system. Here, I choose the term spatiality rather than space because what I wish to emphasise with this notion is how video surveillance rearranges the social and spatial organisation of urban space, thus giving rise to a new regime of being – and being seen – in public.

The remainder of the chapter is devoted to describing in greater detail what I mean by surveillant spatialities of urban space. Once I have done so, I will use data from the fieldwork to provide empirical support to this notion, and to advance some ideas about the role played by the new regime of visibility (Brighenti, 2007) made possible by CCTV within the overall politics for the control of urban space in the two cities.
Surveillant spatialities

The three-fold understanding of urban space that I am proposing in order to understand the relationship between CCTV, policing and the city is reminiscent of the efforts made by scholars such as Lefebvre (1991) and Soja (1996) to abandon the dualism that traditionally plagued geographical thought, split, as it was, between the materiality of spatial forms, and their cognitive representations. In this vein, we can consider how Lefebvre's work sought to overcome this duality thanks to an analysis of the actual production of space that would lead to a unified theoretical understanding of the various kinds of space and the modalities of their genesis. Along the same line, Soja identified “three kinds of space overlapping and interacting: physical, mental, and social space” (Peet, 1998: 223), and introduced the notion of Thirdspace to account for the “real-and-imagined places” that exist along with the materiality of space and the mental representations we use to understand it. As Soja says:

Briefly told, the spatial story opens with the recognition that the mainstream spatial or geographical imagination has, for at least the past century, revolved primarily around a dual mode of thinking about space; one, which I have described as a Firstspace perspective and epistemology, fixed mainly on the concrete materiality of spatial forms, on things that can be empirically mapped; and the second, as Secondspace, conceived in ideas about space, in thoughtful re-presentations of human spatiality in mental or cognitive forms. (...) In the late 1960s, (...) an-Other form of spatial awareness began to emerge. I have chose to call this new awareness Thirdspace and to initiate its evolving definition by describing it as a product of a “thirding” of the spatial imagination, the creation of another mode of thinking about space that draws upon the
material and mental spaces of the traditional dualism but extends well beyond them in scope, substance, and meaning. (Soja, 1996: 10-11)

Because my interest in video surveillance has led me to try to understand how technology and space interact in the everyday making of urban environments, another important reference is represented by authors who have investigated the growing relevance of information and communication technologies (ICTs) in transforming urban spaces and society at large. Within the field, studies initially focused on the idea of the network society and how the transformative capabilities of ICTs enabled the shift from the industrial to the post-industrial society (Castells, 1996; Kitchin, 1998). Alternatively, at an urban scale a competing research programme revolves around the material effects of the implementation of ICTs in terms of how cities are built and managed (Foth, 2008; Graham and Marvin, 1996, 2001). However, looking at how space and technology influence one another is still, I think, a perspective that is very much reminiscent of the oppositional understanding of space that Soja tried to overcome with the introduction of his notion of Thirdspace. On the contrary, what I believe is central here is the acknowledgement of how different domains interact, intersect and recombine, in the process giving rise to a certain 'something' that did not exist before. More precisely, I wish to focus my attention on the circular relation that exists between the material space of the city, the implementation of a given technology (in the case at hand, an open-street CCTV system) and notions of risk and dangerousness in public space (or, conversely, about the desirability of some conducts and behaviours over others, which is the same). This continuous recombination of elements and domains gives rise to what Aurigi and De Cindio termed “augmented urban spaces”, where “‘virtual’ and 'physical' spaces are no longer two separate dimensions, but just parts (…) of a whole” (2008: 1)

This is precisely the perspective I am adopting here to try to account for the continuous cross-pollination between the material reality of the built environment and CCTV, and how new spatial and social arrangements – in short, new spatialities – are born out of it. Under this light, the blurring of the divisions between the material and the 'virtual' – where does one end? Where does the other begin? – is key to the emergence of a new mode of ordering (Law, 1994), a new diagram of power (Foucault, 1977), where a sociotechnical system for the control and management of people is inscribed into the material reality of the built environment.
The introduction of a new notion never appears out of thin air and my case is certainly no exception. In this regard, I think it is important to stress the similarities between what I am doing here and the work of other scholars who, following different paths, have all come to the conclusion that the 'material' and the 'virtual' are no longer two separate realms, but are continuously reproduced the one through the other. For one, my notion of **surveillant spatialities** can thus be profitably linked to Murakami Wood's idea of spatial protocols as “highly restrictive and controlling rules embedded within the materiality of urban space, which produce all kinds of new liberatory and repressive possibilities” (Murakami Wood, 2008: 94). At the same time, Kitchin and Dodge’s introduction of the concept of code/space to account for “the mutual constitution of software and sociospatial practices” (2011: 16) is also, I believe, informed by the same desire to address analytically the idea of space as a multi-layered concept, where a variety of elements are at play at the same time to produce its complexity.

In regard to this multiplicity, I believe that the notion of **surveillant spatialities** serves two distinct goals. First, it highlights how the politics of control in the city are influenced by, and in turn help to shape, the material reality, the abstract representations, and the lived realities of people, whose continuous entwinement produces urban space as we know it. Second, it also acknowledges that the attempts to reduce complexity through video surveillance give rise to new spatial and social arrangements within the space of the city. Thus, the hierarchical social relations and the specific rearrangements of urban space that result out of the implementation of an open-street CCTV system are exactly what I wish to identify with this notion.

On one hand, these spatialities are dominated by the mental representation of city space in terms of risk; on the other, though, they imbue with meaning this very space (Elden, 2009). More precisely, they represent the embodiment in space of relationships of control between those who govern and those who are governed, between watchers and watched. Because neither the material space of the city, nor the risk-based layer of CCTV are, in themselves, a static and stable formation, it follows that these spatialities will equally be an unfinished construction, always in the making. Understanding the processual nature of these formations is instrumental in exploring them in greater detail, so as to better qualify how they come into being, and why.

In choosing to follow this approach, both Pred's and Thrift's works are an important reference, in that the focus they steadily place on practices allows them to acknowledge
that space is continuously made and remade, and open to negotiation over time. Specifically, in seeing place-making as contingent on the interaction of process and practice, Pred (1984) helps to shed light on how structural features and institutional and individual practices come together to produce place. Further down along the same line, the formulation of non-representational theory as adopted by Thrift (1996), and its focus on events and practices through which the world emerges, is a keen reminder of the situated and embodied nature of human practices. It is in light of these works that the next step in the analysis gains significance, focusing, as it does, on the meanings and practices attached to surveillant spatialities, in order to understand how they come into being, and how they impact on urban policing.

As for the meanings, they revolve around the concepts of neoliberal urbanism and of moral notions of order that were analysed in a previous chapter. It is commonly argued in the literature that one of the outcomes of the neoliberal reorientation of the models of urban governance has been the increase in control and policing, with order becoming a key priority. As a result of these developments, increasingly a massive contradiction is taking centre stage in how we think of, and experience on a daily basis, public space. In this regard, Smith’s idea of revanchist urbanism (1996) is particularly relevant, as it links the transformations that have occurred in urban space to a conservative reaction against the anti-discriminatory policies that emerged from the 1960s onwards. This is thoroughly consistent with a neo-liberal re-imagining of the city that pushes heterogeneity out of sight and eliminates the markers of inequality from urban spaces. Spatially, this new breed of urbanism (Keil, 2002; Smith, 2002; Hackworth, 2007) then comes to be organised around morally tinged notions of decency and propriety (among others, see: Coleman 2004; Rogers and Coaffee, 2005; Young et al., 2006; Graham, 2010), so as to become functional to the elimination of the markers of inequality within urban spaces. The segregation of the urban poor that ensues is, thus, placed within a narrative of “the city [seen] as a space of segregation, division, exclusion, threats and boundaries, where the story of city life as mixing and mingling is replaced by a story of antagonism, fear and exclusion” (Watson, 2006: 1).

As for the practices, what I am interested in is the identification of the strategies and behaviours that bring these spatialities to life and, once they are in place, continue to support their existence. While in the chapters that will follow the ethnographic sessions conducted in the two control room will provide the data needed to expand on this issue,
it can already be said that attention will not be limited to the workplace practices as enacted by the CCTV operators, but will also take into account as diverse elements as the spatial arrangements of the control rooms, the norms that regulate the use of the two systems and access to the footage. The decision not to limit my attention to the actions of human actors is rooted in the assumption that I share with actor-network theory that institutions and ‘social’ phenomena are embodied into concrete interactions, or, to choose a different phrasing, are networks that are held together by people and, crucially, things. In relation to this last point, I believe it is important to highlight the similarities that exist between the geographical literature I have quoted throughout this section and ANT. While, on one hand we have a geographical thought that understands that “place is constituted through reiterative social practice” (Cresswell, 2004: 39), at the same time ANT effectively “demonstrates how reality is constructed through processes of translation, association and alliance (...). In other words building reality and truth (...) [are] recognised as intricately organised socio-political processes” (Thrift, 1996: 23. Emphasis in original).

Adopting this specific perspective, two key questions then emerge, relating to the “how” and the “why” of surveillant spatialities.

**How?**

As for the first of these questions, in light of what I have been saying in the pages above, the focus is steadily placed on the social and spatial practices that construct these surveillant spatialities. In order to understand how these are established and maintained stable, I started by looking at the focal node of the network that constitutes video surveillance systems: the control room. My conceptualisation of this site relies mainly on two concepts: heterotopia and liminality. After a brief outline of each, I will highlight their commonalities, to then proceed to discuss how their integration is relevant in order to properly understand the control room and, as a consequence, CCTV. The concept of heterotopia found its original formulation in two writings of Foucault’s from the mid Sixties: the introduction to *The Order of Things* (Foucault, 2002a), originally published in French in 1966, and a lecture given the following year at the Centre for Architectural Studies, which first appeared in France shortly after Foucault’s death, and was translated into English in 1986. Foucault never went back to further
elaborating the topic so that, in spite of the attention it has since received from a number of scholars (Hetherington, 1996, 1997; Soja, 1996; Lees, 1997), we should consider it a “theoretical work in progress” (Hook and Vrdoljak, 2002: 206). Although it can be used to label a given site as heterotopic, something Foucault himself did naming, in this instance, the psychiatric hospital, the prison and the mirror, in light of its ability to echo the politics of its general context the concept is more fruitfully put to use when considered as a “particular way to look at space” (Hook and Vrdoljak, 2002: 207-208), an analytical tool that can bring together politics, power and space. Through its lens we are offered an alternative representation of social reality that highlights the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of surrounding spaces; as such, heterotopias are “sites of alternate social ordering” (Hetherington, 1997: 38).

The notion of liminality first emerged in anthropology, where it was used by Van Gennep (1960[1909]) in his analysis of rites of passage in small-scale societies. After six decades of neglect, the concept was rediscovered by Turner, who in 1967 published the essay “Betwixt and between: the liminal period in rites de passage”. Rites of passage are concerned with the management of changes of status in people, and in how they can be re-integrated into society once they have fully transitioned from one status to the other. Van Gennep identified the three stages of rites of passage – separation, transition, incorporation – and associated liminality with the middle one, characterised by fluidity and the temporary suspension of established societal structures. It is thanks to Turner's work that the notion of liminality successfully moved beyond the study of rites in small-scale societies. “Turner realized that 'liminality' served not only to identify the importance of in-between periods, but also to understand the human reactions to liminal experiences: the way in which personality was shaped by liminality, the sudden foregrounding of agency, and the sometimes dramatic tying together of thought and experience” (Thomassen, 2009: 14). Moreover, liminality can be applied to both time and space. If considered spatially, it can be used to identify either specific places that act as thresholds, areas or zones or countries or other large regions (see Thomassen, 2009: 16).

In order to integrate these two concepts in a theoretical conceptualisation of the control room, the starting point is my reading of Hetherington's work (1997) and his argument that both notions are “about the relationship between freedom and order” (Hetherington, 1997: 32). The liminal nature of the control room is expressed in its physical being
between two spaces – the inside of the police station and the outside of the city – thus acting as a go-between from one to the other. Additionally, its functioning as a border between them is also highlighted by the clearly demarcated boundaries that it possesses, and that are associated with the specific practices designed to identify who can access it and who cannot (Hetherington, 1997: 33-34). This aspect is quite similar to one of the features Foucault assigns to heterotopic spaces, as “[h]eterotopias always presuppose a system of opening and closing that both isolates them and makes them penetrable. In general, the heterotopic site is not freely accessible like a public place. Either the entry is compulsory, as in the case of entering a barracks or a prison, or else the individual has to submit to rites and purifications. To get in one must have a certain permission and make certain gestures” (Foucault, 1986: 26). The heterotopic character of the control room is not exhausted thus. What I believe is an equally crucial aspect, here, is the possibility, afforded by the presence of the screens continuously broadcasting the images captured by the camera in the confined space of the control room, for the inside and the outside to conflate into one another. This juxtaposition of opposites is another of the characteristics that give heterotopias their significance, in that they are able to unsettle well-established social and spatial relations. In the case of the control room, “inside” and “outside” effectively come to co-exist in the same place.

What is achieved there is the proposition of an alternate ordering of the city that, at once, challenges the traditional understanding of “inside” and “outside” as mutually exclusive, while trying to rearrange city space in light of ideas about what is desirable and “good” for the city and its inhabitants at large. “Heterotopias are spaces in which an alternative social ordering is performed. These are spaces in which a new way of ordering emerges that stands in contrast to the taken-for-granted mundane idea of social order that exists within society” (Hetherington, 1997: 40). Thus, central to the spatial and social rearrangements made possible by the presence of the control room – and consequently, by the implementation of video surveillance – is “some idea of social improvement” (ibid. 52) which sees forms of remote control as preferable to police officers patrolling the streets, and the re-orientation of the wider paradigm of control away from reaction towards pre-emption as worth pursuing.

I believe the arguments I presented in order to highlight the liminal and heterotopic nature of the control room are solid. Based on them, the control room acquires special relevance in any analysis of CCTV, as it becomes central for the promotion of the
alternate ordering of the space of the city that this technology is part and parcel of. As such, the issue we need to focus our attention on is how its specificity is maintained in the everyday management and use of the video surveillance system. It is my opinion that central to our understanding of this specificity are two concurrent processes: on one hand, the marking of a series of boundaries between the control room, the police station, and the space of the city and, on the other, the practices that make it possible for these boundaries to retain a degree of openness. In order to substantiate my claims, in the following chapters I will use data gathered during the conduction of fieldwork to show how each of the two cities I studied has adopted symbols, implemented rules and put in place specific authorising regimes to mark, and protect, the specificity of the control room, and the practices and strategies people employ to negotiate their way around them.

**What follows?**

As an end result of this process, it is my claim that the establishment of these surveillant spatialities allows the police to advance claims on time, both in the present and the future tense.

As for the former, the singling out of risk areas in the city and the live streaming of footage from these zones live into the control room is thought to guarantee the direct intervention of the police – in the form of quick deployment of patrols – in case of need. In this regard, what is crucial is the degree of integration of video surveillance within the organisational practices of the control room and, more generally, the policing strategies adopted by the force. The central claim is one of increased efficiency, with the targeted surveillance of suspect persons replacing the need to control the generality of the urban population. However, there are two main problems with this approach: namely, the idea of efficiency and that of targeted surveillance.

Norris and Armstrong (1999) were the first to demonstrate that people are likely to be targeted “not because of what they have done, but because of who they are, and operators identify them as belonging to a particular social category which is deemed to be indicative of criminal or troublesome behaviour” (Norris and Armstrong, 1999: 112). As a consequence of how suspicion is socially constructed between CCTV operators, and the working rules they develop to identify suspect persons, minorities and young
males end up being disproportionately targeted. In relation to the issue of deployment, Norris and Armstrong’s work also showed that police interventions are not dependent on the kind of behaviour witnessed through the cameras, but rather on a series of formal and informal organisational characteristics, such as the level of integration between the CCTV system and the police and the level of personal discretion afforded to operators. Coming to the issue of efficiency, we have already seen in a previous chapter how very few studies have so far tried to quantify the monetary benefits brought about by CCTV, and how there is no definite agreement over whether or not video surveillance can effectively contribute to policing. Moreover, on a more general level, we also need to keep in mind how the very meaning of efficiency is far from being an ever valid criterion whose meaning is shared and peacefully accepted. On the contrary, efficiency needs to be seen as the contested, negotiated and partial outcome of struggles over meaning, success, failure and change, “a political claim couched in terms of the achievement of fairly specific political goals” (O’Malley, 1992: 260).

In relation to my claim that through video surveillance the police advance a claim that is projected into the future, the deterring potential of the cameras needs to be taken into account. While this is also a very contested issue, with literature on the specific topic unable to reach conclusive results, it is nevertheless true that, in the two cities I studied, police officers firmly believed that CCTV did indeed posses such a potential. As such, I think it can be assumed without much trouble that, in light of this belief, the cameras are seen as a fundamental instrument into the normalisation of people's future behaviour, in a move that is, in itself, consistent with the shift from reaction to pre-emption within the field of crime control that has already been brought up several times in the course of this work.

**Questions for the fieldwork**

What I set out to do in this chapter was explaining why data from the fieldwork will be analysed the way it will in the chapters that follow. Taking inspirations from a variety of authors and from disciplines ranging from human geography to anthropology, I first introduced the notion of *surveillant spatialities* to account for the emergence of new spatial and social relations in the city after the implementation of an open-street CCTV system. The work of authors such as Lefebvre, Thrift and Hetherington was
subsequently referenced to provide support to the introduction of this new concept, and to explain how these spatialities come into being.

