The ‘self-organization’ of welfare services in deprived and wealthier urban neighbourhoods in the Dutch Participation Society

Dipartimento di Sociologia e Ricerca Sociale
Dottorato in Urban and Local European Studies (URBEUR)
Supervisore: Prof. Enzo Mingione

Dottoranda: Eva Bosch
Matricola: 774572
Anno Accademico 2012-2013
Ph.D. Thesis

The ‘self-organisation’ of welfare services in deprived and wealthier urban neighbourhoods in the Dutch Participation Society

Eva Bosch, May 2016

URBEUR program of the University of Milano-Bicocca

PhD Supervisor: Prof. Enzo Mingione
Table of contents

Foreword ................................................................. 7
Abstract ........................................................................ 8

Chapter 1: Introduction ..................................................11
1.1 The debate on self-organizing welfare: a challenge for urban equality ...........................................11
1.2 Outline of the dissertation ..........................................................................................................................16

Chapter 2: Welfare service changes in the city .......................18
2.1 1900-1970: Creation of the European welfare states ................................................................................19
2.2 1970 until today: Changing economies and populations bringing new social risks .................................20
2.3: New Public Management in welfare services: the market turn ............................................................22
2.4 The ‘Social Investment State’ ..................................................................................................................26
2.5 Civil society delivering welfare services: the ‘participation society’ .....................................................30
2.6 Political reasons for the ‘voluntary turn’ ..................................................................................................32
  2.6.1 Volunteering to bring more direct democracy ................................................................................33
  2.6.2 Volunteering to answer to the complexity and place-specificness of social problems .....................34
  2.6.3 Volunteering to bring back solidarity between citizens ....................................................................35
  2.6.4 Volunteering to repair community in ethnic concentration neighbourhoods ..................................37
  2.6.6 Volunteering enables the state to govern at a distance: ‘Neoliberal communitarianism’ .................40
2.7 Conclusion ..............................................................................................................................................43

Chapter 3: A theoretical frame for understanding neighbourhood differences in welfare self-organisation ........46
3.1 Looking at the area populations’ individual level characteristics ............................................................46
3.2 Looking at organisational density and institutional responsiveness in the area ........................................49
3.3 Hypotheses and subquestions .................................................................................................................52
3.4 Conclusion ..............................................................................................................................................55

Chapter 4: Rotterdam’s turn towards self-organized welfare services. ....57
4.1 Rotterdam: the deindustrializing city ........................................................................................................58
4.2 Rotterdam: the multicultural city .............................................................................................................64
4.3 Rotterdam welfare service politics ..........................................................................................................66
  4.3.1 An exceptional political landscape ..................................................................................................66
  4.3.2 Problematizing Rotterdam’s poorer neighbourhoods: not clean, not safe, not friendly .................67
  4.3.3 LR’s analysis of the causes of lost liveability ..................................................................................68
  4.3.4 LR’s solutions to repair liveability: being selective about who comes to the city .........................69
  4.3.5 Frontline governance: face-to-face with the existing population .....................................................71
4.4 Interpretative frames for ‘Policy Laboratory’ Rotterdam ............................................................................79
4.5 Conclusion ..............................................................................................................................................82

Chapter 5: Research approach ..............................................83
5.1 The case-study neighbourhoods ..............................................................................................................83
5.2 Data collection methods ..........................................................................................................................87

Chapter 6: Activation: who self-organizes what kind of welfare services and why? ....................................89
6.1 Different neighbourhoods, different self-organized welfare services .....................................................89
6.1.2 Incidence and goals in the Borough Dataset ................................................................. 89
6.1.3 Granted applications in all Rotterdam boroughs ............................................................. 91
6.2 On Leaders’ SES status and ethnicity ................................................................................. 92
6.3 Activation: triggering neighbourhood problems and other motives .................................... 95
  6.3.1 Cluster 1: Emancipation of one’s own ethnic or religious group .................................... 103
  6.3.2 Cluster 2: Unemployed or retired volunteers seeking a pass-time, social contacts, a sense of purpose and/or access to recreational activities or care ........................................ 108
  6.3.3 Cluster 3: Higher-educated self-employed leaders and lower-educated helpers working (also) for their professional career and some financial earnings ...................................... 120
  6.3.4 Cluster 4: ‘Light’ initiatives: public space improvements and neighbourhood parties ........ 132
6.4 Activation through neighbourhood social networks .............................................................. 136

Chapter 7: Material Resources for self-organisation ............................................................. 141
  7.1 Neighbourhood stigma ..................................................................................................... 141
  7.2 Self-organisations’ good governance ................................................................................. 149
  7.3 Access to resources through cooperation between self-organisations .............................. 152
  7.4 Supporting initiatives that can access hard to reach groups .............................................. 159
  7.5 Special funds for deprived urban areas ............................................................................ 164

Chapter 8: Conclusions and discussion .................................................................................. 169
  8.1 Empirical research in the strategic case of Rotterdam: participation wanted! .................. 173

Appendix A: last part of newspaper article by C. Huismans ................................................. 182
Appendix B: last part of newspaper article by Snel and Engbersen ........................................ 184
Appendix C: interview guide semi-structured volunteer interviews ......................................... 185
References ................................................................................................................................. 187
This dissertation could not have been written without many people’s contributions. First of all, I want to thank my supervisor professor Enzo Mingione, who helped me to find and grasp many of the main concepts of this work and always kept an optimistic outlook on the progress. I would also like to thank professor Serena Vicari and dr. Marianna d’Ovidio for organising the URBEUR program that offers thorough and up to date sociology education preparing PhD candidates for research. I am also grateful to them because they made me and my colleagues feel very welcome in Milan and at Bicocca University. I would like to thank professor Mauizio Pisati for teaching us about the tools and boundaries of social science and as such gave me a firmer ground to stand on during my research. And I am thankful for my PhD colleagues Abdel, Alessandro Linus and Catarina. They made my year in Milan so much fun and even more interesting. We always considered ourselves lucky to be colleague PhD-candidates, and we were!

I am certain my research has also profited a lot from the years I worked in the SVW section of OTB, Technical University of Delft. A special thank you to André Ouwehand, for sharing ideas about writing a dissertation and social science in general throughout the years, and for keeping me in the ‘writing loop’. I also want to thank Wenda Doff, Saskia Binken, Mariska van der Sluijs and Ton van der Pennen very much for staying interested in what I did after my time at OTB and always being willing to talk about our work. My thanks also go to Paul de Graaf of the Rotterdam statistical research bureau OBI, who made a further analysis of the VTO2013 data for me. A great thank you to the people in Rotterdam in Eindhoven who took the time and interest to show me their part of the Participation Society and of the city. This is undoubtedly the best part of doing a qualitative research in urban sociology.

Outside of work I received much support from my close friends, support and a way of putting things in perspective from my parents and brother, as well as a big, big pile of trust (in me and all women:) from my sister. The kids at the ‘Harbourtown’ community centre where I did my volunteering work, every week showed me that there is so much more than work and so much to have fun about. But most of all I want to thank Martijn, who went through the joys and frustrations of this project with me, and helped me three years on end with his critical mind, his interdisciplinary view, his warmth and his being who he is. A big thank you to you from my heart.
Abstract

This dissertation investigates the Dutch policy turn towards more volunteering in neighbourhood-based welfare services, and its effects on poorer and wealthier urban neighbourhoods. Over the last two decades, various Western European governments have become more attentive and supportive to citizens’ voluntary organisations in the fields of social cohesion, care and emancipation in the neighbourhood. In the UK, the so-called ‘Big Society’ policy frame has become very influential. Current British Prime Minister Cameron described it as a ‘huge cultural change (...) where people develop active and sustainable communities and don’t always turn to officials, local authorities or central government for answers to the problems they face’ (Cameron, 2010 in Lowndes and Pratchett 2012). The last five Dutch administrations have been inspired by the British example, and the current administration has named this policy trend the ‘Participation Society’ (Participatiesamenleving). It has expressed in various policy documents that the Dutch welfare state is to transform into a ‘participation society’.

The dissertation project empirically tests one of the critiques on the Dutch participation society. This critique holds that deprived urban areas have less potential to self-organize welfare services and that, consequently, the level and quality of welfare services will be lower in these neighbourhoods than in richer neighbourhoods. Therefore it is feared that more support for welfare self-organisation will eventually exacerbate existing social inequality in the city. This fear is voiced across the sociological literature and political debate on the participation society, by its proponents as well as its critics. They caution that various (randomized sample) population surveys have shown that lower-educated and poorer citizens not only participate less in political activities (as was first found by sociologists Verba and Nie in the US in 1970), but also in volunteering for neighbourhood welfare services. Because of this lower activation (people’s choice to volunteer) in deprived areas, the areas will have less self-organisation than richer neighbourhoods. On the other hand, there is also proof of relatively high activation in deprived areas if there is substantial professional and financial support from government: several British and Dutch researches have monitored the volunteering-promotion programs that were often part of ‘integral’ urban renewal operations during the late nineteen nineties and early two thousands. They found that the programs were successful in sparking high numbers of volunteering initiatives in these deprived areas. Nonetheless, over the last three years, Dutch population survey-based researches predicting low numbers of volunteering residents for deprived neighbourhoods, have made newspaper front pages.

However, randomized sample population surveys are only one way to chart volunteering practices, and the method has its problems (for instance the usually low survey response rates among lower-educated and ethnic minority citizens). Therefore, this dissertation investigates voluntary welfare service self-organizations directly, in different parts of the city. The choice for qualitative case study research was also made to be able to investigate in more detail the potential mechanisms causing differences in the number of volunteering organizations and their success in richer and poorer neighbourhoods. On the basis of case studies of four socioeconomically different neighbourhoods in Rotterdam, the research answers the central research question ‘do deprived and wealthier neighbourhoods have different potential to organize welfare services?’

Rotterdam, the second-largest city of the Netherlands, was chosen as the main research site because of its strong focus on volunteering in welfare. Its relatively poor economic performance has created large welfare needs as well as problems for the municipality to finance it. Therefore, the city’s administration
supports volunteering in welfare services in part to save money. Moreover, in the last fifteen years Rotterdam’s economic distress and starkly increased ethnic heterogeneity contributed to the dominance of a local populist political party that is strongly focused on neighbourhood ‘liveability’: a term to denote residents’ feelings of safety and tidiness and social cohesion in the neighbourhood. This party believes in practical policies and in working directly with citizens - in a controlling or in a supportive way - to increase neighbourhood liveability. The Participation Society frame fits this party’s approach because it is also aimed at supporting citizens’ liveability-minded behaviour, and has been given much room in Rotterdam (a large Resident Initiative fund was set up to give financial support to residents’ initiatives in all neighbourhoods of the city).

The research is thus a case-study of four Rotterdam neighbourhoods: two wealthier and two deprived areas. In these neighbourhoods, I counted the number of all-year-long welfare service providing volunteer groups. I define welfare services as such services in the fields of care, social cohesion and emancipation as (local) government can also be found to finance -or used to finance- through social work or through other professional welfare services. The outcome of this inventory is that such groups are actually more numerous in the poorer than in the wealthier neighbourhoods: the deprived neighbourhoods have twice as many groups. Also my analysis of all 2014 funding applications in two Rotterdam Boroughs -one mostly wealthy and one mostly deprived- indicated that there were more volunteering projects per inhabitant in the deprived Borough. This is not in line with the findings of earlier survey based researches in Rotterdam that predict low activation for the poor neighbourhoods (Engbersen, et al. 2015). However, my research did confirm a common finding of survey based researches into volunteering: in all four research neighbourhoods, the initiators of the groups are mostly higher-educated people.

To understand why the deprived neighbourhoods have more groups per inhabitant, even though their population is on average lower educated than that of the wealthier neighbourhoods, it proves necessary to look also at self-organization leaders’ and helpers’ motivations for volunteering. My interview data indicate that for many higher educated leaders, volunteering is related to paid work. Part of their motivation for volunteering is that it brings useful social contacts for their work, builds their CV, and/or is also partially paid through municipal Resident Initiative budgets. Especially self-employed creative workers are found in this group, but also self-employed social workers. Many of these self-employed social workers were fired during the budget cuts in Rotterdam’s welfare services in the last few years. Now some of them help lower income citizens in the same way they used to do, but now on a (partially) voluntary basis. In the second place, higher educated leaders working in low-income neighbourhoods are quite often ethnic minority volunteers who work to help their own ethnic group. The higher number of organisations in deprived areas is thus also partly thanks to their ethnic diversity and the strong networks and emancipatory ambitions within ethnic minority communities. Thirdly, I found that many volunteers are non-working citizens (retired or unemployed) who are motivated by the opportunities for social contact and useful or pleasurable occupation of their leisure time. Among this group I also interviewed several ‘beneficiary’ volunteers, who also use the service that they co-produce. This suggests that unemployed citizens (for lack of work or health reasons) on average have more time and more need to find spheres of occupation and sociability than employed citizens, and that for some for unemployed these spheres are found in volunteering. Therefore, the relatively high number of (time-intensive) welfare service volunteering initiatives in the poorer neighbourhoods is probably in part related to their high unemployment rates.

The research also questions how the socio-economic profile of the neighbourhood influences initiatives’ opportunities to acquire the needed material resources. It inquires whether cooperation between
initiatives to share resources, is more difficult in either type of neighbourhood. The interview data suggests that in practice, cooperation is harder in the deprived neighbourhoods because there are more ethnic and (sometimes) class lines dividing the initiatives. I also looked at observational and interview data to see whether deprived neighbourhoods’ stigma hinders volunteers’ when they apply for funding, but this does not seem to be the case. Rather, civil servants explicitly praise and support volunteers from these areas for being active for society, showing the participation society frame’s focus on citizens’ activation, especially for marginalized groups. However, under the Resident Initiative program, the municipality only sponsors residents’ groups’ activities, not the group itself. Therefore, many groups struggle to pay for their own accommodation and this makes the groups frailer. Furthermore, I investigated whether groups in deprived areas are more easily sponsored when they give the municipality more access to hard to reach groups. Here it showed that especially in deprived areas, initiatives are indeed often supported because they are instrumental to the municipality’s policy goals for the area. However, not all of the welfare needs targeted by the municipality are met by volunteering groups. In my research neighbourhood almost no volunteer groups serve youngsters, even though the municipality would like to see this. There are also hardly any unpaid volunteers working for unemployed residents’ labour market reintegration. If there is a ‘residents’ initiative’ in these fields, it usually depends on the partly paid work of ‘professional volunteers’ with a background in social work. Lastly, I enquired whether volunteering organizations’ performance in terms of ‘good governance’ (whether the organization is led in an accountable and effective way) influences decisions about funding. The qualitative data made clear that municipality’s knowledge about groups’ efficiency is often limited at the moment they decide. Also, initiatives sometimes deliver the welfare services in quite another way or quality than the municipality did, when they still provided this service. Yet this is not often a reason to deny funding to groups.

Together, the empirical data show that the relatively large number of neighbourhood welfare services self-organizations in the lower income research areas is mostly due to higher activation. It also indicates that the services that are self-organised in Rotterdam’s participation society are often well adapted to local welfare needs. At the same time, this self-organised welfare landscape is quite fragmented along ethnic lines and sometimes also class lines. Furthermore, the supply of welfare services is difficult to supervise or steer for local government. Lastly, even though deprived neighbourhoods have relatively more welfare service groups, this is still a very small number in absolute terms, and the losses that come with Rotterdam’s participation society policies are most tangible in these areas. They used to have much more state-funded welfare services than the wealthier areas of the city. The fact that these have been largely scaled down in budget cut operations, impacts residents’ daily life more strongly in the deprived than in the wealthier neighbourhoods.
Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 The debate on self-organizing welfare: a challenge for urban equality

In 2015 an alderman of Rotterdam, The Netherlands’ second largest city, wrote a letter to introduce a new subsidy program. This is the first part of that letter:

“The municipality council states: The city is not made by the municipality, it is made by the citizens, firms and social organisations. The municipality thinks and works in cooperation with its citizens, it initiates, supports and (sometimes) it steers. The goal is to have results in the street, the neighbourhood and the district. We make sure that municipality officers are more flexible, listen and drop by to have a look, and in that way are better and faster at responding to the citizens’ needs. (…) We take care of the support for residents who take an initiative. The support is complementary to the network in the borough, and is done in an efficient and coaching way, focused on stimulating residents’ own capacities and citizen power.” (Letter accompanying the new guideline on residents’ initiatives, Alderman for Harbour, Sustainability, Mobility and Organisation, city of Rotterdam 2014d, p.2, my translation)

In this text, Rotterdam’s local administration gives the role of creator of the city to market-organisations and, particularly, to citizens’ organisations, rather than its own municipal organisation. Civil servants’ main responsibility is to support, facilitate, listen and direct citizens who make things better in the neighbourhood. Because the alderman wants to support residents who invest in their neighbourhood through volunteering, he has also created a new subsidy program for their initiatives. “These can be for instance initiatives focused on care for one another, focused on language to stimulate participation, focused on talent development for youths, or focused on making the borough more fun” (ibid, p.2). These examples have to do with residents’ care for each other, and for each other’s wellbeing and chances in life. As such, they are much like the state’s own welfare services of for instance social work, elderly work, childcare and education.

The subsidy program that the alderman announces in this letter, consists of around 7 million euro per year for all Rotterdam boroughs together. Whereas subsidy possibilities were more scattered before, from now on they will be distributed by one central office for each of the 14 Rotterdam Boroughs. These are the Borough Committees; groups of publicly elected volunteers that convene on a monthly basis. When they approve of an application, typically up to €10,000 can be subsidized.

On a Saturday in October 2014, a community centre in Rotterdam is booked by the local Borough Committee. It hosts a ‘fast response booth’ for all the borough’s residents who want to take a neighbourhood initiative. These residents can obtain advice from municipality officers and borough committee members. They may even hear that day whether they can obtain the money they ask for: fast decisions about funding will be made for some of the ‘easier’ plans. The hall is decorated with garlands, free coffee is ready, the doors open at ten.

By 10:15, a Borough Committee member tweets pictures that show around 60 residents in the hall of the community centre. Many of them look busy talking with Borough Committee members and municipality officers. “Full house already! Come turn your plan into an initiative” he adds to the picture tweet. When I arrive, at 13:30, the hall still seems as full as in the pictures. In the entrance area of the community centre, I sit down next to a resident who has brought her lunch with her. She tells me she expects to stay several hours, because she has several plans.

In the square outside the community centre, three women and a man sit on a bench in the autumn sun. The man is a ‘neighbourhood networker’, a municipality professional, whom I have met before. They are eating cake and he invites me to sit down with them. He tells me that they have applied for funding to renovate the community centre’s kitchen. Alma, one of the women, will then be willing to cook for the
neighbourhood’s elderly and children there. They got some of the money already today, but they heard that other things, like three-phase electric power for the kitchen, cannot be financed, something that they do not understand. When I ask, the women tell me that they know each other through the residents’ neighbourhood safety meeting group, that the neighbourhood networker runs.

The Borough Committee receives around 150 applications that day. The rest of the year’s monthly meetings, are for a large part dedicated to evaluating all these applications.

In May 2015, I go to see a Residents’ Initiatives Consultation-hour, in another Rotterdam Borough across town. I saw an announcement for the consultation-hour in one of the neighbourhood papers of that borough:

‘Do you want to turn a good plan for your street or neighbourhood into a residents’ initiative? A bit of help from the Borough Committee members may support you. A warm welcome to residents and initiators who want to talk to committee members about their plan and have their questions answered. Coffee and tea will be served. Each first Tuesday of the month, between 18:00 and 19:30’.

When I arrive at the municipality office in this borough on this early summer evening, I see a market stall right behind the office’s main entrance. It has several piles of flyers, and a flag that says ‘Borough Committee’ hangs from a pole next to it. The Committee member staffing the stall is directing people to another room. They were looking for the municipal administrative office, where you can pick up a new passport or drivers’ licence. As they leave, I go up to the market stall. The man has lots to tell about his borough, he is involved in one of the boroughs neighbourhood residents’ organizations and in a community centre run by volunteers. He also has a lot of time for me. The consultation hour doesn’t draw any other visitors in the hour that I am there. It hasn’t attracted many people in the last two sessions either, the committee member tells me.

This dissertation is a study of the kind of initiatives these Borough Committees in Rotterdam try to promote and support. The research looks at the growing governmental enthusiasm for citizens who do volunteering work to ‘self-organize’ welfare services in their neighborhood. This is a feature shared by several Western-European welfare states today. The best known and most influential policy framework in this respect is the British Big Society framework, stimulating UK citizens to become active in helping others in their neighbourhood. The term Big Society was coined by the current Cameron administration, but already since the 1980’s, British governments have put high moral value on citizens’ generosity and practical help for each other, which should be understood ‘as part of an attempt to reform the welfare state’ (Kearns, 1995, p.155, see also Williams, 2005). But also in countries like Sweden (Bunar 2011), Germany (Schnur 2005) and the Netherlands (De Wilde, et al. 2014; Reijndorp 2014; Schinkel and Van Houdt 2010) there is renewed political appreciation for volunteers who ‘self-organize’ local welfare services, typically in the neighbourhood. In the Netherlands this policy trend has become known over the last few years as the transition from a welfare state to a ‘Participation Society’.

Governments hope that self-organisation by locally embedded volunteers can help to restrain welfare costs, but will also strengthen cohesion among citizens and between citizens and local government, and, lastly, will help address the increasingly diverse local welfare service needs of today’s heterogeneous societies. The local welfare services where involvement and initiative of volunteers are sought, are mostly in the domains of care and recreation for vulnerable groups, administrative help, poverty relief, language education for migrants, neighbourhood social cohesion and safety. Citizens are also stimulated to voluntarily run accommodations for these services such as community centres and libraries. Among these volunteer-provided services, long term care for elderly or ill is often provided by individually operating volunteers without much formal organisation, but the other activities usually take place in in organised neighbourhood-based volunteering groups.
I will address the reasons for the ‘volunteering in welfare services’ policy turn, and the types of volunteering that are sought in more detail in the next chapter. This introduction is the place to present the main research question of the dissertation. In the debate on the described policy turn, especially one criticism looms large: the fear that more reliance on local volunteering for welfare service provision will lead to exacerbated inequality between more and less socially included citizens. Critics like Uitermark (2012a) but also self-organization enthusiasts like Rotmans, argue that more space for citizen initiatives in building public services ‘may lead to a division between active, high educated people, and passive, low-educated people’ (Rotmans 2012, p.28, my translation). This may affect also the quality of services in the places where both groups predominantly live: the wealthier and the deprived neighbourhoods. The concern is often voiced that in deprived areas, where welfare services are most needed, the capacity to self-organize is low. Thus the policy focus on self-organisation will exacerbate social inequality (Kanne, et al. 2013; Uitermark 2012a; Van Kempen, et al. 2015).

This fear is grounded in traditions of social research. The idea that low educated residents remain more passive in volunteering to help others in the neighborhood, finds a basis in well-known household survey based research into participation levels in politics and volunteering among different socio-economic status (SES) groups. Since Verba and Nie found in 1972 that socio-economic status is positively related to political participation (voting, campaigning, addressing local representatives etc.), much focus has been placed on the personal characteristics – education level, income, occupational status- and the connected resources – money, education, civic attitudes- that predict such participation. Later American and British quantitative research, such as that by Marschall (2001), Williams (2005) and Brady, et al. (1995) found again that higher income and education are linked to more participation in local politics and in (top-down organized) neighbourhood volunteering.

However, even if such research results create the expectation that deprived neighbourhoods know few volunteering initiatives, such expectations are not completely in line with various researches looking at volunteering for the neighbourhood directly, by talking to and surveying neighbourhood volunteers (De Wilde 2008; Hurenkamp, et al. 2006; Sampson, et al. 2005; Tonkens, et al. 2012; Tumber 2012). Especially Dutch qualitative researches that focused on urban renewal neighbourhoods, observed that there were plenty of subsidized bottom-up organisations ‘doing’ welfare services in these areas (Tumber 2012; De Wilde 2008). At the time of these researches, large national subsidies were available for physical renewal of Dutch deprived neighbourhoods. These budgets also entailed money for social investment in these areas such as professional and/or financial support for neighbourhood volunteering groups. The researchers found welfare-service-like self-organisations that had much higher shares of young, female, ethnic minority and / or lower SES members, than the ‘talking’ neighbourhood organisations that seek influence in neighbourhood political and administrative matters (see also Kearns (1995), for the same finding in the British context). Tumber even finds that volunteering is higher in deprived than in other neighbourhoods and De Wilde describes the deprived Dutch neighbourhoods she studied as ‘bustling’ with state-subsidized bottom-up volunteering organisations.

Still, in Dutch debate on the participation society, it is generally considered that volunteering for welfare service provision is lower in deprived neighbourhoods. Two times in the last two years, Dutch social scientists made the quality paper front pages by predicting problems for poorer neighbourhoods. Both times, these researchers concluded from household survey results that deprived neighbourhoods were heading towards lower levels of welfare services in today’s ‘Participation Society’, due to lower volunteering of the residents. The first columns of both articles are translated below.
“Risk of emerging ghettos in the ‘participation society’”

The shift to the ‘participation society’ that the [current national] Rutte administration supports, will probably cause few problems for 80% of the population. But poor neighbourhoods, where residents have little contact with each other, are likely to become the victim.

Klarendal in Arnhem, one of the country’s most deprived neighbourhoods

Of all Dutch citizens, residents of a poor neighbourhood are least willing to make an effort for their neighbours and residential environment, when the state withdraws during the next couple of years.

This is the outcome of a survey research, held among one thousands citizens, by [research firm] TNS Nipo. "If the government expects from all people to take over government tasks, this will go well in some neighbourhoods,” says Peter Kanne of TNS Nipo. "But without additional government action, other neighbourhoods can spiral down and become ghettos” (...)

For the rest of this article, see appendix A. My italics.

If the citizen has to do it by himself, poor neighbourhoods will be left behind

What impact will the withdrawal of the government have on neighbourhoods? Citizen participation works mainly in the rich white neighbourhood, say Godfried Engbersen, professor of general sociology at Erasmus University, and Erik Snel, assistant professor at the Erasmus University.

Having a privileged social and economic position provides further benefits in life. This is an ancient mechanism identifiable in many societal domains: better educated people benefit more from cultural and educational institutions, high income groups receive more mortgage deduction because they own more expensive homes, the digitally literate keep the lead on the electronic highway, and millionaires see their possessions grow much faster than small savers. This mechanism has once been named the Matthew effect: "For whoever already has some, will be given more, and they will have an abundance. Whoever does not have, even what they have will be taken from them." (25:29). Or in everyday language: the poor are getting poorer and the rich are getting richer.

This mechanism is gaining significance now that more responsibilities in the Dutch welfare state are shifted to the citizen. In various social spheres, substitution takes place: the government withdraws and the citizen is expected to take over certain tasks. We see this in the sphere of social work and care and specifically in neighbourhood policy. But the question is whether this shift of responsibilities may lead to greater inequalities. Will not old mechanisms induce that wealthy groups expand their privileged position and poor groups become
further disadvantaged?

**Matthew effect: "For whoever already has some, will be given more, and they will have abundance. Whoever does not have..."**

We believe the Matthew effect is visible in the larger Dutch cities. The context is well known. Facilities such as community centres, libraries and recreational activities for vulnerable people (elderly, disabled, Alzheimer’s patients) are scaled down, and greater use is made of volunteering citizens and civil society. In Rotterdam, local government withdraws from the social domain, and relies on the “citizen power” of its inhabitants through ambitious and fine-grained neighbourhood policy schemes.

Our research - based on the Rotterdam Social Index Survey that was held among some 15,000 Rotterdam residents - shows that in neighbourhoods with the largest low-income group and a high degree of ethnic diversity, citizen participation occurs significantly less than in more affluent neighbourhoods in the city. This is true for three important types of citizen participation: volunteering, community participation and volunteering in long-term home care for frail family or friends. In the rich Kralingen neighbourhood, levels of volunteering are higher, residents are more often active for the area and there is more voluntary long-term home care provision than in the poor areas of South Rotterdam, such as the neighbourhoods Afrikaanderwijk, Bloemhof and Feyenoord. And it is these poor neighbourhoods, which have many social problems, that are most in need of successful citizens’ initiatives.

Further analysis of our data indicates that differences between neighbourhoods are primarily related to individual characteristics of residents. Higher educated people participate more than lower educated people, native Dutch participate more than allochthonous Dutch, homeowners participate more than renters, people with a lot of neighbourhood contacts and neighbourhood attachment participate more than those with few contacts and little connection. These people often live in wealthier neighbourhoods. But we also see citizens from boroughs with many low-income households, who participate more than one would expect on the basis of their individual profile (many of them low-skilled, many migrants, many who have recently moved to the neighbourhood). Unmistakably, there are citizens’ initiatives in poor neighbourhoods involving not only the ‘usual suspects’ but also young ethnic minority women and lower educated people. And we also see that there are exceptions to the rule that there are fewer neighbourhood initiatives in poor, diverse neighbourhoods. A familiar example is the Rotterdam neighbourhood Oude Westen, which has a rich tradition of civic participation.

What does this all mean for Rotterdam urban policy? First of all, policy must take note of its selective effects. For wealthier neighbourhoods the current policy turn does not change much. In those neighbourhoods enough residents are actively taking care of the neighbourhood. But that is different in the most vulnerable neighbourhoods of the city.

(…) see appendix B for the rest of this article

---

1 The term used in the original Dutch text is ‘allochthonous’ (‘allochtonen’). In the Netherlands ‘allochthonous’ is used by the Central Bureau of Statistics to indicate people who were born outside the Netherlands, or who have at least one parent born outside the Netherlands. The term allochthonous, with the meaning described above, has become common in everyday language in the Netherlands and will also be used in this thesis. Furthermore, in the rest of this text I will sometimes use the term Moroccan (or Turk, or Caboverdean) for a Dutch citizen who was born in Morocco (or Turky or Cabo Verde) or whose parents were born there. Even though I do not describe nationality and citizenship correctly in this manner, it is useful for the sake of brevity and because people often refer to themselves and others in these ways.
Especially the second article connects the idea that welfare self-organisation will exacerbate social inequality to Merton’s (1968) Matthew effect: the idea that in many spheres of life, wealthier or more socially included people are able to improve their better position even further. According to these scholars, self-organisation of welfare is a case in point, because wealthier, higher educated people, typically living in better neighbourhoods, are more willing to volunteer for the wellbeing of their neighbours. Yet, as Snel and Engbersen write towards the end of this excerpt, their research is also somewhat inconclusive: the researchers find several poorer neighbourhoods and poorer respondent subsets for which volunteering is higher than expected.

On the whole, then, Dutch survey based research into welfare self-organisation hints at more self-organisation in wealthier neighbourhoods, (but with exceptions of poorer but well-organized areas and without researching the practices of self-organisation directly), whereas some qualitative researches have shown Dutch deprived areas to be ‘bustling’ with inhabitants initiatives (but these do not compare with the situation in wealthier areas and may be influenced by the generous subsidy programs for initiatives in deprived areas at the time of research). So, while this issue is very much alive in scientific and political debate, there is little direct empirical knowledge of the impact of welfare service self-organisation in poorer neighbourhoods compared to wealthier ones. There are studies pointing to scarcer welfare service self-organisation in deprived areas, but there are also others that recount of numerous volunteering initiatives in these areas. This ambiguity in the data and the lack of in-depth comparative research strategies into the matter, has guided my research question. The central research question therefore is:

Do deprived and wealthier neighbourhoods have different potential to ‘self-organize’ welfare services?

This dissertation documents my investigation.

1.2 Outline of the dissertation

This dissertation is the outcome of a research based on semi-structured interviewing as well as observing activities and meetings in 33 neighbourhood based volunteer groups in Rotterdam, and two groups in Eindhoven. In the main research site, Rotterdam, I observed most leaders of all neighbourhood volunteer organisations in welfare services that existed in 2014 in two deprived and two richer neighbourhoods. All four neighbourhoods have about 7000 inhabitants. I also spoke with several professionals (civil servants, social workers and policymakers) that work with these leaders. In Eindhoven I spoke with leaders and helpers of two rather similar welfare service organizations, one in a higher middle-class and one in a lower middle-class neighbourhood. The dissertation charts what kind of services these organisations deliver, as well as their successes and obstacles, while looking at the potential influence of the composition of the population of the neighbourhood. Especially the socio-economic and ethnic composition will be looked at. Another empirical component of the research is the analysis of all 224 applications for Resident Initiative funding made by neighbourhood self-organisations between March 2014 and March 2015 in two Rotterdam boroughs. These two boroughs, one relatively rich and the other relatively deprived, together have 115.000 inhabitants.

Rotterdam, the main research site, is a good site to research the policy turn towards more self-organization and welfare services in the context of local welfare state withdrawal. This is because it is a city that combines severe cutbacks on welfare service spending with extensive publicity campaigns and sustained funding programs for neighbourhood-based volunteering organisations in welfare services, as is shown for instance in its current welfare service policy program ‘Rotterdammers for one another – From welfare state to welfare street’ (Rotterdam 2014f). The next three chapters of the dissertation
provide a basis for understanding this embrace of self-organisation. Chapter two deals with the general evolvement of post-WWII Western-European local welfare systems towards not only more market steering, but also towards more involvement of local civil society. The third chapter draws on the research literature on local civil society in welfare-services to see whether and how this is likely to lead to different outcomes for deprived and wealthier neighbourhoods, and formulate subquestions accordingly. Chapter four explains why in Rotterdam, even more than in the other large Dutch cities, emphasis on self-organisation is strong. It also deals with the interpretative frames scholars have provided for the city’s self-organisation minded approach to welfare service provision.

The empirical part of this dissertation consists of three chapters. In chapter 5 the research neighbourhoods and steps of the empirical part of the research are described. Chapter 6, on activation for self-organisation in the four research neighbourhoods, is followed by a chapter on the organisations’ access to the other resources they need. In the last chapter of this dissertation, the research is discussed and conclusions are drawn about the question whether deprived and wealthier neighbourhoods have different potential to ‘self-organise’ welfare services.
Chapter 2: Welfare service changes in the city

Although the 'Participation Society' and Big Society are new terms, of course throughout history people have organized things they needed through volunteering. There are plenty of historical examples of people uniting to self-produce services that we would now consider 'welfare services', not as a market or family activity, but out of other (self-) interests. Examples range from medieval farmer cooperatives, charities and guilds to workers’ saving clubs of the industrialization era, and from today’s Salvation Army to the feminist movement. They show that citizens across the ages have organized the ‘welfare’ goods insurance, care, social cohesion and emancipation together through civil society, and mostly at a local organisational scale.

Local self-organisation of welfare, in other words, is not new. Yet what is quite unique about its current practices in several Western-European countries is that it now happens aside a substantial system of state provided welfare schemes, and is actively promoted by this state. Notably in the UK, a succession of British national administrations going back to the late nineteen nineties have considered it their task to stimulate citizens to be active for local society through volunteering. This communitarian outlook was part of the 'Third Way', and is nowadays part of the UK’s Big Society policy frame, that ‘aims to devolve powers to communities and establish a greater role in public services for voluntary and community organizations’ (Lowndes and Pratchett 2012, p.12). Also Dutch national administrations, inspired by the British example and its conceptual basis, have seen themselves as partner of volunteering citizens since the beginning of this century.

The Dutch states’ enthusiasm for volunteering in local welfare services, coupled with lower public budgets for these services, is so strong that several authors have pointed out that the welfare state is in fact in transition towards a so-called ‘participation society’ (Boutellier and Boonstra 2009; Uitermark and van Beek 2010. In 2013, the Dutch King in his yearly speech on behalf of the Dutch government, also pointed to the necessity of this transition. The idea of a calibration of the welfare state also speaks from a government-ordered 2013 advice report on self-organisation by the Dutch Advisory Board of Social Support. It was summarized by its chair in the following way: ‘As the government retreats, citizen self-help is a great necessity. (...) This requires a government that gives citizens a free reign, partly takes distance from the welfare state, and gives up part of its authority. Active citizenship should be given a clear field’ (Frissen, et al. 2013).. British Prime Minister Cameron has presented the Big Society policy framework as a fundament to his administration. Cameron has described it as a ‘huge cultural change (...) where people develop active and sustainable communities and don’t always turn to officials, local authorities or central government for answers to the problems they face’ (Cameron 2010 cited in Lowndes and Pratchett 2012).

How did this turn towards more volunteering in welfare services come about, and which ideas lay behind it? In order to understand how the policy trend towards self-organisation of welfare services emerged in several Western European states, and specifically in the Netherlands, this chapter places it in the perspective of welfare state building and recalibration since World War II.

2.1 1900-1970: Creation of the European welfare states

Welfare states, as developed especially in Western Europe since the start of the twentieth century, can be understood as historical accumulations of nation states’ policy programs directed at citizens’ wellbeing. Up until 1900, care for dependent groups such as children, disabled, elderly and (other) poor had been mostly provided within families and by charitable institutions (and in some cases by the market), but in the second half of the last century, a growth of state-organised arrangements occurred, which blossomed in the fifties, sixties and seventies, or the ‘trentes glorieuses’. In this period, the nation state became the main organizing force in securing sustenance income, health care and education for dependent groups, and arrangements were often translated into national laws, creating social rights for citizens (see for instance Oosterlynck, et al. 2013, p.4). The Dutch Scientific Council for Government Policy speaks in this regard about the two ‘classical’ tasks of the welfare state of insuring (mostly through income transfers) and caring (through national healthcare and long-term care systems for elderly and disabled) (WRR 2006).

Whereas these two functions are aimed at protecting citizens against problems of hardship, also two other functions can be identified in welfare state arrangements from the 1950’s on, especially in those of richer countries. In the early post-war decades, the welfare states’ ambitions of insuring citizens and caring for citizens, increasingly expanded also to emancipating and connecting them (ibid).

The emancipatory function of the welfare state involves its efforts to create more possibilities of education and political participation for the citizens, especially for those who are marginalized. The idea that the state should not only insure the population against extreme poverty but also stimulate its immaterial potential gained political attention in the nineteen sixties and seventies, a period of quick recovery from post-war economic hardship in many European countries. In the Netherlands Den Uyl, prime-minister from 1973 until 1977, for instance argued for further investment in social work provision by the state since ‘material welfare in itself does not grant happiness’ (Den Uyl, quoted in Boutellier and Boonstra 2009, p. 8). At that time, state efforts for emancipation were traditionally confined to the realm of education. Now the Dutch state also started to provide services for children’s recreation and cultural education, support for youths, for female emancipation and for political self-organisation in neighbourhood matters (notably in organizing low-income residents’ influence on the urban renewal happening in their working class urban neighbourhoods during the nineteen seventies and eighties). As international labour migration grew, also language courses and support groups for migrants were set up. All these new types of state-funded services became known as ‘social work’, and the ‘social workers’ formed a new occupational sector. These professionals also added a new dimension to the caring function of the welfare state, by providing financial and psychological advice to residents in community centres (Boutellier and Boonstra 2009).

Social workers also became important in realizing the fourth function of the welfare state\(^3\). This connecting function involves stimulating citizens to build ties with different societal groups. This is deemed important in order to maintain a sense of solidarity and shared identity in society. It is also

\(^3\) In the early decades of Dutch state-sponsored social work, it was delivered mostly through non-profit organisations adhering to the different religious, socialist and humanist pillars structuring and dividing national society in the first half of that century. As the cultural-political segregation of Dutch society faded during the sixties and seventies, also the social work organisations secularised, professionalized, and often merged. They became generally open to all neighbourhood inhabitants and almost completely reliant on state funding. During the last four decades they have de facto been semi-governmental organizations (see for instance Metz, 2009, p.20).
intended to offer people connections to alternative social worlds than the ones they were born into and thus advance (social) mobility. The welfare state’s connecting function operates in the first place at the national level through the solidarity enacted in social assistance, but it is also striving for at neighbourhood level. In the neighbourhood, specialized social workers (also known as community workers) for instance organize projects for social cohesion in the neighbourhood’s public spaces, which are identified as sites of belonging and interaction for inhabitants of different social groups.

As such, connecting, emancipating and caring welfare services provided (mostly) by social workers, have become an important part of welfare service provision in countries like the Netherlands. They stimulate social cohesion in society and social mobility and participation for marginalized groups, through various forms of empowerment and integration (Tonkens 2009; WRR 2006). Although they seem ‘border zones’ of the functioning of the welfare state, as they do not involve income redistribution and immediate protection from hardship, they can nevertheless form essential building blocks to participation and belonging of marginalized groups.

It should furthermore be noted, as the WRR and Therborn (1995) make clear, that the welfare state project has also (had) other goals besides providing care, insurance, emancipation and connection opportunities to individual citizens. Welfare state arrangements have also been promoted as tools to improve public safety by diminishing poverty, to stimulate national economic growth by enhancing the spending power of poor households, to increase the populations’ productivity by improving citizens’ education and health levels, and to prevent that social tensions disrupt order in society (WRR, 2006, p. 37). Nevertheless, The WRR’s fourfold typology of caring, insuring, emancipating and connecting welfare services offers a useful tool to recognize the services offered by neighbourhood self-organisations studied in this dissertation as types of welfare services, and to understand this as a change in their modus of organisation since the post-war period of growth. The next paragraphs will describe what other important adjustments welfare service provision has seen during the last half-century.

2.2 1970 until today: Changing economies and populations bringing new social risks

After the rapid development of the welfare state across Europe until the early seventies, a recalibration in welfare provision occurred (Kazepov 2010; Therborn 1995; Van Ewijk 2010). A weakening of Western-Europe’s global economic position in the breakdown process of the Fordist accumulation model (Streeck 2011) and ageing populations combined with increasingly lower fertility rates, made it difficult to finance the welfare state as once envisioned. Particularly the rising public deficits that most countries faced due to abatement of economic growth, stimulated governments to seek new welfare structures that incurred less costs.

As the Western European economies and societies started to change from roughly 1970 onwards, formerly unknown patterns of social risks emerged. While the lifestyles of Europeans grew more heterogeneous and economies deindustrialized, sociologists started to write about the New Social Risks. These are formerly little known welfare need patterns for which the European welfare systems had been barely prepared at the time of their creation, and to which they also never fully adapted later (see Bonoli 2004; Oosterlynck, et al. 2013).

At the time of their design, in the first two post-war decades, welfare systems were shaped to counter the main risk threatening the typical household of that time: that of the single breadwinner becoming unable to earn a living for his family, due to sickness, ageing or temporary unemployment - in this exceptional period mass unemployment occurred only during short periods of cyclical
downfalls of the (national) economy. Corresponding to these ‘traditional’ risks, disability benefits, pensions and unemployment benefits were created, often based on a single (male) breadwinner model and contributory schemes paid by workers.

In current times, however, tertiarization of the economy (characterized by a premium on high education and insecure, low paid jobs for low-skilled workers), instability of adult relationships, increasing female labour participation and international migration, have created new vulnerabilities for households: the young risk unemployment as they face more temporary employment and lack access to social benefits that are based on contributory schemes designed to fit workers with more stable jobs. The low-skilled risk both recurrent unemployment and becoming a ‘working poor’, since current service economy jobs for low skilled are insecure, know fewer training possibilities, low wages and relatively little labour union protection compared to the low-skilled jobs in the industrial sector of the past (Andreotti and Mingione 2013). Also, low-educated workers who(se parents) have migrated from rural economies in the developing world, face risks. Due to skill gaps and discrimination, they encounter above-average chances of unemployment in the deindustrializing European economies. Furthermore, in most European countries, working single parents (mostly women) - a phenomenon barely known at the time of the welfare states’ construction- face difficulties arranging childcare. The advancement of female labour participation also means that many families have become more dependent on the state or market for elderly care and childcare. The result of all these tendencies is that groups of citizens -in most cases low-skilled citizens- face ‘new poverty’, which is no longer limited to cyclic periods of decline of the (national) economy, but becomes a structural situation of insecurity and material poverty. Furthermore, ‘new poverty’ is cumulative, in the sense that individuals who are not only low skilled, but also a single parent, young and/or a first or second generation migrant, face even more difficult conditions. When looking at these risks, an increased need for ‘new’ welfare services becomes clear, such as childcare, elderly care, education programs for low skilled and inclusion strategies for migrants.

Unfortunately, the provision of such ‘new’ welfare services has faltered in most European welfare states. This is due to a set of related causes. In the first place, since the households encountering the new risks and its ensuing poverty have very different lifestyles, labour trajectories and stages in the life cycle, ‘new poverty’ is often experienced in a more individualized and socially fragmented way’ (Oosterlynck et al, 2013, p.6, but see also for instance Bauman, 2000), with consequently less political representation and (labour) organisation. Therefore, the call for new welfare services has been less well orchestrated than that during the main era of formation of the welfare state. Secondly, in all but the Scandinavian countries, the effects of tertiarization, migration, household instability and female labour participation became manifest mostly from the eighties onwards, so in times of stagnated economic growth and already increased welfare budget pressures due to the maturation of ‘classic’ welfare state provision (pensions, benefits for ill workers). As expansion was deemed too costly, governments have taken only relatively modest attempts at organizing these ‘new’ services. Furthermore, as Pierson (1996) shows, path-dependency incurs that it is harder for states to abolish or change existing services and insurances for existing represented groups than to neglect new and unrepresented groups. Due to political power formation, existing social policies such as pensions, pensioning ages, and contributory earned rights often stayed in place, whereas new arrangements could not be established (ibid), although it should be noted that austerity measures after the 2008 crises have often affected these ‘earned rights’ as well. A last reason why it is difficult to organise welfare state cover for new risks, is that these arrangements have to address much more diverse needs and groups than the traditional schemes. This diversification further complicated welfare state modification. It is no longer only the unemployed breadwinner who should be provided for financially, but now both men and women, young and old, native and migrant all have welfare needs in their own specific way. This not only made
welfare services more difficult in terms of their administration, but also from a political viewpoint. Where new provisions were arranged for one social group, this often raised demands by all other groups to have the same or be compensated by a new service created for them. This makes expansion of welfare arrangements much more costly (Frissen et al, 2013; Schuyt, 2013).

The result of all the forces pulling at the European post-war welfare systems is that most of these states often do not adequately shield people from the new risks of poverty. Consequently people face ‘instability and weak integration into society’ (Ranci 2010, p.13 see also Cantillon 2011). Especially in neighbourhoods at the low end of the urban housing market, where low-educated, single parent and/or migrant households are concentrated, the problems of mass long-term unemployment, working poor and new problems of social cohesion have become most visible (Oosterlynck et al, 2013, p.5). In these neighbourhoods, the welfare state project has not been able to end poverty and according to some authors poverty here must be acknowledged as advanced marginality (Uitermark 2014b). Here, welfare services are most needed.

2.3: New Public Management in welfare services: the market turn

Instead of developing the types of welfare services the new social risks required, however, a first wave of welfare service reform mainly addressed their mode of production. From the nineteen eighties and nineties on, many Western-European countries reorganised their welfare services to make them more marketlike. Rising welfare costs as well as the persistence of poverty - most visible in deprived urban neighbourhoods - were increasingly recognized as disappointing aspects of the welfare state. It led to critique on the efficiency of welfare arrangements; existing state provided services and transfer schemes were cast as overly centralized, inefficient and bureaucratic (Marinetto 2003; Tonkens 2009). Moreover, several politicians and scientists started to emphasize that welfare allowances and services created dependent rather than active citizens (Marsland 1996; quoted in Van Ewijk 2010). As a result of both tendencies, in the eyes of many commentators the welfare state had become ‘a black hole in which money disappears without giving clear results’ (Tonkens 2009. p.11, my translation).

Several perceptions played a role in this changed outlook on welfare. Regarding welfare allowances, the critique grew that for many recipients, life on allowances had become preferable to working. According to some, the preference to be a welfare recipient had even become a kind of culture, as it was handed down to recipients’ children (see for instance MacDonald, 1996). In this vein, the leader of the Dutch Christian-Democrats, the largest party in national government at that time, stated in 1991 that many of the users of the health disability allowance (WAO) were ‘exaggerators’ (aanstellers).

Not only the efficiency of welfare allowances, but also that of welfare services was heavily scrutinized in the Netherlands. Already in the nineteen seventies the ‘emancipation paradox’ had become a major topic in debate, mostly among left-leaning politicians and other citizens. According to this ‘emancipation paradox’ it makes no sense to develop emancipatory welfare services to empower

---

4 Two examples of this weak integration are the current state of the integration of migrants and that of single parents in the labour market. In all European countries labour participation of low skilled labour migrants continues to be rather low, and unemployment is high also for their children. Consequently there is a relatively high level of social exclusion for these groups and half of the population of these countries experiences ‘social tension’ between natives and the concerned ethnic minority groups (EUROfound, 2003, quoted in WRR, 2006). The second example regards integration of single parents in the labour market: public childcare provision has not been developed to bring female labour participation to the level of that of men, in all but Scandinavian Europe. In the UK and the Netherlands childcare takes up 45% and 30% respectively of the average low skilled worker’s salary (data for 2002, WRR 2006, p.103).
citizens; since all people are equal, no person can know what is best for another person (Tonkens, 2009 p.10). In 1979, philosopher Achterhuis added to this critique a Foucault inspired attack not only on the welfare services of emancipation, but also on those of care and connection. He published a study that held that welfare services like social work foremostly enabled the state to exert social control over citizens, while providing work to welfare professionals but little cure for clients. Instead of solving problems, welfare service workers often diagnosed more, non-existent problems for clients.

At that time there were very few robust researches into the outcomes of social work interventions (and hardly any randomized trial researches) and Achterhuis’ empirical base can be described as anecdotal (as also Achterhuis himself states on page 14 of his book). His critique was also quite radical; Achterhuis repeatedly underwrites the idea that similar to welfare service provision, also health care provision aggravates rather than solves the problems it is meant to cure. Yet his critique became influential in the debate on welfare service planning: a national law to regulate and provide welfare services through the national state, that had just been installed months before, was abolished again in 1982 (see for instance Tonkens 2009, p.12, Boutellier and Boonstra 2009, p.9, or Metz 2009, p.21).

In this period, welfare services’ inefficiencies and perceived counterproductive effects were thus seen as increasingly heavy burdens on the potential of citizens as well as on the state’s now tightening budget. In response, a shift in governing welfare and other public services occurred that has often been described as New Public Management (Schuyt 2013; Tonkens 2009; WRR 2006). In New Public management, welfare services are reorganized to incorporate more market-based principles such as quasi-marketization and management-styles known from commercial actors. Central idea was that these strategies would introduce the ‘discipline of the market’ to welfare services, and that this would create more efficiency and effectiveness by giving incentives for sharp budget monitoring, standardization, specialisation and, lastly, innovation.

A first market discipline measure propagated in New Public Management is privatisation. This entails the outsourcing of state provided services, such as welfare services, to commercial actors. In this way, care for children, ill and elderly, education, public housing etc. may all be assigned to commercial actors. These actors will then compete and thus enact the discipline of the market. According to Hemerijck, outright privatisation (without compensating the citizens that buy the services) has scarcely happened during the last decades of welfare restructuring in the EU, but ‘private provision of publicly financed services has increased substantially’ (2012, p.9). In this type of privatisation, welfare services are delivered by commercial or other private actors, but the state buys these services for citizens or compensates the citizens (partially or completely) when they buy them for themselves.

Such a shift towards private provision of publicly financed services has happened most clearly in two domains Dutch welfare services: that of public housing and of healthcare insurance. But the privatization of welfare services with a public compensation-system, in these cases, has not been an unequivocal success, as will be outlined below for both examples.

**Private provision in Dutch public housing**

In the Netherlands, public housing is called ‘social housing’ because it is managed not by the state but by Housing Associations (‘woningbouwverenigingen’). The Dutch Housing Associations originate from early nineteenth century saving clubs for the working classes. In the four decades following World War II, however, these private clubs had de facto become state institutions; they were paid large subsidies in order to build the quantities of housing commissioned by the state to solve the country’s severe housing shortage (Ouwehand and
At their heyday in 1980, Housing Associations had become the owner of 40% of all Dutch housing in this way, and they rented out housing not only to lower class but also to middle class households. Reprivatisation of this welfare service came in 1995, when the government decided to end all subsidies to the Associations and make them once again private, not-for-profit institutions. From that moment on, the associations have had the responsibility to provide housing to households in the lowest four income deciles, who receive user subsidies (huurtoeslagen). To cover the losses involved in providing housing to these poorer households, Housing Associations were given state permission to sell part of their housing stock and also to develop market activities (Van der Veer and Schuiling 2005).

Between 1998 and 2008, the Dutch housing market was booming and the reprivatized Associations were making large profits from selling part of their stock and developing middle class housing for sale. The Associations thus fared very well and this was seen as proof that the introduction of market steering worked to improve efficiency.

As their financial reserves grew, Dutch government called upon the Housing Associations to invest in the deprived areas, where they usually owned most of the housing. Consequently, the associations financed physical renewal schemes, often with a ‘social mix’ design. In social mix urban renewal, middle income housing is built to replace part of the old, low-income housing (see for instance Dol and Kleinhans, 2012). In the 1990s and first decade of this century, ‘integral’ neighbourhood restructuring schemes usually also entailed social and economic programs to improve public space, safety, social cohesion, and chances for youth and unemployed. Housing Associations contributed financially to such plans and also often built new real estate for welfare services (such as schools, community centres and care centres) and contributed to support programs for neighbourhood volunteering (Aedes 2007). Between 2007 and 2011, Housing Associations and the state together even developed a national strategy to improve the country’s ‘40 most deprived neighbourhoods’, which were situated in 18 cities. More than half of the required total investment of 1200 million Euro was paid by the associations (Permentier, et al. 2013, p.31). Part of this ‘40 neighbourhoods’ national policy plan was a 59 million Euro voucher program. With these vouchers inhabitants could finance their self-organized initiatives in the neighbourhood.

Since 2010, however, Housing Associations have suffered under a collapse of the Dutch housing market and under the implementations of new central state taxes. Moreover, in 2012 the country’s largest association encountered a two billion Euro loss due to the purchase of ill-fated financial derivatives and fraud. Other associations had to save it from going bankrupt. Because of all this, the financial reserves of the Associations have shrunk. Many employees have been fired, the ‘40 neighbourhoods investment program’ was ended and more stock has been sold nation-wide.

As a result of policies favouring homeownership and the unforeseen financial problems of the privatized Housing Association, by 2013 the share of social housing in the Netherlands had gone down to 31%, where it was still 38% in 1995 (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2013a, p.7)

---

Private provision in health insurance and at home care

Another important example of reintroduced private provision of welfare services in the Netherlands can be found in health insurance. Since 1941, the national health scheme (‘Ziekenfonds’) covered medical treatment costs for many lower income groups, and by the end of the twentieth century the majority of the Dutch population was insured in this way. In 2005, however, this national scheme was ended, and now all citizens are obliged to buy health insurance for the treatment of common or life-threatening medical conditions from private insurance companies. The lower income groups receive refunds for their insurance contributions for basic care. Citizens that want more expensive care or want to choose between hospitals, have to buy extra, non-
refunded, insurance packages. In this system, commercial insurance companies instead of the state negotiate with hospital management teams, and this was thought to engender more competition and thus efficiency in medical care provision. This mechanism, however, seems somewhat hampered by the fact that in practice 90% of all Dutch citizens buy from only four insurance companies. Moreover, the need to restrain national public spending on medical care has not lost its urgency (Wynia 2015).

A stronger focus on consumer’s choice was also followed in the provision of at-home care for the elderly and ill. As of 1996, recipients of such care were enabled to pay the provider of their choice from a state provided budget entitled to them personally (‘persoonsgebonden budget’). This quasi-market strategy indeed entailed an enlarged freedom of choice for service users, and the number of home care providers swiftly grew in number. Yet the system of personal home care budgets was severely sized down again in 2013, because of its costs and because cases of fraud occurred.

For most Dutch welfare services of emancipation, connection and at-home care, however, market presentation strategies have been introduced that do not involve consumer choice. In social work and home care provision, the state has increasingly shifted towards ‘contracting out’. Rather than organise their provision through a fixed set of (semi-)governmental organizations, local governments set up tender procedures. In these procedures, various private (often reprivatized) providers enter bids to win the local governments’ commission for welfare services for a district or municipality. In this way they can make an informed choice between more providers than if they would buy directly. In many municipalities, the local states’ commissions for home care, but also social work such as administrative and psychological support, youth, elderly and community work, now follow a periodical tendering process. Thus, semi-governmental welfare organisations from one city have been seen to expand their ‘market’ to other cities, while other organisations were found less competitive and lost the subsidy for providing their type welfare services (Movisie 2010).

In tenders for social work and care, it often occurs that the total package of requested services and/or the compensation for service delivery is smaller than in the previous tender cycle. This is because Dutch municipalities as a rule need to be increasingly financially stringent; over the last ten years, more and more responsibilities for care (mentioned above) and emancipatory social work have been transferred to them by the central state. These decentralisations happened through the implementation of new national laws: the 2007 ‘Act on Social Support’ (‘Wet Maatschappelijke Ondersteuning’) and its 2015 revision, as well as the 2015 ‘Participation Act’ with regards to active labour market policies, e.g. support activities for unemployed citizens to find new work. These new laws were almost always coupled with substantial budget cuts (see paragraph 4.3 of this dissertation for the example of the outcomes for Rotterdam municipality). The Act on Social Support of 2007, for instance, explicitly aims at cost reductions by letting citizens volunteer in care and other welfare service provision (Verhoeven and Ham 2010). However, volunteering can only do so much, and as municipalities received less state funding for welfare services, budget cuts at municipal level have been usually unavoidable.

A prominent aspect of New Public Management is quantitative targeting - and subsequently monitoring- of welfare service providers’ output. These techniques, also known as Corporate Management, have become important for welfare providers and municipalities to monitor progress. They are also helpful in the tendering process, as they make bids and achieved results more comparable. To this end, the outcomes of welfare services such as youth work, elderly care and labour market reintegration programs have to be made measurable and uniform. This has been implemented for instance in social work, where intervention plans for individuals or households, treatment
moments and (preliminary) results have all become quantifiable objects to be registered. Especially the number of ‘cases closed’ has become an important statistic (see for instance Movisie 2010). Such quantitative monitoring techniques moreover helps managers to oversee and guide the actions of individual social workers; a professional group that typically has relatively much discretionary power to decide what intervention suits their client (see for instance Lispky, 1980).

Subjecting social work and other local welfare services to tender procedures and corporate management, was seen as the way to break through their inefficiencies. Yet, as the example shown above for social housing, health insurance and homecare, New Public Management also has its shortcomings with regards to improving social work. Many users of these welfare services face several, interacting problems (see also paragraph 2.2 of this dissertation on new social risks); social exclusion is usually multidimensional and is often a combination of backlogs in the field of education, health, work, income and/or social relations. This complexity and interrelatedness makes that it is difficult to solve problems of social exclusion with the compartmentalized, standardized service provision that New Public Management promotes. Furthermore, a classical ‘market’ problem is cooperation; for competitors on a market, the sharing of knowledge can harm their competitive edge (although this problem can also occur between purely bureaucratic organisations). In social work, where an integral approach and long-term knowledge of clients’ dossiers is important, non-cooperation between (new and old) service providers can present problems.

Secondly, the fact that clients’ problems are complex and often have a long history also means that the success of a single intervention is hard to measure on a short time or to attribute to this intervention. Especially in prevention activities, for instance when working with youths, successes do not show themselves clearly as ‘cases closed’. In connecting welfare services, such as community work social cohesion projects (neighbourhood parties, neighbourhood sports or conflict mediation etc.), the successes also prove particularly hard to establish and/or attribute to quantifiable aspects of an intervention (Lub 2013).

In those types of social work where successes are more easily measured, for instance household administration support, ‘cherry-picking’ is a potential problem. In organisations where ‘cherry picking’ is prevalent, people with ‘easy’ problems are serviced first, people with difficult problems late, if at all (Noordegraaf 2008; Trommel 2010).

Lastly, problems occur also on the organisational level. (Quasi-)marketized welfare services, have proven to need state regulation and monitoring (as the examples of Dutch health insurance and social housing have shown). This brings (back) a lot of administrative work and thus costs (Sorensen and Torfing 2007, p.1). Moreover, the risks involved in competition through tendering can result in mergers among semi-public and private bodies providing the same services, which increases bureaucracy and distance to the ‘consumer’. All in all, efficiency gains through Public Management in connecting, emancipating and caring welfare service provision are not obvious.

2.4 The ‘Social Investment State’

The spreading of New Public Management, described in the last paragraph, meant mostly a change in the organizational modus of welfare services. Since roughly 2000, however, also new perspective on welfare policy goals has developed itself in Western countries. This has happened most clearly in the
This new perspective has become known as the ‘activating state’ or ‘enabling state’, but mostly as the ‘social investment state’ approach, after Anthony Giddens, sociologist and British Labour party’s Third Way architect, coined the term (Jenson and Saint-Martin 2003, p.83). It incorporates some of the insights of the New Social Risk literature (ibid, p.91) and holds that states should focus less on their income transfer schemes for the nonworking population, and more on social policies that help citizens prepare throughout their lives for the risks that a radically changed societal and economic order incurs. This new order is today’s more flexible, global and knowledge-based economy. The social policy changes that member states (and their local administrations) have since devised to facilitate optimal employability for citizens, together carry the name of ‘social investment state approach’.

