In this paper, we study the principal-agent problem. It is well known that in continuous-time, it is possible to prove the existence of an equilibrium (u*,S*) in a considerably general setting, and however little is known about the strategies themselves. Our goal is to present a universal way to construct these strategies as limiting strategies of a very simple type. © 2012 Springer-Verlag.
Raimondo, R., Mirrlees, J. (2013). Strategies in the principal-agent model. ECONOMIC THEORY, 53(3), 605-656 [10.1007/s00199-012-0706-2].
Strategies in the principal-agent model
RAIMONDO, ROBERTO;
2013
Abstract
In this paper, we study the principal-agent problem. It is well known that in continuous-time, it is possible to prove the existence of an equilibrium (u*,S*) in a considerably general setting, and however little is known about the strategies themselves. Our goal is to present a universal way to construct these strategies as limiting strategies of a very simple type. © 2012 Springer-Verlag.
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