To sum up, I have made two basic claims in relation to the everyday existence of a video surveillance system: one, that it works thanks to the establishments of a series of clear boundaries that separate the control room from the space of the police station and city space at large; two, that CCTV is directly linked, in the eyes of the police, to the possibility to advance claims over the present and the future of city space. I am well aware that both these claims raise a number of questions, to which the following two chapters – one devoted to Central City, the other to Northern City – will provide detailed and in-depth answers, supported by empirical data gathered during the conduction of fieldwork.

As already said, attention will be focused on the symbols, the rules and the regimes used in the two cities to mark, and protect, the specificity of the control room, and the practices and strategies people employ to negotiate their way around them. The link I established between CCTV and time also allows me to consider as varied issues as the integration of video surveillance into existing policing practices, and the ways in which the system is ordinarily used, along with the formulation of working rules on the part of the operators and who gets targeted as a result. On a more general level, what efficiency comes to mean in the two cities will also be explored, while efforts will be made to characterise as precisely as possible the idea of proper, acceptable behaviour in public space that emerged from the fieldwork and the effects that CCTV has brought about in the two cities, policing-wise.
12. In Central City

*Introduction*

The ethnographic sessions analysed below were conducted between the last week of October and the first two weeks of November 2010, for a total of 36 hours. The control room where the observations took place is open 24 hours a day, so initially a first round of observations was aimed at covering all the different time slots; after that, attention was mostly focused on the early morning and the late afternoon, as these are the busiest times of the day in the areas covered by the cameras. As a result, the final coverage was quite exhaustive, with the earliest sessions starting at 7 AM and the latest ones finishing after 2 AM; each session ranged in length from thirty minutes to four hours. In order to conduct the observations, a written authorisation was issued by the Chief’s office, thus allowing my presence in the control room. This was also necessary to comply with national legislation on privacy, which states that access to the premises where video surveillance systems are housed must be strictly regulated.

Four officers are permanently assigned to the control room; in addition to them, there are three replacements, in case one of the former is ill or unavailable for work. When there is no shortage of personnel, these officers can also work in conjunction with the first group to support them in the management of the control room. Throughout the observations the four main officers were always on duty except once, when one of the replacements was in charge. Shifts last six hours (first shift: 0-6; second shift: 6-12; third shift: 12-18; fourth shift: 18-24) and are organised on a rotating basis so that every officer’s schedule will be: fourth shift – third shift – second shift – first shift – repeat. Every two weeks officers have some days off. Patrolling officers follow a different schedule, as the local police can only guarantee territorial services between 7 AM and midnight from Sunday to Thursday, with an extension until 2 AM on Friday and Saturday evenings\(^{59}\).

The system includes 12 cameras which are either physically connected to the broadband network belonging to the municipality, or transmit in a wireless mode; the whole system can be controlled from two computers located in the Local Police Station. Footage is

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\(^{59}\) In the summer patrols are maintained until 1 AM during the week and 3 AM on weekends.
stored in two servers placed at the *Centro Multimediale* (Multimedia Centre, hereafter: CMM), a public company which provides assistance and support to local administrations in the region to foster innovation and the introduction of digital technologies in their activities. Images are recorded and stored for seven days before being destroyed automatically; officers in the control room can view them live and control every camera manually, but they cannot access the recordings without a written authorisation signed by the chief.

The control room where the observations took place is the heart of the station. The room is long, narrow and cramped with things; on the U-shaped desk there are four PCs (one is not working, two control the video surveillance system and the last one is used to manage all communications between the control room and patrolling officers), a joystick which controls the cameras, three telephones, a set of speakers, an old CCTV monitor in black-and-white showing the outside of the station, a panel controlling the entrance to the station and to the garage below, two printers (only one is currently functioning), and a paper pad. On the other side there are another printer, two computers, drawers and a closet where folders, records, authorisations and other documents are stored. The walls are completely covered with phone numbers and a sure sign of competence is an officer’s ability to locate a number quickly, much to the amazement of those who happen to be in the room. On the opposite wall two 40-inch flat screen TVs are hung, broadcasting the images recorded by the cameras. On the left one all 12 cameras are shown at once, while the other just shows one; the camera to be transferred on the second screen can be changed at all times. Finally, just behind the entrance there is a large armchair, strategically placed in front of the TV+VCR set at the other side of the room. If two officers sit at the desk at the same time, there is so little room that they almost cannot move and even answering the phone can become quite complicated. Ideally, all monitors should be arranged as to face the wall where the video surveillance screens are hung, but the room does not allow for such an arrangement. As a result, when officers need to use the two PCs in the back to, among other things, run checks on vehicles – one of the most common tasks to be completed in the control room – they necessarily have to turn their backs to the screens.
I concluded the previous chapter arguing that CCTV can work thanks to the marking of a series of boundaries between the control room, the police station, and the space of the city at large. As I will show, these boundaries are drawn using a variety of elements, with varying degrees of visibility; also of note is how in order to produce the specific spatial regime within which CCTV can work, distinctions are not only drawn over space, but over people, too.

**Marking boundaries**

I concluded the previous chapter arguing that CCTV can work thanks to the marking of a series of boundaries between the control room, the police station, and the space of the city at large. As I will show, these boundaries are drawn using a variety of elements, with varying degrees of visibility; also of note is how in order to produce the specific spatial regime within which CCTV can work, distinctions are not only drawn over space, but over people, too.
In what follows, I rely heavily on Gieryn's notion of boundary-work, as first formulated in a paper published in 1983, and defined as an “ideological style found in scientists' attempts to create a public image for science by contrasting it favourably to non-scientific intellectual or technical activities” (1983: 781). In order to proceed with my analysis, I feel it is necessary to spend more than a passing moment on this notion. First, Gieryn acknowledges how the process of marking boundaries is never completed but always in the making, so that it is through the continuous drawing and re-drawing of boundaries that the epistemic authority of science comes to be established. Second, he identifies four different types of boundary-work: monopolization, expansion, expulsion, and protection (Gieryn, 1995: 424) that can alternatively be used to defend the autonomy and legitimacy of 'proper' science. Third, and more problematically for the analysis I am carrying out here, Gieryn exclusively focuses on the rhetorical styles and the discursive strategies used by scientists to separate themselves from 'pseudoscientists' and to defend the autonomy of science, thus assuming that only professional ideologies are at play in the definition of boundaries.

However, while I believe this notion can also be fruitfully applied in the present context, I cannot share Gieryn's initial assumption. That is why the first step in my analysis is the significant widening of the definition of what constitutes boundary-work in the context of the CCTV system in Central City. In light of this decision, I include into it not only the discursive practices adopted by the actors, but also elements such as the architecture of the police station and the national and local codes of regulation in use there. This extension serves two related goals. First, maintaining Gieryn's idea that boundary-work can assume different forms and is constantly negotiated between the parties involved allows me to account for the variety of practices and strategies adopted in Central City to mark the boundaries of the control room, while at the same time alerting me to the fact that, no matter what, these borders always retain a degree of porousness and openness. Second, in allowing me to consider how things, and not only actors, contribute to establish the spatial regime that makes it possible for CCTV to work, it also reflects my initial assumption that network durability is something that is achieved thanks to the interaction of humans and non-humans alike. Using excerpts from the fieldnotes I drafted during the time spent in the control room – for reader clarity, they will appear in italics throughout – and material from other sources, I will
now move on to describe the different types of boundary-work that I identified in the context of the control room.

**Regulation**

As seen in a previous chapter, to this day the regulation of CCTV remains strongly centralised and under the control of the Italian data protection authority. While the primary aim of the legislation is the protection of the privacy of those falling under the gaze of surveillance cameras, these are also relevant in terms of the analysis that is being carried out in these pages. This is because since the very first general provision on video surveillance, issued in 2004, it was made perfectly clear that central to the very protection of people's privacy is the control over who has access to CCTV, both in terms of the number of people involved and the qualifications they possess.

In this vein, in that national regulation on video surveillance explicitly regulates who can access the premises where facilities are housed, it draws a line that proceeds down to the code of practice adopted by police personnel working in the control room. Because the two questions that are central to me – how many people can enter the control room? What qualifications gain someone entry to the control room? – both imply the need to manage carefully the threshold of the control room, I believe that the first, and most abstract, type of boundary-work that is encountered in Central City pertains to the control of accesses to the control room via the instrument of legal regulation and the implementation of codes of practices. As such, this specific kind of boundary-work can be labelled as *regulation*. In regard to it, the formulations adopted by the latest general provision on video surveillance and the code of practices in use in Central City are strikingly similar.

*It will be necessary to specify, in writing, the names of all the persons authorised to enter the premises where video surveillance facilities are housed, to use the equipment and, when unavoidable in light of the purposes sought, to view recorded footage. The number of subjects involved must be kept to a minimum (...). It is also necessary that different levels of access are established, in correspondence with the tasks discharged by each operator, so as to differentiate those who are only able to view the images from those who can carry out more complex tasks (record, copy, erase footage, adjust camera view etc.).*

*(General provision on video surveillance, article 3.3.2. My translation.)*
Operators must make sure that entry to the control room, where the monitors for the open-street CCTV system implemented in the territory of the municipality are housed, remains always closed and only authorised personnel and technical staff in case of scheduled maintenance or malfunctioning are granted access. (From the document that accompanies the appointment of a police officer as a new CCTV operator in Central City. My translation.)

**Physical demarcation**

What I want to look at now are the most obvious types of boundaries that mark the space of the control room: the doors, walls and other physical barriers that separate it from the rest of the police station, and the city space at large. In addition to the regulations just introduced above, in fact, what is observable in the station is a system of progressive closures that effectively separates the control room from the surrounding space. All these barriers are extremely visible and, often, guarded, so that is impossible to walk through them without police personnel taking notice. In addition to structural elements such as walls and doorways, the presence of such boundaries is further marked by the use of signage, significantly more and more evident the closer we get to the control room.

For someone who wishes to enter the police station, the first hurdle is getting past the main entry (1). Doors are always locked, and you need someone to buzz you in to get into the building. Once inside, the space is clearly divided into two by a flight of stairs, with a waiting area on the right-hand side where people form lines for one of the offices located on this floor, while on the opposite side a sentry box (2) marks the passage towards the control room. The only door that leads to it is placed so as to be inaccessible to people, as it is necessary to walk through the sentry box to reach it. If someone managed to walk past it, they would be faced with the proper entry to the control room, thus seeing that the wall (3) that separates it from the sentry box is made of glazed glass, so as to make it impossible to see through it. Additionally, it is also covered by a copy of the aforementioned provision and a summary of the same document, put up as a reminder to those coming in and out of the room. In order to dispel any remaining doubt, on the door there is a bright red 'NO ENTRY' sign, which makes it clear that access to the room behind it is restricted.

As pictures are not allowed inside the police station, the image below provides a visual representation of the spatial arrangement of the ground floor of the building. Numbers
1-3 indicate the barriers one has to get through in order to access the control room, located in the top left corner of the image.

![Figure 13 – Plan of the police station, ground floor](image)

**Personal identification**

The final type of boundary-work that I identified in the control room refers to the traceability of operators and their actions. Once again, while this measure is designed to avoid unauthorised and/or illicit use of the system, it also introduces a distinction between the various members of the force, effectively discriminating between those who are entitled to access the control room and those who are not. Control is enforced in two different ways.

First, in order to be able to use the computers that control the CCTV system, operators need to log in using their personal user name and password, and have to log out once their shift has come to an end. In this way, everything that they do while using the system is recorded in the internal log files of one of the two machines, and remains accessible to technical staff and higher ranks, who both have system administrator privileges. While this measure is consistent with what is dictated by national regulation of CCTV, the former deputy commissioner of the local police of Central City, who was responsible for the implementation and initial management of the system, introduced an additional level of control, designed to monitor closely operators' use of the system without having to access the logs stored into the computers. When the system went live, in case they needed to zoom in on something, all officers were instructed to fill in a
form specifying the time, the duration and the reason why they had zoomed, with the form then to be stored in a cabinet inside the control room itself. According to the former deputy commissioner, such a measure was taken to encourage officers to consider the possibilities offered by video surveillance carefully so as to avoid any possible abuse and, at the same time, protect the privacy of citizens. Originally, the measure had first been implemented in Florence, where it had received particular praise from the DPA. It was thanks to the deputy's personal network of acquaintances and membership of the Italian chapter of the forum for urban security that the idea was subsequently adopted in Central City, too.

The three strategies I have just described are all designed to control access to the control room in order to protect the privacy of those walking under the gaze of the cameras. While they do so using different instruments – from legal regulation to the construction of physical barriers that shield the control room from the surrounding space – and with different levels of detailing – from the general letter of regulation to the minute, low-technology strategies to keep track of what operators do in the control room – they all contribute to construct a series of boundaries that protect and separate the control room from its surroundings. However, all boundaries are, to a degree, porous and permeable, and retain a degree of openness, as will be detailed in the next section. To conclude, the table below summarises the types of boundary-work adopted in the police station of Central City.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Boundary imposed over</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regulation</td>
<td>Regulatory space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>From national legislation to local codes of practice adopted in Central City, access to the control room is rigidly regulated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demarcation</td>
<td>Physical space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maintenance of physical barriers that separate and protect the control room.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification</td>
<td>Individual officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Use of personal credentials to use CCTV equipment; log-keeping when zooming.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Types of boundary-work in Central City.

**Crossing boundaries**

Soon after the beginning of the observations in the control room, it became clear to me that its daily reality differed greatly from the depiction provided by the regulations in
place there. Because of the professional routines and the organisational arrangements
that have come to be established in the police station, on a practical, day-to-day level
the boundaries I described in the section above are almost invariably ignored by
operators, patrolling officers, and higher ranks alike. Literature-wise, this mirrors the
findings produced in other in-depth studies of how CCTV is used in different contexts,
which show how the specific arrangements adopted in the workplace impact severely on
how CCTV is used and the overall efficiency of video surveillance operations. In
relation to the case study, this is also the first empirical demonstration that the
placement of CCTV within the police station and its policing strategies is not as clear-
cut as official documents would suggest.

Structural factors

The institutionalised carelessness in relation to respecting the boundaries that mark the
space of the control room is not only due to organisational peculiarities or a given
aspect of the professional culture expressed by the operators or police officers in
general, but also to some very mundane reasons. In this regard, the main issue is the bad
ventilation of the place, where a bad air conditioning system is made all the worse by its
working in combination with poor design.
The control room only has one small window that cannot do much to freshen up the
room, as it gives onto a closed courtyard. In addition to that, when the centralised
heating is on the room gets extremely hot very rapidly and it soon feels like the air in it
has been breathed a thousand times, to use the vivid description offered by a police
officer. While I was in the control room, operators also complained that excessive
heating made them feel sleepy, which is another reason why the window remained open
most of the time. The problem is reversed during night shifts; as the heating is turned
off, it soon gets so cold that operators often have to wear their coat inside the control
room. Finally, the presence of the screens needs to be considered, too. Because they are
always turned on, they never have the chance to cool off, so passing next to them means
being literally invested by a heat wave. Quite creatively, one of the officers assigned to
the control room turned this fact to his advantage, as he showed me during one of the
sessions in the control room.
Session 3 – afternoon
Moment of calm in the control room, so chance for some small talk with the operator on duty.\textsuperscript{60} He tells me the cameras are not used that much, but that he has found a way to put the monitors to good use. To show me what he means, he gets up from the chair and positions himself very close to the screens, but with his face turned in the opposite direction. When his neck hurts, this way he can feel the heat produced by the screens right onto the sore part with “great relief and no prescriptions”.

The end result is that to even out all these factors, the door is always left open, thus neutralising one of the barriers marking the perimeter of the control room. Significantly, higher ranks are well aware of the situation, as can be seen from the excerpt below.

One of the things I was really clear about was the need to define access to the control room. (…) We clearly marked the division between the sentry box and the control room, though I am pretty sure the door remains open most of the time…

Former deputy commissioner of the local police of Central City

Though paying attention to the door being closed in his infrequent visits to the control room, the chief has, so far, done nothing to address this issue, and no countermeasures have been adopted. Thus, empirical evidence points to the conclusion that this particular boundary between the control room and the outside is only formally maintained, but practically ignored.

Organisational factors

Another series of factors leading to the practical deletion of the barriers surrounding the control room can be identified in the organisational practices that have come to be established in the station. Patrolling officers spend most of their shifts outside and, as such, do not have an office; at the same time, though, they are also often required to do paperwork – i.e. form filling, report drafting – to document their actions or reconstruct retrospectively a specific event. However, the unavailability of a place where they can sit and engage in office work leaves them in an unclear position, and while some choose to bring the paperwork home, this is a solution that only a minority of officers adopt. Rather, this has resulted in a series of informal, but surprisingly stable, arrangements, based on personal preferences and ties, between office and active personnel, which run

\textsuperscript{60}This was one of the very first sessions, so I was not yet a familiar face in the control room.
parallel to the official distribution of tasks and resources in place in the station. Essentially, this means that each patrolling officer is entitled to use the computer of a specific co-worker, without having to ask for his/her authorisation. This is relevant for the argument that I am developing here because operators assigned to the control room are no exception, and calmly allow co-workers to use the two computers in the control room that do not control the video surveillance system.