An important document outlining this new long-term economic orientation on welfare services is the European Commission’s report on Social inclusion of 2001. The report brings to the fore that social policy shifts in the EU are needed ‘to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustained economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion’ (European Commission 2001 quoted in Smyth, et al. 2004, p.1). In order to remain competitive, welfare states should prepare their citizens for the life-long learning and the flexible outlook on work that will be demanded from them. States are to do this by combining several welfare strategies, mostly the strengthening of certain social policies of ‘activation, investment in education, more and better jobs, flexicurity and family-oriented services’ (Cantillon 2011, p.439). As also De Deken (2012) notes, this means particular state investment in several welfare services. These services are notably in childcare (to enable the female workforce to grow), Active Labour Market Policies that lead unemployed back to work, educational services, and also elderly care (when it is (also) intended to enable adults to work instead of care, and balance their work and family life).

In the social investment state agenda, especially Active Labour Market Policies (ALMP’s) gain much attention. These are policies to increase unemployed citizens’ employability. ALMP’s use different strategies to achieve this, often in a mix. In the first place, vocational training and education can be offered to unemployed citizens to improve their job chances. Also, subsidized, sheltered and temporary jobs (often in the public sector) can be created to keep people occupied and prevent depletion of work ethos and human capital, such as existing skills and feelings of self-worth. A third ALMP strategy departs from the idea that for many citizens, working isn’t attractive enough when benefits bring in a comparable amount of household income. Therefore, benefit cuts and sanctions for unemployed as well as tax advantages for the employed should make unemployment much less attractive than working. In a fourth approach, intensive state-funded professional counselling helps unemployed in their job search.

Together, more state provision of ALMP’s, childcare, educational and elderly care services must strengthen the supply side of the labour market: in the social investment state, efforts are directed at raising the quality and availability of the labour force. The banking-related term ‘investment’ is apt, because in all these approaches the focus is on rewards that are mostly to be awaited in the future (a large emphasis is put on welfare services for children’s education and wellbeing), and which can be economically defined (growth in jobs and economic productivity). The investment is social, because the effort is made in the first place by citizens themselves, for which they are facilitated by the state.

---

The social investment state approach is also recognized in Canadian (Jenson and Saint-Martin, 2003) and Australian policy-making in welfare (Smyth et al, 2004).
(Jenson and Saint-Martin 2003, p.89). There is less state effort to raise equality through cash transfers, or to increase labour demand macro-economically, for instance through counter-cyclical spending. In the words of two of Europe’s leaders of the beginning of the century: “the state must become an active agent for employment, not merely the passive recipient of the casualties of economic failure” (Blair and Schroder 1999 quoted in Jenson and Saint-Martin 2003).

A look at the evolvement of the different types of welfare expenditure in the over the last 20 years shows that also in the Netherlands the social investment approach was followed in practice, although not very fervently (see fig. 2.1).

**Fig. 2.1: Welfare expenditure in the Netherlands 1985-2007 as % of GDP (‘social investment’ categories are in italics)**

![Welfare expenditure chart](chart.png)


The figure shows that most changes in Dutch expenditure on welfare are in line with the social investment approach. Welfare cash transfers, especially for citizens below 65, went down during this period (mostly thanks to lower unemployment in the late nineties, but still diminishing in the years after 2000 when unemployment rose again), while on the other hand expenditure on the ‘social investment’ service of childcare grew. There was little growth of spending on ALMP’s, although this would be expected if the social investment state agenda was followed. Maybe the spending hasn’t grown because, unlike in the Nordic countries and France where the emphasis of ALMP’s is on human capital investment through education, in the Netherlands it is on labour market re-entry counselling.
(Hemerijck 2012, p.4), which does not involve such costly education programs for unemployed citizens. Next to job search counselling, Dutch workfare policies since the nineteen nineties have mostly consisted of the strategies of benefit cuts and (especially during the nineties and early two thousands) creation of sheltered, subsidized jobs for unemployment. Most recent policies, however, have ended admission to sheltered jobs, while revision of the law on poverty allowance (‘Wet Werk en Bijstand’ of 2012) has created the opportunity for municipalities to ask recipients a ‘favour in return’. This ‘favour’ consists of ‘unpaid work that is of use for society, but does not replace (other people’s) paid jobs’. Not all municipalities have started to use this last right, but several of them have. In these municipalities unemployment benefits are now conditional on doing a certain number of hours of unpaid work per week in public service and volunteering organizations. As such, the ‘obliged volunteering’ measure is a combination of two strategies: the investment approach of giving unemployed citizens opportunities to learn more skills and retain feelings of self-worth and attachment to working life, but also the strategy of making more demands to people living in benefits, so that in comparison working life will become (even) more attractive.

As the particular path of the Dutch social investment state approach has already shown, the term ‘social investment state’ binds together European states’ welfare policy focus on long-term labour-pool quality, but to reach that goal states have chosen quite different trajectories (Smyth, et al. 2004). Differences between states in ‘social investment state’ practices have been described by for instance Cantillon (2011), Vandenbroucke and Vleminckx (2011) and Smyth, et al. (2004). Smyth et al. point out that Giddens, an important creator and ground-breaker of the social investment idea in the UK, chose the term to indicate that the state should be much more entrepreneurial. The UK government should keep spending ‘limited, directed only where it is ‘needed’ and where it will pay off most’ (Jenson and Saint-Martin 2003b, p. 5 quoted in Smyth et al.). For Giddens, also the outsourcing of public projects to public private partnerships is therefore part of the social investment state. In the Scandinavian countries, on the other hand, already at the end of the twentieth century many effective care systems for children, elderly and disabled were in place, greatly enlarging the female workforce. In these countries, the emphasis was thus on providing welfare services of care through the state, and this has been an important ‘investment state’ example for many other EU countries. ‘Actor Labour Market’ or ‘workfare’ policies in Scandinavia are also different from that in the most of other European nations, in the sense that they have a strong focus on (re)schooling and counselling unemployed citizens (Moen Gersjøe 2015). In for instance the UK, policies are more directed towards workfare through benefit cuts.

Probably because the policy routes within the social investment state idea were so different, in most EU states they have not led to protection against poverty in the way it does in Scandinavia (Cantillon 2011; Vandenbroucke and Vleminckx 2011). According to Cantillon, this is because in most countries it resulted in a combination of retrenchment in redistributive cash transfers and higher spending on social investment welfare services that benefit mostly richer households (particularly childcare and parental leave, which are used mostly by dual earner higher income families). For the period 2004-2008, she calculates that in most European social investments states, poverty among working age adults has not fallen. Also in the Netherlands, the chosen mix of social investment inspired welfare reforms has not resulted in an overwhelming success in poverty reduction. The country’s poverty rates have been rather constant between 2000 and 2011 (Planbureau 2013, p.22), while income inequality between the highest and lowest income deciles has steadily grown over this period (WRR 2015, p.2). The social investment state, thus, has many different shapes that vary between countries (and within countries) and the Dutch version has so far mostly resulted in a decrease in welfare spending on cash transfers, and has not yet proven to be particularly effective in beating poverty.

What is interesting in the ‘social investment state’ paradigm, with respect to the following ‘participation society’ welfare calibration in the Netherlands, is that both ‘paradigms’ rely partly on
responsibilization of the citizen by the state. Particularly the ALMP’s show that in the social investment state paradigm welfare services are often viewed as rights that come with obligations: Upon the citizen rests the responsibility to be as employable as his health permits, and citizens have to make investments in their employability. Giddens has even described the prime motto for the Third Way as ‘no rights without responsibilities’ (Giddens 1998, p. 65 quoted Lister 2003 p.428). This means that citizens are no longer regarded as merely the tax-paying, ‘social rights’ endowed citizens of the trentes glorieuses, nor as consumers who can discipline welfare service providers to be efficient, as in the New Public Management approach. In the social investment state, citizens’ work-mindedness work-mindedness is of importance, and the responsibilization towards work (through ALMP’s) has become a component of the social investment approach. This is rather like the stress on citizens’ community-mindedness in the Big Society and participation society paradigms (see next paragraph of this dissertation). What is also alike, is that UK politicians have seen local communities as instrumental to the reinforcement of citizens’ moral state. Describing the social investment paradigm in the UK, Rose (2000) quotes Giddens’ suggestion “that conventional poverty programs should be replaced by “community-focused approaches, which emphasize support networks, self-help and the cultivation of social capital as a means to generate economic renewal in low-income neighbourhoods” (Giddens 1998, p. 110 cited in Rose 2000). As we shall see, in the participation society paradigm, local communities are regarded as fostering grounds for community-mindedness among citizens. Lastly, a similarity between the (British) social investment state paradigm and the participation society is a special interest in marginalized groups. In the social investment state paradigm this interest in marginalised people facing poverty is grounded not only in reasons ‘of social justice (…) but also in the fear that these marginal populations are a threat to social cohesion, that is, to the enterprise as a whole’ (Jenson and Saint-Martin 2003, p.7) and the effects that growing up in poverty can have on children’s future employability. Not poverty itself is seen as a problem, but its potential to permanently harm children’s capacities and social norms, as poverty can ‘foster antisocial, exclusionary behaviours, such as criminality, dropping out and so on.’ (ibid) p.92. This interest in – especially marginalized – citizens’ pro-social norms that the social investment state approach displays, is also present in the social investment paradigm, as we will see below.

2.5 Civil society delivering welfare services: the ‘participation society’

Next to the established ‘market turn’ and connected to the ‘social investment turn’, over the last decade also a ‘volunteering turn’ in Dutch welfare services has become increasingly clear, as was discussed in chapter 1. The so-called ‘participation society’ posing approach aims to volunteering in welfare services to a strong degree. Several authors (Boutellier & Boonstra, 2009; Uitermark & Van Beek, 2010) and the Dutch government have even spoke of a transition of the Dutch welfare state into a ‘participation society’. The government did this most prominently by means of king Willem-Alexander’s yearly ‘regal speech’ in 2013. In this speech, the Dutch monarch reads out a statement on behalf of the government. Part of the speech in 2013 was:

“It is unmistakable that people in today’s network- and information-society are more assertive and independent than before. In combination with the necessity to curb public deficits, this leads to a slow but steady transition of the classical welfare state into a participation society. We ask everybody who is capable, to take responsibility of his or her own life and community” (Ministry of General Affairs / Ministerie van Algemene Zaken 2013, my translation).
Furthermore, in the same year, the Dutch Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations issued a policy brief, that was titled “The Doing-Democracy” (*Kabinetsnota Doe-Democratie*). The brief expressed that “it is of great importance that the government actively contributes to a transition towards more ‘doing-democracy’, in which the government ‘takes care that’ instead of ‘takes care of’ (...) This is relevant from an administrative point of view in light of developments such as upscaling, decentralisations and budget constraints” (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2013b, p.3). Suggested policies to achieve this ‘doing-democracy’ entail ‘giving more attention to citizenship and social entrepreneurialism in education’ and ‘giving governmental support to volunteers and citizens that take initiatives’ (ibid). In the Doing-democracy policy brief, especially the British policy program of the Big Society is mentioned multiple times as an inspiring example.

Indeed, as several authors have noted, policy enthusiasm for volunteering in welfare services has a relatively long political history in post World War II Britain. Already in the late 1980s, Thatcher’s speech about ‘the citizen’s responsibility to be merciful and generous to others’ (Kearns 1995, p. 157). The focus on community-minded, ‘active’ citizenship was further developed by Thatcher’s ministers, mostly in the Home Office and Education Department, to ‘include a role for ‘active business’ and a partnership with the voluntary sector’ (ibid, p. 157). According to Marinetto (2003) and Verhoeven and Ham (2010), British citizens’ responsibility in these years boiled down mainly to being employed and not depending on the welfare state too much. But in the following New Labour administrations, from 1997 to 2010, a gradual shift of perspective occurred. As Milligan and Fyfe (2006) write: ‘Keen to distance itself from both the ‘Old’ Labour Left (pro- state, anti-market) and the Thatcherite Right (pro-market and anti-state)’ New Labour sought its Third Way. An important component of this new Third Way was that it embraced a communitarian perspective on citizenship while most of its economic policy held on to a neoliberal framework. In this communitarian perspective, citizens had the duty to revitalize community through volunteering and participation, but the government was explicitly willing to be their partner in this project, by actively inviting and helping citizens to organize themselves for public ends. As Marinetti describes, for the Third Way administrations ‘the voluntary sector [was] integral to the reform of basic public services such as education, health and welfare provision’ (2003, p.34).

This involvement of volunteering in British public services has also shown very prominently in the Third Way revitalisation plans for deprived neighbourhoods. In the late nineteen nineties and early two thousands, the main British financial framework for such plans were the Single Regeneration Budgets. These were central state organized tender procedures for deprived neighbourhoods’ restructuring plans. Single Regeneration Budgets were for ‘integral’ plans involving both physical, social and economic measures, delivered by public and private parties including non-profit community organizations. The tender criteria for the budgets often had as a strict requirement that local volunteering organizations should participate. Consequently, local community organisations gained a role in more than a thousand of neighbourhood renewal plans (Rhodes, et al. 2003 p.1406). They obtained tasks like the organisation of labour market reintegration courses, the provision of administrative support to households, the management of playgrounds, the provision of housing maintenance advice and the mediation between local youths and firms offering internships. However, the money flow for British neighbourhood restructuring plans (and connected investment in residents’ volunteering) gradually ended as the 2008 crisis began. More in general, governments’ financial support for volunteering in welfare services diminished under the Conservative governments of 2010 and 2015, and cuts were also made in welfare services in general. However, political promotion for volunteering was sustained and even expanded by these administrations, and the approach was named ‘Big Society’. This term, however, has become associated with recent sharp budget cuts in British
In the Netherlands, the history of the policy focus on volunteering is shorter, but still goes back to the administrations of 2003 and 2007. These administrations were inspired by New Labour’s ideas on volunteering as an important part of the welfare state modernization. The neo-communitarian aspect of the Third Way – its aspect of self-organized solidarity within communities smaller than the state – particularly appealed to the Dutch Christian Democrat (CDA) leaders of that period. At the same time, the emancipatory potential of citizens’ deeper involvement in public matters attracted the Dutch Labour party, which was part of the 2006-2010 administration (Verhoeven and Ham 2010). Like in Great Britain under New Labour, also in the Netherlands, the renewed political interest in civil society translated most clearly in the central state’s support programs for non-profit small-scale community organisations in integral renewal schemes for deprived neighbourhoods (here mostly through vouchers in the ‘40 neighbourhoods program’, see paragraph 2.3.1) (see Verhoeven 2010, p. 240 or Kullberg et al. 2015, p. 26). These costly urban renewal programs were generally ended around 2010. Similar to the situation in the UK, however, also the Dutch administration sustained their enthusiasm for volunteering. Under the following (right-centre) administrations it has also widened in scope. Neighbourhood-based volunteering is now strongly supported for deprived as well as wealthier neighbourhoods and in many public and welfare services (Verhoeven and Oude Vrielin, 2015); all in all, a countrywide transition towards a ‘participation society’ is promoted.

2.6 Political reasons for the ‘voluntary turn’

The last paragraph has sketched the rise of the political attention for volunteering, but it has not yet described in detail what the reasons behind the political enthusiasm are. This paragraph will list no less than seven reasons.

In the first place, volunteering in welfare services promises to relieve pressures on the state’s finances. Various texts written by the Dutch national government, among which the Dutch monarch’s 2013 speech, explicitly state this argument for transition towards a participation society (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2013b, p.18, Ministry of General Affairs, 2013). The economic crisis of 2008-2014 has made the revision of welfare services a pressing matter.

Ways to economize in welfare services are particularly sought-after, because as Van Ewijk (2010, p. 27) points out, this is relatively difficult. Whereas a municipality can increase labour productivity in for instance garbage collection or city hall’s administrative services through technological innovation, this is hardly the case in care and emancipating and connecting (social) work. These welfare services rely for a large part on talking and recognizing citizens’ emotions and life situations. This is -and for the foreseeable future will be- labour intensive-work: it fits the sociological concept of emotional labour (Hochschild 2003) and only very little of it can be relegated to computers or robots. Together with a growth of (more and more diverse) welfare service needs (see paragraph 2.2) it is therefore understandable that governments actively seek volunteering citizens particularly for welfare service provision.

Moreover, a delegation of well first service tasks from the (central) state to lower institutions including volunteering groups, can relieve budget constraints in still another way. As Kazepov argues, ‘decentralization of powers in the last decades was often accompanied by budget cuts. Political reaction to the resulting limitations to service provision is weakened since democratic control over territorially fragmented and diverse sets of actors (so many localities, so many systems) is complicated and services are no longer entitlements precisely covered in national administrative laws’ (Crouch,
In other words, delegation of tasks to ever more actors, makes changes in welfare services more fragmented and difficult to oversee, and therefore also harder to protest against.

At the same time, the financial story is not the complete picture of the reasons behind the 'volunteering turn'. The fact remains that the policy turn towards volunteering occurred already in the nineties in the UK and in the early two thousands in the Netherlands. This shows that it is more than merely a strategy to urgently restrain public deficits. After all, the nineties and early two thousands were not periods of recession for the UK and Netherlands. As is indicated in for instance the regal speech, 'the volunteering turn' promises answers to societal problems that go beyond the state's financial concerns. I will detail them in this paragraph.

2.6.1 Volunteering to bring more direct democracy

A first non-financial reason for governments’ focus on volunteering in public services, is that it presents a way to democratic innovation. Dutch policy documents repeatedly state that as citizens’ education levels have gone up since the nineteen sixties and access to information has been enormously enlarged through the internet, citizens today more strongly desire to be heard about issues that concern them. At the same time administrators can no longer claim to be much more knowledgeable than citizens about these issues (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2013b). Citizens for voluntary involvement in delivering welfare services would strengthen direct democracy. Citizens’ influence would be enlarged because by helping to create welfare services they can also shape them to their liking.

For politicians, such involvement of citizens in politics seems particularly urgent also in light of citizens’ growing disengagement from representative democratic institutions: since roughly the nineteen eighties, most Western-Europe countries have seen consistent dropping of national and municipal voting turnout, party membership and increased fragmentation and volatility of voting patterns (see for instance Belamy 2008, p.3; Mair and Van Biezen 2001; Van Reybrouck 2013). This threatens the legitimacy and smooth functioning of traditional representative democracy. If local welfare services become the object of co-creation by citizens and local government together, citizens would feel more heard and local government would look more responsive and concerned to them (Tonkens 2013). Involving citizens in local policymaking in areas that interest them could thus reacquaint disengaged citizens with politics. Citizens’ stronger involvement in collective issues could thus help bridge the deepening abyss in trust and identification between citizens and state.

Proponents of the view that citizens’ direct involvement in public services such as welfare is necessary to re-strengthen democracy, often commemorate that there have been times and places where this involvement was much stronger than today (De Moor 2012). In several ancient Greek Poleis in the fourth and fifth century B.C. for instance, most decisions were made by citizen juries open to all male, non-slave citizens. Also, yearly lotteries were held to distribute most of the political jobs over this same

---

6 According to so-called ‘deliberationists’ - of whom political philosopher Walzer is perhaps most well-known – decision-making through citizen juries, citizen boards or public policy discussions -or any other name for ‘less vertical, representational and more horizontal and cooperative forms of ‘steering’- results in discussions and decisions that are more ‘quiet, reflective, open to a wide range of evidence, respectful of different views’ than those typical of the arenas of representational politics (Walzer 1999, p. 58 quoted in Papadopoulos and Warin, 2007). They would thus not only create stronger, more legitimate democracy, but also better decisions.
group in a random fashion (Marinetto 2003; Van Reybrouck 2013, p.50-67). Although these systems completely excluded women and slaves, it can be said that for the other polis-inhabitants political citizenship was more substantial than that of today's inhabitants of representative democracies. As Marinetto writes: “From what we know of this ancient culture, our Greek citizen would probably regard Britain’s political system as not even worthy of being described as democratic” (2009, p. 104). Indeed, it stands in contrast with today’s representative democracies, in which most people’s involvement comes down to going to the ballot box once or twice every four years. Other historical examples of more direct self-rule are the Roman patrician families of the renaissance, who had so much influence that they could be said to co-govern the city and balance each other’s power (Drost erij and Hendriks 2011). Also, in the late middle-ages burghers in the rich northern Italian city states and later in north-west European cities enjoyed considerable decision-making power in urban politics, note (Le Galès and Therborn 2010 and Van Reybrouck 2013 p. 67-76). Moreover, in the late-mediaeval period guild systems and farming cooperatives were very involved in what today would be seen as welfare issues. By building financial and market structures to cover personal risks and make them collective, they helped in the first place their members to cover risks of unemployment, sickness and death, but they often also provided caritas to non-members (De Moor 2008).

From the eighteenth century on, however, nation states became increasingly manifest, overpowering local self-government. At the same time, the rise of the nation state also created certain guarantees of freedom for individual citizens, as T.H. Marshall writes in his influential 1949 essay ‘Citizenship and Social Class’. According to Marshall the emergence of this civil citizenship (citizens’ rights to be free from state interference in many realms of life, and thereby the emancipation of burghers vis-à-vis the state), happened in the eighteenth century. In Marshall’s view, which has been often adopted by other scholars, civil citizenship was furthermore complemented by political citizenship from the nineteenth century onwards. This consists of citizens’ entitlements to vote and be organized in representative democracy. Social citizenship, largely, was increasingly realized in the post-war decades, and relates to the instalment of rights to education, healthcare and economic welfare. With the instalment and realization of social rights, the state not only functions as an apparatus of control (through the army, police and judicial courts) but also as a social apparatus providing welfare services. With full social rights the welfare state would have reached completion. Yet, as shown in paragraph 2.3.1, the state attempted to recalibrate this social apparatus from the nineteen eighties onwards. Proponents of more direct involvement of citizens in public issues find furthermore that Marshall’s social and political citizenship do not constitute complete citizenship. More citizen participation is needed to reinvent relations between citizens and government, and stop the invasive force of bureaucracy that dismisses citizens’ contributions (see for instance Rotmans 2012; Van Meerkerk 2013).

2.6.2 Volunteering to answer to the complexity and place-specificness of social problems

Another reason for the increased political enthusiasm for volunteering in the neighbourhood is the complexity argument. This argument holds that most neighbourhood problems are social problems (such as unsafe streets or welfare service needs) and that social problems usually require a multi-dimensional analysis. Solutions must be based on scientific but also on local, experience-based knowledge. Governance settings that include of local, well embedded citizens would be better able to create such contextualized, multi-dimensional and therefore effective solutions. Especially neighbourhood volunteers would have such embedded, local knowledge of neighbourhood social problems.

This argument is related to the previous one because they both focus on strengthening governance.
Here, the exact argument is that administrators cannot oversee the complexity of today’s urban social problems; therefore residents’ local knowledge is needed as well. The complexity of today’s urban problems of marginalization shows for instance in the New Social Risk literature (dealt with in paragraph 2.2 of this thesis). The integral approach to urban renewal followed in Dutch urban renewal in the 40 deprived neighbourhoods approach (see paragraph 2.3) testifies of the complexity of problems in deprived urban areas. In integral urban renewal, the starting point is that neighbourhoods cannot be improved by physical renewal alone, but must also be strengthened by investments in its social and economic structure. Also Wilson’s famous 1987 study on the problems of the American ghettos of the nineteen eighties elucidates how complex and place-specific the causes for urban marginality often are. Based on surveys and ethnographic data, Wilson describes how Black households in these neighbourhoods are severely disadvantaged by the simultaneous loss of work opportunities within traveling distance, the rise of drug trade, residents’ fear-induced withdrawal from neighbourhood social contacts, and the out-flow of middle class Black households who could otherwise be role models for the remaining families. Wilson’s analysis is thereby one of many, and interacting social and socio-economic factors. Following Rittel and Webber (1973, p. 160, quoted in Specht 2012) such a complex set of interacting factors is in fact what defines most social problems, even if they are not as severe as those in the American ghettos. Social problems are typically shrouded in a denser cloud of uncertainty regarding their causal factors (and consequently also their possible solutions) than most problems that are foremostly of a physical nature (the causal mechanisms of global warming, nuclear waste or earth quakes are for instance clearer than those of the growth of extreme-right violence or the perception of lower social cohesion in a neighbourhood). According to Rittel and Webber, many social problems must therefore be termed ‘wicked problems’, which require ongoing and precise research. This research must be founded not only on administrative data or ‘book knowledge’ but also on knowledge acquired through personal, place-based experience7. To give a concrete example in the realm of social problems in the neighbourhood: A locally embedded social worker helping an unemployed drug-addicted father, may know that this man used to be clean when he had work and also knows that there is a garage around the corner that needs a mechanic. Thus, the more geographically distant welfare service provision becomes, the less likely it is that such helpful and time and place specific pieces of information are available.

According to the complexity argument, it is important to involve the knowledge of volunteers who are active in their own neighbourhood, as these people are often well embedded in the neighbourhoods’ social networks and also know the neighbourhood’s physical and social state inside out. In contrast to professionals, such residents have spent more time in the neighbourhood and therefore are experience experts. They also may be very motivated to think in new directions because have a more personal interest in the neighbourhoods’ future than the professionals working there. Their knowledge is therefore of great use in tackling welfare service problems and other problems in the area. This would be even more necessary in deprived neighbourhoods, where professionals often have difficulties to reach all residents and these residents’ local knowledge.

2.6.3 Volunteering to bring back solidarity between citizens

Besides its values for local decision-making, many politicians see self-organisation in welfare services also as an important tool to improve social cohesion amongst citizens. They believe that self-organisation of solidarity at local levels will lead to a stronger moral awareness among citizens of one’s

7 This relates to Yanow’s (2004) concept of ‘local knowledge’, which he described as the everyday but specialized knowledge about local conditions, stemming from own experience rather than second hand analysis, that is necessary to solve place-specific problems.
dependency upon and responsibility towards the rest of society, and thus to more social cohesion (Etzioni 1995; Milligan and Conradson 2006). This belief has fueled the British Third Way and Dutch governments enthusiasm for volunteering of the last decades (see paragraph 2.4). The current Dutch administration for instance states that the ‘lack of social cohesion in an increasingly fragmented society feeds a deeply felt need in society to strengthen trust’ and that ‘the creation of more community and solidarity by government and society’ is one of the three ‘main reasons why the ‘doing-democracy is relevant and manifest’ (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2013b, p.14, my translation).

The perceived lack of social cohesion is often blamed on the welfare state itself. The reproof, communicated by communitarian sociologists like Etzioni, holds that solidarity organized through the impersonal ‘distant’ functioning of the welfare state has led to calculating, consumerist and even fraudulent behaviour from the side of citizens. People would make maximum use of benefits and services, legally and sometimes illegally, because giver and receiver of benefits don’t know each other personally. Therefore, there is less awareness of each other’s sacrifices, and less control on free-riding. People also make maximum use of services and benefits because they feel they have already paid for them through taxes (see for instance Boutellier and Boonstra 2009; Schuyt 2013). To illustrate this political sentiment, Rose for instance quotes Jack Straw, Home Secretary in Blair’s 1997 – 2001 Third Way cabinet, who stated that in the UK, collective responsibility had become confused with the idea of the state as “some sort of universal great provider, which made no moral judgements regardless of the merits of those who were dependent upon it” (Straw 1998 quoted in Rose 2000, p.1404). Rose continues that according to Straw:

...this reinforced the natural tendencies of human beings toward selfishness, it made rights seem like consumption goods dispensed by the state to its inhabitants and pictured individuals as mere consumers, bundles of wants. “The citizen, perceiving himself in like fashion, loses sense of his duties, as a citizen to himself, his fellows, and the civic order, at worst without sense of honour or shame” (Straw, 1998, quoting Selbourne 1994, p.70)

As was shown in paragraph 2.3, commentators across the political spectrum have also emphasized that social arrangements and social services make people dependent rather than active (see also Zuckerman 2000 quoted in Van Ewijk 2010). People in strongly developed welfare states would also have lost the habit and thereby their comfort with helping others directly. Especially politicians on the right side of the political spectrum sometimes believe that for all these reasons the welfare state ‘crowds out’ non-state organized solidarity (although empirical research does not support this idea, see for instance De Beer and Koster 2009; Gërëxhani and Koster 2012).

Solidarity through volunteering, on the other hand, is seen as more personal than the enforced solidarity organized through taxes and welfare by the state, and would thereby make people more aware of the dependencies and similarities between them. Thus, involvement of civil society in welfare service provision promises to reinvent solidarity between citizens (Boutellier and Boonstra 2009; Schuyt 2013). Etzioni for instance pointed out that ‘individuals socialised into a communitarian society, have a moral obligation to that society and, hence, are likely to be more reasonable and productive than isolated individuals’ (Milligan and Conradson 2006, p.1). Voluntary organisations are seen as making this socialization possible through their close connection to citizens and local communities and communitarian outlook. Similar stances can be found in the nineteenth century writings of De Tocqueville (Lichterman 2005) and nowadays in the communitarian philosopher Walzer (1994, p.190, quoted in Van Montfoort 1995, p.28)
2.6.4 Volunteering to repair community in ethnic concentration neighbourhoods

The last subparagraph has dealt with the political view that volunteering is a medicine to cure a socially incohesive society. There is one particular set of social cohesion problems for which neighbourhood volunteering is called to the rescue; volunteering should repair the ‘lost community’ of ethnic concentration neighbourhoods in the increasingly multi-ethnic Western European cities. This is also the case in the Netherlands, as will be outlined below. I will first sketch how in the last decade, investment in ethnic diverse neighbourhoods’ social cohesion became a topic on the Dutch political agenda.

In the Netherlands, substantial immigration waves occurred already during the middle ages and 17th and 18th century. However, the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century formed a period of low international immigration. Still today, the Netherlands is reluctant to consider itself to be an immigration country (Rath 2009, p.675)9, even though from the nineteen fifties onward decolonization of former Dutch colonies and low-skilled labour shortages strongly revived immigration. Today no less than 21% of the Dutch population is a first or second generation international migrant. The largest migrant groups are the Turkish, Moroccan and Surinamese Dutch, these migrants and their children today account each for two per cent of the population. Non-Western allochthonous (i.e. coming from other continents than Europe, North-America or Australia) account for 12% of the population (CBS 2015). Within the country, ethnic minorities are strongly concentrated in urban neighbourhoods with lower average housing prices. In the ‘40 most deprived urban neighbourhoods’9, western allochthonous and non-western allochthonous make up respectively 11% and 49% of the inhabitants (CBS 2015, data for 2012)10.

While the Netherlands was growing more ethnically diverse, Dutch national politics of the last century paid relatively little attention to problems of living together in an increasingly multi-ethnic society. National politics were mostly characterized by a ‘laissez-faire’ discourse regarding cultural differences or integration between the ethnic majority and the new minority groups. At the same time, patterns of social exclusion for minorities in the spheres of labour, education and political participation were hard to miss (Rath 2009). Around 2000 labour market participation of non-western allochthonous adults was 25% below that of native Dutch adults years, and average standardized household income 30% lower. These percentages have not changed over the last 15 years (SCP 2014, p. 44 and 77).

As of roughly 2000, however, problems of ethnic diversity and cultural integration became more and more a topic of debate11. In 2000 a left-wing political scientist and journalist published a book that warned against the fast growth of an allochthonous underclass (Scheffer 2000). The book also criticized the reluctance of Dutch society to formulate and defend its cultural, ‘modern’ values. While Dutch politics and public debate had largely ignored the small, right-wing objections to further immigration up until then, Scheffer’s book drew much attention. Moreover, in 2004, a famous Dutch film director known for his harsh criticism on Islam, was murdered for these criticisms by a Dutch-

9 See paragraph 2.3.1.
10 For research on the causes of residential segregation in Dutch ethnic concentration neighbourhoods, see for instance Bolt et al (2008) or Van der Laan Bouma-Doff (2007)
11 Disintegration of urban neighbourhoods’ social cohesion has been feared in other historical periods of migration as well. During the 19th century period of industrialization, the influx of people from rural Dutch provinces was depicted as threatening urban society and order in a similar way as today’s problematization of multi-ethnic urban society (see for instance Blokland-Potters 2003).
born Moroccan migrant’s son. These publications and events triggered a shift in the debate on cultural ‘integration’ in Dutch media and politics. Migrants’ less favourable position in society used to be foremostly attributed to socio-economic disadvantages, but now increasingly also cultural differences were seen as causal (see for instance Rath 2009, p. 679, and see Uitermark 2012b, chapter 5 for a thorough analysis of this shift). Politically, the unease with cultural differences was voiced by new-formed parties such as the Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF) since 2002 and since 2006 by the PVV (Partij voor de Vrijheid).

In 2002, Pim Fortuyn, the leader of the LPF, explicitly put the problem of ‘faltering integration’ high on the political agenda. In his campaign for the national elections, he repeatedly spoke of Islam as ‘a backward culture’ and also held that young migrants from the Dutch Antilles should be sent back to their islands of origin (Volkskrant 2002, also quoted in Uitermark 2012b). He also explicitly connected the ‘integration problem’ to the territory of deprived neighbourhoods, stating that the immigration flows had rendered many urban neighbourhoods ‘unliveable’. ‘Liveability’ (leefbaarheid) is the term generally used in the Netherlands ‘to refer to the level of crime and nuisance, feelings of safety and residential satisfaction, as well as interaction and ‘social cohesion’ among residents’ of a city or neighbourhood (Van Eijk 2010a, p. 824). Sociologists Duyvendak and Tonkens confirm that Fortuyn’s perception of ‘unliveableness’ and withering cohesion in these neighbourhoods resounded with the perceptions of many native-Dutch residents living there: ‘It wasn’t a coincidence that during the Fortuyn revolt it was foremostly native Dutch residents living in deprived neighbourhoods, who didn’t feel at home in ‘their’ old neighbourhood because it was ‘taken over’ by migrants. Fortuyn spoke in this respect about a ‘dishomed’ nation’ (Duyvendak and Tonkens 2007, quoted in Van der Graaf and Duyvendak, p.15, my translation). Many of Fortuyn’s voters were native-Dutch living in these areas or in neighbourhoods that were likely to become more multi-ethnic (Van Kempen and Bolt 2002).

Until this period, most politicians had regarded problems of ethnic diversity in Dutch society mostly in terms of migrants’ disadvantaged position on the labour market. From 2000 on, however, the ‘multicultural drama’ was primarily cast as a dramatically low sense of home both allochthonous Dutch and native Dutch living in multi-ethnic neighbourhoods felt. The perception has been that the last group lost its sense of home, while the first one never had enough emotional attachment to the Netherlands to begin with. Since 2000, to recreate such sense of home, in national politics several ‘integration’ policies have been designed to ask migrants to show loyalty to the Dutch cultural values and underwrite that the Netherlands is their home. As Van der Graaf and Duyvendak explain (2006, p.15, my translation):

‘Whereas up till the last few years immigrants were mostly asked to fulfil practical demands (having a job, taking care of yourself and speaking Dutch), since a couple of years also emotional commitments are demanded from migrants: feeling loyal towards the Netherlands (and proving that by having no other than the Dutch passport) and feeling at home here. Through ‘naturalization festivities’ and specific questions on Dutch cultural heritage in ‘Integration courses’ (Inburgeringscursussen) a heavy focus is put on these commitments (…) Emotionalization of the integration debate has probably much to do with the failing sense of home of the receiving nation: native-Dutch that have increasingly felt less at home through their image of Islamic migrants.’

As shown above, particularly the deprived neighbourhood is seen as the stage of lost community. De Wilde for instance states that in Dutch neighbourhood renewal policies ‘a link has been made between the arrival of migrants, fear over residential segregation and the disintegrating cohesive structure of deprived urban neighbourhoods’ (De Wilde 2015, p.28). Therefore, it is at this spatial level that many social cohesion projects have been implemented to restore community. As part of the national ’40
neighbourhoods’ program a funding program was developed to finance social cohesion projects in these neighbourhood. The funding was to be spent on ‘activities that foster (especially more durable) contacts between allochthonous and autochthonous residents’ (Oberon 2008, p.7) and was named ‘Space for Contact’ (Ruimte voor Contact). The evaluation report summarizes that in the 40 renewal plans, problems ‘around integration and segregation’ are explained in the following way:

The core of the problem is that people and groups in neighbourhoods live alongside each other but have no contact; in some districts also conflicts between these groups occur. There is little mutual involvement and togetherness. This is caused by the fact that:
• Residents hardly understand each other;
• Residents have different values and do not understand each other’s culture;
• Residents do not feel responsible for each other or the environment;
• Residents live close to each other, under less favourable conditions, so that mutual irritations arise more quickly;
• The neighbourhood population composition is shifting, causing tensions between the various groups in the district. The original inhabitants may perceive this as threatening. (Oberon, 2008, p.13, my translation)

To counter these problems, the neighbourhood renewal plans ‘mostly counted on increasing citizens’ participation in the neighbourhood as they become more active in society; fostering neighbourhood social cohesion and meetings between (groups of) neighbourhood residents, so that they learn to accept and respect each other’ (ibid, p.14). The evaluation report mentions that a considerable share of the subsidies was spent on ‘residents’ own initiatives, that make them responsible to improve their own position and their neighbourhood’ (ibid, p. 8).

Social cohesion projects thus typically involve volunteering and are often focused on multi-ethnic neighbourhoods. Authors like De Wilde (2015, p.28), Uitermark (2014b) and Hengeveld and Janssens (2010) for instance demonstrate how governmental enthusiasm for residents’ volunteering in social cohesion projects has grown as the neighbourhoods’ multicultural character has been increasingly problematized over the last two decades. In her dissertation, De Wilde describes such a volunteering based neighbourhood community project that was started by the Amsterdam municipality in a poorer, multi-ethnic neighbourhood. Here the municipality aims to promote the neighbourhoods’ social cohesion by supporting residents’ ‘cosy’ volunteering initiatives.

The political quest to repair ‘lost community’ in Dutch deprived multi-ethnic neighbourhoods thus presents another argument for neighbourhood volunteering. Volunteering presents a means for contact between resident groups but also a way in which allochthonous residents can prove their emotional attachment to Dutch society at the scale of the neighbourhood. In paragraph 4.3 I will analyse in more detail how the problematization of multicultural neighbourhoods and political interest for volunteering in welfare services are related in my research case Rotterdam. This will show that particular in the superdiverse city that Rotterdam is, much effort has been put on mending the ‘lost community’ of ethnic concentration neighbourhoods through fostering resident’s street- and neighbourhood initiatives.

2.6.5 Volunteering for the emancipation of marginalized groups

A fifth argument to promote volunteering in welfare relates to its empowering potential for citizens. While the communitarian approach to solidarity explained in subparagraph 2.6.3 has been greeted with enthusiasm across the political spectrum, especially for leftist politicians also this aspect is very
appealing. The idea is that volunteering helps citizens to learn ‘civic skills’ (such as how to participate in meetings or write letters), develop ‘civic virtues’ (such as tolerating and dealing with diverging opinions), learn about what is happening in their neighbourhood and in the wider community, obtain political information and become politically mobilized within their organisations (Verba, et al. 1995b, Warren 2001 quoted in Brandsen, et al. 2010, p.20). Together this strengthens their (options for) political engagement.

The teachings of Walzer, Sen, Bourdieu and others have pointed at the great relevance of such political participation especially for more marginalized groups. These thinkers have underlined that active (rather than only passive) political participation is an essential part of citizenship. Their works on the multidimensionality of poverty -in this perspective often termed ‘social exclusion’- showed that poverty is only partly a question of material need. The other obstacles to social inclusion are limited direct political participation and lack of recognition of (group-) identities. Sen for instance states that lack of participation harms the positive freedom of marginalized groups (Oosterlynck, et al. 2013). Positive freedom, a concept coined by the philosopher Berlin in 1958, consists of the possibilities to do and achieve something, as opposed to negative freedom from restrictions and limitations (Bifulco 2013). It is, in other words, the emancipatory freedom to become aware of new possibilities, while negative freedom is the freedom to not be bothered by others. Collective action such as volunteering, often creates awareness of the desires of the group and the ways to fulfil them, and thus strengthens positive freedom. Moreover, Sen argues that the values that people need to envisage positive freedoms for themselves are influenced and created in public discussions and social interactions, ‘which are themselves influenced by participatory freedoms’. Or, as Oosterlynck, et al. (2013, p.22) put it: ‘The idea that people in poverty are able to discuss and participate in struggles on the control over the means to satisfy their own needs is in itself empowering’.

Especially in an increasingly heterogeneous urban society, generally in terms of lifestyle but also more specifically in terms of cultural background, the need for direct participation in shaping public issues – such as welfare services – is large. This stark heterogeneity is hardly present in representational politics, and maybe even unattainable. The heterogeneous city seems to call for different models of public participation and decision-making than voting alone.

2.6.6 Volunteering enables the state to govern at a distance: ‘Neoliberal communitarianism’

A last explanation for the growing political attention for active citizenship in welfare services is that it enables the state to govern ‘at a distance’. This explanation – almost antithetical to the one described above- is provided by Foucault inspired writers like Cruikshank (1994) and Rose (2000) in the UK and Schinkel and Van Houdt (2010) and De Wilde (2015) in the Netherlands. These writers follow Foucault’s central idea that from late middle ages onwards, government has been increasingly pervaded by the mentality that “everything” can, should, must be managed, administered, regulated by authority’ (Allen 1998, p.179 quoted in Rose 2000). To this end, practices of regulation have developed. However, many of these regulatory practices are not exerted through the state’s own bureaucracy but through the practices of non-state institutions or through everyday practices of citizens themselves. In the last case, state power is enacted through citizens’ self-regulation.
In the ‘governmentality’ inspired view of these writers, the strong political interest in local volunteering is explained by the fact that ‘community involvement is an effective means of social regulation’ of social problems by citizens (Marinetto 2003, p. 104). That is why it can count on much governmental interest and support. Reflecting on the British interest in active citizenship, Marinetto says this in the following way.

*Community has now become integrated into professional programs and knowledge. This ‘technical’ use of the concept (...) has contributed to the way the community is a new focus for dealing with established social problems. This in turn has demarcated a new sector for government, one in which the capabilities and resources of communities could be utilized by policy programs through placing the onus on responsible self-help. In Rose’s words, it is a matter of ‘government through community’ (ibid, p. 109, quoting Rose 1996, p 332)*

In this view, the state’s focus on community is thus a new modus of governmentality in which citizens’ objectives are aligned with those of the state. To this end, the state facilitates the community-based initiatives that fit in with its own goals, and presents the community-minded people taking such initiatives as good examples for other citizens.

Like Rose and Cruickshank have done for the British context, political scientists Drosterij and Peeters (2011) and sociologists Schinkel and Van Houdt make the case for the Netherlands. In their article ‘Governing through freedom-neoliberal communitarianism and the responsible citizen’ (2010, my translation), Schinkel and Van Houdt point to a revived governmental interest in citizenship that goes beyond formal (legal) citizenship and has come to encompass also moral citizenship. They use the term *neo-liberal communitarianism* to describe the Dutch national and local state’s practices to mobilize ‘good’ citizens to volunteer in public tasks. By addressing the values of inhabitants, and thus stimulating their self-regulation, the state tries to ensure that ‘neighbourhoods solve their own problems’ (ibid, p.19). Also Drosterij and Peeters describe governments’ enthusiasm to govern by way of citizens’ community minded initiatives: ‘in the current timeframe, much attention is paid to the idea of self-reliance: a government that allows public tasks to be taken over by responsible citizens. The idea of self-organisation or self-reliance is formulated by governments as an ideal, as a new form of policy” (2011, p.463, my translation).

What kind of self-organisation and self-reliance practices are these? Drosterij and Peeters draw attention to the last five Dutch governments’ shared political focus on citizens’ community-minded behaviour through their ‘support for citizens’ volunteering initiatives, in the obsession on national norms and values, and recently in the fantasies about ‘Big Society’ and ‘small government’ (ibid p. 456). They show for instance how with an appeal on their own responsibility, migrant citizens have become obliged to find and finance their own integration courses, and elderly and ill to actively search for more home care by volunteering friends and family. At the same time, resident initiatives to self-organise such formerly mostly public provisions, are celebrated by politicians. Schinkel and Van Houdt furthermore give the example of Rotterdam’s neighbourhood safety program for citizens. In these neighbourhood boards, citizens discuss the neighbourhood safety with police officers and civil servants, but the civil servants also actively invite the citizens to improve safety (self-organize neighbourhood watches, arrange street lights in dark corners in the neighbourhood, distribute door to door flyers on how to make your house burglar-proof etc.).

---

12 This is a strongly condensed description of the governmentality perspective in social sciences. For a much more thorough explanation, see for instance Dix (2010)
According to Drosterij and Peeters, the states’ action repertoire to create such public-mindedness among citizens, cannot consist of behaviour enforcement through the law (that doesn’t befit a legal state or Rechtsstaat), or through subsidies (subsidies are part of the emancipatory perspective, which hasn’t proven its’ worth in the post-war decades). This leaves government only with the option of supporting voluntary participation through civil servants’ practical assistance, and communication strategies which make clear to the citizen that good citizenship entails public-mindedness and public-minded actions. They give an example of such communication, quoting the last national governments’ policy brief on ‘Integration, cohesion and citizenship’.

’Citizenship is grounded in the participation of each citizen, in being self-reliant and by knowing and applying the rules of Dutch society. Citizenship therefore rests on active participation in all relevant aspects of society: in the labour market, in the education system, in one’s own neighbourhood and living environment, [it rests] on protecting and supporting the democratic state of law, on raising children to be responsible citizens, on being concerned with other citizens’ wellbeing and respecting their rights’ (Ministrie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2011, quoted in Drosterij and Peeters, 2011, my translation).

In this quote, citizenship is made dependent on various behaviours, including people’s altruistic behaviour. The authors note that Dutch national and local governments often present themselves as the partners of citizens deploying altruistic initiatives, similar to policy discourses in the British Third Way and Big Society (ibid, p. 467, see also paragraph 2.5 of this thesis).

All these authors writing about instrumentalization of volunteering by government, warn that the focus on community has repressive features for marginalized groups. According to them, the current focus has created a situation in which marginalized citizens are no longer primarily depicted as disadvantaged by the economic structure, but are seen in the first place as persons who lack feelings of community and lack mainstream society’s public-minded values. To turn the tide, ‘their’ local communities must therefore responsibilize and ‘re-moralize’ them (see also paragraph 2.3.3 on responsibilization towards work in the social investment state). Schinkel and Van Houdt for instance describe the more coercive practices of counselling at-risk-citizens into good, attached citizens in Rotterdam. They show that for ‘at-risk’ citizens, mostly living in deprived neighbourhoods, local government has set up increasingly invasive in-home intervention programs in the fields of child-raising and home visit programs to check for welfare assistance fraud. Rotterdam has also chosen for a zero tolerance approach on nuisance for the public spaces of these neighbourhoods. According to Schinkel and Van Houdt as well as Drosterij and Peeters, local and central state would thus increasingly regard disinterested, unattached, inactive and/or not (yet) ‘integrated’ citizens as risk-citizens whose morals need to be repaired, whereas they stimulate and facilitate the ‘active citizens’, who ‘take their responsibility’ to volunteer for public issues in their street, city or country (Schinkel and Van Houdt, p.13). In other words, the communitarian turn of the state has two sides: the state responsibilizes at-risk citizens (towards better child-raising, work-ethos, cultural assimilation etc.), and actively supports mainstream citizens’ community-minded initiatives to keep doing the volunteering work that they do.

13 I would say that the ‘participation society’ frame does involve legal conditions to direct the citizen to more public-minded behaviour. The new 2015 Participation Law, for instance, has created the possibility for municipalities to demand volunteering work from poverty allowance recipients. Also, various subsidies for citizens’ public-minded behaviour are in fact available in the Netherlands. We can think for instance of the subsidies for raising children that cannot be raised by their parents, or for applying energy saving measures.

14 The program will be explained in paragraph 4.3.5 of this thesis.
In the governmentality perspective, the political turn towards welfare service self-organisation and residents’ initiatives thus springs from the intricate workings of state power, rather than from citizens’ interests. However, it can be argued that this Foucauldian perspective does not provide a reason as to why the central states and municipalities would be oriented towards governing through citizens’ own initiatives. As all mentioned authors describe, governing through citizens’ own initiatives presents a paradox. If the state enables citizens’ welfare service initiatives, rather than organises welfare by itself, this means not only responsibilization but also autonomization of citizens. Autonomization of citizens inevitably occurs because by taking on tasks citizens also gain freedoms to decide over how to provide those tasks. Thus, ruling welfare services at a distance through self-helping communities may be cheaper, as Cruikshank (1994) holds, but it seems unlikely that governments can instrumentalize community initiatives to deliver exactly what it wants. As Drosterij and Peeters argue it is unlikely ‘that the will of the citizens can be deducted to the will of the state’. Following ‘a philosophical debate going back to the pre-Socratics’ it should be acknowledged that ‘citizens have at least two loyalties: that of their private life and that of the society at large’ (2011, p. 467). Therefore, if they cannot use the force of law or the lure of subsidies, states often have difficulties steering their citizens, and there is little reason to think this is different in the Dutch participation society.

Autonomization also happens because in political discourse, community is cherished as a field in between the state and the market and therefore the community’s initiatives – at least in the political discourse – should not be conflated with those of the state (Rose 2000, p.1400-1401). On a practical note, there is another problem with the ‘governing at a distance’ explanation presented by the Foucault inspired authors. It presupposes a capacity for governing institutions to discern between two types of citizens: the marginalized at-risk citizens (that the state wants to control) and the other citizens (that the state wants to facilitate in their volunteering for local public causes). However, in practice, the boundaries between at-risk and ‘responsible’ citizens are not clean-cut or easy for the government to assess up front. As the literature shows, also numerous initiatives of marginalized citizens living in deprived neighbourhoods have been state-funded in the last 10 years in the Netherlands, leaving them room to establish their own goals and means to reach these goals.

2.7 Conclusion

This chapter has shown that during the roughly seventy years that most European countries now have known substantial state-provision of welfare services (of insurance and care but also of emancipation

\(^{15}\) Drosterij and Peeters do not use the governmentality perspective to explain the reasons for the political interest in responsibilizing citizens towards altruistic behavior. In their view, the interest springs from perceptions about increased freeriding and irresponsible overconsumption in the Dutch welfare state. They illustrate this by describing the political debate on overconsumption of subsidies in the arts’ sector, and on care recipients’ reluctance to lean upon their social network. Also perceptions that some migrants are unenthusiastic to integrate into Dutch society, have been given much political attention. Altogether, this has led in Dutch politics to disappointment about citizens’ morals. The state therefore urges the citizen to find back and act upon his moral compass, thereby implicitly assuming that this compass is aligned with that of the state. In the empirical case they studied in the city of Dordrecht, compasses do not turn out to be alligned: the volunteering citizens in a public decisionmaking game chose completely other investments than the municipality envisioned. (often the citizens wanted the municipality to improve the public space nearby their home, rather than contribute to a public service by ‘doing’ volunteering themselves). Drosterij and Peeters also point out that it is remarkable that a string of Dutch cabinets behaving largely neo-liberally in the economic sphere has had such a value-driven, demanding approach in the sphere of citizens’ private behaviour.
and connection), welfare state organisation has encountered waves of change. In the Netherlands, a
first large wave has been that of New Public Management, which started in the nineteen eighties: in
reaction to tightening budgets as well as doubts about state provided welfare services’ efficiency and
effectiveness, market-based or market-oriented steering mechanisms have been introduced. As such,
welfare service provision has been opened up to other players than the state. Yet, the results have not
been overwhelmingly positive. In connecting and emancipatory welfare services, these
disappointments have been partly due to the difficulties to standardize services and measure output.

A next calibration is happening since around 2000. In the ‘social investment state’ approach, welfare
should be aimed in the first place at preparing citizens for professional life in a globalized, flexibilized
and knowledge-intensive economy. Welfare services of childrearing, education, active labour market
integration and work-family balance support therefore have gained attention, while cash transfer
systems have been deemed less important. Welfare services thus once again are in the spotlight, but
now tied to responsibilization of citizens towards working and/or being active to improve one’s labour
market position. Activation and responsibilization towards education and work are important parts of
this perspective, and according to British Third Way ‘social investment state’ architects, a large share
of this responsibilization takes place through citizens’ social capital embedded in their local
communities. Thus, the paradigm can even be connected to a revived interest in neighbourhoods,
individuals’ norms and self-help, particularly among marginalized groups, all in a quest to help people
to invest in themselves and their employability.

British Third Way thinkers also laid the groundwork for increased involvement of
volunteering in local welfare services; a communitarian revaluation of citizens’ volunteering and
altruism became an important part of the Third Way approach to urban governance (especially that of
deprived neighbourhoods) and this eventually led to the current British Big Society and Dutch
‘participation society’ policy frames. Like in the ‘investment state approach’, the focus is on citizens’
activation and responsibilization, but now towards volunteering instead of (investment in) work. So,
whereas in the social investment approach government pictures itself as the citizens’ supporting
partner in their employment trajectory, in the so-called ‘active citizenship turn’ or ‘participation
society’, government sees itself as partner also in their community-minded projects.

Overseeing these shifts, we can observe that the ‘Participation Society’ frame shares with New
Public Management the idea that welfare services are best when they are the result of private-public
governance, and the idea that citizens’ input is an important control on effectiveness. With the ‘social
investment state’ perspective it shares the focus on citizen activation and responsibilization.

Various reasons for political enthusiasm for self-organisation have been provided in this chapter. (In
fact, there are so many expected gains, that the concept may be regarded as overladen with
expectation). In the first place, outsourcing of labour in welfare service to volunteers is seen as a way to
relieve pressure on state budgets. Furthermore, volunteering can bring better informed and more
democratic input to the shaping of welfare services, if tuned in to local, and ideally diverse
participation processes. In the latter case, volunteering may enhance the emancipation of marginalized
groups, especially when they themselves get a stake in creating these welfare services. Moreover,
volunteering would be the medicine to cure crumbling cohesion and solidarity in modern society,
especially in urban, multicultural society. Lastly, it is argued that volunteer presents a way for
governments to govern at a distance; citizens’ emotions and responsibilities are adressed, so that they
will do part of the tasks of the government. This point is brought forward by Foucault inspired
sociologists. Some of them argue that responsibilization in the Big Society and Dutch participation
society is fundamental and far-reaching. They hold that in these frames the dominant political outlook
on citizens has shifted. Whereas earlier in the twentieth century, citizens were foremostly seen as
economic stakeholders bound to the state through social rights (in periods of socialist rule) or as rationalist maximizers of self-interest (by neoliberal governments) or even as guided by unconscious forces and desires from a psychological viewpoint, they are now presented as ethical beings first and for all, and their (lack of) altruism and adherence to civil values is what constitutes their citizenship (Rose 2000, p.1398). This is a rather outspoken way of interpreting the 'participative society', but a focus on citizens' sense and acts of community (their emotional commitment to being Dutch, their favours in return for welfare, and their voluntary 'self-organisation' groups) has undoubtedly pervaded Dutch ideas about citizenship and welfare service planning in the last decades.
Chapter 3: A theoretical frame for understanding neighbourhood differences in welfare self-organisation

Now that the opening up of welfare services towards market and civil society has been roughly charted, we can focus on the academic literature that will be helpful for the question central to this dissertation: what is the influence of more local civil society on the delivery of welfare services across the city? Fortunately, in congruence with growing political attention, also the number of researches on neighbourhood volunteering has grown over the last two decades (sometimes described as (part of) neighbourhood ‘active citizenship’ or neighbourhood ‘joined-in governance’). However, as was already mentioned in the introduction, this literature has produced somewhat differing ideas about capacity for self-organisation in rich and poor urban areas. This chapter will deal with the available studies in more detail to identify which causal mechanisms they present that can help to understand differences in self-organisation potential for rich and poorer neighbourhoods. The identified mechanisms are then used to guide the subquestions for the empirical research of this dissertation. The literature is reviewed in groups, according to the two methods they generally follow: firstly, the analysis of randomized sample population surveys and secondly the direct study of initiatives. Both have their own implications when explaining and predicting the extent of citizen involvement in a geographical area.

3.1 Looking at the area populations’ individual level characteristics

In the Dutch debate on the ‘participation society’, estimations of the effects it will have on different neighbourhoods are often based on survey researches (see paragraph 1.1 and the discussion of the two newspaper articles from Dutch quality papers). The idea is that volunteering capacity in a geographical area can be modelled on its residents’ socio-economic, socio-demographic, and – according to some – also socio-psychological characteristics. These researches aim to chart the different average participation rates of different groups in society.

Verba and Nie’s 1972 political participation study has been very important for such participation survey research. This study discovered strong connections between higher socio-economic status and majority ethnic status on the one hand and higher political participation (voting, campaigning and addressing local representatives) on the other. The study inspired many researchers to also look for relations between citizens’ individual characteristics and their neighbourhood volunteering. In this way, researchers in the US (Brady, et al. 1995; Marschall 2001) and the UK (Williams 2005) also found socio-economic status to have a positive influence on likeliness to be a neighbourhood volunteer. They sometimes, but not always, found that neighbourhood volunteering rates are also higher for white ethnic majority citizens than for ethnic minority citizens (Bolt and Ter Maat 2005, p.57 ; Marschall 2001).

In the Netherlands, survey-based studies into neighbourhood volunteering have been conducted by Bolt and Ter Maat (2005), De Hart and Dekker (2009), Houwelingen, et al. (2014, p. 51.) and Engbersen, et al. (2015). These studies confirmed the positive relationship between respondents’ socio-economic status (usually operationalized as respondents’ education level) and neighbourhood volunteering. Bolt and Ter Maat for instance explain the relation in the following way: ‘people with a high socio-economic status have a relatively high participation rate [in neighbourhood volunteering], because they have on average more contacts and more cognitive and social skills than people with a low socio-economic status’ (my translation). Bolt and Ter Maat also find, however, that having a job – which is also an indicator of higher socio-economic status – does not increase likeliness to volunteer in
the neighbourhood. They write: ‘maybe the positive effects of having a job (more social contacts, strengthening of cognitive and social capacities) even out the negative effects (less time, less orientation on the neighbourhood)’. The research by Van Houwelingen et al is interesting for my dissertation because it makes a difference between ‘talking’ and ‘doing’ neighbourhood volunteering. ‘Talking’ volunteering is described as taking part in neighbourhood meetings and debates, ‘doing’ volunteering as ‘being active to maintain neighbourhood facilities or to make the neighbourhood more beautiful and safe’. As such, ‘doing’ volunteering is rather close to the welfare service volunteering that this dissertation focuses on. Van Houwelingen et al find that ‘doing’ volunteering rates are only slightly higher for higher-educated than for lower-educated Dutch citizens. In ‘talking’ neighbourhood volunteering on the other hand, higher-educated citizens show a much stronger overrepresentation. The researchers offer the following explanation: ‘Since higher-educated people have higher net labour participation, it could be that time-pressure is the reason why people with paid employment prefer to do volunteering work that has a political or administrative character rather than a (time-consuming) practical-executive character. Also, higher educated presumably have more civic skills that nowadays are appreciated and maybe even necessary for volunteering that has a political/ administrative character’ (ibid, p. 52, my translation).

Also Engbersen, et al. (2015) conclude from their survey research among Rotterdam citizens that higher socio-economic status is related to higher neighbourhood volunteering, and they also find this relationship for ethnic majority status (see the newspaper article based on this research in paragraph 1.1 of this dissertation). According to them this ‘is a problem in the context of the withdrawing welfare state. By closing publicly financed, professional facilities, public service provision in cities will grow bleak. While residents of more well-to-do, mostly ‘white’ neighbourhoods can counter this with their own activities, this is much less the case for the poor and ethnically diverse neighbourhoods of cities like Rotterdam’ (ibid, p.6). It should be noted, however, that the neighbourhood differences found by Engbersen et al are not very strong. Between the richest neighbourhood (16% of the household have an income in the lowest two national income quintiles) and the poorest neighbourhood (76% in this income group) the percentage of volunteers drops from 27% to 20% according to their trend line. In other words, whereas the share of poorer households increases almost fivefold, the share of volunteers goes down by only a quarter.

One interesting aspect studied by Engbersen et al (2015) and Bolt and Ter Maat (2005) is whether so-called ‘neighbourhood effects’ exist in neighbourhood volunteering. This term refers to social processes in neighbourhoods that cannot be explained by the composition of the population alone. They are processes that are (partly) caused by the neighbourhood (for instance the effect that in a crime-ridden neighborhood people have less trust in each other because of their bad experiences in the streets)16. In these researchers’ regression analyses, neighbourhood-level statistics were included to see if these can help to predict a respondents’ likeliness to volunteer when his or her personal characteristics are controlled for. They used the average income level in the neighbourhood where the respondents live, its share of low incomes, its ethnic diversity, and for Engbersen et al also respondents’ perception of neighbourhood dilapidation. However, this yielded no reasonable increase in the explained variance of their models (no increase for Bolt and Ter Maat and 1.6% of all variance for Engbersen et al.). Both research teams stress that average participation rate can therefore probably only be related to the aggregate of residents’ individual characteristics and that there are no neighbourhood effects.

