This paper focuses on social dilemma games in which players may or may not meet the same partner again in the future. A novel prisoner's dilemma experiment, a meta-analysis of public goods experiments, and a meta-analysis of previous prisoner's dilemma experiments document high cooperation rates if the likelihood to meet the same partner again in the future is high.

Ghidoni, R., Cleave, B., Suetens, S. (2019). Perfect and imperfect strangers in social dilemmas. EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 116, 148-159 [10.1016/j.euroecorev.2019.04.002].

Perfect and imperfect strangers in social dilemmas

Ghidoni, R
Primo
;
2019

Abstract

This paper focuses on social dilemma games in which players may or may not meet the same partner again in the future. A novel prisoner's dilemma experiment, a meta-analysis of public goods experiments, and a meta-analysis of previous prisoner's dilemma experiments document high cooperation rates if the likelihood to meet the same partner again in the future is high.
Articolo in rivista - Articolo scientifico
cooperation, contagion, matching protocol, laboratory experiment, meta-study
English
lug-2019
2019
116
148
159
reserved
Ghidoni, R., Cleave, B., Suetens, S. (2019). Perfect and imperfect strangers in social dilemmas. EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 116, 148-159 [10.1016/j.euroecorev.2019.04.002].
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/10281/226639
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