Equally importantly, the control room also doubles as the stock room for the station. In light of its ground floor location, it is easily accessible to officers, who often stop by if they need specific items. As much as it is a practical solution, this has resulted in an almost uninterrupted flow of visitors that effortlessly go back and forth. Along with stationery and meal tickets, the register where the shifts and duties of each officer are specified is here, too, so at all times people come in to take a look at it. The register is issued weekly and is updated daily to account for people on sick leave and other changes, so every morning, especially when the weekend is approaching, people come into the control room to ask if the 'new services' are out yet, so that they can see if, when, and crucial to them, with whom they are working. To officers, it probably is the most prized item in the control room.

Session 10 – early afternoon.
It is around noon and officers have been coming to the control room for the whole morning to ask for the shift register, which has not been issued yet. Officer C1 is on duty and is somehow bothered by the constant flow of people coming in all asking the same thing. He starts telling everyone to inform the others the register is not out yet, then, when this does not work, he starts writing a notice, which he wants to put up on the wall for everyone to read. While he is working on it, the phone rings and he forgets about the notice. When the register finally does come out, he rushes out of the room saying out loud that “services are out”. I am left in the control room alone, while he collects every officer nearby.

Also, because the control room is the only area of the station that remains open 24/7, it is also used as a drop off location by officers, in case they need to leave something for one of their co-workers to collect. The following note is a case in point:

Session 12 – early evening
One of the officers has recently had a baby girl. As in other similar occasions, the whole station have decided to buy the baby a present, so they are collecting money. As the control room is the only place in the station which is always open and, at least in theory, is never left unattended, this is where the money is kept. People just keep coming
Informal dynamics in the workplace

Because of its easy-to-reach location, and the close ties that exist between most police officers outside the workplace\textsuperscript{61}, the restricted area of the ground floor is also the place where officers relax and socialise with co-workers, either when they have just ended their shift or they stop at the station while on patrol. Here, officers know that they can always find someone to chat some time away, tell jokes and get to know the latest gossip. In quieter times, people come in to watch TV, too, especially during the evening, when usually there is not much to do and no phone calls to attend to. Thus, the place often gets crowded so that, literally, there is no room left. When this happens, the division between the sentry box and the control room disappears and, if some officers show some hesitation in stepping over the invisible line that separates the two spaces, they are encouraged to ignore it by their co-workers.

Session 6 – early evening.
Two women officer who are about to end their shift come to the control room to wait for the moment to go home. The TV is on and is broadcasting a quite famous Italian soap opera. One of the two officers starts recalling how she would always watch the show when she was a college student, then, based on this specific memory, tries to calculate how long the show has been on TV. Soon all the people in the control room join the conversation, until the officer on duty turns to one of the computers in the back and launches a web search to find the answer.

Session 13 – late afternoon
Though not in service, an officer comes into the sentry area to show everyone his new puppy, which was just visited by a vet nearby. Everyone gathers around the dog to stroke it and play with it. The officer in charge of the control room leaves his spot in front of the monitors and joins the party for a few minutes.

Significantly, officers are not the only ones who ignore the physical boundaries of the control room, as the following excerpts from my field notes demonstrate.

Session 1
Today is my first day in the control room. I still do not know what to expect and feel

\textsuperscript{61}Among officers, some outdoors hobbies (hunting, mushroom-picking) or membership to sports associations are very common, so that interactions are frequent even outside the workplace.
slightly out of place in the company of police officers. After an hour, one of the
sergeants comes in to talk to the officer in charge, with her children in tow. Apparently
the kids were in the neighbourhood and stopped by to say “hello” to their mother. When she realises I am the room, too, she quickly tells her children to wait for her outside.

Session 12
It’s late in the morning and there are two officers working in the control room. A
woman comes in and starts talking to one of the officers. After a few moments, he
finishes what he is doing so he stands up and leaves the room with her. It turns out she
is his wife and is here to talk to her husband about a new closet they need to buy. They
move to the other room to talk about furniture.

In addition to the two episodes presented above, another telling exchange between two
officers – C3 and C4 – at the end of a shift is definitely worth mentioning, specifically
for the way C3 tried to downplay her co-worker's slip in front of someone that, at the
time, was still quite new to the control room.

Session 6 - afternoon.
It is 6 PM and officer C4 is here to replace officer C3. I have met him once only when I
interviewed him, but this will be my first ethnographic session with him. When he comes
into the room he does not realise who I am and before I have a chance to introduce
myself he turns to officer C4 and asks her if I am her daughter. Rapidly, she tells him
who I am. She looks somehow embarrassed by the episode and tries to downplay the
whole thing.

Very soon into the fieldwork, it was apparent to me how this relaxed atmosphere
effortlessly extends from officers to their relations with immediate superiors, with
whom exchanges are always familiar and strictly on a first-name basis. During my time
in the control room, necks only stiffened in the rare occasions when higher ranks
stopped by. When the lieutenant\textsuperscript{62} and the chief happened to be in the room postures are
straightened, uniforms are worn with greater care, ties are tied, access is restricted and
the TV is, almost invariably, turned off. The silence is made even louder by the almost
immediate stop to the friendly banter that is the usual currency of the place, and which
is resumed as soon as superiors go back to their offices, upstairs. In relation to this, the
only case I witnessed of an officer being reprimanded for entering the control room
despite being unauthorised to do so was due to the unexpected presence in the room of
the lieutenant himself. In addition to the excerpts I presented above, in order to

\textsuperscript{62}Head of the unit responsible for the video surveillance system.
emphasise the exceptional nature of the event, I chose to contrast it with the account of how, on a separate occasion, an ordinary citizen was able to walk undisturbed into the control room, due to the operator in charge being unable to attend to her.

Session 14, morning.
An officer comes into the control room because she needs to have something printed. The officers on duty tell her they’ll do that for her and that she can come back later to pick the document up. When she comes back the lieutenant is in the control room talking to one of the officers about a technical matter. He is not usually seen in the control room. Upon seeing her, he says: “Who authorised you to come into the control room?”

Woman officer [very matter-of-factly]: “Oh, he has to give me something”.
Officer [somewhat abruptly]: “I’ve put it in the other room”.
Woman officer [sounding surprised and a little bit teasing, to control room operator]: “Oh, so you didn’t want me to come in, then...

Session 4, early morning.
Today there is just one operator manning the control room and the reception desk. He is running a check on a license plate for colleague out on patrol so he cannot attend to inquiries from the public. All doors are open, so a woman comes into the control room asking for information on how she can talk to someone about a ticket she received. As he is busy working, the officer cannot attend to her as soon as she enters the room, so she spends a couple of minutes just waiting in there, looking around with curiosity.

Police culture and the attitude towards bureaucracy

Finally, I want to spend some words to describe how other strategies for the marking of boundaries are equally disregarded. As said above, a log where officers have to record all the instances where they used the cameras to zoom in on something is in use in the control room. Upon first hearing about it, I hoped it could prove a precious source of information on the targets of video surveillance, as its existence would easily allow for a triangulation of sources – interviews with the officers, observations carried out in the control room, documentary analysis – regarding who the objects of surveillance are. However, the first hint that things could be not this straightforward came during the interviews, when more than once officers hinted that zooming in on something is not a daily occurrence in the control room, with adverbs such as “rarely” and “infrequently” peppering their conversation. Later, the observations confirmed that over-regulation has led to the non-use of the system rather than the appearance of a group of critically-minded CCTV operators. In the 36 hours I spent in the control room, the zoom was only
used twice, and the action was not registered in either case. In relation to this
development, I believe the interviews can help to shed some light on how the officers
came to terms with this curtailment of their professional autonomy, and how, in the end,
in order to reject the log they ended up abandoning some of the possibilities afforded by
the cameras.
In the course of the interviews officers initially claimed that the regulations in place in
the control room are not detrimental to the overall efficacy of the system:

*On a practical level they have no consequence. The few times when we had to zoom in
on something then we filled in this form, but really it has three or four fields so it is not
a big deal. It does not take much time to complete it, so it does not have a negative
effect on the work.*

*Control room operator C4*

However, there was not widespread agreement on this issue, as the following excerpt,
culled from the interview conducted with one of the sergeant, shows:

*It sounds absurd, but this is how things are… In the end you just look at things on the
screens instead of zooming in and stating the reason why you did that. (…) The truth is
no one ever zooms.*

*Sergeant A of the local police of Central City*

In order to understand this attitude, two factors must be taken into consideration. The
first one has to do with the larger and larger role bureaucracy and form-filling have
come to play in the officers’ daily routine and the degree of dissatisfaction that
accompanies it, so much so that, given the possibility, they will avoid any task that
bounds them to an added load of paperwork. What is even more surprising than the
constant underuse of the system is the fact that the register is, in itself, completely
useless; in order to use the computers in the control room every officer must log on to
the system using his or her own username and password, which makes every officer and
every move easily traceable. To use the words of one of the officers assigned to the
control room:

*This [register] is totally unnecessary, is just part of a bureaucratic mentality that
demands that we keep registers for everything. It is just a waste of time.*

*Control room operator C2*
Another consequence of this register is that officers feel deprived of any possibility for personal initiative, which negatively affects their motivations while on duty; another excerpt from the interviews is very specific about this:

*In our job personal initiative is fundamental. We always have to make decisions and if I am too tied up, if there are too many rules... I mean, we already follow strict rules [on what can or cannot be done] so it’s not like we do what we want... It’s a matter of seconds, it’s a moment and if I don’t feel motivated, I don’t feel free to do it [use the zoom function], the moment has passed and I haven’t seen a thing. I wish we had more freedom.*

Sergeant B of the local police of Central City

Essentially, the officers perceive this particular rule as demeaning to their professional standing, as they see it as proof of the lack of trust on the part of superior ranks on their judgement and sense of responsibility. At the same time, they all stressed how they never forget that they “wear a uniform” and have it very clear in their minds that when they are in the control room they are “there to work”. The fact that their actions could easily be traced without the register adds up to their irritation.

*I don’t really know why they introduced it [the register]... Maybe they wanted to sensitise us to a better use of the system, but as we are here I guess it is kind of obvious that we are not in a playful mood.*

Control room operator C3

The outrage felt by officers can be better understood in light of the mock bureaucratic nature (Gouldner 1954) of the police. While in principle the actions of police officers are rigidly regulated by law and there is a well defined line of command which should ensure the control of higher ranks on lower level officers, this depiction is far from the truth. “The essentially unbureaucratic and nonmilitaristic nature of low-level police work (...) suggests that the police organization presents an impressive hierarchical façade that only serves to disguise the nonbureaucratic reality of much activity” (Punch, 1983: 228-229). However, Ericson and Haggerty (1997) contest this understanding, and on the contrary argue for police work to be considered as inherently shaped by the categories and formats used to communicate and exchange information, both internally and externally. In this regard, the increasing bureaucratisation of police work in Central City, of which the zoom log is an instance, supports Ericson and Haggerty’s perspective, and allows us to see officers’ resistance to it as an attempt to contrast the
progressive transformation of policing practices. While at the moment these attempts are successful, it remains to be seen what kind of arrangement will be achieved in the long run.

**Managing time or killing time?**

I argued in the previous chapter that the implementation of a video surveillance system is used by the police force that manage it to advance claims on time, both in the present and the future tense. On one hand, CCTV is depicted as a technological solution that allows for the quick, almost immediate, deployment of police personnel in case of need; on the other, in the long run the deterring potential of the camera is believed to have a normalising effect on people's behaviour in public. However, in order to get a fuller picture, it is necessary to contrast these claims with the day-to-day reality of CCTV operations, to see if, and to what extent, practice and discourse go hand in hand.

The control room doubles up as the operational centre of the station and officers assigned to it run a variety of tasks, included, but not limited to, the management of the CCTV system. More precisely, they have to control and coordinate officers on active duty through a network of phone and radio communications, manage incoming calls from citizens to an emergency hotline, liaise with the Civil Defence in case of critical situations emerging and attend to people who show up at the station and, usually, need to be redirected to the office they need. When personnel are available, there are two officers per shift assigned to the control room, so that one can focus exclusively on the tasks at hand, while the other attends to the reception desk located in the sentry box. Because the implementation of the video surveillance system has not opened the way to the hiring of new personnel, the task of controlling the cameras has fallen upon the shoulders of the officers that were already assigned to the control room on a permanent basis. This is one of the things the operators complained about most strongly, as they feel that this particular arrangement does not allow them to do their job at the best of their possibilities or to use the system other than in a residual manner, or, as one of them said while being interviewed “consistently with the other duties” they have. Clearly, this has an impact on the effectiveness of the system itself, as it can happen that, at any given moment, there is no one looking at the cameras. The situation is

63Police staff amounts to 116 members, of whom around 80 on active duty.
exacerbated when there is just one officer on duty, so every time someone arrives at the station he/she must necessarily leave his/her spot to go and attend to the visitor. The following episode is a case in point:

Session 6 - evening.
It is 8:10 PM and a man arrives at the station to report a problem; he needs to hand in a certificate before midnight, but the automatic drop-in device located on the ground floor of the INPS64 building is broken, so he has come here to see if the local police can do something about it. There is just one officer on duty, so he is forced to leave the control room unattended (with me inside) and go talk to the man. He remains away for 36 minutes.

Additionally, after a short amount of time in the control room it became evident that, even when not otherwise engaged, operators do not really pay attention to the cameras. The boring nature of the job of CCTV operator can be identified as one of the factors informing this disregard. As one of the officers put it, simply “there’s no end to it”. In considering the uneventful, for the most part, shifts and the boredom that, thus, ensues, Goffman's notion of secondary adjustments (1961a) is particularly helpful, in that it helps to focus the attention on the careful arrangement of practices and strategies that the operators adopt in order to deal with these problems. As such, an analysis that seeks to uncover what happens normally inside the control room – i.e. what the officers do when they are waiting for something to happen – cannot refrain from looking at those “habitual arrangement[s] by which a member of an organization employs unauthorized means, or obtains unauthorized ends, or both, thus getting around the organization's assumptions as to what he should do and get and hence what he should be” (Goffman, 1961a: 189). While, at a first glance, it could be said that most of the time officers actually do nothing or very little, such a statement needs to be reassessed in light of the dense undercurrent of subordinate involvements (Goffman, 1963) in which operators are immersed, so that it can be calmly said that the officers’ doing ‘nothing’ is actually quite a nuanced activity. So, what do operators do, and how do their actions relate to the claims advanced by the police hierarchy pertaining to the effects of CCTV in the city?
An internet connection can provide a quick way out from the bore of the job towards a potentially bottomless source of distractions, so it should really come as no surprise that officers spend a large portion of their time surfing the web. The other most popular

64 Istituto Nazionale di Previdenza Sociale, the Italian Social Security Agency.
pastime in the control room is, quite predictably too, television, and what soon became evident in the course of the observations is how these two occupations – surfing the Internet and watching TV – are segmented by age. The youngest, being in his early thirties, officer among those in charge of the control room\(^{65}\) is also the one who spends more time on the web and has with it the greatest familiarity. At the same time, he is the only one who never watches TV, only using it as a source of background noise. His coworkers are well aware that he is the one to go to if they need something done online, and he is usually ready to help, though he devotes the largest portion of his time to Facebook.

Session 7, morning.
Officer Paolo\(^{66}\) is sitting in front of one of the PCs in the back, intently typing on the keyboard. From where I stand I cannot actually see what he is doing, but someone must have turned the speakers on because I can clearly hear the “pop” noise that signals a new message in a chat session on Facebook. This gives him away immediately. This does not really come as a surprise, as many of his exchanges with colleagues so far are Facebook-themed, too: his relational status, comments on pictures he has posted, women he has dated, clubs he has gone to. Basically, all he talks about has to do with Facebook.

Session 10, early afternoon.
I come into the room and see officer C1 and officer Paolo intently working on a computer. From what they say, it comes out the young one is helping his older colleague to buy an ink cartridge for his home printer on line, because, as C1 says, “young people are better at this”.

However, Paolo is not the only one who likes spending time on the Internet:

Session 14, early morning.
It’s around 9 AM and officer C4 sits in front of one of the PCs in the back to watch an excerpt of a TV show that was broadcast the evening before. The whole time, he completely ignores the screens.

The TV in the control room is almost invariably on; only one of the four sergeants does not consider it appropriate for officers to keep it turned on while at work, so every time he comes in he turns it off, with officers turning it back on as soon as he leaves. TV

\(^{65}\)This officer is one of the replacements, and only works as the sole responsible of the control room when appointed officers are not available. In light of his position, he was not interviewed.

\(^{66}\)The name has been changed.
plays an important role in the control room as, on one hand, people can literally flock together to watch it and, on the other, along with politics, it is the most common topic of conversation among officers.

Session 6, early evening.
During an, again, uneventful stint, Officer C1 is watching the news on TV while officer Paolo is working on the computer, his back facing the monitors. The sergeant comes in and starts watching TV as well.

Session 11.
It’s almost 9 PM and the officer leaves the control room to go on a coffee break. The two officers on patrol duty, who happen to be in the station at this time, remain in the control watching TV, while he goes and has a cup of coffee.

To a degree, officers in the control room even feel free to pursue their hobbies while at work. In this regard, officer C2, with his research on military history, is the perfect case in point. He always carries a folder with him with documents on his research and he spends most of his time working on those. He sits at one of the computers facing the wall, thus having his back turned to the video surveillance screens most of the time, collecting and reorganising the biographies of soldiers and making phone calls to various register offices in the area to verify their dates of birth and death. A common staple of his conversation, usually uttered after answering the phone or completing a task is the phrase: “I have done what I was supposed to do, now I can take care of my own stuff.” Such a bold remark is supported by the behaviour of his immediate superiors, who, upon entering the control room, never seem to be bothered that he is, almost invariably, working on a personal project. One of the sergeants even asked him how the thing was coming together, once. Others are usually more restrained in their pursuits, or at least do not indulge them as constantly as he does.