Next to the focus on respondents’ ‘hard’ characteristics of socio-economic and ethnic status described above, in the last 15 years also a set of ‘soft’ respondent characteristics has gained the attention of neighbourhood volunteering researchers. The influential work of Putnam urged researchers like to also regard indicators of respondents’ ‘social capital’ as predictors of neighbourhood volunteering. This is because Putnam’s theory holds that people’s social capital is strongly related to their involvement in local volunteering. Social capital itself, in Putnam’s view, is a construct of a person’s social networks and his or her norms of reciprocity and trust. These elements would reinforce each other: people have larger social networks because they have stronger norms of reciprocity and higher social trust, and vice versa. The problem, according to Putnam’s theory, is that modern individuals’ declining civil society membership and (consequently) shrinking social networks reduces individuals’ general trust in others, which in turn harms (civil) society and volunteering. General trust in others in the neighbourhood is further complicated by ethnic diversity, resulting in lower levels of volunteering for the community in more ethnically diverse cities, according to his study of 41 US cities and rural areas (Putnam 2001; Putnam 2007). Putnam’s theory has led various researchers of volunteering to include questions on individuals’ civic norms, levels of trust and neighbourhood social network size (Marschall 2001; de Hart and Lelieveldt 2001; Dekker 2006; Foster-Fishman, et al. 2007), even though the outcomes are not always in line with Putnam’s theory (see for instance Bolt and Ter Maat 2005) and the causal direction is hard to prove (Lichterman 2006).

All in all, the different types of volunteering survey researches are most consistent in one aspect: they almost always show that likeliness to volunteer in the neighbourhood is statistically related to SES-characteristics of a survey respondent. This is also the finding that has made several authors worry about the capacity for self-organisation in deprived areas, for instance Williams (2005 p.177) in the UK, Uitermark (2014a) in the Netherlands and Wuthnow (1998, p. 112, cited in Sampson, 2005) in the US. However, survey research does not tell the whole story of neighbourhood volunteering in welfare or other services. The individual level data approach has the advantage that it works with respondent characteristics that can be operationalized and quantified relatively easily, but the operationalization of neighbourhood volunteering is more problematic. As respondents may understand different things to be neighbourhood volunteering, surveys usually use more specified lists of activities to define the concept. However, these lists differ between researches and this makes the outcomes harder to compare. Another difficulty is the inclusion of informal organizations in such item lists. These are usually not known to survey makers (Van der Zwaard and Specht 2013, p. 4). Also, household surveys usually give little insight in where, why and with what aim and results respondents volunteer, or how many organisations are present in different types of areas and what they achieve. Population survey research points to differences between demographic groups, but does not explain them beyond differences in cognitive skills and availability of time. Moreover, it disregards which meso-level contexts are fostering it, i.e. what kind of volunteering and institutional structures enable or stimulate citizens to volunteer.

17 Sometimes they are also not very consistent. In Engbersen et al (2015) for instance, some of the items used to construct neighbourhood volunteering involve volunteering in other places or at other spatial scales than the neighbourhood.

18 Regarding the aims of volunteering: Often the presumption is implicit that all voluntary involvement sensitizes people to the ‘public good’ and other people’s needs, following Alexis de Tocqueville influential and promising analysis of civil society in eighteenth century America. However, NIMBY organisations show that the orientation on other classes, gender-, age- and ethnic groups is not self-evident, and even if volunteers have the goal of helping others, that goal is not always achieved, see for instance Lichterman (2005) and Eliasoph (1998).
3.2 Looking at organisational density and institutional responsiveness in the area

Population survey research, however, is not the only research method to look at volunteering in the neighbourhood. There is another volunteering research tradition that puts volunteering organizations and their institutional contexts in the spotlight: social movement research. This literature has studied various activist and other volunteering organizations qualitatively and quantitatively. Social movement research usually does not concern itself with estimating different neighbourhoods’ levels of organization, however. An important exception is the research by Sampson et al (Sampson, et al. 2005).

In this research, Sampson et al coded newspaper reports of civic actions\(^{19}\) organized by volunteering organisations in all Chicago neighbourhoods between 1970 and 2000 to see if there were important differences. The authors explain their method and neighbourhood focus by pointing out that social movement research has often shown that volunteering is more than simply the result of the aggregation of individual civic behaviour and norms. Instead, it has demonstrated that the mobilizing power of a volunteering organization, as well as cooperation between organizations, strongly mediates whether citizens can realize (a claim for) a public good (see also Van der Zwaard and Specht 2013, p. 32). Sampson et al. find that in their research period, civic events clustered in particular Chicago neighbourhoods. Their logistic regression indicates that high incidence of civic events is mostly related to high neighbourhood-level organisational density and a long history of self-organisation in the neighbourhood, not to the socio-economic status of the neighbourhood. They find this relationship not only for protest civic events, but also for community self-help or social cohesion events.

Although the reasoning that civic event incidence is related to the number of events in the neighbourhood may be somewhat circular, it is likely that organisations indeed profit from each other’s nearness by cooperating. Looking at Sampson et al’s civic events map, we can furthermore see that several of such clustering neighbourhoods in Chicago have a low average income level (even though Sampson et al. do not explicitly draw this conclusion in the paper).

\(^{19}\) Civic actions, in Sampson et al’s definition, are ‘public events that bring two or more people together to realize a common purpose or specific claim’. They can be protest events to ask politicians to make changes, but also community centred events to self-create community services, such as ‘blood drives, community festivals, fundraisers, and community watches against crime’, which in this dissertation would be regarded the self organisation of welfare services.
Another lesson drawn from social movement literature is that a *triggering event* is very important to spark civic action. In the context of neighbourhood volunteering, Bolt and Ter Maat (2005) argue that urgent threat to the neighbourhood’s physical or social state can cause neighbourhood volunteering organizations to become more active and/or lead to the formation of new organisation. There is little comparative research, however, that can prove or refute this relationship. Some survey researches correlate respondents’ volunteering levels with rather imprecise measures of neighbourhood problems such as neighbourhood safety indices (based on resident surveys and police data) or neighbourhood attachment scores, but this seldom yields significant relationships (Van der Zwaard and Specht 2013, p.40).

Research into social movements has also yielded that recruitment of new neighbourhood volunteers very often happens through personal, friendly connections, rather than written pamphlets and invitations sent to unknown others (Lowndes and Pratchett 2006; Verba et al. 1995a). This means that the existence of social networks in the neighbourhood may be very important for recruitment; not because it builds general trust as in Putnam’s model, but because they are the main infrastructure for the ‘handwork’ of recruiting. To my knowledge, there is no research that looks at differences in volunteer recruitment through social networks for deprived and wealthier neighbourhood. Yet there may be differences, since it is known that residents of deprived neighbourhoods often have more neighbourhood-*centred* social networks; Van Eijk (2010b) has shown that inhabitants of Dutch deprived neighbourhoods on average have as many neighbourhood contacts as those of richer neighbourhoods, but fewer contacts outside the neighbourhood. This means that for the average deprived neighbourhood resident, a relatively high share of her or his friends live nearby. This could advantage these areas when it comes to neighbourhood volunteer recruitment.
It is interesting that the nineteen nineties and first decade of this century saw many new studies into neighbourhood volunteering organisations. This period was the heyday of ‘integral’ neighbourhood renewal programs in the Netherlands and Great Britain, which often encompassed governmental funding and professional support for volunteering-based neighbourhood self-help organizations (see paragraph 2.5 of this thesis). This helped to create new volunteering organizations in deprived urban renewal areas, and researchers started to investigate their functioning and neighbourhood and institutional context (see for instance De Wilde (2008), Hurenkamp, et al. (2006) and Tonkens et al. (2012) for the Netherlands and Jupp (2012) for the UK). These researches thus focused on volunteering in deprived areas in times of relatively generous subsidy programs, and most of them found considerable numbers of volunteering organizations in the areas. De Wilde for instance states that the urban renewal neighbourhood she studied ‘bustles with subsidized bottom-up citizen organisations committed to solving a neighbourhood social problem’ (2008, my translation). Various researchers note that such new neighbourhood volunteering organisations -providing services in for instance children’s education, language lessons for migrants, household administration support, social cohesion projects etc.- often have much higher shares of young, female, ethnic minority and / or lower SES members than the more formal, ‘talking’ neighbourhood organisations whose aim is to influence neighbourhood decision-making by debating with officials (see also Kearns 1995).

In light of the strong professional and policy support these volunteering organisations received, the researchers not only investigated the organisations’ capacity to mobilize volunteers, but especially how municipalities, public housing agencies and frontline welfare organisations could help them. They exposed the volunteering organizations’ need for supportive, inviting, communicative and patient government officials, who do not try to steer their aims, but provide mental support, material and financial help when requested. Tonkens, et al. (2010) for instance, explain how collectives need financial and in kind support from (semi-) governmental institutions, not only to deliver services but also because these are experienced as tokens of appreciations, which encourage the volunteers to keep going. By looking at the interface between citizens’ organisations and government in local governance, the researches of this period followed and confirmed the findings of the so-called ‘institutional approach’ to citizen participation in local governance. This approach was largely developed by British scholars, notably Lowndes and Pratchett (2006), Maloney, et al. (2000) and Stoker (1995). Like these British scholars before them, the Dutch researchers observed that self-organisations could hardly function without financial, material and networking support from (semi-) governmental institutions. What is more, they found that many neighbourhood volunteering organisations were not ‘pure’ bottom-up organizations. They were often formed because government officials had actively invited citizens to act upon a local issue and facilitated the first steps of their budding organizations (Tonkens, et al. 2010).

Some of these ‘institutional approach’ researches have also provided empirically grounded explanations for the survey research finding that higher educated residents do more volunteering (which is an important basis for the concerns about equality in the Dutch ‘participation society). The researchers describe how the higher educated residents that they studied were relatively better at ‘thinking strategically and claiming public attention’ and at ‘the sometimes strenuous work of negotiating with co-citizens, policy practitioners and politicians’ (De Wilde, et al. 2014, p. 3377 and see also Hurenkamp, et al. 2006, p. 58-60). They point to the importance of volunteer group leaders’ strategic insight, i.e. the ability to reflect on their organisation’s strengths and weaknesses (Lichterman 2006) and to anticipate wishes of their sponsors and partners. Higher educated would have more strategic insight. In a Bourdieusian perspective, higher educated citizen’s success in negotiating can furthermore be explained by assuming that they share certain class-shaped ways of communicating, vocabulary, taste and interests (or in one word their ‘habitus’ as described by Bourdieu (1986)) with
the higher educated professionals who decide about sponsoring. This may result in more identification between them and make that higher-educated citizens are better heard by the people deciding about means and help (see also Lipsky, 1980).

However, also in Bourdieu’s perspective, decision-making is not completely determined by the decision-maker’s personal biography or (unconscious) identification or affinity with the own socio-cultural group. Therefore, as Kerklaan (2015) for instance writes, sponsors’ decisions are also guided by their internal deliberations involving the ‘orders of worth’ of efficiency and equality (Boltanski and Thevenot 2006). In her fieldwork study, Eliasoph (2009, p. 297) also uses Boltanski and Thevenot’s framework to identify several criteria that sponsors often use to decide about funds for welfare service providing volunteer groups. She finds that funding decisions often depend on the sponsor’s impression of the applicants’ transparency (do they do their work in an accountable way, do they produce data by which the sponsor can check what has been achieved with the money?), its inclusiveness (is it open to different kind of users?), and its flexibility and responsiveness to the local context (sponsors do not wish to finance volunteering organizations that behave like ‘entrenched bureaucracies’, instead they look for flexible organisations who are tuned in to local needs, and ideally are self-help grassroots movements consisting of many local residents). Following Drosterij and Hendriks (2011), we can thereby argue that many quality standards commonly applied to evaluate governmental actors (such as effectiveness, transparency and openness to diverse citizens), are thus also applied when sponsors decide about welfare service volunteering organizations’ funding requests.

3.3 Hypotheses and subquestions

Starting from the literature presented in this chapter, hypotheses can be made about which neighbourhood-related factors may influence initiatives’ success in richer and poorer areas. The literature has yielded insights in the ways welfare service self-organisations find volunteers, which I will term activation. It has also provided understanding about how self-organisations find the other means they may need from institutions: in the first place money, but also professional help and material support such as an accommodation. I will term these means resources. On the basis of this literature I use eight subquestions to guide the research. Each regards potential, mechanisms that could cause differences in self-organisation success for richer and poorer neighbourhoods.

Activation

A generally held idea, supported by household survey-based researches, is that volunteering is higher among the higher-educated and majority ethnic population, also in neighbourhood welfare-service delivery. This idea, and its possible implications for richer and poorer urban neighbourhoods, will be tested as a hypothesis in this research.

The first subquestion therefore is

1: Do higher-educated and majority ethnic residents engage in neighbourhood welfare-service volunteering more than other residents?

If the answer were yes, this would probably contribute to more welfare service self-organisation in wealthier neighbourhoods, as they are home to higher shares of higher educated and majority ethnic residents. It should be noted though, that even if the average person from a deprived neighbourhood may not have organisational skills to the same extent as a person from a wealthier neighbourhood, this does not mean he or she does not have enough skills to participate. Also, as Dutch deprived
neighbourhoods are heterogeneous and it takes only a few residents to set up an organisation, too much focus on ‘the average resident’ may not be justified.

However, on the basis of several researches we can also hypothesize that *neighbourhood social or physical problems trigger activation, and that this will result in more activation in deprived than in wealthier neighbourhoods*. This may mean that deprived neighbourhoods, which typically have more social problems, could see more activation than wealthier neighbourhoods, namely because they have more problem-triggered volunteers. This dissertation will therefore also try to answer the question:

2: Are members in deprived neighbourhoods more activated to become a volunteer because of triggering neighbourhood problems?

The literature points at another important factor in volunteer activation: part of the reason to become a volunteer is often that one has received a personal invitation from within one’s social network. As Van Eijk has shown, deprived neighbourhoods residents’ social networks are often more neighbourhood bounded than those of wealthier neighbourhoods. This may mean that activation for neighbourhood purposes is easier in deprived neighbourhoods than in wealthier neighbourhoods. Especially networks of non-Dutch co-ethnics may be strong, and deprived neighbourhoods are home to relatively high shares of minority ethnic groups. Summarizing, it can be hypothesized that *as social networks are more locally bounded in deprived neighbourhoods, activation is more prominent here than in wealthier areas*. The relevant subquestion here is:

3: Do self-organisations in deprived neighbourhoods find more volunteers through neighbourhood-based social networks, than those in wealthier neighbourhoods?

**Resources**

As qualitative researches have suggested, higher educated citizens are often better able to organize a self-organisation. They would be more able to reflect on it, and on what sponsoring institutions want from it. They would therefore be better at negotiation, gaining the attention of administrators and at showing that they adhere to values of ‘good governance’ (that they pay attention to representativeness, accountability, effectiveness, etc. in the process of their self-organisation). It may be that as deprived neighbourhoods on average have fewer high educated inhabitants, their initiatives have less success in gaining resources from institutions, because of these reasons. I therefore formulate the research question:

4: Do collectives in deprived neighbourhoods have more difficulty to implement ‘good governance’, and convince funding institutions of their ‘good governance’?

Maybe higher-educated active citizens are better at gaining the attention and understanding of the relevant social professionals and administrators, because professionals and administrator identify themselves with them more easily, so that they get the benefit of the doubt more often. Identifications and expectations of good governance may further be influenced by neighbourhood reputation, or, in negative terms, neighbourhood stigma. I hypothesize that *active citizens with less or non-mainstream cultural capital or coming from stigmatized neighbourhoods will generate less (subconscious) understanding and identification among officials, harming their chances of attracting resources*. Translated to the neighbourhood level this results in the following subquestion:
5: Do deprived neighbourhoods and lower-educated active citizens have a stigma that creates preconceptions lowering their chances on institutional support?

Furthermore, the research by Sampson et al has suggested that ‘organisational density’ (the number of self-organisations in a neighbourhood) is important for self-organisations, as it enhances opportunities for cooperation. I therefore hypothesize that if self-organisations find other cooperative self-organisations and networks in the neighbourhood, this will improve their access to resources and to new volunteers. Several researches suggest that deprived neighbourhoods in the UK and Netherlands may have relatively dense structures of existing social organisations and (professionally supported) self-organisations, compared to wealthier ones. Organisational density may thus advantage self-organisations particularly in deprived areas. To see if this is true, I seek to answer the subquestion:

6: Is neighbourhood volunteering organisational density important for organisation’s cooperation opportunities, and what does this mean for wealthier and deprived neighbourhoods?

It should be noted though, that organisational density might sometimes work in other, less positive ways than Sampson et al predict. More collectives may mean more competition for resources, and therefore fewer resources per collective if the total amount of resources is fixed. Moreover, a mere sense of competition can inhibit corporation, and sharpen (already existing) tensions between groups in the neighbourhood (Uitermark 2014c, p.11). These mechanisms could explain why higher organisational-density may not benefit the organisations in an area.

Furthermore, the cited literature on neighbourhood renewal in Western Europe has shed light on special budgets for social projects including self-organisation, which since the nineteen nineties have increasingly become part of ‘integral’ improvement schemes for deprived neighbourhoods. The availability of such neighbourhood renewal budgets can strongly advantage self-organisations from these areas over those in other parts of the city. It must be noted, though, that almost all neighbourhood renewal budgets, including the sums earmarked for social investment, have been severely cut or altogether ended since the onset of the 2008 crisis. Still, also outside the urban renewal operations governments may create more funding opportunities and professional support for volunteer groups in deprived neighbourhoods. Local government may choose to concentrate its support resources for self-organised welfare support resources in the areas with highest neighbourhood welfare-service needs and highest perceived needs for investment in social cohesion, which are the deprived neighbourhoods. At the same time, local governments also promote self-organisation to improve citizens’ informal solidarity, direct democracy and the informational basis of administration. Local governments usually seek to promote this in all neighbourhoods, irrespective of their socio-economic status. Therefore, adjustment of volunteering support budgets to neighbourhood SES is not self-evident. We must therefore know how local governments distribute its resources of self-organisation support over the city, and how this impacts different types of neighbourhoods. This leads to the following subquestion:

7: Are initiatives in deprived neighbourhoods better able to access resources because they can get special budgets for deprived areas?

Lastly, self-organisations can be instrumental to local government policies in a specific way; they can function as communication channels between local government and groups of residents that institutions otherwise often find hard to reach. These groups are for instance the area’s ethnic minority residents, low-literate or ‘problem’ youths. (Semi-)governmental institutions may sponsor self-
organisations that are in closer contact with these residents, if they perceive them to be more successful in delivering services and information and requests to these citizens. To test if this is an influential argument for sponsoring self-organizations in deprived neighbourhoods’, the following subquestion is formulated.

8: Do local governments support collectives in deprived neighbourhoods, because these are able to reach marginalized groups that the governmental finds hard to contact?

These eight hypotheses imply relationships between neighbourhood socio-economic status (and ethnic composition) and its self-organizations’ potential to find volunteers and resources. These relationships are ordered in the conceptual model below.

**Figure 3.2: Conceptual model relationship between activation, resources and type of neighbourhood, numbers corresponding to the subquestions**

Source: author

### 3.4 Conclusion

In this chapter various relationships between the neighbourhood, activation and opportunities for attracting means were hypothesized. Importantly, several contributions in the literature showed that citizens’ activation does not merely rely on internal motivations but is also a result of personal social networks and abilities as well as institutional response and support. The role of the government and other institutions also emerges as important for self-organizations’ access to professional support and material resources. The support of institutions should therefore be part of studies into neighbourhood...
volunteering. The chapter has also shown that population survey-based researches do not give much insight in the influence of the neighbourhood context. Research into volunteering organizations give more clues for understanding why some groups rather than others emerge, grow and stay involved in local welfare service provision, and what this ultimately means for the quality and accessibility of services for different groups and neighbourhoods.

To answer our central question, we therefore need to research active citizens’ volunteering organizations and look for potential relationships between their success and the opportunities for activation and resources that the neighbourhood offers, as discussed above and summarized in the conceptual model. These hypothesized relationships have been translated into seven subquestions, each investigating a possible mechanism behind different outcomes for welfare self-organisation in richer and poorer urban neighbourhoods, see table 3.1. They will structure the empirical chapters 6 and 7. The first three subquestions inform Chapter 6 which deals with activation. The other subquestions are dealt with in the seventh chapter, that focuses on access to material resources. To understand the studied volunteering organizations in their specific neighbourhood and local context, however, it is necessary and that we know the socio-economic, demographic and political characteristics of the locality. To this end the next chapter describes how the participation society in my main research site, Rotterdam, has developed itself.
Chapter 4: Rotterdam’s turn towards self-organized welfare services.

Rotterdam, with 610,000 inhabitants the second city of the Netherlands, was chosen as research site since it is very outspoken in several aspects that relate to the welfare-service transition under investigation. Rotterdam can be considered a ’strategic’ or ‘unique’ case for this research, because, as this chapter will show, the political embrace of self-organisation is even stronger than in other large Dutch cities. The next paragraphs will elucidate how Rotterdam’s relatively weak socio-economic profile, and high ethnic diversity, have led to high and diverse welfare service needs in a tight financial frame, but also to an administrative culture of experiment and interventionism in social policies. This culture has also contributed to the current political enthusiasm and large sponsoring program for welfare service self-organisation.

The hypothesis tested in this research holds that the current policy focus on supporting self-organized welfare-services and downsizing state provided services, will result in more (and better) welfare services in wealthier than in deprived Dutch neighbourhoods. The elements of the hypothesis are present in a relatively strong way in Rotterdam: the city has put strong political emphasis on welfare self-organisation in poorer as well as in wealthier parts of the city, while budget cuts in state-provided welfare services have been taking place for a long time now, and the deprivation of the poorer neighbourhoods is very strong on a national scale. The city can therefore serve as a strategic case. Strategic case research is important because, in Flyvbjerg words, ‘if the thesis could be proved false in the favourable case [where all constituent elements are very much present], then it would most likely be false for intermediate cases (Flyvbjerg 2006, p.226). I therefore focus on Rotterdam, and within this favourable case, I focus on the poorest and richest neighbourhoods.

Other reasons for choosing a strategic case are provided by Small (2009), who, besides agreeing with Flyvbjerg’s argument, adds other methodological merits. In small-n case studies, the chosen cases are often presented as average, ‘representative’ sites that would lead to generalizable findings above the local level, comparable to large-n study findings backed by statistical significance. Small however argues that in small-n case study research it is impossible to identify such cases beforehand, if they even exist. For research questions involving various site-specific factors –which is very often the case in neighbourhood studies and other fields of urban sociology- there usually is no ’average site’. Instead, when case studies are aimed at generating findings that have predictive power also for other cases (to match the generalizability known from statistical study in a different way) logical rather than statistical inference is called for. A fruitful approach for logical inference can be –again- the study of unique rather than average cases; cases where special policies are implemented or where social phenomena occur in a different social context than expected. Such case studies can offer clearer insights in what constitutes the researched phenomenon.

Small reminds that time is another tool when trying to get to logical inferences in case study research. Repeated case observations help the researcher to see recurring event-sequences, and if a logical explanation for these follow-ups can be construed, a causal connection may have been discerned. For this reason I have repeatedly observed one residents’ welfare initiative and two funding decision making arenas over time (the so-called Borough Committees, see paragraph 1.1), but practically this meant that I could best focus on a city not too far from my home during my fieldwork period, and Rotterdam was only a 15 minute train ride away. Lastly, that Rotterdam is a strategic case where self-organisation is relatively strongly supported is also important in light of the research subquestion on
the meaning of cooperation between volunteers’ initiatives at neighbourhood level. The multitude of
initiatives in Rotterdam, that are surviving partly because of the supporting policy programs, also
allows for a research into their web of inter-relations and interactions at neighbourhood scale, whereas
in other cities the lower spatial density of initiatives made this more difficult to research.

Yet of course, the choice for one strategic case should not lead to a set of findings of mechanisms
entirely idiosyncratic for Rotterdam and thus unusable even as ‘searchlights’ for other research sites in
the Netherlands or elsewhere (Van den Berg 2014, p.37). I have therefore also studied two citizens’
initiatives in Eindhoven (one in a lower middle-class neighbourhood and one in a higher middle-class
neighbourhood) to see whether the Rotterdam practice is not different because of a locally-based
factor entirely unforeseen in the hypotheses. This would make the precautious type of generalizations
that case study allows for, unwarranted above local level.

4.1 Rotterdam: the deindustrializing city

Rotterdam, much like many other Western European deindustrialized cities, is a city struggling to find
new economic prospects since its economic base began to decline in the 1970’s. Rotterdam is
traditionally seen as the Netherlands’ ‘quintessential industrial city’, mainly because of its world port
function and the manufacturing and logistic firms that have clustered around it (Van den Berg 2014,
p.37 and see also Van der Waal and Burgers 2009). Ever since the 1870s, when the municipality
together with a bold industrialist executed the plan to further expand the city docks and dig new
connecting waterways, the city has played a large role in Dutch economic growth. From 1962 until
2002 it even was the world’s busiest port until this position was taken by Shanghai, and still today it
constitutes the world’s fourth, and Europe’s largest point of entry for seaborne cargo.

The harbour used to create large demand for low-skilled labour, especially up until the 1970’s. After
that time, however, employment rates rose, similarly to the situation in other distressed harbour cities.
While containerization and global competition gradually pushed down the number of port-related
jobs in Rotterdam, a new service economy that could create new jobs barely materialized. Van der
Waal (2009) compares the economic development of Rotterdam and Amsterdam since the nineties,
and concludes that Rotterdam’s transformation to a more service oriented economy is seriously
lagging. Referring to Meijer (1993) and Cheshire (1990), heattributes this mainly to the city’s
historical economic profile. He writes: ‘successful transition from industrial to service-based economy
is easier for cities that already new clustering of high level services before the industrialization started
in the 70s of the last century. This was the case in Princeton, New York, London, Frankfurt and
Amsterdam. Cities that had always leaned mostly on industrial activities, such as the rust belt cities in
the US, Manchester and Liverpool in the UK, the German Ruhrgebiet, and in the Netherlands
Rotterdam, lost out’ (p. 5, my translation).

But how exactly did Rotterdam ‘lose out’, or, in the famous words of one of its former mayors20,
ended up ‘heading the wrong lists’ in a self-reinforcing tangle of low average incomes, employment
rates, education levels and housing quality?

In the nineteen eighties, Rotterdam was not yet lagging far behind the other cities. In the Netherlands,
this decade was a relatively long crisis period, the first real crisis since the post-WWII economic boom.

20 Mayor De Lange, cited for instance in Ouwehand and Doff 2013
The nation’s economic problems were due to the oil crises of the seventies, global competition in manufacturing and to welfare state and minimum wage arrangements that were not adapted to service-based economic expansion (Kloosterman 2014, p. 109-112). This crisis was very real in the cities and especially in Amsterdam, where the unemployment rate rose to even 24% in the second half of the eighties, surpassing national rates by far (Kloosterman 1996). Yet from the nineties on, among the larger Dutch cities Amsterdam, Utrecht and Eindhoven were able to shift towards knowledge intensive sectors, whereas Rotterdam remained much more of an industrial city. In 2005, 22% of the working Rotterdam population did industrial work (mainly in port-related logistics), compared to only 12% in Amsterdam. 37% of Rotterdam workers held a job in advanced services in Rotterdam, against 48% in Amsterdam (Van der Waal, 2009).

Figure 4.1: Jobs in Rotterdam and Amsterdam according to sector in 2005

Source of data: (Van der Waal 2009)

The lower share of jobs in producer services and the higher share of industrial jobs are also reflected in the occupational requirements of jobs held by the Rotterdam working population. These are on average lower than in the other large Dutch cities. During the last decade, such differences have turned out to be persistent (see figure 4.2). Occupational professionalization\(^\text{21}\) occurs at a relatively low rate in Rotterdam, and the share of employed working inhabitants working in middle or low educational level jobs is still the highest of all four cities.

---

In relation to this, also the share of higher educated in the working age population is relatively low in Rotterdam. Even though it is a university city, only 37% of this population is higher educated, just slightly more than the national share (34%) and much less than Amsterdam (57%) and Utrecht (63%). Rotterdam has even fewer higher-educated adults than The Hague (42%), a city that does not have a university. It is true that, as education levels in the Dutch population are rising, also Rotterdam has become better educated between 2002 and 2011, and even at a higher pace than the country as a whole, but the educational gaps with Amsterdam and Utrecht have not narrowed in this period (Rotterdam 2015d, p.10).

Not only are jobs in the Rotterdam region on average less knowledge intensive than in the other Dutch city regions, they are also fewer in relation to the population. Rotterdam has held the unpopular first position on unemployment rates since the nineteen nineties. Over the years 2010, 2011 and 2012 average unemployment was 10,3% in Rotterdam, much higher than in the other large Dutch cities (Amsterdam: 7,2%; The Hague: 8,7% and Utrecht: 5,6%) and almost twice as high as the national rate (6,4 %). Congruently, the share of unemployed inhabitants (working less than 12 hours and wanting to work more than this) has been much above the national average for at least twenty years. This can be seen in figure 4.4, which shows Rotterdam’s unemployment situation since 1996. It also makes clear that whereas during the nineties Amsterdam’s unemployment level was among the highest of the larger cities, this urban economy is comparably doing much better in the last decade, whereas Rotterdam’s position has worsened.
A factor that must not be missed when trying to understand Rotterdam’s economic position, is that in Rotterdam, more strongly than in other larger Dutch cities, unemployment is for a very large part the burden of the non-native Dutch population. For the native-Dutch population, unemployment levels have been quite comparable to that in the other larger Dutch cities, but for the non-native Dutch, it was usually around 10% higher than for first and second generation migrants living in one of the other larger Dutch cities.
Fig 4.5: % of non-employed among allochthonous and native-Dutch population of the five largest Dutch cities, 1996-2013

% unemployed among working age allochthonous % unemployed among working age native-Dutch

Source: CBS, compiled by author through www.rotterdamincijfers.nl

Unsurprisingly, higher unemployment and on average lower skill level jobs translate in a consistently lower income average for Rotterdam. Figure 4.6 shows that in the municipality, standardized
household incomes are approximately 10% lower than the Dutch average and also much lower than that in the Rotterdam city agglomeration ('Stadsgewest')\(^{22}\).

What is also important is that the income gap between Rotterdam city and its agglomeration is wider than in Amsterdam, which means that a relatively large share of Rotterdam’s middle and higher classes choose to live in the vicinity rather than in the city. In fact, Rotterdam is a city where the percentage of workers holding a university level job in the city is barely higher than in its region (in Amsterdam and Utrecht the difference is 8%, in The Hague 4% and in Rotterdam it is only 3% (CBS 2015)). This means that many high-educated workers in Rotterdam commute to their workplace, typically in the city, from the bordering municipalities. To explain this, Engbersen, et al. (2005, p.16) underline that Amsterdam has traditionally been attractive as an urban dwelling environment to the cultural and economic elites, whereas Rotterdam is not. They relate this to the lower availability of attractive middle class dwellings (preferably low rise with a garden) in Rotterdam compared to other Dutch cities, arguing that Rotterdam’s almost unbroken post-war social-democratic reign up until 2002 has led to a housing stock consisting of many Housing Association-owned cheap rentals and very little middle class housing (ibid, p. 32)\(^{23}\). Yet, it must be noted that at 47%, the Rotterdam share of housing owned by a Housing Association is only 1% higher than that of Amsterdam (CBS, 2012). Other factors must not be overlooked when trying to explain why the back-to-the-city movement of the middle and higher classes taking place in Amsterdam for several decades now (see Boterman, et al. 2010), is much less prominent in Rotterdam. One reason will be that Rotterdam’s centre lacks historic lustre, as it was almost completely destroyed in World War II\(^{24}\).

---


\(^{23}\) See paragraph 2.3.1 on the provision of affordable rental housing by Housing Associations, which is not completely comparable to public housing in many other western countries.

\(^{24}\) In the last year, several Dutch newspapers and economic reviews have reported that Rotterdam’s economy is in fact showing signs of improvement, in line with the recovery of the 2008 crisis in the rest of the Netherlands. Especially tourism to Rotterdam has increased, see for instance ‘Economische Verkenningen Rotterdam (2015) Rotterdamse Economie aan de beterende hand’ (http://evr2016.publizines.nl/?pagina=31 ). Several new skyscrapers, a new large food-court in the city centre and the new central station have helped to create a 15% growth in the number of tourists over the last two years. These are mostly Dutch visitors from out of town, but also international tourism has grown, with help of recommendations by The New York Times, the Guardian and Lonely planet. Even though tourism is still at only 10% of Amsterdam tourism, this is an important success for Rotterdam, and it is hoped that the tourism will bring new jobs and foreign investment. One outright success, so far, is the relocation of the headquarters of the Netherlands largest telecom firm from the Hague to Rotterdam, which is planned for 2017. The firm motivated its decision by pointing to Rotterdam’s ‘modern industrial appearance’ (Volkskrant, 19-4-2016). So far, however, recovery signs do not show very clearly in statistics on Rotterdam’s economic performance over the last two years.
4.2 Rotterdam: the multicultural city

As mentioned above, Rotterdam is also a strategic site because together with Amsterdam it is the Netherlands’ most multicultural city, which in itself creates specific and more diversified welfare service needs, but also opportunities for innovation (Putnam 2008), for instance in welfare services. Rotterdam today is home to people of 175 different nationalities, ‘a level of diversity comparable to Amsterdam, London, and New York’ (Entzinger and Engbersen 2014, p.2). In 2014, 49% of all Rotterdammers were born outside the Netherlands or had at least one parent that was born outside the Netherlands. As such they are called allochthonous (‘allochtoon’) in Dutch statistics as well as in Dutch everyday speech. 11% of the Rotterdam population is so-called Western allochthonous: they or one or both of their parents migrated from other European countries, the US, Australia or Canada. People who(se parents) came from other countries are called ‘non-western’ allochthonous; at 37% Rotterdam has the highest share of non-western allochthonous inhabitants of all Dutch cities. Especially in the so-called ‘concentration’ neighbourhoods’ in Rotterdam’s south, west and part of the north, the share of native Dutch is usually only 20 to 40 per cent of the neighbourhood population (CBS, 2014).

Fig 4.7: share of native Dutch (CBS definition) per Rotterdam neighbourhood, 2015

Like many other Western-European cities, Rotterdam has seen intra- and international migrant flows to and from the city since its early beginnings. However, the pace of international migration during the last century does not have its precedence in history (Crul, et al. 2014, p.12). Most of the migration that flowed to Rotterdam in the 20th century was particularly linked with the city’s function as a world traffic hub and later also with its manufacturing clusters. The sizeable Cabo Verdean and Chinese communities (amounting to around 2% and 1% of the population respectively) first came to the city as seafaring labourers and their families (Da Graça 2010). Young Turkish and Moroccan men were brought to the Netherlands in the 1960’s and 70’s to address low-skilled industrial labour shortages, which also existed in the Rotterdam harbour and factories. Their families eventually joined them, and
today, first and second generation Turkish and Moroccan Rotterdammers make up respectively 7 and 6 per cent of the population. Surinamese form 8 per cent of the city's population, the first generation arrived mostly in the nineteen seventies and eighties in the decolonization process of their country and its aftermath. Other ethnic groups arrived from the nineteen nineties onward, fleeing from wars in countries such as former Yugoslavia, the former Soviet Union, Turkey, Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, and Somalia. In this period also many people from the Dutch Antilles and Aruba came to Rotterdam, and today first and second generation Antilleans make up 4% of Rotterdam’s population. Most recently migrants have also been arriving from Eastern European countries, such as Poland and Bulgaria. As transitory labourers within the EU many of them do not register themselves in the municipality, but experts estimate their number at around 30,000 in Rotterdam (Entzinger, 2014, p. 2).

Having a minority ethnic status is often linked to a lower socio-economic position in society, and Dutch society is no exception. The average Surinamese Dutch household has 18% less in standardized household income than the average native-Dutch household. Surinamese have the advantage of coming from a country where Dutch is one of the national languages, for almost all other non-western ethnicity groups average household income is even a third lower than that of Dutch households, and unemployment is three times higher (Rotterdam 2013; SCP 2014, p.41 and 75). For the first generation Turkish and Moroccans who came as industrial workers and had had received very little schooling for other professions, unemployment is mostly due to the collapse of the Dutch manufacturing sector. But also for their children (and sometimes grandchildren) unemployment is high: today, 28% of non-western allochthonous aged 15-25 is looking for work but unable to find it, against 10% of the native Dutch young adults (CBS 2013). The unfavourable labour market position of young allochthonous is often due to lower educational levels, but also to many Dutch employers’ discriminatory outlook when hiring employees, as experimental researches continue to show25. For Rotterdam, a 2011 inventory yields that in several of its neighbourhoods unemployment among first generation Moroccan and Turkish adults in the working age is even more severe than in the rest of the country. With only 33% of Moroccan migrants and 42% of Turkish migrants holding a paid job, employment here is 10% lower than the national average for these groups.

It should be noted, however, that despite lower average economic status, a substantial share of non-western migrants achieves socio-economic mobility in Dutch society. Especially many of their children are upwardly mobile, and consequently the Dutch urban middle class of today is also multicultural. In 2006, Dagevos et al estimated that a third of the Surinamese and a sixth of the Turkish and Moroccan Dutch belonged to the middle class26. Dagevos et al saw that the allochthonous middle class was still growing, and this also becomes clear from the fact that educational achievements of young non-western allochthonous are rapidly catching up with those of the native-Dutch. In 2003, 32% of native Dutch young adults (aged 25-35) had completed higher vocational education (‘hbo’) or university, compared to 18% of non-western allochthonous young adults. For young Turkish Dutch this was 11% and it was 14% for young Moroccan Dutch. By 2014, 45% of native-Dutch in this age group are higher educated, but for non-western groups the percentage has grown more strongly: today 33% per cent of non-western migrants is higher educated. The Turkish higher educated sub-group more than doubled to 25% and the Moroccan share, now at 26%, nearly doubled (CBS 2015). An important example in Rotterdam of (and often also for) the emancipatory achievements of non-western migrants is the personal background of the city’s current mayor, Mr Ahmed Aboutaleb. In the nineteen seventies, he moved as a sixteen year-old from a small Moroccan village to The Hague where his father was a low

skilled worker. After a long educational trajectory and several career steps, Aboutaleb was inaugurated to be Mayor of Rotterdam in 2009.

With such a high diversity of ethnic groups, and a majority native-Dutch group that makes up just half of the total population, Rotterdam can be termed super-diverse (Crul, et al. 2014). This term is particularly adequate because, even though the Dutch debate on integration is often held in terms of a dichotomy between allochthonous and autochthonous groups, especially the ‘group’ of allochthonous Dutch is extremely heterogeneous in terms of ethnicities, cultures, faiths, economic position and migration trajectories, as discussed above. As mentioned in paragraph 2.6.4, Dutch public debate has shown reluctance regarding the acknowledgment of the country’s cultural heterogeneity, but for many inhabitants of diverse Rotterdam neighbourhoods, the multiculturalness of their neighbourhood is already an everyday lived reality. In such a situation the debate on integration will have to take a new turn. As Crul et al. note, majority-minority cities invoke new understandings of cultural integration. ‘In societies where one group forms a clear majority, other minorities are expected to adapt to established norms and habits. In absence of a single ethnic majority, everyone will have to adapt to everyone. Diversity will be the new norm. This will entail a major psychological reorientation’ (ibid, p.14). Logically necessary as this reorientation may be, it has so far not been a self-evident practice, nor has it been a smooth experience in the Rotterdam’s financially strapped city politics, as will be addressed below.

4.3 Rotterdam welfare service politics

The last two paragraphs have shown that Rotterdam is both a de-industrialised city that has adapted only slowly to new economic perspectives, as well as a multicultural city that has seen swift ethnic diversification since roughly the nineteen seventies. Both realities have implications for the city’s welfare needs and resources, as will be discussed in this paragraph. Moreover, the exceptional economic and demographic situation has contributed to a rather singular urban political landscape for Dutch standards, in which various welfare services have been quite remodelled. Problems of urban marginality have been addressed by measures to limit the influx of new lower-income households to the city. Regarding the welfare services for the existing population facing urban marginality, Rotterdam has become nationally renowned for its activating ‘front-line’ approach to governing these problems. Also the ‘social investment’ approach can be discerned in the city’s social policies, particularly in the way Rotterdam deals with active labour market policies and support in parenting issues. Lastly, a problematization of the social cohesion in multi-ethnic Rotterdam has guided support programs for the self-organisation of street activities. As I will argue in this paragraph, also the current, relatively large policy program for supporting active citizens’ initiatives in neighbourhood welfare services and public space, connects to Rotterdam’s strong front-line governance tradition, its social investment approach and lastly, to its administrators’ concerns about the city’s social cohesion.

4.3.1 An exceptional political landscape

The political road that Rotterdam has taken in the last 15 years is rather unlike that of any other Dutch city. In the last century, ‘worker city’ Rotterdam had always been a stronghold of the Dutch Labour party (PvdA), but the city took a political turn in 2002. In this year, the new founded party Livable Rotterdam (Leefbaar Rotterdam, further abbreviated as LR) at once became the largest fraction in the local elections. Since then, Rotterdam has been the only Dutch city where a populist, anti-migration party has had strong political influence, as it has always held around 29% of votes in the city since then
This paragraph will show how since 2002 local administrations have changed the city’s welfare services to make it more oriented towards so-called ‘front-line’ interventions and towards citizens’ responsibilization and activation.

**Fig 4.8: Timeline of Rotterdam municipality politics and important events influencing the Dutch debate on multiculturalism**

Maybe it is not surprising that of all Dutch cities it was in Rotterdam, where highest unemployment and ethnic diversity combine, that a populist anti-immigration party could come to power and that also a national party with this outlook was created (Uitermark and Duyvendak 2008; Van Liempt and Veldboer 2009). This party, Leefbaar Rotterdam, was founded in 2001 by Pim Fortuyn, a former sociology professor living in the city. During the elections of March 2002, his new party won 35% of the votes in the city. Later that year he also ran a campaign for the national elections with his newly created party Lijst Pim Fortuyn. Like in Rotterdam, much of his national campaign was built around curtailing migration, especially marriage migration from Morocco and Turkey (see paragraph 2.6.4 of this thesis). After Fortuyn’s death, Lijst Pim Fortuyn still won 17% of the votes in the national parliament elections and joined the national government’s coalition, but the party soon imploded due to internal strife. From 2006, a new party called PVV has voiced the extreme-right viewpoint on migration. Its leader, Geert Wilders, has ranted not only against further immigration but also against all Muslims living in the Netherlands. Yet, in the last national elections the PVV obtained only 10% of the votes, and in municipal elections it has never been able to become part of a local administration. As such, Rotterdam is the only city where an anti-immigration party has ruled: LR led the 2002-2006 board of Mayor and Alderpersons and has regained this position in 2014, now holding 28% of the votes, and ruling with a centre-right coalition. In the two intermittent ruling periods, in which Labour led the administration, LR still held 30% of the votes.

**4.3.2 Problematizing Rotterdam’s poorer neighbourhoods: not clean, not safe, not friendly**

According to various scholars, LR has laid the groundwork for a major policy ‘regime change’ in Rotterdam (Noordegraaf 2008; Van Liempt and Veldboer 2009). This happened in the period of 2002-2006, when they were the city’s largest party and ruled together with the Christian Democrats and the right-wing Liberal Party. This regime focused on the ‘liveability’ of the city’s less wealthy
neighbourhoods, which was to be reinstalled mainly through repressive, 'hands-on' measures. 'Liveability' (leefbaarheid) is the term generally used in the Netherlands ‘to refer to the level of crime and nuisance, feelings of safety and residential satisfaction, as well as interaction and ‘social cohesion’ among residents’ of a city or neighbourhood (Van Eijk 2010a, p.824). Importantly, this regime was sustained and further developed during the following two ruling periods of Labour, and during LR’s current ruling period since March 2014. As such, Rotterdam has even become a national example for its focus on deprived neighbourhoods’ liveability and the uncommon measures it has taken to improve this (Noordegraaf 2008, p. 228; Snel, et al. 2011; Van Ostaaijen and Tops 2007). The ascent of LR in Rotterdam and the rise of Pim Fortuyn in the national elections of 2002 even kindled much political interest in deprived neighbourhoods across the Netherlands in those years. ‘Politicians were encouraged make many visits to these neighbourhoods, to repair the breach between citizen and politics and regain lost authority. The neighbourhood once again enthralled everyone’ (Engbersen, et al. 2005, p.5, my translation).

4.3.3 LR’s analysis of the causes of lost liveability

Thus, in LR’s approach to neighbourhood problems, ‘liveability’ is central, as is suggested already by the party’s name. In LR’s view - in 2002 but still today- foremostly the liveability of Rotterdam’s poorer neighbourhoods is threatened, and policy should in the first place address the problems in the streets there, that also affect the ‘problemless’ households living in those neighbourhoods (and which LR regards as an important part of its electorate). Liveability by definition relates to a geographical entity, typically a neighbourhood, and the first focus is on social problems as they manifest themselves within the (public) space of that neighbourhood, rather than on the influence of socio-economic changes on individual deprived households and the social problems they may face. This citation from the 2002 administration’s coalition, makes clear what causes LR and its coalition partners saw for the neighbourhoods’ liveability problems. The 2002 administration states:

"Rotterdam has undergone a transformation in 30 years. Not only has Rotterdam become a world port, it has also become a world city. As has often been the case in our history, this development has very real consequences on two sides: on the one hand an incredible new potential for cultural, economic and social capital and on the other hand a large number of transitional problems: an extraordinary challenge regarding social integration. For our administration it is important to take these two sides very seriously and find effective answers. (...) Social life in the city isn't functioning anymore. It is a struggle. The result: a city with far too little social cohesion. One of the underexposed effects of the rapid transformation is a strong reduction of the attachment Rotterdammers feel towards their city. Newcomers are not yet (enough) at home here, while the indigenous population feels less and less at home: Rotterdam isn't "their" city anymore. Many Rotterdammers are unhappy about how things work in their city. About how clean, safe and friendly it is. But they don't see their own role, their responsibility in this.

(Board of Mayor and Alderpersons of Rotterdam, 2002, my translation and italics).

In this quote, the municipal administration casts the city as struggling under low levels of social integration and social cohesion and even dysfunctional social life, causing low levels of cleanliness, safety and friendliness, the main determinants of liveability. Rotterdam in this view, is a city in turmoil because of international migration, with the result that both allochthonous and autochthonous Rotterdammers have no sense of belonging (anymore). 'Newcomers’ lack of attachment and the withdrawal of the native-Dutch are deemed to have caused a collapse of social life: a picture of
disturbed everyday relations brought on by strong change, comparable to for instance Durkheim’s descriptions of ‘societal anomia’ (Scott and Turner 1965).

As was mentioned before in paragraph 2.5.3, in the first years of the new century this way of problematizing ethnic diversity was relatively new. Only two years had passed between the first serious interest in media and national politics for a publicist critiquing the multicultural society (Scheffer 2000), and the publication of this coalition agreement. As such, the Rotterdam administration’s stance breached the more politically correct celebration of cultural diversity that was dominant in political circles in the Dutch nineteen eighties and nineties.

The Rotterdam coalition, moreover, related the city’s ethnic diversity not only to lower social cohesion, but also to ‘a trespassing of the absorption capacity for disadvantaged households in several Rotterdam neighbourhoods’. It did this in the 2003 regional housing plan ‘Rotterdam perseveres’. This report states that ‘the colour is not the problem, but the problem often has a colour’. The plan presented various measures to alleviate the problems in these neighbourhoods, several of which regarded the inflow of allochthonous citizens: marriage immigration should be curtailed, asylum seekers should be largely diverted to other cities, and those who did come to Rotterdam should be able to prove their ‘solid cultural integration’ into Dutch society. The report was published shortly after the Rotterdam demographic forecast 2003-2017, which predicted that the share of native-Dutch inhabitants in Rotterdam would be less than 50% from 2010 on (Hertogh 2006; Ouwehand and Doff 2013). As Van Liempt and Veldboer describe it, ‘it was claimed that if nothing happened, native Dutch citizens would become a minority in an increasingly poor city’ (2009, p.99). As such, the new LR administration clearly problematized both the city’s poverty and its ethnic diversity.

To support all the measures it has taken in response to the neighbourhood problems, the Rotterdam administration and national government have often pointed at the exceptionally bad shape Rotterdam would be in. The 2002 Mayor’s expression that ‘Rotterdam is heading the wrong lists’, has become widely known in the Netherlands. Also in ‘Rotterdam perseveres’ the administration underlined ‘that the situation in Rotterdam is many times more serious than that in the average big city’ and that an audit commission of the national government has concluded this as well (see also Uitermark and Duyvendak, p.3). To turn the tide, the administration wanted ‘to zoom in at neighbourhoods, and need[ed] special conditions and specified rules to do this’ (Rotterdam, 2004, p. 16 cited in in Hertogh, 2006, p.21). The specific liveability policies that LR started and that the following Labour and LR administrations sustained and further developed, will be described below.

4.3.4 LR’s solutions to repair liveability: being selective about who comes to the city

‘Rotterdam perseveres’ prescribed one neighbourhood liveability strategy that Rotterdam has pursued enthusiastically in this century. This is the upgrading of the city’s housing stock to attract higher income households. Over the last 20 years, the upgrading has taken place mainly through demolition of older, low-income housing in deprived areas, and construction of middle- or higher-income housing on these sites. This strategy is of course not unique for Rotterdam. Such ‘social mix’ urban renewal has been a common practice in Western world cities for decades. It is seen as a way to strengthen the city’s economy and its tax base, and also diminish liveability problems in deprived neighbourhoods. In Rotterdam, such urban renewal happened especially in the south and east of the town. Mainly as a result of these urban renewal operations, the city’s share of cheap housing has gone

---

27 See for instance Galster and Friedrichs (2015) for an overview of the research on this policy tradition and its neighbourhood effects.
down from 65% of the total housing stock in 2000 to 56% in 2014 and further decrease is planned: in 2030 it must be 47%. This must be realized by demolishing 20.000 cheaper dwellings and building 36.000 new middle-and higher-income dwellings in the city (Rotterdam 2015b, p. 16).

Also another measure was designed in 2002 to achieve a lower influx of poor residents. This is the housing allocation rule ‘Act Special Measures against Big City Problems‘ which prohibits certain groups of low-income households to move to areas where, as ‘Rotterdam perseveres‘ puts it, the ‘absorption capacity‘ for them has already been reached. The low-income households that are forbidden to rent here are all jobless households that have not lived in Rotterdam in the last 5 years, with the exception of students and elderly. National government created this legal construct in 2005 on request of the Rotterdam administration; it had to be passed through national parliament because this measure creates infringements on citizens’ equal rights and therefore can be considered to be at odds with the constitution. Because of these infringements it was eventually given the status of a temporary experiment rather than a law. This experiment has been running for 14 years now and became commonly known as the ‘Rotterdam-Law‘ (Rotterdamwet).

Under the Rotterdam-Law five Rotterdam areas (expanded to six in 2015) have been selected as so-called Hotspots. They are chosen on the basis of a Neighbourhood Safety Index statistic that was designed by the first LR administration. This Index, ranging from zero to 10, is the outcome of a mathematical formula that includes objective crime indicators, subjective (inhabitant survey generated) liveability ratings and neighbourhood statistics, among which the share of non-Western allochthonous (Hertogh 2006; Ouwehand and Doff 2013). By capturing the ambiguous concept of neighbourhood safety in a single statistic, much information and causality is (inevitably) lost or thwarted (Van Swaaningen 2007, p. 245), but the Safety Index has helped Rotterdam’s last four administrations to appear focused and accountable - the mayor of 2002 even connected his political fate to a rising safety index within his term - and successful; in all the years that the Safety Index has existed, the Rotterdam average always went up (Ouwehand and Doff 2013, p.120; Schinkel and Van den Berg 2011).

The Rotterdam-Law thus creates restrictions on housing opportunities for many low-income newcomers to the city, with the aim to stop ‘problem accumulation‘ in the city’s distressed areas and eventually improve liveability (Hochstenbach, et al. 2015, p. ii). Although ethnicity is not a direct criterion in the Rotterdam-Law, by steering low-income groups away from these areas they should eventually also have fewer allochthonous inhabitants. This can be deducted, as Van Eijk makes clear, from the political debates preceding the law’s instalment in 2005. Both in Rotterdam’s city hall and in national parliament, the ethnic diversity of the Hotspots was usually mentioned as an argument to support the Rotterdam-Law. Arguments involving the areas‘ ethnic diversity were proposed not only by populist parties like LR in Rotterdam and LPF in national parliament, but also by centre and left-wing parties (2010a, p.824).

The Rotterdam-Law was installed in 2005, and continued during the Labour-led and LR-led administrations that followed. It has now existed for ten years. Over the years, four evaluations (three by the Rotterdam municipality and one by the University of Amsterdam on commission of the Ministry of Housing) have shown that the measure has had little or no effect on neighbourhood liveability ratings (Hochstenbach, et al. 2015). Nevertheless, in 2014 the duration of the ‘experiment‘ was once again prolonged by another 20 years, and one new Hotspot area was added. Today, it is applied to 9% of all housing in the municipality.
A third measure to select better newcomer inhabitants for Rotterdam’s deprived areas consists of a charter that the municipality signed in 2009 with the city’s social housing associations. In this charter the parties agree to the screen aspiring renters for history of nuisance (complaints about them, not convictions) if they wish to move to or within Rotterdam’s poorer neighbourhoods. Similar charters were signed in a few other Dutch municipalities. However, this type of screening is not legally allowed, and Rotterdam is pushing for adaptation of the Rotterdam-Law to make it legal. All the same, Rotterdam has screened around 4000 households in the last six years, and, according to the journalistic TV show Zembla (September 30th, 2015), this resulted in 100 housing refusals, which is half of the screening-based refusals in the Netherlands.

**4.3.5 Frontline governance: face-to-face with the existing population**

The Rotterdam-law and screening policy are strictly administrative types of ‘liveability’ interventions; it consists of the ‘distant’ application of a set of rules by a municipal officer sitting at an office desk. The measures are meant to influence which type of newcomers come to the poorer neighbourhoods. Yet, since the first LR ruling period, Rotterdam has also become nationally renowned for its large focus on so called ‘front-line governance’ in working with and for the existing population in (mostly) these areas, which brings a completely different type of policies than the administrative approach described above.

In frontline governance, much importance is given to the role and discretionary power of front-line welfare professionals that work face-to-face with citizens, such as police officers, teachers, nurses and public housing inspectors. In the literature on welfare administration, these professionals are also known as ‘street-level bureaucrats’ (Lipsky 1980). In front-line governance, the administration supports interventions where the primary process between professional and citizen is leading. This stands in contrast to ‘policy governance’, where goals and ways of working designed by city hall are most important (Tops and Hartman 2009, p.191).

In the Netherlands, the attention for front-line governance grew especially in Rotterdam: during nineteen nineties Pim Fortuyn himself had often proclaimed that the political elites undervalued frontline government employees, and had drawn too much power to policy makers’ offices regarding targets, implementation and financial rewards. As such, the policy making elite had made policy less responsive and effective to social problems ‘on the ground’. According to Fortuyn, Rotterdam’s Labour-led administrations of the nineteen nineties had also liked to plan and talk in the policymakers’ office rather than intervene in the city, because this enabled them to neglect the politically sensitive issue of the unliveable ethnic concentration neighbourhoods. The new LR administration would mend this mistake, and was committed to restoring efficient and accountable governance with a large focus on front-line workers’ interventions.
Interventions to stop nuisance and crime in the neighbourhood

Fig 4.9: Violent crimes (including sexual crimes) per 1000 inhabitants, reported to the police in the largest four Dutch cities, between 2005 and 2012

In practice, Rotterdam’s investment in front-line interventions has shown itself most prominently in the realm of safety in public space. Safety is an important component of ‘liveability’, and the city’s violent crime rates were in 2002 – and still are - the highest in the country. For LR’s first 2002-2006 administrations, but also for the following Labour-led and LR-led administrations, safety has become a major focal point in city policy (Snel, et al. 2011; Van Swaaningen 2007).

Most new safety measures that have been implemented since 2002 have been directed at the Hotspots and other poor areas with a low Safety Index. In 2002, a new type of civil servant was created to watch over security in the neighbourhood: the so-called City Marines. City Marines are amply budgeted (and well paid) front-line safety professionals, who work in and around their temporary office set up in Hotspot shopping streets. They personally order or implement law and order enforcement projects as well as social projects in the neighbourhood. Their budgetary freedom to finance social projects on the basis of the neighbourhood’s Safety Index score and their personal observations in the neighbourhood, is an example of ‘the matching of criminal justice and social policy in Rotterdam’ (Noordegraaf 2008, p. 233, quoting Boutellier 2001) and a front-line governance approach.

A second front-line measure to address crime in combination with other social problems are the ‘Intervention Teams’, which operate in the Hotspots and other poorer areas of Rotterdam. Since 2001, these teams make door to do house-visits (without a search warrant) to ask residents about possible social and financial problems. At the same time they check for crime, social assistance fraud and other misbehaviour as well as for potential child-raising problems. In 2011, for instance, circa 30.000 households were visited (Rotterdam 2011). The practice is considered a success, and has been copied to The Hague and other Dutch cities, even though the Rotterdam’s ombudsman has had stern critique on the way these teams deal with residents’ privacy (Noordegraaf 2008; Schinkel and Van den Berg 2011)

A visit by the Rotterdam intervention team can also be the start of a parenting education course for households. If the intervention team identifies child-raising problems in a program, often a call is made the municipal ‘Bureau Frontline’ (Bureau Frontlijn). This Bureau organises coaching trajectories
in which families are accompanied in their daily life by a social worker or student. This Bureau’s mission is to find “new solutions” for problems in “lagging behind neighbourhoods”. They underline their hands-on practical way of working: “We go into the neighbourhoods and try to listen to people. We value practice more than theoretical models” (Van den Berg 2014, p.102). The Bureau’s welfare workers and welfare-work students accompany the parents when they go to school or when organizing their home, giving them housekeeping and child-raising advice using ‘insistence and perseverance’ (Schinkel and Van Houdt 2010, p. 19). Rotterdam’s particularly large program for parenting education can be related to the social investment idea, which focuses on investment into citizens’ (economic) potential especially when they are young, but it has chosen very front-line and responsibilization-oriented interventions to create such investments.

Front-line ALMP’s: activating intervention in joblessness

Rotterdam is also known for its particularly front-line approach to welfare services of labour market reintegration. In the Netherlands, contributory schemes insure against sharp income losses due to unemployment for a maximum of two years after losing one’s job. After this period, or for those who have not worked before, social assistance (bijstand) is available for unemployed in a household that has no other substantial income sources. In the last five years, implementation responsibility for social assistance was transferred from the Dutch state to the municipalities. Nowadays, the central state allocates funding to local governments based on an estimation of the probable amount of long-term unemployed in the municipality related to its socio-economic and demographic characteristics. If the funding exceeds the use, municipalities can keep the difference, and the procedure is meant as an incentive for local governments to try to diminish the use of non-temporary unemployment allowances.

Fig 4.10: Share of benefit recipients among citizens aged 15 to 65, for the large cities and the Netherlands, 2013

![Graph showing the share of benefit recipients among citizens aged 15 to 65 in the Netherlands, Amsterdam, The Hague, Rotterdam, and Utrecht.](image)

Source: CBS 2015, compiled by author.

As figure 4.10 shows, Rotterdam has more residents receiving social assistance than the other Dutch cities. It was also one of the first municipalities to experiment with so-called ‘obligatory volunteering’ (see paragraph 2.4 of this dissertation). In the Rotterdam experiment that was started in 2010, social assistance recipients in selected neighbourhoods in the city have been obliged to do a certain number
hours of volunteering work per week, usually 20, to retain their full benefits. In case of health problems or child care responsibilities, these recipients are allowed to work fewer hours (see also paragraph 2.4 of this thesis on the ‘favour in return’ ALMP in the Netherlands). The ‘obligatory volunteering’ experiment has been slowly rolled out and became city-wide policy in 2015, after the new national 2015 Participation-Law had reinforced its legal basis.

In Rotterdam, the demands on recipients’ favour in return are different for people who have been unemployed for less than five years, than for those with a longer unemployment history. Applicants in the first group are enrolled in an ALMP called ’Work-pays’ (Werkloont). They do 20 hours of unpaid street cleaning work per week for 15 weeks, while wearing reflecting vests. This practice has received harsh critique in a report by the city’s ombudsman, mostly because of the tone in which people are addressed, and because of the stigma attached to the reflective vests (which in the Netherlands are also worn by people fulfilling a court-ordered ‘work sentence’). However, this program is still the current practice and will be continued in this ruling period (Rotterdam 2015c).

Recipients who have been unemployed for more than five years, on the other hand, are allowed to find their own type of volunteering work with whatever civil society or welfare organisation they choose, or to take (also) language or other classes for 20 hours per week. In practice, most of these ‘volunteers’ work with a welfare organisation and under the supervision of a welfare professional.

These two types of ALMP’s that Rotterdam developed fit the front-line governance model because they consist of much direct interaction between government employees and citizens. In the year of my fieldwork, however, the number of long-term unemployed doing a favour in return was not yet very large. By the autumn of 2014 there were 2800 citizens doing this type of obligatory volunteering (Rotterdam 2014c, p.114), which was 9% of all Rotterdam long-term poverty allowance recipients at that time.

At the start of these ALMP experiments in 2010, the administration’s arguments for them focused on the improvement of job chances for unemployed. As such, the ALMP’s where much in line with the social investment state perspective, in which citizens are stimulated and sometimes forced to invest in their labour market position (see paragraph 2.4 of this dissertation). A disappointing evaluation of Rotterdam’s favour in return program’s effects on participants’ job chances, however, has urged the administration to shift the goalposts of their arguments for this experiment. In 2014 the program was renamed ’Favour in Return’ (Tegenprestatie) and the rationale is now ’that it is normal to do something for society in return for one’s benefits’ (Arnoldus and Hofs 2014, p.9-10; Rotterdam 2014b, p.2). The idea that volunteering improves job chances has thus become less prominent in local government’ communication. This new reasoning is more close to ideas belonging to the ‘participation society’ policy frame, that couple citizenship to the obligation to make oneself useful to society and make certain social rights (such as poverty allowance) conditional on such efforts (see paragraph 2.5 of this dissertation).

