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Thesis Title:

"Social identity conflict among Druze living in Carmel and Golan"

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Abstract

This thesis analyzes the complexity of social identity in two groups of Druze living in separate territories in Israel: Mount Carmel in the North West of the country, and Golan heights in the North East, at the border with Syria. The two groups, belonging to the same religious minority, are different from an historical, political, and social point of view. Druze, Arab, Israeli, and Syrian identities play different roles in the two groups – hence the complexity. These different identities may be in conflict with each other. The main hypotheses are that this identity conflict is significantly different in Carmel than in the Golan; and that it may be related in different ways to psychological dimensions such as optimism, collective self-esteem, and experiences of guilt and shame.

The theoretical background of this thesis is based on three central theories: optimal distinctiveness (Brewer, 1991); social identity complexity (Roccas and Brewer, 2002); and bicultural identity integration (Benet-Martinez, 2002). The advantage of these theories is that they explain a large proportion of the complexity of social identity; however, these theories emerge in research as limited in conflictual contexts such as the Arab ‐ Israeli conflict. The main effect in multiple identification process is the relation between oppositional and compatible social identification. As a consequence, individuals aim to construct a "third" social identity defined by the integration between both original identities: e.g. Druze/Arabic or Druze/Israeli or Druze/Syrian. This process involves values and cultural aspects. The thesis uses the above theories to explain the complexity of the "third" identity of the Druze. Furthermore, it investigates the ways in which the political conflict between Israel and Arab countries influences the "third' identity of the Druze.
In a first step, the thesis reconstructs the ecological context: the historic, economic, religious and cultural factors characterizing the two groups of Druze. The research develops into two phases: a first explorative inquiry with interviews of key persons in Carmel and in the Golan, with the aim of deepening the knowledge of the topic. On this basis, the second phase of the research applied 7 scales to a balanced sample of 196 subjects: 102 in the Golan, 94 in Carmel; 46% male, 54% female. The methodology is a mixed one – qualitative and quantitative – on the idea that the argument of the thesis, with its multi-faceted dimensions, requires not only quantitative data but both analysis of discourses and statistics.

From the categorical content analysis of the transcribed interviews, three main groups of categories emerge: one specific to the Golan, one specific to Carmel and one common to both groups. For the Golan residents, the main topics are the separation from Syria with the consequent discontinuations, the loss of Syrian culture and tradition and the lack of citizenship. For the Carmel residents, the main topics are military service law, the feeling of treason and social assimilation. In addition, there are common topics that emerge from both groups: historical aspects, cultural invention, economical aspects and uncertain future.

The most important results of the quantitative research demonstrate first that in both groups the Druze identity remain the strongest one. In Golan emerges a salient Druze/Syrian identity as a third identity. In Carmel emerges with the same relevance Druze/Arab and Druze/Israeli identities. As a consequence, in Carmel emerges a greater conflict between these "third" identities. In addition, the results demonstrate the positive correlation between social identity conflict and lack of optimism, and experiences of guilt and shame. Consequently, these psychological dimensions are more problematic in Carmel than in the Golan. The psychological well-being, as evident in the explored psychological dimensions, emerges as
better in the Golan even if the conditions of life are worse. In addition, the integration of Carmel Druze in Israel underlines the contradiction between economic benefits and social identity conflict.
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Introduction

The following thesis discusses the conflict and the complexity of the social identity of the Druze society who lives in the Carmel Mount and the Golan Heights of Israel.

From a personal point of view, I was born in Israel, a Jewish state surrounded by Muslim countries that define itself as a Jewish minority within a Muslim majority. My parents are native speakers of the Arabic language and we live in an Israeli society that always manifests and emphasizes its Hebrew and Israeli culture, meaning that I live in an Arabic minority within an Hebrew majority. My religion is "Druze" and the Druze residents in Carmel take a major part in the Israeli army. Unlike other Arabs in Israel, the Druze young man is a minority within an Arab majority in Israel. Most of the Druze who live in my village in Carmel consider themselves as Israelis apart from my small family who consider itself as Palestinian - like the cases here above, my family is a minority within a minority.

My social identity is composed from Israeli, Arabic, Druze, and Palestinian heritage, which means a minority within a minority, within a minority, within a minority and within a minority.

The first motive of my PhD thesis is to better understand my personal social identity; I looked and am still looking to know the social conflicts within me and the society I live in. Many persons have once asked me: “How can you be a Palestinian and Israeli at the same time?“

The geopolitical conflicts influence many psychological basics like the social identity. The Druze community in the Carmel is one part of the Arab minority in Israel post-1948 (Druze, Christians and Muslims) but unlike the other minorities, it has a unique relationship with the State of Israel. For example, there is a compulsory recruitment of 18 year-old Druze boys to the Israeli Defense Forces, just like for Jewish ones. On the other hand, this special relationship has detached the Druze from other minorities: many Druze do not identify themselves as Arabs although their
culture and mother tongue is Arabic. For the 1948 the Druze residents in Carmel have been and still remain a minority within a minority. These conditions make an extraordinary social identity for the Carmel Druze, which is why it is often confusing, unclear, changeable as well as in conflict.

The Carmel Druze tried to integrate into the Israeli society by renouncing their Arab and/or Palestinian identity. The process of identity change was successful, but the integration into Israeli society was much less so. Notwithstanding, the Druze in the Golan maintained their Syrian identity over the years. Most of them consider themselves as “Syrians living under occupation” and/or “Arab Druze”. It is rare to meet one who considers himself as “Israeli”, which is very different from the Druze in the Carmel. There is a major discrepancy between the social Druze identities within a very small territory. As a Druze myself, I would like to better understand these differences by conducting my PhD research.

The hypotheses of this thesis that will be better explained in next chapters are as follow:

- There are significant differences between the component of the social identity of the Golan Druze and that of the Carmel Druze;
- There are significant differences between the components among each identity;
- There is a conflict between the identity components;
- The social identity conflict has an impact on the sense of shame and guilt;
- The social identity conflict has an impact on feelings and optimism;
- The social identity conflict has an impact on the self-collective esteem;
- This social conflict decreases contacts between various groups;

This research project is planned in 2 steps:
1. Qualitative research: applying a semi-structured interviews method with key-persons in the Druze community, for example: University Professors, teachers, political leaders, religious leaders etc. As a first stage towards that step, we collect historical, anthropological, economic and social data, before getting into the heart of the interviews.

2. Quantitative research: in this part of the study, we used structured questionnaires and standard scales to measure the aspects of the study. These aspects were divided into two parts:

- Firstly: Identities conflicts.
- Secondly: Psychosocial dimensions.

The participants were men (46%) and women (54%), aged 17-61, who were asked to compile the questionnaires freely; they participated voluntarily after they were kindly asked to do so. The average completion time of the questionnaires ranged from 20 to 30 minutes.

This thesis makes use of numbers and sentences to describe a particular context of the Druze in Israel, more specifically social identity and contentious issues.
1. Ecological Background

The Druze society in Israel is officially recognized as a separate religious entity with its own educational system, courts (with a jurisdiction in matters of personal status - marriage, divorce and adoption), spiritual leadership, military unites and municipal budget.

After more than 68 years of special integration in the Israeli society, the Druze society in Israel has a special standing among the other minority groups.

1.1 Historical Background

The Druze religion began as a small movement and was influenced mainly by Greek philosophy and other religious movements. The Fatimid Caliphate in Egypt founded it in the tenth century. At first it was called "Muouhedun" that means "The Uniteds", because it unifies many religions and unifies the holy of one God. During the reign of al-Hakim (996-1021), the Druze creed came into being, blending Islamic monotheism with Greek philosophy, Buddhism, Judaism and Hindu influences. Active invitations to the Druze religion were brief; since about the year 1050, the community has been closed to outsiders. The Druze community was a minority in the Middle East, for many Muslims societies there were a "Kufar" or "Murtadin" - that means traitors. Since the nuclear age, the Druze reign does not believe in the sanctity of Prophet Muhammad. Muslims persecuted the Druze who had to live in remote places for their security. For many years, the Druze avoided integration or went undercover in other societies for fear of getting hurt.

The first Druze villages were in dispersed mountains for being persecuted, now in southern Lebanon and northern Israel. By the time of the Ottoman conquest of Syria (1516), Druze also lived
in the hill country near Aleppo, and Sultan Selim I recognized Fakhr al-Din as Emir of the Druze, granting him local authority. Until the end of the Ottoman rule (1918), the Druze were governed by emirs, as a semi-autonomous community. In 1921, the French Mandate tried to set up a Druze state, but the attempt failed. Since then, the belief of the Druze is that they always should live under others’ government and should not have their own country. According to the Druze religion, the only Druze's country will be after the "judgment day", known as Armageddon.

Despite the wars and the political conflict in the Middle East, the Druze in Galilee and on Mount Carmel have always kept in contact with the other branches of the community, especially with those of Syria and Lebanon, for the obvious reason of auto-protection.

1.2 The Druze in the Carmel

The Druze society in Israel is formally recognized as a separate religious entity with its own educational system (mathematical, historical, geographical books are different from other Arabic ones in Israeli), courts (with a jurisdiction in matters of personal status - marriage, divorce and adoption), spiritual leadership, military units, municipal budget and even football leagues. The main two issues that differentiates the Druze of the Carmel from the other minorities in Israel are:

1.2.1 The Druze educational system in the Carmel

In the 1956 the educational system in Israel was divided into three groups: Jewish; Arabic; Druze. In other words, there are different books, educational material and budgets to three
different systems. The main idea of this division is to emphasize the distance between the Arabic society and the Druze society in Israel. However, since the founding of the State of Israel in 1948, the Druze educational system has flourished. In 1948/49, only 981 Druze were enrolled in school - 881 boys and 100 girls. Some 30 years later, there were 18,729 Druze students. Today there are over 30,000 Druze students in the school system - some 2.3% of all pupils in Israel, although the representation of Druze in the general population is only 1.6%.

1.2.2 The Druze in the Israel Defence Forces

Since the establishment of the State of Israel, the Druze have been volunteers in the Israel Defense Forces, serving in a "299" battalion.

In 1956, the law that obliges Druze men to join the IDF (Israel Defense Forces) was passed following an agreement between the Head of the Druze political leaders with the Israeli government. According to some Druze leaders, this agreement was born to protect the Druze society from the Arabic attacks and some political leaders claims that this agreement was born to create a favorite minority.

Consequently, the ‘Druze Battalion’ in the IDF was born. The Herev Battalion, also known as the ‘Druze Battalion’, is a ground force battalion in the regular forces of the IDF that consists primarily of Druze soldiers. The battalion was established in 1956, following a decision made to integrate all minority units under one command. Its name, which translates into the “Battalion of the Sword”, is based on the traditional weapon of the Druze (Naim Araidy. 2010).
Many Israeli Jewish commanders claim that the Druze soldiers have a high level of courage and charisma that make a significant contribution to the strength of the IDF and its ability to face challenges, specifically to understand the Arab mentality. Today, Druze soldiers serve in a number of positions in the Israel Defense Forces, including: Camp fighting, Combat, Combat Support, Sea army, Intelligence, Medical Corps, Military Colleges, Technology and Logistics. In 2015, the Druze battalion "299" was closed for unknown reasons.

After 60 years of participation of the Druze in the IDF, it seems that two main reasons explain this participation:

1. "To be loyal to the state that protects you" - in the Druze point of view, Israel was a country that can protect and give security to the Druze society.
2. Economic benefits - many men in the Druze society earn a living from the IDF. After the participation to the IDF, the economical status of the Druze was improved and got better in comparison to other Arab societies.

1.3 Druze in the Golan

The Arabic names of Golan Heights are Jawlan and/or Djolan. In the Bible Golan is mentioned as a city of refuge located in Bashan (Sharon, 2004). The Golan Heights borders Israel, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria. According to the Israel Statistic Center, it has captured 1,150 square kilometers (440 sq mi). According to the Syrian Statistic Centers, the Golan Heights measures 1,860 square kilometers (718 sq mi), of which 1,500 km2 (580 sq mi) are occupied by Israel. The Golan Heights - most of the Qunaytra province and parts of the Dera'a province of South-West Syria - is a mountainous plateau (average altitude of 3,280 feet) coveted for its strategic position and rich water resources.
Israel occupied 1,250 of its 1,750 sq. km during the 1967 War. As a result of the 1973 War, about 100 sq. km were returned to Syria, which means that 1,150 sq. km now remain under Israeli occupation.

On the eve of the 1967 War, the Qunaytra province was composed of an ethnically diverse population of some 147,613 inhabitants, spread among 163 villages and towns and 108 individual farms. The vast majority of the population was Arab, mostly Sunni Muslim, however with small Alewite and Druze minorities; there were also significant communities of Circassians and Turcomans, small numbers of Armenians and Kurds, and some 9,000 Palestinians refugees from the 1948 War. While often residing in separate villages diffused throughout the entire territory, these communities lived in harmony, in particular after Syria gained its independence simultaneously with the end of French occupation. During the 1967 War, Israel seized about 70 percent of the territory with a population of approximately 130,000 living in 139 villages and towns and 61 farms. Within a month, the entire Golan Heights were virtually empty: all that remained were six villages consisting of some 6,000 people clustered in the North-West corner of the territory and about 250 other civilians, mainly in the town of Qunaytra.

Eventually, by July 1967 were six villages remaining in the entire territory: Majdal Shams, by far the largest, Buqa'ayta, Masada, 'AynQinea, S'hita, and Ghajar. Except for Ghajar, which lay at some distance to the West near the Syrian-Israeli Armistice line, the villages were within a few kilometers from one another near the ceasefire lines. Once again, except for Ghajar that is Alawite, the remaining villages were almost entirely Druze.

Indeed, above and beyond the virtual emptying of the prosperous and agriculturally rich land of the Golan region, a genuine demographic revolution in terms of population composition had taken place. The Druze, who formerly made up a relatively small minority in the Golan, then constituted
the dominant majority of the population. All five of the Golan Heights' Druze villages had survived. S'hita, very close to the ceasefire lines, was however destroyed by the Israelis in 1970 "for the safety of the inhabitants", its lands confiscated and the population spread around the other villages. And while many Druze, supposedly 20 percent of the population (mainly the middle classes) had left during or immediately after the fighting, the core of the community remained (Tayseer Mara'i and Usama R. 1992).

1.3.2 The Undefined Citizenship

In December 1981, after the War, the Golan Heights territory became part of the Israeli territory and thus subordinated to the Israeli Civil Law. The Arab residents of the Golan Heights, after a long struggle, agreed to accept Israeli identity cards, however not taking Israeli citizenship (only a few are now Israeli citizens). Today, most of the Druze living in the Golan are citizens without citizenship, i.e. they are subjects of the Israeli Law but they cannot vote and they are not part of the Israeli society. They have to get special permissions to engage with bureaucracy, for example, travel abroad or get married.

The Druze residents never wanted to be Israelis for they believed that they were Syrian citizens and that, one day, the Golan Heights will return to being Syrian territories once again.