Session 15, middle of the afternoon.
One of the sergeants comes in and starts talking to officer C1 about his morning spent mushroom-picking; apparently, the session was a particularly fruitful one and he proudly shows us the pictures he has taken with his mobile of a basketful of mushrooms.

Session 15.
It is almost 6 P.M. and officer Paolo has just come in. He has just bought a DTT receiver and wants to see if it works, so he starts connecting it to the TV in the control room. While he is working on that, a call comes in for a rear-end collision; he ignores the phone, so much so that in the end an officer waiting in the other room comes in and
picks it up herself. I have never seen her before in the control room and she clearly has no idea of how to deal with the call, so she basically acts as a transmitter between the caller and her colleague, who for the entire duration of the call, keeps on installing the receiver, unperturbed.

An important point remains to be made. While, as I said above, boredom does certainly play a part in how operators end up spending a good portion of their time in the control room, this is just part of a bigger, and more complex, picture. Other tasks that are just as mundane – running checks on car, contacting the maintenance department when citizens call in to report a broken street lamp – are attended to quickly and professionally, and for the most part operators are ready and efficient when they need to be. On the contrary, the video surveillance system is never taken into much consideration and is, at best, considered as a fancy gimmick with no real application in the day-to-day work of the control room, or of the police at large. The following excerpts from the field notes provide empirical support to this argument:

Session 12, late morning.
Placed between the screens on the desk in front of the monitors I notice what looks like a joystick. I have never seen it before; it had probably been buried under lots of paper. I ask the operator what that is. The resulting exchange went as follows:
Officer: “Oh, that’s the joystick…. It controls everything [moves his hand around to indicate the monitors on the wall]”
Me: “Was it always there? ”
O: “Yes, yes. Not used once.”
M: “[Surprised] Oh, really? It looks…”
O: “Cool, doesn’t it? We like to be stylish in here, you see…. [Tone heavily ironic]

A running joke in the station revolves around the idea that the flat screens could be used to watch movies instead of the surveillance images, to provide respite to officers and entertain them during breaks.

Session 6, early evening
One of the patrolling officers comes into the control room and, upon seeing me, looks at the monitors and says: “Well, this thing [turning her head to the monitors] doesn’t make any sense in here, they shouldn’t be here… somewhere else perhaps, but here…”
To which her colleague replies: “Yeah, I mean if you think about that… wouldn’t it be nice if they showed movies instead? So when you are here you could always watch one…”
Officers’ behaviour and posture in the control room is particularly revealing of their attitude towards the cameras; when there is nothing to do – i.e. no calls on the phone or on the radio, no checks to run, no person to attend to – still, it is nevertheless very rare for them to dedicate some of their time to watch the monitors attentively. The only one who, at times, happens to do so if officer C3, but still, the screens usually only get a passing glance while officers are busy doing something else or are on their way in, or out. The lack of involvement in video surveillance is so widespread that, tellingly, the same camera can be shown on the large flat screen on the wall for days on end, without any consideration on how the rhythm of the city changes in the course of the day.

Session 5.
It is Saturday night, around 1 AM. It is very cold outside and there are not many people around. Of the 11 cameras working properly, just the one located in Via *** shows people. This is one of the most popular areas in the whole city centre for young people to spend time, with bars, restaurants and pubs. I’d expect officer C2 to, at least, move this camera to the main screen, as the others show a lunar landscape, with no one on the streets. However, he does not and rather spends most of the time watching TV or organising his research notes.

The accounts presented so far show how operators are able to separate the management of the video surveillance systems from the other duties they are responsible for. Any mention of the cameras is usually met by the operators with irony and sarcasm, as this is how they deal with a task that, to them, is useless most of the time and how they mark their distance from a role (see Goffman, 1961b: 85-152) – the CCTV operative – that they simply refuse to assume.

Session 6.
It is 6 PM, end of the shift. Officer C4 comes in and upon seeing his colleague intently working on one of the PCs in the back looks at me and says: “See how we monitor the screens? With our backs turned to them!”

The present discussion raises the issue of resistance in the workplace. From a Marxist perspective, we can classify under this rubric overt manifestations of collective and organized dissent to the logic of the workplace that are best understood in terms of class struggle. However, if we adopt such a definition, there would seem to be less and less room for the successful disruption of power relations in the workplace. On the contrary, if we broaden our view of what resistance can amount to, we can easily realise that there
is more to it than the simple dichotomy between consent and coercion would suggest (Sewell, 2008). Thus, if we “shift the focus of resistance away from the relatively rare events surrounding implacable opposition or total unanimity to the quotidian aspects of workplace politics” (Sewell, 2008: 344), and we broaden the criteria for the definition of the concept, we may realize that resistance has not disappeared from the workplace, but has found a new habitat “in the commonplaces and crevices of intersubjective relations and other quiet subterranean realms of organisational life” (Fleming and Sewell, 2002: 863). In this vein, and against traditional understandings of the concept, resistance can be productively reframed in terms of the “active disengagement” (Fleming and Sewell, 2002) of workers and their “ability to comply without conforming” (Fleming and Sewell, 2002: 864.). The goal, then, is not to be found in the wish to pose a threat to the dominant order of the workplace, but rather in the possibility of “a release valve that enables chronic performance to excessive standards” (Lee Ashcraft, 2008: 382-383).

If we move on to consider these issues from the more general perspective of the local police, they speak volumes on the inability to integrate successfully the technology of CCTV within the practices of the police. Two meaningful implications can be drawn from it. First, this reinforces the claims made throughout this work that technology does not exist in a vacuum but is, rather “socially and politically constructed through complex processes of institutional and personal interaction” (Graham and Marvin, 1996: 105). Second, it is testament to the difficulty police can have in embracing new technologies and, more generally, introduce innovations in their policing strategies, as the literature has long shown (for example, see: Kelling, 1983).

**Who gets targeted?**

One of the central notions that shed light on how a video surveillance system is actually used in practice is that of targeted surveillance, as it details who is surveilled and why. As the literature review on CCTV pointed out, in the course of the years numerous studies conducted in a variety of contexts and nations (among them, see: Norris and Armstrong, 1999; McCahill and Norris, 2003; Mork Lomell et al., 2003; Fonio, 2007) have come to the conclusion that the gaze of the cameras is not neutral and can, and often does, lead to the disproportionate targeting, and consequent exclusion, of
members of cultural and/or ethnic minorities. However, my experience in the fieldwork tells a very different story as in the only occasions when video surveillance was used, the aim was not to follow a suspect but to track officers on patrol or keep an eye on an ongoing situation. Essentially, in the practices of the police of Central City, CCTV has effectively been divorced from crime control and security. Also of significance, during the time spent in the control room a pattern emerged, revealing how the cameras are never the first choice of officers when they have to deal with an emergency, even when they are eventually used.

Session 13, early evening.
A call comes in from the patrol stationed in front of the train station, to say that a steel handrail in the square is broken, so now there is a piece of steel that leans out towards the street, with great danger to both people and cars. They say they will need the Civil Defence to come and fix it. The officer forwards the call and decides not to use the cameras, even though the area is well covered. After a while, not hearing anything from the patrol nor the Civil Defence, he decides to use the cameras to see how things are going and if the repair team has arrived on the scene.

Generally speaking, while radio communications and phone calls are used effectively and effortlessly to maintain contacts between the control room and officers on patrol and to coordinate actions, only rarely is video surveillance even taken into consideration. As a result, it is officers on active duty that, at times, ask their colleagues in the control room to “take a look at the monitors to see what’s going on”, rather than operators proactively using the cameras to provide their colleagues on the road with information on the event that caused them to intervene. A case in point is provided by the unfolding of the handrail incident that has been already mentioned a few lines above.

Session 13, early evening.
Public property has been damaged and an officer is on the scene diverting traffic while Civil Defence isolates the area, to then proceed with the repairing. The whole episode has gone totally unnoticed in the control room, so it is only when the patrol asks for any information leading to the identification of who broke the hand rail that the officer activates manual control of the cameras. He uses intermittently the two PCs that run the surveillance software because with one of them he keeps experiencing problems. Looking at him, I cannot help but think that he looks way more competent when he is surfing the Internet for his own pleasure.
The dynamics of the organisational appropriation of this specific technology on the part of the local police are, once again, hugely relevant. Without much trouble, a system implemented to promote urban security has quietly become a tool for the coordination of police actions, to be used when the other channels of communication commonly used – phone and radio – provide contrasting accounts on what is actually happening in the course of an intervention.

Session 8, around 6:30 PM.
Someone calls the control room to report a gas leak in one of the areas covered by the cameras. Given the nature of the event, I do not expect video surveillance to be used. The officer calls the utilities company and asks them to send someone, as apparently there is a strong smell and people are worried. However, when the technician arrives he cannot find the officer who, according to what the control room had said while on the phone, would wait for assistance. The technician calls the control room back, asking for the whereabouts of the officer. In order to find out where his colleague is, the officer then activates the manual control of the camera in that area and starts looking for him. After a while he still cannot find him, so he decides to call him on the phone and ask where he is. After the call he knows where to look, so he quickly finds him; when he sees him on the screen great hilarity ensues. This is the first time I have ever seen the video surveillance system being used.

The final recorded instance of the cameras being used relates to the settlement of a controversy between co-workers on whether or not the towing of a vehicle had legitimate grounds. Though the officer in charge zoomed in to have a more detailed view of what was happening on the screens, he subsequently failed to fill in an entry on the zoom log, as control room regulations would dictate.

Session 12, morning.
At 10:50 AM an officer calls in, requesting a tow truck in an area covered by the cameras, because a car has been parked in a reserved spot. The officer in the control room sends a truck, but does not use the cameras. After 15 minutes, the same officer contacts the control room again, this time on the radio asking for support, as “there are people here who are saying weird things”. Once again, the officer does not look at the cameras, but forwards the request to the closest patrol, which agrees to go in support. After a while, fearing the first officer to arrive on the scene has incorrectly read the signage, thus asking for the removal of a vehicle that was parked legitimately, the officer in the control room starts controlling the camera in the area to take a look at the signs. He does not use the joystick, but the mouse. The whole operation does not last more than 30 seconds. With the other officer in the control room he starts arguing whether the towing was justified and if the supporting patrol has arrived on the scene. He grabs the mouse again and starts zooming in to look again at the signage and the police car that by now is parked nearby. After a minute or so the two notice two buses stuck in traffic on the other side of the road and thus realise they were looking in the
wrong place, as the traffic jam was caused by the tow truck removing the car. After a few minutes, the officer uses the camera again to see if the traffic is now more fluent. Overall, he does not seem to be able to operate the system comfortably. After the incident is resolved, he also fails to record the zooming in the log.

**Conclusions**

In light of what has just been exposed, the claims on how the local police use video surveillance appear as in need of readdressing. The general disregard of officers towards the system means that they largely rely on other, more established, means of communication in their day-to-day activity, such as the phone and radios. Because of this, the claim that cameras are used for faster deployments of patrols on the street would seem to be untenable. The same goes for the idea that cameras can deter people from engaging in illicit activities, thus promoting the normalisation of behaviours in public. While the data I presented show beyond doubt that these claims are not mirrored in the practices of the control room, though, I do not believe this allows us to draw definitive conclusions on the veracity of the official discourses that the local police of Central City have adopted in relation to video surveillance.

The opaqueness of the police to outsiders is, in this regard, a key factor to be considered. For one, this has to do with how the police as an organisation is characterised by social isolation and internal solidarity among members (Clark, 1965; Reiner, 1978; Crank, 2004). As for the former, the duress of shift work, coupled with the difficulties in letting the tensions of the job go and the unease citizens may experience in dealing with police officers in sociable contexts all contribute to mark the separation between civilians and uniformed personnel. At the same time, the dangerous nature of the job and the need to protect each other's back, both against possible attacks from criminals and in-depth inspections by superior ranks, reinforce the bond that exists between officers (see Reiner, 2010). In turn, these features of the police contribute to the second issue to be considered in relation to the opaqueness of the force, that is that citizens know very little about how the police operate in practice. While, “[t]he lack of information is paradoxical when one considers that police perform the quintessential function of government, namely, authoritative and forceful regulation” (Bailey, 1983: 20), this also has a number of consequences, particularly in terms of the external accountability of the police itself, and the need to establish clear mechanisms for the
identification and persecution of police abuse, and the overall assessment of police work.

Crucially, this opaqueness allows the police to exert a great deal of control on what information is eventually made available to the general public, and gives them plenty of room and autonomy in the choice of strategies for the management of their ‘corporate’ image. Because of this, it becomes possible for the police to uphold in public claims and discourses in the face of day-to-day practices that may be so vastly diverging as to contradict what is said in official statements and other front-stage venues.

I believe this is exactly what has been happening in Central City. Thus, in relation to CCTV, the fact that the system is rarely used and, when this happens, it is for goals that are not the official ones, does not force the police as a whole to reject the claims pertaining to the increase in efficiency – quicker deployments – and efficacy – crime pre-emption through normalisation – that cameras have supposedly brought about. In light of these observations, we can assume that the system ends up serving other goals, for the benefit of other constituencies, rather than protecting the citizens of Central City and making it a safer place. What these goals are and who benefits from them will be explored in the concluding section of this work.
13. In Northern City

Introduction

The ethnographic sessions analysed below were conducted in the first three weeks of April 2011, for a total of 30 hours. The control room where the observations took place is open 24 hours a day, so initially a first round of observations was aimed at covering all the different time slots; after that, attention was mostly focused on the morning and the early afternoon, as these are the busiest times of the day in the areas covered by the cameras. Each session ranged in length from sixty minutes to four hours. In order to conduct the observations, a written authorisation was issued by the chief’s office, thus allowing my presence in the control room. This was also necessary to comply with national legislation on privacy, which states that access to the premises where video surveillance systems are housed must be strictly regulated.

Three officers are permanently assigned to the control room, while replacements are in the process of being selected. In the meantime, when one of the operators is not available, someone else is assigned to the control room on an occasional basis. Throughout the 14 sessions of observation the three main officers were on duty 8 times; in the remaining 7 occasions\(^\text{67}\) a replacement was called upon to fill the position\(^\text{68}\). Shifts are varying in length (first shift: 6:30-13:30; second shift: 13:30-20:30; third shift: 20:30-24; fourth shift: 24:00-06:30) and do not follow a fixed schedule. Every four of five weeks officers have the weekend off. Shifts for patrolling officers follow the same timetable.

The system includes 61 cameras transmitting in a wireless mode, with images broadcast on five large flat-screen TVs. Due to the mode of transmission, the overall quality of the images is not always good and, particularly in bad weather conditions, the system can stop working altogether. Images are recorded and stored for seven days before being...

\(^{67}\) One of the sessions covered two adjacent shifts, one covered by an appointed control room operator, the other by a replacement.

\(^{68}\) This is the main reason why the observations were cut short sooner than originally planned. The continuous technical problems suffered by the system, along with the lack of trained personnel meant that, most of the time, cameras were either ignored or put in the hands of officers unable to use them.
automatically destroyed; officers in the control room can view them live, control every camera manually, access old footage and save it on a removable device.

The control room where the observations were conducted is big, but cramped with things. The sergeant who is responsible for the management of the CCTV system does not have a separate office, but has a desk inside the room. A much larger, L-shaped desk is where the operator sits during the shift. On it, there are two computers used to manage the cameras, another used to record all communication that passes through the room, several phones, a printer and a monitor showing the live signals emitted by the GPS-enabled radios used by patrolling officers. In the room there is also a photocopying machine that any officer can use, several filing cabinets, and storage for the walkie-talkies used by traffic wardens, whose only task is to issue parking tickets. Next to the door, five large flat-screen TVs are used to broadcast the images as recorded by the cameras. However, when fieldwork was conducted one was missing as it had been damaged and officers were waiting for a new one to arrive, while two others, though still physically present, were not always functioning properly.

Due to the large number of cameras connected to the system, officers can select how many of them (either 4, 9, or 16) they want to see on each screen. They can also save any specific configuration they create, so that whenever they want to use it they just have to activate it rather than select every camera manually. Of course, the bigger the number of cameras shown on the same screen, the smaller each square will be.
Most of the time, cameras are directed towards major traffic arteries, as traffic is one of the biggest problems affecting Northern City. As shown in chapters 6 and 9, this choice is coherent with the approach initially adopted by the former administration, which decided to implement CCTV in order to be able to control traffic flows more efficiently. However, in the course of the interviews the current mayor and assessore alla sicurezza both made it extremely clear that nowadays video surveillance in Northern City is used to curb disorder and promote feelings of security among the population. While this fracture was already apparent in the discourses each of the parties involved – city administrators, higher ranks, police officers – used to make sense of the presence of CCTV in the city, in this section data culled from the observations will be used to further substantiate and integrate the claims already made in relation to this issue.

The precarious placement of CCTV

One of the central tenets of STS is that technology becomes a fully constructed object when it interacts with the people who use it (Graham and Marvin, 1996). While this clearly applies to any technology in any given context, surveillance studies have also demonstrated how CCTV operations are deeply affected by social (Norris and Armstrong, 1999), organisational (McCahill and Norris, 2003), and cultural (McCahill, 2002) factors. In light of these studies, it should come as no surprise to see how some

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69 See chapter 9, Discourses on CCTV in Northern City.
characteristics of the context of implementation are hugely influential in dictating how CCTV operations are carried out in Northern City. In addition to technical problems, it is my claim that the re-organisation of the force initiated by the new chief upon his taking office in January 2011 has contributed to unsettle and de-stabilise the formal arrangements and division of labour that had been in place in the control room prior to his arrival. This has altered the context within which the system is located and has, in turn, deeply affected how cameras are used on a day-to-day basis. I will now look at how each of the two issues – technical problems, and re-organisation of the force – conditions the day-to-day reality of the control room as a whole, and of CCTV operations in particular.

