For strategic communication games à la Crawford and Sobel (Econometrica 50:1431-1451, 1982) the paper shows that under some prior beliefs different equilibrium partitions of the state space can have equal cardinality. Hence, there can be different equilibrium action profiles with the same size. © 2012 Springer Science+Business Media New York.
Valsecchi, I. (2013). Non-uniqueness of equilbrium action profiles with equal size in one-shot cheap-talk games. THEORY AND DECISION, 74(1), 31-53 [10.1007/s11238-012-9326-3].
Non-uniqueness of equilbrium action profiles with equal size in one-shot cheap-talk games
VALSECCHI, IRENE ARMIDA
2013
Abstract
For strategic communication games à la Crawford and Sobel (Econometrica 50:1431-1451, 1982) the paper shows that under some prior beliefs different equilibrium partitions of the state space can have equal cardinality. Hence, there can be different equilibrium action profiles with the same size. © 2012 Springer Science+Business Media New York.
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