Obtaining Israeli citizenship would be considered as treason. He who receives an Israeli citizenship will be socially banned.

1.3.3 The Druze educational system in the Golan Heights
The Golan education system was established by the Israel Ministry of Education without previous coordination with its population, thus creating great controversy about the materials studied. The schools in the Golan are supervised by the military system to ensure the teaching of the Israeli education system and no other material.

1.4 Demographic aspects

Worldwide, there are probably about one million Druze, mainly living in Israel, Syria and Lebanon, and several thousands who emigrated to Europe and North and South America. In 2006, there were 120,600 Druze living in the different areas of the Carmel Mount, the Galilee, including about 18,000 in the Golan (which came under Israeli rule in 1967) (Naim Araidy, 2009).

At the end of 2003, there were about 38.5 Druze children aged 0-14, who constituted over one-third (34.8%) of the total population. The percentage of children in the Druze population was relatively high in comparison with the Jewish population of Israel, and relatively low compared with the Muslim population (respectively around 25.5% and around 43.2%). In the 1950s, children aged 0-14 were about 46% of the Druze population.

4.1% of the Druze population is aged 65 and over. This percentage is somewhat higher than that of the Muslim population in this age group (less than 2.7%), and lower than that of the Jewish group (about 11.8%).

1.5 The Druze economy

The economy of Druze in the Golan and Carmel is quite similar. Before 1948, the Golan population relied on agriculture work and the Carmel on residential construction work.
For generations, the economy of the Carmeli and Golani Druze villages was not much different from that of any other minority villages in Israel. They made their living mainly from traditional agriculture and only a few went to work outside the village.

Over the years, the Carmel Druze were influenced by the globalization processes, thus have become modern and urban. They subsisted working in factories, the construction industry and more particularly in the security field (Police, army and prisons). The Israeli army has played a strong part in the economy of the Druze society in Carmel. The workforce of Druze men, as of 2005, was 53%, compared with 61% among Jewish men. The labor force participation rate of Druze women was 19.6%, in contrast with 56% for Jewish women – figures exclude employee data security (data are confidential).

In 2002, the average salary of men within the Druze society in Carmel was approximately NIS 5,400, and the average wage of women was NIS 2,400. By way of comparison, the average wage in Israel that same year was NIS 7,604 (Central Bureau of Statistics of Israel, 2005).

### 1.6 Druze towns and villages

Most of the Druze towns and villages are located in the North of the Israel, mainly on hilltops, an historical spot for defense against attacks and persecution. In Israel, they are populated exclusively by Druze, although over the last century a minority of Christians and Muslims have become residents in some of them.
1.7 The Druze religion - Basics

In the Druze religion there are different religious obligations, which depend on the level of belief. There are two different groups: 1. "Uqqal": Druze that practice all the religious obligations including praying twice a week. 2. "Juhal": Druze that practice only one obligation, to marry only with a Druze partner.
The Druze religion has no ceremonies nor rituals, and no obligation to perform in public. The main tenets that obligate the Druze, specifically the Uqqal (religious), are:

- Speaking the truth (instead of prayer)
- Supporting your brethren (instead of charity)
- Abandoning the old creeds (instead of fasting)
- Purification from heresy (instead of pilgrimage)
- Accepting the unity of God
- Submitting to the will of God (instead of holy war)
- Druze are forbidden to eat pork, smoke, or drink alcohol.

The Uqqal are bound by more precepts than the Juhal. Their external appearance is also different: the men have a shaven head covered by a white turban, a mustache and a beard.

The women wear a white headscarf, called a Naqab. The most pious among the women hide all their hair under a separate covering, the Iraqiyah, which is fastened around the head underneath the white scarf.

Chapter 2

1. Theoretical Background of social identity

2.1 Introduction

Humans are highly social beings. The most important expression of this sociality is that we live, and have evolved to live in social groups. This basic fact has shaped not only what we do, but
also how our minds have evolved to enable us to do it. Groups are not simply external features of our behavioral settings; in fact, they shape our psychology through their capacity to be internalized and contribute to our sense of self, which means that groups provide us with a sense of social identity: “knowledge that [we] belong to certain social groups together with some emotional and value significance to [us] of this group membership” (Tajfel, 1972, p. 31).

The present study brings together the social identity conflict and psycho-social dimensions among the Druze society in Carmel and Golan Heights.

The following chapter looks for theoretical basis of the multiple social identity conflict in relation to political/geographical/cultural conflict, collective self-esteem, shame, guilt and optimism.

How do the following theories study the relation between the multiple identities of the Druze from the Carmel and the Golan? What is the relation between the national identity, the religious identity and the cultural identity? What is the impact of conflict on the psychosocial dimensions such as self-esteem, shame, guilt and optimism of the Druze community from the Golan and the Carmel?

Recently, studies of social processes have expressed growing interest in the fact that most individuals are concurrently members of multiple social groups. Although there has been some research on the effects of cross-culture social categories on in-group (Migdal, Hewstone, & Mullen, 1998; Urban & Miller, 1998), the majority of research on social identity and intergroup relations has been conducted in the context of a single in-group/ out-group categorization.

The main studies on Multiple Social Identity that explain the process of self-identification are:


These theories focus on the relation between the definitions of various categories, but what they do not focus on is what happens when there is conflict between the categories. On the one hand, according to these theories, the Druze from the Golan Heights are supposed to be able to identify themselves both as Israelis and/or Syrians. On the other hand, reality shows us different situations. The source of this problem is derived from the political conditions. The same is happening in the Carmel. A Druze individual has difficulties to identify himself/herself as Palestinian and Israeli at the same time.

According to the Optimal Distinctiveness Theory (Brewer M.B, 1991), individuals have two fundamental and competing human needs: 1. The need for inclusion; 2. The need for differentiation. The relations between the two needs create the Optimally Distinct that defines optimal identity (Brewer M.B, 1991). Therefore, in the case of the Druze society from Mount Carmel, they identify themselves as Israeli when they are in an Israeli context such as university, streets, schools, etc. At the same time, they identify themselves as Arabs only in Arab contexts such as Arab villages, Arab weddings, Arab holidays, etc. What we aim to understand is what happens when they identify themselves as Israelis and Arabs at the same time.
2.2 The Complexity of Social Identity

The Social Identity Complexity theory studies the individual’s subjective representation of the interrelationships among his or her multiple group identities. Social Identity Complexity reflects the degree of overlap perceived to exist between groups to which a person is simultaneously a member of. When the overlap of multiple in-groups is perceived to be high, the individual maintains relative memberships in different groups, converging to form single in-group identification. When a person acknowledges and accepts that memberships in multiple in-groups are not fully convergent or overlapping, the associated identity structure is both more inclusive and complex (Roccas, S. & Brewer M. B., 2002).

![Figure 1. Alternative structures of multiple ingroup representations.](image)

Four main alternative forms of identity structure reflect different ways in which the relationships among multiple in-groups can be subjectively represented. The four structures are represented schematically in Figure 1 for the case of two social category identities (A and B). Each model of in-group representation has implications for the inclusion or exclusion of others as members of the subjective in-group. This provides a link between representations of multiple in-
groups and different patterns of crossed categorization that have been identified in the intergroup relations literature (Hewstone et al., 1993; Urban & Miller, 1998):

1. Intersection: One way that an individual can achieve simultaneous recognition of more than one social identity and yet maintain a single in-group representation is to define the in-group as the intersection of multiple group memberships (Figure 1a). In the case of the Druze from the Golan the individuals maintain the Syrian identity and the Druze identity at the same level. Namely, the Druze identity is sentimentally salient as the Syrian identity. In the case of the Druze from the Carmel, the individuals maintain the Israeli identity and the Druze identity at the same level. Namely, the Druze identity is sentimentally salient as the Israeli identity.

2. Dominance: Another way that individuals can cope with competing social identities is to adopt one primary group identity to which all other potential group identities are subordinated (Figure 1b). The dominance identity could be expressed in this study as the national identity. In the case of the Druze from the Carmel, individuals maintain the Israeli identity as the dominant identity, and the Druze identity as the dominated identity. In the case of the Druze from the Golan, individuals maintain the Syrian identity as the dominant identity and the Druze identity as the dominated identity.

3. Compartmentalization: If more than one group identity is important to an individual as a source of social identity, multiple identities can be activated and expressed through a process of differentiation and isolation (Figure 1c). In the case of the Druze from the Golan and the Carmel, individuals manifest and activate their identities accordingly (Syrian/ Druze) (Israeli/ Druze) in relation to the context.

4. Merger: The final model for representation of multiple social group identities is one in which non-convergent group memberships are simultaneously recognized and embraced in their most inclusive form (Figure 1d). In the case of the Druze from the Golan, individuals combine the Syrian identity
and the Druze identity in one multiple identity. Namely, Druze from the Golan use the term “Syrian-Druze” as the main identity. In the case of the Druze from the Carmel, the individuals use the term “Israeli-Druze” as the main identity.

The limit of “Social Identity Complexity” is its capability of explaining only a few parts of the complexity of the Druze identity conflict. The reason to this is that all of these researches were held under normal conditions without political, geographic, economical, or war conditions. In the case of the Druze society, all these conditions should be taken into consideration in their self-process.

The Druze from the Golan and the Carmel are living in an ongoing political conflict, therefore their social identities are very important in this context. Political conflict and violent context were not really considered in the Social Identity Complexity theory.

The political changes in the Middle East have long- and short-term impacts on the Druze history and their social identity. As a result, the Druze individual could belong to more than two social identities at the same time. In the case of “Social Identity Complexity”, the individuals are mainly two groups: A and B. In the case of the Druze, there are three groups: Arab, Israeli, and Druze.

2.3 The Optimal Identity

Optimal Distinctiveness theory proposes that individuals have two fundamental and competing human needs: the need for inclusion and the need for differentiation that can be met by membership in moderately inclusive “optimally distinct” groups (Bower M.B., 1993). In this study we are looking to describe the “optimal distance” between the various social identities among Druze from the Golan and the Carmel.
Brower claims that individuals strive to attain an optimal balance of assimilation and distinction within social groups and situations. In other words, when an individual feels very similar to others, s/he looks for some ways to be different and special. Furthermore, to obtain a balanced identity, persons will make all kinds of comparisons in an effort to prove to themselves that they are considerably different from other members of this group they belong to. When individuals feel sufficiently differentiated and at the same time assimilated within a group, they reach a content state of equilibrium. At that point, this thesis describes Druze's equilibrium status. How is the balance between the Druze-Arab-Israeli-Syrian identities in the Druze society in Israel? Does this balance have an impact on the daily life of the Druze society member?

The Optimal Distinctiveness theory is based on the Evolutionary Theory (Brewer, B.M., 1999). Brewer emphasizes the important part of the socialization of the human being. She claims that humans, during the course of their evolution, developed in ways of life that would not allow them to live independently from other people; furthermore, social life is a critical aspect in the evolution of the specie. Humans need to be part of larger groups in order to survive. Being part of a group is the basic human emotional need; to be accepted and included as member of a group. Groups could be; family, friends, co-workers, or a sports team. Humans have an inherent desire to belong and be an important part of something greater than themselves. This implies a relationship that is greater than a simple acquaintance or familiarity. The need to belong is the need to give and receive affection from others (Fiske, S.T., 2004). At the same time, individuals need to be different from others, even genetically, like animals looking to reproduce their personal DNA according to Darwin’s theory. To be special is a human need as to be part of a group.

Regarding the social identity conflict of the Druze in Israel, this group is related to the political conflicts in the Middle East, thus being part of a social group could really determine
survival. Therefore, according to CNN, ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant in Syria) killed 15 Christian Syrians (CNN, 2015).

Looking at the “Optimal Druze Identity” according to Brewer’s theory, individuals living in the Druze society in the Middle East need to find the balanced identity between Druze-Arab-Syrian-Israeli- and Palestinian in order to survive and to get a high level of well-being.

Furthermore, in the case of the Druze society, Druze need to be distinctive and assimilate in the in-group considering that the out-group is a physical and cultural threat which makes the “Optimal Identity” hard to equilibrate. For example, the Italian and Christian identity is different from Israeli and Muslim identity even though they both are about nationality and religion. Being Israeli and\or Muslim is a contentious identity, considering the political conflict between Muslims and Israel.

Moreover, Brewer asserts that individuals will only define themselves in terms of appropriate social identities that are “optimally distinctive” and will refuse identities that are either too assimilated or too different. Each experience “occurs at the expense of the other” (Sheldon & Bettencourt, 2002). Equilibrium is dynamic and constantly corrects deviations from optimality (Brewer, 1991, 2003). Individuals will seek out and maintain group memberships that allow this equilibrium to be operated at an optimal level, which depends on the particular social context (Brewer, 2003).
The consequences of an equilibrated identity are positive for the self-conception of the individual. This optimal level of group membership, according to the theory, is associated with positive self-conception (Brewer, 1991, 2003).

From Brewer’s 1991 text, a replica of figure 2 “The Optimal Distinctiveness Model”. The four aspects of the Optimal Distinctiveness theory:

1. Social identification will be strongest for social groups or categories at that level of inclusiveness that resolves the conflict between needs for differentiation of the self and assimilation with others.

2. Optimal Distinctiveness is independent on the evaluative implications of group membership, although, other things being equal, individuals will prefer positive group identities to negative identities.

3. Distinctiveness of a given social identity is context-specific. It depends on the frame of reference within which possible social identities are defined at a particular time, which can range from participants in a specific social gathering to the entire human race.

4. The optimal level of category distinctiveness or inclusiveness is a function of the relative strength (steepness) of the opposing that drives for assimilation and differentiation. For any
individual, the relative strength of the two needs is determined by cultural norms, individual socialization, and recent experience.

Brewer (1991) continues by stating that an alternative basic tenet of the theory is that “excessive” distinctiveness is detrimental to an individual since it can create stigma, negative self-concept, and an undesirable social identity.

The strong aspects of the Optimal Distinctiveness theory is that it is a wide range theory and it could be used in various researches, for example: self-stereotyping, stereotypes and prejudice, and self-esteem (Brewer, 1996, 1999, 2001, 2003). Also, in the case of the minority and majority societies, Optimal Distinctiveness theory is effective; assignment to distinctive minority group categories engages greater group identification and self-stereotyping than membership in large inclusive majority groups (Brewer & Weber, 1994; Leonardelli & Brewer, 2001; Simon & Hamilton, 1994). There is a great deal of experimental data which suggests the validity of Optimal Distinctiveness theory’s claim that individuals in groups strive for both inclusion and distinctiveness. In relation to the Israeli context, which is mixed with many societies, the Optimal Distinctiveness theory could be very valuable.

