

37 can lead the way by investing in prominent technological solutions aligning action in
38 key areas, including industrial policy, while ensuring social fairness.

39 This engagement requires a significant cooperative effort within which different geo-
40 political areas must cooperate and gain mutual benefits. The worsening of the energy
41 crisis following the pandemic period has highlighted the European difficulties in man-
42 aging the transition path to decarbonization goals in terms of the security of the supply
43 of natural gas, which is the energy source with the lowest environmental impact among
44 fossil fuels and is needed to govern the transition process.

45 This new energy scenario, unanticipated when the decarbonization goals were launched
46 with the "Fit for 55" package, has clarified that the energy transition path to 2030 cannot
47 be achieved unless decarbonization goals are rethought with energy security goals.
48 However, geopolitical tensions and growing global energy demand are causing a new
49 concept of energy security to emerge (Lambert et al., 2022). This is a broader concept
50 in which the supply of the least environmentally impactful fossil energy source, natural
51 gas, must be integrated with a concept of security extended to the availability and control
52 of the technology chains that will enable the replacement of fossil sources in energy
53 production.

54 European decarbonization goals can be realized if Europe can promote this technolog-
55 ical change while ensuring the centrality of economic development and international
56 cooperation goals.

57 The issue of industrial development in the area of new technologies for energy produc-
58 tion is central both to the European continent and to accelerating the industrialization
59 process of Mediterranean countries while avoiding risks of industrial relocation to other
60 regions.

61 **2 Background**

62
63 The identification of a common development goal is crucial for geopolitical coopera-
64 tion
65 (Kraemer-Mbula, Vaitas, & Essegbey, 2018). Through inclusive models of peer-to-
66 peer industrial development cooperation, it will be possible to promote the progressive
67 accession of neighboring areas by sharing and promoting synergies on the level of re-
68 search and innovation within developing an integrated market area of green technolo-
69 gies.

70 The RePowerEU measure also identifies two main directions among the measures to
71 escape the deepening gas crisis: a strategy to further increase renewable production
72 targets and energy efficiency targets for consumption processes and a strategy of geo-
73 political diversification of natural gas supply routes (Osička, & Černoch, 2022).

74 These lines of intervention, to be effective, must not be reduced to the role of emergency
75 and temporary responses but can and must represent the start of a process of inclusive
76 cooperation among all countries that share the objectives of environmental sustainabil-
77 ity and can mutually seize the opportunities for economic development arising from a
78 policy for the energy transition. The Mediterranean area presents all the strategic

79 elements to start a path of cooperation of the European continent with African and Mid-
80 dle Eastern countries that share the geopolitical perimeter.
81 Regarding natural gas availability, the Mediterranean area has a potential for natural
82 gas availability that places the area eighth in deposits of proven natural gas reserves
83 globally.
84 The Mediterranean area represents an even more important reservoir for the potential
85 production of renewable sources and green hydrogen, a key energy vector for decar-
86 bonizing industrial processes, mainly green hydrogen. Natural gas and hydrogen repre-
87 sent the two basic energy factors for building an energy transition strategy (Mukelabai,
88 Wijayantha, & Blanchard, 2022). In the short term, the availability of natural gas at
89 competitive costs enables the resilience of industrial production in the countries that
90 share the Mediterranean perimeter and could also ensure the affordability of one of the
91 key factors for industrial reshoring of some energy-intensive production (gas and elec-
92 tricity). The analysis aims to assess the economic effects in terms of a development
93 driver of an integrated area that contains the potential to ensure security and affordabil-
94 ity with respect to gas. Moreover, contextually, it intends to consider how, on the co-
95 operative level, this competitive advantage can trigger a cooperative pathway in terms
96 of industrial development of new green technologies—in other words, identifying how
97 the development of cooperation dictated by an emergency contingency can be trans-
98 formed into an opportunity for cooperation and development and leadership in the con-
99 trol of strategic supply chains for producing renewable energy, hydrogen and energy
100 conservation.