Intervening in the erosion of social cohesion: the Opzoomeren and People Make the City programs

In the quote from the 2002 municipal coalition agreement in paragraph 4.3.3 of this thesis, the alarm bell is sounded over Rotterdam’s social cohesion. The text relates of a withering social cohesion and sense of belonging in the city. The social networks of the Rotterdammers would have become threadbare as their city became more multi-ethnic, resulting in an atmosphere that lacks not only safety but also homelessness and friendliness, which are other important parts of liveability. The coalition agreement also indicates how this problem of individualization in the globalized, impoverished city should be solved: the social tissue cannot be repaired without citizen’s active contributions.
Even before the LR victory, Rotterdam administrators had already invested much time and money in facilitating citizens who volunteer to increase friendliness and social cohesion in the neighbourhood. Since the nineteen nineties city hall has provided large budgets for residents’ self-organised street cleanings and festive street meetings, with an eye to supporting social cohesion especially in deprived multicultural neighbourhoods. This so-called Opzoomeren fund has been a national example ever since (Ouwehand and Doff 2013, p. 120), and has even been copied abroad, for instance in Copenhagen in Denmark and Genk and Antwerp in Belgium (Loopmans 2009, p.109). Part of the idea is that the ethnically mixed residential street is the place where different ethnic groups meet or at least observe each other, and which is a shared interest to all residents living around the space. Whereas the spatial level of the neighbourhood is too abstract and remote for citizens to do much effort, the street is a more likely stage for social life repair through voluntary involvement in for instance cleaning and other resident get-togethers.

Under the first LR administration the Opzoomeren program was sustained and complemented by another program, as the administration observed that social cohesion in ethnically diverse Rotterdam was seriously low (Uitermark and Duyvendak, p.3). This new program expansion was titled ‘People make the City’ (Mensen Maken de Stad). In this program community workers make door-to-door visits to the inhabitants of selected low-income streets. These community workers then organize a series of street parties and gatherings to co-create rules of conduct for the street, such as greeting and keeping an eye on each other’s children. In a final street party, large Street Rules billboards are installed on façades in the street. The selected areas were often multi-ethnic streets. As van Ostaaijen and Tops write in 2007, the integration policies of the Rotterdam mostly ‘focus on programs like Opzoomeren, and People make the City as ways to foster cooperation between all Rotterdammers’ (p.27, my translation).
Today, the People make the City program has been ended, only the street signs have remained. The Opzoomeren program, however, has been further developed. Now, also small volunteering projects for the street’s elderly, children and people with low (Dutch) literacy can be funded. The fund issues small amounts of money (up to €500) to more than a thousand streets (Hengeveld and Janssens 2010). The fund can be used throughout the year, but four times per year there are additional campaigns for special weeks. City papers announce ‘read-out-to-children week’ in spring and ‘care-for-the-elderly week’ in autumn. In the advertisements of the municipally funded Opzoomeren organisation, moral statements about ‘how we do in Rotterdam’ and ‘how we care for one another in Rotterdam’ are prevalent. Also, as the pictures on the Opzoomeren website and in the papers show, non-native Dutch citizens are explicitly part of the target group of Opzoomeren as volunteers as well as beneficiaries of the street initiatives.
Intervening in all these issues: self-organized welfare services

As the programs ‘Opzoomeren’ and ‘People make the city (succeed)’ show, Rotterdam has not only invested in repressive strategies to strengthen ‘liveability’ in its deprived areas, it has also paid much attention to especially altruistic or civil behaviour by its citizens (Uitermark and Duyvendak 2008, p. 1497-1498). Moreover, the Opzoomeren program, formerly directed at street social cohesion and cleanliness, is now also used to finance residents’ small welfare service-like efforts, such as organising incidental recreation for the street’s elderly (meals, outings) and children and for literacy projects. Importantly, this approach of supporting self-help in social cohesion, care and emancipation of marginalised groups, has been further developed and upscaled to neighbourhood level by the current administration.
The title of the current local welfare service policy program ‘Rotterdammers for one another – From welfare state to welfare street’ (Rotterdam 2014f), testifies of the administration’s ambition to increase self-help in the city. It aims for more voluntary help by friends and family to answer care needs of elderly and disabled, but it also aims at more self-help volunteering organizations in the neighbourhood. The program underlines that the 2007 national law on social services and participation (Wet Maatschappelijke Ondersteuning) directs municipalities to stimulate such civil society involvement and that this is necessary because state budgets for municipal welfare have decreased while demands have grown (As of 2015, for instance, support for elderly and disabled has been transferred from the central state to the municipalities in this way). Yet, the policy plan also underlines that involvement of residents’ organizations is important because of the innovation and social cohesion it brings (ibid p.6 and p.12). It notes that an important funding program has been created to help develop such neighbourhood welfare service volunteering organizations. This is the new ‘Resident Initiative’ fund (Bewonersinitiatief) (ibid p.12).

This Resident Initiative fund was mentioned in paragraph 1.1 of this dissertation. It is the main component of Rotterdam’s current investment program for citizens’ initiatives that it announced in its coalition agreement 2014-2018. In this document the municipality promises: ‘if possible we will spend 1% of the total city budget on stimulating citizens’ initiatives - preferably as a one-time investment after which these initiatives can finance themselves- to contribute to the realization of our desire to make Rotterdam the laboratory for social innovation’ (Rotterdam 2014a, p.6). In the first year of the new ruling period, most of these funds were allocated through the € 8.8 million Resident Initiative fund.

In the Resident Initiative system, this total budget is divided over all of Rotterdam’s 14 boroughs according to their population size. For each borough a citizen elected Borough Committee (Gebiedscommissie) decides on how to spend this money. They vote about whether or not to grant the requests for money (up to €10,000) made by volunteering groups in their borough for their activities to improve the ‘street, block, neighbourhood or borough’ (www.opzoomermee.nl). These Committees consist of 10 to 15 citizen members who convene (at least) monthly and receive a small monthly fee of € 500. Funding applications have to comply with five conditions set by City hall: applications cannot be granted if they do not involve voluntary efforts, if the activities are related to political or religious goals, if the applicant is a club and more than a half of the beneficiaries of the activities will be club members, or if the activities are organized by professionals who are structurally employed by the applying organisation. Also, to ‘guard the dynamic character of residents initiatives’ recurring activities can receive funding no more than two times. If these criteria are met, Committees are free in their sponsoring decision for each funding application.

To help Committees in their decision, each application is accompanied by a non-binding advice from neighbourhood based front-line civil servants (so called ‘neighbourhood managers’, and ‘neighbourhood networkers’) and the city’s Opzoomeren staff. Because these civil servants spend much time in the neighbourhood, and help the initiatives with the formal side of their application process and sometimes visit them, they have case-specific and local knowledge (Yanow 2004) that can help the Committee members with their decision. After reading the advice of the civil servants, the Committee members’ vote whether or not to grant the requested Resident Initiative funding. As almost all citizens’ initiatives I encountered during my fieldwork rely for the largest part on the local municipality for their finances, study of the evaluation process of funding applications is therefore a necessary link in studying the outcomes of the move towards more ‘self-organisation’ of welfare in deprived and wealthier Rotterdam urban neighbourhoods.
This new Resident Initiative funding program has ended all other neighbourhood based funding schemes that existed in Rotterdam. Still, with its Resident Initiative fund, Rotterdam is one of very few municipalities to sustain funding for neighbourhood volunteering in such a substantial way and to also invest in several municipal civil servants per neighbourhood to support neighbourhood volunteers. In most other cities the ample resident initiative subsidy programs of the crisis period have been scaled down severely (see paragraph 2.3 of this dissertation for the old voucher programs for volunteering organizations in deprived neighbourhoods). In Amsterdam, for instance, there is no central fund for residents’ volunteering initiatives. The funding is decentralized to the boroughs and not specified in the financial programs for 2014-2018, at city or borough level. A group of active Amsterdam citizens therefore has written a plea to the coalition to insert a paragraph on citizen initiatives in the neighbourhoods and city, like the other larger cities have (Rotterdam, Eindhoven, Utrecht, The Hague). The Rotterdam case is their ideal: they suggest ‘to complement this paragraph with a financial frame based on the Rotterdam City Lab fund: 1% of the city’s total usable budget’ (Amsterdam 2015, p. 3) At the same time, however, Rotterdam has much larger budget cuts in municipality provided welfare than Amsterdam. For the period 2012-2015a 49 million Euro cutback on welfare service spending was implemented, and for the period 2016-2018 another 16 million cut is planned, while poverty relief in this period will be cut by 30 million. Amsterdam, on the other hand, expands its poverty relief cash transfers by 96 million for the 2016-2018 period.

4.4 Interpretative frames for ‘Policy Laboratory’ Rotterdam

As the last paragraphs have shown, the Rotterdam administrations of the last 15 years have developed relatively heavy neighbourhood liveability measures, and this has not gone unnoticed in Dutch social and political science. In public (and policy) debate on Rotterdam’s front-line and activation-minded policies, the traditional public image of Rotterdam is often alluded to, which is that of the active harbour city. It is the image of the worker’s city where ‘the sleeves are rolled up’, where the main football team’s motto is ‘Actions speak louder than words’ and where a popular catchphrase is often heard: ‘no jabbering, let’s scrub’ (niet lullen maar poetsen)28. This image relates well to the ‘doing rather than talking approach’ of the intervention teams, city marines, ‘Favour in Return’ program, Opzoomeren program and Resident Initiatives funds.

There are other frames to understand the policies, as this thesis has outlined. Rotterdam’s ALMP’s and child-raising programs for instance, can be regarded as the city’s version of a ‘social investment’ approach. Also the ‘participation society’ approach is very prominent in the city’s policymaking history. The approach can be recognized in Rotterdam’s ALMP for long-time unemployed and in its various programs for promoting citizens’ particularly friendly efforts for the neighbourhood: the ‘Opzoomeren’ program, the ‘People make the city’ program, and the Borough based funding program. For these programs, Rotterdam has even become a national and international example.

However, there are other interpretative frames for Rotterdam’s innovative policy that are more clearly critiquing it. Critics for instance hold that the promotion of volunteering is a governmental strategy to divert attention away from the shrinkage of state provision of these services, and as a way to achieve budget cuts by using the unpaid labour of volunteers (Van Twist, et al. 2014, p.8). (However, as resident initiatives always entail some resident influence and can never be completely instrumentalized for state objectives, attention diversion and free labour is not the whole picture of growing neighbourhood welfare self-organisation, see paragraph 4.3.5 of this thesis). Several social scientists, furthermore, have noted how the exclusionary measures for new inhabitants of Rotterdam (Rotterdam-

28 See Van der Berg 2012, chapter 2, for a more extensive description and analysis of Rotterdam’s cherished action-minded and masculine public image
law, screening of renters) but also the front-line policies for existing citizens, are aimed at control: citizens in deprived neighbourhoods can be subjected to for instance door-to-door household inspections, to child-raising support at home or, if they are unemployed, to rather rigorous workfare programs that include intensive counselling and obligatory volunteering work. They note that many of these controlling front-line measures come with a war-like terminology of ‘city marines’, ‘intervention teams’, ‘front-line bureaus’ and ‘Hotspots’. Terminology that connotes a necessity of immediate, controlling, on-the-ground action (Schinkel and Van den Berg 2011; Van Ostaaijen and Tops 2007). Some scholars hold that all these controlling measures represent the oppressive side of neoliberal communitarianism (Schinkel and Van Houdt, 2011). Others have presented the frame of ‘urban revanchism’ to understand Rotterdam’s trajectory in social policies.

Urban revanchism is the term Neil Smith coined in 1996 to describe ‘a reconquering process of North-American cities for the middle class tourists and gentrifiers’, by ‘excluding and criminalizing marginal groups that would threaten the ‘quality of life’ in neighbourhoods and public spaces’ (Van Eijk 2010a, p. 821). The urban revanchism theory identifies gentrification and the criminalization of deviant behaviour (sleeping rough, loitering etc.) as local politics’ main tools to (re-)establish the city’s attractiveness for the middle classes, thereby bringing capitalist profit growth while excluding marginal groups from the city. Smith’s book spurred ample debate in the social sciences, scholars debated for instance whether urban revanchism exists also outside the US. Dutch sociologists Uitermark and Duyvendak (2008) defended the idea that the special social policies that Rotterdam has developed since 2002, fit the urban revanchism frame. They argue that Rotterdam’s most marginalized groups suffer under the implemented exclusionary measures (such as the Rotterdam-Law) as well as the disciplining measures (such as Citizens make the City). The authors acknowledge that there are important differences with US urban revanchism: while urban revanchism in the US serves urban middle class interests, Rotterdam’s 2002 LR administration tries to serve mostly its lower- and lower middle-class electorate. But this difference is not important enough to deny the policies’ ultimately revanchist nature (ibid, p. 1486).

In response to Uitermark and Duyvendak, Van Eijk (2010a) argues that Rotterdam’s social policies should not be understood as eventually driven by merely economic motives (as in the urban revanchism model). Instead, she states that ‘these policies are [also] intertwined with ideas about multiculturalism and integration’ (p.820). She documents how in the parliamentary debate on the Rotterdam-Law in 2005, various political parties, from left to right, argued that poverty concentration neighbourhoods were detrimental to deprived households living there, among whom many ethnic minority households. Deprived neighbourhoods and ethnic concentration neighbourhoods, in other words, were deemed problematic because of their assumed neighbourhood effects and the ethnic segregation they embody, also by parties representing mostly middle and lower-class interests.

Van Eijk further details how these political standpoints relate to opinions of the native Dutch residents she interviewed in a Rotterdam Hotspot area. Her interviewees were concerned about the pace of the

---

29 Urban geographer Saskia Sassen was asked on a 2015 visit to Rotterdam what she thought about the fact that Rotterdam both has strong aspirations to strengthen gentrification and at the same time runs ‘disciplining’ forced labour programs for the unemployed. The journalist hinted at the urban revanchism frame. Sassen’s response however, focused on the positive aspects of Rotterdam’s frontline approach to joblessness, arguing that it ‘may very well be that the Rotterdam social assistance policies will play a positive role. It controls powerless citizens, but it also means that young idealist civil servants can stay in touch with the needs of social assistance recipients’, and she compared this to the American situation where long-term unemployed are often completely out of the state’s sight and attention. See Touburg (2015).
ethnic diversification of the neighbourhood. More than talk about safety, they complained about how they saw their social norms about social behaviour in public space clash with those of ethnic minority ‘newcomers’. They linked especially their perceptions of litter and noise to the arrival of ethnic minority groups. Referring to Bauman’s work on globalization (1998), Van Eijk (2010a) deduces from the growing focus on order by populist political parties as well as from her interviews in fast changing lower-income neighbourhoods, that foremostly among lower-educated citizens a struggle ‘for safety (liveability) and social order (the call for integration)’ is often felt (ibid p. 830, italics in original). The word integration, here, must be understood as ‘identificational acculturation’ (ibid p. 824). This call for order in public space and for migrants’ acculturation is taken up ‘particularly by the new rightist parties, such as Lijst Pim Fortuyn and Liveable Rotterdam’, while also in the rest of the political realm the dominance of the multiculturalist ideal has weakened. She thus concludes that Rotterdam’s social policies are not in the first place motivated by ‘urban revanchism’, but rather by ‘insecurities that stem from concerns about national unity and concerns for social order’.

Since Van Eijk’s article in 2010, also the following Rotterdam administrations have problematized influx of international migrants to the city’s poorer areas. The current administration states for instance in the new 2014-2018 coalition that it ‘will limit the influx of deprived people’ from ‘all corners of the world’ to its poorer neighbourhoods (Gemeente Rotterdam 2014a, p.13), and will strive for more income mix in these neighbourhoods. Also the concern about cultural unity in the city is still very prominent, as this quote from the coalition agreement shows:

Rotterdam will be a city where we understand each other’s words and where we treat each other respectfully across ethnic and religious boundaries. In Rotterdam we are surprised about anti-social behaviour and we call each other to account for such behaviour. Everyone has the same rights and obligations and a shared outlook on values is the foundation under our individual freedom. In Rotterdam, residents take the initiative in their streets against dilapidation (‘verloedering’ which in Dutch has both the meaning of physical decay and of social disorder). That doesn't happen by itself; we must work hard at this together, without taboos (ibid, 2014a, p.3).

This excerpt shows that respectful treatment between neighbourhood residents needs to be further developed (‘will be a city where’). Anti-social behaviour is mentioned amidst statements promoting acculturalist integration (‘where we understand each other’s words’, ‘a shared outlook on values’). Furthermore, neighbourhood physical and social problems in the streets should be addressed ‘without taboos’. In the rest of this document the word ‘taboo’ is used to describe avoidance to talk about a phenomenon’s relations with ethnicity or religion (ibid, p.13) and that is likely also the meaning in this sentence. The taboos of the politically correct multiculturalist era should vanish. And finally, like in the excerpt of the 2002 coalition agreement quoted in paragraph 4.3.3, resident neighbourhood initiatives are presented as necessary to overcome the erosion of friendliness.

In Rotterdam’s policy discourse, neighbourhood public space safety and friendliness are thus still tangled up with its poverty and ethnic diversity levels, and residents’ initiatives are presented as an important answer. It can therefore be argued that also Rotterdam’s strong policy focus on well behaving citizens in such areas, for instance in welfare self-organisation, is in part related to the same insecurities around national unity that underlie many of its special safety policies and housing allocation rules. There is a fear or perception that especially ethnic minorities disengage from Dutch society and from neighbourhood society. Therefore, any citizens that are active for society in a way
that is in line with mainstream Dutch cultural ideas about good public causes, are explicitly praised and funded.

4.5 Conclusion

This chapter has shown why Rotterdam can serve as a strategic research site for research into the outcomes of more ‘participation society’ in the city: the city combines severe welfare cutbacks with strong policy attention for welfare service self-organisation. It has shown how the chosen policy trajectory is related to the city’s unfavourable economic position but also to its political and migration history. Economically, the city has been in a worse situation than other Dutch cities since the nineteen seventies. This has created large welfare needs and, as localisation of costs progressed, increasingly smaller budgets to finance them. Moreover, in city politics of the last two decades, Rotterdam’s economic situation but also its ethnic composition have been seen as serious problems. In response, and particularly since a populist anti-migration party obtained considerable power in local politics in 2002, a large number of new social policies have been devised to address neighbourhood ‘liveability’ and related urban marginality problems. So much so that several scholars and also Rotterdam administrations themselves have described the city as ‘a national policy laboratory’ for improving welfare services in such a way that they help to solve liveability issues. Various forms of citizen activation, sometimes facilitative and sometimes more coercive, have been important ingredients of these policies (Schinkel and Van Houdt 2010). In line with its policy innovator’s image and its enduring problematization of urban social cohesion, the current Rotterdam administration envisions itself also as a frontrunner in support for active citizens’ initiatives in welfare and other services. In the coalition agreement 2014-2018 it has recorded its intention to spend large yearly budgets (1% of the total city budget) on stimulating citizens’ initiatives, to contribute to the realization ‘of our desire to make Rotterdam the laboratory for social innovation’. Since March 2014, around 6 million euro per year has been divided over all of Rotterdam’s 14 boroughs according to population size, where citizen elected Borough Committees further distribute this money over citizens’ initiatives. Currently, there are no other Dutch cities where such subsidies are so prominently available for neighbourhood based citizens’ initiatives.
Chapter 5: Research approach

The last chapter has outlined the choice for research site Rotterdam. This chapter presents the case studies and methods I have selected to answer the central research question of this dissertation: do deprived and wealthier neighbourhoods have different potential to 'self-organize' welfare services?

To find this answer, the research relies on qualitative case-study research in two deprived neighbourhoods and two richer neighbourhoods in Rotterdam, all of about 8000 inhabitants. The two deprived neighbourhoods will be called Harbortown and Parktown. The two wealthier neighbourhoods are in the north, and are named Flowerville and Northville in this study. (All real names and place names in my research were changed, to warrant the anonymity of the researched.) In addition, a dataset was compiled of all 224 Resident Initiative funding applications made to the Committees of one richer and one poorer borough in the period from March 2014 to March 2015. This quantitative data is used to see if the findings of the qualitative case-study research can be recognized also in larger N data.

The object of research in these case-study neighbourhoods are the neighbourhood-based volunteering organisations delivering some form of welfare-services throughout the year. Welfare services, in my definition, are such services in the fields of care, social cohesion and emancipation as local government can be also found to finance -or used to finance- through social work or other professional services. That services have to do the type of work that is also found in professional welfare services, means that I exclude volunteering in sports clubs (unless they have volunteering projects explicitly aimed at vulnerable groups) as well as other recreational organizations for adults. I look at volunteer-run, year round initiatives rather than incidental events, because I want to see the effects of the participation society on neighbourhood welfare provision so I investigate organizations that make an effort at offering substantial services. Lastly, because I study formal or informal volunteering organisations; I do not consider informal volunteering where one friend or family member cares for an elderly or disabled person (which is known as cloak care (mantelzorg) in Dutch).

5.1 The case-study neighbourhoods

Fig 5.1: Mean standardized yearly household income per Rotterdam neighbourhood, 2011

*Only neighbourhoods with more than 250 residents are shaded*
Fig 5.2: share of native Dutch (CBS definition) per Rotterdam neighbourhood, 2015

In %

Only neighbourhoods with more than 250 residents are shaded

Source: Municipal administration, elaborated by OBI municipality of Rotterdam

Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show what differences in income-level and ethnic diversity exist between the Rotterdam neighbourhoods. After ordering the neighbourhoods according to average standardized household income, I chose four neighbourhoods that were of the same size (around 8000 inhabitants) and are situated at more or less the same distance to the city centre and have the same kind of urban density. I did not want to include very new areas or suburban areas, because I imagined that in such neighbourhood there are not (yet) as many neighbourhood contacts, and this could affect the level of self-organizations. This led me to my choice, and at this point (January 2014, when the Resident Initiative fund had not yet started) I did not know about any self-organizations in the areas yet.

The two deprived case-study neighbourhoods were selected from the 10% poorest and most ethnically diverse neighbourhoods in the city. These adjacent areas, which I named Harbourtown and Parktown, were built in the early nineteen hundreds to house the labourers and their families of the nearby harbours. The areas consist for about 80% of rental housing, three quarters of which are social housing. The average standardized household income is 20% lower than city average (CBS, 2013), and 40% of the neighbourhoods’ working population receives some kind of poverty allowance (28% is the Rotterdam average). The two neighbourhoods are very ethnically diverse; around 80% of the inhabitants are 1st or 2nd generation migrants of various ethnicities. Moroccans and Turks are the largest groups, both amounting to circa 20% of the neighbourhoods’ population. Other relatively large groups are first and second generation Antilleans, Cabo-Verdeans, Surinamese and Eastern Europeans. As such, both neighbourhoods are among the poorest and most diverse neighbourhoods in the Netherlands.
Both deprived neighbourhoods were particularly troubled by hard-drug sales and related nuisance and crime between 1990 and 2005. In this period these neighbourhoods and bordering areas gained a national reputation for being 'under siege' of drug dealers and associated crime. Many dwellings were undermaintained or even vacant at the time, as many streets where scheduled for demolition or renovation but funding for physical neighbourhood renewal became ran dry. In the same period, prostitution was very present near the neighbourhoods and this attracted more crime. In response, neighbourhood resident organisations were vigilant in attracting political attention to be tougher on narcotic crime and prostitution. In this period, community workers gave practical support to campaigning residents as well as to residents’ initiatives to make the neighbourhood more liveable in these hard times. These initiatives were mostly neighbourhood parties to foster social contacts and familiarity among neighbourhood residents, so that their perception of safety was strengthened. Today, Harbourtown and Parktown still have some groups formed and forged through this troublesome episode in neighbourhood history, such as its residents’ platform (the main political campaigning group in the nineties) and a homework club for Moroccan children, formed in 1985 when parents decided it was too dangerous for their children to play outside.

After 2005 repression of crime became stronger in the area and the prostitution zone was closed down, in line with LR’s attack on ‘unliveable’ areas. Also the neighbourhood renewal schemes in the area were finally completed. At the same time, compulsory treatment of drug addiction became more prominent in Dutch healthcare. As a result of all this, crime rates in the area are much more under control than in the nineties, although the area’s Safety Index remains low (5 out of 10). The percentage of low-income households in the neighbourhoods has been stable throughout the last decade, hovering around 70% in both areas. This is mainly because the areas’ urban renewal did not have high ‘social mix’ ambitions; only three of the renewal streets have been rebuilt or renovated to attract higher income households, two in Parktown and one in Harbourtown. These streets now form little middle class islands in the lower class neighbourhoods, and neighbourhood data hardly show signs of gentrification; in both neighbourhoods the share of higher income households (highest two Dutch income deciles) has remained at around 5% between 2002 and 2011 (Rotterdamincijfers.nl).

---

30 See also Burgers, J. and R. Kloosterman (1996) for a description of this type of problems in Rotterdam neighbourhoods troubled by drugs and prostitution at the end of the twentieth century.
Fig 5.4: socio-economic and demographic data of the four research neighbourhoods in 2014 (percentages have been rounded to the nearest ten)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>% owner-occupied dwellings</th>
<th>% social rent dwellings</th>
<th>% other rental dwellings</th>
<th>average standardized household income per month (rounded to thousands)</th>
<th>% households in highest 2 Dutch income deciles (2011)</th>
<th>% households in lowest 4 Dutch income deciles (2011)</th>
<th>% non-western ethnic minority inhabitants (1st and 2nd generation migrants)</th>
<th>% households with children</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parktown</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>€18,000</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harbourtown</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>€17,000</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flowerville</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>€22,000</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northville</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>€27,000</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Rotterdaminctijfers.nl, data of 2014

At the same distance to the centre of Rotterdam, but in another part of town, are Flowerville and Northville. Like Parktown and Harbourtown, these neighbourhoods mostly consist of closed building blocks of row housing and apartments, built in the early twentieth century. Flowerville has about the same density as Parktown and Harbourtown and Northtown is less dense, and rental housing is limited to 60% and 30% respectively. Average standardized household income is at the average level for Rotterdam in Flowerville, it is 25% higher than Rotterdam average in Northville. These neighbourhoods also have much higher shares of ‘autochthonous’ Dutch (residents who were born in the Netherlands and have two Dutch-born parents): 50% and 70% respectively. Regarding safety, Flowerville scores 8 out of 10 and Northville even 10 out of 10 on the Safety Index. Rather than safety, housing quality is sometimes a problem in these neighbourhoods. Both areas are built on peat, and in several streets the wooden housing fundament have started to rot. Especially for home owners renovation of the foundation structure of their dwelling is an - often unexpected- financial burden that can amount to tens of thousands of euros.

All four selected case-study neighbourhoods are rather alike when it comes to age composition: about 20% of the residents are younger than 15 in all four neighbourhoods (Rotterdam average is 15%) and 70% is below 45 (which is 60% for Rotterdam as a whole). Within this age group, Parktown and Harbourtown have more young adults (15-25) and Northville and Flowerville more inhabitants aged 25 to 45. In congruence with their relatively young age profile, in each research neighbourhood the share of households with children living at home is slightly above the Rotterdam average (28%).

86
5.2 Data collection methods

In this research I will not use individual survey data to look at the possibly differing potential of deprived and wealthier neighbourhoods. Instead I will study neighbourhood volunteering in the way that Sampson et al (2005) suggest: by looking at these practices directly. In this way I want to obtain a more direct assessment of the quantity of these practices in both types of neighbourhoods, and the mechanisms that can explain differences between neighbourhoods, following various rich qualitative studies that have established mechanisms behind failures and successes for individual initiatives and neighbourhoods (see paragraph 3.2). For the research I will follow four steps.

Step 1: In the four neighbourhoods selected for qualitative research I interviewed all present volunteering organisations (that were willing to cooperate) offering welfare services throughout the year. The organisations were found through snowballing, walking around in the neighbourhoods and information from social workers and local papers. As such I have done and transcribed 34 interviews with initiative leaders, mostly semi-structured by the question list in appendix 1. All but two interviews were taped. In most cases I have also done participatory observations at the activities they organized. Furthermore, I studied these organisations through desk research (neighbourhood papers, Facebook and webpages of the organisations themselves and those subsidizing them) and by seeing them present themselves during the Borough Committee meetings dealing with their subsidy requests. In these ways I charted the educational background, profession and socio-economic position of the leading volunteers, the way they had been recruited, the number and characteristics of the people they service and the successes and obstacles of their organisations. I also visited 2 Borough Committees meetings of the Rotterdam’s richest borough North Borough (of which Northville is part) and 6 Committee meetings of the relatively poor Polder Borough (which contains Harbourn town and Parktown). Also, I interviewed 15 professionals working with the initiatives in all 4 case-study neighbourhoods - social workers and civil servants-, and two policymakers working in the Rotterdam city hall, who design policies to shape Rotterdam’s participation society. With them, I also checked whether I had found the year-round welfare service providing volunteer groups in their area.

Step 2: By qualitatively studying also two selected volunteering organisations in Eindhoven, I have tried to see if there may be far reaching consequences of Rotterdam’s government policies on supporting neighbourhood active citizenship that make the city a unique case, and would restrict generalizability of the findings to this single city.

Step 3: Another qualitative component of the research consisted of joining an initiative that is run by lower-educated residents in one of the deprived research neighbourhoods. This started from the idea that I would notice and understand the dilemmas and perks of volunteering in a deprived neighbourhood better, if I was also partly in charge of one myself, rather than being only a theoretically informed observer. This method is known as participatory observation and within the social sciences it is grounded most strongly in the discipline of anthropology. Participatory observation allowed me to follow the ups and downs of this organisation over time and with more background information than a one-time interview or observation provides. It also allowed me to feel the problems and rewards of volunteering more directly than if these perceptions were related to me only indirectly in words. It is therefore a good method to investigate the emotions governed by neighbourhood volunteering, as in many debates on the participation society emotions are given a central place as important drivers for volunteering (De Wilde 2015, p.179-181; Kampen 2014), and motivation is also the object of my second subquestion. Participatory observation, however, also has its complications. The quality of data gathering can be reduced due the researcher’s identification with the research context and by the possibility that her presence affects the context (people change their behaviour because they feel they are being researched). As several anthropologists have noted, being aware of these complications, avoiding to let them gain the upper hand, and writing about their
possible influence, are ways to make participatory observation a worthwhile method within its limitations and strengths (O’Reilly 2005 p. 222, quoted in Specht 2012, p. 87). My way to avoid affecting the research context too much, was to run a separate, individual project within a residents’ initiative. Being a voluntary math teacher for primary school students for a year in a volunteer-run community centre, has enabled me to see the organisation grow during my fieldwork year and feel what it is like to do this type of volunteering work, without affecting the organisations’ decisions in a substantial way.

Step 4: While the qualitative approach of step 1, 2 and 3 forms the core of my research project, a quantitative data analysis is used to see if what I found through qualitative methods can be recognized in less precise but higher N data as well. To triangulate the outcomes of the qualitative approach with quantitative data, I listed all volunteering organisations that applied (successfully and unsuccessfully) for funding in the period March 2014 until March 2015 to the Committees of one relatively rich and one relatively poor borough. This amounted to in total 224 applications, made by 203 initiatives. I believe that this method gives an acceptable inventory of the initiatives present in both areas, as in my qualitative fieldwork I have hardly come across volunteering organisations that have not applied for Borough Committee funding. On the basis of my qualitative fieldwork and internet research (notably studying Facebook pages, which almost all initiatives had) I coded for each organisation the leading volunteer’s SES (based on education level) and ethnic status, as well my assessment of its users’ general income level and ethnic status. I also coded the type of welfare service the organisation delivers, whether it received the money it had applied for, and what amount of money this was. I call the resulting dataset the Borough Dataset. In contrast to the qualitative case-study data, this dataset also contains many organisations that create activities only at a yearly or incidental basis. As such the focus is wider than my qualitative research in the four research neighbourhoods, where I interviewed only organisations that are active throughout the year. All the same, the Borough Dataset gives a good overview of what kind of neighborhood volunteering work is done in socio-economically different areas of Rotterdam.
Chapter 6: Activation: who self-organizes what kind of welfare services and why?

Now that the last chapter has presented the research sites and methods, this chapter and the next will present the research findings. The first direct way to look at the possible differences in deprived and wealthier neighbourhoods’ potential for self-organising welfare services, is to see how many initiatives have established themselves in both types of neighbourhoods, and thus assess the quantity of self-organisation. This approach to assessing the level of welfare self-organisation, taking its cue from (Sampson, et al. 2005), is followed in the next paragraph. The paragraphs following that, will deal with the underlying factors causing this quantity, by answering the three subquestions on volunteer activation presented in paragraph 3.3.

6.1 Different neighbourhoods, different self-organized welfare services

By walking and asking around in the four research neighbourhoods and going to Borough Committee meetings, I soon found that initiatives in the two deprived neighbourhoods actually were more numerous than in the two wealthier neighbourhoods. As shown in Table 1, the inventory of initiatives that I have developed and checked with local professionals and volunteers, makes clear that in the deprived areas there are more year-round welfare service providing self-organisations.

In Table 6.1, the initiatives are ordered by the type of service they deliver. This shows that the deprived areas have more groups providing various types of information and in-kind help for inhabitants, as well as recreation for the young and old among the inhabitants. These face-to-face types of help and recreation activities usually require indoor accommodation. Several volunteers in the deprived neighbourhoods therefore manage accommodations available for self-organized welfare services. The wealthier neighbourhoods, on the other hand, have more self-maintained parks and playgrounds, which can contribute to residents’ social cohesion (and to some extent their health).

Table 6.1: year-round welfare service providing self-organisations in the research neighbourhoods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Harbourtown</th>
<th>Parktown</th>
<th>Flowerville</th>
<th>Northville</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recreation clubs for children</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homework clubs for children</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch language courses</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managing self-run community centres</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elderly care initiatives</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 *</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recreation for elderly</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty relief / administrative counselling</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance of parks and playgrounds</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>12</strong></td>
<td><strong>15</strong></td>
<td><strong>5</strong></td>
<td><strong>8</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* half voluntary, half commercial: (mostly higher educated) residents providing elderly care for minimum wage pay

6.1.2 Incidence and goals in the Borough Dataset

That initiatives are relatively numerous in deprived areas can also be concluded from analysing the Borough Dataset (the 224 funding requests that were made to the Borough Committee in two boroughs between March 2014 and March 2015, see paragraph 5.2, step 4). These boroughs are the
relatively rich borough of which Northville is part, and the relatively poor borough to which Harbourtown and Parktown belong.

I have divided all neighbourhoods in the two boroughs of the dataset in three groups according to wealth: one where less than 10% of the households have a standardized income in the highest national quintile, one where this is between 10 and 20%, and one where over 20% are in this quintile (data from Rotterdamincijfers.nl). (Such a classification gives the same neighbourhood ordering as when they are ordered by average standardized household incomes). The dataset consists of 110 applications from low SES neighbourhoods, 63 from mixed neighbourhoods and 24 from high SES neighbourhoods (I excluded 13 Resident Initiative fund applications that aim to develop services for the whole borough). Purely on the basis of their population size we would have expected 77 applications in the low SES areas, 79 in the mixed areas and 41 in the rich areas. Thus, we can say that the low SES neighbourhoods have in fact relatively many funding-requesting initiatives per inhabitant.

It is furthermore interesting that the differences in most prevalent service types of initiatives which showed for the year-round active groups in poorer and wealthier case-study neighbourhoods (table 6.1), can also be recognized in the Borough Dataset (See figure 6.1).

**Figure 6.1: Funding Applications in the Borough Data Set, by initiatives’ goals and SES type neighbourhood (percentages)**

In the low SES neighbourhoods (self-)help for marginalized groups is much more prominent. Here, one in five applications explicitly state the goal of empowerment. Also children’s recreational and educational activities are relatively popular. It is probable that in the richer areas childrens’ recreational or educational activities outside the home are mostly bought on the market (commercial homework classes, sports and creative courses), while in the poorer areas there is also relatively much interest in volunteer-provided activities for them. In high SES neighbourhoods, on the other hand, there are more applications by initiatives that want to maintain public spaces (parks, playgrounds) or want to stage public outdoor events (neighbourhood parties, markets, memorial events). Such one-
time outdoor public initiatives are all likely to benefit social cohesion in the area, but they are not strongly connected to the welfare projects of ‘care’ and ‘emancipation’\textsuperscript{31}.

\subsection*{6.1.3 Granted applications in all Rotterdam boroughs}

A last confirmation of the somewhat unexpected finding that Resident Initiatives are more manifest in poorer neighbourhoods, is found in the use of the Borough based funding program in the year 2014. 9 of 14 Borough Committees published complete financial overviews for this year, which was the first year of their existence. The overviews relate that in most boroughs there were not enough awarded applications to empty the budgets, even though a high percentage of applications was awarded.

A graphic representation of the data (figure 6.3) shows that in the richer boroughs (higher average household income) less money per inhabitant was spent on initiatives than in the poorer boroughs. The Borough of Pernis is an outlier to this trend. But this borough is exceptional for Rotterdam also in other regards. With 5000 inhabitants, it is also by far the smallest borough. It is a village in the middle of the Rotterdam industrial harbour complex separated from the city itself by 5 kilometre of harbour terrain. Up to 2010 it was its own municipality. The case Pernis may represent an ‘random’ outlier or the case may point to a difference in self-organisation potential between urban and more rural or isolated areas. That question, however, is outside the scope of this dissertation\textsuperscript{32}.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure6.2.png}
\caption{Resident Initiative budget spent in Euros per inhabitant per borough, boroughs ordered by average household income level}
\end{figure}


\textsuperscript{31} Another particular subject that stands out in the high SES neighbourhoods is ‘Housing safety’. This has to do with the exceptional fact that in North Borough several streets have rapidly decaying housing foundations, and resident clubs are now gathering and dispersing information on how to safeguard these, mostly owner-occupied, dwellings.

\textsuperscript{32} The few Dutch quantitative researches that compare neighbourhood volunteering rates between rural areas and urban areas, do not find strong differences for these spatial types (Van Houwelingen et al, 2014)
6.2 On Leaders’ SES status and ethnicity

Now that we have seen relatively higher numbers of volunteering organisations in deprived areas, we can use the subquestion to test potential explanations for this difference. The first traditional way to explain incidence of volunteering activities in a neighbourhood is by looking at the neighbourhood residents’ individual level characteristics. The point is often made that higher-educated, majority ethnic residents do more volunteering, and this is also the basis for my research subquestion 1:

Do higher-educated and majority ethnic residents engage in neighbourhood welfare-service volunteering more than other residents?

If I find higher levels of volunteering in poorer, more multicultural areas through direct investigation of residents’ initiatives, does this mean the positive relation between socio-economic status and volunteering does not hold for my research neighbourhoods?

To research this, I have asked the volunteer group leaders in the four research neighbourhoods about their educational history levels and ethnicity. The outcomes are ordered in tables 6.2 and 6.3 below. I focus on the leaders, as it can be argued (and I often saw in practice) that it is usually one leader that creates and maintains the networks with professionals and makes formal and informal requests for support. Therefore, the skills and networks of the initiative’s leader are most important for gaining subsidies and volunteers, and thus for self-organisation potential.

Table 6.2: education level of the initiative leader and SES of users, per welfare service type, in the deprived research neighbourhoods (leaders can run more than one service)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of neighbourhood welfare service</th>
<th>Turkish community centre Parktown</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Turkish (2nd gen)**</th>
<th>Low</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>self-run community accommodations</td>
<td>Turkish mosque international</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Turkish **</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Turkish (2nd generation)**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Block</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Dutch</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Community centre Daisy</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Dutch</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Elderly care initiatives              |                                  |      |                      |     |

| Recreation for elderly                |                                  |      |                      |     |
|                                       | Mullerflat                       | Low  | Dutch                | Low |
|                                       | Our Cabo Island                  | High | Cabo Verdean (2nd gen)** | Low |
|                                       | Foodbank                         | Low  | Dutch                | Low |

| Poverty relief / administrative counselling |                                  |      |                      |     |
| Turkish mosque international            | Low                               | Dutch | Low                |     |
|                                          | Turkish (2nd generation)**       |      |                      |     |
|                                          | Showme                           | Low  | Antilleaan           | Low |
| Maintenance of public parks playgrounds and streets | Harbouerstown Open Stage | Low  | Dutch                | High |
| Townstreet’s organisation               | High                              | Dutch | Public space        |     |
|                                        | Temporary park                   | High  | Dutch               | Public space |
|                                        |                                   |      |                      |     |
| total                                 | 12                                | 15   |                      |     |

* I was not able to speak with a leader of this organisation
** Leader of a mono-ethnic self-organisation (Turkish, Moroccan or Cabo Verdean)

Table 6.3: education level of the initiative leader and SES of users, per welfare service type, in the wealthier research neighbourhoods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of neighbourhood welfare service</th>
<th>Education level of leader (s)</th>
<th>Education level of the leader of the service</th>
<th>SES of most users</th>
<th>Northville</th>
<th>Education level of the leader (s)</th>
<th>Education level of the leader of the service</th>
<th>SES of most users</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recreation clubs for children</td>
<td>Playground Little Rascals</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Dutch</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>Neighbourly</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homework clubs for children</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch language courses</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>self-run community accommodations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elderly care initiatives</td>
<td>Neighbourly</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Dutch</td>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recreation for elderly</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Dutch</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Coffee hour of the Northville residents' organisation</td>
<td>Dutc</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty relief</td>
<td>Flowerville’s</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Dutch</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Northville’s Residents’ platform</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Dutc</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Initiative leaders’ education levels in the four research neighbourhoods

Overseeing the education levels of initiatives’ leaders in my four research neighbourhoods, I find the same overrepresentation of higher educated people that is almost always found in population survey research on volunteering. In both types of neighbourhoods, two thirds of all leaders are higher educated, i.e. they have finished higher vocational education (hbo) or university. To compare: only 27% of Rotterdam inhabitants aged 15 to 75 has finished higher vocational education or university (CBS, 2014). Educational data are not available at neighbourhood level, but because of the strong difference with the city average, we can assume that higher-educated are indeed overrepresented among initiative leaders in both the wealthier and the poorer research neighbourhoods.

Even if they form a minority, however, lower-educated leaders are not at all absent in the four neighbourhood case-studies. In the deprived neighbourhoods, lower-educated leaders organize recreation clubs for elderly and children (five in total), two homework clubs, a food bank giving out free food to poor households and two household administration counselling initiatives. In the wealthier neighbourhoods, there is a public garden, an elderly care organisation and a playground that are led by lower educated leaders. Some of the lower educated leaders also have supporting volunteers in their organisation that are higher educated, but the largest part of the organising work is done by these lower-educated leaders themselves.

Initiative leaders’ ethnicity in the four research neighbourhoods

The second part of this subquestion deals with the relationship between ethnic status and volunteering rates. Is it true that minority ethnic residents are underrepresented among neighbourhood volunteering leaders? In the fieldwork in the four research neighbourhoods, I indeed found more native-Dutch leaders than could be expected on the basis of the ethnic composition of their population. In the wealthier areas I even found only native-Dutch initiative leaders. In the deprived neighbourhoods, half of the initiative leaders are autochthonous, whereas this should be one in three if the group would be perfectly representative of the neighbourhoods’ ethnic composition. Even though calculating shares is not completely sensible with such small-N sets of data, we may still suspect that native Dutch are indeed overrepresented in both types of neighbourhoods, but not extremely so in the deprived neighbourhoods.

The Borough Dataset provides a way to test the findings in the case-study neighbourhoods in larger-N data. Analysis of the Borough Dataset indeed confirms that there is overrepresentation of higher educated and majority ethnic leaders in all three socio-economic types of neighbourhoods.
### Table 6.4: Education levels and ethnicities of leaders in the Borough Dataset

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rotterdam population (15-79)</th>
<th>Leaders in whole dataset</th>
<th>Leaders in High SES neighbourhoods</th>
<th>Leaders in Middle SES neighbourhoods</th>
<th>Leaders in Low SES neighbourhoods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% of native-Dutch</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% higher educated</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Borough Dataset

### 6.3 Activation: triggering neighbourhood problems and other motives

The last paragraph has shown overrepresentations of higher-educated and –to a lesser extent– native-Dutch leaders in neighbourhood welfare service volunteering. This provides us with a rough idea on which type of people do most of the volunteering in this field. But it is not yet known why these people do it, even though it is unpaid work that takes a lot of effort, especially in the year-round service providing self-organizations, which is where I did my interviews. Maybe by knowing leaders’ reasons, we will also understand better why higher educated and –to a lesser extent– native-Dutch are overrepresented among them. Subquestion 2 will be the guiding question in this endeavour. According to the hypothesis mentioned in paragraph 3.3, a lot of volunteering takes place partly because residents are triggered by a problem they see in their environment and for which they want to devise a solution themselves. The corresponding subquestion is:

2: Are leaders in deprived neighbourhoods more activated to become a volunteer because of triggering neighbourhood problems?

This paragraph will therefore provide an investigation of the triggers and motivations that people have to be active in a welfare service providing neighbourhood self-organisation.

The best way to look at volunteers’ motives is to look into the interview and observation data. In the thirty interviews in which I spoke with leaders about their motivation, most indeed refer to specific social problems that manifest themselves in the neighbourhood, but there are also various people who don’t talk about a neighbourhood situation perceive as negative. Instead, they mostly say they like doing this or they found a situation could be ’even better’. To answer the subquestion we must look at the first group of leaders who do mention neighbourhood problems as part of their reason for volunteering.

What are these neighbourhood problems that leaders mention? In the first place, neighbourhood liveability problems of dilapidation and unsafety in public space are referred to by the interviewed leaders. This is the kind of neighbourhood problems that also the literature has often mentioned as a trigger for activation (see paragraph 3.3). An example is Mr Hadioui, the leader of the Moroccan homework class Our Youth (see table 6.2). He states that 15 years ago, Harbourtown’s drug problems were his reason to start the classes.

33 Using the same neighbourhood SES-typology as described for figure 6.1
Mr. Hadioui: The reason why we started in 1991 was the drug nuisance. It was really the worst in 1984. I have kids myself that I wouldn’t let outside. Then we thought ‘our children should not be in the streets’. Then we started giving homework classes and language classes. Language classes are important so that whenever the children are on a holiday to their grandparents, they can still communicate.

Like Hadioui’s group, also Harbourtown’s Townstreet organisation, that organizes street parties and street embellishment projects in one of the neighbourhood’s main avenues, has its roots in the troubled period of the nineteen eighties and nineties when drug trafficking and prostitution where prevalent. Mats, the leader of the organisation, explains how at that time professional social workers were able to find a lot of street inhabitants to volunteer for events in the street.

Mats: It was really [community worker] Leo who started. He went from door to door with the story about Opzoomeren and whether we would like to start doing something with residents or adopt a Christmas tree. That’s how it started. We first did a Christmas night with a couple of residents, eight or so. Then we started a great street festival in summer. We closed down the street and had dinner in the street. And that became bigger because we needed preparations and more people. And because the problems in the street were large at that time, prostitution, drugs, shootings, we were like: ‘we should not leave it at this but convene more frequently. To think about some things, realize them, organize protests.’

Nowadays, the street still has problems: it has lost its grandeur of the first half of the 20th Century, when it was a major shopping street. Many shop spaces are empty and others are coffee houses with closed façades. Mats is still in the street organisation and would like to do something about this and organize more activities for social cohesion in the street and more political attention for its physical state. However, his experience is that it is much harder to find volunteers for street organization, now that perceptions of strong nuisance are much lower.

I think now we have trouble finding new people because we lack acute emergency. Because earlier the situation was very different and everybody that opened the door saw the misery. You couldn’t sleep because you woke up at night by the nuisance. Loudly honking cars, prostitutes that were walking down the streets. And then everybody will come. But now it’s actually at quite a reasonable level for a large city. Well, if you have visitors from out-of-town they will still say ‘why are you living here?’ and things like that, but yeah, they look at it differently. I’m not exactly bothered but I would like to have it better. So that the street would be cleaner, that the shops look better, those that are still there, and that there is really something done about all those vacant shops. As much as they can do.

What is interesting is that Mats describes nuisance that personally affects the residents - by compromising their safety and well-being - used to trigger the residents of the street into volunteering for more social cohesion in the street. He also describes the direct sensory perceptions the people had of the nuisance. Rather than hearing about it or reading about it, they would directly see the mystery or hear the honking cars. Such sensory perceptions, that cannot be avoided, are a trigger because residents have a strong interest in eliminating them.

Tiago is another example of a self-organisation leader who started this organization because he was concerned about neighbourhood liveability problems. After migrating from Cabo Verde at the age of eleven, he was raised in Parktown, playing football in the neighbourhood squares. In the last few years, however, he feels that parents in the neighbourhood have lost their grip on their children and that youth crime is rising.
I am worried about the fact that boys from 15, 16 years from Parktown and Harbourtown are walking around with weapons [slaps his hand on the table]. That didn’t happen in our time. That was just not done. That wasn’t the way of acting on street. You had to have respect for each other. Go to school, do sports, develop yourself, that was our motto. But not delivering drugs on a little scooter, that was not our way of doing.

When I ask him how he can see if youths are carrying weapons, he says that he cannot see it through their jackets but can see the arrogance in their eyes. He also talked with ‘someone who knows’ about the shootings that have occurred three times in the last six months in Parktown. This perception of urgency has stimulated him to set up a fathers’ group, together with a community worker. His initiative organized several father’s meetings: a sports tournament for fathers and sons, a zoo visit and DIY afternoons. (However the project was stopped when the social worker died and the municipality-funded community centre was closed down in a budget cut operation). Tiago’s case shows how liveability problems can urge someone to start a social project focused on child rearing.

We started the initiative because fathers most of the time have no connection to their children and to their upbringing. If it’s only 10 minutes a day, just sit down with your child, look at what he has done in school, that’s important. The fathers do not know what happens in school, they go to the coffee house and to the mosque. While youth crime rates are still rising.

These examples all have to do with dilapidation and unsafety in the neighbourhood. Mr. Berends, the leader of community centre in a lower middle-class neighbourhood Eindhoven describes a different kind of neighbourhood trigger. For him, the sight of elderly who seldom left their houses in his neighbourhood, became a reason to start a community centre for them and other neighbourhood inhabitants.

 Berends: I have been involved in the neighbourhood resident organisation for 10 or 11 years now and I saw that there is a lot of loneliness in this neighbourhood. I was worried all the time for the social cohesion in the neighbourhood. Almost half of the little dwellings in this street, I was worried about them. A lot of loneliness and related to that also Alzheimer’s disease and diabetics and diseases that elderly have. Eventually those people left in a good way, you know [the street is waiting to be demolished in an urban renewal operation] but I really saw those dwellings as time bombs. Eventually nothing happened but... I always wanted to do something with that loneliness

Like Mats and Tiago, Berends connects his motivation for his project to specific circumstances that (used to) exist in the neighbourhood. However, for most of the other interviewed leaders motivate to solve a social problem, the neighbourhood context is not explicitly part of their statements on motivation. Instead, those leaders describe how they became aware of an urgent social problem through their own personal experiences or the experiences of friends or family members. Sometimes these friends or family members lived in the neighbourhood, but often they did not. They started an initiative in their neighbourhood because the problem is present here (too), and it is nearby their home so traveling distance is short.

A social problem that is often mentioned in this way is loneliness (and care needs) among elderly. In fact, in Northville and Flowerville, initiatives for elderly are the most prevalent type of initiative beside public space initiatives (see table 6.2). Liesbet, a helper at Northville’s Neighbourly organisation, for instance explains how her mother’s personal situation made her conscious of the problem seniors face, which is why she eventually joined Neighbourly.
Liesbet: The motivation started to grow because I was caring for my own mother for a long time and then you see you really what help is needed. And I found out in the circle of friends of my mother, that my mother was quite an exception really, in the sense that she had a family member that just would turn up every time, lastingly, every week for a couple of hours. And that the people around her thought ‘well I would like that myself too’.

Beatriz, leader of the Our Island elderly group of Parktown is also motivated to do something for elderly, in this case lonely Cabo Verdean people. She had gotten to know several lonely elderly through her job as a social worker. She explains that she was emotionally touched by the stories of some of her clients, so much so that she started an elderly meeting group.

Beatriz: The people here really need the group because they’re mostly elderly that are living in an isolated way. One of them I sometimes visit at home and this woman told me that she cries every night when she has to sit down at the desk to eat because she has no one to eat with. That really hurts me then, to hear that.

Tilda, a widower of 81 living in Northville, helps at the volunteer-run neighbourhood library that mostly serves older visitors. The library is situated in the neighbourhood’s Protestant church and run by volunteering church members. Also for Tilda, volunteering is a way to combat loneliness among elderly in the area.

I think being there for each other is very important. It is. But I sincerely mean that. Just be there for one another. There’s so much loneliness and if you can fix it by just borrowing a book with a cup of coffee or a cup of tea, well…

As a widower, Tilda’s awareness of the impact of loneliness rests upon her own experience (I will elaborate this in paragraph 6.3.2).

Other social problems that leaders mention as reasons for their initiative are related to poverty. This is done by two leaders working in the deprived neighbourhoods: Malika, the leader of the Harbourtown food bank, and Troy, the leader of the household administration support. Both initiative leaders got to know poverty from close by, through their own experience and that of friends. Although poverty can be found in many neighbourhoods in the city, Harbourtown is a good place for their initiatives because here the problem is manifest in a spatially concentrated way. For Malika, who lives in the area, it is also suitable in terms of traveling distance.

Malika’s food bank started the foodbank when she was still living in another part of Rotterdam. Through her mental support group for Muslim women she increasingly met mothers who like herself had gone through divorce and now faced a low-income situation. She explains how her food bank developed out of the women’s group.

Malika: Then at a given moment our group got bigger and bigger and then we really heard from sisters that were in trouble, sisters that had to go to a Women’s Shelter to be safe from their husbands who came out of those shelters and were left all alone, that were going through so much hardship. Women that had no more income and had four or five children because their guy had just left all of a sudden. Or women who were left with a bunch of debts. Then we started to secretly have a bag ready for whenever they came by my house, other sisters came to bring stuff here and if this woman in trouble left, I would give her a bag you know. Like that. But at a given moment that became more and more and then we thought: it’s really quite a big social problem. So then we went to look in our networks to be on the lookout for this. In schools. Go to a schoolyard, and in winter if you see a child with summer clothes on there is a problem in
the house, in that family. Well then you go and make a chat to see what's happening there and like that we grew bigger and bigger.

When she moved to Harbourtown and could use her tool shed as a deposit for clothes and food, her food bank started. The initiative grew further when a neighbourhood networker that she befriended, arranged a larger deposit space for her in the municipality-funded community centre.

Malika’s food bank

Every Wednesday a back door to the Harbourtown community centre becomes the office of a food bank that is run and financed by volunteers. Residents of Harbourtown and around who can show papers to prove that they are on poverty or sickness benefits, or earn a very meagre salary, are entitled to one box of food per week, to be picked up at the community centre. The food bank also has a depot of second hand clothes and toys that customers can choose from. I have arranged with the leader of the Foodbank that I can join them next Thursday in their preparations for the food-hand out at four o’clock.

At eleven, while outside the Parktown week-market has just started, inside several women are busy with boxes, food items and clothes. Because it is Ramadan, and most users are Muslim, the boxes will have more food than usual, and also special items like corn soaked in buttermilk. In the next room, a Dutch and Moroccan volunteer have started the day by sorting clothes. I join them, and we go through a large pile of shoes to find pairs. After a while, a Hindustani-Surinamese woman turns up at the door of the depot room, together with her son who is on roller skates. The Dutch volunteer steps outside. She coordinates this morning while the leader is out collecting food, The Hindustani woman has to show her bank receipts and her allowance papers of the last three months to get on the foodbank’s user-list. In the meantime, the boy is skating through the depot room and rattles on a second-hand toy drum-set. The Moroccan volunteer tells him he can pick a pair of shoes as long as he stops drumming immediately. And she adds something in Tamazight that I don’t understand, but the boy does understand because his father is Moroccan.

At one o’clock we eat our own lunch. A second generation Moroccan high school girl has come to join because she doesn’t have school today and she likes preparing the boxes ‘for the fun of it’. Also a first generation Moroccan woman in her 50s is present. The talk is mostly in Moroccan because the woman of 50 speaks little Dutch, but they also translate for me from time to time. The subject is her daughter who has received a marriage proposal. The other women half-jokingly advise that she should not let her daughter marry this man because he is too strict. The mother agrees. With this man her daughter or probably won’t be allowed to go to the sea or eat in the restaurant. She will advise against marriage, even though her daughter is not quite young anymore. As the day proceeds, more women drop in and start dividing food over boxes that are aligned all along the room’s walls. They are mostly Moroccan, and also a Surinamese and Eastern-European looking woman join. Around three o’clock, two men come in. They tell me they are doing this as a ‘stage’, and speak Turkish to each other. The leader of the food bank says she has picked these ‘brothers’ up at a local mosque. They are to deliver boxes to households that live far away from Parktown or are not mobile enough to pick it up themselves.

The food bank is a measure to alleviate the harshest aspects of poverty in the neighbourhood. Also Troy and Abdelkarim, leader and volunteer at the Showme household administration support office, are motivated to address the problems for households, specifically people with debts. Also they know poverty through personal experiences and from that of acquaintances. Troy calls himself an ‘experience-expert’ because of the ‘hard life’ that he has had. Both men see their volunteer work as an investment in their chances to change their work career (see paragraph 6.3 of this thesis for a more detailed explanation of this motivation in welfare service provision volunteering), but they are also
motivated by the idea that their volunteering is valuable for marginalised poor residents of the area. As Abdelkarim explains, his own experience of poverty is a large reason why he cares.

Abdelkarim: Because that was what a lady [visitor of the household administration support office] said to me some time ago. I said 'I know what you are going through'. She says 'no you don't'. I say: 'I do' [gives an intent stare]. Then she was like: 'oh...'. I say yes I know what you go through, what it's like when there is no light and you get the TV-cable from the neighbours. That you are literally in the dark, what that experience is. I say to her 'but let that make you stronger instead of weaker. It should stimulate you to think 'ok I have been there, I know what it is, and I should never sink this low again'.

Next to neighbourhood liveability problems and wider societal problems manifesting themselves (also) in the neighbourhood, another trigger can be discerned that is partly neighbourhood related. In the deprived research neighbourhoods, several leaders were found who are motivated to help their own ethnic group ahead in society. They are active to deliver welfare-service (such as Dutch language lessons, household administration support, homework classes for children etc.) often in combination with religious activities, for their target group consisting of one specific ethnic group of residents of the area and around. They are active in the neighbourhood because this is where many people of their ethnic group live. These leaders want to help their ethnic group overcome specific social problems in the labour market and in crime. Most also want to invest in the cultural identity of their own ethnic group (paragraph 6.3.1 deals with this group of leaders in more detail). As such they are most interested in the emancipation of their ethnic group and neighbourhood problems are only a small part of their trigger. Therefore I treat them as a special group in table 6.5 which is a summary of leaders’ motivations and the extent to which this can be related to the neighbourhood.

Table 6.5: Number of leaders indicating that a neighbourhood problem motivated them to start the initiative

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(Also) motivated by a social problem</th>
<th>Motivated to emancipate one's own ethnic group</th>
<th>Only other motivations</th>
<th>total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Flowerville and Northville</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harbourtown and Parktown</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: author

Conclusion
This paragraph has thus shown that neighbourhood problems sometimes play a role in activation. In neighbourhood volunteering literature, most research has been done on the influence of neighbourhood liveability problems such as nuisance, crime and litter in public space. In the deprived research case-study neighbourhoods, I indeed found three cases of initiatives started by residents who were concerned about such problems (Mats, Tiago and Mr. Hadioui). As Mats’ story shows, the activating effect of liveability problems is probably strongest if people are directly affected by the nuisance and cannot escape it, but still see opportunities for improvement. Another type of neighbourhood trigger are social problems that manifest themselves primarily at the level of the household level, such as loneliness among elderly or poverty, but can become spatially concentrated in neighbourhoods with many elderly or unemployed household. Even though the problem is not caused at neighbourhood level it does take place in the neighbourhood too, and for some interviewees their neighbourhood is a good place to self-organise a project against poverty or loneliness. It is suitable because the target group live close by and leaders can have useful social contacts here and need little traveling time to get to their organization. The higher incidence of poverty in deprived
neighbourhoods (and thus also residents’ likeliness to have personal experience with such problems) partly explains the larger number of self-organisations in these areas. Such leaders, usually do not get triggered by ‘the neighbourhood’ (by walking around or seeing other residents), They are triggered to do something against poverty or loneliness because they experience(d) this personally or through the experiences of a friend or family member. Lastly, the leaders of mono ethnic organizations that are present in the deprived neighbourhoods can be counted as partly triggered by neighbourhood problems, but they are also motivated by ambitions for emancipation of their group in society and needs for cultural identification.

As indicated in table 6.2, however, there are also several leaders who mention only other reasons than social problems for starting their initiative. These are people who started out of personal interest (because they like to do the activities that involves, because they enjoy being with other people and feeling useful, because they expect that it will bring them (closer to paid) work) or because of a neighbourhood opportunity rather than a problem (they want to make and neighbourhood public space or the neighbourhood’s social cohesion ‘even better’). While asking the about motivations in the interviews and observations it thus became clear to me that neighbourhood problems are only part of the reasons why people start initiatives. I have ordered all these motivations in figure 6.3.