The limits of Brewer’s theory according to Badea, Jetten, Czukor, and Askevis-Leherpeux (2010), is that, under threat, Optimal Distinctiveness theory may no longer apply. What is very important to our study is being applied in a political conflict context as is the Middle East. That is, if the group of individuals is threatened, personal identity might not be as salient; hence the need for differentiation weakness. Instead, individuals might attempt to identify with a group that responds most effectively to threats.
2.4 Bicultural Identity Integration

The following research is based on the interaction between identities among the Druze communities in Israel. Given the numbers of bicultural identities in Israel and the Middle East, Bicultural Identity Integration (BII) is an important construct that helps researchers to better understand the diversity within these groups.

Having an integrated bicultural identity means the condition of being oneself regarding the combination of two cultures (Cheng et al., 2007). In case of the Druze, how does the Druze community living in the Golan combine between its Israeli and Syrian identities, while taking into consideration the political situation between Syria and Israel?

“In today’s increasingly diverse and mobile world, growing numbers of individuals have internalized more than one culture and can be described as bicultural or multicultural” (Benet-Martínez & Haritatos, 2005).

According to Benet-Martínez “Bicultural individuals are those who have been exposed to and have internalized two cultures” (Nguyen, A.M., & Benet-Martínez, 2009); following this definition, bicultural identity lies on the integration between multicultures, based on general (i.e. based on demographic characteristics) or psychologically specific conceptualizations (e.g. cultural identifications or orientations). Immigrants, refugees, sojourners (e.g. international students, expatriates), indigenous people, ethnic minorities, those in interethnic relationships, and mixed-ethnic individuals are all included in this definition.

The Druze community in the Middle East has been exposed to many cultural impacts in its history: religious, political, national and traditional impacts. According to the BII model, the Druze should have a complicated social identity. More specifically, the Druze community in the Golan and Carmel has a contradicting identity: Arab and Israeli identities; Syrian and Druze, Druze and Arab, etc.
The BII looks at how the bicultural individual perceives his bicultural identities and whether they are compatible or oppositional. To match between cultures is a fundamental dimension in the BII theory. It also searches to identify the big five dimensions of an individual’s personality according the Big Five Personality Traits theory, including aspects such as sociability, activity and emotionality. The BII looks for relations between the components, finding whether an individual has a cultural distance or conflict within one’s culture, which in turn helps indicate how bicultural is his/her identity. This study tries to understand the differences and the conflict between the Druze social identities. In addition, it seeks to show whether the distance between the identities in the Druze society influences daily life, psych-social aspects and optimism.

2.5 Oppositional Versus Compatible Cultural Identities

Implicit in much of the acculturation literature is the idea that biculturals are consistently faced with the challenge of integrating different sets of cultural demands and messages, conflicting interpersonal expectations, and the potential threats of minority status and discrimination (LaFromboise et al., 1997).

A careful review of this literature reveals that despite these challenges of dual cultural membership, many biculturals succeed at developing a compatible bicultural identity (LaFromboise et al., 1997). These individuals identify with both cultures, even if not at the same level. For example, when asked to describe if they are ethnic or American, these biculturals tend to say “I am both” or “I am Mexican (or African, or Asian) American” (Phinney & Devich-Navarro, 1997). Most importantly, these biculturals do not perceive the mainstream and ethnic cultures as being mutually exclusive, oppositional, or conflicting. They integrate both cultures in their everyday lives, show behavioral competency in both cultures, and switch their behavior depending on the cultural demands of the situation (Birman, 1994; Chuan 1999). For instance, Rotheram-Borus (1993)
described the case of self-labeled Mexican Americans who report engaging in both prototypical American behaviors (being competitive, task oriented, and individualistic) and prototypical Mexican behaviors (having a strong sense of obligation to the family, being emotionally warm and expressive, and deferring to authority) depending on the demands of the situation. On the other hand, the acculturation literature also describes a second type of bicultural experience. For some biculturals, mainstream and ethnic cultures are perceived as highly distinct, separate, and even oppositional orientations. Although these individuals also identify with both cultures or think of themselves as biculturals, they are highly aware of the discrepancies between the mainstream and ethnic cultures and see these discrepancies as a source of internal conflict. As a result, these biculturals keep the two cultural identities dissociated and report that it is easier to be either ethnic or mainstream but hard to be both at the same time (Phinney & Devich-Navarro, 1997). For instance, to be Syrian and Israeli at the same time is a contradicting identification. When asked to describe their ethnicity, other biculturals report “I am a Black (or a Mexican) in America,” as opposed to “I am African (or Mexican) American” (Phinney & Devich-Navarro, 1997). They further state that their dual cultures have “very different views,” and that they feel as if they have to choose one or the other. For example, one bicultural participant in Benet-Martinez and Haritatos’s (2002) study said the following:

“Being “bicultural” makes me feel special and confused. Special because it adds to my identity: I enjoy my Indian culture, I feel that it is rich in tradition, morality, and beauty; confused because . . . being both cultures isn’t an option. My cultures have very different views on things like dating and marriage. I feel like you have to choose one or the other. (19-year-old bicultural Indian American).”

Although perceptions of opposition between different cultural identities are more characteristic of recent immigrants, they are also common among individuals with many years of
exposure to the mainstream culture, as well as U.S. born biculturals (Benet-Martinez & Haritatos, 2002). Furthermore, perceptions of opposition (vs. compatibility) between multiple cultural identities do not seem to be consistently related to an individual’s attitude toward biculturalism (Benet-Martinez & Haritatos, 2002). The acculturation literature reveals that although all biculturals identify with both mainstream and ethnic cultures, some biculturals perceive their dual cultural identities as compatible and integrated, whereas others see them as oppositional and difficult to integrate. The term bicultural identity integration is used to describe this integration between identities. High BII individuals tend to see their dual identities as compatible, whereas low BII individuals experience their dual identities as oppositional.

On the one hand, low BII bicultural individuals have difficulties in incorporating both cultures into a cohesive identity and tend to see both cultures as highly dissimilar. Bicultural individuals with high BII on the other hand, see their identities as complementary and themselves as part of a “third” culture, which integrates elements from both their cultures. The Druze identity and the Arab identity could have a high cohesive bicultural for the reason that the Druze speak the Arabic language.

According to Mead and Métraux (2000), individuals respond in a more stable fashion when their cultural contexts are understood. Past research has examined how these differences in identity organization could relate to other factors. BII is significantly associated with the psychological and social adjustments of the bicultural. Low BII bicultural individuals are found to have inferior bilingual proficiency, experience more anxiety, depression and are more neurotic and less open than bicultural individuals with high BII. Also, low BII bicultural individuals are not chameleon-like (Nguyen and Benet-Martínez, 2009).
2.6 Social Identity and Psychological well-being, self-esteem and optimism

Does being Israeli make one feel shame or/and guilt when an Arab has been hurt? Does being Syrian make males feel optimistic? Does being Arab make one feel less self-esteem?

The present study is based on the relation between social identity and psychological dimensions. According to the Social Identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), group memberships contribute to both self-definition and self-esteem. Affective facets of group belonging can be distinguished, for example, in Tajfel's definition of social identity as “that part of an individual's self-concept which derives from . . . knowledge of... membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership” (Tajfel, 1978).

Indeed, there is ample evidence, across a variety of social groups that both membership and social identification are predictive of self-esteem and psychological well-being. For example, measures of ethnic and racial identity typically show moderate positive correlations with global personal self-esteem, as indexed by Rosenberg’s scale (1965) (Phinney, 1992).

Similarly Luhtanen and Crocker (1992) reported that scores on their Collective Self-esteem Scale, a measure of the self-evaluation of one's group memberships, were positively correlated with levels of global self-esteem. Crocker, Luhtanen, Blaine, and Broadnax (1994) extended these findings by demonstrating that aspects of collective self-esteem predicted the psychological well-being (i.e., life satisfaction or hopelessness) of Black and Asian university students. In a more applied context, Marmarosh and Corazzini (1997) found that members of psychotherapy groups who were reminded during everyday activities of their group and the benefits of belonging (in part by carrying a card labeled "My Group" in their pockets) subsequently rated the group more positively (i.e., displayed higher private collective self-esteem) than individuals in a control condition.

Although researches suggest that group membership is particularly likely to be psychologically beneficial if the group is relatively prestigious (Wright & Forsyth, 1997), social identification can
have positive effects on psychological well-being even if one belongs to a stigmatized minority group.

Some studies have also looked at the relationship between subjective dimensions of belonging to a community and well-being aspects. Hoyle and Crawford found moderate correlations indicating that students' perceptions of greater group cohesion were associated with lower levels of depression, loneliness, and social anxiety. In a second study, belongingness was positively and significantly related to global self-esteem, as well as to a number of specific dimensions (for example physical and social) of self-evaluation (Hoyle & Crawford, 1994). Similarly, higher levels of individuals' sense of community of which one aspect is social identification have been linked to lower levels of burnout (McCarthy, Pretty, & Catano, 1990).

In summary, the existing evidence indicates that category identification and personal self-esteem are related. Moreover, aspects of group identity are predictive of general psychological modifications, although apparently few studies (Crocker et al., 1994) have demonstrated this while checking for global personal self-esteem.

Following these theories, what accounts for the relationship between social identity and psychological well-being in the Druze society in the Carmel and the Golan, especially considering the complexity of the identity?

Does being an Israeli and an Arab at the same time have an impact on one’s self-esteem? Does the identity as Arab, Israeli, Syrian, or Palestinian have an impact on the collective sense of shame/guilt versus the in-group or the out-group?

The first limitation of the above theories is that they did not consider the conflict between the identities. Secondly, there are much more psychological aspects that could be related to social identity: shame, guilt, anger, jealousy and happiness.
In the present study, the goal was to look into and better understand the relation between the identity in a conflict context and the well-being of the individuals. This thesis considers the conflicting aspects of the social identity process in the Druze community living in the Carmel and the Golan as a fundamental issue in the identity process. This study takes a further step by studying the impact of the conflict on the well-being, self-esteem, collective self-esteem, shame, guilt and optimism within the conflicting identity.
Chapter 3

3. The Research

3.1 Research methods

3.1.1 Introduction

In order to better understand the conflicts with the Druze social identity, we chose to apply the “mix method or multiple methods”. The Druze society lives in a complicate and particular situation; therefore, in order to improve the study, we need both "numbers" and "words" - the mixed method gives us a large spectrum of the Druze conflict. Johnson et al. (2007) define the mixed methods as “the type of research in which a researcher or team of researchers combines elements of qualitative and quantitative research approaches (e.g., use of qualitative and quantitative viewpoints, data collection, analysis, inference techniques) for the purposes of breadth and depth of understanding and corroboration” (Johnson et al, 2007 p. 123).

"The mixed method is the multiple ways of seeing and hearing the reality" (Greene 2007,p. 20). The mixed method involves advantages and limits. The following paragraphs link both sides of mix method. In addition, this thesis takes the advantages of the qualitative and quantitative methods, in trying to describe and measure the real social identity conflict of the Druze in Israel.

Advantages:

• Mixed methods research provides strengths that offset the weaknesses of both quantitative and qualitative research.
• Mixed methods research provides more evidence for studying a research problem than either quantitative or qualitative research alone.

• Mixed methods research helps answer questions that cannot be answered by quantitative or qualitative approaches alone.

• Mixed methods provides a bridge across the sometimes adversarial divide between quantitative and qualitative researchers.

• Mixed methods research encourages the use of multiple worldviews, or paradigms (i.e. beliefs and values), rather than the typical association of certain paradigms with quantitative research and others for qualitative research.

• These paradigm stances will be discussed further in the next chapter.

• Mixed methods research is “practical” in the sense that the researcher is free to use all methods possible to address a research problem. It is also “practical” because individuals tend to solve problems using both numbers and words, combine inductive and deductive thinking, and employ skills in observing people as well as recording behavior.

Limits:

Mixed method research has some disadvantages and limitations, namely:

• The research design can be very complex.

• It takes much more time and resources to plan and implement this type of research.

• It may be difficult to plan and implement one method by drawing on the findings of another.

• It may be unclear how to resolve discrepancies that arise in the interpretation of the findings.
• It can be difficult for a single researcher to carry out both qualitative and quantitative research, especially if two or more approaches are expected to be done concurrently (i.e. it might require a research team).

• The researcher has to learn about multiple methods and approaches and understand how to appropriately mix them.

• Methodological purists contend that one should always work within either a qualitative or a quantitative paradigm.

• It is more expensive.

• It is more time consuming.

• Some of the details of mixed research remain to be fully worked out by research methodologists (e.g. problems of paradigm mixing, how to qualitatively analyze quantitative data, how to interpret conflicting results…).

However, the mix method gives this thesis a large prospective of the social identity conflict, the words of the participant, the description of the complexity of the conflict and the lighting drake angels of quantitative research cannot focus on. On the other hand, the quantitative research gives us a proportion of the conflict, the possibility to statistically compare between societies, edges and gender. Mixing both benefits is a better way to get a large point of view for the Druze identity conflict.

3.1.2 Qualitative research subjects:
In the period between 1.1.13 and 1.3.13, I interviewed 12 key persons - 3 women from the Golan, 3 men from the Golan, 3 women from Carmel and 3 men from the Carmel - to study further in depth the social identity of the Druze. I conducted semi structured interviews asking them about psychological, social, political and historical aspects. The average age of the subject is 37 years old. Most of them are socially involved and active and they fully participated in the research. The duration of each interview was 40 min in average.

The full details about the subjects are linked in the last pages, Appendix N 1.

3.1.3 Quantitative research subjects

The participants were men and women, aged 17-61, who were asked randomly. They participated voluntarily after they were requested to do so. Average completion time of the questionnaire ranged from 20 to 30 minutes. 196 people took part in it, among whom 91 men and 103 women, 2 subjects who did not indicate their gender and an average age of 28.7 years.

Carmel total: 94 subjects, 52 men, 39 women, 2 who did not indicate their gender, and an average age of 28.6 years. The participants were men (46%) and women (54%) from the ages 17-61 who were asked to participate voluntarily after signing a participation certificate. Average completion time of the complete questionnaire ranged from 20 to 30 minutes.

The participants were divided into 2 categories:

1. Carmel citizens
2. Golan citizens

The questionnaires were divided into 2 categories that included the same items but in a different order:

A. Demographical items, identities items and psycho-social items.

B. Identities items, psycho-social items and demographical items.

Total subjects: 196, among which 91 men (46%), 103 women (54%) and 2 subjects who did not indicate their gender. Average age: 28.7.

- Carmel: 94 subjects, of which 52 men, 39 women and 2 who did not indicate their gender. Average age: 28.6.
- Carmel B: subjects 55, men 23, women 30, 2 did not indicate their gender, average age 28.6.
- Golan B: subjects 47, men 24, women 23, average age 28.4

3.2 Qualitative research

3.2.1 Introduction

Aims
Druze society is a rather closed one, which makes it difficult for people within it to be open about their opinions and say what is on their minds.

In order to study further in depth of the social identity of the Druze I did an explorative qualitative research with semi structured interviews, asking about psychological, social, political and historical aspects. We focused on the essential issues that affect identity, well-being and future. An aim is also to explore the differences between the Druze of Carmel and the Druze of the Golan.