During the time I spent in the control room, CCTV operations were marred by continuous technical problems. Of the 61 cameras that make up the system, the 6 covering a large park on the outskirts of the city were permanently disconnected after being badly damaged during a thunderstorm, while in the control room operators only had at their disposal two fully-functioning screens, with another missing and two others experiencing problems from time to time. As a result, it was impossible to have all the cameras put on the screens at once, so that the potential reach of operators in the control room was dramatically reduced. In spite of the frequency with which the system breaks down, the procedure to follow in order to file a maintenance request is particularly elaborate and time-consuming. First, because the video surveillance system in Northern City is the result of two different rounds of construction, different companies are responsible for different parts of the system. Additionally, when something breaks down operators are not allowed to file a request by themselves, because they do not know what kind of interventions are covered by the contract with the companies providing maintenance. Rather, they have to report to the head of their division who can authorise expenses and, therefore, has to decide whether or not to forward the request for technical assistance. The only instance where operators are allowed to call maintenance directly is when the whole system shuts down, as happened during my first session. Officers working in the control room are not happy with this arrangement, as this means that repairs are never carried out as rapidly as they would like them to. In regard to this, operators eagerly anticipated the beginning of construction works for the
third portion of the system\textsuperscript{70}, as the same company was also expected to take over maintenance duties for the whole system. It was a shared hope of the control room that this would finally allow for a faster and easier to access service.

Another crucial element to consider is the internal re-organisation of the force initiated by the new chief, who took office in January 2011, and still underway when the fieldwork was conducted the following April. Because one of the key goals of this rearrangement was to increase the amount of officers on patrol duty\textsuperscript{71}, the number of officers assigned to the control room in each shift has been halved, so that now there is just one officer attending to everything. This means that one person has to control and coordinate officers on active duty through a network of phone and radio communications, manage incoming calls from citizens, liaise with the Civil Defence in case of critical situations emerging, and manage the cameras. Additionally, operators also have to record digitally every communication that passes through the control room. Also in light of this, this re-organisation has not proceeded smoothly so far, both for people working in the control room and for officers in general.

The shortage of personnel on office duty experienced in the police station also extends to the control room. At the moment, there are just three officers who underwent appropriate training to work there, and while other officers should be assigned to it soon, no one has been selected yet. Needless to say, the scarcity of trained personnel affects the operations carried out in the control room in significant ways. First of all, the extensive use of replacements to cover vacant shifts means that the control room is manned by officers who are not very familiar with the instruments in it, nor know how to face the numerous tasks that fall upon whoever is responsible for the control room. Second, trained personnel is tired and overworked, as they often have to do their share in addition to anything that replacements leave unfinished, either because they did not know how to do it, or were not authorised to. This last element has a direct impact on video surveillance operations, as replacement officers do not possess full privileges, so they cannot access past recordings, or copy footage onto a removable device. Additionally, because of the chaotic atmosphere of the station, and the stressful nature of the job involved, there is also an extremely high turnover among officers that are potentially eligible to be selected as official replacement for the control room.

\textsuperscript{70}Scheduled for the spring/summer 2011.
\textsuperscript{71}The local police of Northern City have 130 officers, of whom around 50 on active duty.
Essentially, the conditions are deemed to be so bad that they just do not want to work in the control room. This generates a vicious circle, where there are no trained people to assign to the control room, and those that get some training soon ask to be re-assigned elsewhere and then leave.

The effervescence, to use a Durkheimian notion (2001 [1912]), that is temporarily affecting the local police of Northern City greatly contributed to precipitating the arrangements pertaining to the video surveillance system in a state of fleeting instability. In the next section I will detail how this organisational uncertainty reverberated on the fieldwork and on the categories I developed to analyse the ethnographic sessions I conducted. What can already be argued, though, is that it appears that CCTV is not exactly on the top of the list of priorities for the local police of Northern City and that, despite the more recent activation, the system in Central City is more established into the body of the control room than is the case here.

**Environmental fluidity and fieldwork**

In a collection of essays that are part of the empirical beginnings of the sociology of work and occupations, Hughes acknowledged how what is a crisis for some, is bound to be someone else's routine (Hughes, 1958: 46). This is particularly true in the case of the police. Two meaningful implications can be drawn from this realisation. First, sustained involvement and long periods of observations are required of researchers, who need to be available to witness the unexpected when/as it happens. Second, it is precisely thanks to this deep immersion into the world of the police that it becomes possible for authors “to translate and demistify professional work, to give what seem to be chaotic, challenging, uncertain work settings a sense of order, familiarity and repetition” (Smith, 2001: 223).

Uncovering the hidden arrangements that underlie even the most chaotic of environments and give a specific fragment of social reality – in this case, the police station – its stable character is the challenge, and goal, of ethnographic research methods. To put it very simply, what is assumed is that by spending time with someone, by witnessing how they do things and how they talk about what they do, the researcher will be able to understand what a particular ‘piece’ of reality means to them, and what they make of it. “Interpretive explanation (…) trains its attention on what institutions,
actions, images, utterances, events, customs, all the usual objects of social-scientific interest, mean to those whose institutions, actions, customs, and so on they are” (Geertz, 1983: 22).

I subscribe wholeheartedly to the statement I just quoted or, to state it differently, that people understand their reality and are able to make sense of it. However, the time I spent in the control room of Northern City (forcibly) offered me a specular take on this same issue. What if people do not understand the reality they are immersed in and cannot make sense of it in any way?

Several authors have touched upon this problem, with the most notable formulation being Durkheim's anomie. In his study on suicide, he defines it as a “disturbance of the collective order”, a progression of “serious readjustments [that] take place in the social order” (1951 [1897]: 246), a “state of de-regulation” (ibid.: 253) that follows any deep change in the conditions of social life itself. Durkheim is very clear in that it takes time for society to re-adjust and to develop new norms and orientations of value in the face of such transformations and that this positive outcome – the development of a new “scale”, as he says – is not in any way guaranteed. A group or a society can come up with new foundations and proceed in its existence; however, the opposite is also possible, with large-scale dissolution looming on the horizon.

Another author that has looked into what happens in situations of conflict and change is Victor Turner, with the notion of social dramas. Coherently with the author's processual view of social reality, the key characteristic of these “units of aharmonic or disharmonic process” (1974: 37) in relation to my experience in the fieldwork is that they have four separate, and observable, phases. According to Turner’s pattern, the breach causes a crisis, which in turn calls for some redressive action to be taken in order to achieve the reintegration of the system. Crucially, only when the process is complete and the drama is overcome its temporal nature becomes clear to the eyes, and can be used analytically to assess how the societal body has changed. “From the point of view of the scientific observer, the fourth phase – that of temporary climax, solution, or outcome – is an opportunity for taking stock. He can now analyze the continuum synchronically, so to speak, at this point of arrest, having already fully taken into account and represented by appropriate constructs the temporal nature of the drama. (…) New powers will have been channelled into old and new authority and former authority defenestrated. Closeness will have become distance, and vice versa. Formerly integrated parts will
have segmented; formerly independent parts will have fused. (...) New norms and rules may have been generated during attempts to redress conflict; old rules will have fallen into disrepute and have been abrogated” (Turner, 1974: 42). In light of what I witnessed in the conduction of the fieldwork, it is my claim that the local police of Northern City has not been able to recompose its drama yet – with meaningful implications both for my research and the day-to-day operations of the force. Metaphorically speaking, the local police are still pretty much in the midst of the storm. The table below summarises what the different phases of the social drama experienced by the local police of Northern City have entailed thus far.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Breach</td>
<td>Appointment of new chief of police.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis</td>
<td>Established modes of operation are progressively abandoned.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Redressive Action</td>
<td>Internal re-organisation of the whole force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration</td>
<td>Pending.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Phases of the social drama as experienced by the local police of Northern City.

While the situation I was faced with is, epistemologically speaking, fascinating – how can something that is in a continuous state of becoming be analysed and put into categories? – it was empirically unnerving and deeply frustrating, too. Equally, it was also a source of frustration for officers, both on office and active duty alike, stemmed, and fuelled, from the inability they perceived on the part of high ranks to steer the force into a more coherent structure. The exchange below sums up nicely the atmosphere that was typical of the control room.

Session 12, afternoon.
The officer in the control room for the present shift has filed an official request to be assigned to the control room on a permanent basis. He is updating the communications log for the shifts when one-time replacements were on duty and failed to do so. The sergeant asks him how the data entry is going, and he answers he has not had much time to do that, because the phone has been ringing all day. The exchange that follows goes like this:
S: Don't worry; we have until Sunday to finish that. Aren't you happy that we got until Sunday?
O: No, because then we have to insert the data for today, and really I don't know how to do that here...
S: It was you that asked to be assigned to the control room. Don't tell me that conditions
have changed.

O: I do. Conditions have changed, and they were different when I asked to be assigned here. Much better.

S: I know, but I have no power over that, there's nothing I can do about it.

O: I can't do anything about it either, but, really, how can you work when things are always like this?

The end result is the continuous clash, in the control room and in the police station at large, between the chaotic and fever-like activity that occupies those in-between phases when a structure has crumbled, but nothing has emerged to replace it yet, and the need for meaning and order in one's (professional) live. Because of the self-representation of the police as a disciplined, structured and hierarchical entity (Reiner, 2010), I argue that this unresolved tension is particularly aggravating for police officers, who see the internal disorder into which the force has precipitated as a serious threat to their institutional task of enforcing order in the space of the city. How can police work effectively, when disorder has crept into its very own body?

This also provides a clear explanation for the continuous complaints voiced by officers about the lack in “structural quality” of daily services and the bad quality of the job being done by their superiors. Under this light, the distress experienced by police officers can be understood as a dramatised statement of what the police should be like; a cohesive, organised and stable structure, where everybody knows what is expected of them and what their place and role are. The following excerpt is typical of the kind of situations I witnessed in the control room:

Session 12, afternoon.
An officer comes into the control room to ask who is going to replace her, now that she has completed her shift. When she hears who should be her replacement, she answers that the person in question got his order of service changed, so it clearly cannot be him who has to replace her. The operator in the control had no idea of the change, and starts complaining loudly about how these problems now happen all the time. He leaves the control room to understand who has to replace his co-worker.

The lack of a clear organisational structure deeply affects officers' performances, included but not limited to control room operations. Clearly, this also had important consequences for my research and for the categories I intended to use to analyse the data gathered in the fieldwork. To put it very simply, fluidity defies boundaries. Just as lines cannot be drawn over water, so the notions I employed to analyse the sessions
conducted in Central City proved inadequate, once I tried to apply them in Northern City.

On a practical level, the lack of a code of practice for CCTV operations, coupled with the absence of clearly defined physical boundaries surrounding the space of the control room mean that two of the types of boundary-work that I had identified in Central City, regulation and physical demarcation respectively, could not be found to hold validity in the case of Northern City.

As for identification, there is a 2-tier system of credentials in place, which makes the overall picture more complex than expected. First, there is a shared set of credentials that all those working in the control room know, one-time replacements included, which allow any user to activate the screens and control the cameras manually, with full functionality. On a practical level, this has the important consequence of making the association of a given operation with a specific officer less automatic than in Central City, as the same user always remains logged in the computer that controls the cameras. Thus, officers' actions are rendered less transparent and less accessible, and therefore less accountable. However, for more complex operations – accessing past footage, copying images on a removable device – another set of individual credentials is needed, only possessed by each of the officers formally assigned to work in the control room. While this provides a barrier against unauthorised access to stored data, it is also a source of problems and confusion when we take into account the unstable working environment of the control room. Because temporary replacements do not have such credentials, there are only four people in the whole police force – the three officers and the head of the control room – that can perform one of the operations mentioned above, and if they are not available strategies must be developed rapidly to circumvent this limitation. The following note details the only occasion when footage was requested during the time I spent in the control room.

Session 4, early afternoon.

Footage is needed for an investigation pertaining to a car accident. There are four people in front of the computer trying to identify and copy the right segment, but none of them has a password that allows them to do that. One of the four leaves the control room and sets around the station, looking for someone who has the password or knows it. The head of the control room is rapidly located and he has a password. However, he makes it very clear that he is not a techie and is not sure that he can do what is requested. When he gets stuck and cannot go on, another officer with a reputation of being 'good with computers' is summoned into the control room. Together, they call
one of the three officers that explains to his co-worker how to save the images on a USB stick, using the password provided by the head of the control room. Everyone is trying to make this work, because this is the last day the footage is stored before being automatically destroyed. However, in the end the computer cannot locate the file and, after some fruitless attempts, they give up. Eventually, they file another request to store the footage for longer, so that they have more time to try and see if they can get it.

Significantly, while temporary replacements have free, though partial, access to the CCTV system, they cannot use the computer where all communication passing through the control room is recorded. The only thing they can do is record it manually on a notebook, so that when a titular officer is on duty, he/she can access the computer and transcribe everything. Clearly, this takes time away from other tasks, CCTV included.

**Upon whom does suspicion fall?**

In light of what was said in the section above, it should come as no surprise that cameras were rarely used in the control room. In the interviews two themes had emerged clearly, and, though indirectly, both were confirmed by the fieldwork.

First, the use of CCTV to control traffic flows in the city centre and the transit of authorised and unauthorised vehicles in the area was reflected in the large number of cameras that are always pointed in the direction of the large arteries that cut across the space of the city. Significant in this regard is the fact that the need to check whether the presence of two trucks in a traffic-restricted area was authorised sparked the only instance of autonomous use of the system on the part of personnel working in the control room.

*Session 10, morning.*

Today it is market day and traffic in the city centre is quite intense. Traffic wardens have issued many tickets, and patrolling officers are in constant contact with the control room. All of a sudden, the sergeant leaves his desk and goes in front of the PC controlling the cameras. He starts looking at the images to get a better sense of the situation, and soon starts pointing at a specific camera on the monitor that shows two trucks parked in a square within the restricted-traffic area. He turns to the officer on duty and tells them to send someone to control whether or not the two vehicles can stay where they are. This is the first time that someone in the control room independently decides to use the system.

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72By autonomous I mean that the decision to look at the cameras was not the result of a request coming from officers on patrol, or of an order of service formulated by higher ranks.
According to what emerged from the interviews, the second area where cameras are used extensively in Northern City had to do with the removal of unauthorised street vendors from the city centre, and in support of this claim, one of the saved layouts for the cameras is tagged “unauthorised vendors”. However, this specific setting was never activated, nor I witnessed any deployment against such people in the time I spent in the control room. The only occasion when cameras were indeed used in relation to the alleged presence of vendors in the city centre was sparked by the conflict between an order issued by the deputy commissioner and an emergency call to the control room. Because the two officers on patrol had two competing commands – making sure there were no vendors in their area, attending to the emergency call – they came to the control room to ask for clarifications, and resorted to use the cameras to decide to which task to attend to first. What is interesting is that the decision to use the cameras was not made by control room personnel, but by patrolling officers – who were then forced to ask for help on how to control the cameras, being unable to do so themselves.

Session 3, afternoon.
Two patrolling officers have been ordered to go to one of the main squares in the city centre, to make sure there are no unauthorised vendors stationed there. However, an emergency call by an elderly woman has reached the station. She has fallen off her bed and cannot move, so called the local police to ask for help. The officer in the control room decides to send a patrol but it is the same one that is supposed to go and check on the vendors. The two officers ask their co-worker how to control the cameras so they can use the system to check from the station if there are any vendors without having to go there. Soon they realise that the square is empty, so they set out to go and help the elderly woman first.

What I believe is the key finding in relation to the issue of targeted surveillances in Northern City is how the system is used by higher ranks to control at a distance officers on patrol. The following note details the matter more precisely.

Session 6, late evening.
Tonight is a really calm night, so the officer on duty and I have a chance to talk without being disturbed. After a while, he asks me if I have noticed that several cameras are all pointed so as to look at the exact same spot – a tiny alley next to a church. When I say I have, he goes to explain why this is: “That alley leads to a bar, so if the cameras look there they can always know if we stopped at the bar to have a coffee and be a pain in
the ass because of that. Those cameras [pointing at several cameras on the monitors and the screens], they're all the same, so that they can always control us. The statute of workers says you cannot do this, but they do it anyway. As long as there is no paper trail, they know they can do anything they want. So, this is what cameras are for, to control us. Even ex-cons who just got out of jail are not as controlled as we are. And then, with the radios is exactly the same thing. Because they have GPS now, it's easy to use them to control us. This past winter I was on patrol with a co-worker, and it was so cold... and it's not like those who work at a desk know what it is like... Anyway, we spot one of those laundromats, so we stop there for a while to get a bit warmer. You know what happened? From here, they saw that two radios were close for half an hour and when we left they sent someone to see where we had been. Can you understand? Really, this is no way to work...

The excerpt above is important in that it demonstrates how a shift has taken place in Northern City in how CCTV is used daily. Rather than for pre-emption and crime control, a new use has emerged for cameras, that sees them used to control effectively and efficiently patrolling officers throughout the city. This radically challenges the placement of video surveillance within the official discourses on urban security, fear and protection adopted by the local administration. Rather, from what emerged in the course of the fieldwork, the claim that cameras are used to curb crime in Northern City is, simply, untenable.

