We prove that for generic plurality games with positive cost of voting, the number of Nash equilibria is finite. Furthermore all the equilibria are regular, hence stable sets as singletons.
De Sinopoli, F., Iannantuoni, G. (2005). On the generic strategic stability of Nash equilibria if voting is costly. ECONOMIC THEORY, 25(2), 477-486 [10.1007/s00199-003-0441-9].
On the generic strategic stability of Nash equilibria if voting is costly
IANNANTUONI, GIOVANNA
2005
Abstract
We prove that for generic plurality games with positive cost of voting, the number of Nash equilibria is finite. Furthermore all the equilibria are regular, hence stable sets as singletons.
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