Subjects

In this study (in the period between January and March 2013), I interviewed 12 key people from the Druze society who are experts in its social aspects, such as political leaders, teachers, school managers, highly-ranked religious people, academic researchers, businessmen and politicians. Most of them are socially involved and active and they fully participated in the research. The average age of the subject is 37 years old: 3 women from the Golan, 3 men from the Golan, 3 women from Carmel and 3 men from the Carmel.

The duration of each interview was 40 min in average.

3.2.2 Procedure

Research steps

1. Conduct semi-structured interviews with key persons within the Druze community;
2. Analyze the data;

3. Discuss results and conclusions and write a final report.

(The full details about the subjects are linked in Appendix N 1)

Transcription

In the period between March 2013 and May 2013, every recorded interview (between 35 and 50 minutes each) was transcribed into Arabic. Each written transcript must be identical to the original version, therefore it is very important not to lose nor forget any word from the audio speech. This work was arduous for it required attention, patience and time. Each interview was between 20 to 40 pages and 30,000 bets in average.

First analysis

In the period between March 2013 and June 2013, all the interviews were analyzed according to the content analysis mode. At first we extracted the main categories - the analysis was conducted by two researchers after a thorough understanding of the material. Each category was general before more precise categories were created, divided into items and subcategories. These categories represent the dimensions of conflict in the Druze identity. The link to the full items and categories can be found in Appendix N 2.

Translations

In the period between May 2013 and August 2013, the most significant parts of the interviews, according to the model used, were translated into English to confirm and support the first analysis.
3.2.3 Topics and interpretations

Interpretations and definition of the categories - in this part I explain and interpret the categories and the relations between them, using academic articles and quotations from the interviews.

The list of the main topics are the following - distinction in topics specific to the Golan, specific to Carmel and joint topics:

The main topics in the Golan:

- Topic A 1: The discontinuation with Syria
- Topic A 2: Historical aspects of the Golan
- Topic A 3: Arab Spring

The main topics in the Carmel:

- Topic B 1: Collaboration with the Israeli army
- Topic B 2: Historical aspects of the Carmel

The main shared topics:

- Topic C 1: Clinging to the land
- Topic C 2: Identity Conflict
• Topic C 3: Women’s place

• Topic C 4: Cultural invasion

• Topic C 5: Future

Golan

Topic A 1:

The discontinuation between the Golani Druze and Syria:

Most of the interviewees from the Golan consider that physical discontinuation caused by the 1973 War has had a major influence on their social identity, the subject (K) stating: "the persons without identity that declaim: I have been born in Israel and know what is Israel and in all my life I don't know what is Syria, what is in Syria... That's why, I don't feel I belong to a place I've never lived in. So, he will tell you that I belong to a place where I am living right now, know who's living here, my society, and that my belonging is here."

The gap with Syria could explain the loss of social identity for many reasons, including the lack of Syrian tradition and culture: subject (D) describes the dejection as losing part of one’s body: "The lack of communication, if one of the organs gets sick or weak, all the body will be weakened. We have lost the communication with our Druze denomination in Lebanon or Syria. This has put us in a very critical and crucial situation that we are living in a closed area. Communicating with Druze of Israel is not enough, which is a minority. Druze in Israel are slightly more than 100,000 out of about a million Druze all over the Middle East. Lack of communication, identity crisis, missing social and religious horizons as well for the groups that you belong to spiritually, family-wise, historically, and everything that is related to that. Some of the decisive steps are affecting us such as the opening to many of the worldviews and changes. Alcoholism, drugs enter the Golan, and some of the intervening
"deeds that are not from our Druze society originally." (D) argues that when you lose your culture, another culture imposes itself on you that replaces the former one.

There is another psychological aspect: the "nostalgia" and the "curiosity" towards Syria. The new generation grows without this connection, thus they explain that Syria is a dream and they crave to get there someday. Subject (L): "When I was in a kid, my dad used to tell me that we belong to Syria and before the occupation, he used to go to Syria and inform me about what is there in Syria. My mom tells me that we had a house near Damascus, in Jaramana region. My grandpa and grandma were also used to narrate to me what’s there. So, I have had this curiosity to go and see. But I cannot go there because there exists a border between the two states and that they are enemies. So, I cannot go whenever I want to."

**Topic A 2:**

**Historical aspects of the Golan:**

The 1967 war was a critic historical event in the Golan Heights history. In this war, Israel occupied the Golan Heights, which had many social and psychological effects. Subject (K) stated: "In the year 67, the Israeli Army occupied the Golan Heights, after which in the year 81, the Annexation Law came up and Golan was part of Israel. There are around 40,000 Druze people in Golan, whom are known to stay in the Golan land where they lived in Masa'areeb, Baq'ata, Majdal Shams, Ain Qenya, and in Ghajar". Subject (D) pointed out that "in the year 1967, Israel occupied the Golan Heights, in all the villages that were near us all the residents were displaced to the other side. Other villages remained unified and preserved their land, farms, agricultural work, and identity."

Subject (C): "Occupation separates Golan Heights from the geographical, historical, and cultural mandate and heritage with Syria. This creates a deep psychological impact in the
hearts of Golanis”. This means, in a family stricto sensu, my children do not know their relatives. In many families, the son doesn’t know who their uncles on the other part are. Or, the grandchild does not know who is his/her grandpa or grandma. Subject (C) sustains: "Psychological separation of families creates a humanitarian crisis".

Another important event was the Annexation Law. In 1981, Israel applied the Annexation Law to the Golan territory and asked the Druze to accept the Israeli citizenship, but most of the Druze refused it. The person who accepts the identity card would become a traitor and will be expelled from the society. Subject (K): "In the Annexation Law, I’m not so much an expert in politics, but as far as I know, the 81 Law of Annexation of the Golan Heights made Golan become part of the State of Israel. People, as we know, refused the Israeli citizenship and said that their identity was Syrian-Arab thus many problems aroused between the Israeli army and the people. But on the map, Golan is a part of Israel". Subject (L) told: "In 1981, an Israeli decree was issued at the Israeli Knesset to grant the Golan residents the Israeli identity. But we are Syrian Arabs and we don’t accept to take the Israeli identity. There was the 6-month turmoil and it is a remembrance the Golanian families celebrate. Some of the population took the citizenship, those who still didn’t have any nationality. They took the decision that we are abstained from talking to the people who have the citizenship and they are not allowed to participate in the weddings nor the funerals."

The Arab Spring changed many issues in the Golan society. In 2010, many of the citizens of Arab states demonstrated and protested against the different regimes. Nowadays, most of the Golani subjects think that the Arab Spring influences the society in the Golan by being against or pro the Syrian regime. Subject (K) argued: "The "Arab Spring"...So, unfortunately, Golan Heights from long ago was known for its residents so tight in helping one another, simple in
their living, a loving people. But nowadays, after the civil war in Syria, this affected much the conditions in Golan. I say it with pain in my heart that we are not used to this in Golan. I insist to say that I am Syrian-Arab even under the occupation. It is right what is said "A conspiracy on Syria..." But it is also on Golan Heights as well. We, as a civil society, are in depression psychologically". Subject (D) added: "The people of Golan are reactive about the crisis in the Middle East (ME) but are not active. We, as a part and parcel of the Middle East, we look at our role and we see that the ME is boiling. What has begun as "Arab Spring" from Libya, Yemen, and now Syria, it is all a mess and turmoil. In the midst of this mess, it is like a raging ocean you are living in. You cannot predict the consequences whether towards cooling down or escalating. In the short horizon of time, all indicators show that we are heading towards escalation and severe, destroying war. Anybody and all of humanity do not like anything other than security, peace and serenity. The impoverished and torn apart families are a crisis by themselves, which is already so perilous. Our view is futuristic, and no one knows how the future is going to be. But, according to what we can see, which is strange, issues are going towards escalating more than calming down. This will affect all the nations in the region". Subject (L) told: "There is a huge influence (Arab Spring), there exists some division between rebels and pro-regime people. We didn’t like all that happened, which is the dissection of our unity, but it happened. You cannot say to any person that his way of thinking is wrong. After all, each one of us thinks and sees things differently."

*Topic A 3:*

*Arab Spring:*

One of the historical events which influenced the Golan society is the Arab Spring, notably the civil war in Syria as a consequence of this movement. From that moment on, the Golan
society got split into three parts: 1. Pro-Assad 2. Anti-Assad 3. No opinion. The first two groups conflict on the matter, which in turn impacts the Druze society. Subject (K) explains: "The "Arab Spring"...So, unfortunately, Golan Heights from long ago was known for its residents so tight in helping one another, simple in their living, a loving people. But nowadays, after the civil war in Syria, this affected much the conditions in Golan. I say it with pain in my heart that we are not used to this in Golan. I insist to say that I am Syrian-Arab even under the occupation. It is right what is said "A conspiracy on Syria..." But it is also on Golan Heights as well. We, as a civil society, are in depression psychologically."

Subject (D) added: "The people of Golan are reactive about the crisis in the Middle East but are not active. We, as a part and parcel of the Middle East, we look at our role and we see that the ME is boiling. What has begun as "Arab Spring" from Libya, Yemen, and now Syria, it is all a mess and turmoil. In the midst of this mess, it is like a raging ocean you are living in. You cannot predict the consequences whether towards cooling down or escalating. In the short horizon of time, all indicators show that we are heading towards escalation and severe, destroying war. Anybody and all of humanity do not like anything other than security, peace and serenity. The impoverished and torn apart families are a crisis by themselves, which is already so perilous. Our view is futuristic, and no one knows how the future is going to be. But, according to what we can see, which is strange, issues are going towards escalating more than calming down. This will affect all the nations in the region".

_Carmel_

**Topic B 1:**

_Collaboration of the Israeli Druze with the Israeli army:_
Most of the Carmeli subjects said that the Military Service Law was a critical point in the history of the Druze in Israel, when Israel started to treat them as "non-Arabs". Subject (F) said: "In the year 1956, the Druze accepted (the law), but they didn’t ask for it. This is a wrong idea. However, the Israeli Government wanted to military recruit the Druze and as a minority and tough warriors, they accepted on themselves the compulsory military service and with minimal objection.

There was an idea to recruit all Arabs in 1954. Those who came to the recruitment offices from Islam and Christianity outnumbered those from the Druze. But the Israeli Government didn’t want to invest money and energy in the Druze to better their situation."

Subject (A): "Druze entered with the Israeli army and the number of Druze citizens were 12,000 people in the year 1948. All Arabs were defeated. If Druze didn’t support the State of Israel, they would be refugees. So, Druze decided to take their fate into their hands, to stay where the State of Israel rules, cooperate with it and in one way or another preserve their existence. But Druze had protected tens of Christian and Islamic villages like those of El Maghar, El Bega’aya, Kfar Yaseef".

At the same time the Druze were discriminated against and felt inferiority, they protested that Israel should give them more advantages and benefits because they serve in the military service. Subject (H) stated: "There is too much turmoil because you know the political circumstances in Israel created a non-stable Druze human being. You go to the army these days and there is almost complete justice there. This is the truth. When you return to the army, you’ll see that you are not treated the same way as your Jewish colleagues. Acceptance to the market is not equal to that of the Jew. If you want to build at a cheap price, or to be granted to purchase some apartment, an Arab is not equal to a Jew in this but is being discriminated
against, treated as a suspect, and considered unfaithful to the Israeli State. That's how the common people look at an Arab living in Israel.

That's why, you are forced not to disclose that you are an Arab. This means that your accent (language) is Arabic, your food is Arabic, everything in you is Arabic. This is a clear manifestations conflict between the identification as Arab and Israeli”.

Topic B 2:

Historical aspects - The Carmeli Druze history:

The Druze in the Carmel have two critical history events that have influenced their psycho-social aspects.

A: The Israeli Independence:

In 1948, Israel became an independent State and, at the time, the Druze were pro-Israel and did not have a political opinions that were against Israelis. Subject (F) stated: “In Israel or Palestine, we Druze are weak, but always in contact and we rely on our brothers in Syria and Lebanon, until the last incidents came with some conditions from the State of Israel”. There were persecution, problems, and prosecutions by Muslim extremists on the Druze. So, the Druze were urged to defend themselves. Druze joined the Israeli army and the number of Druze citizens was 12,000 people in the year 1948.

B. The participation of the Druze in the IDF (Israel Defense Forces):

The participation of the Druze in the IDF (Israel Defense Forces) opened them the door to get into the Israeli society. Subject (H) explains: “there was a struggle between the Palestinians and the Zionist Movement where Druze stood aside because they are a small minority like 14,000 all over Israel in 18
countries. But, unfortunately, Arab Rebellious Movements rose up without any principles and with no ethics. They tried to transgress and killed people. They were coming to villages holding guns, money, and families wanted money. Some of the Druze families that have been injured during war such as Khanfees, Labin (Rakan's dad), and many Cheikhs went to the Jews. The Jews had always been trying to befriend the Druze and to keep them aside as Druze were known as strong warriors. Then, the Israeli State was established in 1948 and the Druze were part of it. Many of them joined the Israeli army and we were under military rule from 1948 until 1958. In the year 1956, the Druze accepted, but they didn't ask for it. The Israeli government does not see in the Druze soldiers as a fundamental part in the IDF. They do simple missions in most of the three years, there are some cases when they do important missions. Why do you think that they do in the IDF? They fight Arabs at checkpoints. They are the face and the front of the IDF. The Druze does not realize that this confrontation with the Palestinians does not do well to our situation”.

Shared topics

Topic C 1:
Clinging to the land:

Most of the Druze are farmers and workers in agriculture. I found that mainly in the Golan Highlights, where people are very connected to the land, and there is a correlation between the land and social identity. Subject (D) explained: "In addition, the Golani has done something else, which is to preserve and keep his land intact and to use it for agriculture especially cherries, apples."
Preserving our land and its products is part of preserving our identity and not lose it. We have a very important agricultural production, which is an essential part not to be manipulated with and lost from whomever. This gives us independency in our identity. Here, I remember saying to Kamal Joumblat: "Property is a social function, as long as a man owns a land and crops production, this will give him more independency in his identity, which in turn gives freedom and then, you'll not allow anyone to manipulate your potential." This is what happened to the Golani, belonging to a nation, a religion, and preservation of a land."

For many Druze, the land means security and respect; the Druze religion maintains three fundamental aspects: land, ownership and religion. Subject (C) clarified "There was a process of social equality. So, the whole Druze community in the Golan owns a land. These reasons made them stay on their land. This is the beginning of all the invasions, attacks, and transgressions from the time of the Ottomans. From the time of the Ottomans, this land was burned three times and by the French, seven times. But despite all these tough times of destruction and devastation, people didn’t leave their houses or their lands.

Many families were martyrs acting in defense of their country and refused to leave. Politically speaking, people don’t leave their home and run away. For the peasants, land is all they own in life. Therefore there was a correlation between people and their land. This is one of the major reasons that made people stay on their properties."