The next paragraphs will deal with four groups of interviewed leaders that I can discern in my qualitative data, each group characterized by a different combination of interests and work-situations, as these leaders’ professional life is found to be interacting with these leaders’ interests and opportunities to volunteer. I will present four clusters that can be discerned in the data of 38 people (leaders and volunteers from Rotterdam and Eindhoven) who have talked with me about their motivations to volunteer (see table 6.6.). In my experience, a look at people’s needs and capacities in volunteering, makes clear that both are often substantially shaped by people’s work situation. By looking at motivations in terms of needs and capacities, we eventually get more grips on what kind of welfare-selforganisation is done by whom. In the first place: people’s professional life (beside their care tasks) determines for a large part how much spare time they have, that they can devote to volunteering. But (the absence) of a professional life can also have an influence on certain personal needs. Unemployed and retired can have the need to feel useful, be among other people and have an occupation for their time again. For lower-educated unemployed there may also be a need to find new experiences that can lead to paid work. Also for higher-educated but (temporarily) underemployed people, volunteering is often partly done to answer a personal need: that of investing in opportunities for more paid work.
In the next paragraph, a first group of interviewees is described: these are leaders who are working for the emancipation of their, ethnic minority and/or minority religious group. This is one of the two groups of interviewees where I found mostly professionally employed, higher educated people. Also among the volunteers in ‘light’ initiatives mentioned in paragraph 6.3.4 (short-time projects that take relatively little time, such as public space improvement or neighbourhood parties) there are many higher-educated employed citizens. The other leaders I found, however, are either self-employed residents or relatively time-rich residents: retired or unemployed people. The self-employed residents for whom volunteering is partly paid work are described in paragraph 6.3.2, together with a small group of unemployed residents who see their volunteering as an apprenticeship on the way to a new career of paid work. Unemployed and retired leaders and helpers are the subject of paragraph 6.3.2, where I describe their needs for sociability, sense of usefulness and need to co-produce services that they themselves can use.

Table 6.6: Motivation and work-situation of leaders and helpers that I interviewed about this subject, in Rotterdam and Eindhoven (leaders in bold, helpers in normal type)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cluster 1</th>
<th>Cluster 2</th>
<th>Cluster 3</th>
<th>Cluster 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yunus (Turkish community centre Parktown)</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Redouan (community centre and Mosque Hijra)</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiago (fathers' group)</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yasin (administrative support)</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norbert (The Block community centre)</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marit (The Block community centre)</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tina (residents' platform also active in FvIlle)</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sioerd (protest group against housing demolition)</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mats (Townstreet organisation)</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beatrix (elderly recreation Cabo Joy)</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hassan (admin. Support and homework class)</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malika (foodbank)</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mies (elderly recreation Togethercare I)</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berends (elderly recreation Togethercare II)</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kristel (elderly recreation Togethercare II)</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hans (community centre Daisy)</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ron (playground)</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dhr. Qussama (homework class and painting)</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ans (Flowerville church-organised library)</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mania (elderly care Neighbourly)</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liesbet (elderly care Neighbourly)</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benjalah (homework class)</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaap (residents' platform Northville)</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mia (Harbourtown residents' platform and</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faiza (sowing class)</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marlene (Harbourtown residents' organisation)</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meindert (elderly recreation Mullerlat)</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ellis (Flowerville residents' platform)</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdelkarim (Showme household admin support)</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trov (Showme household admin support)</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barto (Showme household admin support)</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sigrid (Parkertown Park public space)</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yasin (administrative support)</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramon (kids' art club)</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mark (active residents' umbrella organisation)</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jessie (The Care-network elderly care)</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antar (management)</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marian (management)</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maria (management)</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lucia (management)</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ofelia (management)</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gunther (management)</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jenny (management)</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yolande (management)</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6.3.1 Cluster 1: Emancipation of one’s own ethnic or religious group

As mentioned above, a first small cluster that can be discerned within the interviewees is formed by the leaders of a minority-ethnic voluntary organisation. Most of them are higher educated, salaried workers and they lead the volunteering organisation in their spare time. These are the first five interviewees in table 6.6: Hassan and Redouan, who were born in Morocco, Yunus, a second-generation Turkish man, and Beatriz and Tiago, both born in Cabo Verde. Their motivation is foremost the emancipation of their ethnic group, which they see as lagging behind. Two other leaders of mono-ethnic organizations are lower educated, unemployed first generation migrants,

According to Parktown and Harbourtown’s neighbourhood manager Michel, minority ethnic self-organizations have been active in the area for a long time. He estimates there are as much as 70 mono-ethnic organizations in the borough that Parktown and Harbourtown are part of. Also Leo, who was a community worker in the area for the last 20 years, tells me that various Moroccan and Turkish groups have existed in the neighbourhood throughout this period. These organizations were led by people from the first generation of labour migrants. Since 1990, Turkish people in the neighbourhood have a mosque that also offers a household administration support office, Qur’an classes and homework classes for children, information nights for parents and women on topics like childrearing, health and crime-prevention, recreational activities for youths and religious youth camps. This mosque is part of a Turkish network for the Turkish diaspora in Europe. The Moroccan organizations in Parktown and Harbourtown have traditionally been smaller and more autonomous organizations. They have organized religious activities, socializing activities (eating and meeting with people from one’s own country or region) and informative meetings. Like in the Turkish organisation, their efforts have also been directed at helping co-ethnics face the challenges of raising children in poorer urban neighbourhoods: they organised homework classes and Qur’an classes that were meant to educate the children but also to keep them busy indoors and away from bad influences in the street. Leo says about this:

Leo: Those [older] self-organisations here from the neighbourhood, that’s just for the largest part first or first and a half generation34. And now slowly you start to see that the second or third generation, always family, well that they begin to grow into the leading role.
E: And in what kind of clubs does that happen?
A: Well particularly in those Moroccan self-organisations. (...) They are all doing the same things actually, but maybe they are different in the family relations, or the village where they came from, or in the degree of modernness. But that is all mixed up. So you can’t say oh that’s from that mountain village, those are from that [village], but it does play a role (...) But they actually originated out of concerns about the children. On Saturday children play outside, it’s dangerous, ugly… And so, out of ideas about safety, children should be inside and supervised and they should be informed a bit about their own culture and their own language, and therefore they started to organise that kind of classes on Sundays and Saturdays.

Leo brings me into contact with two such groups that he still knows in Parktown. One is led by the two brothers Hadioui, but doesn’t seem to draw many children on the Saturday that I visit them, even though the brothers insist that the initiative still receives around 30 children. The other (Bensalah’s Homework club) is also led by two Moroccan brothers, with help from their uncle.

---

34 By first and a half generation migrants Leo means children that were born in the mother country and then at a young age migrated to the Netherlands to join their guest worker father.
Bensalah’s homework class takes place three evenings a week, between six and eight, in a large room in the municipality-funded neighbourhood community centre. Murat Bensalah (54) moved to the Netherlands when he was eighteen, and then lived with his parents in a caravan for six years, in a rural province of the Netherlands. Although he was studying before his migration, he didn’t continue and has had trouble to find work. Also currently he is not working. The brothers repeatedly cancel the interview appointments at first, but six months later, when I have interviewed a partner of their project on another topic and he introduces me to Murat and his uncle, they consent to being interviewed. I can also be present during their next homework class.

In the first ten minutes of the homework class that I attend, fifteen children aged around 10 to 14 enter one by one. They sit down at the tables Murat has arranged in a square and then they start to unpack their school bags. Murat’s daughter and her friend, both first year students at Rotterdam university’s Business Administration faculty, go around the tables to help the children. A few minutes later, the children are busy working from their books and softly chat from time to time. They also chat with me when I ask them about the things they are studying. Although some of the books seem very old, most likely too old to be the same as the children use in school, all children are working.

Murat, the youngest brother of the Bensalas has quite some history in the neighbourhood. He has been organizing the homework classes for 20 years now, and other initiatives leaders in Parktown often know his name (even though they several say they don’t know who of the brothers is Murat). Murat explains that he started his lessons in the first place to get to meet other Moroccans that have also had some education like himself (see paragraph 6.3.2 on sociability as a reason for volunteering). But he also makes explicit that he started it to help Moroccan children ahead in life. I write down what he tells me:

_Bensalah: It is also that I thought if I see a problem why I don’t do something about it. Why must you wait until other people do something? Because my eldest daughter also was difficult in high school and she came home but I could not help her. And my daughter would go to the homework class and there were people that could help her there. You know. And besides, why should you wait for the headlines in the papers “80% of Moroccan doesn’t finish his education”. You must not wait for the news if there is something that can be done._

Bensalah’s group is an example of the ‘old’ mono-ethnic volunteering groups Leo discerned. Next to these groups, Leo has noticed that in the last few years also several mono-ethnic community centres have emerged that are led by higher educated first and second generation migrants. He doesn’t know these leaders personally (local government has stopped financing community work in this neighbourhood and Leo and his colleagues have shifted to helping households facing debt problems). When I go to these organizations I find out that they are indeed led by higher educated leaders. There is a new Moroccan community centre and mosque situated in a Parktown building that used to be a state-funded community centre but was closed down. This new Moroccan centre is led by Redouan – a professionally employed social worker in another part of Rotterdam. Nearby there is a Turkish community centre that used to be a school building. This centre is led by Yunus, who is an employed higher-educated laboratory technician. In these self-funded accommodations, the mono ethnic organizations provide homework and language classes for children and Dutch language classes for adults, sports practice and information nights on relevant issues (how-to’s on raising children, voting, household administration, dealing with racism, burglary prevention, health issues etc.) to their ethnic target group.
In an interview, I ask Yunus what motivates him to do all this work beside his full-time job. He answers that he enjoys helping other people, and doing something in return for the chances he was given.

Y: Well if you see how happy people are here, how happy the children are when they are here. And if you look at homework classes, that gives a certain satisfaction. You are just doing something in return. See, everyone is now cozy at home tonight and we [Yunus and other volunteer] are just here. The idea that you are doing something for the people gives satisfaction. Yes. You don’t need to get money for everything.

This helping particularly is addressed to the Turkish residents of the neighbourhood, as he explains. His ideal is to bring them further in life, and overcome the particular trouble they now have, especially the women, to find higher occupational-class work.

Y: It’s our intention to give the people something useful. Not getting them addicted to something that doesn’t help them in any way [in reference to the Turkish coffee house in the street]. We want that the children get homework support, finish school and an internship. Get their diplomas. And find work eventually. We want to call to firms to find internships for them.

Yunus wants to find internships for Turkish students, and has also arranged for a certification of his community centre, so that he can offer official lower-vocational school apprenticeships to the youths coming to his centre. He says that he finds this important because he has seen from nearby that Turkish students can encounter discrimination in this area. His wife couldn’t find the internship she needed to get her doctor’s assistant diploma. He relates how in one doctors’ office there was a vacancy but she was turned down because she wears a headscarf. Yunus and his wife brought the case before a legal commission on discrimination, but by the time they were acknowledged in their right the apprenticeship was already fulfilled by another person. His wife was so much delayed in her studies that she decided to stop her education. The Turkish centre in Parktown centre also takes part in a mentor-project for high school drop-outs organized by the umbrella organisation for Islamic organisation in Rotterdam.

Also Hasan is concerned about the educational careers of his minority ethnic group. He is a higher educated employee of a local housing association, born in Morocco who leads a homework class in his spare time. He also runs a household administration support network for older Moroccan residents of Rotterdam and uses the municipality’s community centre as his main accommodation. When I asked him why he does this work, he points to his responsibility as a member of society, but specifically to the interests of the elderly Moroccan population of Rotterdam.

E: Why are you doing this?
H: Well, like I said last time. On the basis of an idea of participation, you know, and also belief you know, that you are doing something for society, I think. That, I think, is my stake in it. But not to achieve something or to make some money or anything.
E: But you put quite some time into it.
H: yeah, is right. But that’s the reason, to contribute something. And for that group too. For that large group, they are between brackets a kind of forgotten group. That’s what the [Moroccan] elderly say themselves, right. No-one talks on our behalf. We used to have the Labour party, and the unions, but not anymore. That’s the first thing the elderly say when you talk with them.

To do something about this, Hassan’s household administration support service deals for a large part with poverty allowance rights of Moroccan recipients. I attend one of his information workshops at a
Moroccan community centre and mosque that he organizes with the Alliance for Moroccan Elderly living in the Netherlands. Here, he and other volunteers of the Alliance give information on welfare benefits, health insurance and housing rights, and how to fill in the related forms. After the information session and following discussions, Hassan distributes news bulletins from the Moroccan elderly alliance. The bulletin informs about the governmental plans to lower widow pensions for Moroccans living abroad, and how these plans were cancelled on behalf of the Dutch High Court of Justice. It also deals with the elderly organisation’s protest against the Minister of Social Affairs’ attempts to use Moroccan governmental administrative data to check the incomes of all Moroccan elderly receiving certain allowances from the Dutch government. (As such the elderly association tries to play a political role of protest and its interests are not completely aligned with those of the national government.)

Such an orientation on emancipation is also important for Malika, the leader of the food bank. She is not higher educated but does have middle-level work experience. Since five years, however, her health condition has made her unfit to work and she became a health disability allowance recipient. Over this period, she has spent more and more time on helping and emancipating poor people -particularly Muslim women- in her neighbourhood and the city. She does this with free food packages and Islamic inspirational events. Also a group of rejected asylum seekers receive her food and mental support. I ask her why she does all this, even though the poverty and distress she encounters during her volunteering sometimes weigh very heavy on her and she also has her health condition and the time-consuming responsibilities of being a single mother. Malika answers that she is motivated to help especially Muslim women, like herself, to be self-assured in society as a woman but also as a Muslim.

M: If you knew our ideas, this is merely the start of it. We want much more. For the next five years we have a number of large projects we want to stand for, all regarding women empowerment. We are busy working on that and that will be good...

E: What are you going to do

M: Make women more aware that they are allowed to be who they are while being true to your identity and culturality [sic]. Those are things. And helping. We really want to help out...

She feels that emancipating Muslim women requires more sensitivity to Islamic faith and ‘other than Dutch’ styles of childrearing than welfare work organizations often have.

M: They don’t know about culture, you know, I always say the welfare service directors are white and that mentality goes throughout [the organization]. They don’t think about multicultural society, yes they talk about it, but you cannot find it in the way they act.

E: Can you give an example?

(…)

Welfare workers say [to Muslim women]: you know you are here in the Netherlands so you should do adapt, you should stand up for yourself’. Of course I totally agree with that but we are working here to start a women’s empowerment trajectory but in line with Islamic identity. Because that exists. Because especially in our faith the woman has many rights, while the outside world only thinks there is oppression here, while in fact Islam appreciates women very highly.

Malika finds Dutch welfare services often have too little cultural sensitivity when they try to emancipate women, but also when helping families in distress. According to her, professional welfare workers are often out of tune with the taboos and cultural habits that these households often have. They do not understand for instance what fears people have to talk about their children’s problems. They have fears and taboos because of cultural barriers but also because they are afraid that if they go to the Dutch Youth Care office, it might take the children away.
Also Tiago, who used to run the fathers group, recently started a new welfare service volunteering organization for his own specific cultural group. He is setting up a household administration support for other Cabo Verdeans. I ask him why he switched to working for his own ethnic group. He explains that this is because he has a strong drive to help (‘I can’t stop myself’ he says, he feels helping is his duty to society,) but also because he feels that the opposition between rich and poor in society should be overcome, and lastly because people in the multicultural society must be able to live their cultural identity.

T: I have always said that I’m against assimilation. I’m willing to go a long way with integration but I think assimilation is bad. For me integration is synergy of cultures then something new evolves. That is my goal. And that is what I tried to convey but what happens at this moment, my stakeholders, my people are becoming brazen. Especially in the labour process there is little chance to get a well-paying little job. That is demotivating for people. And some people then go back to school, continue to study. Get a certain qualification, when they turn back to the labour market there is no job for you. Then you must settle for less. And less is again demotivation because you are working below your capacities. So it’s a chain of events.

Tiago has a zeal for emancipation of poorer people that is sparked by his communist political identity. During his youth he was part of the Rotterdam communist party and went to many rallies, and he also knew the social worker that helped his initiative from his Communist Party contacts. Most other leaders in the group of leaders committed to the socio-economic emancipation of their ethnic and/or religious group, combine this with an interest in faith. Malika for instance explicitly states that she gets the power to do all her volunteering work from Allah and feels that it prepares her for judgment day. Moreover, her volunteering work is the way to show to people what Muslims are like and to counter in that way all the prejudice going around in society. Murat Bensalah states in a similar fashion that it is not important that he doesn’t it accelerate on earth because ‘some people work for their salary in heaven’.

Conclusion

Mono-ethnic, emancipatory organizations explain a part of the higher incidence of initiatives in the deprived neighbourhoods. Almost half of the services found in the deprived case study research neighbourhoods even take place within a mono-ethnic organization (see table 6.2). On the basis of my borough data set I estimate that 15% of all applications to the Resident Initiative fund in the poor and mixed SES neighbourhoods, are made by non-native Dutch mono ethnic self-organizations. That does not seem like a large share, but whereas mixed and native Dutch organizations’ applications are relatively often for one-time events or for public space projects (see paragraph 6.3.4 of this thesis), the applications by self-organizations are mostly to finance year-round, time intensive face-to-face service provision projects. As such, the variety and frequency of services they offer to their selected constituency, is higher than in most of the other neighbourhood initiatives I found, and the mono-ethnic organizations provide some of the typical social work activities aimed at emancipation and care that used to be more prevalently provided by social workers in the area.
6.3.2 Cluster 2: Unemployed or retired volunteers seeking a pass-time, social contacts, a sense of purpose and/or access to recreational activities or care

In the interviews in the four Rotterdam research neighbourhoods and in Eindhoven, also a second cluster of interviewees can be discerned on the basis of their motivations for volunteering. These are the various interviewees who - besides wanting to help solve a neighbourhood or societal issue- also expressed personal, non-professional needs as reasons for their volunteering. In the first place, many of the people in this cluster say they volunteer because it gives them a structure to meet people or a means to pass time outside of the house. Some of the people in this cluster furthermore express that it gives them a way to feel useful to society. Lastly, there are also people who indicate that they volunteer not only to join social networks and take part in an interesting project, but also to communally create the services that they themselves use as well.

A look at these interviewees’ working situation (see table 6.6) shows that almost all of them are non-working citizens. Half of them are unemployed because of health reasons or inability to find work, most of which live in the deprived research neighbourhoods. The other half are retired persons. This is a notable difference with the other clusters. The professionally oriented volunteers (cluster 3) are mostly self-employed workers, and the cluster of leaders working for the emancipation of their ethnic minority group are for the most part employed workers. This third cluster, of unemployed and retired volunteers who also expressed personal needs as part of their motivation, can be found in line 6 to 26 of table 6.6.

We can think of reasons why this group almost exclusively consists of nonworking people. In the first place we can assume that for many people their daily access to a variety of social contacts and pastime, and a sense of purpose or direction in life takes place through work, an education trajectory and/or raising children. The interview data suggest that for unemployed or retired adults lacking these spheres, part of these social needs can instead be fulfilled by volunteering work.

It is also notable that this third cluster has many more people who live in single person household than any of the other clusters: one third of the people in this group lives alone, against none of the members of the other groups. Here, the interview data can also be used to inductively reason that for some people living by themselves, volunteering is also motivated by the social contacts it yields, while this on average is relatively is less of a pull factor for people living in multiple person households.

Such a focus on personal motivations to volunteer, furthermore provides a suggestion for explaining why more year-round volunteering residents were found in the deprived research neighbourhoods than in the wealthier ones. Deprived areas, after all, have more unemployed residents. Thus, it can be argued that at neighbourhood level, less wealthy neighbourhood’s higher unemployment rates have a positive relation to their self-organization potential in terms of activation. Therefore we must add this nuance to the empirical answer to the central research question: do deprived neighbours have different potential to self-organize welfare services? We can now state that a substantial share of volunteering is motivated by social needs felt by nonworking people. In other words, deprived areas, which have higher unemployment, will also probably have more residents interested in volunteering because they are unemployed and feel the need to be among other people (again) or work on future oriented projects.
The case-study research suggests that more nonworking than working people volunteer in neighbourhood welfare services. I have tried to underpin this finding by looking at larger N research. Larger N data on this topic can be found in the Rotterdam Survey on Leisure of 2013 (see also (De Graaf 2014)). In this survey research, 3250 Rotterdam inhabitants aged 13 to 75 were questioned about how they spend their free time, for instance on welfare service volunteering in organised groups. These data were paired with respondents’ occupational category. The survey yields that welfare service volunteering is done by 22% of the employed respondents (who do at least 12 hours of paid work per week), by 22% of retired respondents, by 28% of the respondents who are ‘unemployed and receiving benefits’ and by even 44% of the respondents who are unemployed without receiving benefits (for instance homemakers). This is another indication that welfare service volunteering is indeed somewhat more prevalent among non-working than among working Rotterdam citizens.

The effort of non-working volunteers also speaks from the amount of hours they spend on volunteering. I asked the Rotterdam municipality Statistics Bureau if they could specify how many hours the employed, retired and jobless volunteering respondents volunteered per week. These data are less precise, because they also include respondents’ volunteering hours for non-welfare related goals, such as volunteering to further political or religious ends. Still, the differences in volunteering hours per occupational group are very interesting (see figure 2). Especially non-working volunteers are likely to make many volunteering hours, and this effect is strongest for working age nonworking people. Respondents on benefits even form the largest group of ‘hard-working’ volunteers (11 hours or more per week) in the response group. It is likely that several of them join or lead welfare service volunteer groups, as such ‘doing’ work typically takes more time than volunteering in a ‘talking’ organisation (Kearns 1995).

**Figure 6.3: Volunteers’ self-stated volunteering hours per week, by socio-economic position**

![Volunteers' Self-Stated Volunteering Hours Per Week Graph](image)

Source: VTO 2013 Rotterdam, elaborated on my request by Paul de Graaf, Rotterdam municipality

---


36 At the time of the survey, the measure forcing welfare recipients to volunteer in order to retain their allowance, had not been implemented yet at a substantive scale. So this is not the reason for the high number of ‘hard working’ volunteers among them.
Volunteering to get out of the house and meet people

As described above, leaders and helpers in this third cluster relate that they volunteer to help the neighbourhood but also themselves. On the basis of their precise personal goals, the group can be further split in three, often overlapping subgroups: people who volunteer to be out of the house and meet social contacts, people who volunteer to feel useful, and people who volunteer also to use the services their volunteering organization provides.

I will firstly focus on the first group: the residents for whom their personal motivation is to get out of the house and meet people. They are unemployed and retired interviewees who indicated they seek an occupation for their (ample) leisure time and a way to meet social contacts on a structural basis so that these can become acquaintances or friends. All are people who do not have a busy daily occupation through work, education or being the primary caregiver of young children.

One of the people expressing that volunteering is a way to get out of the house, is Oussama (59). He is a voluntary math and Islamic calligraphy teacher at several self-organized Moroccan community centres and the super of a Moroccan community and prayer centre in Parktown. In an interview he told me that after moving from Morocco to the Netherlands, he started an education trajectory to become a high school mathematics teacher. He didn’t finish it and for a long time now he has been a social assistance recipient. Right now he is looking for more places where he can give math lessons on a voluntary basis. When I ask him why he does so much effort, he says ‘I have to get out of the house too. Otherwise I am with my children and wife at home all the time. Always the same walls you know’.

Getting out of the house and doing more interesting things, is key here. Also for Mia (74), long-term leader of Harbourtown’s residents’ platform and organizer of an outdoor neighbourhood venue, life without (paid or unpaid) work doesn’t keep her occupied enough to feel well. When I asked her why she joined the residents’ platform, she focuses on her personal need to be occupied.

Mia: it started actually because I had been declared unable to work because of health problems, and was put on health disability allowance. I was completely at a loss. I didn’t know what to do with myself. And the woman that lives across the street, she asked if I wanted to volunteer at the residents’ platform organisation. And then it goes from one task to another, and you get involved in many things and I ended up in the board.

Also Malika, the leader of the food bank, explains that she started her organization soon after she was declared unable to work because of health reasons. Remaining active was part of her motivations: ‘I’m not the type to sit still’. In these cases, working age people who are unable to work present their volunteering as a partial replacement for the sense of occupation that a job offers.

Also retired interviewees spoke about their volunteering work as a way to be pleasurably occupied, but also to find important social contacts. Meindert (78) for instance, is a former building inspector at a housing association. After his retirement, he became the leader of the residents’ group of the Harbourtown elderly flats. The residents’ organization was initially formed 40 years ago to protest against building plans threatening the view from the flat. Under Meindert’s presidency, which started 20 years ago, it became an organization providing recreational activities to the elderly at an almost monthly basis. This recreational group consists of around flat 40 inhabitants, almost all in their 70s.
and 80s. The residents’ organization also has a network of volunteering ‘flat coordinators’, which are residents who keep an eye on safety in the shared spaces (for instance by installing cameras and changing light bulbs when needed) and on potential health calamities: if there is an overflowing mailbox they go to check whether the inhabitant that owns the mailbox is okay. Meindert coordinates all this. When I ask him to tell me more about his reasons to volunteer, he says that volunteering has always been part of his orientation. His father was a union member, organizing all kinds of gatherings and outings. From an early age Meindert felt he was interested in organizing things for others too, but did not feel a special interest in the union. Instead, sports have always been his passion. When he was still working, he already did many administrative tasks for a local football club and the national football organization (KNVB in Dutch). In his living room, an honorary plaque commemorating his 40 years of volunteering in the football organization is displayed. He describes his extensive volunteering as a calling that makes other people happy and keeps him active.

M: You can say it used to be a calling to be doctor or headmaster of the school or priest, and I got my calling in volunteering, in organization and administration. That is funny you know. I never regretted it and it keeps me nice and…[busy]. In 1995 I retired. They told me 'you can follow a course on how to fill your leisure time in your retirement'. Then I said 'I can teach that course'.

But not only do his two volunteering jobs keep him busy, he has also gathered important social contacts through his neighbourhood volunteering. He used to be a single widower, but has met his new girlfriend through his activities for the flat’s elderly. She is social worker for elderly, employed by a semi-governmental organization, and he met her because she helped him to organize the monthly recreational meetings. Meindert also says that the other neighbourhood volunteers are basically the only people visiting his house for sociable purposes beside his family. His children, moreover, are busy with work and their children and live in the outskirts of Rotterdam. They do not visit him as much as he would like. He feels that the social care for elder family members is better in the ethnic minority families in the neighbourhood. (He sees this for instance through his girlfriend, who is Cape Verdean).

How volunteering can create important social contacts, is also told by Ellis. She retired from work a few years ago. At that moment she decided to expand her volunteering for the Flowerville residents’ organization and become its president. This organization consists almost exclusively of native Dutch residents over 50. She volunteers because she is interested in controlling and, if needed, influencing the municipality’s or housing associations’ neighbourhood plans on behalf of the residents. She does this particularly when these plans regard the neighbourhood’s green public spaces or threaten the amount of low income housing in the area. But volunteering is also a way for her to meet others and acquaint them. She says that 40 years ago, as a working single mother recently arrived in a new town, she didn’t have time to build up a large social network. Also now, her main friends are still in the town she left back then, but through the resident organization she has made acquaintances and friends:

E: That’s what I like about neighbourhood work, you know. That you… I mean, everybody knows me. And in that way I also know a lot of people but they are not my close friends, my close friends stayed in The Hague. And I was working and commuting every day, with small children, so I wasn’t able to build up a network

I: And through this volunteering you’ve found new acquaintances?
E: Yes indeed. And some of them, yes they have become good friends. That’s how it goes.

The kind of residents’ organisation that Ellis is active in, exists in many Dutch neighbourhoods since the 1970s. These residents volunteer to represent all residents’ stakes in neighbourhood planning decisions. The platform members usually discuss the issues that they see with each other and relevant
civil servants. As such they are *talking* organizations that typically keep an eye on city and borough plans and activities regarding their neighbourhood. But they are also *doing* organisations. They organise neighbourhood parties to improve social cohesion, and often other services like administrative counselling for residents. In practice, however, following everything that goes on in the neighbourhood takes much time, and the members of the platforms usually are retired people or jobless people in their fifties, who have the time and enjoy being part of such discussions for the social interactions and (feeling of) political influence it can bring (Kullberg et al 2015, p.204-205). Also Tina, leader of a residents’ platform of a neighbourhood bordering on Flowerville, describes this.

> There really are many people that want to do something for the neighbourhood. But if you have a job, and especially if you have a family with children – you see, I don’t have children so that’s easy for me- or older family members facing health problems that you have to take care of... then you have little time left. And people’s leisure time hasn’t increased over the last years, it has only decreased. But those people, the moment they become retired or unemployed and see that their unemployment will last a while, those are the people that think ‘oh I like to be out of the house and meet other people and do something that is useful for the neighbourhood. And maybe it will lead me to a new job someday’. I won’t say it often does, but....
>
>(interview with Tina, leader of a neighbourhood residents’ organization in Rotterdam)

In my case study research neighbourhoods, resident platform members are all native-Dutch. Most of these interviewees are retired (Mia, Ellis, Jaap), one is unemployed (Marline) and only one is working (Tina, who says she has much time because she doesn’t have children). It is therefore likely that sociability and useful occupation of one’s time are important drivers also for activation for a neighbourhood representational platform.

Sociability can even be a reason to start homework classes for children, as Bensalah tells me. The first motivation he mentions for his volunteering is that it offers opportunities to meet others. These others are not the children but people in his educational, ethnic and age peer group that he wants to meet, in his case educated guest workers from Morocco.

> I: 20 years ago, why did you start giving homework lessons?
> B: We were doing in the mosque then. French, Arab and mathematics. And the mosque was the only place you could meet other Moroccans, we didn’t have pubs. And there you could speak Arabic with people that have had a bit of education. So there I did my lessons.

That volunteering in the neighbourhood presents a way to swiftly build social networks, and that this is an important reason for volunteers to join, is also exemplified by stories from the Eindhoven Togethercare community centre volunteers. These are situated in two neighbourhoods. Each group can freely but temporarily use a housing association-owned dwelling slated for demolition. The community centres are run by groups of almost exclusively native Dutch elderly. (That these neighbourhood centres have no non-western allochthonous volunteers users can be explained by the fact that these neighbourhoods have only 15% non-western allochthonous residents in their population. Elderly, however, are strongly overrepresented: only a third of the neighbourhood adults are over 60). Even though in practice they are elderly organizations, two women below 50 were so interested in gaining contacts that they have also joined.

The first woman is Crystal (38). She is in need of social contacts because after two decades of illness and many years of hospitalization, she hasn’t been very much able to extend her social network through the usual spheres (through work, vocational education, a partner, children or paid hobbies).
Now she is doing much better and living on her own again. She tells me she has volunteered in eleven organizations in the city, mostly in childcare, elderly care, the peace movement and environmentalist groups. She does this because she feels a distinct need to be occupied during the day and to meet other people. Volunteering in a Togethernesscare centre, however, is different for her because it is the first time she volunteers in her own neighbourhood. She explains how she first got in contact with the group, at a time when she was still insecure about her capacities to create social contacts.

C: George told me ‘I want to found a community centre like the one in the neighbourhood next to us’. I asked him what it was and then he started talking about operating a phone line through which neighbourhood residents can call on each other for help. And I said well I’ll have a look but I’m not sure. I find it a bit scary. I don’t know these people, yada yada yada. But it turned out to be a lot of fun and then I stuck around, and one thing led to another and now you’ll have to drag me away from here (laughs).

She tells me she enjoys it very much, particularly because the group gives her much freedom to start projects. In her volunteering work in other parts of the town they did not know her very personally and the volunteering work was more generic and structured. In the neighbourhood centre, on the other hand, she feels she has become part of the group also because of the responsibilities she was given. These are tasks like digital communication, buying art supplies and the planning of the communal dinners. A reasons for her pleasure in working at the neighbourhood community centre, is thus that it brings challenging but manageable puzzles. Meeting people, however, is also important. I asked her what she likes about the centre, and she answers:

C: Well, it’s just fun getting to know people. Who are in your neighbourhood. That it’s close to home; that there are all kinds of things to do that I had never done in my life. So the challenge

E: What was new for you?

C: Well, cooking for instance, of course I do that at home all the time, but here it is for 16 people, and that is something else. How much do I need? How much can it cost? You must stick to your budget. Who likes what? How do we make dessert? The recipes, how much time can it take? Yes. I’m not that good at planning. I had never made a planning in my life.

Even though the other volunteers are older, she enjoys spending time with them. According to her ‘older people can often teach you new things’. When I ask if there are more residents below 60 that volunteer in the community centre, Crystal answers me that there is only one other young person. This is a woman who recently came to live in the neighbourhood with her family, after migrating from Argentina. Being a housewife and away from her social network at home, this woman is motivated to meet new people. Moreover, the volunteering organization offers her a social context to learn Dutch. Crystal says about her:

C: She is a mother of three children, and she used to update our Facebook account. But she is South American so she spoke Spanish and that Facebook should teach her Dutch but that doesn’t work yet. But it does take her out of the house and she indeed learns more Dutch this way and she likes it. And by doing small jobs and tasks more and more she also gets to know the other volunteers. And she also joins in the picking up litter in the neighbourhood.

Such quotes show that volunteering is motivated quite often by volunteers’ personal social needs, particularly their need for sociability. Like the helpers in the Eindhoven Togethernesscare centres, also the leaders of playgrounds and community centres in Rotterdam mention sociability and being occupied as important motivations for themselves and their helpers. I found that, in a similar way as Ellis and Meindert, most volunteers who are focused on gaining social contacts volunteer with other volunteers.
of their own age and ethnicity. This makes sense because it is the easiest way to meet many people one is likely to become friends with. After all, there is much sociological evidence that 'similarity breeds connection' (see for instance McPherson et al. 2001 for a summary of the large empirical evidence base for homophily in social networks). In all realms of life people acquaint and befriend usually mostly people of their own age, gender, race and educational group etc. Although understandable from the point of efficiency, a focus on sociability in practice often leads to rather homogeneous volunteering groups in terms of age, education and ethnicity. Furthermore, a clear disadvantage of this focus on pleasurable sociability is that it creates its own vulnerabilities. Social contacts can also go awry, and in sociability-oriented organization this often makes people (consider to) stop volunteering.

An important way in which social contacts can go sour, is through gossip. Ron, the leader of the large playground in Northville, explains that in his organization gossip is related to boredom. He relates this to the experiences of his sister-in-law:

\[ R: \text{My sister in law likes helping out here a lot but she cannot deal with gossip. So it is just like a company. Actually it is more than in a company, all the gossiping that's going on. And she can't deal with that. That is always a reason for a lot of people to quit} \ldots \text{You know, people volunteer here also to have something to do. And if they have nothing to do then they start to chat away. And you just notice that. So now in winter it's a quiet period, in summer there is much less trouble with it, because then they're busy. In summer they are often helping visitors with three or four volunteers at a time. Well then you don't have time and now it's a quiet time and then it's like blablabla.} \]

Furthermore, decision-making disputes can also strain sociability in a volunteer organization\(^{37}\). Several leaders explained that decision-making power in their group is divided over a large group of unofficial board members. Friction can easily arise in such situations, as for instance Marit, leader of The Block in Harbourtown experience. She recounts there was a conflict when one of the leading volunteers wanted different things for the organization than the rest of the people, and postponed writing subsidy applications. This gave problems in their rather informal decisionmaking structure.

\[ \text{We are not an official voluntary organization in the sense that} \ldots \text{you're not a member so we can also not cancel your membership and say goodbye to you. That is kind of difficult, especially if you have people who are a bit obstructive. Will you have 20 conversations and try to keep that person on board all the time? Or do you say at a certain moment: now it's over for you? That is something I put a lot of energy into and I really did not like that.} \]

She relates how the dispute developed and affected her.

\[ M: \text{So eventually we wrote the rest of the application the way it had to be done and she became so mad! And every meeting of the board became endless and a lot of anger, and that's no fun. For a certain time, I really thought about stopping, because I put so much energy into this and it just made me feel unhappy.} \]

\(^{37}\) A specific type of conflict related to self-organisation, are those conflicts that sometimes happen between volunteers working to improve public space and people living around it. Residents may not like the alteration the volunteer group proposes, such as an 'untidy' vegetable patch or new dog walking field, a 'noisy' festivity, new barbecue area or picknick table. Such conflicts over public space where related to me by the leaders of various residents organizations. However, because public space improvement doesn't regard year-round service provision, these conflicts are outside the scope of this research.
Eventually, however, Marit decided to stay part of the team.

In Marit’s’ group there was a conflict because decision power was scattered over many people in an unclear way. Administrative conflict, on the other hand, can also arise when one person has the lead. A leader of a Togethercare community organization tells me that people sometimes clash about who contributes most efforts to the centre and therefore has the most rights to make decisions. “Then I have to talk and talk to keep people on board”, he says. However, so far nobody has stopped volunteering at the centre for this reason.

Another issue for strife is the money that goes round within an organization. People sometimes become irritated about how the money they contributed to the organization is spent. In two communities there have been conflicts about the amount of money that was spent on supplies, in one case this has caused a leader to stop volunteering.

Of course conflict and gossip can happen in any kind of organization. However, in those volunteering organizations where sociability is a motivator for many volunteers, gossip and conflict have a relatively high impact on the organization’s stability. If these volunteers don’t like the atmosphere anymore, they have few other reasons to keep volunteering.

**Sense of purpose, fulfilling a role of relevance in society**

The second personal motivation mentioned by the interviewees in this cluster, is that volunteering provides them with a sense of purpose in life or a feeling of being relevant to society. Like the need for occupation and contacts, also this need can relatively be important for unemployed and retired people, as they cannot derive this daily sense of purpose from a job. In practice, I encountered the need to feel useful to society especially among working age who are unemployed volunteers (due to an inability to find work or due to faltering health). For elderly the need to find a purposeful role in society is maybe less pressing, because they can look back on a working past or because their peer group as a whole has much free time. For unemployed adults below 65, on the other hand, a mental comparison with working people of their age may induce them to search for a future oriented life project.

Malika, for instance, cannot work because of health reasons, but has a strong drive to fulfil a role in society, together with the other nonworking volunteers at her foodbank and Islamic women organization.

> M: We ourselves are…a few of us cannot work because of health disabilities. But we still want to do something for society because we came from the bottom of society ourselves.

Via her foodbank, Malika also supplies food to refugees staying without papers in the Netherlands. For her this is her most relevant contribution to others. She describes: ‘By being there for them you [I] give them back their existence. They are cast away by the Dutch government, they are cast away by the countries that they came from’. She also describes her volunteering at the school parents’ board as a way to contribute to society and be an example to other parents. In a similar way, Manja, the leader of Flowerville’s Neighbourly care network, speaks about her project as a privilege that gives her life more meaning by being of use to that of others.
Manja: It is a position of luxury that I have been able to do this. Because I've been doing it for four years and I can say that I put it in 20 hours a week on average. There are those weeks… so I became aware that it is special to be able to do this. Even if it is small, I did contribute my bit to the world. I put in my part."

The enjoyment of feeling of use to society, is furthermore exemplified by the initiator of an Eindhoven neighbourhood community centre. After ending his job he started the Togethercare centre. He feels re-energized by leading the community centre and seeing the helpers grow as they learn to run it. He says:

Berend: 'I like making something out of nothing, to put an organization on its feet. To witness those people grow, that's so nice. But I don't join the painting classes or anything, I have enough hobbies, my garden and my social contacts'.

Several leaders also mention other people's words of thanks to them, to illustrate their own reason to volunteer. Through other peoples' recognition they feel valued. An example is Bensalah who says that payment for his work is not the most important thing. Instead 'the most beautiful salary is if one time a man comes across the street to thank you, the father of a child'. I asked him whether this happened to him and he affirms this. Also Meindert feels positive about himself whenever people thank him for his volunteering. He explains:

Yesterday I was at the football club and the boys have played their last game and they came 'well president, thank you very much for your support that you've given over the season. We are grateful that you have supported us and showed us the way. And we enjoyed the game, and have a drink on us'. You know? But that really gives you a good feeling.'

Meindert also describes enjoying getting an audience to listen to him, and speaking to the Rotterdam mayor on behalf of the residents' organization. Like Meindert, also an unemployed helper at the Daisy community centre tells me that he feels very proud when he sees himself depicted on a neighbourhood paper. The paper alludes to him as a person who is a contribution to the neighbourhood. Finally, Malika is proud of the painting a refugee gave her, that hangs over her couch and was made especially for her. She recounts: 'On Facebook he asked, who deserves my next painting? And many people mentioned my name.'

For all these people, their own view on their relevance to society - sometimes felt most clearly through other people's recognition - is a motivation to volunteer.

Direct dependencies on service provision

In the third place, I also interviewed a few volunteers who combine previous personal interests with a direct personal interest in the services their volunteering organisation provides: they not only help produce but also use these recreational or care services. In social movement literature this category of directly profiting volunteers is termed 'beneficiary constituents' (McCarthy and Zald 1977)38. This

---

38 An important group of neighbourhood volunteers that directly profit from their own efforts, are people working to improve the public space around their house. However, my quantitative research was aimed at interviewing leaders or helpers in year-round service providing neighbourhood volunteer organizations. Since public space volunteers typically do not work year-round, there are very few of them in my group of interviewees. Another group of volunteers that sometimes profit directly from their own efforts, are people in
group is not very large in my research data: only five of the interviewed volunteers, all producing care and recreation for vulnerable groups, also use these services themselves. They live in both the deprived and the wealthier neighbourhoods and most of them are elderly.

That volunteers can be both users and producers, chimes in with ideas about the ‘participation society’ in which citizens enact reciprocal solidarity through their own activities rather than through the state. The Rotterdam municipality welcomes this. A city-hall based policy maker on voluntary participation for instance said when I interviewed her: ‘If you want someone to do something for you, then look at what you can offer in return’ (Interview with Bouchra).

In my fieldwork, however, I have found only a few Rotterdam residents who volunteer to also profit from the service it produces or can be exchanged for. One of these few people is Faiza, a Moroccan woman in her fifties. She took over the organisation of her sowing class that up until last year was run by a semi-governmental welfare organisation in the municipality funded community centre of Harbourtown. Last year the course was stopped due to budget cuts, but a community worker helped Faiza fill in the form of a Resident Initiative application. Now they still have the same room as before, only the professional instructor no longer works there. Instead, a new instructor was found in Dasja, a woman from Estonia who followed Dutch lessons in another room of the centre and who is studying to become a professional seamstress at a Rotterdam lower vocation school. She is willing to help the other women with their sowing every week for a year, regarding it as extra practice for herself. Faiza takes care that the sowing machines are working, that there is enough sowing thread and that the room is cleaned after every class. When I visit the course, I see that it is used by approximately 20 women of many different ethnic backgrounds (except for native Dutch). All are grouped around their sowing projects. Faiza tells me she took over the organization because she and the other women enjoy the class and the social contacts it offers.

E: What is the reason you do this?
F: Because we had good atmosphere together and I just don’t want to stop. If we stop no one will meet no one, let’s say. Before the budget cuts we had heard that this would close and everybody did not like it. No we just want to continue, we just want continue. But fortunately we made the [Resident Initiative funding] application. The woman says to me do you want to continue, do you want to be responsible? I say that is okay. And everybody was happy because it just continued. Really. And I like it myself.

For Faiza, her volunteering work is about meeting others (as she says, ‘if we stop no one will meet no one’), but also about creating a service that she enjoys using. It is important to her because it is her main weekly entertainment, besides her aerobics class at the centre. When I ask her if she has any other occupations she says ‘No, I am a housewife, I don’t do anything’.

The other Rotterdam volunteer who can be said to profit from the service she provides is Tilda. She is 81 years old and lives in Northville. She is a widow and a former nurse and volunteers at the neighbourhood church’s self-organized library and helps with serving low-cost church meals for other elderly. She explains that she has other hobbies too but still has a lot of leisure time. She is volunteering ‘because you must have something to do, don’t you?’ and is happy to do something for lonely elderly with her time. She finds the work interesting because of its helping aspect. However, by being there for neighbourhood boards and other ‘talking’ organisations seeking residents’ influence and control in neighbourhood planning. Occasionally it may happen that such planning decisions affect their own street or housing block, and as such affect them personally too. But even in these cases, their profit is often limited because in such neighbourhood planning matters residents’ influence is usually limited.
other elderly, she also will be less lonely herself. At her advanced age, friends and family become scarcer because they pass away, and Tilda implicitly explains that she has to deal with loneliness.

My sister died, but her eldest daughter wants to keep contact with me and then she goes to concerts with me, she took over her mother’s place a bit, I am very grateful to her. I have a daughter, but she has a very busy life and she lives in another town, and like that, but well, for the rest it is good. You have to make something out of it yourself. And I can be by myself very well too. Yesterday I had a day like that. Took a shower, put on fresh pyjamas and looked through my books all day.

Tilda has chats with many other neighbourhood residents while staffing the library. She can be described as a beneficiary constituent-volunteer. Beneficiary volunteers can be discerned even more clearly in the Eindhoven Togethercare community centres. This is because from the start, these centres were created as structures for reciprocal self-help.

Bettie, for instance, is a Togethercare volunteer. She is 81 years old and together with Mies she organizes a weekly book club at the centre for 15 other elderly and themselves. Mies decided to organise it because the club she used to visit at a municipal library, was ended due to budget cuts.

Mies: When the library partly closed down, because they shut down a whole floor, then we [my former book club] had to move to another place and that was further away from my house. And I had to walk a stairs to get there and things... and then I thought I'm glad my neighbour told me to have a look at the neighbourhood [centre] because in a little while you won't be able to do that [health wise]. But that was really hard to accept for me. That I really couldn’t manage traveling across town anymore. So I am happy I joined this neighbourhood group.

Her friend Bettie not only organizes the book club, but also runs a weekly drawing club and a knitting club that produces plaids that are sold. She says that the community centre has brought her a lot. Before the centre was created, she was getting slightly bored. Her children have grown up and so have her grandchildren. Setting up recreational activities and meeting new people has cured her boredom. 'I have a nice husband, but still…' she smiles. 'Now I am all happy again.' Her friend says about her 'Her doctor said that she hasn’t looked this good in years'. Bettie explains that meeting new people is part of her reason for volunteering. She says she already knew many people in the neighbourhood, but now she knows even more of them.

Through those couple of years this project has been running I have, I was already very friendly with the neighbours and actually our whole row of houses... but through those couple of years I got to know a lot of people that, maybe I cannot call them my friends but they are at least acquaintances.

To explain the difference to me she quotes one of the two initiators of her community centre. "She said I know so many people in the neighbourhood because I always walk the dog in the neighbourhood, but I didn't know they were so nice." Also for Mies, meeting new people is important. At her advanced age, she has recently experienced the loss of important friends and family members. Mies recalls how the need to make new friends has caught her by surprise.

I had a couple of good friends, I had a friend living across the street in (other city where she used to live). Someone where you can just step through the door, and say, ‘hi Heleen, I'm here to have a coffee’ Well she died. A year before my husband died, she died. Then I thought ‘Oooh… and I always thought if you aren't here anymore I will still have Heleen. But then I didn't have her anymore. She died and I lost a couple of good friends well they, they are just dead. And that is what I hate so much about getting old"
For Mies, who says that she isn’t the type that easily makes intimate friends, or likes to visit new friends at home, the book club provides her with social contact that suits her. Here she enjoys the level of intimacy and type of conversation topics. ‘At the book club I feel more and more among familiar people’. Bettie adds that to guard this feeling of familiarity, the organisers makes sure the club doesn’t become too large. She says: ‘We have a good excuse, because we can say this room can only hold so many people’. Both women also think the community centre should not expand to a new neighbourhood, because residents in the next neighbourhood have different interests (it is a bit more working class). But they also think the centre should stick to one neighbourhood in order to maintain the sense of familiarity that has been created. Bettie says that this familiarity would be lost if the two centres joined:

We had a workshop with the people of the community centre of the adjacent neighbourhood. And at first they said we want to unite with your group. But now they also realize that it would become way too big if that happened. Because they don’t even know each other. We know each other but they don’t even know each other.

As this example shows, and as I also saw in the Daisy community centre, sociability-oriented people are mostly inclined to look at their own age and ethnic group, and do not want their volunteer group to become very large.

There is another way in which volunteers of Togethercare centres are beneficiary constituents. Volunteers in a Togethercare centre are often interested in the self-help care network it provides. From the onset these centres have focused on recreational activities also to strengthen the neighbourhood’s social networks through these activities, so that they can become a solid infrastructure for self-help in elderly care. To this end, many of the people taking part in the recreational activities have also joined the centre’s volunteer-run telephone helpline service. All neighbourhood residents can call this helpline when they have small household technical problems or care needs (picking up groceries and medicines when they are ill, etc.). Other neighbourhood residents freely provide this help. Users must only make a small payment to the community centre to prevent free riding. The friendly face-to-face contacts the neighbourhood residents have in the recreational meetings help to strengthen a sense of familiarity, trust and shared identity in the neighbourhood. This enables the elderly members to dare ask for help and also to dare opening their door to a helping neighbourhood resident that they are not very familiar with. The presence of an intermediary volunteer lowers the threshold to ask for help even further. Help is seldom declined in your face, because the intermediary just keeps looking until a helper is found.

As noted above, Togethercare’s sociable recreational activities are visited by a group that is rather homogeneous in terms of age. This is not unexpected, as sociability is a large part of their attraction. But in the Eindhoven groups, joiners also want to receive help around their house and help with personal care. Therefore, they need more and younger residents of the neighbourhood to join the network. However, here their image stands in the way. Bettie and Mies explain this to me:

I: Why do you find it important to also have younger people visiting your recreational activities?
B: Because they are our future of course. We cannot do it anymore at a certain moment. The goal is that we can live in our houses as long as possible. And that the others, [Bettie stresses these words] that the others will keep an eye on us when we cannot do it anymore. And the others, that is not Mies looking after me, because by then she won’t be able to manage that herself. Or me looking after her, because by then I won’t be able to do it myself. We need younger people for that. And those younger people should start to care, should start to feel that they live in a neighbourhood where people look after each other.
I: What do you mean by younger people? People in their 60s or in their 40s?
B: Yes. People in their 40s but also people in their 30s. And for that reason some people also say I want to babysit for younger people, if their children are ill. Because it's tit for tat. So Togethercare started as a project for elderly but at a certain moment I think a group of younger people will join. Last Friday we tried to have a cocktail meeting for younger people. Well, not many people came but it is a start. So let the younger people also get to know this place.

I: and if I understand correctly, the image can be a bit of a problem, like that other lady said.

Cora (third volunteer): Yes indeed, because they will still have the idea that it is for elderly people. That it is for grandma Duck.

M: For the old people
B: It’s a club for old people.

As shown above, volunteers’ interest in sociability often creates quite homogeneous group, but this makes it more difficult to form the heterogeneous group that some services require. Still, the Togethercare centres show that group assets can be created out of aggregated personal interests: the neighbourhood residents’ personal social interests have helped to build the informal self-help networks.

Conclusion

The interviewees’ quoted statements in his paragraph make explicit that volunteers can have not only neighbourhood communitarian motivations, but also their own (non-professional) personal motivations. These include finding pastimes and social contacts, and sometimes also the personal need to find more purpose in life by contributing to socially relevant projects. Some ‘beneficiary’ volunteers are also motivated because they want to use the service that they co-produce.

Together, this suggests that retired and unemployed citizens (for lack of work or health reasons) on average have more time and more need to find spheres of occupation and sociability than employed citizens, and that for some for unemployed these spheres are found in volunteering. Unemployed people volunteering to fulfil (also) some of their personal social needs, thus present another partial explanation for the fact that more year-round volunteering residents were found in the deprived research neighbourhoods than in the wealthier ones. In these neighbourhoods also the amount of unemployed people who have much time available is higher, and for some of them this is coupled with a need to be around people and have things to do that can be answered by volunteering.

The overrepresentations of retired persons in volunteering is quite well documented by survey research. But the finding that also younger non-working people are overrepresented runs contrary to the idea that an individual’s socio-economic status is positively related to volunteering. Yet it is known that especially the ‘doing’ volunteering work that is important in most self-organized welfare services attracts more unemployed people than the ‘talking’ neighbourhood volunteering in formal neighbourhood advocacy organizations (Kearns 1995). It takes especially much time to lead such a ‘doing’ organisation.

6.3.3 Cluster 3: Higher-educated self-employed leaders and lower-educated helpers working (also) for their professional career and some financial earnings

The preceding paragraphs have dealt with two groups of volunteers that can be discerned in the qualitative data from the research neighbourhoods: in the first place the higher educated allochthonous residents that are volunteering to help their own ethnic group. In the second place we
have identified a group of leaders who are not working due to old age, or health problems, and who seek a social role or social contacts (or both) through volunteering work. This paragraph will deal with the third cluster. This is the group of volunteers (leaders and helpers) for whom volunteering is directly connected to their professional career. All of the volunteers in this group do volunteering work in a neighbourhood to help overcome social or societal problems that worry them, but also to expand their CV and connections, and often also to earn some extra money through the subsidies they request. The leaders and helpers belonging to this group can be found in lines 25 to 35 of table 6.6.

This group of professionally oriented volunteers – people that want to help neighbourhood residents, but also have the personal motivation that this may directly or indirectly provide paid work – consist firstly of professionally oriented leaders. Such leaders make up about a third of all leaders I interviewed in the research neighbourhoods. Almost all of them are self-employed workers without employees (zzp-er in Dutch, zelfstandige zonder personeel). They work as consultants in urban planning, in the creative sector (as product designers, artists and architects) or in the welfare service sector (mostly social workers, several of whom were fired in the municipality’s budget cut operations). In their resident initiatives, they stick to their field of professional expertise: self-employed social workers for instance organize the same neighbourhood social cohesion projects that they already did when they were still employed by a semi-governmental organization, and self-employed architects set up neighbourhood meetings to develop and discuss public space redesign plans. In practice, at least a quarter of all applications in the Borough Dataset is made by a leader that is partly professionally oriented: 25% of the applications list a (small) fee for a coordinating leader in the planning of the expenses. Most of these applications came from the lowest income neighbourhoods (26), followed by the mixed neighbourhoods (18), and in the high income neighbourhoods there were only seven plans with a coordination charge in the application. Applicants calculating such a fee for organization or coordination are mostly higher educated (of the Borough Dataset applicants that I know have a higher education, 50% does this, versus only one sixth of the lower educated applicants).

Next to these professionally oriented leaders, the group of professionally oriented volunteers also consists of helpers. These helpers, which make up half of the helpers I spoke with, do unpaid volunteering to help others but also to create their own apprenticeship or orientation trajectory on a new professional field. They are all lower-educated.

The next subparagraph will show how the Rotterdam policy context creates options for partly paid volunteering, which is an important motivation for many professionally oriented leaders. It is followed by two subparagraph explaining in more detail what these groups of professionally oriented leaders and helpers look like in my qualitative data. For now, I can already add a new nuance to my answer to subquestion 1:

Do higher-educated and majority ethnic residents engage in neighbourhood welfare-service volunteering more than other residents?

I can now state that the fact that mostly higher educated residents lead volunteering organizations in my research neighbourhoods, is partly explained by several of these higher-educated leaders’ interest in doing work that is useful for local society and also provides them with a bit of money. This practice of paid volunteering is most prevalent in deprived neighbourhoods, even though they have relatively few higher-educated residents in the population. This is in the first place because several of these professionally oriented volunteers are self-employed welfare workers. They are used to work with low-income households, and see most demand for their services in deprived areas. Therefore the deprived neighbourhood is where they are likely to apply for project funding through the Resident Initiative.
fund. Other projects, particularly those in public space, are led by creative professionals or by people working in sports. Sometimes these self-employed welfare workers and other social self-employed professionals live in another part of Rotterdam (the regulation on Resident Initiative funding allows for applications by social entrepreneurs living outside the neighbourhood), but mostly they live in or around the neighbourhood where they want to do their project. Therefore, a further plausible reason for the relatively high number of professionally oriented volunteers in deprived areas is that these areas have a relatively high share of under-employed welfare and creative workers living in and around them. Several of these workers are motivated to make an application at the Resident Initiative Fund, to improve the neighbourhood and at the same time create some work for themselves. Although I do not have quantitative data on the amount of self-employed welfare and creative workers in Rotterdam’s neighbourhoods, I expect that the lower housing prices and rents make the deprived areas relatively attractive to people with a changeable and at times low income\textsuperscript{39}. It also is probable that professionally oriented helpers are more strongly represented in the deprived neighbourhoods. These areas have more unemployed people looking for work experience, and some of them try to gain work experience through volunteering.

The policy context of paid volunteering

Professionally oriented volunteers thus pop up in the qualitative data, even though at first sight, professional motivations and volunteering do not seem closely linked. In public debate, civil society and the market are even usually conceptualized as separate spheres. Nevertheless, in practice the boundary between these spheres is often blurred and initiatives follow market logic combined with altruistic logic: the people who invest a lot of time and skills in a volunteering organisation for the neighbourhood are awarded financially for some of their work.

\textsuperscript{39} I do not have quantitative data to show how much self-employed creative and welfare workers live in the different neighbourhoods of Rotterdam. Data on first-year self-employed residents per neighbourhood in all sectors (Economische Verkenningen 2013, Gemeente Rotterdam, p. 60) show that especially higher income neighbourhoods have many self-employed starters (but they might work in other, more commercial sectors than welfare or creative services). Yet, I saw more former welfare workers and architects and designers explain their application for funding at the committee meetings of the Polder Borough than at those of the wealthier North Borough. The data on starting self-employed residents furthermore shows that for a low income area, Parktown and Harbourtown and surroundings have relatively many self-employed starters in their working age population. This suggest that neighbourhood share of self-employed is dependent on more factors than only its socio-economic profile. Architectural and lifestyle features of the neighbourhoods will also play a role. Almost all of Polder Borough was built around 1900, and until today consists of mostly mixed-use mid-rise streets. For that reason, areas like Parktown and Harbourtown are often perceived as less ‘boring’ than the other low-income areas of the city: the mid- and high-rise functionalist urbanism of the post-WW II city expansions. They are also on a shorter traveling distance to the city centre than most of Rotterdam’s post war expansions. Especially people working in welfare services and (self-employed) creative professionals may find Polder Borough’s relative centrality, its low housing prices, its density and architectural and lifestyle diversity attractive features of the dwelling environment (see for instance Dutch authors Blokland and Van Eijk (2010) and Veldboer (2010) on the preferences of these groups of urban dwellers). Another reason why Polder Borough would have relatively many self-employed starters is probably the higher availability of small shop-spaces in these older neighbourhoods. This leads to more self-employed shopkeepers, and thus to a comparatively high share of self-employed residents for these neighbourhoods.
This fact is acknowledged (and to some extent even promoted) in various policy documents of the Dutch government. The Cabinet’s Policy Brief on the ‘Doing-Democracy’ (quoted before in chapter 2 of this dissertation) for instance reminds that:

‘Doing-democracy seems to be primarily aimed at the relationship between citizens and government, in the public sphere. Yet, the relationship with the market should not be overlooked (…) Many puzzles about the future society originate in people’s tendency to cling to the classical conceptual division between the three spheres government, market and community. In practice, innovative mixes emerge regularly, in which people work professionally and in a committed way, using (albeit in smaller amounts) governmental resources, and with a supporting and strongly outreaching role of civil servants.

The Policy Brief notes that is precisely such blending of market, governmental and community effort that characterizes existing (re)privatized welfare institutions such as the Housing Associations and semi-governmental social work organizations (see also paragraph 2.3.2 of this dissertation). But in this light also so-called ‘social entrepreneurs’ fit the ‘doing-democracy’ paradigm, according to the Policy Brief. It describes social entrepreneurs as a ‘special group of entrepreneurs’ who ‘admittedly work as business organisations, but for whom the solving of a societal problem is primary’ (ibid, p.13). The Brief underlines that Dutch government ‘strongly supports’ such blending of market, state and government efforts to create solutions for societal issues (ibid p. 13).