However, because of the tense relationships between different hierarchical levels and the temporary lack of a definite organisational structure, the other competing rationalisation that I identified in the interviews also needs to be reconsidered. The resistance expressed by the officers against the idea of being under control, along with the lack of credibility of those responsible for drafting daily services is, in this regard, key to understanding how video surveillance has failed to become the tool for the rationalisation of police work that was envisioned by the former deputy commissioner in his interview. Two related elements in the fieldnote above support this statement. First, officers strongly resist the idea of being subject to control, negatively comparing their conditions to that of former inmates who, though in their eyes more deserving of being under surveillance, are not subject to the same level of detailed, real-time control. Because this degree of scrutiny is made possible by the technologies adopted in the control room – video surveillance, GPS-enabled radios – these tools then come to be

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73 Article 4 of the statute of workers (law 300/1970) dictates that employers cannot control their workers from a distance through the use of technological systems. Exceptions are allowed when the control is carried out for organisational or production reasons, and has to be agreed upon by the unions represented in the workplace.
seen under a less than benevolent light by officers, that is, the people that are supposed to use them. This challenges what Goold found in his study on CCTV and police operations in England. In the cities he studied officers were well aware that cameras control their actions while on patrol and sergeants and inspectors explicitly warned them “to remember that they were being watched by the cameras, and to be particularly aware of CCTV whenever they attended an incident in the town centre” (Goold, 2004: 181). Essentially, the different hierarchical levels of the force were united in considering video surveillance as a something that could potentially be used against them, so that it was essential for officers to follow the rules precisely or “to create the appearance of doing so” (ibid.). On the contrary, in Northern City there is a fracture between officers and their superiors, who use cameras to control patrolling officers without them knowing.

The second point upon which I would like to focus attention is the fact that the control of officers is not carried out by control room operators, but directly by higher ranks. This mirrors what McCahill (2002: 162) found in his study of CCTV in the workplace. In his study of how video surveillance is used by management to monitor the workforce in several industrial sites, he argues that cameras are rendered ineffective by the shared class solidarity that brings together CCTV operators and the workers. I believe something similar is at play in Northern City, where officers refuse to engage in what they perceive as “spying” on their co-workers. Combined together, these elements suggest that the claims on the effective use of CCTV for crime control need to be radically reassessed. In the next section, I will elaborate further on this last point.

Conclusions

The realisation that in Northern City video surveillance is used to control patrolling officers and is, because of this, strongly resisted by police personnel is more than enough to conclude that in Northern City CCTV simply cannot be effective in terms of urban security. To clarify such a bold statement, it is worth remembering how one of the theoretical stances that inform this work is the conscious and complete refusal to fall prey to the charms of technological determinism and its many advocates. On the contrary, on the back of much research carried out within STS, I believe that, in any given context, technology is continuously made and re-made by the interactions
between people, objects, and artefacts. If the end users of a technology refuse it, then this will necessarily impact on what that technology will end up being in the context of its implementation. As I said previously, technology is what people make of it and in Northern City, police officers put extra effort in making nothing out of CCTV, and successfully so. As a result, if no one is watching, I am not sure that an area can be said to be under surveillance. The following note vividly summarises the general attitudes of officers towards the cameras.

Session 6, evening.
A one-time replacement is working in the control room. He previously worked in the control room, but has since been reassigned to active service. I have never met him before, so when I arrive I introduce myself and explain why I am in the station. When he hears I am interested in video surveillance, he says: “I worked here with CCTV for a little time, too. You know what the best piece of advice from other officers was? Grab a book and mind your own fucking business. It's all only just a big waste of time”. I soon realise that several cameras are pointed towards the market square, which is completely desert at this time of the day. Throughout the time I spend with him, he studiously avoids to move them in another direction, or to select different cameras altogether.

In the chapter on the different rationalisations of CCTV that circulate in Northern City, I concluded by arguing that because of the competition between the securitarian discourse promoted by the administration and the managerial one adopted by police hierarchy, the understanding of CCTV in Northern City is marked by confusion, disagreement and unrealistic expectations on what the cameras can accomplish. In light of what I witnessed in the fieldwork, I can elaborate further on this issue and render more faithfully the complexity of the overall picture.

The failed integration of video surveillance is not just the result of a conflict over the uses and the definition of this particular technology. While these elements do play a part in shaping the outcomes of the implementation of CCTV in Northern City, an equally important role is played by the organisational characteristics of the police. The lack of a definite structure, and the re-arrangement and re-distribution of roles and tasks sparked by the appointment of a new Chief give the force and unstable and precarious quality, with officers often complaining loudly on the negative effect this has on their daily routines and performances. The integration of a new technology into such a fleeting structure would prove highly problematic and could give rise to unexpected solutions emerging from the interaction between tools and their users that could potentially
develop as far as to challenge, subvert or modify the original goals of the implementation. The fact that the practice of using CCTV to control officers while out on patrol is strongly resisted and contested by the officers themselves adds a further obstacle, with the ideal users of the system effectively refusing to engage with the cameras. Thus, while in the interviews it emerged that officers used the language of privacy to contest the decision of the police hierarchy to use video surveillance to control the workforce, the fieldwork provided further substance to the characterisation of officers' resistance and shed light on the actual strategies and practices they use to neutralise the presence of surveillance cameras.

Conceptually, I believe there is also room for arguing how using video surveillance on patrolling personnel effectively shifts suspect away from potential offenders towards the police. Within a managerial perspective it is the workforce who is seen as suspicious and potentially untrustworthy and, as such, needs to be kept under strict control. Thus, the new regime of visibility (Brighenti, 2007) that emerges in public is not aimed towards marginal subjects, but towards the police, with the veil that covers much of the work of patrols from the eyes of management (Goldstein, 1960; Manning, 1977; Van Maanen, 1983) effectively ripped off. However, in light of the fieldwork and what emerged from the observations the magnitude of this shift needs to be considered carefully. Thus, the complexity of the relationships existing within the local police of Northern City, the instability of the environment where CCTV was integrated and the conflicts between different groups on what to do with the cameras suggest two conclusions. First, any assessment on the effectiveness of CCTV cannot shy away from considering the actual context of implementation, with its orientations, attitudes and professional cultures. Second, there is no pre-determined effect that we can foresee, and therefore encourage or resist, when people, technology and society meet. Things are always more complex than they look.
14. Making sense of fieldwork

As seen in previous chapters, in the literature open street CCTV is traditionally analysed in two related ways. At the macro level, its diffusion is framed within a shift towards neoliberal urbanism. At the micro level, the day-to-day reality of how surveillance is carried out in specific sites relies on the notion of targeted surveillance to explain how public space is purified. While I do not intend to diminish the value of such theorisations, what I witnessed while in the field led me to believe that there are two problems with them: the notion of “neoliberal urbanism” and the idea that control rooms operate in predictable ways.

Thus, drawing upon an eclectic range of sources, from ANT to urban studies and geography, I want to argue that the idea of a ‘one-size-fits-all’ model of urban neoliberalism is untenable, and that a newfound attention to space can help us to advance a novel conceptualisation of CCTV. On a general level, this allows for an explanation of the diffusion of video surveillance in Italy as linked to a broader process of reconfiguration of state sovereignty where powers are shifted from the national government to local authorities. On the back of data gathered in two police-run open street CCTV systems, I also want argue that the day-to-day reality of control room operations relies on the creation and maintenance of a series of spatial distinctions in relation to the policing of urban space. Thus, in order to fully develop my argument, the first step will be a critical analysis of the notion of urban neoliberalism.

**Neoliberalism and urban transformations**

In order to question the placement of video surveillance within a general turn towards neoliberal modes of governance in the city, it is first necessary to clearly define the concept. However, this is a demanding task, given the difficulty involved in formulating a univocal definition of what neoliberalism is. To overcome this problem, I will follow Hackworth (2007) in articulating the concept into three distinct dimensions. After a brief outline of each, I will then move on to show how this framework overlooks local arrangements and contexts and present the implications of such a stance both in relation to urban and surveillance studies.
Neoliberalism as ideology

As anticipated, a great deal of difficulty is involved in formulating a univocal definition of neoliberalism. In the broadest possible terms it can be said that it identifies a set of economic policies that advocate the adoption of measures to foster the freedom of markets in order to promote economic growth. Having its foundations in the work of authors such as Adam Smith and Jeremy Bentham, it shares its main assumptions with 19th century European liberalism; namely, the defense of individual freedom and property rights, the promotion of free trade and the maintenance of minimal – i.e. non-interventionist – state. The idea of the invisible hand of the market is, in this regard, an inspired metaphor. Essentially, it is believed that the market is more efficient than the state in the allocation of resources and that the free interaction of actors who each wish to maximise their interest will necessarily lead to the attainment of common interests.

While the core assumptions have not changed, though, neoliberalism does differ from its older relative. In this regard, a consideration of the specific historical context it emerged out of will help to highlight the differences and clarify the distinction. It is now agreed that neoliberalism was an answer to the general crisis of the 1970s, when the uninterrupted growth of the golden years came to a halt and Keynesian macro-economic policies were unable to pull advanced economies out of the stall. Initially spreading from Anglophone countries, its essential feature is what Peck and Tickell (2002) termed the “roll-back” of state functions, which saw the weakening of the redistributive power of the nation-state along with a consistent shift of resources from the assistance to workers to the assistance to capital. Additionally, the drive towards the deregulation of economic activity was matched with a general movement towards privatisation, with the result that power shifted sensibly from elected governments to private capital. Significantly, the overall goal of national economic policies also changed, moving from full employment to efficiency and competitiveness of national economies as a whole.

While a brief description of the essential features of neoliberalism can help to put into sharper focus the object of the present discussion, in order to explain its ongoing vitality it is necessary to consider it in terms of ideology. While such a perspective does downplay what is an inherently contradictory phenomenon, nevertheless it is in this capacity that we can account for its success in shaping subjectivities and political programmes alike, as witnessed by the relevance of discourses centred on choice and flexibility outside the economic realm (Larner, 2000). Under this light, “[t]he hegemony
of neoliberal ideas is [therefore] important, because creating a dominant neoliberal ‘common-sense’ helps establish unquestioned assumptions that make it very difficult to imagine, let alone achieve, alternative projects” (Purcell, 2008: 14). In this regard, Hall’s work on the establishment and diffusion of paradigms in the policy-making process is particularly relevant, as it can be used to explain how, at a certain point in time, neoliberalism came to be seen as the only way to identify and discuss problems and to choose the strategies ‘best suited’ to address them. As Hall acknowledges, “policymakers customarily work within a framework of ideas and standards that specifies not only the goals of policy and the kind of instruments that can be used to attain them, but also the very nature of the problems they are meant to be addressing. Like a Gestalt, this framework is embedded in the very terminology through which policymakers communicate about their work, and it is influential precisely because so much of it is taken for granted and unamenable to scrutiny as a whole” (Hall, 1993: 279).

**Neoliberalism as a mode of urban governance**

In order to account for the changes occurred in the modes of urban governance two distinct but related developments need to be mentioned: the imperative for growth (see: Molotch, 1976), seen as a way to overcome the global crisis of the 1970s, and the process of glocalisation (Swyngedouw, 1992; Courchene, 1995), which identifies a two-fold process of downscaling and upscaling, triggered by the national scale no longer being the hegemonic scale of power. As for the former, downscaling is crystallised into the shift of powers and the devolution of authority from the nation-state to lower levels of government. Because of this transfer, state-level policies for the redistribution of wealth are substantially weakened, thus exposing vulnerable regions to tighter competition, both intra- and internationally (Purcell, 2008:11). In the opposite direction, upscaling is exemplified by the shift of prerogatives from the state to international or supranational organisation; in this regard, the process of European integration is an interesting attempt at the dissolution of national sovereignties into a new supranational state.

Taken together, these transformations have coalesced into what Harvey (1989) termed entrepreneurialism, that is the adoption on the part of local authorities of a more entrepreneurial stance in government. One of the most visible signs of such shift is the
growing concern with “the exploration of new ways to foster and encourage local developments” (ibid.: 3) at the cost of sacrificing the provision of services to citizens. Because this passage takes place in the face of the increased mobility of capital, the overall goal comes to be the attraction of external resources into the city, in what is, essentially, a zero-sum game. Given how many of the spatial barriers to capital have fallen, the competition between cities and regions has also become more intense, as competitors are now no longer exclusively located in close geographical proximity the one to the other.

The most distinctive feature of this model of urban governance is a new institutional configuration: the public-private partnership. In this capacity, public and private actors co-operate together in what are essentially speculative activities aimed at maximising the profit to be had from place, rather than territory (Harvey, 1989). As the overall goal is the enticement of capital, this is accompanied by growing concerns over the ‘climate’ of the city, with measures commonly adopted to restore and promote a good business climate, and a feel-good atmosphere in the sites of urban consumption. In this regard, consumers, tourists and visitors become much sough-after, as consumption replaces production as the main source of income for de-industrialised cities, which consistently reinvent themselves as places of consumption (Zukin, 1995). In their dealings with private companies, cities now also offer subsidies and other kinds of facilitations – monetary, infrastructural, regulatory – in the hope of creating the preconditions for successful economic activities. The $900 million given to the NYSE by then-mayor Giuliani to prevent the stock exchange from moving to New Jersey, as it had threatened (Smith, 2002), is, here, a famous case in point. Significantly, such a generosity is made possible by the very shift of powers from the nation-state to lower, more local scales of government. While during Keynesianism collective bargaining and labour relations were always regulated nationally, in fact, a tendency towards more localised and decentralised forms of economic negotiations and regulations is now identifiable, from the United States, where it has long been common, to countries such as Sweden and the UK (Katz, 1993).

The result of these interventions is, to all extents and purposes, a peculiar distribution of risks and benefits, with local authorities absorbing the former, while entrepreneurs enjoy the latter. However, it still remains to be seen how and if the benefits gained by enticing capitals can have a positive effect city-wide. As Molotch notes, in fact, “under
many circumstances growth is a liability financially and in quality of life for the majority of local residents. Under such circumstances, local growth is a transfer of quality of life and wealth from the local general public to a certain segment of the local elite” (1976: 320). The environmental consequences and the overall sustainability of growth are, in this regard, cases in point.

**Neoliberalism as a driver of urban change**

Clearly, the changes in the modes of urban governance do reverberate on the built environment, with urban space essentially becoming “a motor for rapid capital accumulation” (Greenberg, 2008: 27). Visually, the re-invention and re-imagining of the city brought about in the name of consumption and entertainment is directly responsible for the proliferation of malls, museums, stadia, concert houses and the like. What city administrators wish to reproduce with these building is the so-called ‘Bilbao effect’ (Rybczynski, 2002)\(^7\); however, while at times these developments earn their place in the imagination of people and on the pages of tourist guides, there is also a darker side to them.

One of the consequences of the efforts made to maintain an artificial feel-good atmosphere is the increase in control and policing, with order becoming a key priority. While public space has always been inextricably linked to the provision of public order, in fact, it is the definition of order itself that has now become highly problematic. To elaborate further, while its close association with bourgeois views on respectability in public space is certainly not new, the association that is introduced between disorder and crime is. The enduring success and popularity, even outside academic circles, of the broken windows theory (Wilson and Kelling, 1982) does bear witness to this development. The idea of order advanced in the original article vividly describes the path towards decline of a “stable neighborhood of families who care for their homes [and] mind each other’s children” (Wilson and Kelling, 1982: 31) where signs of disorder, left unattended, attract “a criminal invasion” (ibid.: 32) of disorderly people. In this context, the meaning of both order and disorder is extremely clear. Where the former signals that “the community cares about its neighborhood and is prepared to enforce norms of orderliness”, the latter “means that no one cares” (Harcourt, 1998: \(^7\)

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\(^7\)This refers to how the construction of a branch of the Guggenheim Museum by Frank Gehry turned the Spanish city of Bilbao into a touristic attraction.
There is no room for ambiguity or negotiation: disorder is always bad. Thus, “state abstinence [in relation to social reproduction] is matched by a heightened state activism in terms of social control” (Smith, 2002: 437); as a result, the promotion of the city “as an entertainment venue for the middle classes” (Lees, 2003: 614) is accompanied by the purification of city centres (Sibley, 1995) and the expulsion of flawed consumers (Bauman, 2004). This is thoroughly consistent with a neo-liberal re-imagining of the city that tames heterogeneity and turns it into a token of exoticism or, when this fails, resorts to pushing it out of sight to eliminate the markers of inequality from urban spaces. In this regard, a passage from Cindi Katz (2001: 104-105) is particularly revealing and is, as such, worth quoting at length:

The new Grand Central is a space of extraordinary order and control that does not just ‘compensate’ for the ‘jumbled’ nature of the spaces of everyday life, but rests upon material social practices that criminalize and evict targeted others who disturb ‘the order’. (…) Poor, racialized, and otherwise marginalized people are scapegoated and made to bear responsibility for their disenfranchisement, impoverishment, and marginalization in the unseemly and ever more vicious politics of rapacious neoliberal capitalism.

