In this paper we propose a model in which there are ideological and strategic voters who vote under proportional rule. We prove that the behavior of ideological voters matters for the determination of the outcome. We show that a subset of strategic voters partially counteracts the votes of the ideological voters.

De Sinopoli, F., Ferraris, L., & Iannantuoni, G. (2011). On the Effect of Ideology in Proportional Representation Systems. MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES, 62(2), 87-90 [10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.05.001].

On the Effect of Ideology in Proportional Representation Systems

Ferraris, L
;
Iannantuoni, G
2011

Abstract

In this paper we propose a model in which there are ideological and strategic voters who vote under proportional rule. We prove that the behavior of ideological voters matters for the determination of the outcome. We show that a subset of strategic voters partially counteracts the votes of the ideological voters.
No
Articolo in rivista - Articolo scientifico
Scientifica
Voting
English
87
90
4
De Sinopoli, F., Ferraris, L., & Iannantuoni, G. (2011). On the Effect of Ideology in Proportional Representation Systems. MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES, 62(2), 87-90 [10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.05.001].
De Sinopoli, F; Ferraris, L; Iannantuoni, G
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/10281/311162
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