In the same vein as the national Policy Brief, also the Rotterdam municipality gives room to market involvement in its Resident Initiative program. Even though the term Resident Initiative seems to suggest that initiators will be striving to improve the quality of the neighbourhood space because they live there, the aspiration to earn some money while doing this is also valid according to the municipal regulation on Resident Initiatives. In the regulation document, the municipality makes clear that ‘social entrepreneurs’ are eligible for this funding, and that they can apply for funding for projects inside or outside their borough of residence. When awarding the Resident Initiative applications of social entrepreneurs, Borough Committees members must however keep a few things in mind

\textit{“For social entrepreneurs we [the Borough Committee and supporting civil servants] check that there is a clear and concrete contribution to a societal problem, and that residents are involved in the application and execution of an initiative. [Plans must be] supported by a revenue planning in which the societal gains outweigh the (societal) costs (…) Possible ‘profits’ flow back to the social enterprise and are used for the benefit of the society and the societal problem”} (Further Rules on Resident Initiatives, 2014, p.5)

All applications – from social entrepreneurs or other citizens- must furthermore be accompanied by an advisory note written by civil servants that know the neighbourhood. They score each application on various five-point scales, one of which regards the extent to which the plan \textit{‘also makes use of applicants’ own contribution in time and / or money’}. Social entrepreneuring with governmental funding is allowed, as long as there is also an unpaid contribution. Furthermore there are temporal limits to the funding period of initiatives, whether they are led by social entrepreneurs or by ‘normal’ residents. The regulation prescribes that subsidies \textit{‘cannot be used for projects that create structural financial demands, or cause expenses for dismantling the project, for instance in case of continuous accommodation costs or continuous salaries outside the period of activities’} (Rotterdam 2014a; Rotterdam 2015). More in general \textit{‘organizations that have employees cannot receive Resident Initiative funding’} (Rotterdam 2014b).
Rotterdam thus includes small-scale market activities in its participation society concept, but with several limitations. Therefore, in practice, implementing social enterprising in policy focused mostly on unpaid volunteering, is not as straightforward as it seems. In the first place the Borough Committees regularly debate during their meetings what kind of work is worth reimbursement, and if so, how much reimbursement would be reasonable. The regulation document is not clear on this issue. What does it mean when profits ‘flow back to the enterprise and are used for the benefit of society’ as the regulation prescribes? A few months after their start, the committee of Polder Borough therefore forms a subcommittee to answer the question: ‘What is social entrepreneurialism? Because right now we don’t have an exact idea what it is precisely’ (interview Committee member Mark). Several applications by social entrepreneurs furthermore trouble the Committee, because their funding might unfairly advantage the applicants vis a vis their unsponsored competitors on the market. Lastly, it proves difficult for civil servants to check applicants’ contribution of ‘free’ time: at the time of the application the initiatives are still in the planning phase. Quite often, during the Borough Committee meetings I attended, the Committees spend much time on establishing what financial rewards for volunteering are allowed and just.

Eventually, and often despite protest of one or more Committee members, the Committees does grant some money (for instance 1000 Euro) for the coordination activities of the leaders, acknowledging that it is work that should be paid. It is more difficult to gain subsidies for the executive work involved in delivering the services (these problems for the Committee will be elaborated in paragraph 7.2 on initiatives’ good governance).

The space created for social entrepreneurs in the Resident Initiative program, also changes the meanings of certain words belonging to the participation society discourse. Both the Policy Brief on Doing-Democracy and Rotterdam’s Regulation on Resident Initiatives generally denote people providing services formerly arranged by the welfare state as ‘residents’ taking ‘resident initiatives’ and often as ‘volunteers’, but in these documents -and also during the meetings of the Committees- the word ‘volunteer’ can also stand for the activities of partly paid social entrepreneurs, and the word ‘resident’ now can also mean an enterprising citizen living outside the neighbourhood.

Leaders for whom paid work is part of their motivation

Now that the outlines of the professionally oriented volunteer and its policy context in the Resident Initiative program have been sketched, I will show more in detail what kind of volunteering is done with -partly- professional motives. This will elucidate that professionally oriented volunteers can be found especially in the deprived neighbourhoods, and that they work in almost all sectors of welfare services: care, recreation for vulnerable groups, social cohesion projects, but also in redesigning public space, and citizen participation in physical neighbourhood planning. It will also show that particularly professionally oriented volunteers in care and physical urban planning can sometimes generate an income or create valuable job opportunities for themselves, connected to their volunteering. Usually, however, the subsidies paid for coordination are not nearly enough for leaders to make a living, and most household income has to come from combining several self-organized welfare projects and other commissions as a ‘zzp-er’ (self-employed person without employees). I will deal with each sector in turn.

Care in the neighbourhood between volunteering and professionalism

In the field of care, two resident initiatives can be found in the research neighbourhood that create both volunteering and paid work. In the borough of the deprived neighbourhoods, the Polder Borough
Care Network was founded three years ago. Its main activity is the organisation of healthy but cheap dinners. They take place in parishes and municipality-run or self-organized community centres around Polder Borough, often on a weekly basis. The users are mainly elderly and people with psychiatric problems. (Over the last two decades, the number of psychiatric patients and elderly living on their own instead of in large-scale homes, has risen. This is because local and national government have promoted independent dwelling since it presents less public cost, see for instance SEO (2004)). The dinners are prepared by volunteers, by employed care-professionals who do this as part of their job, and by unemployed people who have to do volunteering work in order to retain their full poverty allowance. There is considerable interest in communal eating by the independently living elderly and psychiatric patients in Polder Borough’s neighbourhoods, and this innovation has gained attention in local and national press. The network has also gained substantial funding in the three years it has existed.

The Care Network was initiated by artist Elaine, care consultant Tjerk and urban planner Jessie. All were self-employed at the time of the founding of their initiative. In the second year of their initiative, they gained a large subsidy from a special municipality fund (Fonds Sociale Infrastructuur) that helped to make their organisation grow. According to Neighbourhood Manager Michel (the municipality’s central civil servant for Parktown and Harboutown), in practice only hard working, work-seeking professionals with much experience and expertise in the field of their initiatives, gain access to larger amounts of municipal funding than the maximum of 10.000 euro per Resident initiative application. When I ask him whether there are any resident organisations that obtain structural subsidies, he says:

*M: No, well, there are some initiatives...Like the Care Network...What I notice is that... you almost need a couple of people that just lost their jobs and now are willing to be an initiative leader with the idea: this will get me... this will be my new job. This isn’t just one of the twenty things you can do next to your job.*

In the local and national press, the Care Network is presented as an icon of the power of volunteering, with volunteering helpers and leaders. In Tjerk’s words, however, some of the leaders’ work is also paid. When he defends his funding application at a Polder Borough committee meeting, he is asked how much money goes to the professionals for their organization:

*Tjerk: How much money goes to the professionals? Well, we haven’t made a budget plan yet. Our own hourly fee is part of it, we will be open about that. We had a look at what we ourselves have invested, time and the economic value of that time. We calculate that it is about 100.000 euro’s or 125.000 euros. So we also put some hours in the budget plan for ourselves (…) And we gave some discount on our hourly fee. Because we said we understand very well that it will be lower for this kind of project, so we made it an hourly fee of 45 Euro. (Borough Committee meeting, December 2014)*

Some (small) form of salary of the leaders is possible because it has gained around 20.000 euro for different projects in 2014 Resident Initiative subsidies from two Boroughs, and in 2013 also a subsidy of between 20.000 and 50.000 euro from a special municipal budget. The municipality has not yet published an account on this single-issue subsidy fund (Fonds Sociale Infrastructuur). The municipality nor the care network told me how large this subsidy was, both noting that this was part of

---

40 People who volunteer to retain full poverty allowance are rarely presented as such by professionals. Also the Care Network avoids the term ‘volunteer’, one of the initiators explains to me, because it has become ‘tarnished’ by the municipality’s new regulation of obligatory volunteering for full benefits. They are valued as people who give voluntarily, because this is often their true motivation. This tarnishing of the word volunteer is another example of a meaning shift in the words used in the participation society discourse.
the confidential business information of the Care Network.

However, the need for new forms of elderly care is felt not only in deprived neighbourhoods. Also the wealthier neighbourhood Northville has a successful care initiative, generating also paid work. This care initiative is called Neighbourly. It matches elderly with other neighbourhood residents. These residents help the elderly with household tasks and keep them company, for which the elderly user pays 10 Euro per hour. In this case, the coordinating leaders are unpaid volunteers (Manja, the main initiator, has a husband that provides enough income for the household to leave her much time for her initiative) but the helpers are paid. Neighbourly uses a rule in Dutch tax law, under which paid homemaking work (cleaning, cooking, etc.) does not create legal labour relations if it is done for less than 4 hours per week per client (‘belastingcategorie dienstverlening aan huis’). For most participating helpers in Northville, this salary is lower than what they (used to) make when they work(ed) in their normal job or what their partner makes, and therefore most of them still consider it as ‘partly volunteering work’, says Liesbet, one of the helpers/participants. Manja describes Neighbourly as a citizen’s initiative, in which residents provide social care in the neighbourhood and in this way it is ‘somewhere in between professional care and volunteering in the neighbourhood’. Neighbourly has obtained funding from the Resident Initiative subsidies, from a municipal single-issue fund for citizens’ initiatives (Rotterdamidee), and other funding from charities. Manja also had a professional coach provided for free by the municipality’s central office for resident initiatives.

**Physical urban planning between volunteering and professionalism**

Beside care initiatives, there are also resident initiatives that are in the field of urban planning that successfully generate some income for the leaders. Such an initiative is community centre The Block. Three years ago in a Parktown street, a group of temporarily under-employed architects living there had the idea to renovate a vacant working space and turn it into a community centre. Their street is a mixed street of cheap rental dwellings, some workspaces and some more expensive owner-occupied housing. Their new community centre was named ‘The Block’: it now consists of meeting rooms, an atelier and a kitchen, the construction of which was partly financed by Resident Initiative funding. Their group also created designs for the public spaces around their community centre, as well as energy saving plans for the housing in the street. For making such plans, the participating volunteering architects and planners were paid by the municipality and the Housing Association owning the street’s social rent apartments. As leader Marit explains, it was not the initial idea to generate money through the activities of The Block’s collective.

Marit (architect, renovating and leading a community centre in the basement of a housing block): "We didn't start as a professional firm, we started from the idea 'we want something different. And there is nothing happening downstairs here, so then we will have to start it'.

Yet funding became available for their redesign plans for the centre and surroundings, as well as for the social activities in the centre activities. Both the municipality and the Housing Association have been enthusiastic about the potential of The Block. Marit, the leader of the Block, finds that the municipality’s and Housing Association’s current focus on the participation society is helpful to their projects in several ways. This in turn has created opportunities to turn parts of their volunteering work into paid commissions.

*It actually works a bit in our favour because all these things we do, they wouldn't have been possible five years ago if we had asked the municipality for those things. For instance, now we can refurbish the street*
outside our centre, take part in participation processes, we are allowed to rent this centre [from the Housing Association] for a very affordable rent. (...) So what you see now is actually that the story changes from volunteering, for the pleasure of it or to solve an annoyance, but in any case you are going to do it voluntarily, that changes: you can and you want to earn something for it. So you try to make it into commissions so that people, preferably people who live very close by, can participate at different levels and can also earn money.

Regular work in architectural design in Rotterdam was very meagre at the time of their initiative (in 2013, many architects in Rotterdam were out of work because of the long-term building slump that has hit the Netherlands since 2008, and construction activity nationwide was at a historical low, see CBS 2015, p.5). However, the Housing Association had decided to sell much of its stock in the street of The Block, and was interested in making the street look better. This probably helped the resident initiative to turn some of this interest into paid commissions for their group: “we have quite a few architects and urban that of course always commend themselves whenever there is something involving stones”, says Marit.

Such a paid commission happened for instance for Gemma, who got into contact with Marit through a mutual friend. She is now running a temporary communal garden in the street, on a large undeveloped plot awaiting the construction of middle-class housing. This community garden was partly financed through Resident Initiative funding and the preparatory groundwork was done by favour-in-return volunteers (see previous footnote). It now hosts a weekly kids’ gardening afternoon, attracting children from both the social rent areas and the (new) owner-occupied housing. Gemma tells me that she got her job through somebody she knew in The Block. She was renting a vegetable patch somewhere across town as her private hobby, and then somebody to block asked her: don’t you want to set up our communal garden for us? ‘And now the municipality pays me as a self-employed community gardener’, says Gemma.

The friend through whom Gemma got her paid assignment leads several other Resident Initiatives. After the first year of the Resident Initiative program, a group of committee members expresses that they will no longer support sponsoring her and other applicants that have already obtained several portions of funding, for the sake of fairness to other applicants. By that time the Polder Borough committee has experienced that they do not have enough money to sponsor each application they approve of. Also neighbourhood manager Michel says he is watchful initiating residents do not use the budget many times per year and create an income out of it.

M: “You [I] keep an eye on how many applications the group has already done in a year. Isn’t their piece of the cake getting a bit too large? (...) If someone makes a new application every month with a substantial budget for organization fee, well come on…

E: it shouldn’t be a profession.

M: the professional initiator? Well it’s a nice profession but let’s not do that”;

In practice, a limitation to the Resident Initiative funding program is thus that that individual residents cannot apply for organizational fees many times per year.

A small group of architects and urban planners living in Harbourtown, is also involved in many volunteering initiatives in the area. They have for instance helped to create neighbourhood parties, improve green spaces, organise art events and gatherings around food. One of them tells me he has been active in the area for years. His professional perspective on his volunteering work is not focused on obtaining some organisation fees, but is much more long-term and oriented on getting to know the
neighbohood inside out. He indicates that he knew from the beginning this volunteering would be time-consuming, but has always regarded it as an investment in the neighbourhood and in his professional career.

"Before moving to this neighbourhood I had been working as a planning consultant for years, also abroad. They fly you in for a project and after two years you're gone again. But I think that most problems, especially in areas like this (Parktown and Harbourtown), require people's long-term commitment as well as intricate knowledge of the area and a network. So in 2002, I said, I just want to work in my own Borough. So I am going to get myself involved in all kinds of things here in a systematical way, starting from very small things but [with the idea that] new structures should develop, that allow for doing several things at a large scale and over longer periods. (…) I have always had the philosophy: the attention you give will always come back to you. You'll always have more, you just don't know in what way exactly."

Now, after 10 years of volunteering in many neighbourhood organisations, opportunities for consultancy work in long-term, larger scale neighbourhood plans have materialized. When I interview him, he has just founded the 'Polder Borough Structure', together with an architect and an urban planner, who, are also volunteering in various resident initiatives. Within a week after the official launch of the Polder Borough Structure, the housing Association and municipality gave it a large paid commission. They will be the project coordinators of a housing renovation project of several streets in Harbourtown (which will remain cheap rentals). It will also guide the multi-stakeholder governance process of the neighbourhood park redesign. According to the urban planner, his new-formed organisation was given this commission because the Housing Association and municipality know that these projects require an integral approach, combining social and physical interventions in the neighbourhood. Such an integral approach then necessitates coordinators that personally know different types of neighbourhood professionals and can unite them and raise their joint commitment:

"And you notice that they [Housing Association and municipality] have a need for a party that can connect all these sectorial interests of professional parties. That knows all these people and can just make connections. Not only connections on the basis of functional needs, but also on the basis of personally knowing them, knowing their values and vision. (…) All three of us have a very firm network so we know all these people, we have been working with them for years and they with us. So there is trust and I can say: okay let us form a group and see how we will get this [urban renewal plan] done"

For the members of the Polder Borough Structure, doing coordinating volunteering work in the neighbourhood has yielded personal connections and local knowledge. Their long-term investment of volunteering has enabled them to work as professional neighbourhood planning project coordinators.

**Social workers gaining commissions through Resident Initiatives**

Care and physical neighbourhood planning thus offer some examples of opportunities for ‘professional volunteering’. In other sectors where I find professionally driven volunteers, however, the money streams per initiative are more limited. This is the sector of ‘social work’, that includes children’s and youth recreation and education and projects for street or neighbourhood social cohesion.

An example of a professionally oriented volunteer working in children’s recreation and education is Ramon. He is the leader of the children’s art club. He is a higher educated painter and historian, living in Harbourtown. He tells me that 10 years ago he started this initiative because he found it necessary that children from his deprived neighbourhood get into contact with art. The subsidies from the municipality to run this art club also provide his main source of income, which is modest. (He and his
family live in a social rental apartment and he later tells me that they often do not go on summer holidays to spare money).

When I first meet Ramon, and introduce my research, he says that he is interested to participate. Lately he feels discouraged and down because he has received a string of refusals to his subsidy applications. In the last few years, he has found it increasingly hard to gain structural subsidies. In earlier municipal funding programs - when it was still channelled through civil servants and alderpersons - resident groups could get funding for activities they had been doing for years. But under the new Resident Initiative plan, each organization can get subsidy for one type of activities only once (see the subparagraph on the Rotterdam policy context for paid volunteering). In the Borough Committee Regulation document, this prohibition of structural subsidies is described as a way to stir innovation, but it presents problems for Ramon. He furthermore finds that also charities are increasingly focused on temporary, 'innovative' projects, and do not grant money to activities organised on a more structural basis. Because there is little money now, Ramon has decided to keep providing free lessons, but for the time being there will be much less salary for him. He hopes that eventually some subsidy request will be awarded. The next time I meet him, one of his plans has indeed been granted but the money is still short. It is hard for him to plan activities ahead and also to pay Amad, his helper.

Also in the fields of youth work and social cohesion projects, I come across several professional volunteers in Parktown and Harbourtown. Here, too, the financial gains per project are small. Examples are community worker Richard and youth worker Jamal. They both try to create new paid work out of Resident Initiatives, after losing their jobs at a semi-governmental social work organisation that went bankrupt. The Resident Initiatives they come up with, occupy them a few hours per week, and I estimate that this brings them a few thousand Euros per year. Paid through the Resident Initiative fund Richard now continues his work as the organizer of several Street Meetings (where he invites residents of a street for a coffee gathering on the sidewalk) and as the main organizer of Parktown’s resident platform. The application for the coordination of the platform was officially made by his wife, as a resident. Jamal has used Resident Initiative funding to reopen his club for Moroccan youths, which he already had when he was still employed at semi-governmental social work organization. He scaled down the number of club nights per week to one.

Both Richard and Jamal do not mention in their applications that they are social workers by education and experience (and thus likely to bring their initiative to a good end). Marit and Norbert, likewise, are presented in the Committee Members as residents of Parktown, not as architects or urban planners. Their resident-identity is most important in the resident initiative discourse, also because the resident initiatives cannot be used to create services that will have employed professional leaders or cause costs when they are dismantled (see paragraph 4.3 of this dissertation).

Helpers with a work-oriented motivation

Not only initiative leaders sometimes have professional interests among their reasons to volunteer. Also for half of the ten helpers I interviewed or talked to, work and volunteering are linked. This was for instance the case for Liesbet, who I interviewed as a paid helper for Neighbourly (see above), and who receives a small hourly payment for her one-on-one elderly support activities. The other professionally oriented helpers I interviewed are not paid for their volunteering, but they see their volunteering work (also) as an apprenticeship or as a preparation for gaining a paid job in the field of their volunteering. These are Yassin, Troy, Abdelkarim and Barto, all lower educated allochthonous
men in their twenties and thirties. Whereas the partly paid leaders are presented and often present themselves as residents more than professionals to the Committee, these volunteering helpers always make clear to me that they do this as a kind of work, or want to gain paid work through it.

To give an example: Yassin is a second generation Turkish man of 22. He is helping Turkish and Turkish-speaking Bulgarians with their household administration in an office space of the Turkish International mosque. He is finishing lower vocational education in social work, and an apprenticeship is necessary for his degree (MBO). In the Netherlands, students in lower vocational education often have difficulty to find an apprenticeship, and for allochthonous students this is often even harder due to discrimination (see for instance Klooster, et al. 2016). Through a Turkish friend, Yassin eventually found this volunteering apprenticeship, and it was officially acknowledged by his school when he presented it. All other volunteers at the household administration support office are doing this as their official lower vocational school apprenticeship too, except for the volunteering coordinator.

Yassin thinks it is a pity that they do not pay him (now he has to make more hours at his side job as a cleaner of offices) but he likes that it is about helping people. He explains that he enjoys helping people, and went back to school to study this, also inspired by his faith.

Before, I studied lower vocational school, just construction you know. Then you do things with your hands. But this [apprenticeship] is purely with people, one-on-one, talking listening, those kind of things. And the feedback you get, through that you also improve yourself. Then you learn how to deal with people. You always need that. With your wife, with the children you will have... Little bit with the neighbours. Those are all rights in Islam you know (...) That you really try to live with your fellow humans. Yes. And I found that this education really had to do with my faith. So for that reason I chose it. I went to open days of schools.

Although he likes his volunteering for its helping aspect, his main intention for doing it is clear: he wants to obtain his social work degree. “When my education is done, I won’t stay here I think. Because, it is like, what they do here really is volunteering work. And well, I’m married now so I should have some income. So I am studying now and later I’ll have to get a job.”

This is somewhat like the situation of Troy, Abdelkarim and Barto, even though they are all unemployed and not studying at the moment. They volunteer (without pay) at the Showme household administration support office, and enjoy helping their clients with sorting out their financial administration. In the first place, however, they are volunteering to see if a social work job would suit them, and to increase their chances of obtaining such a job by gaining some experience.

Troy, for instance, worked as a self-educated cook in restaurants, but found he didn’t want to work nights anymore. After a sabbatical year, a social worker advised him to find a new professional future through volunteering. After ten months of volunteering as a household administration support he knew that:

‘I really like this, and I can do it, and I am going to get my education in this settled, and things, because this is just the direction I want now. And is said to the director [of Showme], if you have a vacancy and you can hire new people, would you think of me?’

Troy’s friend Barto joined him last year, and was surprised by how much he too likes the work. He says: ‘I can say that I have found my calling’. Abdelkarim has had the same positive experience. He has
health problems, and working is not possible for the time being, but in the future he too would one day like to be hired by Showme or a regular welfare organization. ‘I asked Troy and Melanie, our director, if maybe there are some lessons or whatever, then I’d like to sign up for it. Because I don’t want to stick to volunteering, if it keeps going this well I would like to work here’. At the same time, creating paid positions is very difficult for Melanie, the social entrepreneur leading Showme. Her volunteering network consists of 800 volunteers active in several poorer parts of Rotterdam (70% of which are ‘favour in return’ volunteers, she tells me, mostly working in social care for elderly) and only six paid coordinators. Five of them have a temporary position and want has a fixed contract. She knows that several of her more experienced volunteers eventually would like to be hired. This weighs heavily on her. She finds it

’very difficult. Because you will have to disappoint some people. Right now I have three people on the nomination list, that would love to have a paid job. All three of them are really good but I can hire only one of them at the moment. That hurts me. I would like to hire them all but that is not going to happen at the moment.

Creating paid work in her organization that operates between market, state and volunteering is particularly difficult because of the way it is currently typically financed in Rotterdam. Like the Polder Borough Care Network and Ramon’s art club, Melanie’s Showme organisation depends almost completely on municipal project subsidies and smaller Resident Initiative contributions, all of which are typically to be spent within half a year or within one year. As such, she can only create five temporal and one fixed job and her own position as a social entrepreneur. (Officially, organizations that employ professionals would not be eligible for Resident Initiative funding, (see paragraph 4.3 of this dissertation), but this rule is not often mentioned in the Committee meetings)41.

41 Also favour-in-return-volunteers can be regarded as professionally oriented volunteers, after all they have to volunteering to retain their full poverty allowance and thus have income. However, since I have not seen many of them during my research I do not describe them as a group here.

In principle it is very well possible that favour-in-return volunteers join volunteer-run neighbourhood organizations. People who have been on poverty allowance for more than five years, are free in their choice which organization they will volunteer for, as long as their work does not replace work that would otherwise be a paid job, and as long as they can work for 20 hours a week (see paragraph 4.3.4). However, on the whole, I could find very few favour-in-return-volunteers working in year-round neighbourhood organisations run by unpaid volunteers. Most volunteer-run organizations in practice find it too much trouble to guide and supervise the favour-in-return volunteers. Some of these last volunteers have to build a portfolio, and therefore have to be taught new tasks every two months. This led The Block to quit seeking favour-in-return volunteers. Another organization, Daisy, stopped looking for volunteers because the interview process was disappointing and time-consuming. Many favour-in-return volunteers called for a job interview, but eventually they did not come to the appointment. Flowerville’s resident organisation hasn’t tried working with favour-in-return volunteers because they have the premonition that these volunteers will not be motivated enough, and because they find it unjust that poverty allowance recipients must work. Sometimes, however, volunteer-run organizations already had helpers who in 2014, when the favour-in-return policy was increasingly rolled out, found out that they needed a volunteering position of 20 hours per week to retain their benefits. Such volunteers usually obtain a ‘contract’ from their volunteering leader without any problem. Occasionally, the same happens for volunteering leaders’ family members and close friends. Yet, all in all, the introduction of the favour in return policy has not made a large difference in the daily functioning of the volunteer-run neighbourhood groups I interviewed. Maybe this is also because most of my fieldwork took place before the policy was completely implemented.

The social entrepreneurs in care that I spoke with, do use many favour in return volunteers (Showme’s home care group and the Care Network). These social entrepreneurs get subsidies for placing a targeted number of favour-in-return volunteers. Still, by far the most favour in return volunteers work with (semi-)governmental organizations, volunteering in, schools, municipality run community centres and playgrounds and especially in
Conclusion

This paragraph has shown how altruistic as well as personal professional interests inspire the efforts of a share of the leaders and helpers in the Rotterdam research neighbourhoods. To these leaders -almost all of them higher-educated and self-employed in welfare services, creative jobs or urban planning-their initiatives provide in some paid work and sometimes even lead to new jobs. For the helpers, their gains are mostly in the field of work experience. The data have also shown that professional oriented volunteers are more often seen in the deprived research neighbourhoods than in the wealthier ones, plausibly because the deprived areas have more self- and under-employed residents interested to do partly paid work in welfare services or urban planning.

In my research neighbourhoods, initiatives that provide labour market reintegration or (social) care to elderly and people with a psychiatric background, as well as initiatives in urban planning, were most successful in creating paid projects for the leaders. They have been sponsored by various subsidies that the city has made available to new welfare service providing organizations that are innovative and make use of (favour-in-return) volunteers. Self-employed social workers in other fields and creative workers, on the other hand, usually rely only on the Resident Initiative fund to create or continue their work. Many leaders who ask coordination fees for their efforts, can get them through this fund. The Resident Initiative program thus explicitly allows for social enterprising, but for a limited amount of money per applicant. To obtain the fund, it is also often needed that social and creative workers switch to project-based instead of structural activities, and that they present themselves in the first place as residents rather than professionals. For the larger initiatives, larger municipal project subsidies are available, but these are also project based and single-issue and usually don’t offer the financial stability to create fixed jobs for leaders or helpers, which is also not the purpose of the policy programs.

6.3.4 Cluster 4: ‘Light’ initiatives: public space improvements and neighbourhood parties

In my qualitative research I focus on year-round face-to-face service providing initiatives, as the last paragraphs have described. However, there is a whole group of initiatives that is more ‘light’ and take place in the open air, which I came across during the Borough Committee meetings. These are in the first place residents’ initiatives to improve public spaces in the neighbourhood (physical transformation of municipality-owned sidewalks, parks, squares and playgrounds), and in the second place open-air neighbourhood parties. I call them ‘light’ because they are relatively little time consuming for the volunteers to organize. The parties usually take place only once a year. Public space projects are normally designed by residents but realized by professional gardeners after which residents only do the incidental maintenance efforts. I did not interview many of these leaders, because my focus is on year-round welfare service provision: these mean the most to neighbourhood welfare service levels, which is the object of my research. Nevertheless, the parties and public space projects are likely to benefit meeting opportunities and thus eventually the social cohesion in the neighbourhood and this makes them classifiable as welfare services too (in earlier times, community workers often spent much time organizing such festivities and public space projects together with citizens, while now increasingly these tasks are completely relegated to citizens). I will discuss the types of residents elderly homes (interview with Joep and Lizette, coordinators of the Municipality’s umbrella organisation of volunteering organizations, see also Arnoldus and Hofs 2014)
involved in this kind of ‘light’ volunteering shortly here, because their composition points to the influence of time on activation for welfare service volunteering. It seems that these projects, that can enhance social cohesion but do not rely on time-intensive face-to-face work with the beneficiaries of their projects, are feasible and interesting for those who have limited time. It is furthermore important to note that often these ‘light’ services also draw more mixed users regarding ethnicity and socio-economic class than the indoor activities, which usually serve more homogeneous groups of residents (as will be further described in paragraph 7.3).

Public space improvement
A look at table 6.2 shows that public space improvement projects are present in both the wealthier and the deprived neighbourhoods. In the wealthier neighbourhoods they form a larger share of the volunteering projects, since there are less indoors projects here. The table furthermore shows that especially many Dutch, higher-educated residents are involved with setting up public space improvements. In the Borough Dataset this becomes even clearer. All but two of the 44 Resident Initiative applications for improvement of public space were done by a native-Dutch resident, and they are typically also higher-educated (in 8 cases I could not check this). Six of these applications were made by self-employed citizens with a ‘green’ profession, and in these cases a sum is mentioned to be paid to the applicant for his work.

In the research neighbourhoods several ‘light’ projects are taken by leaders that I interviewed because of their work for other, year-round service projects. Norbert’s organisation The Block, for instance, has also made several applications for redesign of public spaces around the community centre (some of it as partly paid work through the Resident Initiative funds, see paragraph 6.3.3). He explains that in such cases, the trigger to start an initiative is not a problem (as in paragraph 6.1 of this dissertation) but an opportunity: residents feel a certain street, park or square could be ‘even prettier’.

I: Were you triggered by the problem?
N: Well, a problem… there has to be some energy. And sometimes energy comes from people’s idea, ‘shit, things should really change here’. But sometimes it is that people think ‘wow this is a nice place’. For instance in our street. It wasn’t looking too good, the road was dangerous, but on the other hand it’s so beautiful and near the park, it could connect to the beautiful harbour space that’s around the corner. Wouldn’t it be great if this could become a nice connection for bikes and pedestrians, with fewer cars. So that was our plan and now the municipality is creating it, they are completely refurbishing it in the way we designed it two years ago.

Norbert also mentions that their redesign of the street was also necessary to protect the fundament of residents’ houses. Norbert bought his house 10 years ago. More in general, it can be supposed that homeowner residents are also more likely to be interested in improving the public space around their house in light of the value of their property. In Rotterdam, home-owners are relatively often higher educated native Dutch people. What is more, the streets of owner-occupied housing often have more green public spaces than social-rent streets, so home-owners may also more opportunities to make these public spaces ‘even better’.

Although the applicants of public space projects may usually be Dutch and higher-educated, the users of such redesigned outdoor spaces are typically as ethnically and socio-economically mixed as the neighbourhood. Compared to indoor spaces, these neighbourhood outdoor volunteering initiatives have very informal ways of access (the parks and gardens usually have no registration, you do not not have to talk to anyone if you don’t feel like it, there is no specific entry time and the space usually is more ‘from everyone’ because it is municipality owned). This apparently can make a rather mixed
group of residents feel welcome and interested enough to share such a space for leisure purposes. This is for instance the case in two volunteer run parks in Harbourtown and Parktown.

### Parktown park

Parktown also has a temporary park, on the site of a demolished housing block, that is waiting for new housing development. It is run by two professional social workers paid on project-basis by the municipality and through Resident Initiative funds. There is also a second garden that is completely volunteer-run. All helpers in these parks are native-Dutch residents. When the weather is nice, however, residents of various ethnicities use the parks to sit or take a walk.

The professional gardeners in the temporary park want to find new volunteers, it is part of their assignment, and they have tried various things to find people to join their gardening group. Even though they both have had a ‘green’ education, sometimes they act as if they don’t know how to plant a tree to attract helpers. “Many people know from their country of origin how gardening and agriculture is done properly”. Still, it is hard to draw residents to the gardening team. ‘Maybe, you know, I can understand that you don’t want to handle a shovel for fun if you have worked all day to pay the mortgage on those dwellings across the street’ says Anis. But even though their group of volunteering gardeners isn’t ethnically mixed, Anis and Bahsa see that the users of the garden are quite mixed. ‘Especially on Wednesday afternoons it is busy in our garden. Kids come to play here, and they play in different groups than just with their ‘own kind’. Girls like to sit in the back of the garden, there’s more benches over there. “And even if adults hardly work in the garden, they are often here to just sit or stroll and see the each other and the children of different cultures, and eventually that helps to feel at home in the neighbourhood”.

When I walk through the park, after the interview, I walk behind a line of four Hindustani people. They seem a family and they are on their way to watching the chicken coop. I see that four Moroccan men are chatting (in a Moroccan language) at a picnic bench with tea or coffee that they drink from a thermos. A ‘white’ man, I cannot tell where he is from exactly, sits on a bench at the other side of the park.

### Neighbourhood parties

During my visits to the Committee meetings, I saw that many applications concerned funding for volunteer-organised neighbourhood parties. The Borough Dataset confirms this. It furthermore makes clear that neighbourhood parties are particularly prevalent in the higher SES neighbourhoods (the wealthier neighbourhoods had 25 applications to fund an outdoor neighbourhood party, compared to 13 for the lower SES neighbourhoods (see figure 6.1). I also visited various of these parties supported by Resident Initiative funds during my fieldwork period. Flowerville and Northville had parties that were organised by the ‘official’ residents’ platforms (as described in paragraph 6.3.2.). In Parktown and in Harbourtown, also two community centres organised outdoor parties in their street. In all these parties the combination of free activities for children and music, and the relatively informal ways of access that outdoor spaces have, made that for many of these parties visitor groups were quite mixed. I did not see many conversations between people of different ethnic groups, but there I did see groups observing each other. Community and social workers often played a role in creating attractions for a mixed audience. Yet, I also visited two ‘neighbourhood’ parties that are bonding rather than bridging. In these parties, only residents of a certain ethnic or class group in the neighbourhood meet each other. All the parties are described below.
Flowerville’s residents’ platform has a yearly Festival. This year it has bands, a professional djembe workshop and a bouncing castle supervised by the municipality’s children’s recreation team. It also has several stands from semi-governmental welfare organisations in elderly care, youth work and the city’s resident initiative support team (Opzoomeren). Even though this Saturday happens to be an important Muslim holiday - on which Muslim families often each other’s homes – there are quite some children that look Moroccan to me with their parents. I also see a group of Hindustani residents joining. The resident organisers belong to Flowerville’s resident platforms. They are all native-Dutch and mostly in their fifties or older. They are walking from stand to stand and meeting and discussing with a lot of people. (Most of the visitors are just standing around and chatting with the people they came with.)

Northville has a party at the playground, where the visitors are mostly native-Dutch but also many Turkish and Moroccan-looking families are present, because the playground draws a mixed audience of children throughout the year. Here, again a lot of children’s games and information stands of semi-governmental welfare organisations, including the community workers of the adjacent poorer neighbourhood. The nearby grocery store supplies food and flyers and balloons. The celebration of the national holiday, organised by residents of Flowerville’s ‘better part’, on the other hand, draws almost exclusively higher income native-Dutch and western-allochthonous families. It is organised ‘all by themselves’ as Ellis, the leader of the Flowerville residents’ platform tells me, ‘they don’t want our help, which is fine of course’.

In Park- and Harbourtown I visit a street party of the community centre Daisy, a neighbourhood party by community centre The Block, and a fun fair organised by the Turkish International Mosque, all of them partly financed by the Residents’ Initiatives Budget. The first two parties have visitors from different ethnicities. In Daisy’s street party it is mostly the people living in this street, who are overseeing their children while they take part in candy-shuffleboard and have their faces painted. The Cabo Verdean elderly club that uses Daisy as its accommodation also has two stands: one with food and the other with second hand clothes. The different organizers keep to their own stalls, but the result is a mixed party.

At the Block’s party, there are many types of visitors, not only the native-Dutch middle class residents that The Block’s indoor activities (yoga classes, art, ‘healthy’ dinners) usually draw. Their music program is ‘multicultural’ and there is a pastry-selling stand manned by Turkish women from the International mosque across the street. Later, a leader of The Block tells me that the women were successfully asked to be here by a long-time community worker now turned self-employed, working at the municipality-funded women’s emancipation centre.

At the Turkish mosque International fun fair, which is at the square outside a large mosque near Parktown, I am the only non-Turkish visitor. The site is separated from the rest of public spaces by fences, but a large attraction for children can be seen: see-through inflatable balls in which children can bounce on water. Apart from the entry sign, most signs are in Turkish and also the most spoken language is Turkish. Later that day there will be a tour through the mosque, in which two Committee members of the Borough Committee will take part. The advice given to the committee states that ‘this initiative offers opportunities for meetings between cultures’ (Advies Polder Borough Committee Meeting, august 2014) but if these opportunities were sought, they have not really been used in my view.

Conclusion

I came across many ‘light’ initiatives during the committee meetings I visited and while studying the Resident Initiatives in the borough dataset: incidental parties and public space projects, which both take less time than the year-round face to face service provision that happens in the initiatives I studied. I noted that there are especially many higher-educated native-Dutch leaders who are active in this field. The relatively high occurrence of ‘light’ projects in wealthier neighbourhoods can be connected to a probably more limited amount of time for volunteering. These neighbourhoods have
many dual-earner families (see also Kullberg, p.149 en 209 on limited volunteering in neighbourhoods with many dual-earner families). The higher incidence of public space projects can also be related to home-owners’ higher interest in the physical state of the environment of their property, as well as to the fact that wealthier neighbourhoods have more green public spaces, and thus more opportunities for residents to see potential for further improvement.

It should furthermore be noted that these activities are not only ‘light’ in the amount of effort and time they take from volunteers, but also often more ‘light’ in terms the formal and informal demands on users. Activities for children and music (as long as this music is not related to one specific lifestyle group) make that the activities are attractive for socio-economically and ethnically mixed audiences. Community workers often make sure that also residents that are of different ethnic or class background than the volunteering organisers, are personally invited. In this way I found that several of the light initiatives I visited brought together a more mixed group of users than most indoors volunteering services I saw.

6.4 Activation through neighbourhood social networks

This paragraph will look at the role of neighbourhood social networks in the formation of volunteering organisations for welfare services to answer my third subquestion: Do self-organisations in deprived neighbourhoods find more volunteers through neighbourhood-based social networks, than those in wealthier neighbourhoods?

Policy documents describing social cohesion in an area often allude to the presence of social networks as well as residents’ willingness to help other. This is for instance the case in the national Ministry for Housing, Neighbourhoods and Integration’s introduction to the community-building program of the 40 neighbourhoods approach, quoted in paragraph 2.5.3 of this dissertation. It concludes that deprived neighbourhoods are generally neighbourhoods where people have little contact with one another and don’t feel responsible for one another. Also in the influential communitarian writings of Putnam, repeated friendly face-to-face contacts between residents are indispensable for the formation of norms of solidarity. Neighbourhood informal social networks and volunteering to help other residents, in other words, are often represented as a paired twin. Writers about civil society following the institutional approach, also stress the importance of personal invitations. All in all there is reason to think that informal social networks in the neighbourhood are particularly important for the activation of volunteers for neighbourhood initiatives.

But did neighbourhood social networks really play a large role in the activation of the volunteers interviewed in this research? I analyse their accounts about their activation, to answer this subquestion.

In the four Rotterdam research neighbourhoods and in Eindhoven I have spoken with 36 ‘joining’ volunteers, (so people who had not started the initiative themselves) about how they had become involved. Some of them I interviewed, others I had a short chat with on the subject of their joining during my (participant) observations of the activities of their organisations. I do not take my interviews with initiators of volunteering organisations into account here, because starters per definition are not joiners, and therefore they cannot have joined through their neighbourhood-based social networks.

Taken all these joining volunteers together, only a minority of volunteers mentions a social contact with (an)other neighbourhood resident(s) as their way of getting involved in the initiative: 14 volunteers talk about being asked through a friend, family member or acquaintance living in the neighbourhood. 13 do not: they were either connected through a social contact living outside the neighbourhood, through a welfare worker, through using this welfare service themselves, or because
they had just heard about it and went to see it by themselves. Four self-employed people joined because it could potentially offer new work-contacts and commissions; they got in contact with the initiative through their more formal ‘work’ contacts, rather than through acquaintances and friends in the neighbourhood. One joiner volunteers to fulfil an apprenticeship necessary to finish his education, and he found the organisation through a school contact. For another four people their route to activation was a combination of being personally asked by a neighbourhood contact and another factor (because they wanted to keep using the welfare service, or because they went to look for it themselves and were very much interested already).

Table 6.7: Joiners by way of introduction to join the initiative

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Introduced to the organisation by</th>
<th>neighbourhood social contact</th>
<th>door-to-door approach/use of the service</th>
<th>social contact living elsewhere</th>
<th>welfare worker</th>
<th>Own initiative (non-users, non-work-related)</th>
<th>Own initiative work-related</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Is Volunteering in own neighbourhood</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is Volunteering in other neighbourhood</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* data from 36 joining volunteers, 5 of which had joined through two routes instead of one ‘route’

I will deal with the joining routes mentioned in table 6.7 one by one

**Introduced to the organisation by a neighbourhood contact**

Joining a local volunteering initiative in welfare services, thus sometimes happens through one’s local informal social network in the neighbourhood. I noticed that for this type of joiners in the deprived neighbourhoods, the contact is often a close friends or family member. The Daisy community centre in Parktown, for instance, is run by Hans, a mother and two daughters. They run the centre together with two close friends living in the neighbourhood, as well as one woman they met through a municipality worker. Likewise, both Harbourtown homework classes are managed by a set of brothers. In the case of Bensalah’s class, also his daughters, who are university students, help him to oversee and instruct the children. The daughters have also brought some of their friends to help. The Bensalah family thus is an important backbone of the homework club. It is also a neighbourhood-based social network, since the brothers live in Harbourtown, but not a network of people who have met each other through living in the same area.

It also happens (in both type of neighbourhoods) that neighbourhood networks partly overlap with religious networks. People meet other neighbourhood residents of the same faith as they go to to use prayer centres or other religious facilities. In such cases, the chief binding force behind the social network is faith, but since many of the people live nearby, the networks they form are also partly
neighbourhood networks, albeit selective to faith and for most of them also ethnicity. Four joiners I spoke with were asked in this way through a neighbourhood religious network. Three of them live in the deprived neighbourhoods, and these are all Muslim networks. Tilda from Northville volunteers at the church-run neighbourhood because she has ‘been volunteering at my church for 13 years now, and they started this’.

Redouan, leader of the Moroccan Islamic community centre Hijra describes in practice how the number of volunteers helping at this centre expands through its religious and cultural functions. The centre offers a prayer room for men and also an Arabic/Qur’an school for elementary school boys and girls. It also provides a homework class, women’s’ meeting hours, information evenings warning against youth radicalisation and jihadism, neighbourhood safety watches around New Year, calligraphy classes, youth camps and administrative counselling. Redouan recounts that at the neighbourhood school’s playground, Muslim mothers talk with each other about the Qur’an classes while waiting for their children. The centre finds most new adult visitors when mothers and fathers bring their children to the Saturday Qur’an classes. That eventually yields volunteers for their organisation. Also Malika tells me that prayer centres are important for her organisation to find new volunteers. Thus, several ‘doing’ initiatives in deprived areas find a share of their volunteers through neighbourhood networks, but these networks are specifically family and close-friends networks, or religious networks.

In both the deprived and wealthier areas, however, several other joiners mention that they have got involved through ‘just’ a neighbour they knew a little bit. This happens in the organisations that are explicitly focused on the neighbourhood. These are the neighbourhood platforms that represent the neighbourhood’s residents in planning decisions (described in paragraph 6.3.2), the Townstreet organisations, but also the Together care centres that explicitly limit their services to their neighbourhood. Such geographically-focused deal with ‘the neighbourhood only’, All these organisations with an exclusive focus on the the neighbourhood need to find not ‘just’ volunteers, but residents as volunteers. Several interviewees of these organisations explain that they have gone to residents’ doors to find them.

A leader of the Together care community centres in Eindhoven explains that they have rung all bells of all elderly residents of the neighbourhood.

Berends: At a certain point the initiator came to her pedicure here in this neighbourhood and they started talking. Together they went to ring the bells of 60 houses where elderly live, and that yielded in total 14 volunteers.

Existing social networks sometimes determine which doors are chosen. As Mats, the leader of the Townstreet organisation explains:

E: How did you find people that you asked for the recruitment dinner?
A: We just rang their bells, I guess. Usually you know… well I didn’t know them all. But one of us knows another neighbour and so on. And then we would just make an invitation like…you give it or you explain a bit what the purpose is. And I think most reacted positively, like, ‘oh that will be fun’.

**Introduced to the organisation by a contact living elsewhere**

Half of the organisations are offering services mostly for people living nearby, but are also open to users from outside the neighbourhood. Here recruitment through social networks means attracting acquaintances and friends that not necessarily live in the neighbourhood. This for instance happens in Bensalah’s homework group (the friends of the daughters and another helper) but also in the poverty relief services. Malika, initiator of the Islamic food bank explains:
M: Well, the volunteers come, some of them come from the neighbourhood here, but I actually have a lot of volunteers who come from all kinds of places. One comes from Vlaardingen, one from Ridderkerk, one from Krimpen [three satellite towns of Rotterdam], I actually met them all through Facebook.
E: that's modern
M: Most of my team, I have them all through Facebook.

Also Bensalah has helpers that volunteer even though they live in other neighbourhoods, but all in all, this way of recruitment is not very frequent in my fieldwork data, as table 6.7 has shown.

**Introduced to the organisation by a social worker**

Especially in the deprived neighbourhoods, volunteers are also found through social workers who guide people to the initiatives. This is shown for instance in the account of Abdelkarim, who joined the Showme household administration counselling service.

Abdelkarim: Well one time I had to visit our social worker who’s specialized in administrative issues. And then he said maybe you should have a talk with Melanie [social entrepreneur leading the volunteering service Showme network]. Alright... Because I have some debts myself, so I know how people just live and what it’s like. So at this certain moment I went to Alice. And I say: listen it was a misunderstanding because the social worker helped me but he thought that I would just need some more help with getting my administration sorted. But that is not necessary. I just came to say that my appointment is no longer needed. Well she heard me talking and she said what is your country of origin? Well I’m Moroccan. Are you working right now? I say: no. But would you like to work as a volunteer? Like one day per week or so? I say: well... She said, no, I really need you, I got you, I really want to have you in my team because you speak Dutch very well, you’re very friendly and you stick to your appointments. You come here especially to say you don’t need the appointment. I would really like you to work with us.’

Whereas Abdelkarim was recruited by a social entrepreneur, paid by project based subsidies from the municipality, residents in deprived areas are also often advised to volunteer by ‘normal’ social workers, those working for the semi-governmental welfare organisation (that won the tender for delivering state-provided welfare services in the neighbourhood). These social workers typically also have targets for how many residents they should ‘lead’ towards participation in volunteering or other non-profit organisations.

Harbourtown welfare worker: there was this lady who came to see the ‘General question hours’. And because she doesn’t speak the language very well her neighbour came along. And we were like: how good of the neighbour. So we gave her compliments: how great you help your neighbour so well. And then she said yeah, no but I do that for other neighbours too. Then I thought, would you... because she’s doing this for years now, would you be willing to do that for other residents as well? Then she said yeah that’s okay. So we introduced her to the community centre in that way.

The lady still works at the neighbourhood community centre, now mostly in supporting the children’s club, as her weekly administrative support visiting hours hardly attracted any users. But this way of activation for joiners happens more often.

**Recruitment through one’s own interest**

Another route for people to join is through their own interest. Some of the joiners just saw or heard something about a volunteer run welfare service, and decided they wanted to know more about it and
maybe join. Jaap, a member of the Northville resident platform joined because during an information night of the municipality about a reconstruction of a square, he felt residents’ interests weren’t represented well enough. When he voiced this, the platform asked him to join. Similarly, Ellis, joined because she was interested in neighbourhood politics and had had good experiences with volunteering in neighbourhood platforms in her former hometown. He she called up the platform in her new neighbourhood to meet them and eventually she joined. Such ‘talking’ organizations thus sometimes receive ‘spontaneous’ joiners. Also higher-educated self-employed joiners who have (also) professional reasons for their volunteering, sometimes find the way to an organisation after seeing a flyer or an announcement. These joiners relate their volunteering to work and take the initiative of approaching the organisation. This was for instance the case for Liesbet, who does partly paid work for Neighbourly, and called the organisation after reading a flyer she saw in the supermarket.

**Conclusion**

According to the literature, joining a neighbourhood volunteering organisation often takes place after a personal invitation from a friend or acquaintance in the neighbourhood. During my qualitative research I found that this indeed also sometimes occurred. Especially in the deprived neighbourhoods, invitations often come from neighbourhood networks that overlap with family and religious networks. But most of the joiners in my qualitative research followed other ‘joining routes’. They were invited by social workers or by social contacts that do not live in their neighbourhood. Also, for many professionally interested volunteers a personal invitation from a friend wasn’t necessary. Just reading a flyer or knowing the leaders professionally, can be enough reason to get in contact with the organization. Lastly, the organizations that have a strong geographical focus (the platforms, streetorganisation and Togethercare centres) often have active searches for new resident-volunteers but do not only focus on their social networks. They go door-to-door or approach new people during meetings. All in all, the importance of social networks for activation in neighbourhood volunteering, should therefore not be overstated. The fact that the deprived neighbourhoods have more professionally oriented joiners and joiners that were invited through social workers, even made that the share of joiners found through social networks was a bit lower than for the wealthier areas.
Chapter 7: Material Resources for self-organisation

This chapter investigates whether initiatives in deprived neighbourhoods have more difficulty to get the ear and support of the relevant professionals and administrators, due to neighbourhood stigma, residents lower organisational capacities, or social distances between them and the institutions that can provide support. Focusing mostly on the decision-making arenas of the Borough Committees, I chart how deprived neighbourhoods as a whole, and the different neighbourhoods within them, fare when it comes to accessing professional support, and financial and material means. The subquestions outlined in paragraph 3.1 guide this enquiry.

7.1 Neighbourhood stigma

The first subquestion relating to means is subquestion 5:

Do deprived neighbourhoods and their active citizens have a stigma that lowers chances on institutional support?

Here the question is whether in the lower income case-study areas, resident initiatives have more trouble to find material resources than in other areas, because potential sponsors have less faith that their money will be well spent. I will focus here on Rotterdam, because this is where my neighbourhood-level case studies are. I look at the Residents Initiative fund because in practice this is the main source of financial support for neighbourhood self-organizations’ activities. In fact, practically all the initiatives listed in table 6.2 and 6.3 made (successful) applications to this fund.

In this light, an important first indication that neighbourhood stigma does not play a large role at neighbourhood level, can be found in Figure 6.2, presented in paragraph 6.1.3. This figure showed that in 2014, more money per inhabitant was spent on self-organization in the poorer boroughs than in the richer boroughs. Also, as the last chapter showed, especially in these poorer boroughs there are various lower educated leaders of self-organisations who are able to get Resident Initiative funding through the borough committees. The Borough Dataset indicates that in both Boroughs 90% of funding requests were accepted in 2014, and that the acceptance rate is more or less the same for initiatives of lower-educated as for higher educated leaders, and the same for minority-ethnic leaders as for native-Dutch leaders. Moreover, according to Michel, neighbourhood manager of Parktown and Harboutown, the number of resident initiatives coming from minority ethnic groups in Polder Borough is more or less in line with the share of Minority ethnic people in the area, which is around 80%. Michel does make the distinction that higher educated native-Dutch residents’ initiatives ‘dare to ask for more money’ but since they have fewer applications, he thinks ‘that the composition of the population is reflected in the distribution of the total budget’.

How can we explain that people from low-income neighbourhoods, including the lower-educated applicants here, are very successful in obtaining this type of funding? This is best understood by noting that volunteering is generally promoted in Rotterdam, by administrations, policymakers and local civil servants alike, for higher-educated but specifically also for lower-educated citizens.

---

42 Michel adds about this: ‘Maybe there are more initiatives among non-western groups, but these Dutchies ask for more ‘if this group has a festival, then they think large. Maybe because they know how to do things at a larger scale from their job. ‘We need at least a few thousand’, while for the same money the community centre [Daisy] in fact may run for a whole year’
Rotterdam administrations’ enthusiasm for a volunteering has been described already in paragraph 4.3.5 of this dissertation. It also speaks for instance from the targets the (Labour party-led) 2010-2014 administration and the current administration have (had). The last administration had as one of its 15 SMART targets ‘to keep the number of volunteers in the city at least 140,000 volunteers’ (Rotterdam, 2010, p.13-1443. It motivated this target by stating that ‘it is important to fully capitalize on volunteers’ potential because we (the municipality) concentrate more and more on our core responsibilities’. The next (current) LR-led administration has made volunteering the main component of its ALMP for long time unemployed, and has installed the Resident Initiative fund.

Volunteering is thus warmly welcomed at the level of city administration, but my interviews show that also policymakers working in city hall cherish volunteering. They value it not only because it can help save municipal money, but also because it enables them to focus on a new, more active side of marginalized citizens. According to these policy makers this perspective is more inspiring than regarding these citizens foremostly as passive subjects of their policies as used to be common in the municipality’s organization. Bouchra, a city-hall policy maker on voluntary participation, for instance, tells me that she is energized by the prospect of devoting more of her worktime to promoting reciprocal self-help in Rotterdam. She explains that now that she is almost 50, she is thinking about what she wants with her career. Her bosses want her to become a manager in the municipal organization,

‘But that’s not what I want, I really want to make a difference in the city. And I think that we should bring the city much closer to city hall, and use the city as the laboratory for the learning organization that the municipality should be. And then you can look at residents’ initiatives. Even though Rotterdam is a vulnerable city, with many problems, you also see that residents take beautiful initiatives together. Like no other party they are able to do the right things for their neighbourhood. So that’s why I think you should support it and facilitate that, and really start to listen to what citizens want.

According to Bouchra, residents know what is needed in their neighbourhood but have lost the habitude to provide informal help to each other. She thinks that this is caused by the fact that much self-help has become professionalized over the last decades. She points to the example of Dutch language courses. 30 years ago, her mother migrated from Morocco, and soon after learned to speak Dutch from her neighbour. In the meantime, Dutch language education has professionalized. ‘We have pampered these people [with state provided lessons]’ says Bouchra. ‘Look at France, all migrants in France speak French and the government doesn’t do anything for that’. Rather than pamper citizens, local government should look again at what people can do for each other. She gives an example of the type reciprocal self-help that she would like to see more often:

‘We had this project that was part of Opzoomeren, where non-western allochthonous women said ‘we want to learn Dutch very much and in return for that we want to provide care’. Well, a project was arranged with an elderly home, that they would get into conversation with the elderly there. Those women wanted to practice more than anything, and they provided the care. And I think you can have creative ways to realize things but you should also listen to the needs and wishes of people.

43 Moreover, during this administration, social work organizations’ success was monitored on the basis of a neighbourhood survey (Sociale Index) charting residents’ ‘Social efforts’. This Social Effort index was calculated on the basis of respondents’ self-reported efforts in volunteering in care for frail and elderly family members or friends, volunteering in general and efforts for the neighbourhood.
She adds that the crisis-induced budget cuts also make it necessary to use volunteering, but that this is a blessing in disguise, because this has put the government on the path of seeing citizens in terms of their potential rather than only their needs.

B: because we used to have money. Then you can offer things to citizens. But it’s just not there anymore. So how can you still realize those goals? (…) So that’s why I think the citizen is the catalyst, the citizen has talent, what kind of position or diploma, that doesn’t matter, the starting point is that you think ‘that person is just someone with talent and’ then we should just see at what she has to offer to the development of the city. And that’s different from the way citizens used to be regarded up until now’. E: Like that. That is a direct effect of the budget cuts?
B: Yes, I always say the budget cuts are a blessing.

Bouchra’s examples deal with lower-educated volunteers and she also makes clear that diplomas shouldn’t matter in this more self-organised society. Also Renée, a policy maker in the municipality’s safety department, relates how Rotterdam’s focus on volunteering promises a new, more inspiring perspective on marginalized citizens. She quotes a municipal officer from Seattle who came to speak to civil servants at the kick-off meeting of a social investment program for a poor borough of Rotterdam. She recounts:

He told us ‘you guys only speak about how they [the residents of this borough] do not speak the language and that ends everything. You think in terms of problems. In my town, in the US, nobody speaks the language. I don’t speak Dutch either. But what can people do? Maybe they can bake cookies.

Renée tells me that this more holistic view is also the way in which she wants to approach citizens. To further illustrate this she refers to a photo book that was made for the kick-off meeting. The photo book is a collection of group portraits of various leisure clubs in the deprived Borough. Members of these clubs were asked to also bring their social network to the photographer. Renée saw a picture of a group of women that looked into the camera in a very self-assured way. Later she read that this was a group of teenager mothers. That was a big surprise to her. The photo book reminded her of the fact that these residents have their own networks and things they care about and are proud of, while, according to her, policy makers have often lost the touch to see marginalised residents as active people first, not only as subjects that must be fitted into their problem oriented policy targets.

Also among the front-line civil servants and social workers working directly with citizens, I met much interest to see residents as active rather than passive people. Flowerville, for instance, has two community workers, Linde and Imane, who work mostly in the social rent areas of the neighbourhood. Last year, they were given new function titles, and they are now called ‘participation brokers’. Linde tells me what her job is now about:

‘We go from door to door and talk to the residents (...) we ask them how do you think about the neighbourhood and what they think could be improved, and we especially ask them ‘what would or could you do? What do you want to do for another or for the neighbourhood?’ And the people say: I’d like it if there were more activities for children… well most people are like: I’ll put that in your lap, and they expect us to do it. But that is no longer our job. We say ‘what can you do?’ and we help them along. Well, go do it yourself and make sure that there are more residents, and we will support you. Imane: Often, people don’t even know what their talents are

143
Imane tells me that ‘supporting people to get the best out of themselves’ is called New Style Social Work (Welzijn Nieuwe Stijl) and that this is what she learned in social work academy and during her last job. She adds: ‘it’s nice work, working with people. It really is’. Linde replies:

Yes, and what I noticed is that by just asking the question ‘what would you like to do for another person, would you like to do something for another person?’ That many people say ‘oh, yes, why not’. And that’s for me... maybe I should have started asking that question earlier in my career.

The day after the interview I attended the neighbourhood meeting that Linde and Imane had organized. In the invitation they announce that in this meeting ‘the neighbourhood will meet the frontline professionals and residents will look at what they themselves can do to make the neighbourhood better’ (invitation to Flowerville’s neighbourhood meeting). During the meeting the participation brokers take much time to investigate potential volunteering ambitions among the 30 residents that have turned up, and propose various initiatives to them. Even though this does not result in new initiatives during the evening, the participation brokers seem to enjoy the activating perspective towards neighbourhood self-help that their job now entails.

Harbourtown does not have participation brokers, but there is a neighbourhood networker. This is a group of civil servants, one for each Rotterdam neighbourhood, who spend much time in the street. Neighbourhood networkers are responsible for reporting litter, vandalism and nuisance in the area so that the municipal services can fix these problems, but they are also there to help the neighbourhoods’ initiatives in their interactions with the municipality. Neighbourhood networker Zeineb, who is a second generation Turkish woman, tells me that she talks to everyone in the street Harbourtown (‘I just go up to them and start to chat. Sometimes they must think that I’m crazy but I’m okay with that’). She explains to me how she often acts upon her urge to activate especially the migrant mothers sitting on the neighbourhood’s benches. She feels that now that municipal budgets for children’s and youth activities have been cut, parents themselves should step up.

Sometimes I speak to mothers and they say ‘my son is getting bored, he can’t go anywhere’. And then I ask her – I can be rough you know – what did you do yourself to make sure that he has some activity? [And they answer] well what can I do? And I say: you have been on this bench for hours. Why don’t you go and play with your child, go and play football, and then they’re all like hmmm... they won’t do it. But that’s what we shouldn’t have anymore maybe. I am not going to keep your child busy, me being the municipality. Of course it’s nice if I can teach him something or if you’re really not able…but you should learn to have a more active role in your child’s leisure.

Zeineb is also happy that most of the welfare work for adults in the municipality-funded community centre has changed. It is no longer possible to just chill or play cards in the Community Centre’s Hall. The manager will send visitors upstairs to create an activity by themselves. Zeineb agrees with this policy.

“You should spend your time in a useful way. And if you don’t know how to, we will teach you, because just hanging about for four hours and complaining about 10 things in the meantime... do you know how much you can do with those four hours if you spend them in a productive way?

I: Don’t you think these people [who spend much time drinking coffee at the community centre] would really prefer to have a job? That there is work that they like to do for them?

Z: Probably, but go and search for a job then. Don’t sit around watching women.
Zeineb mentions Daisy Centre in her neighbourhood as a positive example of residents’ efforts to activate themselves, even if this isn’t always easy. She tells me how she keeps going back to the Daisy Centre to give advice and support to its leader, Hans. Hans is a former mailman and has never been in charge of a whole community centre. He is especially worried about paying the rent, as he has told me many times as well. ‘Then he is stressed out’ says Zeineb ‘and I have to spend half an hour to motivate him. Whatever happens, call me! I’m just like a coach sometimes. I have to say ‘you can do it. You can do it. Just give it a try.’ Like Bouchra, Zeineb thus enjoys seeing lower-educated residents use their abilities, and ‘snap out’ of passivity. When I ask her why she keeps supporting Hans, she says: it’s part of my job but I also find it important personally, because it’s educational. You will learn. You have to fall and lift yourself up again to learn (…) I’m happy with every initiative that there is in Harbourtown. Just the fact that you do something for a group of people or for yourself or your neighbours, that’s what I like.’

All these civil servants describe that they like to see the marginalized residents more as active subjects. Renée wants to get rid of her policymaker’s gaze in which marginalized people are first and foremost the object of problem solving interventions by the municipality. Zeineb and Bouchra furthermore note that sometimes welfare services have made people more passive: they do not think of organizing their own leisure activities, children’s activities or language education anymore. They were pampered. Now they would ideally like to see marginalized residents activate each other, and feel that the budget cuts can be a helpful circumstance to end the pampering.

Marit, leader of the volunteer-run community centre The Block in Harbourtown, also has stories about civil servants who get enthusiastic when they see active residents. She recounts how their community centre was hired by groups of policy makers, even though renovation works were in full sway. The fact that it wasn’t finished, only made it more attractive because it has such a good vibe that residents are at work and changing things to their liking. Especially the ‘under construction’ aspect of the building is therefore appealing to visiting policymakers.

Marit: Downstairs there are three spaces that are really nice, but they haven’t been renovated at all yet. And some parties find that very interesting.