Subject (H) pointed out that "Druze have three main values, which they maintained all over history. Isaac Ben Tesfi published a scientific article in 1952, which deals with the question: "How were Druze able to preserve their existence for more than 1000 years in spite of the hostile environment they live in?" My answer, according to my knowledge, is because of three values. The Druze preserves religion, land (properties), and purity (honor)."
**Topic C 2:**

**Identity conflict:**

Most of the interviewees speak about the social identity conflict in the Druze communities. Three categories prevail: Arabic, Druze and Israeli.

The mother tongue of the Druze is Arabic, thus they have the basic Arab background, and yet what makes them different from other Arabs (Muslims and Christians) is their involvement in the Israeli/Jewish society. At the same time, Israel treats the Druze similarly to all the Arabs, negating their involvement in the IDF (Israel Defense Forces) and other security systems. Meanwhile, Arabs think that Druze are traitors, thus treat the Druze as non-Arabs. Subject (H): “We haven’t become Jews and we are still not Arabs.”

Subject (E) develops: "Being an existing minority, we originally have a problem to take away our identity. But, we were separated from Islam to the extent that we are losing our own identity. But, as far as we are living in the Israeli State, we cannot but leave our identity. I don’t say from where my origin is but I say that I’m Druze as my identity or I am Israeli. A young traditional Druze man from the Carmel Mountain identifies himself as a Druze Israeli."

Subject (H) reports: “This is the identity according to the state, but I’ve never studied it to know its depth nor whether it is based on a solid foundation. I have no principle, which helps me be like any other citizen. I say that this is the easiest way to live, to please the government, with the idea that there are no enemies because I don’t have enough potential to fight them. In the current political conditions since the rise of the Israeli State, the Druze knows himself on the basis that it’s easier for him not to search for his origins but rather to know his identity.”
Subject (F) tells: “Our identity has a small problem in respect with the government. This is because we are pro-Israeli regime and when the State of Israel is present and strong, we’re present and strong as well. If, God forbid, the State of Israel will be instable, we will be the first harmed.

What is the identity problematic? If I want I can tell I define myself as Druze-Israeli, then the Arab identity is a problem. Being an Arab native language is right mother tongue. While in the State of Israel there exists another problem: The Arab became a political concept in the Arab-Israeli reality. The Israeli is the person pro State of Israel and the Arab is the person who is against Israel. We’ll not be able to change this fact. If now you say to a Druze - Israel “you’re an Arab” he gets offended. Or, tell him that he is an Arab because his mother tongue is Arabic, right, the fact is, it's a fact. I have a problem: Druze have no argument, Israel is not a debate, an Arab has it and argues.”

Subject (A) tells: "From one side, concept definition (An Arab) in the state of Israel. This is the Political concept. National concept hero. He became Political concept, whose name is Arab, and it was said that if you say to anyone that Arab. Is (Against) anti-Israel, so today is perceived as something that we as an Arab (Against) anti-Israel, and does not want to be anti-Israel."

Topic C 3:

Women’s place:

Women are torn between the social identity conflict that the Druze men experience similarly, and whether to be conservative or modern. In the history of the Druze society, women have always had a specific role in the family: they should be about the education of the children and their homework. In the past, women did not see themselves as a dominant part of the society, but today they have more power and influence. In the last few
years, women have started working outside the village studying at university. Yet, the freedom of the Druze women is limited and differs from other women in Israel. That is why the interviewees talked about the difficulties of women within the Druze society.

Subject (H): *If you want to know the social level of a society?! You must know the social position of the women in that society. If the men and the women respect the women it is a high society and if the society places the women in low positions it means that this society is undemocratic and primitive."

Subject (L): *"If we want to change the treatment of Israel to our society, we need to change our vision of our women. In these times, the women are fundamental part of us, it is impossible to live in 2013 and to be in 1500. The women must be in governments, politics, sports and not only in the kitchen."

*Topic C 4:

*Cultural invasion:*

The social split between the generations and the conflict, between being traditional vs. being modern has bases in the "cultural invention" as the Golan and Carmel Druze claim. Subject (C) argues: *"Materialism is overwhelming nowadays. What does a Druze young man want? He wants to live in luxury and be a person of good standing, to own a car, a house, have a wife; this is what he is really concerned about. This means that materialism and selfishness are astounding.*

*When you ask today social scientists about the difficult problems of the world, they say that it is selfishness. What does come out of selfishness? Crime, violence, hostility, robbery - all*
because of selfishness. According to economists, greed is the consequence of selfishness. We are a part and parcel of this changing society where we are infected by this disease, lamentably.

However, as we see it nowadays, our objective is to find the unifying, good, Muslim Druze who is beneficial for himself and fruitful to his society. The aim today is to raise the next generation on this notion"

The Druze society is a conservative one; the involvement of the Druze in the Israeli society exposed the Druze to its modern aspects, which was critical to the Druze.

Subject (A) adds: “From the Israeli point of view, we have security and stability, with no fear. We have laws and a structured country. The crime rate is similar to any other place for Jews. For the first time, the Druze feel in Israel as if they live in the United States of America. The Druze feel secure, and nobody asks you if you are Druze; and if the Druze are not taking their rights, this is another issue. The Druze will be killed because he is Druze is not for sure in any other places.

Furthermore, there is a tremendous weakness, in that we did not make the most of Israel’s technological advancements, education and perseverance. And yet, we took the superficiality, shallow issues and pseudo as well as the culture of pornography, forgetting about the good essence. We have had a blind tradition about girls and women. In the public places or in the streets, we gained laxity, negativity, and looseness. The Druze abroad, whether in Australia, in the US or in England face a slow danger of a civilized cultural invasion, which is changing them and taking them away from their religion and original culture. This can be seen as more dangerous than the military invasion during the Ottoman Empire. At the time, there was something clear in front of your eyes that we could be secure from. Here you are not secure.
You are just an impersonation of what you see on TV and on the internet, which enters into the core of the house and is called globalization”.

Subject (H) develops: “Materialism is overwhelming nowadays. What does a Druze young man want? He wants to live in luxury and be a person of good standing, to own a car, a house, have a wife; this is what he is really concerned about. This means that materialism and selfishness are astounding.

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We are a part and parcel of this changing society where we are infected by this disease, lamentably.

However, as I see it nowadays, our objective is to find the unifying, good, Muslim Druze who is beneficial for himself and fruitful to his society. The aim today is to raise the next generation on this notion.”

Topic C 5:

The future:

The interviewees say that they are uncertain about the future; part of them is pessimistic whereas some are optimistic. Both groups are insecure and uncertain. Subject (D) explains: “Look, if you want to see the future, this scenario is very complicated. What really hinders you is a set of intellectual, political, dogmatic, emotional laws. Here, there is a historical truth that I’m against the State of Israel in every way. We don’t look for a prosperous future here in Golan Heights. My future, as I can see it, is under the auspices of a Syrian-Arab regime. According to the situation in Syria, there is tyranny and a rebellious and revolutionary people.
So, we have hope, after 46 years where our land was occupied, to build a new Syria under a new democratic, diverse regime that elects a leader fighting for a patriotic policy and a moral project. We believe, more than any time in history, about the possibility to regain the Golan Heights. I think that the return of such a regime is through peace negotiations with the State of Israel. Then, Golan Heights will return to Syria. This is what I can feel but I don’t sense any other future for the region, residents, and identity. This is the only way to see the things, I am realistic and optimistic.”

3.2.4 Discussion

Druze in the Golan Heights talked about their difficulties related to the distance between them and the Druze in Syria. Ever since the occupation of the Golan Heights back in 1967, the Druze have neither close relations nor connections with their relatives and families from the other side (Syria). The separation from Syria causes them to lose the Syrian identity for they are pulled apart from their culture and Syrian traditions. In addition, the Druze feel curiosity, pining, longing and concerns towards the Syrian Druze. The separation from Syria is causing a strong will to visit Syria, especially among the youth. Those were the topics that regularly came up during the interviews that took place in the Golan Heights.
The Druze in Carmel see the inception of the law on compulsory recruitment to IDF (Israel Defense Forces) as an important event in the history of the Druze in Israel. In 1952, Druze spiritual leaders signed a convention that compels every young Druze who turns 18 to be recruited to the IDF. Since then, the Druze have been defined as a separate society from the rest of the Arabs in Israel. As a case in point, they have a separate education system. The interviewees claim that even though the Druze do their duty like any other Jewish citizen in the country, they are deprived. Furthermore, when a young Druze enlists in the army, he is exposed to the Israeli Jewish society; this cultural transition is extremely sharp and rough in that this young kid goes from a conservative and traditional culture to a modern and Western culture. Quite often, this exposure causes an identity conflict.

Druze, particularly in the Golan, mentioned the importance of "preserving the land", the Golan economy being mainly based on agriculture. Therefore, they consider the land as a part of their history, culture and personal identity. In their point of view, the land is their identity. If someone loses his land, he loses his identity. In addition, the Druze religion commands the Druze people to keep and maintain the lands they own since lands are the source of security and livelihood.

Interviewees from the Golan see a few events as of great importance in shaping the Golan Druze society, notably the 1967 Israeli occupation. In 1981, the Annexation Law of the Golan Heights was applied: from then on, anyone living in Golan was now subject to the Israeli Law. After the law was imposed, the Druze refused to accept the Israeli citizenship and therefore the vast majority is still without a citizenship (the Druze of the Golan Heights, captured in 1967 from Syria and annexed to Israel in 1981, are considered permanent residents under the Golan Heights Law. The majority turned down full Israeli citizenship in favor of retaining Syrian citizenship and identity). However, Druze within Israel acknowledge the independence
of the State of Israel in 1948 as an important point in the development of the Druze community. In addition, they perceive the law of compulsory recruitment of young Druze as an event that changed the status of the rest of the Druze population in Israel.

Carmel Druze interviewees talked about the harassment and the persecution they suffered from in Muslims villages before the establishment of the State. Battles and fights on religious grounds were of great impact on the Druze.

One of the most important issues, commonly brought up by both Druze societies, was the major division between different groups within each society. The interviewees from both sides talked about this division and its implications. The Golan is made of two major groups, each stepping further towards radicalism. One supports the Assad regime while the other is against it. The split between the two groups is tearing the society apart, society that has always been united against the Israeli occupation in the Golan Heights. Resisting the Israeli occupation used to be an issue that helped maintain social unity. However, the main inner conflict in the Druze of the Carmel Mountain is between secular and religious people. On the one hand, religious people in the Carmel are continuously interfering, trying to influence the behavior of the residents through the use of religion. Secular people, on the other hand, are less interested in being led by religion, as they are in seeking modernism. The religious see this phenomenon as "cultural invasion" whereas the secular see it as religious coercion.

Moreover, there exists another social split, common in both Druze societies, which is the division between men and women in terms of way of life, commitment to society or even difference between the demands of the society towards men and women. The woman’s status in the Druze society is lower than that of the man. This difference is causing a major tear in the society’s way of thinking, well-being and social perceptions.
Interviewees emphasized certain feelings and concerns they see as very crucial and common in the Druze society. Among those, are pessimism regarding the future, confusion and instability in their identity, anxiety towards the prospects of their relatives who live in Syria, fatigue coming from the current situation, low social esteem, deprivation by the state and personal insecurity.

The main topic the Druze in Carmel focused on is social identity. Druze people are going through an ongoing identity crisis. Israel treats them as non-Arabs despite their mother tongue being Arabic. At the same time, Arabs from other religions treat the Druze as traitors for serving in the army. The Druze are in the middle of the two societies. On the one hand, they are drifting apart from the Arabic culture as their language is beginning to absorb more and more Hebrew and English words. The Arabic traditional customs are losing their importance. On the other hand, the State of Israel is not investing enough in infrastructure, education and social projects. The well-being of the Druze is equals or sometimes even less than that of the rest of the Arabs living in Israel. In general, it is quite difficult for the average young Druze man to feel as a part of any social group because s/he always feels like an outsider.

The interviewees claim that the Israeli government’s approach to the Druze is disrespectful or irreverent. Druze feel that they are being treated unequally compared to Jewish citizens. What’s more, Druze argue that the state does not give them what they deserve even after serving in its army. They contend that there exists discrimination on a religious basis, Jewish settlements receiving more from the state. Some interviewees claimed that even some Muslim villages get more from the state than Druze ones. There is a trust crisis between the Druze and the State of Israel. Hence, it is possible to see that many Druze emphasize on their religious identity before their national identity. They might even say “I am a Druze" before stating "I am an Israeli." It is important to note that the Druze in the Golan Heights do not feel any
disappointment towards the State of Israel, since they see it as an occupier, thus expecting no better nor just treatment from it.

The attitude of the Arabs (Muslims, Christians) towards the Druze, according to the interviewees, is judgmental and offensive. They consider the Druze as collaborators with the State and lacking patriotism. Army recruitment initiated the division between the Druze and Arabs, where Arabs rejected the Druze and did not accept them into the society. Druze felt that the Arab society did not want them, hence they took a step back and disengaged themselves from the Arabs. It was important for me to ask the interviewees about their perspective of the future. Most of them predicted an unstable and unknown future. The general tendency was pessimistic. The Carmel Druze saw a cultural loss and identity crisis whereas in the Golan, Druze evoked civil war and a social split between the generations and the conflict between being traditional vs. being modern has roots in the "cultural invention" - as the Golan and Carmel Druze claim.

3.3. Quantitative research

3.3.1 Introduction

Considering the ecological background and the results of qualitative research, the aims of this step are firstly to study the components of the social identity of the Druze in the Golan Heights and Mount Carmel, trying to give numbers to describe the identity conflict, by using standards scales to study the elements of each identity and the relation between these elements. Secondly, we directed our goals at a better understanding of the conflicts between the social identity components and how this conflict is expressed in psychological dimensions as the sense of shame and guilt, feelings of optimism and collective esteem.
3.3.2 Hypotheses

The hypotheses of this quantitative research are as follow:

1. There are significant differences between the components of the social identity of the Golan Druze and that of the Carmel Druze, or rather, what is the significant differences between the original identities of each group (Arabic - Syrian – Druze – Israeli).

2. There is a dominant identity crossing both groups. Does the fact of living in an ongoing political conflict increase a dominant identity?

3. There is a conflict between the identity components. Identifying in more than two social categories (Arabic - Syrian – Druze – Israeli) at the same time creates a social identity conflict.

4. The social identity conflict has an impact on the sense of shame and guilt in the Carmel and in the Golan.

5. The social identity conflict has an impact on feelings of optimism in the Carmel and in the Golan.

6. The social identity conflict has an impact on the self-collective esteem in the Carmel and in the Golan.

7. There is a correlation between the social identity conflict and the quality of contacts with Jewish citizens in the Carmel and in the Golan.

3.3.3 Methodology

In this part of the study, we used structured questionnaires to measure aspects of the study. These aspects were divided into two parts:
Firstly: identities conflicts;

Secondly: psycho-social dimensions.

