The term model in philosophy of biology points at a number of non-coincident concepts. Such a multiplicity - I argue - can hinder debates, especially those in which multiple, heterogeneous elements are eligible as models. I argue that the goal of defining shared and uniform criteria for the identification of models in biology seems not achievable, and thus suggest a pragmatic approach: I propose the choice of model concept to be shared, contextual and functional to the single discussion in philosophy of biology; I also recommend as much clarity as possible about the local intended meaning of the term model. The model notion was brought “in centre stage” in philosophy of biology in the 1980s by authors (mainly Lloyd, Beatty, and Thompson) within the “semantic view of theories”. The concept of a model, strictly understood as meta-mathematical, was seen on the one hand as an improvement - relative to the logical empiricist “received view” (e.g. Suppe 1977) - for specifying the axiomatic structure of theories, on the other hand as a particularly appropriate description of the mathematical core of evolutionary biology. i.e. population genetics (e.g. Lloyd 1988), especially through the “state spaces” approach (Van Fraassen 1980). The semantic view and the model concept were also presented as resources for characterizing biology rightfully as a science, meeting some of its peculiarities such as the lack of “universal laws”. In the years that followed, the concept of model remained central in philosophical accounts of biology, but while the semantic view stood as an inclusive “big tent” (Godfrey-Smith 2006) the model concept diversified, drifting away from the primal logic-mathematical formulation (e.g. Downes 1992). Very soon, for instance, the variety of degrees of abstractions of models and the contextual nature of their relationships with the world were acknowledged (Giere 1988). Besides mathematical models, philosophers of biology began to consider and define other kinds of scientific models, like e.g. experimental laboratory systems or simulations, coming up to include among models even museum specimens and collections (Griesemer 1990). Recent works (Morgan & Morrison 1999) pointed out the heterogeneity of scientific models, the absence of general rules for their building, and their partial autonomy from both “world” and theories. Despite such a multiplication, the concept of model often appears in philosophical debates with insufficient specification, or without an agreement fitting with the discussed phenomena. As an instance, I conducted an analysis of the recent debate on “fitness landscapes” (Wright 1932) in evolutionary biology (e.g. Provine 1986; Ruse 1992; Skipper 2004; Kirkpatrick & Rousset 2005; Pigliucci & Kaplan 2006, 2008; Reiss 2007; Calcott 2008; Wilkins & Godfrey-Smith 2009). The analysis shows how diverging conceptions of model can confuse the debate, or prevent it from reaching issues by bending it towards general clarifications about models. Cases like this are particularly complex in that they offer different elements as potential candidates to the role of model (mathematical equations, diagrams with multiple interpretations, verbal descriptions, and more) and also potentially alternative terms like “theory” and “metaphor”. At present it is difficult to require, for the model category, universal criteria - whether they concern peculiar building strategies, particular relationships with world or theory, constitutional requirements or whatever else. It seems more promising to adopt a pragmatic approach (e.g. Plutynski 2004) that considers the scientific context to establish, case by case, “what counts as a model and how”. From such an approach stems a precautional request of clarification, agreement, and functionality of the meaning of model in debates in philosophy of biology

Serrelli, E. (2010). Models in philosophy of biology: a pragmatic approach. Intervento presentato a: Triennial Conference of SILFS, the Italian Society of Logics and Philosophy of Science, Bergamo.

Models in philosophy of biology: a pragmatic approach

SERRELLI, EMANUELE
2010

Abstract

The term model in philosophy of biology points at a number of non-coincident concepts. Such a multiplicity - I argue - can hinder debates, especially those in which multiple, heterogeneous elements are eligible as models. I argue that the goal of defining shared and uniform criteria for the identification of models in biology seems not achievable, and thus suggest a pragmatic approach: I propose the choice of model concept to be shared, contextual and functional to the single discussion in philosophy of biology; I also recommend as much clarity as possible about the local intended meaning of the term model. The model notion was brought “in centre stage” in philosophy of biology in the 1980s by authors (mainly Lloyd, Beatty, and Thompson) within the “semantic view of theories”. The concept of a model, strictly understood as meta-mathematical, was seen on the one hand as an improvement - relative to the logical empiricist “received view” (e.g. Suppe 1977) - for specifying the axiomatic structure of theories, on the other hand as a particularly appropriate description of the mathematical core of evolutionary biology. i.e. population genetics (e.g. Lloyd 1988), especially through the “state spaces” approach (Van Fraassen 1980). The semantic view and the model concept were also presented as resources for characterizing biology rightfully as a science, meeting some of its peculiarities such as the lack of “universal laws”. In the years that followed, the concept of model remained central in philosophical accounts of biology, but while the semantic view stood as an inclusive “big tent” (Godfrey-Smith 2006) the model concept diversified, drifting away from the primal logic-mathematical formulation (e.g. Downes 1992). Very soon, for instance, the variety of degrees of abstractions of models and the contextual nature of their relationships with the world were acknowledged (Giere 1988). Besides mathematical models, philosophers of biology began to consider and define other kinds of scientific models, like e.g. experimental laboratory systems or simulations, coming up to include among models even museum specimens and collections (Griesemer 1990). Recent works (Morgan & Morrison 1999) pointed out the heterogeneity of scientific models, the absence of general rules for their building, and their partial autonomy from both “world” and theories. Despite such a multiplication, the concept of model often appears in philosophical debates with insufficient specification, or without an agreement fitting with the discussed phenomena. As an instance, I conducted an analysis of the recent debate on “fitness landscapes” (Wright 1932) in evolutionary biology (e.g. Provine 1986; Ruse 1992; Skipper 2004; Kirkpatrick & Rousset 2005; Pigliucci & Kaplan 2006, 2008; Reiss 2007; Calcott 2008; Wilkins & Godfrey-Smith 2009). The analysis shows how diverging conceptions of model can confuse the debate, or prevent it from reaching issues by bending it towards general clarifications about models. Cases like this are particularly complex in that they offer different elements as potential candidates to the role of model (mathematical equations, diagrams with multiple interpretations, verbal descriptions, and more) and also potentially alternative terms like “theory” and “metaphor”. At present it is difficult to require, for the model category, universal criteria - whether they concern peculiar building strategies, particular relationships with world or theory, constitutional requirements or whatever else. It seems more promising to adopt a pragmatic approach (e.g. Plutynski 2004) that considers the scientific context to establish, case by case, “what counts as a model and how”. From such an approach stems a precautional request of clarification, agreement, and functionality of the meaning of model in debates in philosophy of biology
paper
Philosophy of science, models, modeling, evolution, population genetics
English
Triennial Conference of SILFS, the Italian Society of Logics and Philosophy of Science
2010
2010
open
Serrelli, E. (2010). Models in philosophy of biology: a pragmatic approach. Intervento presentato a: Triennial Conference of SILFS, the Italian Society of Logics and Philosophy of Science, Bergamo.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/10281/22163
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