I: that it looks dynamic?

M: Yes, and also the municipality finds that really exciting, to see that vivacity. Even though it isn’t finished at all (laughs) and they had this meeting here lately, a lunch meeting where people could make a speech on the soapbox, and 50 people from the municipality came flying in.

In a similar vein, Community Centre Daisy’s Facebook page draws 62 likes in its first two weeks, even though at that point Daisy didn’t run any activities yet. These likes came for the largest part from local social workers, policy makers and people working in the borough administration.

According to Norbert, another leader of The Block, civil servants are also interested in being close to certain self-organization because it can help to safeguard their own job. He describes how his neighbourhood planning organization, that started out as a volunteering group but recently got its first large paid commission (see paragraph 6.3.3), got popular with civil servants. He explains:

The weird thing is that, everyday it is in the papers that 400 civil servants will be sacked in Rotterdam in the next budget cut operation. So they are stressed out about their own job. So how can we [the volunteering-based planning group] give them something so that they have more to offer than other civil servants, so that at the moment sacking decisions are made, they will keep their job’.
Working with successful self-organizations, in the Rotterdam participation society, in Norbert’s view, can thus also help civil servants ‘profile’ themselves, to gain a bit more job security.

Like the civil servants, also the Polder and North Borough Committees are enthusiastic about almost all residents’ initiatives in the area, as their 90% funding application acceptance rate shows. During one Committee meeting in North Borough that I attend, the committee for instances expresses that it would like to see even more resident initiatives, particularly in its few deprived streets. The president of the Committee asks the members to contribute to a home-visit approach in the borough’s seven most deprived streets. Even though there is little money for physical renewal of these apartment blocks, there is something that can be done. He asked the members:

‘Maybe we as the committee can give ourselves the target that at least for resident initiatives will develop in those streets in the next year. Of course the more the better, but for now we are looking for four Committee members who want to take this upon themselves and make a case for that’.

Although the North Borough committee thus believes in resident initiatives, and even if it feels it can somehow generate resident initiatives in deprived areas – as this quote shows- they use only half of the budget for resident initiatives in the first year.

Polder Borough, at the same time, has received so many applications that they have spent all their money of the Resident Initiative fund. In twitter and Facebook messages, the Polder Borough Committee expresses pride in serving ‘the most vibrant, entrepreneurial and altruism-minded community of Rotterdam’, and encourages other Boroughs to follow their ways of inviting and stimulating self-organisation in welfare (they have indeed done more than other committees. Next to their monthly meetings, they also organized special discussion nights for existing initiatives where they can discuss their experiences. One meeting regarded initiatives’ accommodation needs, the other the opportunities that they see for delivering care. The members also are present at markets and festivals to ask for citizens’ opinion about the Borough Plan, which is the Committee’s main guiding document, in a face-to-face manner and through online communacation. Furthermore, several of the members update a Facebook account on decisions of the Committee, but also on many other (mainly positive) events going on in Polder Borough. The Committee of North Borough has relegated its Facebook account to a commercial communication firm, and this firm posts messages less often than the Polder Borough committee does). As Joep, a staff member of Rotterdam’s volunteering umbrella organisation tells me:

‘The Polder Borough Committee is proud that they overspent their budget. They even managed to get money from what was left in other boroughs, to make ends meet. That is nice work of course. But there are some pretty energetic types among them, so that’s probably a reason as well’.

At one of the Polder Borough Committee meetings that I visit, I hear a member put this zeal for supporting residents’ initiatives in words. The Harbourtown kids’ art club is asking for 6000 euro from the Resident Initiative fund. Officially the rules don’t allow this because part of the activities has already taken place and funding should be requested in advance. Also, funding cannot be granted for activities that have been sponsored twice before (see paragraph 4.3.5). Nevertheless, the committee member pleas for the granting of the money, and his words indicate the way the committee sees itself as a structure to stimulate as much volunteering as possible.
Committee member (of a left-wing party): I think it is really important to ask ourselves with every decision: why are we on earth, to put it in biblical terms. In my view we are gathered here as a committee to stimulate participation, to give people the possibility to do something. In that regard the criteria are part of the means and never a goal. And I think it’s very important to support something that we believe in, or at least that I believe in, instead of go by the rules and deny the funding because the application should have been done earlier.

Participation, in this quote, is a value in itself. This committee member has also visited the Kids’ art club and feels the (partly paid) volunteering is very worthwhile, because it brings artistic expressions and education to children who may not find this at home. Another committee members’ quote affirms most members’ large enthusiasm for almost all volunteering that residents do. This member is happy to support the funding application of Cabo Joy:

Committee member: I will vote in favour of this proposal. The reason is that I find is a beautiful example of citizen participation. Because that’s why we do it, right? The citizen that makes an effort for society, and tries to make an effort in several ways. And of course we will have to wait to see if it works out, But I’m sure it will work out if I hear you [the applicant] talk like that. I wish you the best of luck.

Like in the last quote, for some committee members the emphasis is on supporting peoples’ altruism, as a value in itself. This indicates that volunteering is seen as a way to make society more friendly (as in the ‘volunteering to bring back solidarity’ argument described in paragraph 2.6.3). Other committee members are particularly committed to (unpaid and paid) volunteering because they feel that bringing citizens efforts in local service provision make them more personal and adapted to local needs (see paragraph 2.6.2). Committee member Mark tells me for instance how he sees his function as actively supporting Residents Initiatives, not only by saying yes or no to initiatives, but also by giving advice and connecting them to other groups.

‘Our function is more or less to be a community worker, now that Harbourtown and Parktown no longer have municipality funded community workers. I want to stimulate and support those kind of things because they can contribute to quality of service in the neighbourhood, while institutions have a tendency to become rather generic and general and impersonal. Like in the way that the municipality funded community centre has the atmosphere of an office and isn’t cosy at all (…) therefore, I think every resident initiative is valuable in itself. And if an application isn’t good enough yet, then the municipality should support these people to make it good enough’ (interview with Committee member Mark)

Kerklaan (2015) offers a model to interpret committee members’ decisions, that also helps to explain why lower educated applicants are not overlooked (as the Bourdieu inspired prediction underlying this subquestion suggested, see paragraph 3.3 of this dissertation). In the spring of 2015, Kerklaan also did a qualitative study of borough committees in Rotterdam. He observed their meetings and interviewed several committee members, and concludes that members mostly adhered to three different evaluation frames. He discerns in the first place members’ tendency to support ‘instrumental’ resident initiatives. These ‘instrumental’ initiatives are the plans that members think will help to solve (social) problems in the neighbourhood. The Borough Plan, which the committees have written together with the municipality, contains the committee’s targets for the area and thus often serves as a practical reference point for judging initiatives’ instrumentality. Kerklaan’s second frame is ‘independence’. In this frame, residents’ volunteering participation is an important goal in itself: whatever citizens are willing to volunteer for is therefore valuable. This relates to the ideas that volunteering brings direct democracy and that residents know what the neighbourhood needs (the arguments described in paragraph 2.6.1 and 2.6.2 and in line with Mark’s position quoted above). Thirdly, Kerklaan notes that
many members follow also a fairness frame. The committee members are aware that local politics sometimes have a tendency to overlook the needs of vulnerable, less assertive groups. These members are therefore insistent that money is spent more or less evenly over higher educated and lower educated groups and over both the majority and minority ethnic groups in the neighbourhood.

The independence frame (any volunteering is good) and fairness frame (special attention for marginalized groups’ initiatives) thus create ideological bases for sponsoring also the initiatives of lower-educated leaders. In Polder Borough, Mark’s political party is strongly committed to the independence frame. Their motto is ‘Citizens know best!’ (website political party Polder Borough). Other members, mostly those belonging to the Labour Party keep an eye on ‘fairness’ and sometimes make a case for funding especially allochthonous and/or lower-educated residents’ initiatives during the meetings.

How the independence frame urges the Committee to fund many applications, and also those of lower-educated leaders, shows in practice for instance from this event during one of Polder Borough’s committee meetings that I visited. An initiative was awarded money, even though some members couldn’t agree with its goals.

In autumn 2014 a Cabo-Verdean woman working as a shop assistant, presents her initiative to the committee. Her idea is to organise a beauty pageant for girls from the neighbourhood. While many of the ‘independence’-minded committee members are enthusiastic, two other members—one belonging to a leftist party, the other to LR—are strongly opposed. The first committee member argues that while he admires the young woman’s can-do mentality and originality (‘the independence frame’) he finds that the state should never sponsor beauty pageants, as they do not teach children that self-worth and self-assurance really spring from inner beauty, and set them off on the wrong track. The LR committee member agrees, and is even brought to tears by the dilemma. Other committee members argue that ‘this is what participation is about, residents make themselves heard for what they find important’ (the independence frame), adding that applications for children’s activities are generally awarded by the Committee because increasing children’s well-being is mentioned as a target in the Borough Plan (the instrumentality frame). It would be odd to make an exception this time because of personal feelings of what is good for children. The beauty pageant funding application is eventually accepted.

Later that year, I am present at a Polder Borough committee meeting where the members have a heated discussion to evaluate a resident initiative presented by higher educated native-Dutch residents. In this case the fairness frame of several members stands in the way of granting the money. The residents’ plan is to organize a networking event for all volunteering clubs in the borough. The initiators have calculated that this will cost €5000 for their organizing work. Even though most members find it a good plan, several Labour and LR members protest that it is too much money. They are bothered by the fact that some of the leaders of this initiative have been paid through the resident initiative before, for other initiatives. One of the Labour party members starts shaking her head during the presentation, and talks twice as fast as she normally does when she says: ‘but almost all volunteering club that you will involve in your networking event, they already had the money from us!’ Later that month, one of the protesting members states that too many of the residents’ initiatives are organised in a network of higher educated borough residents, and that he will keep an eye on that. The initiative eventually gets money, but less than what they had asked for.
Conclusion
Lack of funding because of a neighbourhood’s stigma does not seem to be the case. Rather, civil servants explicitly praise and support volunteers from deprived areas for being active for society, showing the participation society frame’s focus on citizens responsibilization toward community-minded behaviour especially for marginalized groups. Also for many Committee members, inclusion of all groups of residents in the Resident Initiative program is important. Fairness, i.e. the wish that also the neighbourhoods’ lower SES groups are well represented among the funding recipients, is an important evaluation criterion for them.

7.2 Self-organisations’ good governance

4: Do collectives in deprived neighbourhoods have more difficulty to implement ‘good governance’, and convince funding institutions of their ‘good governance’?

To answer this question, I want to find out whether it is true that funding decisions often depend on the sponsor’s impression of the applicants’ transparency and effectiveness, and if so, what this means for lower-income areas. In other words, do self-organizations in practice have to show that they adhere to the same kind of standards as governmental institutions, to get funding. I formulated this hypothesis on the basis of research by Eliasoph (2009), described in paragraph 3.2. But where Eliasoph describes how US state- and charity-sponsored volunteer groups provide much quantitative monitoring data to inform their sponsors (and convince them to keep sponsoring them), in most Rotterdam Resident Initiatives monitoring is rather loose and usually based on qualitative data only. Moreover, in the Resident Initiative program, decisions about funding are always made before the initiative has started, because according to rules set by City Hall, funding applications must precede the activities. Therefore, the committee decides on the basis of the plan, rather than on the basis of achieved results. Usually a neighbourhood networker, neighbourhood manager or Committee member will take a look during the activities, to see how are they eventually were developed. Committee member Mark explains how this goes in practice:

Mark: if there are funded events, then, not always but we usually get an invitation. For instance, the flat has a new meeting room that was funded and there is an opening. Well I didn't go there but…
I: But isn't it difficult to keep an eye on how many people are serviced and what is achieved?
M: Yes. Well that is also something we sometimes have discussions about in the Committee, like how is the committee going to account for that? I think you [the self-organization] have to hand in some sort of financial overview, when it's done. And I think it's also obligatory to send two pictures of your activity.
But I think there's also… there are some self-organizations that… all committee members have a network in the neighbourhood so they know which applicants are probably only fantasizing, and who are the people who can actually make things happen, and who have shown in the past that they can make things happen. So there's an element of trust there.

Trust and visual impressions thus are important, as well as committee members’ personal contacts with leaders (although the committee also receives and accepts many applications of residents that have not had volunteering initiatives before). As far as I have seen, initiatives indeed write a report of their project with quantitative data on the money spent, but without much quantitative data on the results, such as the number of people they serviced. the supervision of the spending of the budget is done in a rather loose way. According to committee member Mark from Polder Borough, this is also befitting the spontaneous character of resident initiatives. He says:
It is a bit a matter of different cultures between the system world and the lifeworld. The system world is more directed towards control and accountability, and the lifeworld is more directed towards trust and cooperation, so... I don’t really feel the need to check things up and down to see if things went the way they went.

Mark refers to Habermas’ (1987) dichotomy between the system world (the bureaucratic, professional way in which institutions function) and the lifeworld (how people’s behaviour in daily life is guided by less rational patterns such as their personal relationships, solidarity, stories and identities), which is the world that the resident initiative long to in his view. He finds therefore that resident initiatives can be monitored in an informal way, for instance through the occasional visits of committee members or on the basis of pictures of the events. Also neighbourhood networker Michel explains that monitoring shouldn’t be too much about the process and numbers, but about the eventual goals. Goals should be in the first place the provision of welfare services or other public services to the neighbourhood, and the main thing is that organizations work towards these goals. Only if he thinks resident initiatives are too often about providing paid work for the leader, or too much about religion, he ‘will try to start a conversation about that with leaders. (…) it’s a kind of, let’s call it intuition, that allows you to interpret the rules this way or that way’. He tells me that he sometimes makes several reservations for an appointment to visit a resident initiative, so that they’re not completely sure when he will show up. If it turns out that some money is spent on the wrong things – Michel gives the hypothetical example of homework class teachers going on a trip to Mecca - the resident funding could potentially be withdrawn but in practice, says Michel, ‘that is a lot of work and often things are left the way they were’.

Supervision in the Rotterdam Resident Initiative program thus takes place in rather informal ways and does not involve business plans or quantified targets (the only quantitative data to be found in Resident Initiative applications is usually the budget plan). This is in line with the idea that volunteering is in itself altruistic behaviour and should not be monitored or criticized for not being effective enough. Also, the fact that there are no output targets maybe explains why most initiatives remain rather small regarding their user group, especially if having a pleasurable pass-time is a main driver for the volunteers that are involved. Most of the indoor activities mentioned in table 6.2 and 6.3 service around 10 people or less per week (with the exception of the Poverty relief / administrative counselling groups and the Moroccan and Turkish homework classes, several of which serve much larger groups).

Some resident initiatives also receive funding through other municipal funds, because they help the municipality realize its goals in self-help in care and ‘favour in return’ volunteering (Showme and the Care Network). For this special funding, the municipality gives them quantitative targets on the number of people they should engage. However, unlike the social work organizations that used to deliver services in labour market activation and care, these social entrepreneurs do not have public annual reports, showing what they do (Showme’s leader doesn’t want to give me the year report and the Care Network tells me to treat their data as confidential business information). And such information is also not used during the committee meetings when Showme and the Care Network ask for smaller amounts of Resident Initiative funding money. All in all, the absence of quantitative data makes it hard for committee members to occupy themselves with questions about output. It also makes it difficult to say anything about the extent to which organised self-help can replace state provided welfare services. There are mainly stories and almost no output data of what the Resident Initiative fund has achieved in terms of the number of people that were serviced. Accountability in
quantitative terms thus does not seem to be a big issue for access to Resident Initiative funding for welfare-service volunteer groups.

This is not to say that self-organizations always do exactly what local civil servants have envisioned. Regarded from the independence frame, it is only logical that’s residence initiatives sometimes function in ways that do not completely accord with the municipality’s own objectives. In the 2014 coalition agreement, the municipality for instance states ‘that it will not subsidize institutions that are mostly directed towards their own culture’ (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2014a, p. 13) because this would hamper integration. Professional or accommodation costs will therefore no longer be reimbursed (even though Rotterdam has a long history of sponsoring minority-ethnic organizations (see Uitermark 2012) and still today funds the umbrella organization for Muslim networks). Self-organizations activities however, can be funded through the Resident Initiative as long as they don’t involve structural costs, paid employees and are not ‘related to religious activities’ (Rotterdam 2014e and see paragraph 4.3.5 of this dissertation). In practice, many of the groups sponsored through the Resident Initiative fund are minority mono-ethnic organizations (see table 6.2), but also the requests of Christian clubs doing children’s activities are always sponsored by the Committee (sometimes without mentioning the religious background of the organisation during the Committee meeting). Occasionally, the funds are used for activities that have goals relating to welfare but at the same time explicitly also to religion (The Turkish mosque for instance requests funding for, among other things, the celebrating of a Muslim feast with elderly in a nearby elderly home). Furthermore, in my experience, some of the sponsored Turkish and Moroccan community centres sometimes have a different way of dealing with gender diversity than would be state-funded social work usually does.

The Hijra Community centre for instance holds a ‘night to meet the neighbourhood’. All visitors are served fresh Moroccan food by a group of male volunteers from the centre, cooked by women who are not present. During a power point presentation, leader Redouan shows the centre’s activities. He presents a neighbourhood watch team of boys and men that was active during New Year’s Eve, the homework class for children, its prayer centre and its recreational activities for women. The picture of this last activity, however, only shows a rack of handmade jewellery. Women are not to be photographed, it seems. ‘That activity draws a lot of visitors’, says a visiting social worker jokingly. Redouan does not react to this remark.

In a third community Centre, just outside Harbourtown, swimming lessons are organized for boys and girls. A note on the wall says that every Wednesday afternoon there will be a special bus to get the children to a swimming pool at the other side of Rotterdam, and that ‘this activity is for boys between the age of 4 to 12, girls between the age of 4 and 7’.

These examples show how due to religious and cultural influences, self-organizations’ or service provision does not always mirror Rotterdam integration policies. Other practices sometimes do not completely reflect the municipality’s health policies. In the community centres organized by lower-educated leaders that I visited, smoking is often permitted and if there is food for sale, this is often fried food. And, although in professional children’s work, workers have to show a Certificate of Conduct (‘Verklaring omtrent gedrag’), this is not often the case in the volunteering groups I interviewed.

Sometimes, the fact that self-help relies on volunteering work also means that providers are less trained to deliver a service than social workers usually are. Hans and Abdelkarim both tell me that they have felt ill prepared at the start of their project, which is giving Dutch language education and
household administration support respectively. For Hans this is because he had little formal education when he was young, for Abdelkarim because he never had any lessons in the subject. In the Resident Initiative program, it seems, there is a strong belief that residents have the knowledge to do almost anything a welfare service or public space project takes. Neighbourhood civil servants’ advice to the committee meetings, or committee members themselves, hardly ever make note of a potential lack of skills threatening the success of the plan. On the other hand, when residents do have such knowledge, because they are architects, youth workers, community workers by profession (see paragraph 6.3.2) this is often not mentioned in the Committee meetings. Such leaders are usually only alluded to as ‘residents’. Systemworld notions about efficiency (such as the bureaucratic idea that jobs require extensive formal training) do not seem to be very decisive in the evaluative frame of the committees.

All in all, I conclude that bureaucratic notions about extensive accountability, transparency and efficiency do not have much influence on resident initiatives’ chances to get funding from Borough Committees. Potentially lower capacities among lower-education residents to provide transparency and efficiency therefore hardly negatively affect access to Resident Initiative resources in deprived areas.

7.3 Access to resources through cooperation between self-organisations

Based on the work by Sampson et al (2005) I furthermore formulated the hypothesis that in areas with more self-organization, each individual self-organization will have more access to resources because they can share them with each other. The accompanying subquestion is: Are there differences in self-organisational density in wealthier neighbourhoods than in deprived neighbourhoods, and do self-organisations profit from cooperation?

In my interviews in all four case study research neighbourhoods, I have asked leaders whether they cooperate with other initiatives and in all neighbourhoods I indeed saw cooperation between self-organizations. This happened especially during outdoor neighbourhood festivals. In Northville for instance a festival organized by the playground also had market stands manned by the neighbourhood platform, the Watersmith neighbourhood garden and many other shops, social work organizations and city-wide operating volunteer groups. Also the festivals in Flowerville, Harbourtown and Parktown often involved various self-organizations of the area in cooperation (see paragraph 6.3.4 of this dissertation).

When it comes to indoor activities, however, cooperation often seems more difficult. Northville has very few indoor services, but the other neighbourhoods do. At the same time, these neighbourhoods are more social economically and especially more ethnically mixed than Northville. The interviewed civil servants from these neighbourhoods often talk about how this diversity makes that groups are not very inclined to work together. Community worker Leo, for instance, notes that self-organizations in Parktown and Harbourtown function very well alongside each other but not in cooperation. ‘There are no conflicts here. They just do it beside each other without interacting. They don’t cooperatively develop initiatives and exchange,’ says Leo. Imane and Linde tell me there is little interaction between the native Dutch Flowerville resident platform and other ethnic groups in the neighbourhood. Likewise, neighbourhood manager Michel refers to collaboration in Parktown and Harbourtown across ethnic and class lines as ‘the holy grail’; as something that is very hard to achieve.

Michel: I think that there are… few… crossovers between for instance the users of the Turkish Community centre Harbourtown and a club like The Block. Those are separate groups (...) There is little overlap, there are few people that visit both places, so to speak.
I: And is there something you can do about that, being the municipality?
M: Well that is of course... the Holy Grail you’re always looking for. How can I make people that enjoy living in a diverse neighbourhood indeed profit from that diversity. And on the other hand how can I make people who get together because of their shared cultural background profit from the fact that there may be somebody living around the corner who can easily help you start a small business or fill in your tax form, or teach you Dutch. How do you profit from each other’s... well maybe not talents, but how do you just make life easier for each other?
I: Are there any examples in Harbourtown or Parktown?
M: hmmm [thinking] that’s a good one. Maybe the [professionally led] project in this neighbourhood next to Parktown, in which people with a psychiatric background give language education (...) but those are really small successes (smiles)

Michel describes the difficulty to make groups cooperate in this ethnically, and to some extent also socio-economically diverse area. Neighbourhood networker Zeineb relates the lack of cooperation between self-organizations especially to cultural differences between the groups.

Z: Here in Harbourtown and Parktown, it’s always either a Moroccan club or a Turkish Club or a Cabo Verdean club and... that makes it really easy for them, it’s quite accessible, so far as I can see it it goes rather well. But the moment you ask them to do something together then it gets difficult. Because within their own clubs, or you can say cultural groups, it goes quite well but you should not ask them to take a look during each other’s activities or reinforce each other. That is kind of difficult

She talks about the fact that in many groups another language than Dutch is used as the common language. This is necessary because many first-generation migrants in the neighbourhood do not speak Dutch well. But logically, this makes cooperation with other groups more difficult. (The leaders of the minority-ethnic organizations talk about cooperation with social workers and they also receive native-Dutch politicians during election times, but for the rest their users and partners are mainly other co-ethnics and announcement notes on the doors of the Turkish and Cabo Verdean organizations’ accommodation are mostly in their own language). Furthermore, as was noted in paragraph 6.3.2, in all four neighbourhoods many volunteers value their volunteering work also for the sociability that it brings. Such sociability is usually easiest within one’s own ethnic group. Together with the language barriers and/or emancipatory ambitions people have for their own ethnic groups, this explains why most volunteer teams are mono-ethnic. In fact, of all 39 self-organized services in the four research neighbourhoods (mentioned in table 6.2 and 6.3) only five are created by ethnically mixed volunteer teams.

Especially the volunteering teams for which sociability is a main driver are rather homogeneous in terms of the volunteers and users’ ethnicities and education level. Such are almost all the teams running community centres, elderly recreational groups, children’s recreational groups and gardening groups. In all four case studies neighbourhoods, the resident platforms, for instance, consist of native white residents only (this is an observation that has been made also in many other studies on Dutch neighbourhood platforms, see for instance Kullberg et al, 2015, p. 204). Especially in Harbourtown and Parktown, this means that the platform doesn’t represent the ethnic composition of the neighbourhoods very well. However, it seems very hard to cross ethnic boundaries and expand the organization so that it includes also other ethnic groups, says social worker Leo.

Leo: 'when the Harbourtown residents’ platform completely crumbled down, partly because of the renovation that made all those people move out of the neighbourhood at a certain moment, yes, then
those white Dutch residents, they would have had to have a completely allochthonous constituency, so to say, but that never really happened. The resident organisation members say they want that, in words, but in deeds they absolutely do not want it.

Likewise, all community centres’ volunteer teams in the four research neighbourhoods consist of people of the same ethnicity and more or less the same education level. This is also the case for the community centre The Block and Daisy, even though both centres aim to be community centres for the whole, ethnically and socioeconomically mixed neighbourhood. The Daisy community centre has a language course and a children’s recreation club, which services many non-native Dutch. Yet it is difficult for the volunteer group to organize in a multi-ethnic volunteering group. They lost their only non-native-Dutch volunteer in the summer of 2014. This Cabo-Verdean woman, hosting a Cabo-Verdean elderly group, left the centre for another one two kilometres away, run by another Cabo-Verdean woman. Also in The Block, socio-economic mixing of volunteers but also of user groups doesn’t really work, leader Marit tells me.

The Block is mostly visited by the higher-educated people living in the same street, which is one of the very few streets in Harbourtown that also has middle-income housing. There is a weekly coffee meeting with coffee and fruit shakes. Besides that, there is the coffee hour walk-in organized by Richard, visited mostly by the renters that have known the (now self-employed) community worker for years. They used to be one and the same coffee-group, but that did not feel good, Marit explains. Therefore, they now take place at different times of the week. She explains:

And we [the juice-bar] just like to attract that other target group. I’ve really been there a few times with Richard’s group. You see that the younger people, higher educated people, people who consider themselves cosmopolitans, they won’t sit down with Richard’s group. And my own … I also just prefer to have a cappuccino or a fruit juice and just be left alone. You know, I do not necessarily always have to make a lot of fuss about the things I do not like in the neighbourhood [as the people in Richard’s group do]. So there you notice again that tension, we try to include different groups in the community centre sometimes, but you cannot mix the groups. It’s more that they can pass each other or something … that they all come here, but not necessarily mix.

The leader also indicates that she finds it difficult to connect with the other self-help organizations, she says that to her they are geographically quite far away. They are also far away in terms of atmosphere. She finds that the ‘old’ community centre run by the semi-public welfare organization depresses her because the people sitting and playing cards in the recreation hall seem so passive. Also in the streets in the rest of the neighbourhood the atmosphere is passive, ‘people seem not to care to make something out of their living environment’. It costs her a lot of effort to enter the municipality funded centre for women’s activities and the Turkish mosque across the street, because in both places she finds it weird that men and women are separated there. All residents, however, are very welcome to the annual festival (see paragraph 6.3.4 of this dissertation), and the leader ‘keeps searching for connection to the neighbourhood because in the future we cannot continue to function without that connection’.

Marit’s story makes clear how difficult it is to cross cultures and education levels, when you are motivated to build comfortable contacts through your volunteering, rather than potentially challenging or tiring ones. She is very honest in her statements. Other members of sociability oriented volunteer groups often tell me that they cannot find other types of residents to join their group. They state for instance that you cannot expect from poor residents in the neighbourhood that they volunteer to make the neighbourhood the better, because poor people have so many things to sort out and concerns about how to pay the rent. Native Dutch leaders of
the too-white-to-be-representative resident platforms say that they have noticed that ‘discussion meetings are not what allochthonous residents like to do’ (Tina), or that ‘the allochthonous people in the neighbourhood already have their hands full with organizing things around their mosque and cultural networks’ (Mia and Marline) or as a community centre leader says ‘poor people are often too busy with surviving to do much for the neighbourhood’.

Also, Mia tells me, allochthonous residents ‘tend to volunteer in self-organisation groups of their own culture because there they understand how everything goes, there they feel more that they can be themselves, so it isn’t strange that this happens. Whether you talk about Indonesian Muslims or Turks or whatever is living here, people tend to stick to the culture that at least understands them well’. If people volunteer (also) to feel understood and be among people with whom one shares so much that becoming friends is relatively easy, Marline’s statements probably ring true, for allochthonous but also for autochthonous volunteer groups.

I can see the difficulties to create cooperation also ‘live’, during a ‘neighbourhood platform session’, one afternoon in March. As part of a Resident Initiative, Richard has invited all Harbourtown and Parktown’s self-organisations and professional welfare organisations to meet and share ideas. Earlier, Richard had told me he was ‘organizing this neighbourhood meeting with a new starting group called Hijra’. He tells me that when he invites ethnic-minority organizations personally for these platform meetings, they often say they will come but don’t come in the end. Yet, he has good hopes that the new Hijra group will be at the meeting. Yet, eventually, even though it takes place in the Hijra centre, no representative of that community centre attends. The meeting draws only around 30 professionals working in welfare and administration in the neighbourhood, and only three, native-Dutch initiative leaders. Sometimes a Moroccan volunteer looked around the corner, but no words were exchanged between these volunteers and the guests.

A few months later Hijra took the initiative to invite ‘the neighbourhood’ to an evening meal, in order to show the neighbourhood what they are doing. The leaders of the neighbourhood park gardening crew and of the evangelical children’s club both used the opportunity to talk about their need for volunteers. The evangelical club wanted to reach out to the neighbourhood in a more thorough way, to enact God’s love. The gardening volunteers ‘felt bad about being a middle-class white group, unable to find the other residents of this neighbourhood’ and its leader said she ‘refused to believe that there aren’t people in your [Moroccan] association that like gardening just as much as I do’. The leading volunteer of the Moroccan organisation promises to inform the members about the recruitment event of the gardening committee. However, the recruitment meeting is eventually only visited by new Dutch aspiring gardeners. Such failed attempts to cooperate between organizations mostly oriented towards sociability or emancipation of a minority-ethnic or religious group, indicate that self-organisation density in a neighbourhood in itself does not lead to cooperation.

Marina, a social worker in Harbourtown recognizes that some of the low income households in the area volunteering is too much to ask. However, she is more specific and states that this is true for some households facing serious problems of debt. Community worker Richard, on the other hand argues that some of the volunteers working in a neighbourhood garden are low income ‘survivors’ who need the garden to relax from surviving. Also, the idea that poor people are too busy with surviving to volunteer, is rather contrary to the belief that volunteering is good for everyone, especially for unemployed people as the Rotterdam’s ALMP communicates. It is also antithetical to the idea that many people have a talent to give to the city that is not used so far, that the civil servants quoted in paragraph 7.1 held.

---

44 He says: ‘Here, in the other streets, around 70% of the people live on the poverty line, I think. So they are, as I call it, in survival mode. And they will be very busy in their homes so you cannot expect them to occupy themselves with the neighbourhood, with urban planning. So the residents’ neighbourhood safety discussion group [that a municipality professional leads], that isn’t working at all here. Because people are really, a few flowerpots near their home that is the maximum maybe, I’m overstating, but is often too much to ask them to be involved in their streets because they are too busy surviving’.
At the same time, ethnically mixed volunteer teams do exist in Harbourtown and Parktown. This happens in less sociability-oriented organizations. The volunteers in Showme’s household administration support group are in first place motivated to increase their prospects on paid work, and together they form an ethnically mixed group. Also the leading volunteers of the Foodbank are not in the first place motivated by sociability. Rather than have chats with each other or the people they give food to, they have much zeal to help the poor overcome the harshest poverty and enact their faith. This has attracted an ethnically mixed group of female Muslim volunteers, that moreover includes both higher and lower educated women. From the start this group was ethnically mixed because it was initiated by native-Dutch converts to Islam. This ethnically mixed core group of volunteers has gathered a large, equally mixed group of helpers around them (see the description of Malika’s food bank in paragraph 6.3 of this dissertation). Lastly, also the Mullerflat elderly group has some non-native Dutch members, whom leader Meindert got into contact with because they live in his flat (only about half of the residents of the flats are native-Dutch). All these five ethnically mixed volunteer groups also have ethnically mixed user groups. Moreover, also almost all the mono-ethnic volunteer groups working for children’s recreation in have (young) ethnically mixed user groups, as well as Daisy’s language class. Lastly, also self-organised public space projects, playgrounds and festivals bring together ethnically mixed user groups (as described in paragraph 6.3.4 of this dissertation). Children and/or open air, in short, seem to be the lubricant for spending time together in the same space in the ethnically diverse neighbourhood.

That cooperation between volunteer groups in the neighbourhood is limited, is also known in the Polder Borough committee. Various committee members would like to see more interaction between the groups, believing that this can bring social cohesion and exchange of social capital (like Michel described above). The committee does not pose demands regarding the mixedness of initiatives, but they do study successes of mixed initiatives elsewhere. These are notably the small, volunteer-run community centres in other Polder Borough neighbourhoods in which more than one type of group uses the same accommodation (typically one mono-ethnic group after another, not at the same time). These successes are studied so that they can hopefully be replicated elsewhere. Mark explains:

For instance the volunteer run community centre in [adjacent neighbourhood], that is a success story because they have talked with the organizations and mono ethnic organizations in the neighbourhood before and while starting up the community centre. And by sharing the ownership over this space something interesting happens, a space of meaning is created. If several clubs start to do something, then discussion between groups will start as well. And that’s what makes society. But that doesn’t come out of the blue and not everybody has the capacity to do that.

Mark thinks that such shared community centres usually require a paid employee to really make them work, and realizes creating mixed spaces is hard. This is in line with my observation that most of the

45 Finally, there is also a monthly Polder Borough Women’s Network meeting in a municipality funded community centre that draws together leaders from all the mono-ethnic women’s groups using this centre. Zeineb tells me that this is actually the only place where she sees intercultural cooperation succeed. At the same time, the fact that several of the attending Muslim women are not allowed to come in places that also receive men, creates its own cooperation problems. In 2015, the centre is closed down due to budget cuts and the women need new accommodation. Eventually the municipality decides to buy an annex to another municipality-run Community centre. The volunteer-run community centres in the area cannot be guaranteed to be free of men.

46 Only once during the six eight meetings I attend, a committee member is critical about an initiative’s closedness to others. He feels a native-Dutch elderly group is not welcoming the non-native elderly who want to join (The initiative still gets the funding).
indoor welfare service activities that bring ethnically mixed groups of adults together, were indeed started and run by paid social workers. Such activities are the language classes for mothers in the neighbourhoods' elementary schools, the sowing class that Faiza took over from a social worker, the resident safety groups run by Zeineb and her colleagues and the neighbourhood meetings that participation brokers Linde and Imane organise for Flowerville. Sometimes these social workers also try to make existing self-organizations more ethnically mixed, but this isn’t so easy in the case of sociability-oriented groups, as this Flowerville meeting shows.

### Professionals in Flowerville trying to expand sociability initiatives or make them more mixed

It’s eight o’clock: the community centre in Flowerville is open for the Neighbourhood get-together. Yesterday, community workers Linde and Imane told me they were organizing this night. They have sent out 250 invitations, and asked people face to face ‘because in that way you still reach more people’. Now they stand on the pavement outside the community centre, welcoming residents that arrive.

In the room there are three tables, one around which neighbourhood professionals are seated, several of them in uniforms, and two tables where which residents are seated, about 20 in total, there are people of many different ethnicities but most are native-Dutch. In one corner of the room, four elderly native-Dutch women and one elderly man are seated. When I ask, the elderly tell me they organise a weekly recreation afternoon here called Rotterdam’s Golden, where they play bingo, cards and shuffleboard together. One of the women says to me about their club: “We are losing people, nothing new joins”.

The first half hour of group discussion focuses on complaints about youths in the neighbourhood. Then, after a break with free tea and cake, Linde announces ‘it is time to find neighbourhood initiative’. Both resident tables ‘will discuss five things that you find positive about your neighbourhood and one thing that you can contribute to yourself’. Imane thanks the professionals for having been present. If they want they can leave now, ‘because they probably have all kinds of other activities tonight’. Only the youth workers, the neighbourhood networker and Elinor, a Surinamese-looking community worker, decide to stay. While Linde sits down at the other residents’ table, Elinor and Imane join ours.

Imane starts by asking the people to say something positive ‘because there’s always something positive’. Several elderly women at my table say that they indeed like it in their flat and when Imane wants to know how they feel about the neighbourhood atmosphere, they say they also like that quite well. Imane writes it down. How do they interact with the neighbours? ‘Well, those are Turks and Moroccans but they don’t bother us’. ‘So I’ll write down that allochthonous and autochtonous are interacting well with one another’ says Imane. ‘you are Rotterdam’s Golden, right?’ she adds, ‘How does it go? Doesn’t that attract only Dutch people?’ the elderly confirm that it only attracts Dutch people. One elderly lady mentions that they will also soon have the yearly street barbecue. ‘Just the Dutch people, actually’, says the elderly lady. ‘Why is that?’ asks Imane, who seems to think about making these initiatives more mixed. ‘Probably because it isn’t Halal’, says the lady.

After talking about a safety plan for the elderly flat, Imane returns to the subject of mixed initiatives. She asks if ‘people from other cultures could maybe be present at Rotterdam’s Golden once?’ “It’s no use” says the elderly man. The president before him has already tried this, but the people from other cultures “simply don’t want to come, simple as that”. One of the ladies says it is because they have “a different mentality, they are completely different when it comes to mentality”. It isn’t strange, the third lady says. If you go the city’s Concert Hall, where she goes every Sunday, there are only white people there. ‘Those people just have different interests’ ‘Hmmm’, Imane nods, ‘but I have contacts. Shan’t I bring them along one time?’ “No, there’s no need”, says the man who is the president, and the ladies agree. Eventually Elinor, a community worker whose specialty is sports, comes up with an idea. What if the group joined her for a tour along the hidden courtyards
of the neighbourhood. Several of the elderly decline, but some like the idea and they make an appointment. ‘Well, then our little group is done now’, says Imane, ‘nice and fast’. Our ‘resident initiative’ has been found.

All in all, cooperation in indoor activities is scarce, even though civil servants often see this as a missed opportunity. At the same time, the self-organizations that I interviewed in Parktown and Harbourtown do not often mention the lack of cooperation in the neighbourhood as a problem by (several of them are part of Christian or Muslim umbrella organizations, through which they have cooperations with other self-organizations in other neighbourhoods that share their religious outlook). The leaders of the Harbourtown kids’ art club, however, do feel that the lack of cooperation is symptomatic of larger problems of a loss of identification between cultural groups in the Netherlands. Leader Ramon is acquainted with several Moroccan groups because they paid him to write their subsidy-applications for art events in the past. Lately, he and his colleague have also gone to several new minority-ethnic community centres in the area to see if they are interested in doing art projects for children together. Eventually the organizations were not interested. Ramon and his helper Amad feel that minority-ethnic self-organization is growing, and that this must be seen as a reaction to the new tone in the the public debate on ethnic integration. This tone is more dismissive of migrants and non-native Dutch cultural habits (see also paragraph 2.6.4 of this dissertation). As a result, minority-ethnic residents in the neighbourhood are often inclined to withdraw into their own groups and culture, and turn down invitations to collaborate with other self-organisations. (My own experience is also that several of the Moroccan group leaders did not want to be interviewed at my first request). Ramon explains why he thinks this is an understandable development but also one that can harm children’s openness to other cultures and their freedom in choices.

E: You told me there are also self-organisations that have art activities.
Ramon: Yes, only the thing is that now you see how those organisations based on ethnicity and religions grow and become stronger as a reaction to the climate in the country. That is like... 'you all should actually leave this country', right? So, and I think that this is a great pity, that that is the motivation. More Arabian lessons, more of this and that. That is a reaction against what others shout. You really see that as a reaction
Definitely
E: Is this something of the last few years?
R: It happens more than before, yes.
Amad: they also have more financial possibilities
E: They do?
Ramon: Yes indeed, you see..
Amad: They try to be independent financially... in the last year I came across three Moroccan groups that took over a really big building to start their own community centre. If you can take over an old school you must have money.
Ramon: We went to the opening and we were received very warmly. And this one guy, our friend was also a painter, he said that he was very keen to do a workshop with us on painting. But he never called back. We kept trying, but... According to me they're just trying to serve their own people with their activities and strengthen the kind of group feeling. Like guys, stay true to yourself. Whatever they shout we have our own story, culture, religion, you know. That's such a pity if you think about... I would rather have people grow up here that are open to ehm... all the developments in city and that they want to blend in with everyone without having reserves about who the other at the table is, or at the job or in

47 This interview took place not long after the xenophobic politician Geert Wilders’ ranted against Moroccans during a party following the 2014 municipal elections in the Hague. During this party he asked the audience whether they wanted ‘more or less Moroccans in the Hague’ and the audience answered: ‘Less!’
school. So that’s what we have this [painting] space for, you come in here to make your own choices, and everything we do, choose your own colours. We didn’t make a big book that determines what we should paint. So… at the small scale these kids actually go through the big drama of outside when they grow older. Like, at what fundament do I want to shape my life; should I follow the big book or can I make my own choices?

Conclusion
The interview data suggests that in practice corporation is harder in the deprived neighbourhoods because there are more ethnic (and sometimes class lines) dividing the initiatives. Therefore, even though self-organisation density is higher in the deprived neighbourhoods, this does not result in more sharing of resources.

7.4 Supporting initiatives that can access hard to reach groups

This paragraph answers subquestion 8: Do institutions find it attractive to support collectives in deprived neighbourhoods as it may provide them access to hard to reach groups, and does this eventually result in more resources for deprived neighbourhoods? The idea behind this question is that self-organizations serving resident groups that the municipality finds difficult to reach (such as low-literate residents, isolated elderly, ‘problem’ youths and first generation migrants) may have relatively easy access to funding neighbourhoods. They would receive extra support from the government, because the government finds that they are particularly good at reaching those neighbourhood residents that the government doesn’t have much contact with through its standard communication channels. This hypothesis is based on for instance the work of Tonkens (2010). Mostly in the deprived case study research areas, there are several self-organizations servicing such ‘hard to reach’ groups. If the hypothesis is correct, they would receive more support, and this could result in more access to resources in deprived neighbourhoods.

The first part of the subquestion regards governments’ view on self-organizations instrumentality. Is it true that Rotterdam municipality sees self-organizations of deprived areas - more than those of wealthier areas - as instrumental to their goals because the municipality regards these self-organizations as capable to reach out to marginalized groups? This is indeed the case, as I found in my Parktown and Harbouertown fieldwork. Policymaker Bouchra explains that minority-ethnic self-organizations are important because ‘emancipation only happens within one’s own group, so I very much support the fact that people gather’, and civil servants in the deprived case study neighbourhoods talk about how self-organizations are helpful to communicate with the first-generation migrant population of the deprived neighbourhoods. When Michel and I talk about the mono-ethnic community centres in Parktown and Harbouertown, he for instance tells me:

M: The fact that you have these [minority-ethnic] community centres is instrumental to other targets of the municipality.
I: But not for all targets I suppose, because you are also of course at a distance to these organizations?
M: Yes, but to give an example, from a safety perspective we are interested in burglary prevention. We must inform vulnerable groups that they cannot let anyone into the house and that the front doors of the flats should be closed. So we [the municipality] want to pay visits to certain groups to tell that story. So that is nice, but then it is even nicer if these groups already gather in some places, because otherwise you have to do burglary prevention going door-to-door and talk to all the inhabitants.
I: So that is the reason you support these groups
M: Well, this is just a small practical example of the idea that, you know, it is valuable to have a partner with whom you can organize your [the municipality’s] contact to society in a specific neighbourhood.
Like Michel, also Zeineb tells me that minority-ethnic self-organisations are useful to reach certain goals of the municipality. She says that she goes to minority-ethnic organizations’ women’s clubs to talk about subjects like burglary and public health problems caused by leaving old bread in the streets (according to certain interpretations of Qur’an verses, bread must not be put in the waste bin and therefore some residents leave it on the pavement). Also the Polder Borough Committee is usually interested in funding applications by and for ‘hard-to-reach’ groups, but for a different reason. The reason to pay special attention to initiatives of marginalized groups, is that they have committed themselves to several goals involving marginalized residents in the neighbourhood. For the period 2014 to 2018 an important part of their targets is mentioned in the following excerpt from the Borough Plan:

Our goal is to foster self-reliance among the residents. To this end we stimulate citizen’s capacities and labour-market participation. Language problems are decreased, educational results and general health conditions are improved. Self-reliance among elderly is fostered by improving the accessibility of facilities. The use of poverty allowance is reduced because through programs that lead people towards work. Also the number of volunteers in the neighbourhood is increased and there is more attention for marginalized (‘kansarme’) families. (…) Female emancipation is fostered through the municipality funded women’s centre. Lastly, sports and culture are used as a means to create attachment to the neighbourhood and social cohesion. (Polder Borough plan, 2014, p. 15)

These goals deal with a whole set of marginalized groups: poor households, people with little proficiency in the Dutch language, unemployed people, less emancipated women to name a few. (This stands in contrast for instance with North Borough’s targets for Northville, which are ‘increasing residential satisfaction’, stimulating volunteering for the neighbourhood, increasing people’s happiness with greenery in the neighbourhood and to bring down complaints about rotting housing foundations and dog excrement in the street’). Rotterdam Borough Committees, however, do not decide about the municipality’s efforts in these matters, they can only decide about whether are not to fund the applications of the residents’ initiatives that present themselves to committee. This means that self-organizations dealing with marginalized residents’ personal problems -which in practice are usually social entrepreneurs in social work or ethnic-minority self-organizations (see paragraph 6.3.3 and 6.3.1 of this dissertation respectively) - have their special attention. Committee member Mark for instance notes that the committee has some questions about how they can stimulate that Resident Initiatives address especially the committee’s goals regarding marginalized residents’ individual problems.

There are a couple of questions in the committee. (…) What kind of extra demands can we have towards resident initiatives? Should we bring the things we targeted in the Borough Plan more to their attention? Like, if there are initiatives that really address people’s problems of poverty, isolation or debts or do something with the youths, then we are especially interested (interview with Mark).

This attention also speaks from some of the statements I heard during the Polder Borough committee meetings. A member for instance stated that the committee cannot spend too much on redesign on public space, because they have to prioritize social projects.

Committee member: Just one more remark about resident initiatives. If we start financing the redesign of physical space with Resident Initiative funds, then we will empty the fund very quickly. And in Polder Borough there are many initiatives that a lot of people want to make use of. And we want to enable as many people as possible to make use of them. And if too much of the fund goes into redesign of the physical space, then too little is left for the people themselves, so to speak.
This stands in contrast with the two committee meetings in North Borough that I visited, during which almost half of the money was spent on the redesign of playgrounds and little parks. These were redesigns that residents ask for through Resident Initiative applications.

In Park Borough, the social projects (projects for ‘the people themselves’) are thus often prioritized over costly physical space projects. There is often special attention for initiatives involving ‘hard to reach’ groups, and most applications of minority-ethnic organizations are awarded in the six meetings that I attended. A specific topic shows that the Polder Borough Committees would like to help even more self-organizations that can help them reach their targets involving ‘hard to reach’ groups. This is the topic of youth work. Unemployment and early school-leaving among youths and young adults is a problem in the Rotterdam deprived neighbourhoods, and especially among the second generation non-Western migrants (see also paragraph 4.2 of this dissertation). Therefore, investment in youths is one of the Committee’s five main targets for Parktown and Harbourtown. It states in the Borough Plan:

‘Youths that are growing up in Parktown and Harbourtown are confronted with backlogs in several areas. We need to focus on the themes of school dropouts, talent development, support and activation to realize the ambitions for youths in the neighbourhood’ (Borough Plan 2014-2018 of Polder Borough, p. 17)

The committee would very much like to grant money to resident initiatives that are willing to do something with the neighbourhood’s teenagers, especially now that almost all state-provided youth clubs were ended in budget cut operations48. However, no groups present themselves that have plans to do this in Parktown and Harbourtown. In the other neighbourhoods of Polder Borough there are 12 initiatives applications for plans to work with youths (see figure 6.1), but these are all initiatives of government employed social workers, formerly employed social workers (see for instance the initiative by youth worker Jamal mentioned in paragraph 6.3.3 of this dissertation) or entrepreneurs that have sports schools or music studios and are willing to run a paid initiative in their own business (the committee denies funding to several of these last initiatives). Unpaid volunteering for local youths is not popular. The only volunteer-run committee-funded initiative for youths involving also volunteers, is led by a policeman in one of Parktown’s community centres. However, this project is soon ended because the user group of youths has locked a volunteer up in the main room of the community centre. Other initiatives are by the Moroccan and Turkish self-organizations but they do not apply for funding and it therefore remains unclear how much and what they exactly do. When finally a group of Harbourtown young women present themselves to the Polder Borough Committee with their plan for a teenage girl support group, the committee is more than enthusiastic. One of the members for instance says:

Committee member: First of all, I really want to congratulate you that you have come with this project to us, and that you will do it in our Borough. I really think it’s a beautiful project. We have actually not seen enough youths here in the Borough Committee that dare to start such a [youth’s] project.

---

48 A look at for instance the 2010 year report of Harbourtown and Parktown’s largest social work organisation at that time (now bankrupt) shows that there were 16 clubs for teenagers and young adults in the five community centres these neighbourhoods had (now two). During my fieldwork year, no such state-funded activities for youths exist anymore. There are only two state-funded ‘ambulant’ youth workers who talk with youths in the streets of the neighbourhood, and one social entrepreneur who does paint jobs and bootcamps with ‘problem’ youths from the Borough.
Committee members take several pictures of the girls and post them on their Facebook account, congratulating the girls with their great initiative. Eventually, however, the group doesn’t really take off. Few activities are developed by the young women’s group, even though it was very much cherished by the committee. The initiatives by several other volunteers interested in youths show that very few people are willing or confident enough to start a project working with teenagers directly. Tiago, for instance, who was triggered by the problem youth crime (see paragraph 6.1 of this dissertation) chose to work with fathers instead of youths, so as to invest in the quality of the upbringing of future youths. Also Bensalah tells me he works with children, because he wants to prevent rather than cure. He has seen from nearby that his friends’ son dropped out of school and got ‘difficult’ and therefore wants to invest in children when they are still malleable. ‘I see children as future youths’ says Bensalah.

I hear about early school leaving and youth unemployment (and sometimes about associated petty crime) not only from Bensalah, but also from several other Moroccan men I speak with during my research. They often come up with this topic even though I usually don’t ask about it, while it doesn’t occur much in my interviews with other Parktown and Harbourtown residents. When I looked through my six transcriptions of talks I had with Moroccan men in these neighbourhoods, in four of them personal stories about youth unemployment come up. A man I interviewed because he is a playground supervisor in Harbourtown, for instance, tells me his son is at home ever since he quit school. He did a job interview with the border police, but was rejected. Since then he is ‘laying on the couch’. During a visit of the mayor of Rotterdam to the municipality-funded community centre of Parktown, I sit next to a Moroccan father. First we talk about the mayor, but then the father points to his son who sits across the room. He proudly tells me his son graduated from the Technical University of Delft last summer, but now he is worried. The son had found a job in an energy consultancy firm. However, he received a phone call during his holidays and the firm told him that they didn’t need him after all. ‘You should try all the ways’, says the father to me, ‘even though sometimes ways forbidden’, and he crosses his arms to communicate ‘forbidden’.

An organiser of a homework class and his friend also start talking to me about educational and labour market problems in their family. The friend’s son is 18 years old. ‘Every month my son goes to an office across town where he gets €200 from the government. But my son isn’t at home at night and during the day he is sleeping’, says the friend, and adds that he himself isn’t sleeping well at night if his son is gone. ‘And if he is at home he will listen but if he is in the street he listens to the other kids and they are stronger’. The man says he has gone to see a social worker who helps his son after his period of school absenteeism, and he has also talked to the police. ‘I have even invited the police in my house to ask them what I can do with the boy. But the police took my son’s side and told me that I could not lock my son up in our house’. Now the father is afraid his son will be involved in petty crime again, like he has been before. His son has attended a project from the municipality and was in a special type of school, but ‘there he only finds bad boys, they are all standing outside blowing weed’. The homework class organiser says that he feels such youth counselling projects are also ‘just business’. If a project is over, the counsellors have made some money but the boy goes back to his old life. The organiser and his friend tell me that they used to bring the son to a school at the other end of the city. They would bring him by car in the morning. ‘And that is hard because he is a strong man, but I said to [my friend]: start your engine every day’. And then there was a special initiative ‘by Dutch people’ for boys to work and learn at the same time. That was good. But behind their backs, the son quit his job there. ‘When you hear that…’ says the
friend. Both men fear moreover that boys today can be tempted to go to Syria, even though they have not heard about this directly. Yet they are afraid that ‘somebody will come to talk and you have no money and then you will be more inclined to listen to someone who wants to bring you to Syria’. Their own volunteering efforts, however, are directed to elementary school children as they feel it is more feasible to prevent than cure problems with teenagers.

During my fieldwork year, jihadism was not yet very present in the Dutch news. Yet, in the autumn of 2014, Moroccan leader Hassan presented a plan to the Committee of Polder Borough to organise information nights for Moroccan parents to warn against radicalization and inform about the municipality’s internship programs for allochthonous youths. This plan was turned down by the committee, with the argument that they were looking for residents that do something to create jobs and internships, rather than have more discussions and talks. However, after the Charlie Hebdo events, the leader was contacted by city hall. They wanted to work with him because of his knowledge and, particularly, his contacts with Moroccans in Polder Borough, so that the municipality could get their own deradicalization experts in touch with a Moroccan audience (interview with Hassan).

The hope that volunteering can take over state-funded youth work thus hasn’t really come true in projects yet in my research neighbourhoods. This can also be witnessed in another ‘welfare service’ for ‘hard to reach’ groups that the government would like to see volunteers work for. This is the activation of long time unemployed residents. The municipality pays semi-governmental welfare organizations and social entrepreneurs to create ‘favour in return’ volunteering positions within their organisations for long-term unemployed (see for instance Showme and the Care Network described in paragraph 6.3.3) In theory, long-term unemployed can also work as helpers in volunteer led neighbourhood self-organizations. Yet, in practice I barely see this happening (see also footnote nr. 41 of this dissertation). The leaders of the platforms of Harbourtown and Flowerville both tell me that they do not want to supervise people on behalf of the government, they don’t like to be put in the position of controller and decide about other people’s welfare allowances. Also, the leader of the Flowerville resident platform for instance says:

    Well, hello, we are doing this voluntarily! I think that if all kinds of vulnerable people are dropped in our lap... well, then I think, we try, but we have our hands full already with our own work. I don’t think that is fair. If a community worker guides them, that’s reasonable. That’s a good idea I think. But not us...

The support of policymakers, civil servants committee members for self-organizations serving hard to reach groups, shows that these professionals are aware of these groups’ instrumentality for municipality goals (even if in practice not all of their targets are met by self-organizations). Therefore the first part of my subquestion can be answered affirmatively. However, this does not result in more money for self-organizations from deprived neighbourhoods together (the second part of the subquestion). As mentioned before, the Resident Initiative funds in Rotterdam are divided evenly over the Boroughs according to population size. Thus, even though self-organizations’ networks among marginalized groups are valued in deprived neighbourhoods, this does not result in more funding, because the decision about total funding is made at city level, and within this total budget, Boroughs in practice award money to almost any plan as long as it is not at odds with their own objectives.

Conclusion
Especially in deprived areas, initiatives are indeed often sponsored because they are instrumental to the municipality’s goals for the area. However, this does not result in more funding to these areas. Also, not all of the welfare needs that committees would like to see met by ‘instrumental’ volunteering groups, are popular among volunteers.

7.5 Special funds for deprived urban areas

This paragraph will answer subquestion number 7: Are initiatives in deprived neighbourhoods better able to access resources because they can get special budgets for deprived areas? I will look at what governmental funding is available for neighbourhood level welfare service volunteering organizations, and what this means for the wealthier and deprived research neighbourhoods.

The last paragraph has already outlined that marginalized groups’ self-organizations have the attention of Rotterdam policy makers and civil servants, but that this doesn’t result in more Resident Initiative funding (which is usually their main source of financial means) for the deprived Boroughs compared to wealthier boroughs. That is a first answer to the research question. Next to the Resident Initiative fund, however, in 2014 the municipality also created a 1.5 million euro fund that was paid to social entrepreneurs and semi-governmental organizations promoting welfare service volunteering (‘Fonds sociale infrastructuur’). The money wasn’t intended for volunteer-run organizations but for professionally run organizations that involve volunteers as helpers. Although it was available for professional initiatives from anywhere in Rotterdam: in practice almost all money was spent on the poorer neighbourhoods (www.rotterdam.nl/fsi). Two self-organizations in the deprived research neighbourhoods also received money: Showme and the Care-Network. However, even if we disregard these two self-organizations that were sponsored by the special fund (see table 6.2 and 6.3 of this dissertation), the deprived neighbourhoods still have more welfare service volunteering organizations. As such we can state that the higher incidence of self-organizations in neighbourhood welfare services in the deprived case-study neighbourhoods is not the result of a larger availability of funding for these areas.

Volunteer-run initiatives in deprived Rotterdam neighbourhoods, in other words, have more or less the same amount of access to resources as those in wealthier neighbourhoods. At the same time, the Resident Initiative fund has aspects that are more problematic for many self-organizations working in deprived neighbourhoods than for those from wealthier neighbourhoods. This is due to three limitations set by city hall (see also paragraph 4.3 of this dissertation): Resident Initiative funding is not meant to sponsor recurrent activities (this rule would help to preserve the innovative and self-reliant character of self-organization), it cannot be used for structural payments to employees and it cannot be used for paying the rent of accommodations (buildings). According to Michel, such limitations were created to make sure that people focus on activities and output, but they were also installed because ‘this is a period in which we have to make new compromises with a smaller budget’.

The new funding program with its stricter rules is sometimes problematic because various organizations in Polder Town were habituated to the more generous schemes that Polder Borough used to have. During the national ‘40 most deprived neighbourhoods’ investment program (see paragraph 2.3), Polder Borough had its own funding scheme for residents’ initiatives, but this was ended four year ago. Also, a special Rotterdam fund for minority-ethnic self-organizations has been ended since two years because the current administration thinks sponsoring ethic minority organizations hampers integration (see paragraph 7.2 of this dissertation). Now they can only look for
funding for their activities through the Resident Initiative fund, or seek funding through their own aggregation of private means (from members, sponsoring firms or charities). Lastly, Rotterdam has also changed its rules about the use of community centres. Michel explains this:

_Michel: Back then, people could also use the municipality-run community centres for free. And now the municipality has outsourced the community centres to another organization, and now resident initiatives have to pay the hourly cost price of the rooms they use._

Taken all these changes together, according to Michel and other people I spoke to, the Resident Initiative fund is actually not as generous as the more scattered funding schemes and material support that existed in Polder Borough up until 2014.

_Michel: I don’t know if we have more resident initiative money now than before. I think we [the municipality] used to do it already very much. I remember that we had this Borough administrator who said during the election campaign ‘let’s spend 1 million on the minority-ethnic organizations’. Now we have 800.000 to divide over all self-organizations, so the minority-ethnic self-organizations but also all the others._

As Michel explains, all self-organizations have to get their money through the Resident Initiative fund. This means that they can no longer ask for sponsoring for structural activities (activities should be project-based and non-repetitive), cannot ask for reimbursement of accommodation rent and cannot ask for salaries for paid employees. The rule that structural activities should not be sponsored, could be a problem mostly in the deprived case study neighbourhoods because they have most year-round service providing services (such as the recreation clubs for children and elderly, language courses and poverty relief). In practice however, the Polder Borough Committee is rather lenient with city hall’s rule that prohibits recurrent sponsoring of the same activities by the same organization. It keeps sponsoring many recurrent activities that they think are just functioning well. Many of the Borough’s volunteer-run language and homework classes and children’s recreational activities that received Resident Initiative money in 2014, continued to do so in 2015 (and 2016). One committee member says for instance about the festival of The Turkish International Mosque that they have sponsored before (and attracts basically only Turkish residents, see paragraph 6.3.4 of this dissertation): ‘this is an organization that I know well, they reach a lot of people, and I know that they do well what they do. So okay it isn’t innovative, but sometimes you just have to do what you’re good at, [and do] the things that you know are effective’. In the committee meetings I visited, I have never seen that resident initiative’s funding applications were denied for being too repetitive.

City hall’s Resident Initiative’s new rules on accommodation are more often found problematic. This is because also the use of accommodations is more prevalent in the deprived than in the wealthier areas. In the deprived areas, more activities are indoors (see tables 6.2 and 6.3 and also figure 6.1) but the resident fund criteria do not allow for reimbursement of rent of an accommodation outside activity hours. For many of the self-organisations I spoke with (and the services using them such as homework classes, elderly groups etc.) this is a problem. Some of the very old groups are lucky to have been given their accommodation in the past (Harbourtown for instance has a playground that used to be run by volunteers and had its own building. The playground community has stopped volunteering but they still own the building. Also Mr. Hadioui’s group has its own building). Other groups have been using their Housing Association owned accommodation for free, since the Association thinks they are of great value to the neighbourhood (Harbourtown’s kids Art Centre). However, now that financial pressures on the municipality and housing association have increased, free use has become less common. I found that all the groups that have started in the last few years, either can only temporary
use a social-rent dwelling slated for demolition (the Eindhoven Togethercare organizations) or have to pay rent to a Housing Association (the block, Daisy community centre) or the municipality (The Turkish community centre Parktown).