In the first part we measured the social identity conflict by using structured questionnaires based on the Theory of Bicultural identity integrity using scale Version 2 (BIIS-2) by V. Benet-Martinez (2005). In addition, we used the social identification scale (Phinney, 1990; Phinney, et al., 1997).

In the second part of the surveys, we measured the psycho-social dimensions by using structural questionnaires: in order to measure the relation of the identity conflict with optimism, we used the life orientation scale (Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994). Regarding the collective self-esteem and perception of the social group, we used the collective self-esteem scale (Luhtanen, R., & Crocker, J., 1992).

We adopted the social distance scale to measure the quality of the contact between groups and used the shame and guilty scale to measure the feeling of shame and guilt between groups. We went for the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS-X, 1994) to measure feelings in relation to identity conflict.

To go more into details:

- Was asked to the participants to compile the social identification scale (1990, Phinney) adapted to the research contexts, and further we asked them to indicate the sense of identification of 4 different identities: Druze, Arabic, Israeli and Syrian;

- To answer one central aim (Psychosocial dimension) of this research, we asked the participants about the sense of optimism by using the life orientation scale (Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994). The questionnaires were divided into 5 items which measure the self-future expectations.
- *Collective self-esteem scale* (Luhtanen, R., & Crocker, J., 1992) mustered the self-perceptions of the self-identification group. We used the questionnaire to better understand the impact of the conflict on the individual's perceptions of the group.

- The *social distance* scale measured the quality of the contact and the social relationships between groups. We asked the participants to indicate the quality and the quantity of the relations with outside groups. We used this information to understand whether the social conflict increases or decreases contacts between different groups.

- Shame and guilt questionnaires were used to study the impact of the social identity conflict on the shame and guilt feeling when the in-group/out-group expresses a violent act against the opposite group.

Social distance questionnaire was carried out to test the quality and the quantity of the contacts between the participants and the out-group.

The average completion time of the questionnaires ranged from 20 to 30 minutes.

The complete questionnaire are in Appendix N.3.

### 3.3.4 Subjects

The participants (N 196) were men (N 102 - 46%) and women (N 91- 54%) – 3 subjects did not indicate their gender - from the ages 17-61 (average age 28.7) who were asked to compile the questionnaires freely; they participated voluntarily after they were kindly asked to do so and after signing a participation certificate.

The participants were divided into 2 categories:

3. Carmel citizens

4. Golan citizens
Carmel: N 94 subjects, of which N 52 men, N 39 women, 3 did not indicate their gender - average age 28.6.


The questionnaires were divided into 2 categories that have the same items but in a different order:

C. Demographical items, identities items and psycho-social items.

D. Identities items, psycho-social items and demographical items.

- Carmel A: subjects N 39
- Carmel B: subjects N 55
- Golan A: subjects N 55
- Golan B: subjects N 47

3.3.5 Results

3.3.5.1 The identities conflict among the Druze: Carmel vs. Golan

Table 1: Social Identities Conflicts, (BIIS-2) by V Benet-Martinez (2005)
We conducted repeated ANOVA measures in order to compare the different types of identity conflicts. The analysis of table (N.1) revealed a significant main effect for conflict type, $F(2,176) = 3.87, p = .023, \eta^2_p = .042$. Post-hoc comparisons using the Bonferroni adjustment ($\alpha = .05$) showed that the conflict between Arab and Israeli, the conflict between Druze and Israeli and the conflict between Druze and Arab was significantly greater for the Carmel Druze than the Golan Druze. The largest gap was in the conflict between the Arab and Israeli identity, what is a confirmation of the hypothesis that the Druze in Carmel have more social identity conflict since they are socially divided between the Arab society and the Israeli society.
3.3.5.2 **Comparing social identities**

Table 2: Comparing social identities group-crossing

We conducted a t-test in order to compare the levels of conflict between the components of identities in the Carmel and the Golan together. The participants of each group were conjoint to one group to measure which identity conflict is more salient than the other.

- Druze and Arab;
- Druze and Nationality: in order to compare the other conflicts, we considered the Syrian identity and the Israeli identity as national identity and we called it "Nationality";
- Arab and Nationality: in order to compare the other conflicts we considered the Syrian identity and the Israeli identity as national identity and we hereafter refer to it as "Nationality".

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Conflict Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Druze and Arab</td>
<td>2.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Druze and Nationality</td>
<td>2.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab and Nationality</td>
<td>3.73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The table shows that the conflicts between Arab & nationality is the salient conflict in both groups. In other words, to have a conflict between Syrian and Israeli in the Golan or to have a conflict between Arab and Israeli in the Carmel is greater than any other type of conflict: Arab-Druze or Druze–nationality.

3.3.5.3 **Social Identity components**

Table 3: Social Identity components (Social Identification scale), Phinney 1990.

![Social Identity Components Graph]

For the Arab, Druze and Israeli identities, we conducted a 2-way mixed ANOVA with each region (Carmel vs. Golan) as a between-subject factor and identity type as a within-subject factor. The analysis revealed a significant main effect of identity type, $F(2,364) = 127.92, p<.001$, $\eta^2 = .413$, and a significant main effect of region $F(1,182) = 43.79, p<.001$, $\eta^2 = .194$. However, these effects were qualified by a significant identity type × region (Carmel vs Golan) interaction, $F(2,364) =$
36.54, $p < .001$, $\eta^2_p = .167$. Post-hoc comparisons using the Bonferroni adjustment ($\alpha = .05$) showed that:

- **Carmel Region**: the results showed that the Druze identity was significantly greater than any other identities (Israeli and Arab) ($p < .001$);

- **Golan Region**: Syrian identity was measured only among the Golan Druze. In order to compare the other identity components we conducted repeated ANOVA measures. The analysis revealed a significant main effect for the identity component, $F(3,279) = 94.90$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2_p = .505$. Post-hoc comparisons using the Bonferroni adjustment ($\alpha = .05$) showed that the Israel identity was significantly lower than any other identities (Syrian, Druze and Arab) ($p < .001$). In addition, the Arab identity is significantly greater in the Golan than in Carmel.
Table 4: Correlations among the Social Identities conflict in the Carmel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Carmel</th>
<th>Conflict Arab &amp; Israeli identity</th>
<th>Conflict Druze &amp; Arab identity</th>
<th>Conflict Israeli &amp; Druze Identity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Arab &amp; Israeli identity</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Druze &amp; Arab identity</td>
<td>.263*</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Israeli &amp; Druze Identity</td>
<td>.804**</td>
<td>.096</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above table (N.4) displays the zero-order correlations between the social identities conflicts in the Carmel.

The table shows that the conflicts between Arab & Israeli identities are strongly correlated with Druze & Arab identity conflict and Israeli & Druze identity conflict. In other words, the individual who lives in the Carmel with high conflict between the Arab & Israeli identity is strongly correlated with high conflict between Druze & Arab identity, and at the same time experiences high conflict between Israeli & Druze identity.
3.3.5.5 Correlations among the Social Identities conflicts in the Golan

Table 5: Correlations among the Social Identities conflict in the Golan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Conflict Druze &amp; Arab identity</th>
<th>Conflict Arab &amp; Syrian identity</th>
<th>Conflict Syrian &amp; Druze identity</th>
<th>Conflict Israeli &amp; Syrian identity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Druze &amp; Arab identity</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Arab &amp; Syrian identity</td>
<td>.638**</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Syrian &amp; Druze identity</td>
<td>.667**</td>
<td>.704**</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Israeli &amp; Syrian identity</td>
<td>-.063</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>-.026</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table (N.5) displays the zero-order correlations between the social identities conflict in the Golan with social identities conflict. The table shows that the conflicts between Druze & Arab identity are strongly correlated with Arab & Syrian identity conflict and Syrian & Druze identity conflict. In addition, the conflict between the Israeli & Syrian identity has no correlation with other conflicts. Put another way, the individual who lives in the Golan with high conflict between the Arab & Druze identity is strongly correlated with high conflict between Syrian & Arab identity and high conflict between Syrian & Druze Identity.

3.3.5.6 Identification categories in the Carmel

Table 6: Correlations between the Social identity conflict vs. the Social identification categories in the Carmel
The above table (N.6) displays the zero-order correlations between the social identities conflict in the Carmel with social identifications.

The table shows that the conflict between Arab & Israeli identity is negatively correlated with Israeli identity. In addition, the conflict between the Druze & Arab identity is negatively correlated with Arab identity. Furthermore, the conflict between the Israeli & Druze identity is positively correlated with Arab identity. In other words, the individual who lives in the Carmel with high level of Arab identification is positively correlated with a high conflict between the Israeli & Druze identity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict Arab &amp; Israeli identity</th>
<th>Arab</th>
<th>Druze</th>
<th>Israeli</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>**</td>
<td>.051</td>
<td>-0.041</td>
<td>-0.283**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Druze &amp; Arab identity</td>
<td>-.480**</td>
<td>-.025</td>
<td>.193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Israeli &amp; Druze Identity</td>
<td>244*</td>
<td>-.081</td>
<td>.104</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.3.5.7 Identification categories in the Golan

Table 7: Correlations between the Social identity conflict vs. the Social identification categories in the Golan
The above table (N.7) displays the zero-order correlations between the social identities conflict in the Golan with social identifications.

The table shows that the Arab identity is negatively correlated with identity conflict between Druze & Arab identity, Arab & Syrian identity and Syrian & Druze identity. In addition, the conflict between the Druze & Arab identity is negatively correlated with Israeli identity present in a small amount of subjects. In addition, Syrian identity is negatively correlated with identity conflict between Druze & Arab identity, Arab & Syrian identity and Syrian & Druze identity. Furthermore, the Israeli & Syrian identity conflict is not correlated with any of the social identifications.

In other words, for the few individuals who live in the Golan with high level of Israeli identification, this identification is positively correlated with a high conflict between the Arab & Druze identity. In addition, in the Golan, the high level of Israeli & Syrian identity conflict is not correlated with any social identity category. The explanation of this non-correlation is the fact that the Syrian-Israeli conflict is a particular conflict, being a combination between two independent national identities which is a high sensitive conflict that can be seen as the acceptance of the Israeli occupation.

### 3.3.5.8 Optimism and Social Identities conflict in the Carmel

Table 8: Correlations between optimism vs. social identities conflict and the social identification categories in the Carmel

| Conflict Druze & Arab identity | -0.385** | -0.234* | 0.224* | -0.404** |
| Conflict Arab & Syrian identity | -0.470** | -0.057 | 0.195 | -0.424** |
| Conflict Syrian & Druze identity | -0.214* | -0.258* | 0.172 | -0.467** |
| Conflict Israeli & Syrian identity | 0.045 | 0.064 | -0.054 | 0.060 |
The above table (N.8) displays the zero-order correlations between sense optimism and the social identities conflict and the social identification categories in the Carmel.

The table shows that the Arab and Israeli identification is negativity correlated with a sense of optimism. In other words, the individual who identifies himself as Arab or Israeli has a lesser sense of optimism. In addition, the identity conflict has no correlation with a sense of optimism in the Carmel. In addition, the Druze identity is more correlated with optimism / less pessimism than other identities. In other words, being a Druze in Carmel is to be more optimistic than other identities.

3.3.5.9 **Optimism and Social Identities conflict in the Golan**

Table 9: Correlations between optimism vs. social identities conflict and the Social identification categories in the Golan.
The above table (N.9) displays the zero-order correlations between sense optimism and the social identities conflict and the social identification categories in the Golan. The table shows that the conflict between the Israeli and Syrian identity is negativity correlated with a sense of optimism. In other words, the individual who has a conflict between the Syrian and the Israeli identity has less sense of optimism. In addition, the social identification categories has no correlation with a sense of optimism in the Golan. Briefly, in the Golan, sense of optimism does not correlate with the variables of identity (except as noted above), differently to what happens in Carmel.

### 3.3.5.10 Contact and Identities Conflicts in the Carmel

Table 10: Correlations between quality and frequency of contacts vs. Social Identities conflict and the Social identification categories in the Carmel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Carmel</th>
<th>Conflict Arab &amp; Israeli identity</th>
<th>Conflict Druze &amp; Arab identity</th>
<th>Conflict Israeli &amp; Druze identity</th>
<th>Arab</th>
<th>Druze</th>
<th>Israeli</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High frequency of contacts with Jewish citizens</td>
<td>-.306**</td>
<td>-.053</td>
<td>-.274**</td>
<td>.225*</td>
<td>-.042</td>
<td>.405**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The above table (N.10) displays the zero-order correlations with the quality and quantity of contacts with Jewish citizen in relation with the social identities conflict and the social identification categories in the Carmel.

The table shows that the Arab and Israeli identification is positively correlated with the high frequency of contacts with Jewish citizens. In addition, the Arab & Israeli identity conflict is negatively correlated with the high frequency of contact and positively correlated with the positive quality of contacts with Jewish citizens. The same effects happen in the case of Israeli & Druze: Identity conflict is highly correlated with a positive quality of contacts with Jewish citizens and negativity correlated with high frequency of contacts with Jewish citizens. The conflicts between the Druze & Arab identity is not affected by the quality and quantity of contacts with Jewish citizens.

Put another way, the individual with a high level of contacts with Jewish citizens has high level of categorization. The explanations of the negative correlation between high frequency and social identity conflict are that the Druze residents in the Carmel are living in on-going discriminations and contradiction treatment. Sometimes they are treated as equal citizens and sometimes are treated as second level of criticizes. This dual treatment supports to create a split in the sense of belonging.

| Positive quality of contacts with Jewish citizens | .254* | -.196 | .317** | .132 | -.180 | -.192 |

3.3.5.11 Contact and Identities Conflicts in the Golan:

Table 11: Correlations between quality and frequency of contacts vs. Social Identities conflict and the Social identification categories in the Golan
The above table (N.11) displays the zero-order correlation of the quality and quantity of contacts with Jewish citizens, in relation with the Social Identities conflict and the Social identification categories in the Golan. The table shows that the identifications categories and the conflict between identities are not correlated with the quantity of contacts with Jewish citizens. In addition, the Israeli & Syrian identity conflict is highly correlated with a high quality of contacts with Jewish citizens. In an opposite way, the Druze and Israeli identifications decrease with a high quality of contacts with Jewish citizens.

### 3.3.5.12 Collective Self-esteem and Identity Conflicts in the Carmel

Table 12: Correlations between collective self-esteem vs. the Social identities conflict and the Social identification categories in the Carmel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Conflict Arab &amp; Israeli identity</th>
<th>Conflict Druze &amp; Arab identity</th>
<th>Conflict Israeli &amp; Druze identity</th>
<th>Arab</th>
<th>Druze</th>
<th>Israeli</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Carmel</td>
<td>Positive collective self-esteem</td>
<td>-0.093</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>-0.095</td>
<td>0.095</td>
<td>0.552**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The above table (N.12) displays the zero-order correlations between collective self-esteem with the social identities conflict and the social identification categories in the Carmel.