As a result, it can be argued that increasingly a massive contradiction is taking centre stage in how we think of, and experience on a daily basis, public space. In this regard, Smith’s idea of revanchist urbanism (1996) is particularly relevant, as it links the transformations that have occurred in urban space to a conservative reaction against the anti-discriminatory policies that emerged from the 1960s onwards. In this vein we can also quote Sampson, and his claim that practices such as the aggressive policing of the quality-of-life initiatives in New York City deployed during Giuliani’s tenures as mayor (Kahan, 1997) have coalesced into a “neoliberal approach to public order” (Sampson, 2009: 8-9) that, he contends, is increasingly being exported to Europe from the US. Combined together, these authors help us to understand the impact of neoliberalism on urban space. Spatially, this new breed of urbanism (Keil, 2002; Smith, 2002; Hackworth, 2007) then comes to be organised around morally tinged notions of decency and propriety (among others, see: Coleman 2004; Rogers and Coaffee, 2005; Young et al., 2006; Graham, 2010), so as to become functional to the elimination of the markers of inequality within urban spaces. The segregation of the urban poor that ensues is, thus, placed within a narrative of “the city [seen] as a space of segregation, division,
exclusion, threats and boundaries, where the story of city life as mixing and mingling is replaced by a story of antagonism, fear and exclusion” (Watson, 2006: 1).

**The Anglo bias in urban and surveillance studies**

To sum up, the articulation of neoliberalism in urban space has a series of key features to it. The decision-making process moves away from elected assemblies, with the balance of power now tipping in favour of private stakeholders. The new institutional configuration that symbolises this shift is the public-private partnership, where, as seen above, a peculiar distribution of the risks and benefits brought about by the turn to entrepreneurialism comes to be established. Also, the increased mobility of private capital can account for the overarching concern with climate on the part of local authorities. Cities have to be attractive and exciting while displaying a positive attitude towards visitors and business; yet, they also have to be safe and able to neutralise any threat posed to the feel good atmosphere that pervades them. It is in this light that the strengthening of forms of control can be understood, particularly in its targeting of marginalised categories of citizens.

I do not want to diminish the importance of such a theoretical framework. However, I also do believe that the role played by context needs to be highlighted more decidedly, in order to get to a more solid and empirically rich understanding of how neoliberalism can affect urban space. In this regard, my claim is that the notion of a path-independent model of neoliberalism is, simply, untenable: as economic sociology has demonstrated, economic relations and activities do not exist in a vacuum but are, indeed, embedded within existing social relations (Granovetter, 1985). What is required, then, is that we stop thinking of neoliberalism as a set of trans-geographical policy preferences devoid of historical elements (Hay, 2004: 507) and start to look at the sites where these strategies are adopted. On the contrary, the inability to do so would effectively underplay the relevance of the national, regional or local contexts where neoliberal policies are implemented, much to the dismay of our analytical and critical capabilities in relations to contemporary urban transformations.

Because cities are, at least for urban studies, the locus of the production of theory, I believe that sharpening the focus of our empirical investigation would, for one, offer

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75That is, by local configurations of power, resources, constraints and incentives.
more than a passing opportunity for the improvement of our theoretical tools, both in scope and depth. Referring to cities of the global South, Robinson rightfully acknowledges that “a large number of [them] do not register on intellectual maps” (2002: 531). However, I believe the claim could also be made that outside Anglophone countries much of the analysis 76 carried out in the global North focuses on the so-called global cities (Sassen, 2001), so that even in the case of Western Europe, most studies feature cities like Paris, Berlin or Rome (Nappi-Choulet, 2006; Holm, 2006; Prêteceille, 2007; Rousseau, 2008; Hertzfeld, 2009). By obscuring the level of interconnectedness of more peripheral cities this reinforces a claim of exceptionality that is in itself widely debated, in the process leaving a gap in our understanding of how cities are affected by the developments discussed here.

Politically, I also believe that the possibility looms large that focusing exclusively on a very specific typology of city could hinder our capacity for alternative readings of contemporary urban spaces and programmes of action that seek to promote a different way of seeing, understanding and living public space. Tighter levels of controls are not inevitable, and nor are residential segregation or the commodification of public space. Choices and decisions can be reversed, trends stopped, actors empowered, communities revitalised (Moulaert, Rodriguez and Swyngedouw, 2003; Swyngedouw, 2005; Gerometta, Hausermann and Longo, 2005). While I do not wish to deny the steely grip that neoliberalism and its proponents have come to have on our cities, and that social polarisation, marginalisation and poverty have, in the experience of many, increased, I also believe that all this has, somehow, coalesced into a narrative that proceeds, in many analyses, with the force of inevitability. However, in spite of structural constraints, the possibility for agency and resistance should never be underestimated, nor we should limit our search for them to a few, well trodden paths. What we need to do as critically engaged scholars is to continuously remind ourselves that things could, indeed, always be otherwise.

76 I am perfectly aware that such a claim is extremely vulnerable to criticisms. While it is impossible for anyone to read everything about a given topic, what I am saying here is that most of mainstream – that is, in English – literature presents an unabashed Anglo bias, with an almost exclusive focus on British or North American cities. Clearly, it is more than highly likely that debates within national scientific communities display a wider range of analyses. However, I believe it is equally fair to assume that the mostly unchallenged predominance of English as the de facto language of academic communication does limit the chances of such works to be included into wider discussions.
Cerny’s notion (2004) of different varieties of neoliberalism is one of the possible solutions that can be found in the literature. In the same vein, Peck, Theodore and Brenner’s idea of ‘actually existing neoliberalism’ “draws attention to the contextual embeddedness and path-dependency of neoliberal restructuring projects.” In turn, this allows us to explore how “distinctive national, regional and local contexts, defined by the legacies of inherited institutional frameworks, policy regimes, regulatory practices and political struggles” (Peck et al., 2009: 49-50) shape the outcome of these same projects. In their analysis of the historical trajectories to neoliberalism of France, Mexico, Chile and Great Britain, Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb (2002: 534) also come to the conclusion that “local institutional conditions and dynamics shaped (...) the channel through which neoliberal ideas could diffuse and influence policy”. In light of a growing body of literature that acknowledges the contextual nature of neoliberalism, (Kus, 2006; Muehlebach, 2007; Prasad, 2005; Birch and Myknenko, 2009), then, the use of the notion of neoliberal urbanism equally needs to be approached with greater and greater care.

For one, it is reasonable to assume that processes of urban transformation will be influenced by the regulatory framework in place in a given country, with all the consequences of the case, discourse-, policy- and planning-wise. In relation to the point I am developing, this means that while some alternatives will be compared and contrasted, others will never even make it to the table. Also, that a variety of factors can help us to understand why this happens and why the different stakeholders conduct themselves they way they do during negotiations. To be more specific, though with no hope of completeness, regulations in the field of environmental protection, along with compulsory standards of anti-seismic protection and concerns for the conservation of listed buildings and the harmonisation of new projects with the surrounding environment are all likely to exert a degree of influence. Equally important, cultural factors are at play, too. Attitudes towards the development of supermalls and the standardisation and commodification of public space do vary greatly, as movements for the protection of independent retailing and their benefit for local economies and local identities do testify. The degree of individual participation in public life should be taken into account, too, along with the extent to which practices of participatory planning are encouraged and supported, particularly in the case of contested projects.
Finally, all those elements that could be broadly termed as anti-market should be considered, too, in spite of the difficulties involved in their assessment. Issues such as the level of corruption and the collusion between different stakeholders, particularly between administrators, planners and developers – though clearly antithetical to the idea of a market free from constraints – do influence the decision-making process, and it would be myopic to pretend otherwise. In this regard, many will probably be familiar with a now infamous planning row that raised a fair number of headlines, both for the relevance of the project and the personalities involved, centred on the redevelopment of the Chelsea Barracks site in Central London. Having voices his opposition “at a teatime meeting with the emir at Clarence House” (Booth, 2010), Prince Charles was in this case instrumental to the withdrawal of the initial plan and the subsequent submission of a new project, recently approved by Westminster Council.

Moving on to surveillance studies, chapter 4 described how they have been the object of a successful process of academic institutionalisation and are now a cross disciplinary field of inquiry in their own right. One of the main goals of surveillance scholars is to get to an understanding of surveillance which reflects its complex and messy nature; therefore, empirical investigation of specific sites is a vital part of how theoretical advancement is achieved, especially in light of the extreme variability in surveillance experiences. As Lyon said, “[d]ifferent cultures, different social values (…) serve to shape surveillance and responses to it in various ways” (Lyon, 2007: 6).

However, in spite of these claims, a cursory glance at the body of literature that has been produced in the years reveals how the overwhelming majority of references comes from Anglophone sources. On the contrary, “non-Anglophone literature on surveillance is almost completely absent in current epistemological debates about the theoretical, analytical and empirical pillars, profile and scope” of the discipline (Klauser, 2009: 23). Why is this? Surveillance is clearly not a phenomenon restricted to English-speaking countries, nor can we assume that surveillance technologies will have the same effects everywhere, thus rendering the need for empirical investigation of other contexts less pressing. Rather, such a position would lead us straight back into the trap of technological determinism, whose rejection surveillance scholars strongly advocate. Specifically referring to CCTV, another peculiar feature of the existing literature is that, even when studies are conducted in non-English-speaking countries (Mork Lomell et al., 2003; Helten and Fischer, 2003; Samatas, 2004; Fonio, 2007), to a large extent they
reproduce the findings emerged in classical analyses of video surveillance, such as Norris and Armstrong’s (1999). As a result, the impression is strong that control rooms operate in predictable ways – that is, they target specific categories of people – and that, on a more general level, the growing diffusion of CCTV systems can be explained in terms of the shift towards neoliberal urbanism.

As I said, in no way do I wish to downplay the value of these works, nor the influence they have had on this research. However, it is also hard to believe that local specificities do not play any part in shaping the day-to-day reality and the outcomes of surveillance practices. For example, the Italian context greatly differs from the British one in the far heavier legal regulation\(^77\) that CCTV systems are subjected to, which effectively limits what can or cannot be done or seen with the cameras, where they can be located and who has access to the footage. Organisationally, CCTV systems in Italy are mainly run by local police forces, with officers in charge of the cameras. The outsourcing of surveillance jobs is, based on my research experience, practically non-existent. Additionally, the fieldwork revealed how rather than personnel working in isolation in a dark control room, arrangements are far more informal and precarious, with CCTV monitors housed in the operational headquarters and simply added to the series of tasks that officers must attend to.

Finally, the breakthrough in governance signalled by the growing relevance of public-private partnerships was not as evident in my case studies. Much of the literature agrees in considering the shift of responsibilities from the state to citizens and organizations of the civil society as a key moment in the reconfiguration of its role from provider to facilitator (Rose, 2000). In this regard, if we look at the UK, it is evident how the role of private actors was instrumental to the growth of CCTV in the country. On one hand, private actors (among them retailers and developers) consistently lobbied for the adoption of open-street CCTV systems that would protect commercial premises. On the other, since the very first City Challenge Competition public funding was made conditional on the availability of matching private investments, so that video surveillance systems throughout the country came to be financed with both public and private resources. At the opposite end of the spectrum, private investments are largely absent in Italy, with state funding for security-related projects matched by public non-

\(^{77}\)See chapter 7.
state investments. Upon realising this, I was thus forced to discard the idea that video surveillance could be framed within the creation of a mixed public-private network of relevant actors for the implementation of a new security-oriented approach to urban governance.

Combined together, these differences, along with the data gathered while on the field, made it extremely clear that my analytical and conceptual framework was totally inadequate to account for the variety of video surveillance that I witnessed in the two cities selected for this research. Suddenly, I realised I had to start looking for a new definition of what video surveillance really is.

**Opening the black box of video surveillance**

What emerged in the course of the fieldwork turned out to be a major cause of puzzlement. After just a few hours spent observing operators in the two control rooms, in fact, it became apparent that the systems in both cities were not used at all, but rather ignored by the operatives, and quite masterfully so. As the amount of time I spent observing the two sites grew, I became more and more aware that I was not gathering the data I had expected I would find and that there was something I was missing. But what exactly?

For one, I was deeply dissatisfied with the ethnographic accounts I was producing, as essentially they were a naturalistic description of what happened or, rather, what did not happen in the control rooms. I was increasingly aware of my inability to reconnect the reality of the fieldwork – i.e. that video surveillance was never used – with the constant and consistent investment in terms of both monetary and organisational resources that the two cities spend for the maintenance and planned expansion of the two systems. Additionally, the fact that in one of the cities the existence of the system itself is not well known and the municipality has not ‘played the video surveillance card’ forced me to discard the possibility of understanding CCTV in terms of its symbolic relevance for the control of urban space. What seemed to me like an insuperable contradiction – the system does not work well, therefore we will buy more cameras – was not perceived as such by the actors governing the process. On the contrary, in both cases, further expansion of the system is something that was scheduled, in varying stages of completion, while the research was carried out. It goes without saying that it was simply
not possible dismiss the fieldwork as an example of city administrators going crazy, because of my inability to understand what was unfolding before my eyes. Rather, if we assume, as I do, that people’s actions are never unreasonable to them or, equally, that there is always a reason why people behave in a certain way\textsuperscript{78}, then we are forced to try to understand any practice or behaviour according to the point of view of those who enact it, much in the spirit of Weberian verstehen. Clearly, it was time for a radical reconsideration of both my initial assumptions and theoretical framework. Thus I started afresh, this time assuming that CCTV was mobilising some kind of resource and activating some strategies or configurations that, once in place, were helping to make resistance to the further expansion of the systems less likely.

Admittedly, this is not a conventional way to look at video surveillance, but because established perspectives had failed me I had no choice but to look somewhere else. Consequently, much of the analysis I eventually carried out was heavily influenced by actor-network theory, currently a minority approach in contemporary sociology. Before going further, though, I feel I need to clarify my relationship with theory. In this regard, my personal attitude has always been to consider notions and concepts as tools that can be creatively assembled together to explain social phenomena in analytically challenging ways. In light of this, perhaps I should better say that what follows is based on my reading of ANT. As ANT is now used in a large variety of, at times incompatible, ways, though, I believe my approach sits quite well in regard to it.

The central tenet of ANT is that nothing can be considered big in itself, but everything has to be made so. The fundamental implication is that “the nabobs of this world (…) are no different in kind sociologically to the wretched of the earth” (Law 1992a: 379), as macro actors are really only micro actors that are at the helm of a set of consolidated relations. A consequence of this is that institutions and ‘social’ phenomena undergo a radical redefinition and come to be understood as something that is embodied into concrete social interactions. Equally importantly, ANT also refuses to limit to humans the application of the notion of agency, so that society comes to be held together not just by people, but by things, too. It is in this light that Latour’s claim (1991) that “technology is society made durable” can be understood. In any case, the goal is to

\textsuperscript{78}Clearly, this is not a nod towards rationalism, as the motives involved in someone’s action need not be rational in the sense of the calculation of the best means possible in relation to a given goal.
discover the processes through which the ‘facticity’ or the self-evident character of social facts is established, that is, how in the first place it is possible to talk about facts. Accordingly, attention is shifted towards the processes that build up something as a fact and the sources of resistance that these same processes encounter.

This brief outline of the assumptions behind ANT provides the necessary background for the introduction of a novel conceptualisation of CCTV, seen here as an arrangement of material and social relations. This last point bears with it some fruitful implications: first of all, that in our analysis of video surveillance we need to take into account as diverse objects as official documents and codes of use, rhetoric tools and discursive practices employed by relevant actors, spatial arrangements of the control rooms, organisational features of the two police forces, operators’ routines and relative verbalisations, and so forth. Additionally, that efforts should be made to understand how this specific network is put together and, subsequently, held in place, along with a consideration of the kind of effects that this configuration generates. What needs to be brought to light are the strategies and the resources that actors – both human and non-human alike – activate to guarantee the existence and the reproduction of the network of relations that make CCTV up as an object and that, at the same time, neutralise the action of competing forces and sources of resistance.

However, making the case for video surveillance to be understood as an arrangement of multiple relations can only take us this far, for this does not provide any hint on what the strategies we need to identify might be. Because, as said above, the approaches I chose to follow are inherently plural, the literature does not provide a ready-made answer to the present issue, either. What we have, though, is an extensive body of studies conducted in a large variety of settings (Latour, 1983; Akrich, 1992; Law, 1992b, 1994; Thrift, 1996; Mol, 1998; Cussins, 1998; Singleton, 1998; Suchman, 2000;) and it is exactly from the combination of sessions of intensive reading with my own experience on the field that the research was allowed to progress further. In other words, it was necessary to reach a level of saturation as a reader, for me to be able to exercise my sociological imagination as a researcher.

The first distinctive mark of this operation is the wilful departure from the paradigmatic consideration of video surveillance as directly linked to neoliberalism and its impact on urban space. In doing so, I by no means wish to dismiss the authors who have thus analysed the growth of CCTV, or to deny the value of works that provided precious
insight and informed much of what I have been doing here. At the same time, I have no intention of denying the eminently, and evidently so, political issues that the use of video surveillance bears with it, nor am I advocating a move towards political neutrality, incidentally one of the accusations usually thrown at ANT (see: Star, 1991; Amsterdanska, 1999; Ausch, 2000). Rather, I believe that investigating “how connections between heterogeneous elements become established, how associations are made and unmade, how different elements interassociate with each other, and how assemblages and facts emerge as outcomes of such processes (...) allows us to consider that things could fail or be otherwise” (Alcadipani and Hassard, 2010: 424). In that it attempts to combine a strong emphasis on empirical work, with a qualified consideration of neoliberalism in its continental Europe variety, the conceptualisation I am advancing can be considered as a meso-level theory (Merton, 1968), open to empirical testing and amendment. Secondly, I put forward the case for a consideration of CCTV that emphasises its territorial nature, thus affording the possibility of a new understanding of it that is grounded in the creation of a set of spatial distinctions which organise urban space in a new way, geared towards the search of ever more efficient forms of policing it. In light of this, the control room can be seen as a liminal hub placed at the intersection of these spatial relations, which also lead to the generation of a new, risk-based, geography of city space.