Table 7.1: Accommodation situation for each self-organisation in Parktown and Harbournown

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of neighbourhood welfare service</th>
<th>Harbourtown accommodation</th>
<th>Parktown accommodation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recreation clubs for children</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harbournown kids’ art-club</td>
<td>Free (from HA)</td>
<td>Community centre Daisy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kids’ Street-Gardening</td>
<td>Free because outdoors</td>
<td>Parktown Park</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish international mosque</td>
<td>Pays rent to municipality</td>
<td>Amitié</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Church-sponsored</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homework clubs for children</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bensalah’s homework club</td>
<td>Uses state-funded municipality for free</td>
<td>Moroccan mosque Hijra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bought the building with mosque members contributions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Turkish community centre Parktown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Hadioui’s group</td>
<td>Own building</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch language courses</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>self-run community accommodations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish mosque international</td>
<td>Bought the building 30 years ago with mosque members contributions</td>
<td>Turkish community centre Parktown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Pays rent to municipality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Block</td>
<td>Pays rent to HA</td>
<td>Community centre Daisy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Pays rent to HA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elderly care initiatives</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recreation for elderly</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mullerflat</td>
<td>Uses the free room of the inactive Playground association</td>
<td>Our Cabo Island</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Pays rent to HA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty relief / administrative</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>counselling</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish mosque international</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Foodbank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Free (unsuitable) room in community centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Showme</td>
<td>Pays hourly fee to community centre</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance of public parks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>playgrounds and streets</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harbournown Open Stage</td>
<td>Free because outdoors</td>
<td>Parktown park</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Free because outdoors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Townstreet’s organisation</td>
<td>Free because outdoors</td>
<td>Temporary park</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Free because outdoors</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.2: Accommodation situation for each self-organisation in Flowerville and Northville

166
Having their own accommodation, rather than sharing it with other groups in a community centre, is important for many of these groups (see also Ham and Van der Meer 2015, p.137). The Eindhoven community centre leaders explain how just having a place attracts people willing to volunteer their, for instance by teaching others to paint, make flower bouquets or cook for other residents. Yunus tells me how the sports room in their (former municipality-funded) community centre allows them to have boxing for youths and aerobics for women. This is also what Tiago liked about his community centre, when it was still operated by the municipality and he could use it for the fathers’ group. A fixed accommodation also gives flexibility and a sense of home to the group’s activities. Groups like to redecorate the spaces and give it a different atmosphere than the ‘generic’ atmosphere of municipality-funded community centre. Many also like the flexibility of having their own space, whereas sharing spaces necessitates a lot of scheduling work. All these aspects are important, and losing an accommodation (because the municipality-funded community centre is closed) can make a self-organisation decide to stop (this happened to Hassan’s homework class and was also one of the reasons of the end of Tiago’s father’s group).

Most volunteer-run community centres in Parktown and Harbourtown now have to pay monthly rents. They deal with their rent problem in an inventive way. As they can only request funding for activities, they calculate a bit more for their activities than they actually costs, so that they can pay their rents from the surplus. This explains why a third of the funding applications in Polder Borough...
amounts to 10.000 Euro (or a few hundred less). 10.0000 euro is the maximum they can apply for through this fund. When I run into Yunus, a few months after the interview, he for instance tells me that the community centre is functioning well, but the rent ‘is just really hard to get by’. His centre is sponsored by a chain of Turkish butchers in the borough, and this brings in some money, but not enough ‘so I did these activity subsidies, because you can’t have a structural subsidy’. The committee is aware that funds are used to pay rents with, as Mark tells me.

Mark: Also, we know that many volunteer run Community centres have financial troubles.
I: That is related to the fact that you cannot give structural subsidies right?
Mark: Yes, that is a difficult criterion in the city hall rules (…)
I: Because I understood that now sometimes initiatives calculate a bit more for their activities than what it actually costs, so that they can pay their building for instance
Mark: Yes. Yes, but that just makes sense, I think. I can imagine that there is reluctance [in the municipality] to finance structural costs, but the moment something is a structural contribution to the neighbourhood, well than that actually needs to be accompanied by structural subsidies.

As tables 7.1 and 7.2 show, religious organizations that also run welfare service like services, often do not have this rent problems. Various of the mosque and church related self-organizations own their own building. Hijra, the new Moroccan mosque and community centre in Parktown, for instance ran a large money-drive to gather donations from Muslims in the neighbourhood and (far) around. Oussama and other volunteers I speak with are very proud that they gathered 300.000 euro in this way. Such religious charity drives have the advantage that they can also (implicitly or explicitly) have something to offer in exchange for donations: a reward for the donor’s in the afterlife.

At the end of 2014, the Hijra centre holds a charity drive, to collect ‘the last 55.000 euro for the Islamic centre Hijra’ in a former elementary school in Parktown. ‘let’s work together for the afterworld’ it says on the poster. I have a look at a YouTube movie they put on their Facebook page During the video men come up to the bench of three speakers, bringing cheques. They eventually earn € 41,100.- One of the men for instance says: “We just got a message from sister Musa, who lives in Belgium. And she is a single mother. And she literally says ‘I have forty euros in my bank account, nothing more. But those €40 go to the Hijra mosque in Rotterdam.”

Also the Turkish International Mosque has a charity drive for new accommodation during my research period.

**Conclusion**
Under the Resident Initiative program, no special funds were created for deprived areas, even though in practice the self-organizations in these areas often have higher financial needs. This is because their activities are more often indoor and year-round than in wealthier area, and this brings accommodation costs. However, the municipality only sponsors residents’ groups activities, not the group itself. Therefore, many groups struggle to pay for their own accommodation and this makes especially some of the groups in deprived neighbourhoods frailer (or become reliant on religiously inspired charity drives).
Chapter 8: Conclusions and discussion

This dissertation is an investigation of the outcomes of a social policy trend that has increasingly manifested itself in many Western European countries over the last two decades. This trend is the growing political enthusiasm for citizens’ neighbourhood-based self-organisation in welfare services. By this I mean politicians’ and administrators’ attentiveness and support for organised voluntary self-help in the fields of social cohesion, care and emancipation in the neighbourhood by its residents. In this respect, the current Dutch administration even envisions the Dutch welfare state to transform into a ‘participation society’ (participatiesamenleving). It has voiced this in various policy briefs and by way of the King’s 2013 annual speech. In the UK, the so-called ‘Big Society’ is a similar policy frame as the ‘participation society’, and one that has become very influential. The current British Prime Minister described it as a ‘huge cultural change (...) where people develop active and sustainable communities and don’t always turn to officials, local authorities or central government for answers to the problems they face’ (Cameron, 2010 in Lowndes and Pratchett 2012).

The dissertation project is aimed at empirically testing one of these critiques: I investigate whether it is true that deprived urban areas have less potential to self-organize welfare services and that, consequently, the level of welfare services will be lower in these neighbourhoods than in richer neighbourhoods. The fear that more support for welfare self-organisation will thus eventually exacerbate existing social inequality in the city, is voiced across the sociological literature and political debate. Several authors warn against such a Matthew-effect in the Dutch ‘Participation Society’.

A main reason for commentators to warn for such a Matthew effect, is that various household survey researches have shown that lower-educated and poorer citizens not only participate less in political activities (as researches have continuously shown for Western countries ever since Verba and Nie first investigated this in the United States in 1970), but also in volunteering for neighbourhood welfare services. Little self-organisation would thus come about in deprived areas. On the other hand, several North-American, Dutch and British researches looking directly at neighbourhood volunteers, have found high numbers of such volunteering initiatives also in deprived neighbourhoods. Nonetheless, over last three years, Dutch household survey-based researches predicting low performance for deprived neighbourhoods have made newspaper front pages, and both proponents and criticators of the participation society warn that poorer citizens will show low levels of volunteering. It must be noted though, that population surveys are only one way to chart volunteering practices, with its own potential flaws.

In the Netherlands there are many expectations about growing inequality between richer and poorer neighbourhoods in the ‘Participation Society’. Yet there is hardly any research into practices of volunteering for welfare services that takes such a spatial comparative approach. Therefore this dissertation is a case-study research to answer the question: Do richer and poor neighbourhoods have different capacity to self organize welfare services?

To understand what the ‘Participation Society’ means for the production of welfare services, we must have a rough idea of how the Dutch and western-European welfare states have evolved in the last decades. In what ways is the Participation Society new, and in what ways does it connect to earlier calibrations of welfare states? This was outlined in the second chapter. The chapter begins by indicating what may be obvious: also before the formation of the welfare state, people self-organized welfare: they built volunteering structures to help each other and themselves. Throughout history, people have often collectively created structures to protect against harsh poverty, to provide care, and, especially since the industrial revolution, to emancipate marginalized groups and connect them to wider society. We can think in this respect about charities, guilds, farming cooperatives, unions, saving
clubs for the collective realization of worker housing etc. From this viewpoint, self-organisation hardly is a defining feature for the current period in time. What is unique to the last two decades, however, is that this time self-organisation is realized next to an extensive system of state provided welfare provision, and that the state is also the active promoter of self-organisation.

These Western-European welfare states were for a large part formed in the 1950s, 60s and 70s. In these decades, state-financed schemes were installed that insured against poverty and provided care to elderly and disabled. The welfare arrangements of these first three postwar decades were designed to insure for the typical family of that time against the two most common and serious problems, that of the male breadwinner becoming temporarily unemployed due to macro-economically induced cyclic downfalls in labour demand, or of becoming indefinitely unemployed due to old age. By installing these arrangements, states created what T.H. Marshall’s called ‘social rights’ for citizens. Over the 60s, 70s and 80s, Western-European states also became more involved with fostering emancipation and social cohesion in society. Up until then the education system was the only state welfare service contributing to emancipation, but from the 50s on, emancipation and social cohesion were also nurtured through a new professional field that became known as ‘social work’. It is especially in the areas of caring, emancipating and connecting that citizens’ that the government looks for citizens’ active help in the Participation Society in the last two decades, while in the realm of insuring the activation of citizens towards work has been come important (which is part of the so-called ‘social investment state’ approach).

In the seventies and eighties, however, the first financial problems started to show for welfare budgets. State budgets declined due to lower economic growth and rising public deficit, in combination with an ageing population and lower fertility rates. Moreover, since the nineteen seventies also new social risks had started to emerge, which up until then had hardly been anticipated. Built in the first post-WO II decades to protect against temporal short-time unemployment of the male breadwinner, welfare arrangements were not prepared for many new types of hardship that have become common in modern society. Firstly, in the course of deindustrialization, unemployment has often become structural for especially many low-educated working-age citizens. Remaining low-skilled labour often became flexibilized and unions could exert less pressure on salaries and job protection. At the same time, women’s increased labor participation has led to higher childcare needs, and lower stability of adult relationships to increased chances of poverty for single parent households. International migration has furthermore incurred skill mismatch and discrimination on the labor market, whereby migrants and their children face increased chances of poverty and need welfare service in for instance labor market integration and language education. These risks have become known as New Social Risks in the sociological literature. The risks bring new cash transfer needs, but also particularly growing welfare service needs (notably childcare, labour market integration programs, language courses etc.). In the same period, ageing populations’ growing pension needs started to way heavy, while path-dependency and powerful vested interests made it difficult to change existing welfare policies.

Instead of developing the types of welfare services the new social risks required, however, a first wave of welfare services reform mainly regarded their mode of production. From the eighties on, the financial burden and inflexibility of welfare services gained much attention. Increasingly, welfare services were seen as inefficient and as creating dependency among users. Welfare service cash transfers and social work would harm the morale and potential of citizens. In response, relief was sought from implementing market-based principles in the organisation of welfare services, a movement across western welfare states that has become known as New Public Management. These market-based principles are notably the replacement of structural subsidies by more strictly monitored project subsidies and quasi-marketization. Although the strategies were meant to create efficiency and innovation through the ‘discipline of the market’, welfare services often proved hard to reform in these
Since around 2000, other modernization of welfare services has therefore been attempted, and this modernization has become known as the so-called ‘social investment state perspective’. More clearly than the New Public Management approach, this perspective acknowledges the new welfare service needs outlined in the New Social Risk literature. The perspective has taken cues from the Scandinavian welfare service systems as well as from British Third Way ideology. Following the ‘social investment state’, ‘enabling state’ or ‘active welfare state’ approach, the emphasis of social policy should be on preparing citizens for Europe’s global competition in a new more flexible and knowledge-centered economy.

To raise productivity in this economy, the citizen should make investments in his or her education and work-family balance and work-mindedness. Therefore, the perspective promotes ample welfare service provision in the fields of childcare, education and active labor market policies as well as in elderly care that relieves working age children from extensive care tasks. As such, the social investment state entails responsibilization of the citizen (citizens must be aware of that they must invest in being employed or in being employable) but such investments can also bring empowerment and emancipation. The Social investment idea also furthermore stresses the importance of marginalized groups’ social inclusion, especially through work. This is because social exclusion, notably poverty in households, is deemed to have negative effects on the future capacities of children and on social cohesion in society and thus on society’s economic performance. In practice however, most varieties of social investment approaches that were followed by several EU countries, have not yet proven to diminish poverty.

The turn towards volunteering in welfare services

In roughly the same period as the emergence of the social investment state approach, the turn towards more volunteering in welfare services appeared in several western European countries, most strongly in the UK and the Netherlands. The shared idea is that governments should promote and support citizens that want to be active in and for their neighbourhood on a volunteering basis. Like the social investment state, inspiration can be partly traced back to the British Third Way. Up until 2007, in both the UK and the Netherlands, policies to achieve this voluntary neighbourhood involvement were mostly embedded in integral renewal plans for deprived neighbourhoods. Today, however, the policy efforts are country-wide in both states, and are known as the Big Society frame in the UK and Participation State frame in the Netherlands.

Politicians are enthusiastic about these frames not only because they promise ‘free’ volunteering labour in welfare services and thus lower costs. Already in the 90s, scholars have written about several other political motivations for the turn towards more volunteering. In the first place it is hoped that the involvement of citizens in providing and shaping public services, will renew the bonds between politics and citizens. This would be most necessary in current times, in light of growing political disengagement among citizens, and a new knowledge balance due to which citizens are less likely to leave all decisions to state authority.

Another often quoted reason is that volunteering can bring back solidarity between citizens. The extensive system of indirect solidarity provided through the welfare state, would have made citizens less comfortable, less habituated or less willing to behave in a solidary way towards other citizens or to society at large. Direct volunteering for one another would be able to mend this.

Furthermore volunteering is seen as a way to repair community in ethnic concentration neighbourhoods. Over the last two decades, the perception has grown in the Netherlands that deprived neighbourhoods suffer from low levels of social cohesion, not in the least because they are home to residents of many different cultures that do not understand each others languages and norms. Social cohesion must be brought back through face-to-face interaction between residents. Residents’
voluntary participation in (self-organized) neighbourhood projects, is therefore essential.

Fourthly, the involvement of local residents in policymaking but also in welfare service provision, is seen as a way to access more knowledge about local conditions and local social problems, which are inevitably structured by these conditions.

Fifthly, volunteering is regarded as a potential stepping-stone in the emancipation of marginalized groups. This is interesting especially for left-leaning politicians. Through volunteering, people may learn political skills, as well as skills that make them more employable. Here we see a link with the social investment state perspective. Yet, there is more to be gained than employability only. If marginalized groups can shape welfare services to their needs through volunteering, and make themselves heard and seen, the state will become aware of the diversified needs of today’s multicultural, multi-lifestyle society.

In the view of Foucault-inspired writers, lastly, policies promoting citizens’ involvement in the provision of local public services must foremostly be understood as a new state project to govern at a distance, and thereby increase state power. In this view, community has become an object of state manipulation, in which communities are depicted as defined by mainstream values. Citizens who hold these mainstream values are facilitated in their initiatives, whereas ‘at-risk’, mostly non-working citizens are forced to adhere more to these values through frontline interventions in their life, such as at home child-rearing support, obligatory home visits, and obligatory cultural integration courses that focus on mainstream values. By working on the values of at risk inhabitants, and facilitating community-value driven initiatives of other residents, the state tries to make citizens and neighbourhoods more self-regulating. It aims to create, in other words, neighbourhoods that ‘solve their own problems’. However, what is not clear in this perspective, is how the state would be able to discern between at-risk and other citizens, and how it ensures that initiatives are in line with state objectives. It seems likely that responsibilization and facilitating citizens to fill in these new responsibilities in the way that they feel is best, also brings freedoms and thus a potential for empowerment.

Concluding we may say that the participation society perspective shows elements of the social investment state perspective. The responsibilization of citizens towards community-mindedness reminds of the social investment state’s responsibilization towards work-mindedness. Both paradigms, moreover, propagate that citizenship is bound up with being active, and that being active is virtuous. Some authors argue that because of its responsibilizing aspects, the Participation State should be regarded as a new governmentality that disciplines citizens towards community values. If it is, this governmentality in any case allows large freedoms and agency to citizens, which can in turn bring about emancipation and the better adjustment of welfare services to today’s culturally pluriform society.

While chapter 2 discussed the historical background and roots of the participation society in this way, chapter 3 discussed the academic literature that can give us clues about how more volunteering in the production of welfare services will turn out for poorer and wealthier urban neighbourhoods. Estimating these outcomes for organized neighbourhood volunteering in the current Dutch Participation Society is, after all, the object of this dissertation research. Many quantitative, population survey-based studies exist, that model the volunteering capacity of a geographical area on its residents’ socio-economic and socio-demographic (and more recently also psychological) characteristics. In this line of research, which started with Verba and Nie’s 1972 political participation study, the outcome is typically that higher-educated, higher income groups do more volunteering and thus that the wealthier neighbourhoods they live in have more capacity to self-organize than poorer areas. However, survey-based researches have certain problems. They have trouble to chart informal organisations, outcomes often are less reliable because of selection effects
(lower response rates for lower socio-economic and ethnic minority groups), and they yield little knowledge about what kind of volunteering is done, for how long and what it achieves. Also, these statistical researches can suggest causes for the overrepresentation of volunteering in richer neighbourhoods they find, but cannot expose any causal links for it.

To my knowledge, only one peer-reviewed research compares the incidence of civic self-organisations across urban space. This is Sampson et al’s 2005 research on civic organisations in Chicago. This research does not show an overrepresentation of organisations in the city’s wealthier areas, but a pattern that is rather independent of neighbourhood socio-economic status. As such, it does not confirm expectations on the basis of the population survey researches. Taking their concepts from social movement literature, Sampson et al attribute the clustering of welfare service self-organisation events in certain neighbourhoods to these neighbourhoods’ higher organisational density and history of self-organisation. Cooperation and learning between these self-organisations, in other words, would strengthen their power and mobilization potential within the neighbourhood.

The social movement literature furthermore suggests that triggering events are very important to spark action among citizens. In line with this, some Dutch researchers suggest that worse neighbourhood conditions in fact lead to more volunteering, as these bothering circumstances urge residents to act.

A third group of researches also looks at self-organisations directly, but does this in a qualitative way, sometimes complemented by volunteer surveys. These researches emerged during the 1990s and early 2000s in the UK and Netherlands. They studied the effects of the generous budgets for neighbourhood volunteering in the urban renewal operations of that time. They usually describe high incidence of initiatives in lower income neighbourhoods (although without comparing this to that in other types of neighbourhoods). This line of research is also sometimes called ‘institutional approach research’, because it has much attention for the support these organisations receive from local government professionals, politicians and social workers. It underlines that such support cannot be missed for most neighbourhood organisations. It also makes clear that self-organisations often started because social work professionals and administrators strongly invited and supported residents to begin, rather than from local residents’ own ideas. These invitations are often focused on citizens of deprived neighbourhoods, because politically these areas are seen as in urgent need of fixes for social problems, not in the least that of withering social cohesion. Once an initiative is started, neighbourhood residents also become volunteers because they are invited by a politician, welfare professional or by someone in their informal social network in the neighbourhood.

‘Institutional approach’ research furthermore often describes that self-organisations led by higher-educated citizens can respond to these invitations most successfully, because they are more familiar with the type of good governance that administrators want to see, or find more understanding because these residents habitusses are more like their own. On the other hand, as is sometimes illustrated in these researches, officers, social professionals and politicians may be extra interested in supporting the initiatives of more marginalized groups, as these initiatives can be ways for them to get into contact with people they feel are hard to reach through mail and ‘standard’ communications.

Analyzing the research on neighbourhood (welfare service) self-organisation in this way has yielded several cues for sub questions that can help elucidate why poorer and wealthier neighbourhoods’ self-organisation may differ. The empirical answers to these sub questions are summarized in the next paragraph.

8.1 Empirical research in the strategic case of Rotterdam: participation wanted!

To answer the research question (Do richer and poor neighbourhoods have different capacity to self
organize welfare services?). I made an empirical comparison of initiatives working in socioeconomically different neighbourhoods. To study sets of such initiatives, I have done a case study research of four neighbourhoods in the city of Rotterdam, the second city of the Netherlands. Chapter four details the demographic economic and political situation of Rotterdam. The city is not chosen because it would present a ‘typical’ or average case. As Small and Flyvbjerg logically argue, in-depth sociological case-study research it is not methodologically sound to search for a ‘typical case’. Instead, Rotterdam was selected because it is a strategic case: here all constituent elements of the hypothesis I am testing are strongly present. These elements entail a strong policy focus on welfare service self-organisation, and a manifestation of that focus in both the wealthier and poorer neighbourhoods.

Rotterdam is also a unique case: a case where the constituent elements of the hypothesis have rather unexpected streaks, and in studying such an ‘odd’ case, unforeseen causalities may be revealed. Rotterdam’s policy focus is specific because of its urgency. It is a fact that Rotterdam’s relatively poor economic performance presses on local government’s welfare service expenses while it has also contributed to a relatively populist local political landscape. In this political constellation, many policies have been designed to improve neighbourhood livability by trying to steer citizens’ behavior in matters of neighborhood safety and cleanliness, child-rearing and social cohesion. The Participation Society’s focus on community-minded behavior for the neighbourhood fits the city’s focus on neighbourhood livability.

Economically, harbour city Rotterdam has been in a less favourable position than other Dutch cities since the nineteen seventies. Deindustrialisation and offshoring has hit hard in the city’s harbour and connected logistic sector, leaving a substantial portion of the city’s -relatively low-educated-population unemployed. This has created large welfare needs and, as localisation of welfare costs from the Dutch national to the local levels progressed, increasingly smaller budgets to finance them. Rotterdam is also very multicultural: it is the Dutch city with the highest share of non-Western first and second generation migrant residents. What is important is that both Rotterdam’s economic situation and also its ethnic composition have been strongly problematized in local politics, particularly since a populist anti-migration party has obtained considerable power in local politics from 2002 on.

During the three administration periods this party was in power, but also during the two intermittent periods, a large number of policies have been devised, especially to address neighbourhood ‘livability’ and urban marginality. So much so, that several scholars and also Rotterdam administrations themselves have described the city’s as ‘a national policy laboratory’ regarding livability issues and the connected welfare services. The support for Rotterdam’s ‘livability’ approach cannot be seen independently of concerns about cultural unity in this very multicultural city. Important strategies to overcome the burden of welfare spending and also increase neighbourhood livability, have been developed in the field of housing. Urban renewal has created more expensive and less cheap housing in the city. Also a special housing allocation rule was devised to further limit the availability of housing to households dependent on health or poverty benefits. Housing measures aim to select which income groups can come to the city and work in a ‘distant’ way. On the other hand, most other new liveability policies in Rotterdam policy are ‘frontline policies’. They rely on close contact with citizens, and on citizens’ own efforts for change. Civil servants’ face-to-face interaction with citizens to activate them, sometimes facilitative -such as the local support programs for residents’ neighbourhood volunteering projects- and sometimes more coercive, have been important ingredients of these policies.

In line with its policy innovator’s image and its enduring problematization of urban social cohesion, the current Rotterdam administration now envisions itself as a frontrunner particularly regarding their administrative and financial support for active citizens’ initiatives in welfare and public
services. In the Ruling Program 2014-2018, it stated its intention to spend large yearly budgets (1% of the total city budget) on stimulating citizens' initiatives, to contribute to the realization 'of our desire to make Rotterdam the laboratory for social innovation'. Since March 2014, the Resident Initiative fund has been installed. In this fund around 6 million euro per year is divided over all of Rotterdam’s 14 boroughs according to population size. In each borough, publicly elected Borough Committees decide about self-organizations applications for Resident Initiative funding. As such, Rotterdam is a city where subsidies and support for neighborhood self-organizations are very prominently available.

**Steps of the empirical research**

In Rotterdam I have researched my central research question through neighbourhood-level case study research. I have done qualitative interviews and observations among almost all welfare service self-organizations in two richer and two deprived Rotterdam neighbourhoods and among professionals working with them. I also made a qualitative study of two selected volunteering organisations in Eindhoven, one in a lower-middle class and one in a higher-middle class neighbourhood. I have included these Eindhoven cases to see if there may be far stretching consequences of Rotterdam’s government policies on supporting neighbourhood active citizenship that make the city so unique that this would restrict generalizability of the findings to this single city. Furthermore, using quantitative methods, I have analysed a citywide household survey, as well as a dataset of funding applications by welfare self-organisations from the city’s richest and poorest borough.

In Rotterdam, two deprived neighbourhoods -with standardized household income averages in the lowest quintile of neighbourhoods- were chosen for the fieldwork. They were named Harbourtown and Parktown. The two wealthier neighbourhoods are in the third and in the fifth quintile. They are named Flowerville and Northville in this research. Average income is about 30% higher in Flowerville than in the deprived neighbourhoods, and 60% higher in Northville. Also, whereas in the deprived neighbourhoods 70% of the inhabitants is non-western allochtonous, in Flowerville and Northville this is respectively 30% and 10%. In these neighbourhoods, I made an inventory of all resident-run, year round initiatives (rather than one-time events) that are located in the neighbourhood and are active in the fields of emancipation, social cohesion (including neighbourhood parties and public space projects), poverty relief, care and recreation for vulnerable groups, in other words in the welfare projects of ‘connecting’, ‘emancipating’ and ‘caring’.

To triangulate the outcomes of the qualitative approach with quantitative data, I also listed all volunteering organisations that applied (successfully and unsuccessfully) for funding in the period march 2014 until march 2015 to the Committees of one relatively rich and one relatively poor borough. This amounted to in total 224 applications and I call the result the Borough Dataset. Because these applications are not only for year-round, but also for incidental projects, the scope is wider than in my qualitative case-study research of year-round groups in the neighbourhoods. All the same, the dataset helps to see differences in volunteering in wealthier and deprived neighbourhoods.

**Outcomes regarding activation for initiatives in deprived and wealthier neighbourhoods**

The qualitative and quantitative research steps have provided answers to my research questions. In an investigation of the number of resident initiatives, it first of all became clear that all-year-long, welfare service providing volunteer groups are actually more numerous in poorer than in wealthier neighbourhoods. This came to the fore in my intensive research of four Rotterdam neighbourhoods, and also in the analysis of all 2014 funding applications in two Rotterdam Boroughs. In the two
deprived research neighbourhoods there were even twice as many year-round service providing welfare service self-organisations than in the wealthier areas.

Looking at the content of what these groups do, further differences show. A difference for deprived neighbourhoods is that they more often focus on emancipation and self-help, whereas relatively many organisations in richer neighbourhoods work to maintain and improve public spaces, to organise neighbourhood media and festive public events.

My sub questions have served to try and understand what could cause such differences.

_Do higher-educated and majority ethnic residents engage in neighbourhood welfare-service volunteering more than other residents?_

This subquestion is inspired by the population survey researches that show higher neighbourhood volunteering for higher-educated and majority ethnic survey respondents. My empirical investigation confirms these overrepresentations also for the Rotterdam case-studies, most strongly regarding education level. In the wealthier neighbourhoods, the share of higher educated (Dutch applied university level or higher) among leaders of welfare service volunteering was three quarters, and two thirds in the two poorer neighbourhoods. Knowing that only 27% of all Rotterdam adults aged 15 to 75 is higher-educated, this means a strong overrepresentation. There are also relatively many native-Dutch leaders in the four research neighbourhoods. In the wealthier neighbourhoods there are even only native-Dutch leaders, and half of the leaders are ethnic Dutch in the poorer areas (native-Dutch form respectively 70% and 30% of the population in these neighbourhoods).

These overrepresentations are also found in the Borough Dataset, which not only consists of self-organizations year-round service provision projects, but also incidental projects like parties and public space improvements. Higher-educated initiative leaders made 51% of the applications in the low SES neighbourhoods, 70% in the mixed neighbourhoods, and 94% in the high SES neighbourhoods. Native-Dutch leaders are responsible for 95% of the applications in the high SES neighborhoods, 66% in the middle SES neighborhoods and 68% in the low SES areas.

To understand why particularly these groups volunteer and why richer neighbourhoods have fewer and often 'lighter' volunteering projects, we look at leaders' motivations. According to my hypothesis, a lot of volunteering takes place because residents are triggered by a problem they see in their environment and for which they want to devise a solution themselves. The higher incidence of problems in deprived neighbourhoods could thus explain the higher numbers of self-organizations.

_Are members in deprived neighbourhoods more activated to become a volunteer because of triggering neighbourhood problems?_

Neighbourhood triggers do indeed play a role in activation for volunteering in welfare services in the case-study neighbourhoods. In the deprived neighbourhood, these triggers were sometimes problems of dilapidation, youth crime and unsafety in the streets, so the type of neighbourhood livability problems that the literature often mentions as a trigger for activation for neighbourhood volunteering. However, this type of reasons only inspired a small group of leaders. Another type of neighbourhood trigger are social problems that manifest themselves primarily at the level of the household level. Especially loneliness among elderly and poverty were found to be such triggering problems in the case-study neighbourhoods. Even though the problem is not caused at neighbourhood level it does take place in the neighbourhood (too), and for some interviewees their neighbourhood is a good place to self-
organise a project against poverty or loneliness. Elderly projects happen in both types of neighbourhoods, poverty projects mostly in the deprived ones. Helping to overcome a social problem, however, is usually only a part of the reasons leaders (and other volunteers) have to volunteer. Personal and professional motivations also play a role for all the people I interviewed. To understand why the deprived neighbourhoods have more groups per inhabitant, it therefore proves necessary to have a wider look at self-organization leaders’ motivations for volunteering.

My interview data indicate that for many higher educated leaders, volunteering is related to paid work. Part of their motivation for volunteering is that it brings useful social contacts for their work, builds their CV, and/or is also partially paid through municipal Resident Initiative budgets. Especially self-employed creative workers are found in this group, but also self-employed social workers. Many of these self-employed social workers were fired during the budget cuts in Rotterdam’s welfare services in the last few years. Now, some of them help lower income citizens in the same way they used to do, but now on a (partially) voluntary basis. In the second place, higher educated leaders working in low-income neighbourhoods are quite often ethnic minority volunteers who work to help their own ethnic group in a deprived neighborhood. The higher number of organisations in deprived areas is thus also partly thanks to their ethnic diversity and the strong networks and emancipatory ambitions within ethnic minority communities. Both leaders working for the emancipation of their minority ethnic group and professionally oriented leaders are often higher-educated, which explains their overrepresentation in my research. Thirdly, I found that many volunteers are non-working citizens (retired or unemployed) who are motivated by the opportunities for social contact and useful or pleasurable occupation of their leisure time. Among this group I also interviewed several ‘beneficiary’ volunteers, who use the service that they co-produce. This suggests that unemployed citizens (for lack of work or health reasons) on average have more time and more need to find spheres of occupation and sociability than employed citizens, and that for some for unemployed these spheres are found in volunteering. Therefore, the relatively high number of (time-intensive) welfare service volunteering initiatives in the poorer neighbourhoods is probably in part related to their high unemployment rates. Next to these, year-round service providing self-organisation, in the Borough Dataset also many ‘light’, incidental initiatives can be found. As mentioned above, these are more prevalent in the wealthier neighbourhoods. These light initiatives are in the first place public space improvements. In all four neighbourhoods, it is mainly native-Dutch, higher-educated residents who coordinate public space improvement projects: gardening in a small or large neighbourhood park or the upkeep of a shopping street, the redesign of a playground. The users of such spaces, however, are typically as ethnically and socio-economically mixed as the neighbourhood. Indoor services, however, often draw an ethnically and socio-economically homogeneous user group. Furthermore, the fact that working, higher-educated people often run these ‘light’ less time-demanding projects, points to the importance of free time in welfare service neighbourhood volunteering.

Do self-organisations in deprived neighbourhoods find more volunteers through local social networks, than those in wealthier neighbourhoods?

According to the literature, joining a neighbourhood volunteering organisation often takes place after a personal invitation from a friend or acquaintance in the neighbourhood. During my qualitative research I found that this indeed sometimes occurred. If invitations come from within a neighbourhood social networks, especially in the deprived neighbourhoods this is often also a family or religious network. Most of the joiners in my qualitative research, however, followed other ‘joining routes’. They were for instance invited by social workers or by social contacts that do not live in their neighbourhood. Also, for many professionally interested volunteers a personal invitation from a friend wasn’t necessary. Just reading a flyer or knowing the leaders professionally, can be enough reason to
get in contact with the organization. Lastly, the organizations that have a strong geographical focus (the platforms, streetorganisation and Eindhoven neighbourhood care centres) often have active searches for new resident-volunteers but do not only focus on their social networks. They go door-to-door or approach new people during meetings. All in all, the importance of existing informal social networks for activation in neighbourhood volunteering, should therefore not be overstated. The fact that the deprived neighbourhoods have more professionally oriented joiners and joiners that were invited through social workers, even made that the share of joiners found through social networks was a bit lower than for the wealthier areas.

The other sub questions regard if there are differences in access to financial means in deprived and wealthier neighbourhood. The first of these sub questions is:

Do deprived neighbourhoods and their active citizens have a stigma that lowers chances on institutional support?
Based on my Rotterdam fieldwork, I can state that poorer neighbourhood do not have less access to funding because of the stigma of their neighbourhood. To the contrary, civil servants explicitly praise and support volunteers from deprived areas for being active for society, showing the participation society frame’s focus on citizens’ responsibilization toward community-minded behaviour especially for marginalized groups.

Do collectives in deprived neighbourhoods have more difficulty to implement ‘good governance’, and convince funding institutions of their ‘good governance’?
The Rotterdam fieldwork here shows that bureaucratic notions about accountability, transparency and efficiency do not have much influence on resident initiatives’ chances to get funding from Borough Committees. The qualitative data made clear that municipality’s knowledge about groups’ efficiency is often limited at the moment they decide. Also, initiatives sometimes deliver the welfare services in quite another way than the municipality would do or used to do, when they still provided this service. Yet this is not often a reason to deny funding to groups. Potentially lower capacities among lower-education residents to provide transparency and efficiency, therefore hardly negatively affect access to Resident Initiative resources in deprived areas.

Do institutions find it attractive to support collectives in deprived neighbourhoods as it may provide them access to hard to reach groups, and does this eventually result in more resources for deprived neighborhoods?
Here, the Rotterdam fieldwork showed that especially in deprived areas, initiatives are indeed often supported because they are instrumental to the municipality’s policy goals for ‘hard to reach’ groups in the area. However, not all of the welfare needs targeted by the municipality are met by volunteering groups. In my research neighbourhood almost no volunteer groups serve youngsters, even though the municipality would like to see this. There are also hardly any unpaid volunteers working for unemployed residents’ labour market reintegration. If it happens in residents’ initiatives, it is usually partly paid work of ‘professional volunteers’ with a background in social work.

Are there differences in self-organisational density in wealthier neighbourhoods than in deprived neighbourhoods, and do self-organisations profit from cooperation?
The interview data suggests that in practice, cooperation is harder in the deprived neighbourhoods because there are more ethnic (and sometimes class lines) dividing the initiatives. Therefore, even though self-organisation density is higher in the deprived neighbourhoods, this does not result in more sharing of resources.
Are initiatives in deprived neighbourhoods better able to access resources because they can get special budgets for deprived areas?

Under the Resident Initiative program, no special funds were created for deprived areas, even though in practice the self-organizations in these areas often have higher financial needs. They have higher needs because their activities are more often indoor and year-round than in wealthier areas, and this brings accommodation costs. However, the municipality only sponsors residents’ groups’ activities, not the group itself. Therefore, many groups in the deprived neighbourhoods struggle to pay for their own accommodation and this makes especially some of the groups frailer (or become reliant on religiously inspired charity drives).

Together, the empirical data show that the larger number of neighbourhood welfare services self-organizations in the lower income research areas is mostly due to higher activation. It also indicates that the services that are self-organised in Rotterdam’s participation society are often well adapted to local welfare needs. At the same time, this self-organised welfare landscape is quite fragmented along ethnic lines and sometimes also class lines. Furthermore, the supply of welfare services is difficult to supervise or steer for local government. Lastly, even though deprived neighborhoods have relatively more welfare service groups, this is still a very small number in absolute terms, and the losses that come with Rotterdam’s participation society policies are most tangible in these areas. They used to have much more state-funded welfare services than the wealthier areas of the city. The fact that these have been largely scaled down in budget cut operations, impacts residents’ daily life more strongly in the deprived than in the wealthier neighbourhoods.

What can be generalized from my findings for the future of Dutch cities in the Participation State? One important observation is that even in cities where local government has much attention and praise for volunteering in neighbourhood welfare services, the number of people that has time and interest to do such volunteering is not very large. Especially in neighborhoods where most households are busy with work and their (young) family, few working age inhabitants volunteer in organized forms of face-to-face welfare service provision (as also the elderly in Eindhoven noted, and is already suggested by Houwelingen et al.’s 2014 research and Kanne and Albeda’s 2013 survey researches in Appendix A). Welfare service volunteering is time-intensive and does not relate well to a busy schedule. I therefore think that the survey based expectations that in the Participation Society welfare services will be better taken care of in higher income neighbourhoods, do not do justice to the situation in the city. Survey questions on volunteering would need to be much more refined, and survey response groups much more representational of the city’s many forms of diversity, to say much about the type and volume of volunteering that can be expected in the Participation Society.

The research furthermore shows that even though the terms ‘participation society’ and ‘resident initiatives’ may create the idea that volunteers in neighbourhood welfare services aim to service ‘society’ or all residents, this is not often the case. Volunteers, in practice, are usually motivated to work (also) for their own particular set of interests. These personal interests are either work-related (for self-employed people or unemployed people looking for work experience) or related to social needs (the need to be with other people, feel useful and busy or co-produce services). Or, in our increasingly diverse cities, people work for their own ethnic group. Shared identity and history, here, is a source of solidarity. All three motivations can actually be found more in deprived than in wealthier areas, and these areas also have more people with much leisure time, which is a prerequisite for welfare-service volunteering. If governments want to stimulate volunteering, they should be aware of what drives volunteers. When ‘marketing’ volunteering, governments can still accentuate the
virtuousness of being active for society, because this helps people make the first step.

The motivations people have to volunteer, already show that they their service-provision is usually not universalistic, in the sense that it is done to serve all residents or the whole of society. People striving to emancipate their own ethnic group, work for users of their own ethnic group. People who want to spend time in a sociable way, often focus on providing services to people who are not too different from themselves. Self-employed volunteers who have (partly) professional reasons for their volunteering, often do the things they are good at and this attracts other higher-educated users from the neighbourhood. In the end, finding a (socio-economically or ethnically) mixed user group usually only works if this is the explicit goal of the initiative. Such initiatives are often taken by (self-employed) social workers and by exceptional people who have time, ideas and idealism to do better than the welfare state.

This means that ethnic (and socio-economic groups) mostly function alongside each other in the diverse neighborhoods of the Participation Society’s cities, which is probably not so problematic for the caring and emancipating functions they provide. Often, these services are even better tuned in to the groups’ needs and local opportunities than if the state provided them. However, it does mean that the connecting function is given less attention, even though in the last few years cracks in the social cohesion of multi-ethnic cities have become more visible. Connecting welfare services, moreover, probably become more needed if people spend more time in their own groups, which could very well be an unintentional effect of the Participation Society.

Some spectators of the current Participation Society hold that it comes with too much responsibilization. Citizens would be manipulated into doing what the state should do. I think that in practice, the role of the state in stimulating volunteering should not be overstated. Volunteering hasn’t grown so much in numbers since the Dutch state started actively promoting it. Also, my research showed that volunteering doesn’t take over all the tasks the state envisions them to take over. Rather, many people’s volunteering work is focused (also) on other identities than that of being a (good) Dutch citizen, as the volunteering within ethnic minority groups shows. Self-organisation is often religious, work-related, focused on minority cultural identities, or on providing excludable goods together but not for others, in other words it is still very similar to the kinds of self-organisation that have existed for centuries.

Volunteering also doesn’t need state-promotion very much because it is often a very rewarding experience in itself (as is already shown by the fact that people do it voluntarily). People often enjoy the social contacts they make, the new types of (work)experiences and skills they gather, the more personal and customized services it yields and the way it looks on their cv. The Eindhoven Togethercare centres moreover show that with a good plan and suitable accommodation, time-rich people are able to collectively produce and use the social goods that they need and that are much needed in ageing societies today: attention and recreation among elderly. In all neighbourhoods in which I researched, however, welfare service volunteering cannot exist independently of the welfare state, and presenting it as a substitute for the welfare state doesn’t make much sense. First of all, welfare service volunteering groups need accommodation; very few non-religious groups have the means to invest in an accommodation up front or later: welfare services are not services that can easily be turned into a financially self-providing business model if accommodation costs are taken into account.

On a more general level, a substitution of a welfare state by a participation society isn’t sensible because the last model doesn’t have much steering authority to monitor and manage that local needs
are eventually met. Also, our diverse cities need a durable, skilled structure of people who can connect the different social groups in society in daily urban living, to contribute to the social cohesion in the neighbourhood and in society. Few volunteers will have the time, experience and drive to be a politically independent connector of residents. Without professional connectors there are less projects that draw mixed user groups, there is less communication and thus less overview in the neighbourhood. Without community workers there are also no professionals that can help residents voice protest. This is a problem particularly in the areas where resident platforms no longer representative of the diverse neighborhood, and therefore also not very much involved in decisionmaking anymore. Also, people usually miss the time, skills and interest and financial rewards to do some of the more difficult, less ‘fun’ welfare services in the city. Looking at volunteers’ motivations and resources (particularly that of time) can help to identify and predict all the spaces where volunteering is of great value, and all the spaces where volunteering isn’t likely to provide the welfare services that our cities need.
Appendix A: last part of newspaper article by C. Huismans

Continuation of the article "Risk of ghettoization in the 'participation society" cited in paragraph 1.1 of this dissertation

Volkskrant 20 September 2013, by Charlotte Huisman (Huism 2014), my translation

Not the same amount of citizen power everywhere

In the regal speech King Willem-Alexander announced that ‘citizens will take responsibility for their own environment’. But the TNS Nipo researchers foresee problems if that approach is rolled out in the same way everywhere.

"There are inequalities in the amount of citizen power across space", says co-researcher Hein Albeda, who specializes in citizen participation. " in one neighbourhood neighbours will do their utmost for that handicapped woman living in the street, in another neighbours will lean back in this way the stress on citizens own power can reinforce inequality. Whoever lives in the wrong neighbourhood, looses out.

TNS Nipo investigated whether citizens are willing to fulfill certain tasks, ranging from cleaning up litter in the street and maintaining public greenery, to care tasks for neighbours, friends and family. It turns out that many people are already taking care of each other and the environment, especially in neighbourhoods where there is much social contact between residents. But few citizens also feel like cleaning up dog excrements, correct misbehaving youths in the streets, or empty trash bins.

‘Well-to-do passives’
Remarkably, the willingness to contribute in a neighbourhood, is dependent on the composition of the population. Around 20 per cent of the population turns out to be less inclined to be active for the community. Half of them are ‘well-to-do passives’, these are mostly relatively young people, with well-paid jobs.
In all their business and ambitiousness, they ‘have remarkably little willingness to do something for others’ the researchers find. But if problems become to big to solve by themselves, they do have the money to hire someone.

The other half are ‘poorer passives’. These are people with little money who often live in high-rise buildings where they hardly know there neighbours. These are often the neighbourhood with litter in the streets, loitering youths and graffiti on the walls.

The researchers expect that for the large majority of the population the transition to a ‘doing-society’ will be easier. This is true, for instance, in neighbourhoods where many ‘well-to-do actives’ live, around 40 per cent of the population. They are are the group that is most willing to do something for the quality of the neighbourhood’s public spaces and for its more vulnerable residents.
Willing to voluntarily...

Poorer active citizens (39%)
- care for needy or lonely people
- care for neighbors or friends
- do home care for family members

Poorer passive citizens (11%)
- enforce parking laws
- correct people in the street

Wealthier active citizens (40%)
- care for street furniture
- correct and counsel street youths

Wealthier passive citizens (10%)
- clean street litter

Albeda et al., 2013

(my translation of the texts in the figure)
Appendix B: last part of newspaper article by Snel and Engbersen

Continuation of my translation of the newspaper article by Snel and Engbersen cited in paragraph 1.1 of this dissertation.

“…It is valuable to look for the advice of sociologist R.K. Merton, who coined the concept of the Matthew-effect. He grew up in a poor neighbourhood in Philadelphia and succeeded to be upwardly mobile thanks to the availability of what he calls ‘public capital’, which means the presence of easily accessible public facilities such as a good elementary school, a fine library, a (music-)theatre and other local facilities.

In the last years the stress has been placed on the meaning of various forms of individual capital for citizens’ future chances in life, such as cultural capital (education), economic capital (income, possessions), social capital (network) and personal capital (health and beauty). Yet, public capital is very important to bring those types of capital to fruition. This does not have to mean state-funded facilities, they may also be citizens’ self-organized facilities such as the Reading Room in Oude Westen (part of Rotterdam) where homework classes are being organized. Whether initiatives of from mecenassen, firms, religious institutions or sports clubs. It is crucial that these are easily accessible facilities where residents are offered chances to develop themselves. Sometimes that requires extra support from the state and professional support, and sometimes that isn’t so necessary at all. That varies from neighbourhood to neighbourhood, as Rotterdam shows. But to prevent growing inequalities, the presence of enough public capital in vulnerable neighbourhoods should be a central point of attention of local social policies.”

By: Godfried Engbersen, professor of general sociology at Rotterdam Erasmus University, and Erik Snel, teaching sociology at Erasmus University
(Engbersen and Snel 2015)1167
Appendix C: interview guide semi-structured volunteer interviews

Introduction
I would like to do research into the ways in which resident organisations are active to improve things for other residents in this neighbourhood. I am very interested in what works well for your organisations, and also in what obstacles might be in the way, according to you. In the first part of the interview I would like to talk with you about what your organisation does, and maybe we can look a bit more in depth at for example the last activity for residents that the organisation made happen. After this I would like to hear from you a bit about how you feel about the neighbourhood. If that is not a problem for you, I would like to tape our interview. That way I can pay more attention to what you say. I will treat everything you say confidentially, and will only write about you or your organisation in a non-recognizable way.

Block 1: The organisation
• Can you tell me a bit about yourself? (if not mentioned: Since when do you live in this neighbourhood?
• With whom do you live? What are your occupations in daily life? Work, other occupations? Education?
• How did you get involved with this organisation? How did you get acquainted with it?
• What is your role within the organisation?
• If not yet mentioned spontaneously:
  • Did you know any people that were already involved in this organisation or this kind of initiatives? If so: how did you know them?
  • What kind of activities does your organisation do
• Can you describe your last organized activity for me?
• If not mentioned spontaneously
  • Who were the target group for your activity?
  • Who were busy organising this in your organisation?
  • Where there any people outside the organisation that were involved in the organisation?
  • How did you get the money, accommodation or any other means necessary for this activity?
  • How did you let residents know they were welcome? What kind of publicity did you have?
  • How was the contact with the professionals supporting your activity (if applicable)? How was the atmosphere?
  • Where there any things that were hard to organize in this activity? Or things that proved impossible?
  • How did you handle this? (Possibly: What personal capacities does it take to handle this?)
• Can you give an example of an activity that did not go as well as you intended?
• We talked quite a bit about a few particular events now. Let’s have a look at all your activities. With whom is your organisation in contact if it needs support? Like money, publicity, consent, accommodation, political support or other types of support? (probe all)
• Is your organisation able to offer something in exchange to these professional parties?
• Looking into the future: How long do you want to be involved in this organisation?

Block 2: About the neighbourhood
• How do you feel about living in this neighbourhood?
• How do people live together in this neighbourhood? What is the atmosphere like?
• Do you feel at home in the neighbourhood? If so: where, at what moments do you feel at home (or with whom)
• When do you not feel at home, where, with whom
• Do you have contacts with people in your street? (draw their locations on the white sheet).
• Do you have contacts with people in your neighbourhood? (draw their locations on the white sheet).
• How did you get to know each other?
• Approximately what share of your acquaintances and friends lives in the neighbourhood? (up to 25%, 25 to 50%, 50 to 75%, almost all?)
• Do you ever hear or read opinions about the neighbourhood from people who don’t live here? What are those opinions?

Extra questions if these topics have not yet been dealt with in the interview by the interviewee:

• With what other resident- or self-organisations does your organisation cooperate?
• Are there ever problems or tension in this cooperation? Ask to describe.
• Did the cooperation with another organisation ever stop? Why?
• How easy is it to get support from professional parties in the last few years? Has this changed over the last years?
• If applicable: This work seems quite demanding to me. I can imagine that it causes stress from time to time. What is it like for you to do this work, emotionally? If someone would want to join you, what should he expect in terms of strains?
• What was your motivation to become active? (probe if necessary the following:
  • Meeting other people
  • Trying to solve a neighbourhood problem (if so, ask how he or she became aware of this problem. Was it something he or she struggled with, or others in their social network?)
  • Because you were asked
  • To learn skills
  • To have political influence
• Are there things that you learned from being active in this organisation?
References

Achterhuis, H.

Aedes

Allen, B.

Amsterdam, Actieve burgers
2015 Ruimte voor Initiatief - de invulling van de 'lege' paragraaf.

Andreotti, A. and E. Mingione

Andriessen, I., et al.
2015 Op afkomst afgewezen - Onderzoek naar discriminatie op de Haagse arbeidsmarkt. SCP.

Andriessen, Iris, Eline Nievers, and Jaco Dagevos
2012 Op achterstand. SCP.

Andriessen, Iris, et al.
2010 Liever Mark dan Mohammed. SCP.

Arnoldus, R., and J. Hofs
2014 ‘Verplicht vrijwillig’ Een onderzoek naar de verplichte tegenprestatie voor bijstandsgerechtigden. WMo Werkplaats Rotterdam.

Bauman, Z.

—

Belamy, R.

Berlin, Isaiah

Bifulco, L.

Blair, T., and G. Schröder

Blokland-Potters, T.

Bolt, G., and R. Ter Maat

Bolt, Gideon, Ronald van Kempen, and Maarten van Ham

Boltanski, L., and L. Thevenot

Bonoli, G.

Boterman, W. R., L. Karsten, and S. Musterd

Bourdieu, P.  

Boutellier, H.  

Boutellier, H., and N. Boonstra  

Brady, H.E, S. Verba, and K. L. Schlozman  

Brandsen, T., P. Dekker, and A. Evers  
2010  Civincness in the governance and delivery of social services: Nomos.

Bunar, N.  

Burgers, J., and R. Kloosterman  

Cantillon, B.  

CBS  

CBS —  

Cheshire, P.  

Commission, European  

Cruikshank, B.  

Crul, M., J. Schneider, and F. Lelie  

Da Graça, A.  
2010  Etnische zelforganisaties in het integratieproces. Rotterdam: EUR.

Dagevos, J., S. Hoff, and A. Soede  

De Beer, P., and F. Koster  
2009  Sticking Together Or Falling Apart?: Solidarity in an Era of Individualisation and Globalization. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

De Deken, J.  

de Hart, Joep, and Paul Dekker, eds.
de Hart, Joep, and H. Lelieveldt
De Lange, H.
De Moor, T.
De Moor, T.
2012 Burgerschap 2.0 kan gelijkheid wél bevorderen.
De Wilde, M, M Hurenkamp, and E Tonkens
De Wilde, M.
Dekker, K.
2006 Governance as glue, Sociology, Utrecht University.
Dekker, P.
2010 Civicness:from civil society to civic services? In Civicness in the governance and delivery of social services. T. Brandsen, P. Dekker, and A. Evers, eds: Nomos.
Dix, G.
2014 Governing by carrot and stick: A genealogy of the incentive, Philosophy, University of Amsterdam.
Dol, K., and R. Kleinhans
Drosterij, G., and F. Hendriks
Drosterij, G., and R. Peeters
Eliasoph, N.
Engbersen, G., and E. Snel
2015 Als de burger het zelf moet doen, blijven arme buurten achter. NRC Handelsblad: 1.
Engbersen, G., E. Snel, and M. ’t Hart
2015 Mattheüs in de buurt: over burgerparticipatie en ongelijkheid in steden. Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam.
Engbersen, G., E. Snel, and A. Weltevrede
2005 Sociale herovering in Amsterdam en Rotterdam. Den Haag / Amsterdam: WRR / Amsterdam University Press.
Entzinger, H., and G. Engbersen  

Etzioni, A.  

Flyvbjerg, B.  

Fortuin, K.  
2013 Onderzoek naar wijkinterventies is heel willekeurig. Pp. 5: Sociale Vraagstukken.

Foster-Fishman, P. G., et al.  

Frissen, P., et al.  
2013 Terugtreden is vooruitzien. Raad voor Maatschappelijke Ontwikkeling.

Wethouders van Financieen van 234 Nederlandse gemeenten,  
2015 Open Brief van Wethouders Financiën aan de Minister van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties. Gouda: Wethouders.

Gërxhani, K., and F. Koster  

Giddens, A.  

Habermas, J.  

Ham, M., and J. Van der Meer  
2015 De ondernemende burger - De woelige wereld van lokale initiatieven. Tijdschrift voor Sociale Vraagstukken

Hamnett, C.  

Hemerijck, A.  

Hengeveld, F., and J. Janssens  
2010 Mensen maken de Stad - Beschrijving van de good practice. Movisie.

Hertogh, M.  

Hochschild, A.  

Hochstenbach, C, J. Uitermark, and W. Van Gent  
2015 Amsterdam Institute for Social Science Research (AISSR).

Houwelingen, P., A. Boele, and P. Dekker  
2014 Burgermacht op eigen kracht? - Een brede verkenning van ontwikkelingen in burgerparticipatie. SCP.

Huisman, C.  

Hurenkamp, M, E Tonkens, and JW Duyvendak

Jacobs, K., and T. Manzi

Jenson, J., and D. Saint-Martin
2003 New routes to social cohesion? Citizenship and the social investment state Canadian Journal of Sociology 28(1).

Jupp, E.

Kampen, T.

Kanne, P., J. van den Berg, and H. Albeda
2013 Niet iedereen is toe aan de participatiesamenleving.

Kazepov, Y., ed.

Kearns, A.

Kerklaan, W.
2015 Beslissen voor de Buurt - De Rol van Evaluatieframes bij de Beoordeling van Bewonersinitiatieven in Charlois en Delfshaven, Sociology, Erasmus Universiteit.

Klooster, E., S. Kocak, and M. Day
2016 Mbo en de stagemarkt, wat is de rol van discriminatie? Verwey-Jonker Instituut.

Kloosterman, R. C.


Kulberg, J., Van Noije, L., Mensink, W. and M. Igalla
2015 Betrokken wijken. Den Haag: SCP

Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties,


Le Galès, P., and G. Therborn

Lichterman, P.


Lipsky, M.
Lister, Ruth  

Loopmans, M.  

Lowndes, Vivien, and Lawrence Pratchett  

Lub, V.  
2013  Schoon, heel en werkzaam? Amsterdam: Boom | Lemma.

MacDonald, R.  

Mair, P., and I. Van Biezen  

Maloney, William, Graham Smith, and Gerry Stoker  

Marinetto, M.  

Marschall, Melissa J.  

Marshall, Thomas Humphrey  

Meijer, M.  

Merton, R. K.  

Metz, T.  
2009  Welzijn in de 21e eeuw. Amsterdam: SWP.

Milligan, Christine, and David Conradson  

Moen Gersjøe, H.  
Movisie 2010 Sturing van welzijn. Movisie.
Oberon 2008 Ruimte voor Contact in de krachtwijken. Oberon.
Oosterlynck, S., et al. 2013 The butterfly and the elephant: local social innovation, the welfare state and new poverty dynamics. ImPRovE.
Rotmans, J.  

Rotterdam, Gemeente  

— 2014d Brief van wethouder Langenberg over de subsidiëring van bewoners initiatieven. College van B&W.
— 2015a Beleidsregel en nadere regels bewoners initiatieven. Gemeente Rotterdam.

Rotterdam, Ombudsman  
2011 Interventieteams: Kijken en bekeken worden. Gemeentelijke ombudsman Rotterdam.
— 2015c Het pad naar werk... niet geplaveid, wel schoongeveegd! Onderzoek naar de praktijk van re-integratie in het kader van de Wet werk en bijstand. Ombudsman Rotterdam.

Rose, N.  

Rose, N.  

Rotterdam, Stadsontwikkeling  
2015d Economische Verkenningen 2105. Gemeente Rotterdam.

Rotterdam, Stadsontwikkeling gemeente  
2013 Economische Verkenning Rotterdam. Stadsontwikkeling gemeente Rotterdam.

Sampson, R. J., et al.  

Sampson, R.J., Morenoff, J. D. and Gannon-Rowley, T.  

Scheffer, P.  

Schinkel, W., and M. Van den Berg  

Schinkel, W., and F. Van Houdt  
Schnur, Olaf

Schuyt, K.

Scott, Marvin B., and Roy Turner

SCP
2014 Jaarrapport Integratie 2013. SCP.

Selbourne, D.

SEO, SCP /

Small, M. L.

Smyth, P., L. Nelms, and D. D. Perkins
2004 After neoliberalism: the social investment state? In VCOSS Congress.

Snel, E., et al.

Sorensen, E., and J. Torfing, eds.

Specht, Maurice
2012 De Pragmatiek van Burgerparticipatie, VU Amsterdam.

Stoker, Gerry

Straw, J.

Streeck, W.

Therborn, Göran

Tonkens, E

—
2013 Als meedoen pijn doet. Amsterdam: Van Gennep.

Tonkens, Evelien, Menno Hurenkamp, and Mandy Ridderhof de Wilde

Tonkens, Evelina Hendrika, et al.

Tops, P., and C. Hartman

Touburg, G.
2015 Interview met socioloog Saskia Sassen. In Vers Beton.

Trommel, W.
2010 De activerende staat; in de schermerzone tussen verheffen en vernederen. In Brave burgers gezocht. E. Tonkens and I. Verhoeven, eds. Amsterdam: Van Gennep.

Tumber, S.
2012 Active Resident Participation at the Neighbourhood level: An analysis of Investment neighbourhoods vs. other neighbourhoods in the city of Utrecht, Human Geography, Utrecht University.

Uitermark, J.
2012a De gevaarlijke belofte van burgerschap 2.0. http://www.socialevraagstukken.nl/site/2012/10/12/de-gevaarlijke-beloftevin-burgerschap-2-0/.


Uitermark, J., and J. W. Duyvendak
2006 Sociale integratie ...straataanpak in de praktijk. Gemeente Rotterdam.

Uitermark, J., and K. van Beek

Uitermark, Justus
2012b Dynamics of Power in Dutch Integration Politics. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

Uitermark, Justus, and Jan Willem Duyvendak

Van Bochove, M., K. Rusinovic, and G. Engbersen

Van den Berg, M.

Van der Graaf, P., and J. W. Duyvendak
2009 Thuis voelen in de buurt: een opgave voor stedelijke vernieuwing Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

Van der Laan Bouma-Doff, W.
Van der Veer, Jeroen, and Dick Schuiling

Van der Waal, J.

Van der Waal, J., and J. Burgers

Van der Zwaard, J., and Maurice Specht
2013 Betrokken bewoners, betrouwbare overheid. Rotterdam: Kenniswerkplaats leefbare wijken Rotterdam.

Van Eijk, G.
2010a Exclusionary Policies are Not Just about the 'Neoliberal City': A Critique of Theories of Urban Revanchism and the Case of Rotterdam. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 34(4):820-834.

Van Eijk, G.

Van Ewijk, H.

Van Kempen, R., and G. Bolt

Van Kempen, R., et al.

Van Liempt, I., and L. Veldboer

Van Meerkerk, J.
2013 Ruimte voor Burgerschap, Filosofie, Universiteit van Amsterdam.

Van Montfoort, C.
1995 Institutionele hervormingen in theoretisch perspectief.

Van Ostaaijen, J.

Van Ostaaijen, J., and P. Tops

Van Reybrouck, D.

Van Swaaningen, Rene

Van Twist, M., et al.
2014 'Ja, Maar...' Reflecties op de Participatiesamenleving. Den Haag: Boom | Lemma.

Vandenbroucke, Frank, and Koen Vleminckx

Verba, S., K. Schlozman, and H. Brady

Verba, S., and N.H. Nie

Verhoeven, I.
2010 Ruimte geven aan initiatieven van burgers. Rooilijn 43:238-244.

Verhoeven, I., and M. Ham

Volkskrant

Walzer, M.

Warren, M.E.

Wethouders, Gemeente Rotterdam. College van Burgemeester en
2002 Het nieuwe elan van Rotterdam ... en zo gaan we dat doen: collegeprogramma 2002-2006. Rotterdam: Het College van Burgemeester en Wethouders.

Williams, Colin C.

Wilson, W. J.
1987 The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and Public Policy. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

WRR

—

Wuthnow, Robert

Wynia, S.
2015 Marktwerving in de zorg is vooral een machtsstrijd tussen politici. Elsevier.

Yanow, D.

Ministry of General Affairs / Ministerie van Algemene Zaken

Zuckerman, D.M.