The table shows that the Arab & Israeli identity conflict and the Israeli & Druze Identity conflict are strongly correlated with a negative sense of collective self-esteem. In addition, the Druze identification is strongly correlated with a positive collective self-esteem. In other words, the identity conflicts are correlated negatively with collective self-esteem.

### 3.3.5.13 Collective Self-esteem and Identity Conflicts in the Golan

Table 13: Correlations between collective self-esteem vs. the Social Identities conflict and the Social identification categories in the Golan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Golan</th>
<th>Conflict Druze &amp; Arab identity</th>
<th>Conflict Arab &amp; Syrian identity</th>
<th>Conflict Syrian &amp; Druze identity</th>
<th>Conflict Israeli &amp; Syrian identity</th>
<th>Arab</th>
<th>Druze</th>
<th>Israeli</th>
<th>Syrian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.223*</td>
<td>.180</td>
<td>.222*</td>
<td>-.045</td>
<td>-146</td>
<td>.005</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The above table (N.13) displays the zero-order correlations between collective self-esteem with the social identities conflict and the social identification categories in the Golan.

The table shows that the Israeli & Syrian identity conflict and Syrian & Druze identity conflict are strongly correlated with a negative collective self-esteem. In addition, the Druze, Arab and Syrian identification is strongly correlated with a positive collective self-esteem. Henceforth, the identity conflicts are correlated negatively with collective self-esteem.

The collective self-esteem in the Carmel is positivity correlated only with the Druze identity, in the Golan it is positively correlated with Syrian, Arab and Druze. This may indicate that the Golan Druze identity is identified with the Syrian and Arab identity meaning that to be Druze is to be Arab and Syrian.

### 3.3.5.14 Shame and Guilt emotion and Social Identities conflicts in the Carmel

Table 14: Correlations between Shame and Guilt emotion vs. Social Identities conflict and the Social identification categories in the Carmel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Carmel</th>
<th>Conflict Arab &amp; Israeli identity</th>
<th>Conflict Druze &amp; Arab identity</th>
<th>Conflict Israeli &amp; Druze Identity</th>
<th>Arab</th>
<th>Druze</th>
<th>Israeli</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positive collective self-esteem</td>
<td>-.198</td>
<td>-.085</td>
<td>-.159</td>
<td>-.090</td>
<td>.295**</td>
<td>.416**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative collective self-esteem</td>
<td>.025</td>
<td>.091</td>
<td>.209*</td>
<td>.218*</td>
<td>.005</td>
<td>-.123</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The above table (N.14) displays the zero-order correlations between Shame and Guilt emotions and the social identities conflict and the social identification categories in the Carmel.

The table shows that the shame and guilt emotion when Arabs attack Israelis is correlated with high level of Israeli identification and Druze & Arab identity conflict. Furthermore, the shame and guilt emotion when Arabs attack Israelis is negativity correlated with high level of Israeli & Druze Identity and Arab & Israeli identity conflict.

In the case when Israelis attack Arabs, the shame and guilt emotion is strongly correlated with the Arabic identifications. Thus, the Arab identity is positively correlated when Israelis attack Arabs and vice versa.

### 3.3.5.15 Shame and Guilt emotion and Social Identities conflicts in the Golan:

Table 15: Correlations between Shame and Guilt emotion vs. the Social Identities conflict and the Social identification categories in the Golan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Shame emotion when Arabs attack Israelis</th>
<th>Guilt emotion when Arabs attack Israelis</th>
<th>Guilt emotion when Israelis attack Arabs</th>
<th>Shame emotion when Israelis attack Arabs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>- .235</strong></td>
<td><strong>.229</strong></td>
<td><strong>-.317</strong></td>
<td><strong>-.086</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.135</td>
<td>.247**</td>
<td>.061</td>
<td>.346**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.103</td>
<td>.268**</td>
<td>-.171</td>
<td>-.092</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.061</td>
<td>.317**</td>
<td>.164</td>
<td>.039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.155</td>
<td>.019</td>
<td>.201</td>
<td>.223**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.164</td>
<td>.039</td>
<td>.174</td>
<td>.042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.174</td>
<td>.032</td>
<td>.163</td>
<td>.215**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.170</td>
<td>.042</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table shows the zero-order correlations between Shame and Guilt emotions and the social identities conflict and the social identification categories in the Carmel.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Conflict Druze &amp; Arab identity</th>
<th>Conflict Arab &amp; Syrian identity</th>
<th>Conflict Syrian &amp; Druze identity</th>
<th>Conflict Israeli &amp; Syrian identity</th>
<th>Arab</th>
<th>Druze</th>
<th>Israeli</th>
<th>Syrian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shame emotion when Arabs attack Israelis</td>
<td>.149</td>
<td>.030</td>
<td>.117</td>
<td>-.198</td>
<td>.085</td>
<td>.266**</td>
<td>.293**</td>
<td>-.095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guilt emotion when Arabs attack Israelis</td>
<td>.220*</td>
<td>.201*</td>
<td>.268**</td>
<td>-.310**</td>
<td>-.112</td>
<td>.111</td>
<td>.129</td>
<td>.313**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guilt emotion when Israelis attack Arabs</td>
<td>-.046</td>
<td>-.036</td>
<td>.036</td>
<td>-.049</td>
<td>.088</td>
<td>.049</td>
<td>-.167</td>
<td>.078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shame emotion when Israelis attack Arabs</td>
<td>.045</td>
<td>.046</td>
<td>.045</td>
<td>.023</td>
<td>.105</td>
<td>.110</td>
<td>-.088</td>
<td>.114</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above table (N.15) displays the zero-order correlations between Shame and Guilt emotion and the Social Identities conflict and the Social identification categories in the Golan.

The table shows that the shame and guilt emotion when Israelis attack Arabs is not correlated with any identity or conflict identity. Furthermore, the shame and guilt emotion when Israelis attack Arabs is strongly correlated with high level of Druze & Arab identity, Arab & Syrian identity, Syrian & Druze identity, Druze and Israeli identification. Moreover, the Syrian identification is negatively correlated with shame and guilt when Arabs attack Israelis.
Chapter 4

4. Final Discussion

The quantitative part of the research shows the social identities conflicts in the Druze society in numbers. We divide the subjects into two geographical parts:

- Golan Heights
- Carmel Mount

We based the quantitative research on the data of qualitative study by doing a semi-structural study using interviews, questionnaires and content analysis. Based on the qualitative results, we built the quantitative questionnaires battery.

We compared the level of the Social Identity conflict in the Carmel and in the Golan, and found that the conflict in the Carmel is higher than the Golan. The table (N.1) shows that the conflict with Arab & Druze, Arab & Israeli and Druze & Israeli identities is always greater in the Carmel than in the Golan Heights. This result confirms our first hypotheses. The explanation of these differences is the complexity of the Carmel's social contexts, and more specifically:

1. The conflict between loyalty to the State and discrimination of Israel towards the Druze.

2. The change of the cultural values - the Druze society in the Carmel is moving from a conservative society to a modern society, leaving behind many traditional values.

3. The small geographical distance between the Carmel mount and Haifa city, which makes more contacts between the Jewish and Druze societies possible.
This quantitative result of the identity conflict topic is supported by the qualitative result; Subject (H) from the Carmel: “We haven’t become Jews and we are still not Arabs.” And Subject (E) develops: "Being an existing minority, we originally have a problem to take away our identity. But, we were separated from Islam to the extent that we are losing our own identity. But, as far as we are living in the Israeli State, we cannot but leave our identity. I don't say from where my origin is but I say that I'm Druze as my identity or I am Israeli. A young traditional Druze man from the Carmel Mountain identifies himself as a Druze Israeli."

All the above examples increase the social identity conflict in the Carmel.

In table (N.2), we show that the conflict between the Arab identity and the national (State) identity is greater than the other types of identities. This data expressed the influence of the geopolitical conflict between the Arabs and Israel. In other words, being Israeli and Arab at the same time and in the same situation creates an identity conflict because Israel is in a geo-political conflict with the Arabs and each other considers the other an enemy.

This geo-political situation influences the individuals who live in Israel and who identify themselves as Arabs. On the other hand, the conflict between the religion & the State or the conflict between culture & religions is smaller than the conflict between culture & nationality.

Social identity is a complex pattern of various identities; we used the social identity scale to measure the component of the identities of the Druze society. Table (N.3) shows that the Druze identity is the most significant identity in the Carmel; the other identities are at an equal level of identification.

In the Golan Heights, the Syrian identity is the most significant; the other identities have an equal level of identification. The explanation of these results is that each society tends to express
and maintain a unique social identity which gives it a particular position within the Israeli society. In the case of the Carmel Druze, they maintain the religion identity, which gives them a unique position in the Israeli society to insure their security and cultural values. In the case of the Golan, the Syrian identity is most significant because it gives them the particular position of a Druze in the Carmel and an Arab in Israel.

Other interesting data is independent social identity conflict: we found that the identity conflicts are correlated between each other. Tab (N.4) and tab (N.5) in both Golan Heights and Carmel, except for the case of the Syrian & Israeli conflict, this conflict is correlated with none of the other conflicts. Because it is purely a conflict between national identities, the individual had to choose between the two identities and could not choose both of them at the same time for a conflict zone reason.

Regarding the correlations between the social identities conflict with social identifications categories, in the Golan and in the Carmel there is "risky" category that increases the identity conflict:


2. Golan: the "Israeli" identification increase the conflict between the Druze & Arab conflict.

This data confirms our initial hypothesis that the conflict zone has a significant effect on the identification categories. An individual who lives in a conflict zone finds difficult to identify himself to both sides of the conflict although he might share cultures, languages and lands.

The second part of this research was conducted to better understand the influence of the identity conflict on the individual’s psychological well-being and psycho-social aspects. Sense of
optimism is one important aspect that is affected by the social identity conflict. We found that sense of optimism decreases with identity conflict. Tab (N. 10) shows that the individual who lives in the Golan and with a high conflict between the Syrian & Golan identity has significantly less sense of optimism. In the case of the Carmel citizen tab (N.9), the identification as "Arab" or/and "Israeli" decreases the sense of optimism. In both cases the social identification is correlated with optimism.

The qualitative part of this thesis supports the quantitative result about the highest level of sense of optimism in the Golan; Subject (D) explains: "Look, if you want to see the future, this scenario is very complicated. What really hinders you is a set of intellectual, political, dogmatic, emotional laws. Here, there is a historical truth that I'm against the State of Israel in every way. We don't look for a prosperous future here in Golan Heights. My future, as I can see it, is under the auspices of a Syrian-Arab regime. According to the situation in Syria, there is tyranny and a rebellious and revolutionary people. So, we have hope, after 46 years where our land was occupied, to build a new Syria under a new democratic, diverse regime that elects a leader fighting for a patriotic policy and a moral project. We believe, more than any time in history, about the possibility to regain the Golan Heights. I think that the return of such a regime is through peace negotiations with the State of Israel. Then, Golan Heights will return to Syria. This is what I can feel but I don't sense any other future for the region, residents, and identity. This is the only way to see the things, I am realistic and optimistic".

Collective self-esteem is also affected by the identity conflict, for high level of social identification increases the positive self-esteem. On the contrary, high level of social identity conflict increases the negative self-esteem.

Tab (N.12) shows that the Carmel citizens with a high level of "Druze" identification possess a high level of positive collective self-esteem. Individuals with a high conflict between Druze Israeli
Conflict and Israeli & Druze Identity have a negative collective self-esteem. The Druze identity is a positive factor in the self-conception of the in-group. In the Golan, only the Israeli identity has a negative impact on the positive collective self-esteem. The other identities increase the positive self-conception.

We give a focus on the sense of guilt and shame emotions in case violence occurs within or outside the group. The results are interesting; we found a correlation between the social identity and shame/guilt emotions when the individual is a victim from the Carmel. In other words, the Carmel citizen who considers himself as Arab feels more guilt and shame when an Israeli attacks an Arab. The Carmel citizen who considers himself as Israeli feels more guilt and shame when Arabs attack Israelis.

In the Golan, we noticed that there is no correlation between the shame/guilt and social identity conflict when an Israeli attacks an Arab. But, on the other hand, we found positive correlations between the social identity conflict and shame/guilt emotions when Arabs attack Israelis.

The social identification has different impacts on the guilt and shame emotions in acts of violence. The complexity of the Druze society is proved by these correlations but it is more difficult to indicate the specific correlations between the identities.
Chapter 5

5. References


CNN, By Laura Smith-Spark and John Vause, February 25, 2015.


Chapter 6

6. Appendixes

6.1 Qualitative subjects details:

Interviewee A:

Name: Sameh
Age: 68
Gender: man
Place of Birth: Carmel
Occupation: Journalist
Family: married + 6 (7 Grandchildren)
Religion: Religious Druze "Sheikh"
Military: served 3 years in the IDF/ Participated in the war of 1967 Education: B.A in linguistics, M.A in Hebrew language from the Hebrew University.
Political views: no preference and does not have any views.

Note: Sameh considers himself as a Druze, an Arab and an Israeli. He has dedicated his life to write and promote the Druze culture. He fears from the mix between the Druze society and other societies, specifically the modern society.

Interviewee B:

Name: Abu Alaa'
Age: 60
Gender: man
Place of Birth: Golan Heights
Occupation: Public Relations (was a farmer)

Family: married + 4 children

Religion: considers himself a Muslim first, then Druze.

Military: Did not serve.

Education: High School degree

Political Views: "against the regime in Syria and Israel"

Note: Abu Alaa' consider himself as a Muslim Druze; he was imprisoned in Israeli jails for 10 years. He now works in a peace NGO against the Assad regime in Syria.

Interviewee C:

Name: Ayman

Age: 46

Gender: man

Place of birth: Golan Heights

Occupation: Journalist

Family: married + 3 children

Religion: Druze

Military: did not serve

Education: High School Degree.

Political views: "Against the occupation."

Note: Ayman said that he was born during the War of 1967, and he always connects himself with the war. He was imprisoned in the Israeli jails, and now he has a news website for the Golan Heights.
Interviewee D:
Name: Noor
Age: 56
Place of Birth: Golan Heights.
Occupation: Teacher
Family: Married + 3 children
Gender: man
Religion: Religious Druze "Sheikh"
Military: Did not serve.
Education: B.A in Education and M.A Special Education from Haifa University.
Political views: No opinion

Note: Noor considers himself as a Druze, an Arab, and a Syrian. He has taught a lot, and he believes that the Druze religion could be useful in education, and it can be in harmony with science. They have to choose between "being special" or "being included".

Interviewee E:
Name: Bassima
Age: 38
Place of Birth: Carmel mount
Occupation: Teacher
Family: Married + 2 children
Gender: women
Religion: Druze
Military: Did not serve.
Education: B.A in Education and M.A communication from Oranim University.

Political views: No opinion

Note: she is very confused in her identity. she says that she suffers a lot because she is a women in an Arab sociaty and she has to resolve two problems - firstly the identity crisis and secondly the social gender limits.