101 **3 Expected results**

102
103 With this article, we aim to explore the factors that have led to the relocation of pro-
104 duction of key green economy technologies to the Far East in recent years to understand
105 what the strategies and benefits of relocation may be.
106 These factors include the high cost of the energy component in European production
107 costs, labor costs, availability of raw materials, and strong economies of scale in tech-
108 nologically advanced production. By comparing the determinants of these factors
109 within a new potential market constituted by the Mediterranean basin, we believe that
110 it is also possible to look at the important investment program promoted by the Euro-
111 pean Commission from a different perspective.
112 In this regard, it is important to guarantee the healthy functioning of the market by
113 promoting fair competition in energy and environmental industries (Di Foggia & Bec-
114 carello, 2021). The analysis aims to verify the potential of the Mediterranean perimeter
115 both in terms of energy costs resulting from shared exploitation of Mediterranean re-
116 sources through an integrated optimization of resources. Of gas first of all but also of
117 renewable energy production potential. Second, the analysis intends to verify whether
118 the labor cost is still a hindering factor in initiating policies of reshoring the production
119 of green technologies. From this perspective, integrated cooperation between the Euro-
120 pean and Mediterranean countries makes it possible to integrate a relevant and stable

121 demand in relation to EU decarbonization goals, substantial funds for R&D and com-
 122 petitive labor costs. These are all factors that could prove successful within an inclusive
 123 cooperation agreement based on the objectives of sustainability, energy security and
 124 affordability, and the development of production capacity with reference to strategic
 125 green economy supply chains.

126 According to the International Energy Agency, the hydrogen costs and supply from
 127 dedicated hybrid solar PV and onshore wind in Africa within 200 km of a serviceable
 128 coast are expected to grow significantly, as reported in Figure 1.


130 Figure 1. Hydrogen production potential and cost
 131



132 Source: IEA (2022)
 133

134 Building 1,230 GW of new photovoltaic installations could achieve an annual solar
 135 hydrogen production of approximately fifty million tons by 2035. In detail, the main
 136 investment opportunities in the Mediterranean are in three countries: Mauritania, Mo-
 137 rocco, and Egypt. In this regard, Figure 2 provides insights into potential demand by
 138 sector.

140 Figure 2. Global hydrogen demand forecasts by sector (Mt of hydrogen equivalent)
 141



142 Fonte: AGHA (2022).
 143

144
 145

146 According to a recent report (EIB, 2022), there are three requirements to enable the
147 production of 50 million tons of green hydrogen in Africa by 2035. First, there needs
148 to be planning, efficient national incentives to mobilize private sector investment. Sec-
149 ond, market-based partnerships are needed to enable the purchase and demand for green
150 hydrogen on a national and international scale and increase cooperation to design, fi-
151 nance, build, and operate green hydrogen production, storage, and distribution infra-
152 structure. What mentioned above also seems plausible due to the number of projects
153 currently in discussion or underway (Piebalgs, 2022). Clearly, for the benefits of such
154 projects to happen, it is important to find the right enablers in terms of the ease of doing
155 business and financial stability.
156

157 **4 Conclusion**

158 The European Union intends to build partnerships to produce energy that are mutu-
159 ally beneficial by aiming to pro-mote renewable energy and cooperate on green tech-
160 nologies and innovation. We underline the fact that it is necessary to intensify the south-
161 ern gas transport corridor and enhance political agreements among Mediterranean
162 countries. The shift to an economy less dependent on fossil energy offers significant
163 opportunities beyond the issue of security and energy supply. Indeed, the new European
164 decarbonization goals to rapidly advance the green transition pave the way for a new
165 perspective in geostrategic cooperation in the Mediterranean. For the Mediterranean,
166 geostrategic cooperation could combine economic development and renewable energy
167 production. We provide an early-stage appraisal of the energy potential of Mediterra-
168 nean countries for renewable energy production to engage in more sustainable energy
169 strategies, policies, and systems and possible synergies to combine energy and environ-
170 mental policies.
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