To define my position with greater clarity, my claim here is that CCTV-as-a-network relies on the creation of two separate sets of spatial relations: with one establishing a distinction between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ in relation to urban space, and the other linking together the ‘national’ and the ‘local’ levels of government. Both these scales are, here, assumed to be fluid, with fixity only temporarily achieved through specific political projects (Swyngedouw, 1992; MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999; Marston, 2000). Given their socially constructed nature, “the extent and content of each scale, as well as its relationship to other scales, must [then] be the result of particular groups achieving a configuration that best suits their agenda” (Purcell, 2008:9). Once it is established, CCTV also reinforces, in return, the two strategies of spatial differentiation through which it is translated in the first place. On one side, then, we have a “relation of conditioning” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 127), where these spatial dimensions shape (the network that is translated as) video surveillance, while on the other, CCTV contributes to constitute them as meaningful and, as such, to maintain
them in place. A visual representation of the two axes will help to further clarify the claims made here:

As the map has been compressed onto a two-dimensional surface, the relations between the two poles of each axis have not been included. Nevertheless, they do exist. Seeing the relation between the central government and local authorities as one of the key factors in the diffusion of video surveillance in Italy allows for the consideration of how elements specific to the country, rather than a-national evolutions in global governance, led to the growing relevance of CCTV. To this day, this process has largely been made possible by the decisive intervention of public actors, which provided the financial, normative and discursive resources to make this possible, while private actors have been notably absent. First, the reconfiguration of state sovereignty that took place in Italy at the turn of the century, coupled with the narratives of emergency on the dangerousness of public space and life in the city opened up a space of autonomy for local authorities to engage in the provision of security to citizens. Financially, this turn was vastly facilitated by the availability at different levels of public funding for security-related projects throughout Italy. Significant in this regard is that the eligibility of projects for funding is conditional upon the availability of matching co-funding from
the municipality or local authority that is submitting the proposal, so that the resources going into a given development all come from public sources, albeit belonging to distinct levels of government. As a result, the progressive securitisation of Italian cities, of which CCTV is an important part, has so far been a process led exclusively by the public sector, with no contribution from private investors.

The picture becomes even more complex if we look at what happens inside control room, and at how policing of urban space is carried out on a daily basis. In the 66 hours I spent in the control rooms I studied, the only cases where cameras were used to track someone were provided by operators using the system to locate officers on the beat. Other than that, in both cities CCTV was largely ignored. As shown in previous chapters, while a variety of structural, cultural and organisational factors play a part in producing this result, nevertheless video surveillance is strongly supported by city administrators and police personnel alike. On the part of the former, this can be explained by pointing at their lack of knowledge about what happens in the control room and the daily reality of how the system is actually managed. As for the police, though, in spite of the internal tensions that accompanied the implementation of the system on the part of patrolling officers, the force as a whole is keen on stressing the importance of having CCTV, and the benefits it can bring about in terms of the policing of urban space. That this enthusiasm comes from the same organisation that dismisses the cameras in its day-to-day operations is only surprising if we do not consider the institutional environment where the local police exist. However, if we do, it becomes clear that video surveillance becomes another tool that the force can use to mark its autonomy from the guiding role played by city administrators, and to heighten their professional standing in their dealing with national police forces that, though traditionally responsible for the policing of cities, are not usually equipped with video surveillance systems. As such, even at the local level of the city, CCTV can primarily be viewed as a device that the local police can, and will, use in their power play with other, more powerful, institutions – city authorities, national police forces – rather than an instrument to be used in the actual policing of urban space.
15. Some final notes on definitions and scales

**A novel conceptualisation of CCTV**

The field research I carried out for this work supports the conclusion that rather than being related to crime control, for which it was almost never used in the two control rooms I studied, CCTV needs to be understood as a device for the circulation of resources between different institutions and levels of government. Analytically, this challenges the idea of a-national homogenising trends in global governance and the related discussions “about convergence, sameness, loss of national uniqueness and, ultimately, (...) the emergence of a homogenous penological landscape” (Franko Aas, 2011: 390). Theoretically, the model that I developed can then be seen as an attempt to bring a consideration of cultural, social and spatial context back into surveillance and security studies, which have for far too long been almost exclusively focused on the relevance and apparently undisturbed diffusion of the British model of urban policing.

Coming specifically to my fieldwork, the model links the diffusion of CCTV in Italy to wider, and context-specific, processes that took place in the country from the end of the 1990s onwards. More precisely, I believe that the diffusion of video surveillance in Italy was possible thanks to a broader process of reconfiguration of state sovereignty, where powers were progressively shifted from the national government to local authorities. This reconfiguration opened up a space of autonomy for local authorities to engage in the provision of security to citizens, with such rearrangement facilitated by two distinct developments. Politically and discursively, I am thinking about the appearance of claims on the state of emergency in the country, promoted by the centre-right coalition that was in power for much of this period. Financially, it is undeniable that the availability at different levels of public funding for security-related projects throughout Italy also played a significant role.

I analysed these countrywide processes in close conjunction with the discourses employed locally by political actors in order to justify the implementation of open-street video surveillance systems in the two cities I studied. The securitarian discourse that was prevalent in Northern City depicted cameras as necessary in order to protect honest, law-abiding citizens from the dangers that lurk in the dark in public space. In turn, the
distance between administrators and the day-to-day reality of how the system is actually managed and used allowed them to promote an image of CCTV as an instrument that enables the enforcement of higher levels of control and guarantees faster police deployments in case of need. This representation also explains the plans that, at the time research was conducted, were underway for the further expansion of the system, due to start in the summer of 2011. On the contrary, in Central City cameras were seen as an expendable casualty in the face of growing budgetary restrictions, with projects for additional cameras put on hold indefinitely. Another difference with Northern City, where police and administrators strongly disagreed on the role to be played by CCTV, is that the contradictions that emerged in this case were internal to the decision-making process of the administration in relation to the very decision of implementing a CCTV system in the city. In regard to this, I argued that the final decision to adopt video surveillance can be understood in light of the progressive embedment of this technology in the everyday life of cities throughout Italy, so that the failure or the refusal to participate in this process was seen by political actors as potentially damaging of the public reputation of the municipality.

In spite of the differences mentioned above, many common features emerged from the study. In both cities the role of private actors was absolutely marginal both in the planning and the implementing phase, with public funding used to put up the two systems. The local police are the sole managing body, with full responsibility for the maintenance and use of the cameras, while in Northern City and Central City alike politicians lack actual knowledge on how police use these systems on a day-to-day basis. Notwithstanding this lack of transparency, in both cities administrators uniformly framed CCTV within a move towards the increasing localisation of the issue of urban security and, consequently, their bigger and bigger involvement in the provision of security to citizens. At the same time, this change of scale (see: Valverde, 2011) was also explicitly linked by them to efforts made by national authorities to promote cameras as an efficient and cost-effective strategy for the control of the territory, with local politicians ready to fine-tune their security policies – however broadly defined – to those.
**What? Where?**

The key finding that emerged from the fieldwork is that in both cities cameras were largely ignored, and used only rarely for purposes related neither to security nor crime control. Thus, in light of my research the unquestioned placement of CCTV within the realm of crime prevention techniques needs to be radically reassessed. In both cities, the only instances when cameras were used pertained to the need on the part of police personnel in the control room to trace officers on the beat, with cameras effectively turned into a tool for the efficient management of scarce resources, far removed from any preoccupations with crime. In Northern City this managerial turn is explicitly, though unofficially, characterised as a top-down form of control on the part of higher ranks over the workforce, with the result that CCTV is strongly contested and resisted within the police, with officers trying to avoid falling under the gaze of the cameras as much as possible. In this regard, it is significant that the police personnel’s opposition to video surveillance is framed in terms of a violation of their right to privacy, though what officers mourned as a loss of privacy was actually characterised as a loss of autonomy. While in Central City cameras are also used to trace patrolling personnel, this is not experienced as undue control by officers, but rather as a form of horizontal, peer-to-peer coordination. As such, while the concerns informing this specific use of the cameras are very similar to those to be found in Northern City, the end result was markedly different, with CCTV seen as a tool that can be used by personnel in the control room to guide their co-workers in the course of an intervention in the space of the city, and as such not the target of officers’ rejection.

However, this all clashes with what emerged from the interviews, where the same people who largely ignored the cameras told me that these “work”, that they make a city safer and therefore we need more of them. These claims can be coupled with the equally supportive statements coming from the administrators I met, which raises the question of what CCTV actually does to generate such a reaction. As they are not used for crime control, which goals do cameras end up serving? The time I spent in the field, supports the conclusion that video surveillance serves different purposes for the benefit of constituencies other that the residents of the two cities, namely administrators and local police.

As for the former, the growing responsibility of local authorities in the field of policing and, more generally, urban security means that they have the obligation to actively
promote actions, programmes and projects that will generate security and will make people safer. However, the regional laws passed from the early 2000s that established region-wide integrated systems of security adopted such a broad definition of security that they effectively opened the door to the strategic behaviour of local authorities. In light of the consistent cuts to the amounts transferred to them by the central government, then, local authorities have re-oriented their action to adopt this specific perspective, in order to attain distributive payoffs. As such, security has become a label that can be applied to the most diverse projects, with the reasonable expectation that this will facilitate access to funding. A new language of security has developed, that is used to translate, and crucially to justify, into today’s concerns with risk and crime the provision of welfare services traditionally carried out by local authorities. To all intents and purposes, security has become a discursive regime that is only incidentally related to how crime actually affects a given city.

In relation to these developments, Pitch (2007) elaborated the notion of “new prevention”, to account for the fusion that is taking place in regional legislation between a social prevention that falls under the responsibility of welfare agencies, and a police prevention that relies on the implementation of technologies such as CCTV in order to control urban spaces. This idea sits well with the point I wish to make. Essentially, I believe that ‘security’ has effectively opened up a new channel of communication and exchange between different levels of government in Italy, where different resources – discursive, normative, political, and monetary – are continuously traded back and forth. In light of this development, local authorities have been more than keen to exploit this new possibility to their advantage, in the hope that applying the label of security to their activities would keep funding flowing in. Two conclusions can be drawn from this. First, we can link the growing concern with security in Italian cities to the wider transformations in governance that have taken place in the country in the last decade. Second, this allows us to understand security – and more specifically, CCTV – in light of the facilitating role it has played in shifting sovereignty downwards and in enabling the circulation of resources between different governing levels at different territorial scales.

The idea of video surveillance as a device used to alter in one’s favour the relationships established with other institutions active in the same field holds for the local police as well. In order to clarify this last claim, I wish to build upon two different paradigms in
organisational theory – organisational ecology and new institutionalism – and to move from them in order to outline the contours of an institutional ecology for the field of urban security. Organisational ecology is a theoretical approach that is concerned with how populations of organisations co-exist, evolve, die and replace one another. The focus is placed on the relationship between organisational structures and the environment with resulting models depending on competition and selection, due to “the strength of inertial pressures on organizational structure” (Hannan and Freeman, 1977: 929). Initially, its proponents were keen to separate ecological theory not only from its predecessors in organisational studies, but from its direct competitors too, as the following claim attests. “Organizational ecology is the one new theoretical perspective that does not subscribe to the adaptation model of organizational change. (...) Most organizational change is the result of processes of organizational selection and replacement rather than internal transformation and adaptation” (Carroll, 1988: 2).

However, boundaries between neighbouring perspectives eventually blurred, leading to a degree of overlapping with new institutionalism, with “the theorem excluding adaptation (...) replaced by hypotheses on the relationship between adaptation and selection” (Amburgey and Rao, 1996: 1269. Emphasis in original.). Whichever the paradigm, both organisational ecology and new institutionalism acknowledge that organisations co-exist in the same field and, be it due to selection or adaptation, in time they modify their structure, they separate and they merge with one another.

I have brought up these two strands of literature as I believe they are both equally helpful in gaining a better understanding of the position of local police forces in relation to the other institutions – municipality, polizia di stato, carabinieri – with which they share space within the field of urban security. In that they have just recently added urban security to their list of duties, local police are the latecomers to this specific niche, which was already occupied by more powerful and more established actors. From an institutional ecology perspective, then, the strategies that local police may choose to deploy to acquire legitimacy and to secure their standing in a competitive environment are clearly worth investigating. On a general level, the literature has identified several possible sources of legitimacy, from the development of shared norms to the ability to gain support from key institutional actors. At the same time, both Meyer and Rowan (1977) and Di Maggio and Powell (1983) “stress that legitimacy is embedded in relational networks and normative codes of conduct” (Baum and Powell, 1995: 529. My
emphasis.). This is exactly how I have come to understand video surveillance in light of the fieldwork I conducted. Rather than being a tool for crime prevention and the control of the territory, in this instance I believe it is more fruitful to view CCTV as a source of legitimacy that local police use in order to secure their position within the field of urban security. Both in Northern City and in Central City local police are the only force with surveillance cameras to their availability, so if other law enforcement agencies need to acquire stored footage or to use the cameras for an ongoing criminal investigation, they have to file an official request that, if accepted, will grant them right of access. Thus, the presence of an open-street CCTV system effectively increases interdependency between these different institutions, in the process strengthening the relational networks both Meyer and Rowan and Di Maggio and Powell talk about. I believe this is the key reason why in my study local police were so supportive of cameras. In that it made them more necessary to others and, as such, less likely to be shunned and snubbed, in the eyes of local police video surveillance is a key tool that empowers them in their dealings with national police forces. Significantly, this allows for a reconciliation of the contradiction between enthusiasm and disregard on the part of officers that I soon noticed in the two cities; when the cameras essentially are a prop for the legitimation of the organisation, it becomes irrelevant whether or not they are at all used for policing. Rather than about crime, in this instance it turns out that cameras are about power.

In light of the conclusions I reached, I believe the present study offers a significant contribution both to criminology and surveillance studies, on one hand, and urban studies on the other. As for the former, the results I obtained challenge many of the assumptions taken for granted when we talk about CCTV and contemporary forms of crime control, particularly in relation to claims on the shrinking role of the state, the growing salience of private actors and the increasing homogeneity in policing practices and strategies. In this regard, I wholeheartedly share Crawford’s view “that [saying that] local context matters is something of a truism, particularly in the messy world of human affairs and social relations where ‘people matter’ and where actions and outcomes are consistently reproduced by the behaviour of individual actors. (…) The history of crime control policy is especially replete with examples of weak application, implementation failure, unintended consequences and perverse effects” (Crawford, 2011: 16).

Moreover, the significance for the field of urban studies lies in the faithful account this work offers of the creativity of local policy-making and its implementation. Following
an admittedly winding path, I think I have shown how CCTV is used strategically by relevant institutions both within the space of the city and nationally, which, in turn, supports a depiction of urban security as a tool that can bring various elites closer together in order to redistribute sovereignty. In light of this, I believe my work fits nicely with research focused on the development of new forms of governance, in that it show how actors at different territorial levels seek to manage changes in the distribution of power and the overall organisation of the state to their advantage.

Additionally, I also feel the present research can be considered as a meaningful contribution to the governmentality literature I examined in the theoretical section of this work. However, the affiliation I am considering is not to be traced back the scientific production of governmentality scholars such as Rose, O’Malley and Valverde, but rather looks directly at how Foucault originally used this notion in his lectures of the late 1970s (Foucault, 2008, 2009). While the authors I have just mentioned have used the concept of governmentality to account for the fragmentation and dispersion of control in advanced liberal society (Rose, 1999a), Foucault used it to investigate the genesis of European nation-states through a new focus on practices of government (Valverde, 2007). Essentially, Foucault understood governmentality as an analytical perspective that opened the way to the study of the transformation of the bond between those who govern and those who are governed, and of the re-framing of the task of rulers in terms of government. The understanding of security in general, and of CCTV in particular, that I am advancing here sits well within this line of thought, as it conceptualises them as strategies that are deployed to give a new shape to relations of authority within the state (see Rose, 1999a: 15), as an assemblage – that is, a network – of “particular apparatuses and devices for exercising power” (ibid.: 19), as a strategy for governing that is only incidentally related to how crime actually affects urban space.

In light of all that I said and all the threads I worked with throughout this work, I feel the most appropriate way to bring this project to an end is by tracing some avenues for future research, and to sketch some possibilities for the application of the notions I developed in my analysis. In relation to the conceptualisation of CCTV that I introduced, comparative research would shed light on the general validity of the conclusions I reached and on how my characterisation of security as a political tool for the redistribution of sovereignty interplays – if at all – with more established theories in contemporary criminological thought. On a more general level, I think this work makes
a convincing case for the proposition of new analytical categories through which urban
security can be studied, which, in turn, calls for a theoretical reconsideration on the
applicability of the same notions at different scales and in different contexts.
The model I am proposing here should not be understood as oppositional to the more
established ways of looking at video surveillance that can be found in the literature.
Rather, I hope that it can be seen as a reminder that local contexts do matter, and that
CCTV, and security more generally, is not something that produces the same effects and
follows the same patterns anywhere it gets to be implemented. Because the diffusion of
video surveillance is, by now, a truly trans-national phenomenon, I do not think it is
tenable for scholars to keep on referring to the British case as a blueprint for all that
happens beyond its borders. Rather, I believe that widening the focus of our empirical
investigation would, for one, offer more than a passing opportunity for the sharpening
of our theoretical tools, both in scope and depth. The creativity of actors and the
relevance of local contexts should never be underestimated, because, as my experience
in the fieldwork taught me, things could always, and unexpectedly so, be otherwise.
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