Interviewee F:

Name: Alli
Age: 30
Place of Birth: Carmel mount
Occupation: business man
Family: Married + 1 children
Gender: man
Religion: Druze
Military: 3 years
Education: Engineer diploma from Haifa University.
Political views: No opinion

Note: he consider himself as Israeli Druze, not Arab. He thinks that if you are an Arab so you are an enemy of Israel. Works in a peace NGO against the Assad regime in Syria.

Interviewee G:

Name: Emman
Place of Birth: Carmel mount
Occupation: Teacher
Family: Married + 2 children
Gender: women
Religion: Druze
Military: Did not serve.
Education: B.A in Education and M.A resource management
Political views: No opinion

Note: she said that the Druze are very lost and confused, they cannot find themselves in the Israeli society.

Interviewee H:
Name: Faddel
Age: 67
Place of Birth: Carmel mount
Occupation: professor
Family: Married + 4 children
Gender: man
Religion: Religious Druze "Sheikh"
Military: Did not serve.
Education: PHD in biology from Haifa University.
Political views: No opinion

Note: he said that the Druze are Muslims, they have survived and adapted themselves for many years to different regimes. The Druze have to live only as Israelis.
Interviewee I
Name: Golan
Age: 38
Place of Birth: Golan Heights.
Occupation: Medical
Family: single
Gender: man
Religion: Druze
Military: Did not serve.
Education: M.B.A from Damascus University

Interviewee J:
Name: Monya
Age: 36
Place of Birth: Carmel
Occupation: teacher
Family: married + 2 children
Gender: women
Religion: Druze
Military: Did not serve.
Education: B.A in special education from Haifa University

Note: she said that women in the Druze society are oppressed and live in ongoing changing mentalities
Interviewee K:
Name: Arren
Age: 22
Place of Birth: Golan Heights.
Occupation: student
Family: single
Gender: women
Religion: Druze
Military: Did not serve.
Education: studying in Haifa University

Note: she can understand the young Golan Druze who identify themselves as non Syrian.

Interviewee L:
Name: Jaber
Age: 23
Place of Birth: Golan Heights.
Occupation: student
Family: single
Gender: Man
Religion: Druze
Military: Did not serve.
Education: studying in Haifa University

Note: He said: "it is very hard to see your homeland with your eyes but you cannot touch it in your hand"
6.2 Qualitative main items and sub items

The main topics in the Golan:

- Topic A 1: The discontinuation with Syria
- Topic A 2: Historical aspects of the Golan
- Topic A 3: Arab Spring

The main topics in the Carmel:

- Topic B 1: Collaboration with the Israeli army
- Topic B 2: Historical aspects of the Carmel

The main shared topics:

- Topic C 1: Clinging to the land
- Topic C 2: Identity Conflict
- Topic C 3: Women’s place
- Topic C 4: Cultural invasion
- Topic C 5: Future

The main sub topics of the qualitative part are:

Item A: (Golan Druze)
The discontinuation with Syria:

1. Loss of identity.
2. Lack the Syrian tradition and culture.
4. Curiosity and looking forward to visiting Syria.

Item B: (Israeli Druze)

Collaboration with Israeli army:

1. Military service law
2. Feeling inferiority

Item C: Clinging to the land:

1. Keeping the identity
2. Religious obligations \ rule
3. Security

Item D: Historical aspects:

1. Israeli occupation
2. Golan annexation law
3. Refusing the Israeli citizenship
4. Independents of Israel 1948
5. Persecution of the Druze by the Muslims
6. Military Service law
7. Druze Education system
Item E: The segmentation of the society

1. Difference between the generations
2. Pro or against the Assad regime
3. Social identity
4. The Arab spring
5. Difference between genders
6. Difference between religious and secular

Item F: Feelings:

1. Optimisms
2. Pessimism
3. Confusing
4. Anxiety
5. Fatigue
6. Unknowing the future
7. Minority
8. Confusing
9. Law self-stem
10. Secure\ safety
11. Individualism

Item G: Social identity

1. Social deprivation
2. Loss identity
3. Multiple belongings
4. Islam\Druze
5. Conflict
6. Losing prospective
7. Ongoing changing identity
8. Arabic tradition

Item H: The Druze policy
1. Loyalty to the state
2. Lack of leadership
3. Racism and fanaticism

Item I: Relationship with the Arabs:
1. Negative view
2. Sense of treason
3. Disregarding of the Palestine identity

Item J: Women position:
1. Law position
2. Conflict between the tradition and modernism
3. Identity conflict
4. Liberty vs. oppression
Item K: Future:

1. Lack of the Druze culture
2. Assimilation
3. Loss identity
4. Pessimism

Item L: The relationship with Israel:

1. Feeling confusion (democracy X racism)
2. Enemy state
3. Secure state
4. Druze Education system
5. Military service
6. Employment
7. Discrimination and racism
8. Losing rights
9. Assimilation
6.3 Questionnaires and scales

Age…………………………..
Gender………………………..
Education:……………………

Bicultural identity scale

In front of you are some sentences. Please indicate to what extent you agree with what it says referring to your Israeli and Arab identity.

**Israeli ---> Arab**

1. I feel there is a conflict, in my basic approach to life as an Israeli and my approach to life as an Arab

   5  4  3  2  1

2. Easy for me to step between being an Arab and being Israeli (R)

   5  4  3  2  1

3. Being an Israeli Arab creates me a feeling of inner conflict

   5  4  3  2  1

4. I feel as moving back and forth between my identity as an Israeli, and my identity as an Arab

   5  4  3  2  1

5. I feel caught between my identity as an Arab and my identity as an Israeli

   5  4  3  2  1

6. Being an Israeli Arab means my attraction to two different directions at once.

   5  4  3  2  1

7. I am an Arab and an Israeli at once.
8. Easy for me to feel an Israeli Arab (R)

9. I feel there is a conflict between being Israeli and Being Arab

10. There is no tension between my Israeli identity and my Arab identity (R)

11. Being Israeli and Being Arab are identities that do not fit together and are not in harmony

12. I feel the need to choose according to which identity I should act like, my identity as an Arab or as an Israeli.

13. My Israeli identity and my Arab identity are combined to produce one complete identity (R)

14. Easy for me to find the right balance between my Israeli identity an my Arab identity (R)

15. I feel that being an Israeli Arab complete one another. (R)

---

**Israeli – Druze**

16. I feel there is a conflict, in my basic approach to life as an Israeli and my approach to life as an Druze
17. Easy for me to step between being an Druze and being Israeli
5  4  3  2  1

18. Being an Israeli Druze creates me a feeling of inner conflict
5  4  3  2  1

19. I feel as moving back and forth between my identity as an Israeli, and my identity as an Druze
5  4  3  2  1

20. I feel caught between my identity as an Druze and my identity as an Israeli
5  4  3  2  1

21. Being an Israeli Druze means my attraction to two different directions at once.
5  4  3  2  1

22. I am an Druze and an Israeli at once.
5  4  3  2  1

23. Easy for me to feel an Israeli Druze
5  4  3  2

24. I feel there is a conflict between being Israeli and Being Druze
5  4  3  2  1

25. There is no tension between my Israeli identity and my Arab identity
5  4  3  2  1

26. Being Israeli and Being Druze are identities that do not fit together and are not in harmony
5  4  3  2  1

27. I feel the need to choose according to which identity I should act like, my identity as an Druze or as an Israeli.
5  4  3  2  1

28. My Israeli identity and my Druze identity are combined to produce one complete identity
5  4  3  2  1

29. Easy for me to find the right balance between my Israeli identity an my Druze identity
30. I feel that being an Israeli Druze complete one another.

31. I feel there is a conflict, in my basic approach to life as a Druze and my approach to life as an Arab

32. Easy for me to step between being an Arab and being Druze

33. Being an Druze Arab creates me a feeling of inner conflict

34. I feel as moving back and forth between my identity as a Druze, and my identity as an Arab

35. I feel caught between my identity as an Arab and my identity as a Druze

36. Being a Druze Arab means my attraction to two different directions at once.

37. I am an Arab and a Druze at once.

38. Easy for me to feel an Druze Arab

39. I feel there is a conflict between being Druze and Being Arab

Druze – Arab
40. There is no tension between my Druze identity and my Arab identity

41. Being Druze and Being Arab are identities that do not fit together and are not in harmony

42. I feel the need to choose according to which identity I should act like, my identity as an Arab or as a Druze.

43. My Druze identity and my Arab identity are combined to produce one complete identity

44. Easy for me to find the right balance between my Druze identity and my Arab identity

45. I feel that being a Druze Arab complete one another.

Identification scale

In front of you are some sentences. Please indicate to what extent you agree with them

**Arabic**

46. I feel emotional closeness to this group

47. The fact that I belong to this group is an important part of my identity
48. I am pleased to contribute to this

5  4  3  2  1

49. It is important to me to see myself as a member of this group

5  4  3  2  1

50. I feel a great commitment to this group.

5  4  3  2  1

51. I like act for this group

5  4  3  2  1

52. When I talk about the group members I usually say "we" and not "them".

5  4  3  2  1

Druze

I feel emotional closeness to this group

5  4  3  2  1

53. The fact that I belong to this group is an important part of my identity

5  4  3  2  1

54. I am pleased to contribute to this

5  4  3  2  1

55. It is important to me to see myself as a member of this group

5  4  3  2  1

56. I feel a great commitment to this group.

5  4  3  2  1

57. I like act for this group

5  4  3  2  1

58. When I talk about the group members I usually say "we" and not "them".
Israel

59. I feel emotional closeness to this group

5 4 3 2 1

60. The fact that I belong to this group is an important part of my identity

5 4 3 2 1

61. I am pleased to contribute to this

5 4 3 2 1

62. It is important to me to see myself as a member of this group

5 4 3 2 1

63. I feel a great commitment to this group.

5 4 3 2 1

64. I like act for this group

5 4 3 2 1

65. When I talk about the group members I usually say "we" and not "them".

5 4 3 2 1

******************************************************************

Optimism scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Not at all true</th>
<th>Al little true</th>
<th>Somewhat true</th>
<th>Largely true</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>66. I expect the best</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
67. Things are likely to go wrong for me. (R) | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4
68. I am optimistic about the future | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4
69. I don’t expect things to go my way. (R) | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4
70. I don’t count on good things to happen to me. (R) | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4
71. Overall, I expect more good things to happen to me than bad. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4

Self Social esteem

72. I am worthy member of the social groups I belong to. Membership (M)  
   5  4  3  2  1
73. I feel I don’t have much to offer to the social groups I belong to. (M) (R)  
   5  4  3  2  1
74. I am a cooperative participant in the social groups I belong to.  
   5  4  3  2  1
75. I often feel I’m a useless member of my social groups.  
   5  4  3  2  1
76. I often regret that I belong to some of the social groups I do.


5 4 3 2 1

77. In general, I’m glad to be a member of the social groups I belong to.


5 4 3 2 1

78. Overall, I often feel that the social groups of which I am a member are not worthwhile.


5 4 3 2 1

79. I feel good about the social groups I belong to.


5 4 3 2 1

80. Overall, my social groups are considered good by others.


5 4 3 2 1

81. Most people consider my social groups, on the average, to more ineffective than other social groups.


5 4 3 2 1

82. In general, others respect the social groups that I am a member of.


5 4 3 2 1

83. In general, others think that the social groups I am a member of are unworthy.


5 4 3 2 1

84. Overall, my group memberships have very little to do with how I feel about myself.


5 4 3 2 1

85. The social groups I belong to are an important reflections of who I am.


5 4 3 2 1

86. The social groups I belong to are unimportant to my sense of what kind of a person I am.


5 4 3 2 1

87. In general, belonging to social groups is an important part of my self-image.


5 4 3 2 1
Social distance

Please answer the following questions:

88. How many Israeli civilians do know personally?
   None   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   a lot

89. How many Israeli civilians do you get to meet on a daily basic?
   None   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   a lot

90. In what frequency do you interact with Israeli civilians on a daily basic?
   None   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   a lot

91. In your ordinary life how much contact do you have with Jewish Israeli civilians?
   None   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   a lot

in the chance that you had face to face interaction with Jewish Israeli civilians, how would you evaluate it according to the following Parameters?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>profound</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>92. Superficiality</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93. Superficiality</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>forced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94. Intimate</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Remote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95. Competitive</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>mutual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>96. Pleasant</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>unpleasant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Shame and guilty

Please note in What degree you felt each one of the following feelings in the past few weeks, whereas (1) means “I felt it greatly” and (5) means “didn’t feel it at all.”

<p>| | | | | | |</p>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>97.</td>
<td>Fury</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>98.</td>
<td>Joy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>99.</td>
<td>Guilt</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100.</td>
<td>Comprehension</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101.</td>
<td>Sadness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102.</td>
<td>Hatred</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>103.</td>
<td>Fear</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>104.</td>
<td>Pride</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>105.</td>
<td>humiliation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>106.</td>
<td>Embarrassment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>107.</td>
<td>Indifference</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>108.</td>
<td>Empathy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>109.</td>
<td>Anger</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110.</td>
<td>Ambivalence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>111.</td>
<td>Disgrace</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>112.</td>
<td>Pity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>113.</td>
<td>Vexation</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
114. Tranquility  
115. shame  
116. Regret  

<p>| | | | | | |</p>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

***************************************************************

Social distance

Please rate your level of Approval with the following Sentence according to the scale demonstrated below:

<p>| | | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Agree to a very small extent</td>
<td>Slightly agree</td>
<td>Agree moderately</td>
<td>Quite agree</td>
<td>agree To a large extent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

117. I feel a great deal of Satisfaction when I think about Arabs civilians’ Treatment towards Israeli civilians.

118. I feel ashamed about some of the Arabs Racist tendencies Towards Israeli

119. I feel ashamed when I think about the behavior of some Arabs against Israeli.

120. I feel guilty when I think about how we Arabs contribute to the suffering of Israeli.

119
121. The image of the Arab in the world became more negative due to their treatment of Israeli

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

122. I feel shame when I discover that some of the Arabs are violent in their nature.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

123. I feel bad because the treatment of the Israeli created a negative image of Arabs in the eyes of the world

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

124. I feel that the Arabs are guilty regarding the treatment Israeli get.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

125. I am ashamed of the damage caused to Israeli by the Arabs.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

126. I can easily feel guilty about the suffering caused by the Arabs to Israeli.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

127. The thought of the attitude of the Arabs to Israeli makes me feel guilty

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

128. I feel pride regarding the conduct of Arabs regarding the Israeli conflict.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

129. The condition of the Jewish citizens of Israel shows that the state has much to be proud of.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

130. Although I was not personally involved in negative treatment to Israeli, I feel bad when I find out that other Arabs were involved.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

131. Israeli are responsible for their situation and not the Arabs

1 2 3 4 5 6 7
132. I feel guilty about what we Arabs do to Israeli.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

133. The thought of the condition of the Israeli makes me feel satisfaction.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

134. I feel regret for actions of some of the Arabs against Israeli.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7